

# Globalization and the future of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries - CPLP: the potential of the block as a defense strategy for Brazil

*La globalización y el futuro de la Comunidad de los Países de Lengua Portuguesa – CPLP: el potencial del bloque como Estrategia de Defensa para Brasil*

**Abstract:** Over the years, Brazil has been tightening its relationship with the member countries of the Community, as recommended in our National Defense Policy (PND). This work analyzed, in the light of the current post-Cold War international conjuncture, the extent to which the CPLP presents itself as a potential block to contribute to the achievement of the National Defense Objectives (OND) mentioned in the National Defense Strategy (END). The methodology used consisted of descriptive elements of internet articles; conditional documents of defense; lecture; and the bibliographic research carried out at the National Defense College - ESG. Initially, it addressed globalization and its influence on the block. Subsequently, the history of the Community was rescued; the important aspects of the maritime universe of the CPLP, the Cooperation Agreements, mainly in the Defense Area, without considering economic or mobilization aspects related to military exercises carried out between the Armed Forces of the block. And finally, possible direct aligned ONDs were described and confronted with the Brazilian strategic interest with the CPLP. The conclusion indicates that the CPLP is configured as an excellent Defense Strategy platform for Brazil.

**Keywords:** CPLP. Globalization. Defense strategy.

**Resumen:** A lo largo de los años, Brasil viene estrechando la relación con los países miembros de la Comunidad, como recomienda nuestra Política Nacional de Defensa (PND). El presente trabajo analizó, ante la actual coyuntura internacional globalizada, pos Guerra Fría, en qué medida la CPLP se presenta como bloque en potencial para contribuir a la consecución de los Objetivos Nacionales de Defensa (OND) mencionados en la Estrategia Nacional de Defensa (END). La metodología utilizada se constituyó de elementos descriptivos de artículos de internet; de documentos condicionantes de Defensa; de conferencias; y de la investigación bibliográfica realizada en la Escuela Superior de Guerra (ESG). Inicialmente, se abordó la globalización y su influencia sobre el bloque. Posteriormente, se rescató el historial de la Comunidad; los aspectos importantes del universo marítimo de la CPLP, los Acuerdos de Cooperación, sobre todo en el ámbito de la Defensa, pero sin tener en cuenta aspectos económicos o de movilización relativos a ejercicios militares realizados entre las Fuerzas Armadas del bloque. Por fin, se describieron y confrontaron los posibles OND directamente alineados con el interés estratégico brasileño hacia la CPLP. La conclusión indica que la CPLP se configura como una excelente plataforma de Estrategia de Defensa para Brasil.

**Palabras clave:** CPLP. Globalización. Estrategia de Defensa.

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## 1 Introduction

In 2019, the Community of Portuguese Language Countries – CPLP will celebrate twenty-three years of existence. As a major player within the Community, Brazil seeks to make use of political-diplomatic and mutual cooperation actions to strengthen its relationship with the bloc's member countries. This is in line with the premises of the *Política Nacional de Defesa* – PND (National Defense Policy), and has the potential of making the Community another strategic national-interest platform.

In this sense, this study intends to analyze, in view of the current, globalized international conjuncture, to what extent the CPLP can be considered a potential contributor to the achievement of the *Objetivos Nacionais de Defesa* - ONDs (National Defense Objectives) prescribed in the *Estratégia Nacional de Defesa* – END (National Defense Strategy).

Thus, we will attempt to: a) describe the phenomenon of globalization and its influence on the bloc's countries; recover the history of the CPLP and its evolution to the present day, highlighting its strategic importance for Brazil; characterize the CPLP maritime universe, especially the South Atlantic, and the influence of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the oceans that bathe the community (section two); b) take an in-depth look at the Cooperation Agreements between Brazil and the Community's member countries, also approaching the actions resulting from these agreements, with special attention to the area of Defense, verifying Brazil's performance within the Community in regards to this aspect; characterize the CPLP as a defense strategy for Brazil by describing which ONDs mentioned in the END are directly aligned with the Brazilian strategic interest towards the Community, assessing the potential of the bloc to achieve these objectives. Section four provides an overall conclusion.

The study itself addresses the universe of post-Cold War international relations; Brazilian performance within the CPLP; and the reflexes of the currently existing Cooperation Agreements between Brazil and the bloc's member countries. Special attention is given to the area of Defense and to the Brazilian Navy (*Marinha Brasileira* – MB), given the significant maritime space encompassing the CPLP (Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans). Albeit superficially, other Agreements and their possible strategic-interest reflections are also mentioned. This paper will not address the economic, deployment, and budgetary aspects of military exercises carried out by the Armed Forces of CPLP member countries, due to the restricted access to data on these subjects.

The analysis will be carried out by identifying feasible ONDs—as highlighted in section three—while confronting them with activities and Cooperation Agreements developed by Brazil alongside the bloc. As described in the Brazilian Constitution and in Brazil's defense-conditioning documents (our Defense Whitepaper, known as the LBDN or *Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional*, as well as the PND and the END), our end goal is to assess the CPLP's potential contribution to the achievement of these ONDs.

The information analyzed here was extracted from internet articles, documents, lectures and academic bibliography (VERGARA, 2007). These sources will subsidize our argument of the importance of the CPLP as a defense strategy for Brazil.

## 2 Globalization, the CPLP and Brazilian strategic perception

There are several definitions regarding the concept of ‘globalization’ and its origin. Today, most people perceive it as strictly associated with economic factors. It is very true that even during the European maritime expansion and the great navigations of the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> centuries the exchange of goods demanded a high degree of global interconnectedness.

Globalization, in fact, is not a 21<sup>st</sup> century phenomenon. Throughout the years, however, the term was subjected to an evolutionary process, gaining new connotations.

The globalization we know today emerged from improved transportation means, advanced telecommunications, and an entire shift in technological development, which has reached a new height with the advent of the internet. This shift catered to the demands of capitalism, since developed countries had a dire need for new markets, with their domestic consumption opportunities mostly saturated (AZEVEDO, 2015, our translation).

From the 80’s onwards, an accelerated pace of technological transformation allowed the world’s main economies—the members of the G7<sup>1</sup>—to feverishly expand their markets, creating today’s so-called “global village” (2013) and fulfilling the necessities of these central economies.

However, it would be wise to remember that globalization is not just about economic factors: it also involves cultural, financial, and political issues. Above all, globalization entails asymmetric power relations.

Similarly, the effects of globalization are a highly debatable point. Its advantages and disadvantages may not have the same respective weights in the ‘political scale’ of international relations.

In any case, this phenomenon has undoubtedly imposed new limits on the exercise of state sovereignty. In this sense, many developing countries have sought ways to adapt themselves to globalization’s negative effects.

It became clear at an early stage that the only way out of the domination imposed on weaker states would be cooperation in the form of regionalization and partnerships. In thesis, the formation of alliances between the less-industrialized countries would create a kind of mega-state, able to survive the terrible consequences of globalization, generating a stronger counterpoint to the great powers.

In this sense, Santos (2000, p. 137, our translation) categorically points out a way out of globalization’s perverse domination:

Regional blocs are, in fact, an effort by member nations to minimize the negative effects of the globalization process. These blocs enable trade between nations in the same

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1 The Group of Seven (G7) is an international group consisting of Germany, Canada, the United States, France, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom. The European Union is also represented. These countries are the seven most advanced economies in the world, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and account for more than 64% of global net wealth, equivalent to US\$ 263 trillion (G7, 2019).

region, better negotiating conditions with other blocs, and even a political stance with greater overall weight.

