

Interagency Operation in question: notes about the MD33-M-12 manual (2017)


Operações Interagências em questão: notas sobre o manual MD33-M-12 (2017)

Abstract: Starting from a qualitative approach and using literature review and document analysis as a source for data collection, this article analyzes the 2nd edition of the manual for interagency operations, edited by the Brazilian Ministry of Defense in 2017, shortly after the major sporting events held in the country, when there was a possibility that the publication would incorporate the main teachings of the interagency work carried out in the period. This analysis made it possible to identify that this possibility was not confirmed, since the 2017 version is quite similar to the manual edited in 2012, including only minor changes in form, without showing noticeable evolution in doctrinal terms, with a planning methodology similar to that adopted by the Armed Forces. We identified a lack of a planning methodology specific to interagency operations, which imposes limits on the participation of agencies in the process, a leading role centered on the Armed Forces' performance in detriment of the participation of other agencies, and a military culture that makes it difficult for all agencies to participate in the planning stages. We argue that it is possible to use a more flexible and adaptive methodology on a larger scale in this type of operation carried out by other State agencies.


Keywords: interagency operations; interagency doctrine; planning methodology; ministry of defense; armed forces.

Resumo: Partindo de uma abordagem qualitativa e utilizando a revisão de literatura e a análise documental para coleta de dados e de fontes, este artigo analisa a segunda edição do manual *Operações Interagências*, MD33-M-12, editado pelo Ministério da Defesa brasileiro, em 2017, logo após os grandes eventos esportivos realizados no país, quando havia a possibilidade de que a publicação incorporasse os principais ensinamentos do trabalho interagências desenvolvido naquele período. Esta pesquisa identificou que essa possibilidade não se confirmou, pois a versão de 2017 é bastante similar ao manual editado em 2012, incluindo pequenas alterações formais, sem apresentar evolução perceptível em termos doutrinários, com uma metodologia de planejamento semelhante àquela adotada pelas Forças Armadas. Além disso, identificamos a falta de uma metodologia de planejamento própria das operações interagências, o que impõe limites à participação das agências no processo, um protagonismo centrado na atuação das Forças Armadas em detrimento da participação das demais agências e uma cultura militar que dificulta a inserção de todos os órgãos nas fases do planejamento. Argumentamos, portanto, que é possível a utilização de metodologia mais flexível e adaptativa no emprego, em larga escala, desse tipo de operação realizada pelas demais agências do Estado.

Palavras-chave: operações interagências; doutrina interagências; metodologia de planejamento; ministério da defesa; forças armadas.

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1 INTRODUCTION

When the Brazilian Ministry of Defense published the second edition of the manual for interagency operations, *MD33-M-12* (BRASIL, 2017), on August 30, 2017, there was a possibility that this review, originally edited in 2012 (BRASIL, 2012), would include some advances in methodological terms (BRASIL, 2016b)¹, which would allow interagency agreements that are more flexible and adaptable to various situations, including their use in operations in which the coordination is exercised by an agency other than the Armed Forces (FIGUEIREDO; MOREIRA; CAMINHA, 2023).

Given that in the four years prior to the publication of the manual (2013-2016), state agencies had undergone experiences that required a large investment in interagency operations to deal with the challenges of public security in the preparation and execution of these movements during major sporting events² held in the country (REVISTA DA ASSOCIAÇÃO NACIONAL DOS DELEGADOS DE POLÍCIA FEDERAL, 2017), which provided “a kind of laboratory, in which civil and military actors could interact, sharing experiences and better understanding other’s culture” (CABRAL, 2019, p. 43; our translation).

