

Geoeconomics and development: the II PND as a strategic vector of national autonomy

Geoeconomía y desarrollo: el II PND como vector estratégico de la autonomía nacional

Abstract: In this work we will present the Geisel government's attempt to relaunch a broad development program with profound structural changes in the national economy, the Second National Development Plan (II PND). We hypothesize that the plan main goal was to better position the country in the competitive international geo-economic order. For that, two objectives are presented. The first is to analyze the "development" theme, which has been re-read and adapted since the Costa e Silva government, since the DSN (National Security Doctrine) needed to be updated to the world and national conjuncture of the 1970s. The second is to show that, in order to achieve the ambitious Plan, Geisel has adopted an autonomous foreign policy in order to represent national interests in accordance with development goals. Thus, the article is divided into two sections, in addition to an introduction and conclusion: in the first, we present the international context; in the second, we analyze the II PND in detail and its strategic developments.

Keywords: Development. Geoeconomics. Autonomy.

Resumen: En este trabajo presentaremos el intento del gobierno de Geisel de relanzar un amplio programa de desarrollo con profundos cambios estructurales en la economía nacional, el II Plan Nacional de Desarrollo (II PND). Se plantea la hipótesis de que el objetivo principal del plan era posicionar mejor al país en el competitivo orden geoeconómico internacional. Con este fin, se presentan dos objetivos. El primero es analizar el tema del "desarrollo", que fue, desde el gobierno de Costa e Silva, releído y adaptado, porque la DSN (Doctrina de Seguridad Nacional) necesitaba ser actualizada al marco coyuntural mundial y nacional de la década de 1970. El segundo es mostrar que, para lograr el ambicioso Plan, Geisel utilizó una política exterior autónoma para representar los intereses nacionales de acuerdo con los objetivos de desarrollo. Así, el artículo se divide en dos secciones, además de una introducción y una conclusión: en la primera, hacemos una presentación de la situación internacional; en la segunda, analizamos el II PND en detalle y sus desarrollos estratégicos.

Palabras clave: Desarrollo. Geoeconomía. Autonomía.

João Miguel Villas-Bôas Barcellos
Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro,
Instituto de Economia.
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.
joao.barcellos@pepi.ie.ufrj.br

Received: Dez. 7, 2018

Accepted: Abr 26, 2019

COLEÇÃO MEIRA MATTOS

ISSN on-line 2316-4891 / ISSN print 2316-4833

<http://ebrevistas.eb.mil.br/index.php/RMM/index>



1 Introduction

[...] Politics, nation and war are essential elements of all and any economic calculation, insofar as, for him [List], the production and distribution of world wealth is a negative sum game where there is and there will be always place for very few powerful national states. (FIORI, p. 21, 1999, our translation)

The elements mentioned in the epigraph, by Fiori (1999), are fundamental for a better understanding of power relations in the history of nations. These are the elements that led Geisel to strategically see the development process, and within the geopolitical and geoeconomic reading of the country's most developmental and modernizing military (CERVO, 2008). The 1970s and 1980s international economic and geopolitical conjuncture was relentless with Third World "developmentalist projects" (FIORI, 2004) and, as a result, Geisel's autonomous development project was heavily criticized and eventually dismantled in the 1980s and, especially, in the 1990s.

In this study, we aim to analyze how the II National Development Plan was used as a tool to expand national power and respond to geoeconomic challenges. For some time, the military – as one can see in the "Young Turks" and the tenentism movements, as well as in the National Security Doctrine (DSN) of the Superior School of War (ESG) – had been thinking on how they could contribute to modernizing the Brazilian state and, therefore, its productive structure. It is within this perspective that, with the civil-military regime of 1964-85, the military implements a development strategy linked to the project of transforming Brazil into a world power – this is known as "Brazil Power".

Notwithstanding the military's decisive contribution to national developmentalism, it should be noted that experiments in this field were initially carried out by Getúlio Vargas (1930-45, 1951-1954), Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1961) and João Goulart (1961- 1964). These presidents were of paramount importance for national developmentalism to become a relevant ideological tool for national structural change¹, and undoubtedly to influence the economic policy pursued by military governments.

Our work will be divided into two sections, the first of which will be a presentation of the international conjuncture and the geopolitical constraints of the global political and economic order. In this first section, we will look at how the United States intervened in the international economic system to benefit and constrain the autonomy of competing countries, as well as a brief analysis of the economic and geopolitical conjuncture of the time. The second section will be an analysis of the II PND and its unfolding regarding the national autonomous development strategy. In this section, the largest and most important part, we will delve further into the formulation process and key initiatives of the Plan and will unfold it into two subtopics,

¹ We understand the term "structural change" from Syrquin's (2008) contribution, that is, a change in the productive structure, in economic aggregates, an important role for industry and the urbanization process.

namely “gloeconomics and military developmentalism” and “the II PND in detail”. Finally, the conclusion shall be a synthesis of the aforementioned subjects.

2 International conjuncture and geopolitical constraints

Before addressing the Geisel government’s development plan, a brief introduction about the global economic and geopolitical conjuncture is required, so that we can better understand internal and external influences on the government’s decision-making process.

According to Fiori, from 1945 to 1973 the global political and economic system was under the “benevolent hegemony” of the United States and a quest for “global governance” with supranational institutions such as the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions: the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (FIORI, 2004). The Agreement provided for the organization and regulation of the world economic system by the creation of the above-mentioned multilateral institutions, with the IMF operating to adjust the imbalance of payments of the signatory countries and the WB would be a reconstruction and development bank (BARRETO, 2009).

The world economy was organized, shortly after World War II, to combat the flattened alternative of Soviet socialism and to benefit capitalist expansion throughout the world, especially in Western countries. The western leadership fell to the United States that imposed its currency, the dollar, as an international reference (KILSZTAJN, 1989) and, according to Serrano, “... defeated the whole of Western Europe for good. It was over this initial position of particularly asymmetrical US power that the post-war international financial and monetary order was built” (SERRANO, 2004, p. 182, our translation). Also according to this author, there was the proposal of three Bretton Woods: the Keynesian [Bretton Woods], which he calls “utopian”; the rules that were approved in the Agreement itself; and the manner in which the United States actually administered the system – which would be the winning proposal (SERRANO, 2004).

However, the global economic system underwent a “geopolitical adjustment” in 1947, which meant a widespread US effort to combat the Soviet threat and change the 1945 agreement. This effort can be summed up as stimulating, through loans, investments and donations to Western Allied countries, their reconstruction and economic restructuring. This period of economic abundance became known as the “golden age of Keynesianism” (SERRANO, 2004).

