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An assessment of cyber threats and migration as challenges to the European Union Pluralistic Security Community in the World Order 2.0

Una evaluación de las ciberamenazas y la migración como desafíos para la Comunidad de Seguridad Pluralista de la Unión Europea en el Orden Mundial 2.0

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Abstract: This article departs from the assumption that European Union is a Pluralist Security Community resulting from symbiotic interactions between material and ideational variables such as beliefs, identities, material capabilities, borders, distribution/perception of power, anarchy and polarity, which gives to this theoretical model greater analytical consistency and ontological density. So, looking into the potential threats the EU is being confronted with and for the negative externalities they can generate in the near future, we are led to reflect on some paradigmatic issues: has the EU reached the limits of its capacity to effectively deal with contemporary challenges? Accordingly, is there a need for a new European concerted plan of action on security and defense issues? To verify how the EU has been tackling some of these challenges and how they impact the defining features of the EU as a Pluralistic Security Community, cybersecurity and migration were selected as our objects of analysis for being good examples of transnational problems the contemporary international system is being confronted with.

Keywords: European Union. Pluralistic Security Community. Cybersecurity. Migration.

Resumen: Este artículo parte del supuesto de que la Unión Europea es una Comunidad de Seguridad Pluralista resultante de interacciones simbióticas entre variables materiales e ideológicas como creencias, identidades, capacidades materiales, fronteras, distribución/percepción del poder, anarquía y polaridad, lo que da a este modelo teórico una mayor consistencia analítica y densidad ontológica. Por lo tanto, al examinar las posibles amenazas a las que se enfrenta la UE y las externalidades negativas que pueden generar en un futuro próximo, nos vemos obligados a reflexionar sobre algunas cuestiones paradigmáticas: ¿ha alcanzado la UE los límites de su capacidad para hacer frente con eficacia a los desafíos contemporáneos? En consecuencia, ¿es necesario un nuevo plan de acción europeo concertado sobre cuestiones de seguridad y defensa? Para verificar cómo la UE ha abordado algunos de estos desafíos y cómo repercuten en las características que la definen como una Comunidad de Seguridad Pluralista, se seleccionaron la ciberseguridad y la migración como nuestros objetos de análisis porque son buenos ejemplos de los problemas transnacionales a los que se enfrenta el sistema internacional contemporáneo.

Palabras clave: Unión Europea. Comunidad de Seguridad Pluralista. Ciberseguridad. Migración.

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1 Introduction

In a paradigmatic article written in 1867 – *L'avenir* (The Future) – Victor Hugo (1802-1885), inspired by the dream of living in a federalist Europe, although in a very nationalist epoch, scattered the seeds of what would become a European political and economic unification project and, in many aspects, anticipated what was about to come several years later by stating that:

> in the twentieth century there would be an extraordinary nation. This nation will be large, which will not prevent its being free. It will be illustrious, rich thoughtful, peaceful towards the rest of humankind. This Nation will have Paris as its capital, but it will not be called France: it will be called Europe. It will be called Europe in the twentieth century, and in the centuries that follow [...]. (HUGO apud DUROSELLE, 1990, p. 324).[1]

Nonetheless, even being in its essence a romanticized depiction of Europe as the ultimate stage of a cultural and political entity, the imaginary content of Hugo's ideas has gradually materialized. His words harbingered an unprecedented process of economic integration firstly fostered by the establishment of a bold proposal for unifying the European production of coal and steel based on supranational principles.[2]

In this endeavor, by bringing together the BENELUX countries (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg), West Germany, France and Italy, the Treaty of Paris, signed in April 1951, established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), a welcome attempt to stimulate integration and cooperation which, in turn, paved the way towards other initiatives such as the Treaty of Rome (1957) and the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) leading to the modern European Union (EU) as currently known: a political and economic union of 27 countries[3]. And, in fact, it clearly seemed that the creation of a common market followed by the introduction of a single currency[4] heralded a promising new era of economic growth and political integration.