Additionally, the works developed both by interagency operators, such as Rosa (2015) and Cabral (2019), and by theorists, such as Araujo Neto (2017) and Vasconcelos (2018) have pointed toward the need to take advantage of the knowledge acquired when Brazil hosted the major sporting events, as well as to improve the doctrine for planning and executing operations of this nature. According to Rosa, when dealing with the lessons learned after the 2014 World Cup:

The Ministry of Defense acted effectively, with **opportunities for improvement in the field of doctrines**, behaviors, and procedures to be implemented. The coordination and purposes unit; the establishment and execution of a matrix of interagency responsibilities and protocols; **the development of Interagency doctrine**; and greater integration and complementarity in actions are the main opportunities for improvement in the Interagency environment. (ROSA, 2015, p. 48, our translation, emphasis added)

In the wake of this discussion, Araujo Neto addressed the doctrinal issue by signaling that:

There should be a reference doctrine, breadth in personnel training, rigorous training, and focused evaluation. In fact, the results of the evaluations should

1 In an interview with the Brazilian Air Force Portal, during the seminar on lessons learned at the Rio 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games, held in Brasilia in October 2016; Aviator Colonel Luiz Cláudio Magalhães Bastos, from the Special Advisory Service for Major Events (AEGE), from the Brazilian Ministry of Defense, stated that: “the consolidation of [seminar] work will generate a report, which will serve as a beacon for [the Armed Force’s] future actions” (BRASIL, 2016b, our addition).

2 According to Meurer and Lins (2016), sporting events that are considered major include: the 2007 Pan American Games; the 2013 Confederations Cup; the 2014 FIFA World Cup; and the 2016 Olympic Games.

feed back into the system for the refinement of the doctrine, repeating this cycle over time. (ARAUJO NETO, 2017, p. 36)

Advancing in this debate, Vasconcelos (2018) drew a comparative picture—in terms of interagency work—between the major events held in Brazil and the attack of September 11, 2001, in the United States of America (USA). For the author, in both cases it was necessary to create integrated systems in order to provide responses to threats to public safety.

Considering this contribution, we can infer that the Confederations Cup (2013) and the FIFA World Cup (2014), in addition to the Rio 2016 Olympic Games, could have done a little more, such as the attack on U.S. soil, to better ground the doctrinal-methodological framework in carrying out interagency operations in the country.

The theme is also discussed in the investigative work conducted by Cabral (2019), in which, when interviewing several interagency operators³ who worked in the Rio 2016 Olympic Games; he demonstrated that, despite all the effort undertaken, the learning obtained during the event ended up not being used in its entirety.

Nevertheless, the desire of theorists and interagency operators for the lessons learned in the period to be in fact incorporated into the doctrine, thus generating methodological improvement, were frustrated. This is because the publication of the new MD33-M-12 (BRASIL, 2017) included only minor changes in terms of form, without presenting perceptible evolution in doctrinal terms, being practically the same as the previous version (BRASIL, 2012), whose planning methodology was basically that adopted by the Navy, Army, and Air Force in their joint planning⁴.

It is within this context that this article's objective, which aims toward an analysis of the second edition of the manual for interagency operations (*Operações Interagênciais*, BRASIL, 2017), is configured, pointing out potential obstacles to its use in a more comprehensive way, especially when dealing with joint operations, that is, with the participation of other organs, in addition to the Armed Forces. With the help of this analysis, we argue that it is possible to use a more flexible and adaptive methodology in the large-scale use of interagency operations carried out by other agencies of the Brazilian State.

2 METHODOLOGY

Given the nature of its object, this article adopted a qualitative methodological approach. The production of data for the research occurs in two procedures: (1) literature review; and (2) document analysis. The literature review investments sought analyses that framed the phenomenon herein discussed in two distinct scales: national and international, seeking to synthesize productions about the existing theme. Inspired by the methodological

3 Cabral (2019) interviewed public agents who held positions of leadership or command in the planning of their respective security agency during the preparation and execution of the Rio 2016 Games.

4 The joint planning process is detailed in another Defense Ministry publication called *Joint Operations Doctrine*, MD-30-M-01, volume 1 (BRASIL, 2020a) and volume 2 (BRASIL, 2020b).

steps recommended by the Joanna Briggs Institute (JBI), the research question was determined; relevant studies were identified; articles that addressed interagency operations in major events in the period from 2013 to 2016 were selected; data was collected; and the results were summarized (PETERS *et al.*, 2020). Regarding the documental analysis, the study focused mainly on the normative framework that deals directly or indirectly with interagency operations within the Brazilian State. In this sense, manuals that deal with the doctrine of this type of operation, manuals about joint operations, as well as decrees and ordinances, were analyzed.