Global economic system and geopolitics go hand in hand, so much that one cannot understand one without looking at the other. An example of this is the 1970s events, witnessed in the Vietnam War – the United States’ defeat to the poor, socialist Asian country – and the abandonment of the Bretton Woods Agreement by the US superpower, which now embraces the flexible dollar and acts to deregulate the financial system. This movement, which was the beginning of what Conceição Tavares called “strong dollar diplomacy,” was based on framing Japan and Germany – economies with great competitive capacity – and retaking world economic hegemony, which will be seen more intensely from 1979, when the Federal Reserve (FED) President Paul Volcker will raise the US interest rate, generating a profound global economic crisis with a major impact on peripheral countries such as Brazil (TAVARES, 1985). If this US hegemonic resumption

movement were not enough, the two oil shocks (1973 and 1979) contributed to destabilizing the balance of payments of most Third World countries, including Brazil.

Thus, one can see the rather delicate and unstable scenario in which the Geisel government will be inserted. There was, at this geoeconomic juncture, an international movement for changes in the international political and economic order, of which Brazil was a part. Many countries called for a New International Economic Order (NOEI) that contemplated underdeveloped peoples and assisted in their material development process. Thus:

This process began with the success of OPEC's strategy on rising oil prices, which in turn spurred the emergence of the Group of 77 and its proposal, approved by the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1974, in favor of the creation of a New International Economic Order, which included (...) defending the right of developing countries to: 1) create producer associations; 2) link the prices of their export products to the price movement of industrial products imported from developed countries; 3) nationalize companies linked to the exercise of sovereignty over their natural resources; 4) define their own rules for the operation of multinationals in their territories. Added to this agenda is the defense of the urgent need to re-discuss the tariff system and the international monetary system itself. (FIORI, 1999, p. 78, our translation)

Faced with this movement for more autonomy, the United States reacted energetically by framing the developmentalist projects of various Third World nations, including Brazil. The strategy was spelled out by various US government analysts and provided for the co-optation of national elites and the use of monetary and financial mechanisms to constrain autonomous development plans (FIORI, 1999).

Next, we will analyze the II PND, implemented by the government of President Ernesto Geisel as an attempt to deepen Brazilian industrialization and give productive strength to the country. One should be able to see how this initiative was the spearhead of a geoeconomic strategy for Brazil's project of transformation into a global power.

3 The II National Development Plan as an instrument to overcome dependency and as support of a power project

3.1 Geoeconomics and military developmentalism

The strategic use of Economics as a tool to achieve geopolitical ends is historical; many powers have done and still do so. Sanctions, blockages, counterpart loans and many other ways of using economic power as a weapon are present in the methods of most powerful nations. According to Blackwill and Harris (2016), this is "geoeconomics", i.e., the use of economics for geopolitical purposes. The Indian Sanjaya Baru (2012, p. 47, our translation) defines Geoeconomics in two ways: "as the relationship between economic policy and changes in national power and geopolitics" and "the economic consequences of trends in geopolitics and national power". The author

advocates a thesis that the intellectual roots of geoeconomics come from mercantilism. In this sense, the II PND conforms to a strategy in which the Brazilian government uses a variety of economic instruments, such as industrial policy, increased public spending, increased investment, among others, with a very clear objective: to transform the country into a competitive power in the international system.

To analyze the development strategy of the Geisel administration, we see great relevance in investigating and understanding the II PND and its structural developments in the national productive system. Thus, some questions arise as guidelines for our research and analysis: i) what were the government's motivations for launching the II PND, since the recommendation was for fiscal adjustment and recession, as the developed world did?; ii) Is there a rationale behind the Plan, or was it only the result of nationalism within the "Brazil Power" military thinking? Another important question: Is the II PND the result of a modernizing mentality or a response to the end of the 1973 "economic miracle", the need for legitimizing regime support through economic growth?

Our analysis relies on a political approach to the issue of development by the "modernizing" and developmentalist military. This does not mean we will neglect the relevant economic aspects of the II PND; our intention, however, is to clarify the country's modernization strategy via the authoritarian military developmentalism that had been nurtured from the "Young Turks" movement, passing through tenentism, to Góes Monteiro's "Army Policy"² and the DSN of ESG – without neglecting the influence of civil developmentalist experiences –, the value given to Brazilian modernization and the project of transforming Brazil into a world power (BARCELLOS, 2016).

It is important we do not to lose sight of the fact that our research is aimed at the geoeconomic and geopolitical analysis of development during the Geisel administration, which, from this reading, tried to build a "Great Strategy"³ for the country's change of scope in the capitalist interstate system.⁴ We seek a interpretation of the period slightly different from other military governments; we understand the Geisel government aimed, through its national development project, to deepen the ideal of "Brazil Great Power" through an autonomous foreign policy, a defense and security policy less involved in internal repression and more concerned with the construction of material capacities (military-industrial complex and nuclear issue), and an ambitious autonomous economic development project, which aimed to transform the national productive structure – the II PND.

We understand there are elements of continuity of the "army policy" and authoritarian modernization in the II PND, but we believe the conjunctural, geoeconomic and geopolitical aspects also had considerable influence over the interpretation and implementation of a security and development agenda in the period that was different from the previous ones.

2 Phrase attributed to Góes Monteiro, who, in general terms, aimed not to subject the Army to the common political game, but rather the opposite, given the inability of society at that time to lead the modernization of the country (TREVISAN, 1985).

3 For "Great Strategy" we use the concept of Parmar (2012), which would be the State use of political, military, and economic means and ends, in times of peace and war, to safeguard national interests and development.

4 As for this approach to the system of states that interact among themselves according to wealth and power, we use Fiori (2015).

In fact, there was a clear and ambitious power project by the developmental military (FIORI, 2015), which included a substantial change in the Brazilian position in the global geopolitical and geoeconomic environment. There is a relationship between the conjuncture (oil crisis, Cold War, etc.) and the structure (economic and technological dependence, underdevelopment, military weakness and vulnerability, etc.) that condition our analysis. From the point of view of a more ‘long-term’ perception, for example, the military thinking⁵ carries within itself a clear intention of national modernization and world grandeur, which, by inserting itself in the conjuncture reality, transforms and adapts this intention in order to shape development and security policies.

Sometimes, the conjunctural factor arouses and deepens structural intentions, as seems to be the case of the oil energy crisis and the proposal of the II PND. The need or concern for economic dynamism has been present in military thinking at least since the coup of the Republic in 1889 and manifested itself most strongly in the DSN, but it lacked the momentum or the appropriate conjuncture to “radicalize” certain postures, such as the opportunity that came with the 1964 coup. However, while on the one hand the conjuncture may awaken certain national forces in the country to change directions – as in the case of the oil crisis, the nuclear agreement with West Germany, the diplomatic crisis with Jimmy Carter and the denunciation of the military agreement with the US –, on the other it can also awaken or deepen the action of great powers to pursue more aggressive policies that are asymmetric in nature or to frame the others, as in the case of the increased US interest rate, constraining the economic policy of competing countries in the First and Third World.

