

Chile and the search for modernization of its Army during the transition to democracy

Chile y las Demandas de Modernización del Ejército Durante la Transición Democrática

Abstract: This study aims to analyze the demands for military modernization and restructuring that led to the transformation of the Chilean Army at the beginning of the 21st century. We briefly discuss changes in military institutions, trying to identify factors or conditions that drive these change processes, and to assess to what extent political authorities exercise control over these changes. We also analyze the case of the Chilean Army in the 1990s, according to the following aspects: international political conjuncture, domestic political conjuncture, disputes and military tensions in the Chilean environment, perception of adverse military capabilities, perception of the very Chilean military capabilities, and the Chilean strategic culture. Finally, we outline the 1994 plan to modernize the Chilean Army. Our conclusion is that the process of modernization of the Chilean Army in the transition to democracy emerged within the armed institution, coming from the very top level, and it was mainly motivated by international and domestic prestige.

Keywords: Military Modernization. Military Innovation. Military Transformation. Chilean Army. Redemocratization in Chile.

Resumen: El propósito de este trabajo es analizar las demandas por modernización y reestructuración militar que condujeron al proceso de transformación del Ejército de Chile desencadenado a principios del siglo XXI. Presenta una breve discusión acerca de los cambios en instituciones militares, buscando identificar los factores o condiciones que impulsan estos procesos de cambios, y evaluar en qué medida las autoridades políticas ejercen el control sobre estos cambios. A continuación, analiza el caso del Ejército de Chile en la década de 1990, según los aspectos: coyuntura política internacional, coyuntura política nacional, contenciosos y tensiones militares en el entorno chileno, percepción de las capacidades militares adversas, percepción de las capacidades militares propias y cultura estratégica chilena. Por fin, presenta las líneas generales del plan de modernización del Ejército de Chile de 1994. Concluye que el proceso de modernización del Ejército de Chile durante la transición democrática surgió en el interior de la propia institución armada desde su cumbre, y fue motivado, sobre todo, por razones de prestigio interno e internacional.

Palabras clave: Modernización Militar. Innovación Militar. Transformación Militar. Ejército Chileno. Redemocratización en Chile.

Fernando Velôzo Gomes Pedrosa

Exército Brasileiro. Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército.
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.
velozopedrosa@yahoo.com.br

Received: Mar. 19, 2019

Approved: Nov. 7, 2019

COLEÇÃO MEIRA MATTOS

ISSN on-line 2316-4891 / ISSN print 2316-4833

<http://ebrevistas.eb.mil.br/index.php/RMM/index>



1 Introduction¹

The 1990s was a transition period in the history of Chile. After 17 years of a rigorous military dictatorship, the country began its transition to the democratic normality. On March 11, 1990, General Augusto Pinochet transferred the Presidency power to Patricio Aylwin. However, taking advantage of the attribute of irremovability of commanders-in-chief of the Armed Forces, which had been established in the 1980 Constitution (CHILE, 1980, art. 93),² the former dictator remained in the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Army for eight years after giving up the power (CAVALLO, 1998). During this transition period, Pinochet retained considerable political power (IZURIETA FERRER, 2015) and challenged the government's initiatives to punish excesses committed during the military regime as well as protected military personnel and civil servants involved in cases of violations against Human Rights. Despite the constant political confrontations, President Patricio Aylwin and his successor, Eduardo Frei, were able to deal with the old general, thus avoiding legal ruptures (CAVALLO, 1998).

Pinochet finally relinquished the command of the Chilean Army on March 10, 1998, at the end of President Eduardo Frei's fourth year in office. Thus, the cycle of transition to democracy in Chile has ended. Despite wounds left by the military dictatorship, the political class had been able to conduct a compromised transition, maintaining the stability and economic foundation that would ensure the future of the country (CAVALLO, 1998).

However, after 25 years under the command of General Pinochet, the Army felt that it had fallen behind in relation to the other armed forces in the country, which, for not being truly politically committed to supporting the military government, could modernize themselves, acquiring new equipment and achieving high professional standards (IZURIETA FERRER, 2015; LE DANTEC GALLARDO, 2015).

This study aims to analyze the demands for the military modernization and restructuring that led to the transformation of the Chilean Army at the beginning of the 21st century. The first section presents a brief theoretical discussion on changes in military institutions, trying to identify the factors or conditions driving these processes of change, and to assess to what extent political authorities can exercise control over these changes. The second section analyzes the concrete case of the Chilean Army, seeking to identify demands

1 This article is a partial result of the research conducted by the author in the scope of the Graduate Program in Comparative History of Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (PPGHC/UFRJ), under the guidance of Prof. PhD. Alexander Zhebit, between March 2014 and March 2018. The author would like to express his gratitude to Lieutenant General Roberto Arancibia Clavel for his support and guidance during the research conducted in Chile. As a researcher holding a PhD degree in History, former Chief of General Staff of the Chilean Army, and professor at Academia de Guerra del Ejército de Chile, General Arancibia gave the author a broad insight into the peculiarities of the Chilean military regime and the transition process to democracy, recommending bibliography on these topics and on the modernization of the Chilean Army, and facilitated the contact and interviews with several former Chilean military authorities, as well as the access to the Archives of the Department of Culture, History and Extension of the Army and to the Central Library of the Army. The author would also like to thank those retired and active duty officers of the Chilean Army who granted him interviews during his research: in Santiago, Chile, General (R) Óscar Izurieta Ferrer; Lieutenant General (R) Christian Le Dantec Gallardo; and Brigadier General (R) Jaime García Covarrubias; in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Lieutenant Colonel Álvaro Enrique Salazar Jara, Chilean instructor at the Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército (2017).

2 The Constitution drafted by the military government was approved in a plebiscite held in 1980 (TAGLE D., 1995, p. 8).

for modernization in the institution in the 1990s, during the process of redemocratization that followed at the end of Pinochet's government. The third section outlines the ideas of the Chilean Army modernization project published in 1994, called the Alcázar Plan. Finally, we present the conclusions of the research that originated this study.

2 Changes in military institutions

Military institutions tend to be conservative. This mostly occurs due to the conservative nature of the military personnel (HUNTINGTON, 1996), and results from the exercise of the military profession and education. War is the riskiest of human activities. Therefore, the conduct of war and the preparation of military forces are not activities that allow hasty decisions and frivolous experiments. Extreme risks involved in the military activity shape and reinforce the military's conservative posture, because although war is an eventual experience for most armed forces, the military education and the troop's training permanently emphasize the frightening reality of armed conflict. As a result, education of military officialdom and troop training encourage the reproduction of consecrated military behaviors and practices (PEDROSA, 2012).

Conservatism of armed institutions also comes from its bureaucratic character and the fact that bureaucratic organizations are averse to changes. As Stephen Rosen notes, large bureaucratic organizations are not only difficult to change, but they are also "designed not to change." And military bureaucracies are particularly resistant to change (ROSEN, 1991, p. 2).

In fact, despite its conservative character, military institutions do change. These military changes and innovations are inevitable, depending not only on the technological development occurring in the civil sector and affecting the military activity (MURRAY, 1998, p. 301), but also on political and cultural changes in societies (FARRELL; TERRIFF, 2002).

2.1 Origins of changes in military institutions

Since the mid-20th century, English and American historians have published studies on changes in military institutions. These researchers have pointed out different sources or motivations for such changes. Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff have identified three basic sources of military changes: cultural norms, political and strategic panorama, and technological changes (FARRELL; TERRIFF, 2002, p. 6). Cultural norms produce persistent behavior patterns, becoming institutionalized in community rules and routines, and imposed by strong sanctions. Although cultural norms are naturally conservative, they can produce changes in armed institutions, whether when changes in the political and strategic framework seems no longer to adjust to the current cultural norms, requiring changes that allow the institution to adapt to the new reality, or as a result of cultural changes that have occurred over time. Farrell and Terriff identify two types of cultural changes: the planned change and that resulting from an external shock. Planned cultural changes occur due to the emergence of new beliefs regarding identity and appropriate behavior. Deep

external shocks in the local cultural system, however, can undermine the current legitimacy norms and patterns of behavior associated with them (FARRELL; TERRIFF, 2002).