Within this context, various regional and non-regional blocs (partnerships) have been formed, in order to articulate and compose a mega-state profile capable of competing with other nations on an equal footing, especially to face the dominant economy represented by the US.

The above understanding is justified by authors Costa e Silva (2004, p. 121, our translation) in the following excerpt:

[...] At the current juncture, economic polarization has been transfigured into regionalization. The [economic] center demands scale, and small countries must come together in larger markets—mega-states such as the European Union—or conform to remaining or becoming peripheral.

Cabral (2004, p. 9, our translation) corroborates this view: “The concept of a mega-state, in this formula, implies the formation of new poles of power; these poles would displace the dominant system from its present hegemonic centrality.”

It is also worth mentioning that the South Atlantic region and the West African coast are within the Brazilian strategic environment and, according to Saraiva (2015, p. 52, our translation), “Africa is the last frontier of global capitalism.” As African countries fall within the group of least developed countries, the reflexes of globalization may be even more prominent there. The African continent’s incipient stage of globalization means that its survival in the face of globalization requires the application of several strategic actions. Thus, the Brazilian strategy of cooperation and the deepening of relationships with Portuguese language countries is of paramount importance.

Portuguese-speaking countries are a relevant space for Brazilian cooperation: ... our common language facilitates the implementation of projects, especially when it comes to human resources training. In this context, Brazil has been developing bilateral cooperation agreements with the Portuguese-speaking African countries (PALOP) and with East Timor, while also undertaking multilateral actions within the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) (DIAS, 2015, p. 12, our translation).

In this sense, the CPLP—with the majority of its member countries in the African continent—may be an important step towards the fulfilling of Brazil’s National Defense Objectives, as established by our National Defense Strategy (BRASIL, 2016a). However, this possibility has to be subjected to rigorous analysis. In line with Almeida (2003, p. 155, our translation), “[...] one of Brazil’s objectives in the Community of Portuguese Language Countries is to open new commercial, political and diplomatic niches.” This is one of the scenarios that will be assessed later in this text.

In the 23 years of the CPLP’s existence, Brazil, the main protagonist of this Community of more than 230 million inhabitants, has increasingly made use of its political-diplomatic

experience and sense of mutual cooperation to try and strengthen its relationship with the bloc's countries. This approach is in line with the PND (BRASIL, 2016b), and can certainly make the Community another national-interest strategic platform.

Thus, at least in regards to economic goals, future prospects can elevate the Community to new heights, leveraging globalization to deepen the relationships between its members.

In regards to this new phase of the Community's development, Gala (2011?) states that East Timor's adhesion in 2002 has created an opportunity to project the Portuguese-speaking universe onto Asia. Mota (2009, p. 52, our translation) agrees that this is an important strategic component: "[East Timor] is a strategic point in the Pacific for the CPLP and its members, akin to Macao for the CPLP's representation in the increasingly competitive Asian world."

In analyzing other geopolitical strategies whose object is the CPLP, the importance that the PRC has attached to the African continent is undeniable. China is deeply interested in the region's inputs and raw materials, which is why the Asian country's investments, influence, and even presence in the Lusophone area have increased in recent years.

It should also be noted that the Macao Special Administrative Region, where the Portuguese language is still widely spoken, is undoubtedly a gateway between the CPLP and the PRC. As the largest destination for Brazilian exports, the PRC has a broad economic relationship with Brazil. The construction of a solid political-diplomatic relationship with this global player—which now occupies the second position in the international economic scenario—is a must for the CPLP bloc, and consequently for Brazil.

The Brazilian foreign policy and its evolution since the creation of the Community is yet another extremely important aspect, a major component of the political-diplomatic relationship between Brazil and the CPLP. With the end of the Cold War and the hegemonic rise of the United States, accompanied by protectionist policies from the dominant economies of the time (G7), then President Fernando Henrique Cardoso seemed particularly sensitive to the future prospects and directions of the Community. In this sense, as pointed out by Saraiva (2001, p. 31), there was a need for formulas to translate the affinities between the bloc's members in a palpable and material way, especially in regards to concrete possibilities of technology transfer, trilateral cooperation, and partnerships with developed countries and multilateral agencies.

The institutional framework of the Community should rely on a well-defined structure (Heads of State and Government Conferences; a Council of Ministers; Permanent Negotiation Committees; and an Executive Secretariat), with clear objectives (political-diplomatic concertation; economic, social, cultural, and legal cooperation; as well as the promotion and diffusion of the Portuguese language)<sup>2</sup> assumed by its members, in order to provide a synergy in favor of the defense of common interests, establishing equality between partners, and projecting the bloc internationally.

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2 Available at: <<https://www.cplp.org>>.

Thus, the Brazilian government of the time perfectly understood the need to adapt to this aspect of the international scenario, i.e., to duly consider the CPLP. This orientation is even more apparent today, as there is a greater impetus towards South-to-South cooperation between Brazil and Africa, with the aim of building a bloc-wide strategy. Such strategy, which is undoubtedly in the national interest, requires a foreign policy capable of projecting the country and ensuring its “survival” in the face of globalization:

[...] The formation of the CPLP takes place in the international context, determined by regionalizing and globalizing trends. ... The proliferation of regional economic and trade arrangements poses new challenges to organizations emerging from alternative foundations, such as common language, as is the case of the CPLP. One must carefully consider the relevance of the CPLP vis-à-vis the European Union (for Portugal), the Mercosur (for Brazil), and the SADC (for Angola and Mozambique). In fact, it makes no sense for the CPLP to mold itself in the image of these other arrangements, given the reality of trade relations and geographical distance between its partners. The most appropriate form of accommodation for the Community is to potentiate other [kinds of] interests, which in turn will potentiate the CPLP itself (SARAIVA, 2001, p. 32, our translation).

As a matter of fact, when analyzing the bloc’s creation, it becomes clear that at the time there was not the slightest possibility of making the CPLP space a free-trade area modeled after the existing economic blocs. One has to take into account that the initial interests behind the creation of this Lusophone space had cultural and linguistic roots. However, since the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, and especially during former President Lula’s administration, the political stability of African governments (democracy), accompanied by the gradual opening of markets and their increasing development, resulted in an increased flow of capital and investments towards these countries. This allowed Brazilian companies and institutions to internationalize and develop activities in the African continent (VALE, ODEBRECHT, EMBRAPA, SENAI, FIOCRUZ etc.).

In President Dilma’s administration, however, the Brazilian external policy for the CPLP was almost forgotten. This was a consequence of the serious political and economic troubles plaguing Brazil. As a side effect of these problems, there was an even closer approximation between the PRC, the PALOP countries, and East Timor. This analysis is corroborated by Holzacker (SANTOS, 2015, our translation), who states: “Since the beginning of the Dilma administration, Brazil has been losing its international legitimacy and its role as a major world power, especially in regards to the space it had conquered in African and Middle Eastern countries.”

At least in regards to economic aspects, the reinstatement of a forward-looking foreign policy for the CPLP could elevate it to new qualitative standards. New regionalization initiatives and partnerships could certainly leverage the Community’s already existing, and considerable, globalizing impetus. Today, the CPLP is comprised of nine countries (Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique, Portugal, São Tomé and Príncipe, and East Timor), as well as several associated observers (Georgia; Republic of Namibia; Republic of Turkey; Japan; Hungary, Czech Republic; Slovak Republic; and Oriental Republic of Uruguay), and 62 institutions who act as advisory observers.