In the next section, we will investigate the fundamental role played by the II PND as the last major national effort for structural change in Brazil. Some aspects of the plan’s decision-making process will be analyzed, such as the characters directly involved – President Geisel and his ministers João Paulo dos Reis Veloso, Mario Henrique Simonsen, and Severo Gomes. Another key aspect to be investigated will be the role of the state and its development-promoting institutions, such as the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES).

3.2 The last major plan of structural change in the Brazilian economy: economy as an instrument of power and the II PND decision-making process

The unfavorable global economic environment contributed to the Geisel government decisions. However, if the general-president had followed the conjunctural influences and listened to some of the most important economic advisers, such as Mario Henrique Simonsen, he should have chosen to implement a recessive, non-expansive economic policy, not such as his own. However, the orthodox Simonsen was not the protagonist of the economic plan, and Geisel concentrated decision-making power on himself, as Mantega shows us:

5 By “military thinking” we mean here the political, economic, cultural and social elements that made up and organized the military’s view of Brazil and the world. For more academic density we use the contributions of Leonardo Trevisan (*The Brazilian Military Thought*), Eliézer R. de Oliveira (*Military: Political Thought and Action*), José L. Fiori (*History, Strategy and Development*) and Oliveiros Ferreira (*Elos Partidos: a new view of military power in Brazil*).

Geisel would make one of the most interventionist governments in the military cycle, responding to the recessionary scenario that was forming on the international horizon by maintaining high investment rates. He reacted to the neoliberal winds, which were blowing very strongly from the most advanced countries towards the Latin American continent, with a strictly developmentalist economic program, which only expanded the already considerable participation of the Brazilian state in the economy. From day one of his administration, he shifted the axis of economic policy to Planning, reducing the power of the Treasury, and placed himself as commander and chief of the major decisions of this strategic area of Government, occupying the seat of President of the Economic Development Council (MANTEGA, 1997, p. 5, our translation).

Another important aspect of the Plan was that the decentralization of investments gave space to industrialists and national entrepreneurs in the sector of capital goods and basic inputs, which generated criticism from groups and sectors of the liberal press (MANTEGA, 1997).

The II PND should be seen as an instrument of structural transformation of the national economy, converging with the policy of “forced modernization”, which has its identity anchored in the military and national developmentalist thinking of transformation of the country into a world power and a more modern nation as its main motto. Our hypothesis meets this interpretation and raises a question: was this thought of modernization structural in military thinking or did it stem from the current conjunctural reactions such as the oil shock? Our answers embrace both the structural and the conjunctural points.

In convergence with our thesis, Luciano Coutinho (1987) states that:

During the Geisel period, foreign policy and certain elements of domestic economic policy were perceived as *strategic*, that is, long-term, irreducible nationals, defined in the light of a “grand national project”. [...] Such project (“Brasil Grande”) gained a very strong expression. In fact, much stronger and more autonomous than, for example, at any time in the past. (COUTINHO, 1987, p. 178, our translation).

The need to keep the pace of growth high, even in times of crisis, contributed to the quality jump in the national industrialization project. There was a need for a strategy of change in the Brazilian productive foundation, and the II PND is the exact unfolding of this perception (CASTRO; SOUZA, 1985). In this sense, its economic planning followed not only a political rationale, which was for long being gestated in the military thinking about national development, but also an economic rationale, as it was not only the result of a conjuncture but also of a need for deepening the Brazilian capitalism (FONSECA; MONTEIRO, 2007).

According to João Paulo dos Reis Velloso, Geisel’s Planning Minister and one of the great supporters of the II PND, the government, despite criticism of experts favorable to the recessive adjustment, would have made a slow and gradual adjustment so as not to impact the public accounts. So much so that there was a reduction of growth from 14% to 6% in 1974. But most importantly, if the government had opted for deep adjustment, as many advocated, the

II PND would be unfeasible (VELLOSO, 1998). Geisel himself reinforces this view by stating that the recession would be very bad for the poor and would create a major social problem (D'ARAÚJO; CASTRO, 1997).

Therefore, given what Geisel understood about the 1967 recession, one can see that:

There were evident signs of depletion of the pattern of durable goods accumulation. Against this background, the new 1974 government faced a serious dilemma. On the one hand, it would make a conservative adjustment, always along the lines suggested by the IMF, and promote that general recession of dubious effectiveness but infallible to erode any government. Or it could promote another type of adjustment that would allow further growth. The latter was the path followed by the Geisel Government with the II PND (MANTEGA, 1997, p. 32, our translation).

It should be emphasized that, in 1973, still as Médici's Minister of Planning, Reis Velloso had already made a survey with the IPEA about the limitations of the Brazilian productive structure and the depletion of import substitutions of durable and non-durable consumer goods. According to the minister, a development plan should be thought of, one that would make the country grow face the limitations imposed by the oil shock (VELLOSO, 1998).

Decisions about economic policy under the Geisel government were made by the president, who commanded the Economic Development Council (CDE), the economic advisory and planning body of the Presidency, created in 1974 (MANTEGA, 1997). According to Velloso, there was a weekly meeting to discuss the projects under the II PND and budget planning, which was attended by President Geisel; he, Reis Velloso, Minister of Planning; Mario Henrique Simonsen, Minister of Treasury, and other advisers such as the Minister of Industry and Commerce, Severo Gomes. Treasury took care of short-term issues such as inflation, monetary policy, etc., while the PND, the coordination of BNDES, Finep and CNPq policies were under the responsibility of Planning (VELLOSO, 1998). It is worth remembering that, during his military career, Geisel had held various administrative positions, mainly the head of Petrobras, which gave him competence and affinity with the economic and planning areas, and where he probably acquired a realistic view of the tough international economy competition between nations and their companies.

Geisel's economic planning team deserves a brief analysis, as there were clearly two trends, the most nationalistic and developmentalist, with Reis Velloso in the Ministry of Planning and Severo Gomes in Industry and Commerce and, on the other hand, in the Treasury office, Mario Henrique Simonsen, a liberal economist with restrictive and orthodox economic policy ideas (MANTEGA, 1997). Reis Velloso became a privileged minister, who met Geisel daily at the so-called "9 a.m. meeting," at which the President met with the Heads of the Civil House, Golbery do Couto e Silva, the National Information Service (SNI) and the Military Office to plan the daily agenda (MANTEGA, 1997).