The most obvious cause of changes in military institutions consists in changes in the political-strategic framework, particularly the emergence of new military threats or changes in the strategic posture of the existing threats (FARRELL; TERRIFF, 2002). New technologies created by defense equipment industries or resulting from the military use of technological developments of civilian origin may also produce profound changes in military institutions, as demonstrated by the impact of rail, motorized, and air transportation on the conduct of wars and on the armed forces.

Emily O. Goldman (2002), in turn, understands that a primary path towards changes in military organizations is the dissemination of innovations originated in one State to the others, and identifies two main sources of motivations to disseminate military innovations: competition, arising from the perception of threats in the international environment, and the search for legitimacy within a social system. In her analysis, the author suggests competitive pressures in the field of international security influence the awareness of the need for changes in military institutions, but the normative considerations—such as obtaining internal and external legitimacy—are those that determine the extent of and the adherence to change, particularly when it comes to emulating foreign models. Goldman also notes that States tend to promote military changes based on the imitation of innovations implemented in countries with greater military capacity and ingenuity, what is characterized as a form of “institutional isomorphism.” Armed institutions imitate each other as it is the easiest way to adopt the best military practices demonstrated in the great wars of the period, but also searching for the legitimacy that can be conferred to them by the emulation of practices and formal aspects of successful military forces.

According to this perspective, organizations change to gain legitimacy, and isomorphism guarantees legitimacy to organizations. The success and survival of organizations partly depend on their ability to conform to and being legitimized by the institutions of their environment. Emulating consecrated practices is a demonstration of responsibility, and prevents the organization from being deemed as negligent. The success of institutionalized bureaucratic organizations depends on the confidence and stability provided by isomorphism (MEYER; ROWAN, 1977). Noteworthy, this is precisely the case of changes in armed forces in peacetime, when their success can only be assessed from the compliance with institutional and doctrinal norms.

2.2 Political control of change processes in military institutions

Regarding the level of control exercised by political authorities over the processes of change in military institutions, we may identify three models of interpretation. According to the first, proposed by Barry Posen (1984), military institutions are among the most difficult to be controlled by political authorities due to their characteristics of large bureaucratic organizations. “They are parochial, closed, large, endowed with all sorts of resources, and masters of a particularly arcane technology” (POSEN, 1984, p. 39). Due to these characteristics, the armed forces would be averse to doctrinal innovations and

are likely to preserve a certain degree of autonomy over civilian authorities. According to Posen's model, military innovation would depend on an intervention by civilian authorities to overcome the inertia of professional military. This model became known as the "external model of military innovation" (NAGL, 2005, p. 3-4).

Stephen Rosen (1991) proposed the second model of interpretation regarding the innovation of military institutions. According to Rosen, institutions would not need to suffer military defeats or be subjected to the intervention of civilian authorities in order to produce military innovations. According to this understanding, which became known as the "internal model of military innovation" (NAGL, 2005, p. 3-4), it is very difficult for the civilian command to impose a process of military innovation, due to the specialization and complexity of the military activity. Civilians would impact more if they could create a strategy to reinforce the action of the most senior officers who already held "legitimate" power in the armed forces.

Later, based on the concepts proposed by Posen and Rosen, other scholars developed an integrated model of doctrinal change. Barry Watts and Williamson Murray (1998), supporters of this integrated perspective, understand that military innovations in peacetime would inevitably be nonlinear, contingent, and marked by casualness. Hence, they preferred to avoid theoretical generalizations about explanations for the processes of military innovation. Instead, they chose to focus on a more modest and feasible objective, that is, to identify the specific actions adopted by high-level officers and civil servants to facilitate innovation in their military institutions. Regarding the scope of civilian authorities' intervention to induce innovation in military institutions, both authors understand that it would be very unlikely for a "handful of visionaries," though very dedicated and loquacious, to have any chance of forcing the institution to accept new doctrines without the acquiescence or collaboration of its bureaucracy (WATTS; MURRAY, 1998, p. 409).

3 Demands for modernization in the Chilean Army in the 1990s

The origins of the demands for modernization of the Chilean Army in the 1990s will be analyzed according to aspects deemed conditioning for the modernization of military institutions: international political conjuncture, national political conjuncture, litigation and military tensions around Chile, perception of adverse military capabilities, perception of the Chilean military capabilities, and Chilean strategic culture.

3.1 International political conjuncture

Internationally, Chilean redemocratization coincided with the end of the Cold War and the wave of redemocratization that terminated military governments dominating the South American political scenario in the 1970s. The end of military governments has defused tensions in the Southern Cone. In 1984, the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Chile and Argentina (CHILE, 1985) was signed, which defused geopolitical tensions between both countries, preventing a war in 1978. In the mid-1980s, Brazil and Argentina began the

rapprochement process that would result in the creation of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) in 1991, including Paraguay and Uruguay (CERVO; BUENO, 2010).

Redemocratization disrupted the international isolation to which Chile had been subjected during the military dictatorship, as a reaction of the international community to violations against Human Rights, which were perpetrated in the country. The end of the isolation would allow the *Concertación*³ governments to put into practice, in terms of international trade, the liberal economic model implemented by the military regime inspired by the Chicago Boys—a group of Chilean scholars formed according to the principles of the Chicago School (SOTO; SÁNCHEZ, 2015). During the *Concertación* governments, Chile signed a series of free trade treaties with countries in the Americas and other regions, becoming one of the freest economy countries worldwide (ECONOMIC..., 2019).

At the regional level, the 1990s and 2000s brought better relationships with neighboring countries to Chile, particularly Argentina, with which all border litigation was resolved. Concerning Peru and Bolivia, both countries still had demands emerging from Chilean territorial conquests in the Pacific War (1879-1883). Peru maintained demands regarding the maritime boundary with Chile and called on the International Court of Justice for a solution in 2008. In January 2014, this Court provided a judgment in favor of Peru in relation to the maritime boundary (INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, 2014). However, both countries are still engaged in a dispute over a tiny triangle of land at the coastline, whose dimension accounts for about 300 meters or less, but its possession causes tensions in the relationships between both countries, and has little difference in the line of the maritime boundary established by the 2014 judgment. Bolivia, in its turn, broke off diplomatic relationships with Chile in 1978, and since then both countries have maintained only consular relations.

3.2 National political conjuncture

The Chilean political transition was a very politically delicate period. Defeated in the popular inquiry of 1988, Pinochet, following the Constitution decreed by himself in 1980, called elections in 1989. In such election, the candidate of *Concertación*, Patricio Aylwin, was elected. One of the first steps taken by President Aylwin after taking office in March 1990 was the creation of a National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation. The purpose of the Commission was “to contribute to the global clarification of truth about the most serious violations against Human Rights” committed during the years of dictatorship, “in order to collaborate with the reconciliation of all Chileans and without harm to judicial procedures that such facts may produce” (CHILE, 1990b, our translation). The issue was extremely delicate and sensitive to the military personnel and especially to General Pinochet, but President Aylwin was very cautious in choosing the commission members. One of the careful measures was not to compose the Commission of politicians opposed to the military regime or people linked to the left-wing armed resistance. For the Commission’s presidency, the lawyer Raúl

3 Coalition of left-wing, center-left, and center political parties that opposed the military government in Chile and came together to defeat the proposal for enduring military government in the 1988 plebiscite. *Concertación* won the first four Chilean presidential elections after the end of the military dictatorship, ruling the country for 20 years.

Rettig was chosen, an old jurist and former parliamentarian, who had opposed to the military government, but whose conduct was blameless (CAVALLO, 1998, p. 22-23).