3 CONTEXTUALIZING MD33-M-12 INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS (2017)

Divided into three chapters and two annexes, just like the previous version, the 2017 edition has 72 pages (BRASIL, 2017), while the first edition has 46 pages (BRASIL, 2012). The 26-page difference, which in principle would indicate a substantial theoretical addition to the manual, is composed solely of the expansion of the interagency glossary, located in the final part of the publication.

The importance of the search for a common lexicon, partially met by this glossary, is not disputed, because, according to Carafano (2011), Field (2021), Ferreira (2022), and Figueiredo and Moreira (2022), the improvement of the understanding between agencies seeks to achieve one of the basic aspects for the success of interagency work. In this sense, the expansion of the glossary in relation to the 2012 edition (BRASIL, 2012) is an appreciable evolution to be noted.

Therefore, when opening the manual, the lack of clarity as to the degree of participation of the agencies in the process of planning operations can be noticed. This is already noticeable in the introduction, where its purpose is presented:

Establishing the doctrinal foundations that will guide the Armed Forces in the process of planning, preparing, and employing joint operations (Op Cj) **involving** the participation of public agencies, non-governmental organizations, private companies, or agencies of other Powers, **in the execution of actions.** (BRASIL, 2017, p. 13; our translation, emphasis added)

The two fragments in bold can generate an understanding of limited participation of the other agencies, restricted only to the execution of actions, neglecting the planning phase of interagency operations, under the coordination of the Armed Forces. This is because interagency relations carry in their concept an idea of balance of power and participatory decision-making that is only possible if there is the commitment of all participating agencies, and not just mere involvement (ANSELL; GASH, 2007; FERREIRA, 2022; JOHNSON *et al.*, 2003).

The fact that the publication of the MD33-M-12 (BRASIL, 2017) remains as a doctrinal manual without its own usage methodology, same as the 2012 edition, is also seen as a possible problem.

A neophyte interagency operator, who is dedicated to reading the manual on screen for the first time, and who is looking for a methodology to help them plan an operation,

will not find it there, since it is not included in the interagency manual. It is necessary to be aware of the five citations contained in the text, alluding to another publication of the Brazilian Ministry of Defense (MoD), entitled “Doctrine of Joint Operations” (*Doutrina de Operações Conjuntas*), MD30-M-01. Of the five citations found in the MD33-M-12, we understand that the most relevant is the one in chapter III, item 3.1.4, which discusses interagency planning:

[the] planning follows the provisions of the publication MD30-M-01, with the necessary adaptations, maintaining the specific attributions and competencies, at the different levels of decision, with the elaboration of the corresponding planning documents. (BRASIL, 2017, p. 23, our addition)

In other words, it is described that the methodological basis is that provided by MD30-M-01, the Joint Operations Doctrine, specifically in its second volume, adapted to a reality in which the agencies participate in the operation.

It is understandable that the interagency manual has used the already consolidated doctrine of joint operations as a planning methodology, of which the use is specifically focused on operations with participation in the Armed Forces, after all, it was gestated and published by the MD. Item 1.4 evidences this application:

The doctrine established in this publication applies to the Commands provided for in the Military Defense Structure and directs the joint employment of the Armed Forces, and must be observed at all levels of planning and execution. (BRASIL, 2017, p. 14; our translation)

The issue that arises is that, in the absence of another methodology for planning interagency operations in the country, this manual has been used by other bodies and agencies, such as the Fire Department of the State of Mato Grosso Sul (MATO GROSSO DO SUL, 2018). In this sense, the intrinsically military approach hinders both the use of the methodology by other agencies in operations without the participation of the military, and the incorporation of the agencies into the planning of an operation under the coordination of the Armed Forces.