The Minister of Planning, João Paulo dos Reis Velloso, had previously been Minister of the same office under the Medici government (1969-1974), but had been overshadowed by the almighty Delfim Neto, then Minister of Treasury. Reis Velloso made a career at Banco do Brasil (BB) and was a student of Mario Henrique Simonsen. He had the opportunity to graduate in the United States at Yale University, where he met James Tobin, who presented him with the Keynesian perspective of economics (MANTEGA, 1997). According to Mantega, before becoming an advocate of developmentalist ideas, Velloso swayed between Eugenio Gudin's monetarist view, CEPAL structuralism, and economic nationalism. Prior to becoming Minister of Planning for Medici and Geisel, Velloso was invited by Roberto Campos in 1964 to found what would become the Institute for Economic and Social Planning, later called the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA) (MANTEGA, 1997).

Another important minister of the II PND was Severo Gomes, who at the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MIC) sought at all costs to privilege domestic companies over foreign ones in the allocation of resources and tax benefits. This improvement occurred through Resolution No. 9 of the CDE, which provided that orders from state-owned companies should be placed with the national industry, and sought to increase the degree of nationalization of the components produced (SILVA, 2003).

Regarded as a businessman and a nationalist minister, Severo was critical of foreign investment and the indiscriminate arrival of foreign companies to underdeveloped countries (MALIN; COSTA, c2009). He will be disconnected from MIC following a public disagreement with the adviser to the French and Brazilian Bank Carlos Lousada, who accused him of being a "leftist minister," while Severo retorted calling him as a "fascist businessman." The case became more delicate as the minister himself publicly defended political openness (MALIN; COSTA, c2009).

Minister Mario Henrique Simonsen, a follower of a more orthodox and liberal line⁶, was an adviser to Roberto Campos and one of the creators of the Government Action Plan (PAEG) during the Castelo Branco period. Prior to assuming the Ministry of Treasury, he taught at the FGV in Rio de Janeiro and published some economic theory books, including "*Inflation: Gradualism vs. Shock Treatment*" (1970) and "*The New Brazilian Economy*" (1974), along with Roberto Campos.

Returning to the analysis of elements that influenced the construction and implementation of the II PND, one should expose the president's own view on the subject. Geisel reports, in an interview quoted above, that he had been deeply concerned about the social situation the recessionary adjustment of the Castelo Branco's PAEG had caused, and would seek to prevent such a situation of unemployment and hopelessness from recurring in the country. Perhaps that is at the base of his "predilection" for Velloso and his developmentalist proposal for the execution of the II PND. According to Geisel himself, Simonsen was usually worried and showed irritation with the option for growth (D'ARAÚJO; CASTRO, 1997). An example of the submission of Treasury to Planning is when "the day-to-day economic policy that belonged to this important Ministry (*Treasury*) was parameterized by the great macroeconomic goals defined in the II National Development Plan, developed in Planning" (MANTEGA, 1997, p. 29, our translation).

⁶ Guido Mantega (1997) states that Simonsen and Roberto Campos were not as orthodox as Eugenio Gudin and other leading economists, but rather "moderate interventionists".

We will now proceed to a more detailed analysis of the II PND. The main purpose of this subtopic is to illustrate the most important details of the plan, to emphasize issues not always discussed or appreciated about the period, such as Law No. 6,151 of 1974.

3.3 The II PND in detail

The II PND aimed at overcoming the economic dependence on capital goods and sought to invest widely and substantially in capital goods, basic inputs, oil, electricity, among other areas considered as priorities by the government. Investments were not only made by state-owned companies, but also by private companies interested in participating in the Plan (BRASIL, 1974).

According to Mantega, there was an increase in exports in the period, which went from 7.5% of GDP to 9.5%, in addition to a 27% increase in exports of manufactured goods. Between 1973 and 1978, the increase of exports was considerable, reaching up to 105% (MANTEGA, 1997).

The developmentalist background of the II PND is not only the result of a need to adopt measures of structural change in the economy, as the modernizing military imagined, but also corroborates theses of the nationalist developmentalism of Presidents Vargas, Juscelino Kubitschek⁷, João Goulart; and important civil theorists such as Celso Furtado and intellectuals from the Higher Institute of Brazilian Studies (ISEB). The Plan, which envisaged the need to deepen import substitution in sensitive areas such as capital goods and basic inputs, resembled João Goulart's Triennial Plan, which had, by hands of its Minister of Planning, Celso Furtado, set clear targets to deepen Brazilian capitalism and structurally transform the national economy, emphasizing decentralized investments and focusing on the energy sector (FONSECA; MOREIRA, 2012).

According to Guido Mantega, the II PND,

...was the last major economic plan of the developmentalist cycle, in terms of repercussion and scope. The II National Development Plan (II PND) was probably the most extensive state intervention program in the country, and that significantly transformed the Brazilian industrial park, with the establishment of a hub of basic inputs and capital goods. (MANTEGA, 1997, p. 3, our translation)

Given the industrial backwardness in several areas, the II PND definitely sought to overcome underdevelopment and the "atrophy of sectors producing basic inputs and capital goods" (CASTRO; SOUZA, 1985, p. 33, our translation).

In this sense, for Geisel, development was the only way to modernize Brazil. He said that, after the "economic miracle," one could not, due to the rise in oil prices in 1973, throw thousands

⁷ It is important to point out that, according to Moreira (2017), there is a difference from Vargas, Goulart and Geisel's national-developmentalism to that of JK's, since the latter gives foreign capital an exaggerated importance, while those seek to reinforce national capital.

of Brazilians into misery due to an economic policy of recession and contraction of investments (D'ARAÚJO; CASTRO, 1997). According to the president, in analyzing the problem of income distribution and the resolution of problems arising from a possible recession, he argued that “a long-term solution, a definitive solution, must be found. That is why I have always been opposed to recession. I had seen the recession at the end of Castelo government and I was willing to do everything to prevent it.” (GEISEL apud D'ARAÚJO; CASTRO, 1997, p. 288). And he complements, saying:

If Brazil wants to be a modern nation, without the problem of hunger and without a series of other ills we suffer, it must develop. And for that, the main instrument, the great driving force is the federal government. The nation does not develop spontaneously. There needs to be someone who guides and drives it, and that is the role of the government. (GEISEL apud D'ARAÚJO; CASTRO, 1997, p. 287, our translation).

Referring to the question of national entrepreneurship and national capital, Geisel outlines a very particular view that meets the structural problem of the capitalist interstate system and its conflict-driven and competitive dynamic for wealth and power: “The British had and have an excess of capitals. They stole the whole world for 300 years and gathered all the money in their hands” (GEISEL apud D'ARAÚJO; CASTRO, 1997, p. 250).