Pinochet protested against the Commission, and the Armed Forces did not comply with the progress of its work. However, in February 1991, the Commission presented its final report, which would be known as the Rettig Report (CHILE, 1996). This Report pointed out a total of 2,298 cases of violations against Human Rights, accounting for 1,151 deaths by State action, 979 missing prisoners, and 168 dead victims of political violence committed by individuals, without connection with the State. The Report also proposed the creation of an agency to continue investigations into hundreds of other cases without conviction. The final report on the work of this agency, the National Corporation for Reparations and Reconciliation, was presented in December 1996, adding 899 more victims of violations against Human Rights, 776 dead, and 123 missing (CAVALLO, 1998, p. 90-91).⁴

The legislation imposed by dictatorship for the transition included a broad authoritarian apparatus, aimed at protecting the civilian government and members of the repressive instrument of the military regime. The “authoritarian enclaves” (ESCALONA MEDINA, 2012, p. 255) included the following military tutelage tools: nine senators appointed by Pinochet, all with a conservative profile, four former commanders of the Armed Forces, and the *Carabineros*;⁵ military super-representation in the National Security Council, which was composed of commanders-in-chief of the three Armed Forces and the general director of the *Carabineros*; the irremovability of commanders-in-chief of the Armed Forces and the general director of the *Carabineros*; article 7 of the new Organic Law of the Armed Forces (CHILE, 1990a), approved a few days before the government’s disclosure to civilians, which was ambiguous regarding the authority of the President of the Republic to appoint, promote, and transfer officers to the reserve force, since it subordinated the President’s decision to the proposals presented by commanders-in-chief of the military forces (CAVALLO, 1998).

Since the beginning of his administration, President Aylwin has been determined to promote amnesty for political prisoners in the military regime. The issue was complex, since many convicted of murders and acts of terrorism were among the prisoners. There was even a personal matter involving the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. Among the political prisoners, several of them had participated in an attack on Pinochet’s life on September 7, 1986. The dictator was unscathed, but five of his security guards had been killed. Throughout the transition, however, amnesty for political prisoners was eventually used by the military as an exchange to obtain amnesty for the military who had violated Human Rights (CAVALLO, 1998).

Nevertheless, delaying maneuvers did not prevent legal measures from being taken in the most alarming cases of violence committed by the military regime. The main responsible people for the murder of the former Minister Orlando Letelier in a bombing by DINA⁶ agents in Washington, in 1976, were convicted in 1995, under President Eduardo Frei’s government:

4 Here I mention the summary presented by Ascanio Cavallo, but you can find the complete data in the three volumes of the Rettig Report.

5 Militarized police force, which acts as a security force across the country and performs ostentatious policing in cities and highways. The *Carabineros* are deemed a fourth armed force in Chile.

6 *Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional*. Chilean government agency responsible for the repression of left-wing armed movements after the 1973 military coup.

General Manuel Contreras, former head of DINA, and his main advisor, Brigadier General Pedro Espinoza (CAVALLO, 1998). These convictions represented the onset of the end of impunity in cases of violations against Human Rights in Chile (ESCALONA MEDINA, 2012).

The tendency of accountability for violations against Human Rights in Chile reached its peak when General Pinochet was arrested in October 1998 by the British government in London, England, where he had gone for a surgery. Pinochet's arrest had been requested by a judge of the Spanish National Court, attributing to the former dictator the crimes of genocide, terrorism, and torture, all indefeasible, according to the Spanish law and the international jurisprudence (AUTO..., 2013). The former dictator was, after all, allowed by the British government to return to Chile in March 2000, due to his precarious health condition. On his return, Pinochet had revoked his jurisdiction prerogative, and was forced to resign his term as senator, being submitted to court by the Chilean judicial authorities (ESCALONA MEDINA, 2012). Although he was never convicted, Augusto Pinochet had his reputation seriously tarnished during investigations, in which millionaire deposits were discovered on his behalf in bank accounts in tax havens (CASO RIGGS..., 2015).

In the purely administrative sphere, since the beginning of the Aylwin government, General Pinochet has obstructed his subordination to the Minister of Defense Patricio Rojas. Pinochet avoided discussing Army affairs with the Minister, seeking to directly deal with the President. Meetings between the Commander-in-Chief and the Minister were always tense, and often ended in heated discussions (CAVALLO, 1998, p. 14, 23, 25, 77, 127, 163, 166).

Military challenges to civilian government during the democratic transition period were not limited to issues related to politics and Human Rights, but also involved General Pinochet's family life. In August 1990, the new Aylwin's government authorities found in archives of the Banco de Chile copies of three checks involving General Pinochet's second son, Augusto Pinochet Hiriart, in cases of advantage in the sale of a small and semi-bankrupted metallurgical industry to the Chilean Army for the value of three million dollars. The case was published in newspapers in Santiago, leaving the old general in a very delicate situation, considering the benefits granted by the Army to his son (CAVALLO, 1998). Before the financial scandal involving the Army and the former dictator's son, the Congress appointed a committee of inquiry to clarify the case and assign accountability for the losses caused to public funds.

The ongoing investigation in the Congress to inquire the case of *pinocheques*, as it became known, caused enormous tension between the Army and the government. At first, Pinochet internally manifested the possibility of resigning from the post of Commander-in-Chief; but, considering the continuation of the investigations and the lack of government support, he determined that Army troops should be on standby in their barracks on the night of December 19, 1990, as an imminent threat to the government and the Congress. The Army's spokesman claimed that everything was nothing more than an "exercise of security, readiness, and bonding," but the threat was posed, and the final report of the committee of inquiry disregarded the existence of criminal offences (CAVALLO, 1998, p. 80).

The *pinocheques* case would return to the headlines in May 1993, when the State Defense Council decided to refer the case to the criminal justice. Once again, Pinochet reacted by using the Army. On May 28, military troops moved within the country and in the capital, wearing combat uniforms, in an event that would become known as the *boinazo*, because of the black berets worn by the soldiers ostensibly placed on standby in front of the Armed Forces Building, a few steps from La Moneda Palace, the government headquarters. In June, the judge responsible for the *pinocheques* case declared himself unable to judge it and transferred it to another instance in a delaying maneuver. The case of the *pinocheques* ended in 1995, when the State Defense Council definitively archived it at the request of President Frei in order to avoid setbacks and to preserve the rule of law (CAVALLO, 1998).

Despite challenges posed by General Pinochet to the governments of the transitional period, corresponding to the years he remained as Commander-in-Chief of the Army after transferring the presidency of the republic, Presidents Aylwin and Frei were very skillful for not giving in so much, in such a way they would be demoralized in their civil authority, and for neither bringing confrontations to a breaking point, which could mean a setback unacceptable by Chile and by the international community (ESCALONA MEDINA, 2012).

Despite past abuses during the military government, the *Concertación* governments preferred not to adopt a confrontational posture towards the Armed Forces, either by subjecting military chiefs to trial, or by drastically reducing manpower and budgets, as it happened in Argentina. The way Chilean civil authorities chose to remove the military from politics was the professionalization of the Armed Forces (IZURIETA FERRER, 2015), adopting an approach similar to what Samuel Huntington (1996, p. 113) called objective civilian control. To do so, they provided political and economic support to a program for the Army modernization, proposed by General Pinochet himself during the transition years. Political authorities were willing to support any initiative to professionalize the Armed Forces (LE DANTEC GALLARDO, 2015).

According to General Óscar Izurieta Ferrer⁷ (2015), initially, the political authorities of the *Concertación* envisioned to develop the model of military modernization adopted in Spain after redemocratization. This proposal was supported by many former opponents of the military regime who had been exiled in Europe and who, during the transition period, held political positions in the new government and chairs at the main universities of the country. The military, however, knew that the existing model needed to be replaced, and recognized the qualities of the new Spanish military model. But they also considered that, if on the one hand the Spanish Armed Forces had adjusted and submitted to political control of civilian authorities, on the other hand, they had benefited from Spain's entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which implied the international commitment to its military training. In the absence of similar conditions, the officialdom of the Chilean Army feared that the emulation of the Spanish model would not be an easy task, and that the simple adoption of a foreign model would be inappropriate for the Chilean reality and its defense needs. Therefore, it was necessary to

7 Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army during the first term of President Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010).

adjust the preference of civil authorities for the Spanish model and the military's proposal regarding a new military model developed in Chile (IZURIETA FERRER, 2015).