Understanding the evolution of African countries and their development vis-à-vis the rest of the globalized world makes the universe surrounding CPLP member countries appear even more promising. Although not very expressive, there are interesting signs of improvement in several areas, especially social and economic indicators. These will simultaneously enroll in a process of urbanization; income improvement; increased consumption and demand for products, all of which are contributing to a positive evolution.

Brazil, associated with Mercosur, and Portugal, associated with the European Community—in addition to PALOP countries' association with other blocs in Africa itself—have been intensifying cooperation arrangements aimed at promoting closer bilateral or bloc relations. Furthermore, the future adhesion of East Timor to the Association of Southeast Asian Countries (ASEAN) has been indirectly contributing to the development of the Community's countries, as explained by Oliveira (2015, p. 45, our translation): “The cooperation received by the PALOP [countries] in the sphere of the CPLP, combined with bilateral agreements, contributes to the development of [CPLP] states.”

In the political-diplomatic field, Brazil has also been playing a key role in projecting the Community, especially with the bloc's proactive participation in multilateral organizations and forums such as the UN and the World Trade Organization (WTO). This has led to important victories in defense of developing countries.

In trade terms, it is also important to recognize the implications of CPLP's creation over the voting of WTO resolutions. Members of the CPLP participating in WTO negotiating rounds can support each other; Portugal, for example, can pressure the European Union regarding the protectionism of agricultural products, which is harmful to Brazil, among other possibilities. It is also key to understand how trade relations between CPLP member states can reduce the existing asymmetries between the eight countries (MOTA, 2009, p. 21, our translation).

Above all, the efforts of Brazilian foreign policy and diplomacy must be intensified in order to foster the bloc's image of a mega-state, strengthening itself in the pursuit of common interests.

[...] Taking advantage of the globalization gap is a duty of CPLP member states, given the need to find solutions for the social and economic survival of their populations. The new view is based on the willingness to practice international politics actively, and not just reactively. ... Hence the need to expand CPLP's negotiating capacity in various international fora; this is important, among other things, to allow it to benefit from international cooperation efforts and the affirmation of multilateralism (CARDIM; CRUZ, 2002, p. 323–324, our translation).

Another clear example of Brazil's influence in building an architecture beneficial to the strategic interests of the bloc's member countries was the election and reelection of

Brazilian Roberto Azevedo as WTO President. He received massive support from African countries. The election of Portuguese national António Guterres as the new UN Secretary-General (since January 2017) follows the same trend.

All of the above is corroborated by the following statement by Oliveira (2015, p. 38, our translation): “... the fact is that the CPLP has been strengthening itself in the international concertation, providing its member states with greater conditions of insertion, as well as a furthering their external competitiveness.”

The foreign policy context surrounding CPLP countries requires special attention. The CPLP must pay constant attention to following the regional developments of globalization, pursuing a strategic vision capable of strengthening the deliberations of its organisms and instances<sup>3</sup>, thus solidifying the Community and its influence over the international scenario.

Given the immense geographical space between CPLP member countries, other nations’ interests in access to raw materials and natural resources as well as external threats stemming from other motivations may have a direct bearing on the sovereignty of the Community’s member countries. In these conditions, defense and security aspects become all too important, especially for Brazil.

Thus, defense-wise, CPLP regions within the Brazilian strategic environment—the West African coast and the South Atlantic—are defined as areas of priority interest in our PND (BRASIL, 2016b).

Moreover, the CPLP encompasses an even larger maritime universe than just the South Atlantic. Thus, the PND determines that maritime communication with the Macao Special Administrative Region (via the CPLP, given the proximity of East Timor) is an important pole of Brazilian entry and presence in Asia. It is worth noting that Brazil’s close relationship with the PRC, as well as the technological perspectives for new, large-scale ships known as *New Panamax* and *Triple-E* (PANAMAX..., 2012), could lead to a new international ordering in the maritime transport of goods, reviving the old shipping routes used during historical European maritime expansion.

[...] However, the projection of Brazil’s economic interests goes beyond the South Atlantic. This projection will be all the more effective if the country is able to correct course and restart its distraught industrial development. At the same time, the diminishing importance of the Panama and Suez Canals for the new classes of cargo ships and oil tankers renews the importance of the old discovery-age sea lanes; hence the need for a worldwide projection of Brazilian economic and political interests, breaking with the geographical limits imposed by official geopolitical thinking and reaffirmed in defense policies (ALBUQUERQUE, 2010, p. 81, our translation).

3 Available at: <<https://www.cplp.org/Default.aspx?ID=2753>>.



In regards to security, since the CPLP has maritime areas in three different oceans, other powers may be envious of its wealth and maritime routes. This may even lead to transnational illicitness. In this sense, national-interest maritime communication lines—even those extending to Asia (East Timor)—must be a cause of security concern. Member countries' current defensive capacities, as well as their degree of interoperability in a possible joint use of forces against possible threats, may bear on how safe the members of the Community feel, especially in the case of Brazil.

In order to provide as reliable an understanding of Brazilian strategic interests as possible, especially regarding the maritime universe of CPLP member countries, one must resort to high-level defense documents, and address one of the main principles of the Brazilian Constitution (BRASIL, 1988), described in item I of its first article: sovereignty.

The LBDN (BRASIL, 2016a, p. 28, our emphasis and translation) provides the following description of the importance of the South Atlantic Sea for the country:

This ocean has relevant strategic areas, such as the “Atlantic Canyon,” [in Portuguese, *Garganta Atlântica*] between the northeast coast of Brazil and West Africa, an intercontinental space of vital importance for world trade. The southern passages connecting the Atlantic to the Pacific provide an alternative route to the Panama Canal, especially for large ships. The Cape of Good Hope, connecting the South Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, is an alternative to the Suez Canal and also offers the best access to the Antarctic Sea. The significant importance of the vast oil basin in the Brazilian continental shelf, as well as the oil import/export routes of equatorial Atlantic countries, are also worthy of mention.

The South Atlantic has economic, strategic, and political dimensions, all of which merit careful consideration.

Regarding the economic dimension, it should be noted that more than 80% of world trade is by sea. More than 92% of Brazil's international trade relies on this vast ocean, with its maritime communication lines with the rest of the world acting as gateways. These routes are similarly important for the bulk of Brazilian oil production, especially when considering the recent discoveries in the pre-salt regions. Other vital activities depending on these maritime routes are fishing, and also the mining of noble and rare minerals found in the EEZ (exclusive economic zone). Regarding the latter, it is worth mentioning that Brazil is negotiating the EEZ's expansion to 350 nautical miles, potentially increasing the Blue Amazon area by about 1 million km<sup>2</sup>, to a total area of 4.5 million km<sup>2</sup>. All of the above is undoubtedly not only a demonstration of the amount of resources available in the South Atlantic, but their extreme importance for the Brazilian economy.

Regarding the strategic dimension, these facts alone demonstrate how relevant the South Atlantic is for Brazil's exercise of sovereignty in this vast maritime space. To this end, the PND (BRASIL, 2016b, p. 8, our translation) emphasizes the following:

[...] the natural Brazilian maritime vocation is supported by its extensive coastline, the magnitude of foreign trade practiced in it, and the undeniable strategic importance of the South Atlantic, which hosts the so-called “Blue Amazon,” an ecosystem whose area is comparable to the Brazilian Amazon. [The Blue Amazon] is of vital importance to the country, as it contains an elevated potential of living and non-living resources: among them, the largest Brazilian reserves of oil and.