Thus, the “74 option” (CASTRO; SOUZA, 1985), which professors Barros de Castro and Pires de Souza refer to as the path chosen for development, imposed a courageous and firm attitude, which according to Moniz Bandeira, Geisel had to spare (BANDEIRA, 2011). In this way, the author illustrates the broad leap toward technological and economic autonomy sought by the general-president:

In order to restrict technology purchases, which weighed as much as oil imports, he created three state-owned companies – Investimentos Brasileiros SA (Investibras), Mecânica Brasileira SA (Embramec) and Financiamento de Insumos Básicos (Fibase) – as subsidiaries of the National Development Bank. The purpose was to sustain, through association with state capital, the expansion of Brazilian private companies, mainly in the sectors of capital goods and basic inputs (aluminum, copper, fertilizers, barrel, etc.). (BANDEIRA, 2011, p. 190-191, our translation)

Corroborating with Bandeira, Carlos Medeiros points out that:

Structurally, with the change in the terms of trade in 1973 and the active policy of II PND to promote substitutive investments in basic inputs and capital goods and, at the same time, to promote exports, the Brazilian economy deepened its industrialization process reaching unprecedented levels among developing countries, both in terms of extension and diversification of its industrial park (MEDEIROS, 2015, p. 20, our translation).

Having made this introduction to the general aspects of the II PND, we will proceed to analyze the details and priority areas of the plan. As an ambitious project to deepen the Brazilian industrial capitalist revolution, the plan envisaged making Brazil as independent as possible of the basic and complex goods and inputs in the supply chain. To do so, one must confront interest groups, especially of sectors from São Paulo that were refractory to the idea of decentralized investments (SILVA, 2003). These, in addition to fulfilling a fundamental role of including neglected regions throughout the industrialization process, such as the Northeast and the North, also fulfilled a geopolitical function of colonization of the country's most remote and impoverished interior (BRASIL, 1974).

In order to deepen national integration through the decentralization of public investments, a hitherto neglected or at least unexplained element in the development plans of other military governments, namely the social issue and income distribution, draws attention. In this sense, the first page of the official document that presents the II PND, Law 6,151 of 1974, states that "Brazil will endeavor, until the end of the decade, to maintain the momentum the Revolution has been trying to generate, to cover the border area between underdevelopment and development" (BRASIL, 1974, p. 3, our translation).

The document states that, due to international instabilities, the country should live with them without giving up development and the increase of the average income of Brazilians (BRASIL, 1974). In addition to projecting economic growth so as not to neglect the social aspect and the increase of employment.

Briefly, we present here some relevant points of the document: i) the need to adjust the economic structure face the scarcity of oil. On this point, the document is emphatic about the need for expansion of the basic input and capital goods sectors; ii) reaching the end of the decade as a competitive and fully industrial economy; iii) the country should expand its power generation capacity. This requires a broad infrastructure package that brings together nuclear, hydroelectric and petroleum expansion by Petrobras⁸; iv) a national science and technology policy with an emphasis on a national postgraduate program; v) planning aimed at national integration; vi) productive occupation of the Amazon and the Midwestern region; vii) a social development strategy that contemplates the massive generation of employment, income, qualified human resources in education and health; viii) the need for integration with the world economy without regional or ideological discrimination (BRASIL, 1974).

⁸ About this, namely the diversification of energy sources, it is worth emphasizing the importance of a strategic alcohol program, Proálcool, which emerged in 1975, by Law 76,593, as an important substitute for oil dependence. In addition to substantially reducing the imports of oil and gasoline, the creation of a specific and comprehensive program such as Proálcool contributed to the generation of a considerable ethanol market niche for Brazil. Through state funding, private companies have invested in large-scale ethanol production, which has spurred a broader process of manufacturing and selling alcohol-powered cars. According to Bautista Vidal, the nationalist physicist who devised alcohol engines, "PROÁLCOOL, (...) is the tiny tip of a huge *iceberg* located in the tropics... and most of it is possible on the Brazilian continent." (BAUTISTA VIDAL, 1987, p. 185, our translation). Another important factor of the National Alcohol Program was the generation of jobs in rural areas. In 1986, Brazil had up to 95% of its fleet of passenger vehicles fueled by ethanol.

These eight basic points – called the “synthesis” of the fourth “Revolutionary Government” plan⁹ – form the foundation of the II PND, which is divided into three parts. The first, whose theme is: “Development and Greatness: Brazil as an Emerging Power”, has seven chapters. In the second part, the title is: “Great Themes of Today and Tomorrow.” It is divided into two chapters: “Energy Policy” and “Urban Development: Pollution Control and Environmental Preservation”. In the third part of the plan there are a number of topics about Brazil at the end of the decade, in which the government makes a comprehensive inventory of all production, sectors, economic and social indicators and growth projections. Finally, the fourth and final part of the II PND is the so-called “Action for Development”, which details the government’s investment program.

Our commitment will not be to analyze each part, chapter and topic, after all, the whole plan is 118 pages long and it is not the primary object of this study to do so, but to analyze the most relevant points of the economic development project with characteristics of structural changes in the national productive system.

In this regard, draws attention to the figure of the total to be invested in the five years of government (1974-79), Cr\$ 716 billion in basic industry, science and technology and economic infrastructure, as well as the budget of Cr\$ 760 billion, aimed at a “social development strategy” that sought to massively increase employment generation and aimed at the real increase of the minimum wage (BRASIL, 1974). Another point to be considered is the financing capacity of this huge program of productive expansion which, according to the law that implemented the II PND (Law 6,151, of 1974), counted expressively on external financing, the inflow of foreign capital and the large participation of state investment.

The expansion and the effort to improve export quality, especially to conquer markets for products with greater industrial complexity, is now seen in the II PND. Thus, pragmatism in foreign trade policy becomes geoeconomic in character, in accordance with the national interest guidelines established by the regime, namely to transform Brazil into a world power. Thus, less and less has the country was taken hostage to the ideological constraints of the Cold War.

Thus, one can see that the international economic conjuncture – the oil shock and the new world economic order of the 1970s – will significantly affect the national development strategy. Thus states the document of the II PND:

Brazil is trying to adjust quickly and fully to the new circumstances, as much as possible, by adopting the necessary measures later this year. The main concern is to adapt, from the point of view of the economic structure, safely and quickly, to the needs of the created situation. This should make it possible that, with a careful and intelligent external financial scheme, accelerated development can be preserved. (BRASIL, 1974, p. 13, our translation)

This “conjuncture pressure” contributed, it seems, to the course of the II PND, but in a different way, as we have seen, because despite the pressures of pro-recession groups the guideline

⁹ It is interesting to note the proposition of “step-by-step modernization,” which was in principle intended by the military in power.

followed a broad developmentalist program that sought to reconcile the coming of foreign capital with the national capital in order to guarantee a:

Positive nationalism orientation, aimed at ensuring the execution of the national development strategy, striking the balance between national and foreign capital and ensuring, in articulation with the international economy, the achievement of the country's goals. (BRASIL, 1974, p. 19, our translation)

Therefore, this “positive nationalism orientation”, which reminds us of Jaguaribe’s “nationalism of ends”¹⁰, was the basis of Geisel’s development project and, in a way, as we have sought to illustrate, of military developmentalist thinking. As said above, Geisel himself reinforces the need to build integral development, based not only on economic growth but also on the modernization of national economy, the improvement of social standards and productive autonomy.