To negotiate this adjustment, a new generation of young senior officers—majors and lieutenant colonels—played a key role. In the final years of Pinochet's government, these officers had gone, by their own choice, to universities in search of greater academic training. According to Izurieta Ferrer (2015), from about 15 to 20 officers attended graduate programs at Chilean universities, in the middle of the military government, and in an environment of strong opposition to the regime. According to the same author, although these officers were misunderstood by the generals and their own comrades, who saw them as "enemies of the military government", they were warmly welcomed in the universities, despite ideological differences, and they had the support of Pinochet, who ordered the Army to finance their studies. The good academic performance of this group of officers and the contacts established with the academic environment have favored the search for the very Chilean model of military modernization.

3.3 Litigation and military tensions around Chile

Throughout its history, Chile has had serious litigation with all its neighbors. The incorporation of large territorial extensions rich in saltpeter, guano, and copper, as a consequence of the Pacific War (1879-1883), originated a permanent hostility from the countries that were defeated and lost territories. The loss of the Antofagasta Province had traumatic consequences for Bolivia, which was transformed into a Mediterranean country. In addition to the issues arising from the Pacific War, Chile has engaged in prolonged border disputes with Argentina. These litigations extended from the border of both countries with Bolivia to the Andes Mountains, the Patagonian Region, and the Beagle Channel zone (BURR, 1974).

Since the end of the Pacific War, Chile has faced frequent states of tension with Peru and Bolivia. The dispute with Peru initially revolved around the possession of territories of Tacna and Arica, which had been incorporated into Chile during the War. According to the Treaty of Ancón (1883), the definitive possession of these territories would be established by a plebiscite to be held within ten years (PERU..., 1883). This plebiscite, however, has never been held. The issue was resolved by the Treaty of Lima (1929), and as a consequence Chile returned to Peru most of the Tacna territory, but preserved its Southern region and the territory of Arica (PERU, 1929). Bolivia, in turn, maintains against Chile a permanent demand for a sovereign exit to the Pacific Ocean.

Concerning Argentina, Chile has maintained a series of territorial disputes that, on some occasions, were about to start a war. These tensions were due to the blur of the borders of the two countries at the time of independence. The Treaty of 1881 defined the possession of the territories along the Andes Mountains, Patagonia, and Tierra del Fuego, and a commission with representatives of both States was responsible for the precise definition of the border line, based on criteria defined in the treaty (RODRÍGUEZ S., 1985, p. 51-53).

However, the process of demarcation of the border gave rise to heated disputes, resulting from the different interpretations of the demarcation criteria. The Chilean historian Enrique Brahm García (2003, p. 83, our translation) reports the "situation of constant tension

that was experienced with Argentina between 1896 and 1902.” In this interregnum, “the war between both countries (considering the consistently possibility of intervention on the part of Peru and Bolivia) has reached the point of being declared several times” (BRAHM GARCÍA, 2003, p. 15, our translation). The relenting of relationships between Chile and Argentina would occur with the 1902 British arbitration award, nulling the differences found by the border demarcation commission in the Southern Region (BRAHM GARCÍA, 2003).

Relationships between Chile and Peru were deteriorated once again during the Peruvian government of General Juan Velasco Alvarado in the mid-1970s. Between 1973 and 1975, the Peruvian government made major acquisitions of modern war material in the Soviet Union, in the largest rearmament program in its history (EL DÍA..., 2014), which made the Peruvian Armed Forces one of the best equipped in the Subcontinent. In the most tense moments of relationships between the two countries, many Peruvian military troops and their equipment were sent to the South of the country, to the alarm of the Chilean government and the armed forces (IZURIETA FERRER, 2015). Velasco Alvarado’s aggressive movements were not accomplished, due to his deposition by a military coup led by General Francisco Morales Bermúdez in August 1975. Having to deal with a huge economic and social crisis, Morales Bermúdez’s government has decreased the pressure on Chile.

In 1978, Chile once again was faced with the threat of a war against Argentina, due to the dispute over the possession of some islands and islets in the Beagle Channel, which marked the Southern maritime border between both countries. The issue began in the late 19th century and had been submitted to British arbitration in 1970 by agreement between the governments of Chile and Argentina. The 1977 arbitration award was favorable to the Chilean position, but Argentina refused to accept it (INFANTE, 1979). At the time, considering itself in military advantage, the Argentine military government decided to seek the solution with the army, beginning the preparation of Operation Sovereignty. When this operation started, the Argentine Armed Forces should invade Chile and secure the possession of the disputed islands (MADRID MURÚA, 2003). Chile understood that Peru and Bolivia would not miss the opportunity to attack the North of the Country, in the event of a war with Argentina. The situation was aggravated by the international isolation of Pinochet’s government, which greatly hindered the acquisition of military resources and political support from the international community (IZURIETA FERRER, 2015). Argentina was within a few hours of invading Chilean territory, but the Vatican intervention prevented the disaster of a war. The mediation of the Pope resulted in the signing of a Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Argentina and Chile in 1984. This treaty would be a milestone for relenting the relationships between both countries (IZURIETA FERRER, 2015), putting an end to the crises that had almost brought them to war on two occasions in less than a hundred years.

The problem with Peru remained latent, but the rebellion of the *Sendero Luminoso* diverted all Peruvian military efforts towards the internal war in the early 1980s. The issue with Peru was resumed during the government of President Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006), when the Peruvian government enacted a straight baseline law for the maritime boundary. Peru also questioned the aforementioned possession of the triangle of land (LEDANTEC GALLARDO, 2015). The issue of the maritime boundary was resolved by the International Court of Justice in 2014, but the issue of the triangle of land remains unsolved. As for Bolivia, its political instability was so great that it gave Chile some “time off” (IZURIETA FERRER, 2015).

3.4 Perception of adverse military capabilities

In the 1970s Chile felt seriously threatened by its neighbors. To the North, Peru's government has begun a long process of strengthening its armed forces, acquiring modern Soviet military equipment costing approximately U\$ 1.2 billion, according to an estimate by the United States of America government. In the early 1980s, the Peruvian Army accounted for over 450 combat vehicles in its inventory, including 300 T-55 "battle tanks,"⁸ as well as dozens of modern aircraft of Soviet origin such as Sukhoi SU-22 fighter aircrafts and helicopters, anti-aircraft artillery, and anti-tank missiles (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 1982).

The Peruvian rearmament effort was apprehensively perceived by the Chilean government and armed forces, considering the great disparity of resources between both countries (IZURIETA FERRER, 2015). In order to counterbalance the military disadvantage, the Chilean government has made several emergency acquisitions, but without any planning, having to bear high costs in the international market. As a result, the Chilean military spending increased from 3.3%, in 1973, to 5.3% in 1974, and to 5.7% in 1975 regarding the GDP (ARANCIBIA, 2007, p. 1).

To the East, Argentina was also deemed by Chile as a serious military threat. The almost incoming war of 1978 once again forced Chile to make emergency acquisitions in a disorganized manner. At that time, violations against Human Rights committed by Pinochet's government had put Chile in a situation of international isolation. In 1974, the U.S. Congress had approved the Kennedy Amendment, which prohibited military assistance and sales of arms to Chile (KENNEDY..., 2009). President Carter's election in the USA in 1977 would further aggravate the Chilean situation, forcing Pinochet's government to resort to intermediaries or countries that had also been accused of violations against Human Rights, such as South Africa, Israel, and Brazil, always paying exorbitant prices due to the lack of planning and the urgency of purchases (IZURIETA FERRER, 2015).