We believe the analysis made by Araujo Neto (2017) about the 2012 version of the manual proved to be quite appropriate when highlighting that:

the biggest problem of the Brazilian document [...] [it's] its **purpose geared toward military** professionals only. That is, considering only the military's organizational peculiarities and operational norms, ignoring the existence of the others, as if all other organs were uniform in non-military procedures and norms. In this way, the document becomes inflexible, shutting down any opportunity for its concepts to be absorbed by other parts of the federal public administration. (ARAUJO NETO, 2017, p. 24; our translation with our emphasis and additions)

Despite the review carried out in 2017, these considerations remain valid when we observe that the publication starts from an even more assertive premise than that of the 2012 publication, regarding the preponderance of the Armed Forces, as identified in the citations:

When the State decides to carry out an action, applying force to assert its interests within [...] its territory, **the Armed Forces form the preponderant component in relation to the other available instruments.** (BRASIL, 2017; our translation, emphasis added)

When the State decides to carry out an action, applying force to assert its interests within [...] its territory, the Armed Forces **generally form the preponderant component in relation to the other available instruments.** (BRASIL, 2012; our translation, emphasis added)

From the above, it becomes clear that the 2017 publication was designed to be used in situations in which the Armed Forces take a leading role in relation to other agencies, which only perform tasks to support the military. This logic permeates the entire manual since the agencies present only the *status* of friendly forces⁵ for the planning and execution of the operation.

As a consequence of this process, we point out that the military predominance may generate coordination difficulties during the operation due to the limitations for the performance of civilian agencies, which may compromise solutions, or at least the management of the problems for which the interagency working group was constituted. Thus, according to Figueiredo and Moreira (2022), poor coordination can create obstacles to the success of the operation. Such aspects will be further explored in the following topics.

4 CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ANALYSIS OF THE MD33-M-12, INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS (2017)

4.1 Lack of a methodology for interagency planning

If, on the one hand, it can be said that the methodology of the joint planning process of the Armed Forces is well structured to face the “current military problems” (MOREIRA, 2022, p. 22; our translation)—by incorporating several modern tools in the recent edition of the two volumes of the *Doctrine of Joint Operations* manual (BRASIL, 2020a, 2020b)—the same cannot be said regarding the interagency doctrine.

The lack of a methodology for a genuine interagency planning process, which allows other agencies to participate fully in the planning and execution of the operation may bring negative implications to the effectiveness of interagency work, if any participating agency perceives that its perspective and interests are being marginalized throughout the process.

5 According to the Armed Forces’ Glossary, Friendly Force is defined as: “A Force that, not being in the chain of command of the commander, performs a task that contributes to the fulfillment of its mission”(BRASIL, 2015, p. 120). The description of which agencies will take part in the operation should be part of item 2.4 of the Operational Situation Examination Model, contained in Annex A of the MD33-M-12 (BRASIL, 2017, p. 34).

Moreover, if participation in interagency arrangements is voluntary, the planning and execution methodology should be attractive to all participants. However, this is not what appears in the wording of the MD30-M-01 (BRASIL, 2020b). The joint doctrine was developed by the military to be used by the military, and its simple adaptation to incorporate civilian agencies into the planning process is inadequate, especially since it limits the participation of other agencies in the operation.

4.2 Limits on the participation of agencies

Agencies cannot be merely consulted about the decisions being made throughout the planning. They must actively participate from the beginning of the plans' elaboration, acting in the correct definition and framing of the problem that to be faced. Such commitment generates equal responsibility regarding the results since the opinion and interest of all agency representatives were considered in structuring the response to solve, or manage, the problem. And, at this point, the manual is erroneous in segregating the lines of action⁶—to be carried out by the Armed Forces—from the activities performed by the other agencies, which can impact the coordination of the operation as a whole. This quote illustrates this separation:

[...] the Operational Commander [...] identifies the particular objectives of each agency and coordinates actions, through the following steps: [...]. **Defining the lines of action for the area of military operations and coordinate them with the activities of the agencies** [...]. (BRASIL, 2017, p. 24; our translation, emphasis added)

The interagency coordination is discussed by Ansell and Gash (2007), when they associate this type of arrangement to a collaborative governance. According to the authors, a critical component that characterizes interagency work is the fact that it is a formal process of collective decision-making. In other words, the participants are not merely consulted, but there is a direct performance and commitment of them at all stages of the decision-making process. Collective decision-making implies that it is not an individual deciding alone, but rather groups of individuals, organizations, or organization systems. Agencies must be present at all stages and phases of the actions' planning and execution, in a deliberative and multilateral process that allows two-way communication flows.