According to Law 6,151, 1974, productive investments sought to decentralize industrial production and integrate the national territory as a whole into the production chain. The intention was, therefore, to change the model of national development itself (FONSECA; MONTEIRO, 2007). However, this will generate great friction with the Southeast industrialists, mainly from São Paulo, and will trigger a crisis that will reflect on the scenario of government’s political support. In accordance with Law 6,151, the CDE (Economic Development Council) issues Resolution No. 14, which determines the decentralization of productive investments of the II PND (GARCIA, 1983). With this, the entrepreneurs from São Paulo, represented by FIESP (Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo) expressed their opposition to the decentralization of investments from 1978 through a note sent to Minister Reis Velloso. According to Mariene da Silva:

Resolution No. 14 was interpreted in São Paulo as an act of discrimination against the state, the implications of which would be stagnation, deterioration, devitalization and paralysis (to name a few of the terms used) of the country’s main industrial hub. There was then a strong reaction from the São Paulo business community (FIESP, ACSP, FCESP, São Paulo Engineering Institute⁴⁹), local public authorities (municipal and state) and the São Paulo press (OESP newspaper). (SILVA, 2003, p. 15, our translation)

The strategy of decentralization of investments was based on the creation of new metropolises capable of producing sophisticated goods with high technological complexity and avoiding being just a producer of unprocessed goods. This would build the capacity to innovate and expand the export of manufactured goods. Another aspect of the plan was the “adjustment of multinational companies to the national strategy” (BRASIL, 1974, p. 20).

For Barros de Castro and Pires de Souza – who reinforce our argument that the II PND was not only a response to the conjuncture but also a necessity of Brazilian capitalism –, in 1974

¹⁰ “Purpose nationalism” was based on the idea that foreign capital was needed to assist in the process of national development (JAGUARIBE, 1958).

the national economy had ceased to be competitive in many sectors and needed to deepen our productive capacity. The deterioration of the terms of trade would have left the Brazilian economy in a delicate situation, hence:

Faced with problems of this nature and magnitude, it would be of no use to hinder the economy and/or reorient domestic spending. More precisely, the mere slowdown of the economy and/or the activation of certain branches and the retraction of others would leave an unbalanced and proven vulnerable economic structure intact, in the face of a world whose instability could no longer be ignored. (CASTRO; SOUZA, 1985, p. 36, our translation)

However, according to the same authors, a large increase in public investment was not enough for the realization of this great undertaking – the change in the productive structure by the II PND. For this reason, the State guided all the instruments of development, such as BNDE financing, and used all political power to pressure entrepreneurs from strategic sectors, such as Ermínio de Moraes, from Votorantim, to expand their investments and productive capacity (CASTRO; SOUZA, 1985). To state-owned companies, however, was reserved the protagonist role in the II PND, which led to heavy criticism of the government by some sectors of the economy. In this regard:

The huge investments made by Eletrobrás, Petrobrás, Siderbrás, Embratel and other public companies were, strictly speaking, the mainstay of the program. This is twofold: *for their strategic function* (our emphasis) and for the fact that, from its orders, many projects were carried out by the private sector. In addition, some of the projects run by the state-owned companies, due to their exceptionally long maturity, would cause the influence of the 74 strategy to go far beyond the decline in private investments associated with it – whose end seems to date back to 1976. (CASTRO; SOUZA, 1985, p. 38, our translation)

The authors go so far as to say that the “strategy of 74” was so important that, even with the change of government and the economic team, the effects of the II PND on the restructuring of the national productive system could not be altered (CASTRO; SOUZA, 1985). Our thesis – that military developmentalism, together with the “Brazil Great Power” thought, has matured and been taken to its ultimate consequences – converges with this argument. The real foundations of the country’s development and productive modernization had to be deepened; hence, Geisel did not slow down the process of growth and change in the economic structure that he expanded and crystallized.

Nevertheless, this statement does not disregard the influence of two other factors for the deepening of modernization and structural change: the legitimacy of the political regime and the world economic conjuncture. What we seek to argue, however, is that these two factors were less relevant in implementing the Geisel government’s development agenda, precisely because military developmentalist thinking had long advocated the need for more productive and strategic

autonomy. It is worth mentioning that, according to Carlos Lessa, “the very strengthening of national capital, repeatedly emphasized by the II PND, would be only the first moment of a Nation-Power Strategy” (LESSA apud CASTRO; SOUZA, 1985, p. 45, our translation). Lessa considers the military command of politics, with its corollary of “Brazil Great Power,” as not necessarily good. Nicknamed the “Prince State,” according to the author, the state becomes a kind of historical and active subject, while society becomes the passive object of this power (LESSA, 1998).

Castro and Souza argue the II PND caused a great confrontation between the “market forces” because, as in the current development project (1974) – converging and deepening the ideal of “Brazil Great Power” – the aim was to decentralize investments so as to form an industrial bourgeoisie in the regions of the whole country and thereby fill the voids and make the development process more balanced. The II PND was the fruit and, in our opinion, the maturation of the ideal of military developmentalism. Thus:

The national industrialization project, which had as its first major milestone the battle for the modern steel industry, is ostensibly assumed there. Such a project, sometimes adopted, sometimes neglected by successive administrations, has deep roots in segments of the civil bureaucracy and the Armed Forces, has the intermittent support of a portion of the native bourgeoisie, and even came to enjoy some popular support in the episode of the struggle for oil. (CASTRO; SOUZA, 1985, p. 45, our translation)

And they go on, “but never ceased to bear the mark of a political determination that seeks to overcome the so-called game of market forces” (CASTRO; SOUZA, 1985, p. 45, our translation). The authors argue that the idea of the “Brazil Great Power” project takes root in the past, specifically in the left and right nationalist groups throughout the twentieth century in Brazil. The question of being above the “game of market forces” is striking in developmentalist and authoritarian military thinking. As we have been trying to show throughout the study, the “mission” of modernizing the country from top to bottom and recognizing that national elites were weak and unable to lead the development process reinforces the argument that the “Brazil Power” project and Geisel’s “Great Strategy” are driven by a political perception of the national development process. That is, the economy is subordinated and instrumentalized according to the political project of power.