Regarding the political dimension, the proximity of the African Continent with Brazil—especially in respect to countries in Africa’s Western coast (which is part of the Brazilian strategic environment)—requires the adoption of policies to ensure security and sustainable socioeconomic development for the South Atlantic Region. Brazil seeks to ensure a close relationship with these countries and maintains a peaceful and collaborative environment in the South Atlantic by means of the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS) (BRASIL, 2017b), originated from a UN Resolution. The resolution prevents the proliferation of armed conflict and the introduction of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction by external interference (i.e., outsider states).

In line with the above understanding, the Ministry of Defense’s Normative Ordinance 64, from November 8, 2016 (BRASIL, 2016c, our translation) enacts the *Diretrizes de Defesa para a Área Internacional* – DIRDAI (Defense Directives for the International Area), clearly stating that: “In the African continent, we must seek to intensify our cooperation with countries within the Brazilian strategic environment, with the objective of consolidating a peace and cooperation zone in the South Atlantic.”

Such a comprehensive political effort in favor of security in the South Atlantic notwithstanding, constant vigilance must be maintained over maritime trade routes and against external interests aimed at accessing the riches within this vast maritime space. This vigilance must apply not only to routes directly concerning Brazil, but also to those linked to countries in the West African coast. In this regard, there are even problems related to transnational illicit activities that are currently plaguing the world as a whole, such as terrorism and piracy. In the Gulf of Guinea, the latter is a particularly serious cause of concern.

In this sense, Bernardino (2011, p. 46, our translation) states that:

The globalization of regional maritime conflict has witnessed a weakening of the capacities of states and their social, political and military structures in Africa, with a direct impact on their ability to safeguard their sovereignty and combat marginality and crime at sea.

Given this example of compromised sovereignty—which may present itself anywhere in the South Atlantic, posing a serious threat to any of the countries bordering this ocean—defense investments are essential. Hence the role of the CPLP, which will be discussed further in the next section.

Coveting developing countries’ raw materials and commodities (oil, minerals, etc.), especially the ones belonging to Brazil and the African countries, the PRC has been investing

in infrastructure capable of providing the largest possible flow of trade with these commercial partners. The PRC's actions are based on the precise understanding that the US has control of the world's major shipping lanes (Malacca Strait; Singapore; Gibraltar; Suez and Panama Canals). In this context, the old discovery-age routes are becoming increasingly important to the Chinese. These routes may eventually allow them to entirely bypass the current reliance on their Yankee competitors. In addition, the innovative *New Panamax* and *Triple-E* ship classes—much more capable of bringing Chinese products to the rest of the world—have motivated the Chinese to break with their reliance on the Suez and Panama Canals (even after the latter was widened, in 2016, to accommodate larger vessels). Thus, the Chinese have recently made a deal with Nicaragua and Russia for the construction of a new<sup>4</sup>, much larger-capacity Canal. The *Epoch Times* analyzes this situation as follows (CANAL..., 2016, our translation):

The construction of the Nicaragua Canal underscores China's need to ensure its access to the Pacific and the Atlantic, in order to protect the major sea routes and strategic points that connect the Asian giant with foreign markets and resource reserves.

With a view to the African Continent, the construction of a railway that will link Angola (Lobito) to Mozambique (Nacala)<sup>5</sup>, and also the Indian Ocean to the South Atlantic—besides other ramifications in the African interior—will greatly favor the logistics of supply to African countries, facilitating the shipment and selling of Chinese products.

It is also important to note that the Chinese presence in the African continent has been growing tremendously, especially within PALOP members. As evidenced by Veloso (2015, p. 53, our translation), corroborating the CPLP-Macao Forum association: “the Chinese foreign policy strategy of using the legacy of Portuguese colonization to get closer to the Lusophone world, facilitating negotiations as well as commercial and economic partnerships, has proven more than adept.”

In addition to the aforementioned Nicaragua Canal, China has a strategic participation in the construction of a railroad to connect the Pacific Ocean and the South Atlantic via South America: the Bi-Oceanic Corridor, with an endpoint either in Port of Açu<sup>6</sup> or Port of Paranaguá<sup>7</sup> (the location is yet to be defined). This shows that the PRC regards the commercial penetration of Latin America as equally important.

However, such a massive Chinese investment in the Pacific-Atlantic maritime interconnection—which includes a state-of-the-art maritime modal with greater transport capacity—would be of no use without a substantial improvement in port infrastructure, so the new demand can be met. Chinese needs, in this sense, could be a great opportunity to boost the

4 Available at: <<https://bit.ly/2KEYMtK>>. Access on: June 27, 2019.

5 Available at: <<https://bit.ly/2NhhWrV>>. Access on: June 27, 2019.

6 Available at: <<https://bit.ly/327xkKQ>>. Access on: June 27, 2019.

7 Available at: <<https://bit.ly/2NvpzuM>>. Access on: June 27, 2019.

Community's development; conversely, they can be framed as a significant competitive threat, since the CPLP bloc still faces serious limitations in terms of technology and equity to invest in port logistics. The PRC's power of penetration in the Lusophone world, accompanied by its large financial resources, means that it has a large leeway for increasing its influence within the Community, thus promoting its development. Such a strategy has fundamental importance for the PRC's commercial interests, especially in the South Atlantic.

Some say that as a result of the US shifting its concerns to the Asia-Pacific region, China's work in Latin America could be intended to fulfill its military interests, by promoting the securitization of the South Atlantic. However, this has not been the case so far: China's modern hard power is still no match to that of the US. Fully conscious of this limitation, China is heavily invested in a soft power strategy, which has successfully enhanced its relationship with Latin America and Africa in recent decades. This remains true not only from an economic, but also from a geopolitical point of view. China is seeking to further isolate Taiwan by diplomatic and foreign-policy means, which translates into trade and military cooperation (arms sales, military training, etc.) with Latin American and African countries, including Brazil and PALOP members. In this movement, China is also able to consolidate its presence alongside the countries bordering the South Atlantic, furthering its interests of gaining access to numerous mineral and energy resources. Finally, one must not forget that the South Atlantic can also provide China with access to the Antarctic continent.

In strategic terms, therefore, the CPLP's maritime universe, especially in the Southern Hemisphere, is integral to China's global maritime governance plan, which can be summed up as the creation of a *New Maritime Silk Road*. As the leading actor in the CPLP, and obliged to ensure the sovereignty of all of the bloc's member countries, Brazil cannot shy away from establishing a strategy of defense cooperation with the members of the Community. This becomes even more critical when we realize that not only the South Atlantic, but also the Indian (West African coast) and Pacific (near East Timor) oceans count among China's strategic maritime interests. This defense cooperation strategy has to be put into effect despite the fact that Brazil and China are major trading partners and colleagues in the BRICS<sup>8</sup>.

Thus, the following is the major outcome of the Chinese maritime strategy, according to the *Epoch Times*:

The Chinese regime's momentum towards the control of key maritime trade points is merely one part of a broader strategy. One of this strategy's tentacles is aimed at changing the current economic *status quo* in favor of China. On January 31, 2013, Captain James Fanell, at the time a US Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer, delivered a speech that would later cost him his job: "Do not fool yourselves: the Chinese regime's

<sup>8</sup> The term 'BRICS' refers to the group of emerging-economy countries formed by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BEZERRA, 2018).

People's Liberation Army Navy is focused on war at sea, with an offensive against their opponent's fleets," he said, adding that "China's negotiating [efforts aim] to take control of other countries' resources" (CANAL..., 2016, our translation).

Regardless of the strategies that the major economic and military powers (Chinese or American) may adopt, and even considering the possibility of a permanent European presence in the South Atlantic<sup>9</sup>, it is high time for Brazil, together with the CPLP, to consider the adoption of a defense-cooperation strategic platform within the "Lusophone Seas."