4.3 Decision-making forums with limited assignments

To circumvent this difficulty, the MD33-M-12 (BRASIL, 2017) provides some forums for agencies to participate within the structure of the General Staff⁷, namely: Oper-

6 Possible solution that can be adopted for the fulfillment of a mission or execution of a job (BRASIL, 2017, p. 58).

7 According to the Armed Forces' Glossary, General Staff is: "Organ composed of qualified military personnel, whose purpose is to advise the commander in the exercise of command" (BRASIL, 2015, p. 108; our translation).

ations Coordination Center (CCOp)⁸, Humanitarian Operations Center (COH)⁹, and Civil-Military Coordination Center (C²M)¹⁰. However, these decision-making spaces have limits in their attributions. For, although the agencies take part in such bodies, they do not organically compose the sections¹¹ of the General Staff, constituted to deal with interagency problems. Therefore, they have a limited role in the planning of the operation, performing, almost always, specific and punctual tasks deliberated by these forums, but endorsed by the military commander of the operation. Thus, regardless of the centers' (CCOp, COH or C²M) format, they are unable to provide an effective participation of the agencies in all phases of the planning and execution of operations.

4.4 Leading role centered on the Armed Forces

In addition, despite the intention of providing consensus¹², such forums also do not account for the necessary division of protagonism within an interagency operation that uses the methodology in question, since the preponderance is always military. Which, in itself, is also a problematic consideration, especially when the search for protagonism overlaps the achievement of common goals. In this regard, Araújo Neto indicates that:

The predominance of the search for protagonism in institutional relations makes the actions of each public agency compartmentalized, which may hinder the development of legal attributions and the achievement of each agency's social objectives [...]. Public agencies would need to find interesting or really necessary reasons for them to decide to pursue common goals with other institutions in detriment of the traditional search for performance results or the strengthening of their media protagonism. (ARAÚJO NETO, 2017, p. 10; our translation)

These issues of dispute for coordination and protagonism would have already created difficulties and obstacles to interagency work involving the participation of the

8 "Integrated by representatives of each involved agency [...], it will detail the planning and trigger the actions necessary to fulfill the mission based on the documents received" (BRASIL, 2017, p. 23; our translation).

9 "[...] COH members coordinate the general relief strategy, identify logistical needs for agencies, and identify and prioritize humanitarian assistance needs for military support" (BRASIL, 2017, p. 29; our translation).

10 "The operational commander may constitute a C²M to: – advise him on guidelines and decisions related to civil-military coordination; – liaise and coordinate between Military Forces and agencies so that they meet the needs of the population; – establish a participatory forum for military and civilian organizations; and – receive, validate and coordinate requests for support from non-governmental organizations, private companies and international organizations" (BRASIL, 2017, p. 28; our translation).

11 The first volume of the Joint Operations Doctrine defines the composition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (EMCj) and its sections: "The EMCj shall consist of the Chief of Staff and, in principle, the following sections: a) D-1: 1st Section (Personal); (b) D-2: 2nd Section (Intelligence); (c) D-3: 3rd Section (Operations); (d) D-4: 4th Section (Logistics and Mobilization); (e) D-5: 5th Section (Planning); (f) D-6: 6th Section (Command and Control); (g) D-7: 7th Section (Social Communication); (h) D-8: 8th Section (Information Operations); (i) D-9: 9th Section (Civil Affairs); and (j) D-10: 10th Section (Financial Management)" (BRASIL, 2020a, p. 51).

12 Consensus, according to the manual, would be one of the guiding principles of interagency operations, alongside collaboration; ability; knowledge; prioritization; unity of effort; flexibility; objectivity and integration (BRASIL, 2017).

military in operations under the coordination of other agencies. The example of *Operação Brumadinho* (2019) (MINAS GERAIS, 2022) is very characteristic, when help from the Armed Forces to act in the operation was partially refused by the Government of the State of Minas Gerais. The quotes below illustrate the situation:

The work protagonism division in the aid of the victims of the Brumadinho tragedy has caused several ‘short circuits’ between the government of Minas Gerais and the Armed Forces. These deployed a contingent of a thousand men since Friday to assist in rescuing survivors. Except that there was no request to use the group. The Minas Gerais government reported that there was no need for this type of support and, if it needed it, it would request it. (PARREIRAS, 2019; our translation)

‘Strangeness’ and ‘frustration’ were the feelings among military members of the Armed Forces who have been on standby since Friday, the 25th, in Belo Horizonte, waiting to assist, at first, in helping to try to rescue people who could be in isolated areas or in the mud, because of the rupture of the Dam in Brumadinho – and, then, to assist in the rescue of bodies, in an attempt to reduce the suffering of those who are in search of their relatives. (ESTADÃO CONTEÚDO, 2019; our translation, emphasis added)

During the operation, the participation of the Brazilian Armed Forces was punctual and with an estimated total of only 190 military personnel (BRASIL, 2021), a minute contingent compared to the over four thousand people who worked in the region (FREITAS, 2021). The number of Brazilian military personnel was similar to that of Israeli military personnel¹³, who took part in the search for missing persons (PARREIRAS, 2019).

The quarrel that occurred in Minas Gerais is not an isolated fact. The search for protagonism and the difficulty of coordination are also present in operations whose coordination is under the aegis of the Armed Forces, such as *Operação Acolhida*, which began in 2018 and is considered, according to Costa (2020), a case of success in terms of interagency relations.

Despite the acknowledged success, there were some problems:

Operação Acolhida has a horizontal governance structure, in which there is no subordination between the actors. Despite this, through the fieldwork it was possible to observe that there are actors with greater protagonism and that consequently influence the actions of the other actors. (COSTA, 2020, p. 43; our translation)

civil and military cooperation in *Operação Acolhida* needs to be adjusted, so that those organizations that feel less represented are encouraged to take a more active role and have their value recognized. Reports have shown that these agencies consciously avoid attending meetings when there is no space to address their specific demands. There were also reports of disagreements between civilian and military representatives [...]. (COSTA, 2020, p. 80)

13 136 Israeli military personnel participated in the Brumadinho operation (PARREIRAS, 2019).

Costa's citations (2020) illustrate difficulties of interagency work, which could be minimized with greater participation of civilian agencies from the beginning of the planning.

5 THE MILITARY CULTURE

Finally, the last point considered relevant is the appreciation that the military has for the principles of war¹⁴ of the command unit, which is “held in high regard by soldiers” (VISACRO, 2017, p. 98), who are not so willing to renounce it. In this sense, imagining a coordination in charge of another agency in an interagency operation with the participation of the Armed Forces would be culturally unlikely. Obviously, the methodology provided for in the MD30-M-01 (BRASIL, 2020b) indicates this predisposition to command by the military establishment. It is worth noting that acting in external conflicts is usually the most important role of the Armed Forces. And in this sense, traditional military operations require trained professionals and large operational units, which are conducted by combatants with high-tech weapons in an environment whose individuals involved in the conflict are potential targets.

However, non-traditional missions place soldiers in situations where targets are mixed with those they must protect. In addition, non-traditional operations, such as interagency operations, are generally conducted in a decentralized manner, combining not only military personnel from different forces, but also involving federal agencies, police, local leaders, non-governmental organizations, among others. This characteristic tends to confuse military members that are accustomed to submitting to well-defined lines of command.

The incompatibility between the characteristics that make up the traditional and non-traditional models ends up causing the imposition of military models informing and guiding interventions in this type of operation, which tends to cause conflict, on many occasions, between military personnel and technical staff of institutions with expertise in the area, as in the case assisted in Operations Verde Brasil I and II¹⁵: “The military does not like interference in command, such as technical guidelines, to achieve better results. Any observation is seen as a bottom-up order, from inspector to military,” said a technician from the Environmental Development Secretariat (Sedam) of Rondônia in the report: Deforestation combat is harshly criticized by defenders of the Amazon, of July 28, 2020 (OLIVEIRA, 2020).