Argentina's defeat against England in the Falklands War (1982) has radically changed this picture. The Argentine Armed Forces came out of the war demoralized, and suffered severe political retaliation from civilian governments that took power after the dictatorship has collapsed due to the military failure. The consequence for the Argentine Armed Forces consisted in reductions in manpower, budget cuts, obsolescence of war material, and the demoralization of the military before the Argentinean society. For Chile, Argentina's defeat in the Falklands War was a milestone for relenting military tensions between the two countries. Since then, Argentina no longer poses a war threat for Chile (IZURIETA FERRER, 2015). Bolivia, in its turn, was perceived by Chile as a minor threat, considering its political instability and its weak economy (IZURIETA FERRER, 2015).

3.5 Perception of Chile's own military capabilities

Throughout the 1970s, Chile had the perception of being at major military disadvantage compared with its larger and most threatening neighbors—Peru

and
⁸ "Battle tank" was the designation of the new generation of tanks, which emerged during the Cold War, with high technology and capable of great firepower, armored protection, and speed.

Argentina. In 1973, the Chilean Army had fewer than 100 combat vehicles in operating conditions in its inventory, all of U.S. origin. Of these, the most modern were 60 M-41 lightweight tanks. Regarding aviation, it had very few helicopters, and depended on the Air Force for air transport missions (GAZMURI, 1985, p. 1).

Faced with Peruvian and Argentine threats in the 1970s, Chile made a major military reequipment effort, although it has failed to purchase first-line military resources, due to budgetary constraints and the precarious financial situation in which the country was inserted after the economic chaos experienced during the government of the *Unidad Popular* (1970-1973). Among the main acquisitions during that decade and in the early 1980s, there were 47 AMX-13 lightweight tanks and 21 AMX-30 tanks—the only ones that could be classified as “battle tanks”—, all French-made, in addition to 30 wheeled reconnaissance armored vehicles EE-9 Cascavel, and 70 armored personnel carrier of the EE-11 Urutu and Cardoen-Mowag Piranha types (GAZMURI, 1985, p. 4-5).

However, the Army’s endeavor to contain opposition movements at the end of the military government, with huge street protests and conflicts, forced the institution to slow its modernization and restructuring. Moreover, it made a significant part of its units be transformed to acquire anti-subversive and control-related capabilities of the internal order, which was fatal from a professional point of view. This also had a very negative effect on the image of the Force, since it transformed the Army into a repressive body against the population (IZURIETA FERRER, 2015).

The Army’s commitment to the military government was not limited to the field of homeland security, but also included the Country’s political administration. During Pinochet’s regime, officers from operational units directly performed administration and government functions, at the expense of the military training of their units. Overall, the divisions commanding generals held the positions of intendants of the administrative regions of the Country, while regimental commanding colonels held the positions of governors of the Provinces (SALAZAR JARA, 2017).

When transition to democracy started in the early 1990s, the Chilean military’s perception was that the Army had fallen behind the Navy and the Air Force. These forces had moved away from the core of the military government and, after its end, they were not trapped in the past, as it happened with the Army, which remained eight years under Pinochet’s command in the first two governments of *Concertación* (IZURIETA FERRER, 2015). The democratic transition found an Army that did not correspond to a country that intended to be modern and democratic. According to General Óscar Izurieta Ferrer (2015), Pinochet was aware of the Army’s inadequacy as the military force Chile needed in the democratic era being established. It was at this point that Pinochet launched a project of modernization and reorganization of the Army.

The poor organizational functionality of the Chilean Army at the end of the military regime can be evaluated based on its operational structure of 2001, when the Institution effectively began its reorganization. At that time, the Chilean Army had as its great basic combat unit the army division (AD) (CHILE, 2001). A functional doctrinal concept would recommend for all divisions to have a uniform organization, consisting

of a balanced set of combat units, combat support units, and a logistics unit,⁹ in such a way to constitute real combat systems, favoring their training and employment in combat. Likewise, it would be recommended for army divisions to be composed of only operational units and without peacetime administrative burdens. However, each of the seven ADs in the Chilean Army had a distinct organization (Chart 1). Some ADs lacked combat support units or logistics. Other ADs were simultaneously organized with armored and mountain divisions, in an arrangement that would have many difficulties in operating together. Three ADs had fixed administrative units in their organizational structures (two arsenals and a horse breeding site) without any relation to the combat activity (CHILE, 2001).

Chart 1 – Organization of the great operational units of the Chilean Army in 2001.*

I AD	II AD	III AD	IV AD	V AD	VI AD	VII AD
IR No 7 Esmeralda	IR No 1 Buin	IR No 6 Chacabuco	IR No 12 Sangras	IR No 10 Pudeto	Bde Ex No 5 Carampan- gue	IR No 14 Aisén
IR No 15 Calama	IR No 2 Maipo	IR No 9 Chillán	MIR No 8 Tucapel	IR No 11 Caupolicán	TR No 6 Tarapacá	IR No 26 Bulnes
IR No 23 Copiapó	IR No 3 Yungay	IR No 16 Talca	AR No 2 Maturana	AR No 7 Chorrillos	LB No 6 Pisagua	AR No 8 San Carlos de Ancud
AR No 5 Antofagasta	MIR No 18 Guardia Vieja	IR No 17 Los Ángeles	ACR No 2 Cazadores	ACR No 5 Lanceros	IR No 24 Huamachuco	ER No 8 Chiloé
ACR No 8 Exploradores	IR No 19 Colchagua	AR No 3 Silva Renard	ACR No 3 Húsares	ACR No 6 Dragones	RA No 6 Dolores	Las Bandu- rias Military Breeding Site
ER No 1 Atacama	IR No 21 Arica	LB No 3 Concepción	ACR No 4 Coraceros	ER No 5 Punta Arenas	ACR No 9 Vencedores	
TR No 1 El Loa	IR No 22 Lautaro	EC Indepen- dente – Los Ángeles	ER No 4 Arauco	TR No 5 Patagonia	ER No 6 Azapa	
LB No 1 Tocopilla	AR No 1 Tacna		TR No 4 Membrillar	LB No 5 Magallanes	Arsenal MWM No 1 Arica	
	ACR No 10 Libertadores		LB No 4 Victoria	Arsenal MWM No 2 Punta Arenas		
	ER No 2 Puente Alto					

* In addition to the large units described in this chart, the Chilean Army also had an Aviation Brigade. Caption: AD (Army Division); IR (Infantry Regiment); MIR (Mountain Infantry Regiment); AR (Artillery Regiment); ACR (Armored Cavalry Regiment); ER (Engineers Regiment); TR (Telecommunications Regiment); LB (Logistics Battalion); Bde (Brigade); C (Company); EC (Engineers Company); MWM (Maintenance of War Material).

Source: Chile (2001, p. 153-173).

⁹ Combat units are those that perform the close combat—infantry and cavalry units; combat support units provide fire support, movement support, and support for coordination and control capability—artillery, engineering, and communications—, in order to increase the combat power of combat units.

In addition to organizational issues, the Chilean Army had also been professionally fallen behind, since it had been more focused on homeland security than on technological advances that had occurred in the military field. It had also suffered professional losses for the training of its officers abroad, due to the international political isolation to which Chile had been subjected. Few countries have accepted Chilean military in their military schools. Only countries such as South Africa, Brazil, and Israel continued welcoming Chilean officers. In those circumstances, it was hard to keep up on military issues (LE DANTEC GALLARDO, 2015). The Army was also exhausted after facing three major challenges simultaneously and successively (the military coup and the fight against internal armed groups, the Peruvian threat in 1974-75, and the almost incoming war with Argentina in 1978). It was also heavily indebted to the government due to emergency acquisitions made at exorbitant prices during the crises with Peru and Argentina. In 1976, the Military Board had modified the old “Copper Law”¹⁰ and allocated 10% of the state company Codelco’s¹¹ sales to the Armed Forces (PATTILLO, 2003, p. 93), but the emergency purchases had been far superior to what was provided for by the Copper Law, and the Army had been left with a huge debt that would only be paid in 2001 (IZURIETA FERRER, 2015).