### 3 The CPLP as a defense strategy for Brazil

Common cultural, ethnic and linguistic traits have facilitated long-standing agreements and projects among CPLP members, which has promoted exchanges between each nation as well as economic development in various sectors. This very cooperation has also contributed to the increase of Brazil's international projection in a globalized and multipolar environment: this equates to a strengthening of the mega-state that represents the Community.

In general, as demonstrated by the last CPLP Council of Ministers Meeting held in Brasília in July 2017, Brazil has been working on its cooperation strategy both at the CPLP multilateral level and at the bilateral level, alongside each member country, in various sectors. The same logic applies to the Defense sector, as we will see below.

An analysis of the evolutionary process of the CPLP's Defense Component<sup>10</sup>, together with all the resulting actions in favor of the Community, shows that this structure is in constant need of adapting to the changes brought about by the 21<sup>st</sup> century's globalized and multipolar world. Diplomacy, foreign policy, sovereignty issues, national interests and external threats are increasingly present in the daily lives of countries. As corroborated by Bernardino (2016), the CPLP Defense component requires us to look towards the sea through the perspective of a genuinely geostrategic Defense cooperation model, able to encompass entire continents and oceans.

Specifically with regard to the Defense Sector, Brazil has sought to employ its collaborative military diplomacy alongside the Community in a proactive manner, as stated by Amorim (2016, p. 299, our translation): "... we attach great importance to this forum, the CPLP, specifically in the area of Defense." This strategy aims not only to contribute to the preservation of world peace, but, above all, to the maintenance of our sovereignty and the insurance of our interests in the Community's four oceans, with special attention to our immediate strategic surroundings in the South Atlantic.

<sup>9</sup> Available at: <<https://bit.ly/2JjXDEX>>. Access on: June 27, 2019.

<sup>10</sup> Available at: <<https://bit.ly/2XcEApp>>. Access on: June 27, 2019.

Moreover, we must raise awareness among the PALOP and East Timor that, similarly to Brazil, the strengthening of these countries' Defense Sectors generates important dividends, such as the safety of their maritime routes and seas, and the protection of their resources against the envious eyes of extra-regional powers. This protection also encompasses illicit transnational acts such as piracy—as exemplified by recent cases off the coast of Guinea-Bissau—and terrorism.

Reiterating this understanding, Amorim (2016, p. 37–38, our translation) states:

We have created a true belt of goodwill in our immediate surroundings, the reinforcement of which must be a permanent concern. This belt of goodwill allows Brazil greater freedom for [adopting] a universalist foreign policy, without the shackles that the eventual presence of threats on its borders would entail. This perception extends progressively to Africa. We wish to contribute specifically to the security of our partners in the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone. We need African countries to ensure that this ocean is a safe avenue for trade, free from piracy and organized crime.

Therefore, Brazil needs its African neighbors to be militarily strong in order to further strengthen the ZOPACAS, and defend the interests of each CPLP member country in their respective strategic environments.

Another important point is that, militarily speaking, Brazil's defensive capacities, followed by Portugal's, are far ahead those of other Portuguese language countries (mainly the PALOP and East Timor), which remain far below those of developed countries, suffering from a significant lack of systems, technology, training, staffing, and infrastructure.

Similarly, according to the Permanent Secretariat for Defense Affairs—which is responsible for coordinating Defense matters among countries in the bloc—to this date the CPLP's degree of joint interoperability within the Defense framework is conditioned only by the execution of "FELINO" Operations, which envisage the joint use of the bloc's Armed Forces in Humanitarian Aid Operations and Natural Disasters. That is, any potential future joint use of forces against threats to the sovereignty of any of the Community's countries is yet to be tested. When or if this type of operation becomes necessary, and depending on the type of threat, such joint action could be limited by a very low perception of security by the different societies of the Community, especially the Brazilian, considering that, as we have pointed out, the current defense capacity of CPLP member countries still presents several shortcomings.

The above point of view, although apparently discouraging, is supported by Amorim's perspective (2016, p. 300, our translation): "Obviously, it would be practically impossible to [conceive of] a unified defense [system] among CPLP countries, which does not prevent us from cooperating and reaching [similar] conclusions on how to cooperate in the defense of each CPLP country."

Brazilian military cooperation alongside the CPLP has the integral support of our 'Singular Forces.' However, in view of the importance of the great sea that unites the Community, the work of the Brazilian Navy alongside other navies of the Community—especially after the establishment

of the “CPLP Strategy for the Oceans” in 2009—shall be our focus, as it has played a leading role, considering its numerous actions, partnerships, and future possibilities (FARIA, 2016).

In addition, it should be noted that cooperation within the Defense Sector also contributes to the promotion of Community development. Cooperation Agreements enable the development of the industrial bases of the defense sector, especially in Brazil, which is currently undergoing a considerable stagnation, resulting from political and economic crisis.

Undoubtedly, the majority of the navies and coast guards in the African CPLP and East Timor are still very young, and require training. The Brazilian defense cooperation, led by the Brazilian Navy, has been acting as a strong political-diplomatic “arm” for the affirmation of Brazil as the bloc’s protagonist. In this sense, Moreira (2008) has long pointed to the importance of South Atlantic security: bordered by new sovereigns clustered around the CPLP, this sea has become a ‘Moreno’ (Brown) Ocean, where Brazil’s intervention is sought after, expected, and indispensable. Thus, in the face of today’s globalized world and regardless of the possibility of new geopolitics imposed by the great (military and/or economic) powers for the four oceans encompassing the Community, the CPLP mega-state must establish a constant sea-faring presence. It must strengthen itself through its partnerships, within international organisms and, especially, within the theater of nations. It must preserve world peace, respecting the principles of non-intervention, reciprocal sovereignty, multilateralism, and the multipolarity of the contemporary world.

The safety of the maritime environment today is more unpredictable than ever before, with incidents and conflicts occurring on an unprecedented territorial scale. There is a recurring view that maritime security will only be achieved by strengthening international cooperation, mutual dialogue and multi-level responses involving intelligence, application of the legal framework and military capabilities. [...] No geopolitical change will be able to alter the relevance of the sea to the future of humanity. In the area of maritime security, navies will fulfill an increasingly vital role in their countries and on the world stage. The repercussions of oceanic issues are mounting, amplified by the interconnectedness of the globalized world (FARIA, 2016).

In this sense, the military cooperation currently being developed between Brazil and the other CPLP member countries—as established by the Defense Cooperation Protocol (Cabo Verde/2006<sup>11</sup>)—in addition to the understandings signed in the Minutes of the IV Navy Conference of the CPLP (Maputo/2015<sup>12</sup>), are evidence enough of the need for a strategic vision based on the strengthening of the Community’s Defense component.

11 “Protocolo de Cooperação no Domínio da Defesa - Cabo Verde/2006.” Available at: <<https://bit.ly/2RPyw0x>>.

12 “Ata da IV Conferência das Marinhas da CPLP - Maputo/2015.” Available at: <<https://bit.ly/2Xi5pnN>>.

Thus, the CPLP has a great opportunity of presenting itself as a decisive contributor to the fulfillment of the ONDs mentioned in the END. We assess this matter in greater detail below, by confronting these objectives with actions that are currently under way and with potential future actions by Brazil alongside the Community.

With the above said, it is clear that, within the political-diplomatic theater, the CPLP adjusts perfectly into certain PND fundamentals:

2.1.5 The National Defense Policy has as its principles the peaceful settlement of disputes, the promotion of international peace and security, multilateralism and South American integration, as well as the country's projection in the concert of nations and the expansion of its insertion in international decision-making processes, which requires a permanent effort of diplomatic-military articulation.