An important aspect regarding the choice for development, or the choice for the expansion of productive capacity as an instrument to overcome external constraints and economic dependence, was the criticism of the II PND. However, as we shall see, many of these occurred at the post-Geisel time, when the international economic developments stemming from the two oil shocks and strong dollar diplomacy (TAVARES, 1985) were harshly felt around the world.

Anachronistic criticism, therefore, since no one expected that such developments could occur and, moreover, face the ease of access to low interest external financing. Why should a government seeking economic modernization – like Geisel’s – fail to take advantage of such a fundamental instrument for the implementation of its national development plan? For Barros de Castro and Pires de Souza, the diagnosis made in 1974 by the government was precisely to prevent

the country from suffering the consequences of international turmoil in the future. In the 1980s, trade gains from the large favorable balance of exports are due to the positive effects of the II PND on the Brazilian industrial park, which had gained robustness and greater competitiveness and complexity (CASTRO; SOUZA, 1985).

Another widespread criticism, especially in the business world, was that the II PND was a strategy of deepening state domination over the national productive system (AGUIRRE; SADDI, 1997; BONELLI; MALAN, 1976). Strategic sectors of the economy, such as the steel industry, petrochemical, paper and pulp, fertilizers, minerals, base industry, among others, were criticized. The newspaper *O Estado de São Paulo* even published a few editorials in a row about nationalization and the risks of the country becoming a socialist economy.¹¹ However, Geisel himself will say the state invests in and occupies sectors that entrepreneurs cannot or will not because they do not have available capital or are not interested in the low rate of return on the short term (D'ARAÚJO; CASTRO, 1997). Beyond this view of Geisel, one must not lose sight of the fact that economic nationalism has historically occupied a captive place to both the left and right of the national political spectrum. Both structuralists, authoritarian and progressive developmentalists, as well as nationalist military, understood that it was necessary to preserve sectors of production and the possession of strategic minerals in the hands of the state.¹²

In addition to criticism that the II PND was an instrument of nationalization of the productive system, the Geisel government also received criticism and disagreement from sectors of the economy that were not addressed or that had not been met with priorities, such as the automobile sector – this sector openly criticized Proálcool and advocated for the adoption of diesel engines in passenger cars (CASTRO; SOUZA, 1985). Foreign debt was another element of criticism from the media and sectors of the economy, as well as orthodox economists. However, as Luciano Coutinho points out, about debt:

It was a global phenomenon of unforeseen indebtedness, but in our case it corresponded to the construction of the last major blocks of infrastructure and industrial capacity (capital goods and inputs) needed as the basis of the “Brasil Grande” project. (COUTINHO, 1987, p. 179, our translation).

These criticisms from sectors of the economy – which supported the regime of exception from its outset – begin to criticize the military government just as it proposes a productive decentralization and the creation of regional economic poles. This coincidence of criticism with the II PND will come to light at a time when the government is beginning to struggle with political openness. As mentioned above, various sectors are beginning to criticize the nationalization of the economic process, such as São Paulo newspapers – *Folha* and *Estadão* –, companies from the same state that were not benefited by the heavy investments of the II PND, and other sectors of society,

11 For more details see the old editions of *Estadão: O Estado de S. Paulo, São Paulo, jul/1973 – dez/1975*.

12 See Góes Monteiro's cited works, doctrines such as National Security (DSN), ISEB publications, and the works of Alberto Torres and Oliveira Vianna.

such as the Catholic Church, the Brazilian Bar Association, among others. These demonstrations are in line with the launch of the 1977 “April Package”, when the government closes Congress and maneuvers to regain the parliamentary majority lost for the MDB-centered opposition at that time (BRESSER-PEREIRA, 2014).

Another element that aggravates the loss of support from economic sectors is that the II PNB finally proposes to “share the cake” accumulated by the growth and speaks clearly, on page 04, of the need to increase the income and living conditions of the worker and middle class. In this sense, the document states:

With such a result [from the II PND’s investments and developments], broad prospects for the income increase of the middle and working classes are opened, either by the effect of the economic program or by the Government’s social policy. (BRASIL, 1974, p. 4, our translation)

Admittedly, the policy of decentralizing investments and the strengthening of “new regional economic elites”, coupled with the increased role of state-owned enterprises in building new productive capacity, caused discomfort in those businessmen who had long enjoyed government benefits and, at the same time, were an important pillar of political support for the regime.

4 Conclusion

In this study, we tried to present Geisel government’s strategy for implementing an ambitious project for developing and overcoming economic dependency via the II PND. Considering Brazil’s peripheral place in the International Labor Division (ILD), the II PND was an instrument for building economic autonomy and attempting to deepen industrialization and the national capitalist revolution itself.

Despite internal and external pressures – mainly from the United States via interest rate increases in 1979 – the Geisel administration’s geoeconomic strategy was broadly in line with its objectives and resumed the developmentalist project of Vargas and João Goulart, as it favored economic nationalism and structural change.

In seeking to make conditions for the Brazilian production system to become more complex and competitive, some results are relevant: exports from 1974 to 1980 were multiplied by 2.8 and there was a 20% increase in exports of industrial products in the same period (MEDEIROS, 2015); the growth of the manufacturing industry, of up to 7.1%; and, above all, the development of the capital goods industry, with 8.5% growth. Thus, “the economy would climb the ladder of capital-intensive and technological-intensive industries” (CASTRO; SOUZA, 1985, p. 76). These data are relevant because they reinforce the developmentalist vision of the Geisel period and its strategy of structural transformation of the Brazilian economy, to overcome the obstacles that prevented the deepening of an autonomous national development.

The balance was quite positive for some analysts, such as Guido Mantega, who argues “the II PND generated a much more integrated industrial structure with a complementary

intersectoral dynamic, which reduced the dependence of the Brazilian economy on hegemonic capitalist centers” (MANTEGA, 1997, p. 38, our translation). In addition, the II PND privileged the national capital that would be in imbalance with foreign capital.

It should not be overlooked that Brazil was one of the fastest growing countries from 1930 to 1980, at an average 6.3% (DATHEIN, 2006). We can attribute this success to the developmentalist projects of great national leaders, while recognizing the exogenous elements of each conjuncture and situation. The “military developmentalism,” as well as its civilian form, had the merit of thinking a strategy of modernization and transformation of the country, to change the place of Brazil in the hierarchy of world power. Ernesto Geisel, with the II PND, is part of this praiseworthy process and serves as an example for us to think about the current directions of the country, which has since lost the “consensus for growth” (CASTRO; SOUZA, 1985) and, therefore, one of the main elements of structural change: the nationalist development strategy.