Pinochet was sure of the Army’s inadequacy as the military force Chile needed in the democratic era that was being established. But he understood that, if that was not the Army Chile needed, it was the one he needed to maintain political control over the country in the transition phase. It was at this point that Pinochet launched a project of modernization and reorganization of the Army (IZURIETA FERRER, 2015).

3.6 Chilean Strategic Culture

Since the end of the 19th century and throughout the 20th century, the main feature of the Chilean strategic culture has been the perception that Chile is “a country under siege” by all its neighbors (VIAL, 1981 apud BRAHM GARCÍA, 2003, p. 47), and that sense of threat has concrete motivations. To the North, Bolivia and Peru had many reasons to seek revenge for their defeat and territorial losses in the Pacific War. To the East, Argentina was economically stronger each day and gathered a military apparatus corresponding to the new status of emerging regional power. The possession of the Subcontinent Southern region caused dispute between both countries and almost led them to war in 1898-1900 and in 1978, with the risk that the Northern neighbors would take advantage of a war in the South to attack Chile and recapture territories lost between 1879 and 1883. Referring to the turn of the 20th century period and the growing tensions between Chile and its North and Eastern neighbors, Robert Burr (1974, p. 244) estimates that Chile was *in danger of moral and military siege*.

The sense of being under siege has, thus, shaped the perception that the Chilean society and its leaders have about the existence of plausible opponents, about the threats they

10 Reserved Law No. 13,196 of 1958, with which a tax on the operations of copper mining companies for the exclusive financing of acquisitions of military equipment was created. Unlike resources allocated to the armed forces in the State budget, funds from the “Copper Law” are automatically directed to the armed forces, without undergoing the regular process of budget debate and approval of the Congress (PATTILLO, 2003).

11 *Corporación Nacional del Cobre de Chile*.

pose as well as the importance and appreciation of their military institutions. The experiences of its main wars in the 19th century—War of the Confederation (1836-1839); Pacific War (1879-1883), and the Civil War of 1891—also provide Chileans with a positive perspective of the effectiveness of the use of force for resolving serious political disputes (JOHNSTON, 1995).

The siege perception makes Chile perceive the offensive action of a preventive war as a form of defensive war. In this sense, the Pacific War, in which Chile undertook initiative and which resulted in the conquest of large Peruvian and Bolivian territories, is deemed as, in the words of a Chilean historian from the 21st century, “a defensive reflection on the part of Chile before the union of Peru and Bolivia, which has seriously threatened the balance of power and Chilean interests” (RUBILAR LUENGO, 2016, p. 220, our translation).

The very existence of the “Copper Law” reflects the feeling that Chile is a country under siege. Its origins date back to a 1938 law according to which part of the profits obtained from the leasing of the State’s rural areas was assigned to the acquisition of war material and to meet the most urgent needs of the Armed Forces. The “Copper Law” was finally passed in the Congress in November 1958,¹² partly motivated by an incident with Argentina about the possession of an islet of the Beagle Channel (PATILLO, 2003, p. 106-107). This allocation of financial resources to military forces without the need for approval of the legislative power demonstrates the priority attributed by Chileans to the national defense.

The second defining feature of the Chilean strategic culture is the people’s self-image in relation to the war activity. Chileans tend to see themselves as a warrior people, whose martial proclivity emerged from the mixture between the blood of the Spanish colonizer and that of the strong and untamed Mapuche native people,¹³ with whom they lived and fought a secular war on the distant frontiers of Auracania to the South of the Country (BLANCPAIN, 1991). General Emil Körner, a German official hired by the Chilean government to begin the process of professionalizing the Chilean Army after the Pacific War, praised “the mixture of blood between Spanish men and Indigenous women,” conferring to their descendants an irresistible war capability (KÖRNER, 1988, p. 189, our translation). Furthermore, the struggle for survival against the rough nature and the peoples originated from those remote borders would have generated “powerful influences on the image and mentality of the emerging nation and on the way of life of the Chilean” (ARANCIBIA CLAVEL, 2002, p. 102, our translation). That experience resulted in the idea of an “warlike epic”, which, although somehow based on the reality, greatly derives from the patriotic fiction. Nevertheless, the myth of the warrior race had the virtue of all myths: “it is a truth that does not need to be demonstrated and neither admits contrary proofs” (ARANCIBIA CLAVEL, 2002, p. 103, our translation).

4 The Chilean Army Modernization Project

The project for the modernization of the Chilean Army started being designed with a series of conferences, or *Clases Magistrales*, held by Pinochet between 1992 and

12 The “Copper Law” was reformed during the Military Regime in six occasions: 1973, 1975, 1976, 1981, 1985, and 1987.

13 They are also known as *araucanos*, a name given to them by the Spanish.

1994, aiming at presenting his vision about the Army for the future, and at establishing the basis of a modernization process (IZURIETA FERRER, 2015). In 1992, the theme of the conference was **Ejército de Chile: Trayectoria y Futuro** (CHILE, 1992); in 1993, the theme was **Ejército de Chile: Posibles Elementos a Considerar en su Proyección Futura** (CHILE, 1993); and on August 19, 1994, Pinochet effectively launched his modernization plan—the **Alcázar Plan**—, with the conference **Modernización del Ejército: Realidad y Futuros Alcances** (CHILE, 1994b).

At the 1992 *Clase Magistral*, Pinochet analyzed the changes the world had been undergoing after the end of the Cold War and their impact on the Army. He also established that moment as the milestone of the beginning of a new planning process for the future, and presented his vision of what the Army should be in the coming decades, synthesizing his guidelines for the modernization process to which the Army was committed in order to form a military force adjusted to the times that would come (CHILE, 1992, p. 5). Pinochet also warned that the military modernization would be a long process that, to be conceived, planned, and developed, would require an effort as great as that to execute it (CHILE, 1992, p. 15).

In the following year, *Clase Magistral* proposed to deepen the theme of modernization of the Army, developing new guidelines to expedite the internal process of studies initiated in 1992 (CHILE, 1993, p. 3). Among other aspects, Pinochet highlighted, in the field of teaching, the increase in the professional training of senior officers, obtained from the completion of the Master's degree program in Military Sciences at the Academia de Guerra del Ejército de Chile. He also mentioned the Master's degree program in Military Engineering Sciences, taught at the Academia Politécnica Militar, the engineering college of the Chilean Army, and programs aimed at Army officers to obtain academic master's degree and PhD titles in universities within the country and abroad, in the areas of Sociology, Political Science, International Relations, Economics, Business, and Engineering. In the field of military instruction and training, he highlighted the onset of a program for the improvement of tactical unit commanders, using computer simulation tools, and the installation of the Centro de Entrenamiento Operativo Táctico, based on a computer simulation system, entirely designed and created with national technology (CHILE, 1993, p. 5-6). The core of the conference was focused on presenting a dual perspective of the Army of the future—one within the scope of national defense, and another within the scope of development (CHILE, 1993).

The Chilean Army modernization project was finally consolidated in the **Alcázar Plan**, launched on August 19, 1994 (CHILE, 1994a), and publicly presented at the *Clase Magistral* of the same year. Alcázar Plan was presented as an integral megaproject for the whole process of modernization of the Army, comprising a period from 1994 to 2010. Due to this long period, its execution was planned to be performed in two major stages: the first until 1997, and the second from 1998 to 2010. Noteworthy, 1998 was the year Pinochet was supposed to relinquish his command of the Army, permanently retiring from institutional life. That is, there was a step to be followed by his successors in the Force Command. And, considering that Pinochet would remain Commander-in-Chief of the Army for 25 years, these successors would be officers of a generation much younger than the old general, who would be 82 years old when he retired from the Army.