2.1.6 In this sense, without disregarding the global sphere, it establishes the Brazilian strategic environment as a priority area of interest; this includes South America, the South Atlantic, the countries of the West African coast, and Antarctica.

2.1.7 ... In view of their historical ties and cultural affinities with Brazil, the Portuguese language countries deserve special attention from cooperation efforts in the field of Defense. ... (BRASIL, 2016b, p. 6, our translation).

Considering the ONDs established by the PND, we can now verify which are identified with the CPLP:

I. Brazil's National Defense Objectives are the following:

II. To ensure sovereignty, national heritage and territorial integrity ...

III. To ensure a Defense capacity adequate to the fulfillment of the Armed Forces' constitutional missions ...

IV. To safeguard the [country's] people, property, resources and national interests abroad ...

V. To contribute to the preservation of national cohesion and unity ...

VI. To contribute to regional stability and international peace and security ...

VII. To contribute to the increase of Brazil's projection in the concert of nations and its insertion in international decision-making processes ...

VIII. To promote productive and technological autonomy in the area of defense ...

IX. To expand the involvement of Brazilian society in National Defense affairs ...

(BRASIL, 2016b, p. 6, our translation).

Among the abovementioned ONDs, objectives I, II, III, V, VI, VII, VIII are potentially aligned with the CPLP, which can contribute in their attainment, as we will see. OND IV was



not selected because it refers to responsibilities that are exclusively Brazilian, referring to internal strategies and strategic actions.

In order to more reliably verify whether the CPLP is a potential block for the achievement of Brazil's ONDs, we must confront the selected ONDs with past and future Brazilian actions alongside the Community.

In doing so, we can pair them with their respective defense strategies (*Estratégias de Defesa* – EDs) and strategic defense actions (*Ações Estratégicas de Defesa* – AEDs), while establishing some baseline parameters.

OND-1: TO ENSURE SOVEREIGNTY, NATIONAL HERITAGE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

ED-2: To strengthen the country's deterrence capacity.

This strategy is related to developing, refining and consolidating the country's conditions to discourage any hostile action against its sovereignty, interests, and aspirations ...

AED-9: To develop capabilities to monitor and control airspace, cyberspace, territory, waters in the Brazilian jurisdiction and other areas of interest. (BRASIL, 2016b, p. 33–34, our translation).

According to Faria (2016), the Brazilian Navy's cooperation in building an architecture for a PALOP and East Timor jurisdictional water monitoring and control system—a Long-Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) system and a Vessel Traffic Management Information System (VTMIS), for instance—may contribute to the monitoring of merchant traffic and of national-interest areas and maritime. A VTMIS in particular could lead to real-time exchange of information with other member countries.

In this sense, the CPLP has potential conditions to contribute to the achievement of OND-1, by means of ED-2 (AED-9).

OND-2: TO ENSURE A DEFENSE CAPACITY ADEQUATE TO THE FULFILLMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES' CONSTITUTIONAL MISSIONS ...

ED-5: Budgetary regularity.

Budgetary regularity allows the Defense Sector to better plan the use of its financial resources, rationalizing this process and making defense spending more efficient ...

AED-26: To allocate an adequate percentage of the GDP to defense spending ... (BRASIL, 2016b, p. 34–35, our translation).

Also, as we have discussed previously, Brazil has been playing a fundamental political-diplomatic role in projecting the Community, especially with the proactive participation of

the bloc in multilateral organisms and forums, such as the WTO. This participation has led to important victories for Brazil and developing countries as a whole.

Especially with regard to Brazilian economic interests, CPLP support in the WTO has been extremely relevant, as Brazil has been achieving significant victories and removing obstacles that hinder the development of certain economic sectors. This has made Brazilian products more competitive in the international market, as recognized by Caulyt (2014, our translation): “Brazil is one of the most active developing nations in the organization’s dispute settlement system and, with victories against rich countries’ protectionist policies, it has gained space for its products.” Such victories favor our export activities, contributing to the effort of a generating a trade surplus and increasing our gross domestic product (GDP). This may also allow for a greater generation of financial resources to be invested in important economic sectors. Depending on the government policy currently in effect, this dynamic may favor investments in the Defense Sector.

Therefore, the CPLP has the potential to contribute, even indirectly, to the achievement of OND-2, by means of ED-5 (AED-26).

OND-3: TO SAFEGUARD THE [COUNTRY’S] PEOPLE, PROPERTY, RESOURCES AND NATIONAL INTERESTS ABROAD

ED-2: To strengthen the country’s deterrence capacity.

This OND concerns the development, improvement and consolidation of the country’s conditions to discourage any hostile action against its sovereignty, interests, and aspirations.

AED-31: To develop capacities to preserve at-risk nationals and safeguard Brazilian property, resources and interests abroad, including maritime communication lines ...

AED-33: To increase the participation of the Armed Forces in operational exercises with other countries ...

AED-35: To develop capacities to maintain the safety of maritime communication lines where national interests are concerned ...

ED-7: To effect defense-related diplomatic actions.

This strategy refers to activities stemming from partnerships between the Brazilian Defense Sector and foreign counterparts, aimed at strengthening trust, friendships, mutual knowledge and developing an environment of camaraderie and cooperation.

It also considers the relationship of the Defense Sector with other state and non-state agencies and with other countries’ societies.

AED-36: To improve our relationship with other countries’ Defense Sectors.

AED-37: To increase naval presence actions in support of diplomatic actions. (BRASIL, 2016b, p. 36–37, our translation).

Through Brazilian military cooperation with the CPLP, the Brazilian Navy's work alongside member countries' navies has functioned as a major political-diplomatic "arm." The leadership of the Brazilian Navy is exemplified by numerous actions such as "FELINO" Joint Operations, in addition to other bilateral Joint Naval Operations in the CPLP's sphere, as well as the strategic partnerships described by Faria (2016).

Likewise, such cooperation from the Brazilian Navy contributes, above all, to the maintenance of our sovereignty and the preservation of our interests in the four seas—especially in our strategic surroundings (the South Atlantic). This cannot but promote awareness on the part of the PALOP and East Timor that, similarly to what takes place in Brazil, the strengthening of their Defense Sectors can generate important dividends, such as the safety of their routes and maritime areas and the protection of their wealth against the envious interests of extra-regional powers. Notable signs of these interests are the permanent presence of England and France in the South Atlantic, and the significant increase in Chinese presence in the Lusophone area, with its sea strategy relying heavily on the American and African Continents. CPLP cooperation is also important for preventing or protecting against illicit transnational acts such as piracy (as in recent cases off the coast of Guinea-Bissau) and terrorism in its most different forms.

Specifically regarding the *Oceano Moreno* (Brown Ocean), an expression coined by Professor Adriano Moreira, it is evident that Brazil needs its African neighbors, especially the CPLP member countries, to be militarily strong. On that basis, they can increasingly contribute to the strengthening of ZOPACAS, defending the bloc's common interests.

Therefore, the CPLP directly contributes to the achievement of OND-3 by means of ED-2 (AED-31; AED-33; and AED-35) and ED-7 (AED-36 and AED-37).

OND-5: TO CONTRIBUTE TO REGIONAL STABILITY AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY [...]

ED-13: Work in international organizations.

This objective concerns Brazil's activities in international fora and organizations, together with the participation of Armed Forces and police contingents in humanitarian missions and peace operations under the mandate of multilateral organizations.

AED-50: To intensify work in multilateral fora and inter-regional mechanisms.