References

- AGUIRRE, B. M. B.; SADDI, F. C. Uma alternativa de interpretação do II PND. **Revista de Economia Política**, São Paulo, v. 17, n. 4 (68), p. 78-98, 1997.
- BANDEIRA, L. A. M. **Brasil-Estados Unidos: a rivalidade emergente (1950-1988)**. Civilização Brasileira, 2011.
- BARCELLOS, J. M. V.-B. Segurança e desenvolvimento como fundamentos da “Grande Estratégia” do governo Geisel: uma análise geopolítica. 2016. Dissertação (Mestrado em Economia Política Internacional) – Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, 2016.
- BARRETO, P. H. História: Bretton Woods. **Revista Desafios do Desenvolvimento**, Brasília, DF, a. 6, n. 50, 2009.
- BARU, S. Geo-economics and Strategy. **Survival**, [S.l.], v. 54, n. 3, p. 47-58, 2012.
- BAUTISTA VIDAL, J. W. **De estado servil a nação soberana: civilização solidária nos trópicos**. Brasília, DF: Editora UnB, 1987.
- BLACKWILL, R. D.; HARRIS, J. M. **War by other means**. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016
- BONELLI, R.; MALAN, P. S. Os limites do possível: notas sobre balanço de pagamentos e indústria nos anos 70. **Pesquisa e Planejamento Econômico**, Rio de Janeiro, v. 6, n. 2, p. 353-406, 1976.
- BRASIL. **II Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento (1975-1979)**. Brasília, 1974. Suplemento a Lei 6.151 de 4 de dezembro de 1974. Available at: <https://bit.ly/2JIGpCV>. Access on: 15 maio 2019.
- BRESSER-PEREIRA, L. C. **A construção política do Brasil**. São Paulo: Editora 34, 2014.
- CASTRO, A. B.; SOUZA, F. E. P. **A economia brasileira em marcha forçada**. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1985.
- CERVO, A. L. **Inserção internacional: formação dos conceitos brasileiros**. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2008.
- COUTINHO, L. Crise econômica e soberania nacional. In: OLIVEIRA, E. R. **Militares: pensamento e ação política**. Campinas: Papirus, 1987. p. 177-182.
- D'ARAÚJO, M. C.; CASTRO, C. (org.). **Ernesto Geisel**. Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 1997.

DATHEIN, R. Brasil: vinte e cinco anos de estagnação econômica e as opções do desenvolvimento. In: ENCONTRO NACIONAL DE ECONOMIA POLÍTICA, 11., 2006, Vitória. **Anais [...]**. Porto Alegre: UFRGS, 2006.

FERREIRA, O. S. **Elos partidos**: uma nova visão do poder militar no Brasil. São Paulo: Harbra, 2007.

FIORI, J. L. (org.). **Estados e moedas no desenvolvimento das nações**. 2. ed. Petrópolis: Vozes, 1999.

FIORI, J. L. Formação, expansão e limites do poder global. In: FIORI, J. L. (org.). **O poder americano**. Petrópolis: Vozes, 2004. p. 11-64.

FIORI, J. L. **História, estratégia e desenvolvimento**: para uma geopolítica do capitalismo. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2015.

FONSECA, P. C. D.; MONTEIRO, S. M. M. O Estado e suas razões: o II PND. **Revista de Economia Política**, São Paulo, v. 28, n. 1 (109), p. 28-46, 2007.

FONSECA, P. C. D.; MOREIRA, C. S. **O projeto do Governo Goulart e o II PND**: um cotejo. Porto Alegre: UFRGS, 2012. Texto para discussão n. 12.

GARCIA, F. C. Articulação de interesses e processo decisório estatal: o caso do Conselho de Desenvolvimento Industrial (CDI). **Revista de Administração de Empresas**, São Paulo, v. 23, n. 2, p. 25-40, 1983.

JAGUARIBE, H. **O nacionalismo na atualidade brasileira**. Rio de Janeiro: Ministério da Educação e Cultura, 1958.

KILSZTAJN, S. O acordo de Bretton Woods e a evidência histórica: o sistema financeiro internacional no pós-guerra. **Revista de Economia Política**, São Paulo, v. 9, n. 4, p. 88-100, 1989.

LESSA, C. **A estratégia de desenvolvimento, 1974/76**: sonho e fracasso. Campinas: Universidade Estadual de Campinas, 1998.

MALIN, M.; COSTA, M. Severo Fagundes Gomes. In: **Dicionário histórico-biográfico brasileiro – DHBB**: pós 1930. Rio de Janeiro: FGV, c2009. Verbete. Available at: <http://www.fgv.br/cpd/doc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-biografico/severo-fagundes-gomes>. Access on: 15 maio 2019.

MANTEGA, G. **O governo Geisel, o II PND e os economistas**. São Paulo: FGV, 1997. Relatório de Pesquisa n. 3.

MEDEIROS, C. A. **Inserção externa, crescimento e padrões de consumo na economia brasileira**. Brasília, DF: Ipea, 2015.

MOREIRA, C. S. O II PND do governo Geisel e a retomada do nacional-desenvolvimentismo. In: ASSOCIAÇÃO BRASILEIRA DE DESENVOLVIMENTO. **Prêmio ABDE-BID**: edição 2017. Brasília, DF: ABDE Editorial, 2017. p. 149-177.

PARMAR, S. S. The maritime dimension in India's national strategy. In: VENKATSHAMY, K.; GEORGE, P. (org.). **Grand strategy for India: 2020 and beyond**. New Delhi: INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE STUDIES & ANALYSES, 2012. p. 83-92.

SERRANO, F. Relações de poder e a política macroeconômica americana, de Bretton Woods ao padrão dólar flexível. In: FIORI, J. L. (org.). **O poder americano**. Petrópolis: Vozes, 2004. p. 179-222.

SILVA, M. V. Política industrial e interesses empresariais: o IIPND (1974-1979). In: CONGRESSO BRASILEIRO DE HISTÓRIA ECONÔMICA, 5.; CONFERÊNCIA INTERNACIONAL DE HISTÓRIA DE EMPRESAS, 6., 2003, Curitiba. **Anais [...]**. Curitiba: ABPHE, 2003.

SYRQUIN, M. Structural change and development. In: DUTT, A. K.; ROS, J. (ed.). **International handbook of development economics**. Cheltenham Glos: Edward Elgar, 2008. v. 1. p. 48-67.

TAVARES, M. C. A retomada da hegemonia norte-americana. **Revista de Economia Política**, São Paulo, v. 5, n. 2, p. 5-15, 1985.

TREVISAN, L. **O pensamento militar brasileiro**. São Paulo: Global, 1985.

VELLOSO, J. P. R. **O último trem para Paris**: de Getúlio a Sarney: "milagres", choques e crises do Brasil moderno. Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1986.

VELLOSO, J. P. R. O governo Geisel: estratégia de desenvolvimento e coordenação da política econômica. **Revista Brasileira de Economia**, Rio de Janeiro, v. 52, p. 15-26, 1998. Número especial.