Considering the long duration of the plan, the objectives of only its first stage were defined: 1st) To materialize concrete achievements for modernization, which were necessary and feasible to implement within the available budget and which would be the basis for the plan to be established; 2nd) To develop, with the necessary time and coordination, the major projects and studies that will shape the main transformations required by the institutional modernization; and 3rd) To create the best conditions to continue the process in the second stage [...] (CHILE, 1994a, p. 2-3).

Based on its initial provisions, evidently, the Alcázar Plan was less of an action plan than the enunciation of a set of long-term intentions, involving only a few immediate actions, which were possible to carry out in the short-term and within the limited available budgets. The main result of its first stage would be developing plans and projects for the modernization process to be performed in the second stage, after Pinochet's retirement.

As stated by General Óscar Izurieta Ferrer (2015, n.p.), who was the officer in charge of writing it “from the first letter to the last one,” the Alcázar Plan was “more symbolic than real.” Some aspects of the plan have been effectively implemented since its creation, such as changes in military education and the inclusion of women in the Institution, but, due to his personal political convenience, Pinochet did not wish the central part of the plan, that is, the restructuring of the Force, to start while he was Commander-in-Chief. The effective reorganization of the Chilean Army would only begin in 2001, in the administration of General Ricardo Izurieta,¹⁴ who succeeded General Pinochet as Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army from March 11, 1998 to March 11, 2002. The Army's reorganization process was delayed not only by Pinochet's decision not to fully deploy the Alcázar Plan before his retreat from the Army, but also by the heavy debts that marked the Army's budget—resulting from emergency purchases of the 1970s—and which were only paid in 2001 (IZURIETA FERRER, 2015).

Considering that the object of this study is the demand for modernization of the Chilean Army, it is not necessary to analyze the effective execution of the transformation process of the Chilean Army, but only its general ideas.

5 Conclusions

The process of modernization of the Chilean Army was conceived in the 1990s, during the democratic transition, still under the command of General Pinochet. The effective implementation of its key aspects of administrative reorganization and force restructuring would only start at the beginning of the following decade. In the international scope, this period corresponds to the post-Cold War and a global wave of democratic optimism. In Latin America, it coincides with the end of authoritarian military governments that had dominated the Region in previous decades. The new regional democratic panorama has allowed the relenting of military tensions in South America, although Peru and Bolivia still maintained border demands against Chile, but now calling on the International Court of Justice to achieve peaceful solutions.

¹⁴ General Ricardo Izurieta Caffarena must not be mistaken for his cousin Óscar Izurieta Ferrer, who was also Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army later in time, between March 2006 and March 2010, and whom was interviewed by me in October 2015.

Internally, Chile has participated in a tense process of transition to democracy, conducted in an agreeable manner, but haunted by the former dictator's permanence as Commander-in-Chief of the Army. Resorting to this political position and the considerable power and prestige he enjoyed along with a significant part of the Chilean society, Pinochet used repeated armed threats to the government as a way to avoid or delay the measures of accountability of those involved in violations against Human Rights during dictatorship.

During these transition years, Pinochet was able to glimpse the changes Chile would undergo in the democratic future being established, and the new demands that would fall on the Armed Forces. Thus, despite using the Army as an instrument of support for his remaining personal power, Pinochet devised a plan to modernize the Force, which would initially be implemented in its superficial aspects, but which should be deepened after his replacement in the command of the Institution.

Therefore, we observed that the impulse of modernization of the Chilean Army emerged within the institution, and it was proposed on the initiative of the Commander-in-Chief of the Force himself. Moreover, we perceived that the political-strategic framework of regional relenting character did not require innovative changes to the Chilean Army. The main motivation for these changes was the aspiration to transform the land force into a modern and efficient institution, respected within the country, and on par with a country that sought a new insertion at the international level. This case demonstrates that armed institutions, despite their conservative disposition, are able to identify their weaknesses and promote changes and innovations.

It should be noted that the design of the Chilean Army modernization project was not subjected to the control of civilian authorities, since the moment was of complete dissociation between the military high command, represented by General Pinochet, and the political authority, represented by the Minister of Defense Patricio Rojas. During the effective implementation of modernization, after Pinochet's replacement, political authorities of *Concertación* governments chose to provide freedom of action to the military, because they understood professionalization as a way to remove military from politics, according to the objective civilian control model.

In short, the Chilean case of modernization of its Army, which began in the 1990s, refutes the theoretical model proposed by Barry Posen (1984), according to which the armed forces would be averse to doctrinal innovations and would depend on interventions on the part of authorities in order to rupture the peculiar inertia of conservatism of the military and to impose the achievement of changes and innovations. Conversely, we observed that this case corresponds to a large extent to the model described by Stephen Rosen (1991), in which the Chilean civil political leadership of the *Concertación* was based on the modernization initiative emerging within the officialdom of the Army as well as on the legitimacy enjoyed by the military leadership in the institution to conduct the process. From a political point of view, the elevation of the Army military performance standards would allow political leadership to exercise civilian control over the armed forces using military professionalism.

References

ARANCIBIA, P. Chile-Perú: una década en tensión 1970-1979. Capítulo Final: Velasco Alvarado fija el “Día D” y Morales Bermúdez lo desactiva. **La Segunda**, Santiago, 24 agosto 2007. Serie Histórica. Disponible em: <https://bit.ly/32uIkB1>. Acceso em: 8 nov. 2019.

ARANCIBIA CLAVEL, R. **La influencia del Ejército Chileno en América Latina 1900-1950**. Santiago: Centro de Estudios e Investigaciones Militares, 2002.

AUTO de detención dictado a Augusto Pinochet. Juez Baltazar Garzón Real. **Analítica.com**, Caracas, 25 sept. 2013. Disponible em: <https://bit.ly/34O1naN>. Acceso em: 19 abr. 2017.

BLANCPAIN, J. P. L'armée chilienne et les instructeurs allemands en Amérique Latine (1885-1914). **Revue Historique**, Paris, t. 285, fasc. 2 (578), p. 347-394, 1991.

BRAHM GARCÍA, E. **Preparados para la guerra: pensamiento militar chileno bajo influencia alemana 1885-1930**. Santiago: Ediciones UC, 2003.

BURR, R. N. **By Reason or Force: Chile and the balancing of power in South America 1830-1905**. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974.

CASO RIGGS: Condenan a 6 militares (r) por malversar fondos para Augusto Pinochet. **El Mercurio**, Santiago, 8 mayo 2015. Disponible em: <https://bit.ly/2Cswsoh>. Acceso em: 19 abr. 2017.

CAVALLO, A. **La historia oculta de la transición**. Santiago: Grijalbo, 1998.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. Directorate of Operations. **Peru-USSR: Implications of the Military Relationship**. Washington, DC: CIA, Dec. 1982. Research Paper. Disponible em: <https://bit.ly/2rqSHc9>. Acceso em: 24 abr. 2017.

CERVO, A. L.; BUENO, C. **História da política exterior do Brasil**. 3. ed. Brasília, DF: UnB, 2010.

CHILE. Ministerio del Interior. Decreto supremo num. 1150 por el que se aprueba la Constitución política de la República de Chile de 1980. **Diario Oficial de la República de Chile**, Santiago, 21 oct. 1980.

CHILE. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. Tratado de Paz y Amistad. **Diario Oficial de la República de Chile**, Santiago, p. 3-6, 14 mayo 1985. Disponible em: <https://bit.ly/2NtKYCv>. Acceso em: 8 nov. 2019.

CHILE. Ministerio de Defensa Nacional. Ley Orgánica Constitucional de las Fuerzas Armadas. **Diario Oficial de la República de Chile**, Santiago, 28 feb. 1990a. Disponible em: <https://bit.ly/2Q2uvXB>. Acesso em: 18 abr. 2017.

CHILE. Ministerio de Justicia. Subsecretaria del Interior. Decreto Supremo nº 355. Crea Comisión de Verdad y Reconciliación. **Diario Oficial de la República de Chile**, Santiago, 25 abr. 1990b. Disponible em: <https://bit.ly/2Q6getj>. Acesso em: 17 abr. 2017.