AED-52: To develop the Armed Forces' capabilities, so they may assume increasing responsibilities in international operations under the mandate of multilateral agencies (BRASIL, 2016b, p. 39, our translation).

Although "FELINO" Operations are still a CPLP-level exercise that predicts the joint use of the bloc's Armed Forces in humanitarian aid and natural disasters, the improvement of this exercise so as to increase the defense capacity and training of member countries' Armed Forces can create the conditions for an eventual CPLP force to be employed under the guidance of the United Nations, should the latter require it.

Likewise, in the political-diplomatic field, Brazil has also played a fundamental role, acting as leader of the CPLP and projecting it internationally, especially with the proactive participation of the bloc in multilateral organisms and forums such as the UN. It is worth pointing out that our country has made efforts to reformulate this organization, even though it is still far from achieving its goal of becoming a member of the UN Security Council.

Above all, the international-relations efforts of Brazilian foreign policy and diplomacy show that, since the bloc presents itself as a mega-state, it must increasingly strengthen itself in the pursuit of the Community's common interests. This makes its building by Brazil a relevant strategy for the pursuit of Brazilian interests.

In this sense, the CPLP contributes significantly to the achievement of OND-5, by means of ED-13 (AED-50 and AED-52).

[...] OND 6: TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE INCREASE OF BRAZIL'S PROJECTION IN THE CONCERT OF NATIONS AND ITS INSERTION IN INTERNATIONAL DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES

ED-14: Multilateralism-based action.

Refers to the Defense Sector's action in applying Brazil's political stance of multilateralism in international relations, international operations, and cooperation with other countries and foreign organizations. This aims to expand the participation of other countries in the discussion of global interest issues, conferring greater legitimacy to decisions.

AED-52: To develop the Armed Forces' capabilities, so they may assume increasing responsibilities in international operations under the mandate of multilateral agencies.

AED-53: To intensify the Defense Sector's role in international organizations.

ED-12: To promote international cooperation.

This strategy refers to activities stemming from partnerships between the Brazilian Defense Sector and foreign counterparts, aimed at strengthening trust, friendship, and mutual knowledge, while developing an environment of camaraderie and cooperation.

AED-47: To foster international mutual trust and security.

AED-48: To step up defense exchanges and agreements with other countries.

AED-49: To intensify the practice of international operations, unilaterally or in plurilateral arrangements; to intensify cooperation initiatives around defense interests.

AED-50: To intensify work in multilateral fora and inter-regional mechanisms.

(BRASIL, 2016b, p. 40, our translation).

As previously mentioned, Brazilian cooperation with the CPLP has proven an extremely valuable strategy by our diplomacy and foreign policy. Common cultural, ethnic and linguistic traits have led to several resilient and long-lasting agreements and projects to promote exchange and the development of each member nation across various sectors. This is especially true for the PALOP and East Timor, with CPLP cooperation leading to improvements in education; health; teaching of the Portuguese language; public safety; agriculture; environment, etc. This scenario has contributed to Brazil's affirmation as a leading actor of the entire bloc.

The country has been working on the CPLP strategy as a means for the creation of a genuine mega-state, able to make its presence felt in the concert of nations, and strengthening itself through its bilateral and multilateral partnerships with international organisms. The common tone of this work has been the preservation of world peace, respect to countries' sovereignty, multilateralism, and the increase of Brazil's international projection in a globalized and multipolar environment.

The contribution of Brazilian defense cooperation in the CPLP is a clear portrayal of Brazil's overall international cooperation model. Such a contribution has direct repercussions on our interests: the strengthening of ZOPACAS, for instance, promotes the preservation of peace in the South Atlantic, keeping it free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

Moreover, as described by Faria (2016), in addition to Operation "FELINO," the country has also carried out other international operations in the interest of defense. These operations resulted from bilateral agreements with the PALOP.

In this sense, the justifications presented for the CPLP's potential as a contributor to the fulfillment of OND-5 also apply to OND-6, realized by means of ED-12 (AED-47; AED-48; AED-49 and AED-50) and ED-14 (AED-52 and AED-53). This allows Brazil to increasingly project itself onto the international scene, sustaining an active voice in international decision-making processes.

OND-7: TO PROMOTE PRODUCTIVE AND TECHNOLOGICAL AUTONOMY IN THE AREA OF DEFENSE

ED-15: Promoting the sustainability of the Defense sector's industrial base ... This strategy seeks to provide stable conditions for the research, development, production and sale of Brazilian defense products, allowing for sustainability in the defense production chain, even if this sustainability has to rely on special legal, regulatory and tax regimes.

AED-62: To promote exports from the defense sector's industrial base.

AED-63: To promote the increased use of local materials in products of the defense sector's industrial base.

ED- 16: Strengthening of the Defense Science and Technology Area.

This strategy's aim is the development and consolidation of defense research, promoting the absorption, by the productive chain, of indispensable knowledge in order to foster the gradual reduction of our dependence on external technology ...

AED-71: To encourage partnerships and exchanges in the research of defense technologies.

AED-72: To acquire technologies that promote an increase the national technological content of our defense products (BRASIL, 2016b, p. 41–42, our translation).

In addition, it should be noted that cooperation within the Defense Sector can also contribute to the Community's development. Cooperation Agreements enable the development of the defense sector's industrial base, especially in Brazil, which is currently undergoing a considerable stagnation, resulting from political and economic crisis.

The military cooperation between Brazil and the CPLP is already showing signs of potentiality and hope for what the Community can offer in terms of resuming the growth of the Brazilian industrial segment, especially in the Naval Sector (albeit in an incipient way). A sign in this direction is the possible purchase of speedboats and small patrol vessels by PALOP and East Timor.

Meanwhile, the export potential of defense products has in the CPLP a very promising market environment. The very presence of a Brazilian Navy Sea and War Captain (CMG) in East Timor, currently serving as Advisor to the Timorese Defense Minister in the deployment of the Maritime Authority, is also concretely presented as a strategic vector of future possibilities for the country's naval sector, since East Timor's naval component is still in formation. Besides, PALOP Defense Sectors are also potential buyers, considering their very young navies.

Likewise, the arc of knowledge<sup>13</sup> defined by the Ministry of Defense also includes the Asian region as an extremely important pole in regards to trade opportunities for Defense Products (PRODE) and, consequently, the search and acquisition of new technologies.

This intensification of Brazil's military cooperation with East Timor, via the CPLP, may help establish a more effective presence on the Asian continent. One vector for that development is the Community's liaison with the Macao Special Administrative Region, which should facilitate Brazil's entry into Asia through the PRC, with which Brazil has a close relationship.

In this sense, the CPLP has concrete potential to become an extended arm of the Brazilian presence in Europe, Africa and Asia, and can contribute to the achievement of OND-7 by means of ED-15 (AED-62 and AED-62) and ED-16 (AED-71 and AED-72).

OND-8: TO EXPAND THE INVOLVEMENT OF BRAZILIAN SOCIETY IN NATIONAL DEFENSE AFFAIRS

ED-17: To promote the theme of defense in the educational environment.

This strategy refers to actions aimed at stimulating discussion about National Defense in the country's educational activities, at various levels, promoting greater awareness of the theme's importance.

AED-75: To work towards the insertion of the defense theme in the national education system.

AED-76: To perform, promote, and encourage teaching activities related to National Defense topics ...

AED-78: To support initiatives in recognition of defense as a subarea of knowledge alongside graduate research funding agencies ...

ED-18: Use of Social Media.

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13 Available at: <<https://bit.ly/2KIQwcs>>. Access on: June 27, 2019.