14 The definition of War Principles, according to the Glossary of the Armed Forces (BRASIL, 2015, p. 223; our translation) is as follows: “Philosophical precepts arising from military campaign studies throughout history and present variations in space and time. They are reference points that guide and subsidize the military leaders in the planning and execution of war without, however, conditioning their decisions. The commander, when planning and executing a campaign or operation, will take into account what the principles recommend, interpreting them and applying them judiciously in the face of the situation, deciding which ones he will privilege, in detriment of others.”

15 *Operação Verde Brasil* was a set of activities triggered by the Federal Government, after the authorization of the use of the Armed Forces in the Guarantee of Law and Order (GLO) in subsidiary actions in the border strip, indigenous lands, federal units of environmental conservation and other federal areas in the states of the Legal Amazon, through preventive and repressive actions against environmental crimes, aimed to combat illegal deforestation and fire outbreaks (BRASIL, 2019). The first edition of this operation, instituted by Decree No. 9,985 of August 23, 2019, initially took place between August 24 and September 24, 2019, and was subsequently prolonged for 30 days, extending until the end of October. In 2020, the second edition of this operation took place through Decree No. 10.341, of May 6, 2020, in which the government instituted *Operação Verde-Brasil 2* for the prevention and repression of illegal activities and fires in the Amazon region (BRASIL, 2020c). This edition, initially scheduled for 30 days, was extended to 60 days (amendment given by Decree No. 10.394, of June 10, 2020), starting on May 11 and extending until July 10, 2020 (BRASIL, 2020d). In turn, Decree No. 10.421, of July 9, 2020, extended the employment of the Armed Forces until November 6, 2020 (BRASIL, 2020e).

This observation is worrisome, since the demand for the use of the Armed Forces in interagency operations, acting jointly with other agencies of the Brazilian State, has become frequent (MOREIRA, 2018) and tends to intensify due to the range of complex problems to be faced by the Brazilian authorities, such as transnational crimes, environmental disasters, epidemics, migration crises, etc. (FIGUEIREDO; MOREIRA, 2022).

6 CONCLUSIONS

This article infers that a possible solution to reduce such tensions, in addition to the forums already foreseen (CCOp, COH and C²M), would be the effective incorporation of the agencies into the sections of the General Staff constituted for the planning of the operation. Thus, a more flexible planning methodology could foresee such a possibility. Moreover, the unity of efforts, and not the unity of command, must be seen as an integrated work in favor of a synergistic approach, which should not become a hierarchical organization, under penalty of not having the adhesion of the agencies.

That said, the simple coordination of the activities in which each agency performs its tasks individually and in parallel is not enough. An interdependence of actions and a complementarity of resources should be sought. This is only possible with the identification of collective common goals that lead to mutual benefits.

As for the synergy of actions, Thomson and Perry describe that “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts” (2006, p. 23). The result of the integrated work should be greater than the simple sum of the actions carried out individually by each agency. Thus, the manual should promote the broad and active participation of agencies in all stages and phases of the process of planning and execution of actions.

Nevertheless, the issue of coordination by another agency, other than the Armed Forces, still encounters strong resistance in the barracks since the principle of unity of command is a cultural aspect difficult to overcome by the military due to its constitutive character in the institutional *habitus*.

The possible solution envisaged would be the production of an interagency doctrine by other bodies, which coordinate interagency work at the most diverse levels, such as the Institutional Security Bureau (*Gabinete de Segurança Institucional – GSI*) of the Presidency of the Republic, coordinator of the Executive Committee of the Integrated Border Protection Program¹⁶ (*Comitê Executivo do Programa de Proteção Integrada de Fronteiras – CEPPIF*), via the National Defense and Security Affairs Secretariat (*Secretária de Assuntos de Defesa e Segurança Nacional – SADS/N*). Thus, we would have other interagency doctrines, in addition to the manuals produced by the Armed Forces.

Lastly, we defend the relevance of the development of research and studies along these lines, both for its contribution to the debate and studies of interagency relations and for the possibility of offering improvements in the way agencies act mutually. To the extent that such knowledge can provide new perspectives on the issue, deepening and complexifying it, especially when analyzed from the point of view of promoting Brazil’s defense capacity.

¹⁶ The Integrated Border Protection Program was established by Decree No. 8.903 of November 16, 2016 (BRASIL, 2016a).

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