CHILE. Ejército de Chile. **Ejército de Chile: trayectoria y futuro**. Santiago: Ejército de Chile, 21 ago. 1992. Arquivo do Departamento Cultural, Histórico e de Extensão do Exército. Documento D-132.

CHILE. Ejército de Chile. **Conferencia “Ejército de Chile: posibles elementos a considerar en su proyección futura”**. Santiago: Ejército de Chile, 19 ago. 1993. Arquivo do Departamento Cultural, Histórico e de Extensão do Exército. Documento D-131.

CHILE. Ejército de Chile. Estado Mayor General. Dirección de Racionalización y Desarrollo. **Exposición Sobre el Plan de Modernización del Ejército “Alcázar”**. Santiago: Ejército de Chile, 27 sept. 1994a. Arquivo do Departamento Cultural, Histórico e de Extensão do Exército. Coleção CAE, ano 1994, v. 161.

CHILE. Ejército de Chile. **Modernización del Ejército: realidad y futuros alcances**. Santiago: Ejército de Chile, ago. 1994b. Arquivo do Departamento Cultural, Histórico e de Extensão do Exército.

CHILE. Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación. Corporación Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación. **Informe de la Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación**. Santiago: Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación, 1996. 3 tomos. Disponible em: <https://bit.ly/32sSemG>. Acesso em: 17 abr. 2017.

CHILE. Ejército de Chile. **Memoria del Ejército de Chile 2001**. Santiago: Ejército de Chile, 2001.

ECONOMIC Freedom, overall index – Country rankings. **The Global Economy.com**, [s. l.], 2019. Disponible em: <https://bit.ly/2qzOjqV>. Acesso em: 1 mar. 2019.

-EL DÍA que Velasco quiso invadir Chile. **El Poder.com**, Lima, 3 sept. 2014. Disponible em: <https://bit.ly/2CrxbGq>. Acesso em: 22 abr. 2017.

ESCALONA MEDINA, C. **De Allende a Bachelet: una vida política**. Santiago: Agilar, 2012.

FARRELL, T.; TERRIFF, T. The Sources of Military Change. In: FARRELL, T.; TERRIFF, T. (ed.). **The Sources of Military Change: Culture, politics, technology**. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002. p. 3-20.

GAZMURI, C. Las armas chilenas 1975-1982. **Defensa y Desarme: América Latina y Caribe**, Santiago, v. I, n. 1, sept./dic. 1985. Disponível em: <https://bit.ly/2K2biSk>. Acesso em: 8 nov. 2019.

GOLDMAN, E. O. The Spread of Western Military Models to Ottoman Turkey and Meiji Japan. In: FARRELL, T.; TERRIFF, T. (ed.). **The Sources of Military Change: Culture, politics, technology**. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002. p. 41-67.

HUNTINGTON, S. P. **O soldado e o Estado: teoria e política das relações entre civis e militares**. Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1996.

INFANTE, M. T. Controversia chileno-argentina en la región del Canal Beagle: laudo arbitral de 18 de abril de 1977. **Revista Chilena de Derecho**, Santiago, v. 6, p. 423-447, 1979. Disponível em: <https://bit.ly/2p4sbo8>. Acesso em: 8 nov. 2019.

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE. **Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile)**. Summary of the Judgment of 27 January 2014. The Hague: ICJ, 2014. Disponível em: <https://bit.ly/36NozIf>. Acesso em: 17 abr. 2017.

IZURIETA FERRER, Óscar. [Entrevista cedida a] Fernando Velôzo Gomes Pedrosa. Santiago: Academia de Guerra do Exército do Chile, 13 out. 2015.

JOHNSTON, A. I. Thinking About Strategic Culture. **International Security**, Cambridge, v. 19, n. 4, p. 32-64, 1995.

KENNEDY y la enmienda con la que le puso límites a la dictadura argentina. **Clarín**, Buenos Aires, 31 ago. 2009. Disponível em: <https://bit.ly/32x633g>. Acesso em: 23 abr. 2017.

KÖRNER, E. El Desarrollo Histórico del Ejército Chileno por Emil Körner, General de División Chileno (1910). In: QUIROGA, P.; MALDONADO, C. **El prusianismo en las Fuerzas Armadas Chilenas: un estudio histórico 1885-1945**. Santiago: Ediciones Documentas, 1988. p. 181-224.

LE DANTEC GALLARDO, Cristián. [Entrevista cedida a] Fernando Velôzo Gomes Pedrosa. Santiago: Academia de Guerra do Exército do Chile, 27 out. 2015.

MADRID MURÚA, R. La Estrategia Nacional y Militar Que Planificó Argentina, en el Marco de una Estrategia Total, Para Enfrentar el Conflicto con Chile el Año 1978. **Memorial del Ejército de Chile**. No. 471, Año 2003. p. 50-70.

MEYER, J. W.; ROWAN, B. Institutionalized Organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony. **The American Journal of Sociology**, Chicago, v. 83, n. 2, p. 340-363, 1977.

MURRAY, W. Innovation: Past and future. *In*: MURRAY, W.; MILLETT, A. R. **Military Innovation in the Interwar Period**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. p. 300-328.

NAGL, J. A. **Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife**: Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005.

PATTILLO, G. Asignación de recursos a las fuerzas armadas en Chile: situación actual y propuesta. **Estudios Públicos**, Santiago, v. 89, p. 91-128, 2013. Disponível em: <https://bit.ly/2CpTvQT>. Acesso em: 8 out. 2019.

PEDROSA, F. V. G. Ideologia e ética militar no Brasil. **Coleção Meira Mattos**: revista das ciências militares, Rio de Janeiro, v. 3, n. 27, dez. 2012. Disponível em: <https://bit.ly/2pKvotv>. Acesso em: 8 nov. 2019.

PERU. Congreso de la República. **Tratado de paz de ANCON**. Lima: Congreso de la República, 20 oct. 1883. Disponível em: <https://bit.ly/2X2PCL3>. Acesso em: 22 abr. 2017.

PERU. Tratado de Lima y su protocolo complementario (Lima, 03 de Junio de 1929). **Diario Oficial de Chile**, Lima, 6 agosto 1929. Disponível em: <https://bit.ly/34Gckey>. Acesso em: 22 abr. 2017.

POSEN, B. R. **The Sources of Military Doctrine**: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984.

RODRÍGUEZ S., J. A. **Chile en el Canal Beagle y mares australes**: tratado de paz entre Chile y Argentina. Santiago: Gráfica Progresión, 1985.

ROSEN, S. P. **Winning the Next War**: Innovation and the modern military. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991.

RUBILARLUENGO, M. La “Prusia americana”: prensa argentina e imagen internacional de Chile durante la Guerra del Pacífico (1879-1881). *In*: CHILE. Ejército de Chile. Departamento Cultural, Histórico y de Extensión. **Jornada de Historia Militar IX y X (regiones)**. Santiago: Departamento de Historia Militar del Ejército, 2016. p. 219-254.

SALAZAR JARA, Álvaro. [Entrevista cedida a] Fernando Velôzo Gomes Pedrosa. Rio de Janeiro: Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército, 6 nov. 2017.

SOTO, Á.; SÁNCHEZ, F. La “Revolución de las Libertades”. A 40 años de la puesta en marcha del Plan de Recuperación Económica Chileno. *In*: SOTO, Á.; SÁNCHEZ, F. (comp.). **El “Padre” de los Chicago Boys**: Arnold Harberger. Santiago: Centro de Estudios Bicentenario, 2015. p. 21-29.

TAGLE D., M. Introducción. *In*: TAGLE D., M. (ed.). **El Plebiscito del 5 de octubre de 1988**. Santiago: Corporación Justicia y Democracia, 1995. p. 7-10.

WATTS, B.; MURRAY, W. Military Innovation in Peacetime. *In*: MURRAY, W.; MILLETT, A. R. **Military Innovation in the Interwar Period**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. p. 369-415.