This strategy refers to actions for the interaction between the Defense Sector and the Brazilian society, enabling Brazilian citizens to learn about the activities performed by the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces, and promoting a genuine, realistic and legitimate image of these organizations.

AED-80: To develop and plan institutional promotion activities.

AED-81: To promote the visibility of Defense Sector actions as a factor in enlightening decision-makers and public opinion regarding defense issues (BRASIL, 2016b, p. 42-43, our translation).

On May 11, 2017, an opinion defending the offering of Defense studies in Brazilian Universities and Institutes of Higher Education was made official (BRASIL, 2017a). Such a formalization will allow this area of knowledge to become part of the educational background of civilian and military specialists, further consolidating our academic environment, and stimulating studies on national defense issues to also take place outside of military education institutions. This should peak the interest of young people, broadening their knowledge on topics of paramount importance related to our PND and END.

It is our understanding that the CPLP should be part of these research initiatives. This will provide the bloc with greater visibility, allowing our society to learn about the political-strategic architectures that Brazil seeks to build, and also about the defense activities performed by our Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces. Explanations of the role of the CPLP and its relations with ONDs I, II, III, V, VI and VII, for instance, contribute to a greater presence of the country on the international scene, which can thus maintain a constant pursuit of its interests.

In this sense, the CPLP also has real potential to contribute to the achievement of OND-8 by means of ED-17 (AED-62 and AED-62) and ED-168 (AED-71 and AED-72).

#### **4 Conclusion**

Today's international conjuncture has shown that globalization, a heritage of the great European navigations, has undergone phenomenal transformations, mainly as a result of technological developments that are bringing different parts of the world closer and closer. However, globalization is also marked by a growing asymmetry in the power relations between major states and developing countries. This applies not only to the economic sphere, but also to culture, politics and finances.

The end of the Cold War, in fact, marked the closure of the ideological bipolarity between West and East, driving the rise of the US as an economic and military power, as well as the prevalence of capitalism over socialism. A unipolar world order thus emerged, led by the US, who continue to strategically pursue their interests, despite the growing influence of new and powerful actors on the global stage, such as China.

The emergence of new regionalizations and partnerships, and the consequent formation of blocs among the least industrialized countries from the 1990s onward, provided a counterbalance to the domination of developing countries by the US together with other strong economies. Mega-states were created to try and survive the dire consequences of globalization, which stem from the inexorable ability of the strongest countries to penetrate the weakest, generating an involuntary dependency relationship that is the hallmark of the entire globalization process. This strategy has been successful in allowing such mega-states to effectively assume a political stance of some weight in the international concert. This takes place not only by means of bilateral and multilateral partnerships, but also in forums and international organizations, where weaker countries can ensure the defense of their interests, even if indirectly. Such a framework has also allowed these countries to cope with the dominant US economy, demonstrating that the principle of multipolarity should prevail.

The accurate understanding by Brazil of the dynamism made possible by globalization allowed the country to establish partnerships and regional and international blocs with South American, African and Asian countries. Within this strategic line of thought, Brazil realized that the historical, linguistic, ethnic and cultural foundations shared by over 230 million inhabitants of the Portuguese language countries could and should constitute a platform for the emergence of a mega-state community, capable of acting strategically in defense of its members' national interests. The formation of this community effectively occurred in 1996, with the creation of the CPLP.

Despite the immense geographical space that surrounds the CPLP member countries (4 continents and 3 oceans), nowadays the immense technological transformations resulting from globalization allow us to shorten distances and bring far-away nations together. However, as we have discussed, the Community encompasses different, unevenly distributed stages of globalization, especially in the PALOP and East Timor, which still require considerable investment and development.

In the case of the CPLP, we have seen the main reasons for the bloc's constitution were not economic in nature. This despite promising economic prospects in several sectors, in which Brazil has sought to follow through with the internationalization of its companies, also establishing bilateral, multilateral, and cooperation trade agreements.

Corroborating this understanding, the bloc's political architecture has provided Brazil with significant gains alongside international organizations such as the WTO, contributing to the development of important sectors of our economy, such as the agricultural sector. This virtuous dynamic has also benefited other developing countries. Similarly, Brazil's goal of projecting itself onto the international scenario, drawing on the Community's own overall projection, is an important foundation for a more proactive participation of the bloc and of Brazil itself within the UN. In this sense, it is worth remembering that our country has made significant efforts to reformulate the UN itself, although it remains far from achieving the goal of Security Council membership.



The maritime universe of the CPLP is also of considerable importance, not only because it involves areas within the Brazilian strategic environment, such as the South Atlantic, but also because defense and security aspects are all too important in face of the external interests in the access to raw materials and natural resources within this vast maritime area (not to mention threats of illicit transnational acts, all of which have already been mentioned, and which may interfere with the sovereignty of the countries of the Community). In regards to military power, Brazil is considerably advanced, followed by Portugal. However, the defensive capacities of other CPLP member countries (especially in the PALOP and East Timor) remain far below those of developed countries. Such capacities are in dire need of more resources, systems, technology, training, staff, infrastructure, increased inter-operability and, above all, government investments.

Furthermore, it is noteworthy that a possible geopolitical change in the CPLP maritime universe, especially in the South Atlantic region, may materialize in the future, as the US is shifting its axis of geopolitical concern to the Asia-Pacific Region. This is a reaction to the Chinese soft-power strategy, with its growing rapprochement with Latin America and Africa by means of infrastructure investments in various countries. It is also a response to a well-thought out maritime strategy for the expansion of Chinese sea-faring presence, access to raw materials, and natural resources. The technological prospect of new freight ships (*New Panamax* and *Triple-E*) may be integral to that strategy, and could lead to a new international maritime freight order, together with potentially increased piracy in focal areas.

Regardless of the strategies that the Chinese and American economic and military powers may adopt, or even those arising from the permanent European presence in the South Atlantic, in addition to having strong partnerships with these countries—especially China and other BRICS—Brazil must understand that the CPLP can play an important role as a strategic platform for our national interests, especially in regards to strengthening the ZOPACAS. Our country's peaceful nature only reinforces this proposition of multiple partnerships and agreements.

In the context of international relations, in a highly globalized, post-Cold War world, the Brazilian work within the CPLP has continuously stood out, as predicted in our PND. This has provided Brazil with a leading role in the bloc. Political-diplomatic action and a sense of mutual cooperation have been the strategy employed by the Brazilian government towards the CPLP, which has allowed it to identify potentialities of the bloc in contributing to the attainment of the ONDs predicted by the END.

In this sense, Brazilian cooperation with the Community, especially in the field of Defense and with special emphasis on the Brazilian Navy, has indeed shown that the CPLP is a potential block for the achievement of our ONDs. All in all, with the analysis carried out here, several elements justify the continued importance of the Community for Brazil. In mathematical terms, the CPLP may contribute to the direct or indirect achievement of 7 out of 8 ONDs, a percentage of 87.5%.

Finally, in light of all the abovementioned considerations, Brazil must increasingly prepare itself for the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, caused by the constant evolution of the globalization process and its asymmetrical power effects. Thus, more than ever, our country can and should expand its relationship with this strategic national-defense platform, the CPLP, attributing due importance to the continuation and improvement of existing defense cooperation agreements with its member countries, especially near the “Lusophone Seas.” As argued by Amorim (2016, p. 308, our translation):

Contrary to unfounded expectations that were in vogue after the end of the Cold War, geopolitics have not been surpassed in international affairs. Regrettably, the perpetual peace envisioned by Immanuel Kant has not yet become a reality.

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