As pointed out by Mix (2013), reflective of this project of a broader and deeper Europe, from then on, several aspects of policy and decision-making processes have been

1 The idea of a "United States of Europe" was firstly addressed by Victor Hugo in the opening discourse at the first Peace Congress, held in Paris, 21 August 1849, and, later, in his speeches for the Peace Congress of Lausanne (1869) and Lugano (1872). It is worth mentioning that federalist ideas are found in contributions from other emblematic personalities that preceded Victor Hugo, such as in the Prussian philosopher Immanuel Kant's 'Perpetual Peace' (1795) or, yet, in the essay 'A Plan for a Universal and Perpetual Peace' (1789) authored by the English jurist Jeremy Bentham. Another influential federalist, this one contemporary to Victor Hugo, is the Italian philosopher and writer Carlo Cattaneo (1801-1869). For additional information on the federalist epistemological approach see Burgess (2009).

2 As for European integration, there are many theories focused on explaining this process, amongst them, Neofunctionalism, Intergovernmentalism, and Federalism. Neofunctionalism was the first one trying to explain the patterns of cooperation in the bloc and, for that, it is grounded in two epistemological pillars: spillover effects and the role of interest groups. In contrast, for Intergovernmentalism – a theory that gained ground in the troubled 1970s – integration is, above all, the result of rational choices made by sovereign states that always act aimed at promoting and maximizing national interests. Andrew Moravcsik is one of the main exponents of this theoretical current. In turn, modern Federalism attributes a fundamental role to the supranational level of analysis, and, for this theoretical perspective, the EU is best understood as a form of cooperative federalism, however, refuting the Neofunctionalism's spillover concept.

3 Few years after a referendum held on 23 June 2016, popularly known as BREXIT (the "British exit") – when "the leave side" won by nearly 52% to 48% – the United Kingdom officially withdrew from the European Union on 31 January 2020.

4 The euro (€), launched in 2002, is the official currency of 19 out of 27 EU countries that are collectively known as the Eurozone.

progressively shifting from national capitals to the EU institutions in a wide array of sectors such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), but, it shall be highlighted, in a context whose decisions are taken by unanimity among the EU Member States in the scope of the Council of European Union (a.k.a the Council of Ministers).

Closely related, the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) – originally conceived in 1999 as European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)[5] – is part of the CFSP and remains a fundamentally intergovernmental tool aimed at enabling cooperation between the EU Member States in operational missions for conflict prevention; crisis management and strengthening of international security drawing on civilian and military assets[6] (CHAPPELL; MAWDSLEY; WHITMAN, 2016; PIROZZI, 2014, 2018).[7]

And, notwithstanding what critics have been stating about EU lack of institutional coordination and coherence in many aspects, as we shall see, with the passing of time the aforementioned policies have contributed to overcoming historical rivalries towards a new idea of community. One built on a prevailing desire of peaceful coexistence based on shared values resulting in a perception of Europe as a Pluralistic Security Community thought to deal with complex demands stemming from a challenging operating system labeled by Richard Haass as World Order 2.0, a new international order mainly based on the premise of sovereign obligation, in other words, what a country owes to other countries.[8]

Moreover, considering that nowadays little stays local and just about anyone and anything can reach almost anywhere, thus establishing complex relations of interdependence, and also presuming that in the World Order 2.0 “what goes on inside a country can no longer be considered the concern of that country alone” (HAASS, 2017, p. 2), overlapping threats originating from abroad and within the European Union demand concerted responses in order to protect EU’s interests.

This is the case of a wide range of issues such as environmental degradation; climate change; conflict-induced forced displacement; radicalization and terrorist financing; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; large-scale cyberattacks; the intentional use of violence by nonstate entities; the proliferation of failed states and organized crime.

5 Signed in 2007 but into force since 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon, by amending the Treaty of Maastricht, amongst other provisions introduced the Common Security and Defense Policy to replace the former European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). It also created the new post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, position firstly occupied by Catherine Ashton (2009-2014). Appointed by the European Council with the agreement of the President of the European Commission for a mandate of 5 years, the High Representative is also Vice-President of the European Commission and is charged with shaping and carrying out the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy. The foreign minister of Italy, Federica Mogherini, was appointed to succeed Ashton for the 2014-2020 term.

6 It is important to point out that the CSDP activities are not exclusively military including, for instance, civilian operations such as police and judicial training. According to Pirozzi (2018, p. 1) “the civilian component of EU crisis management has often been neglected in terms of visibility and resources, but it is mainly through civilian Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) missions that the EU has been able to show its added value as a security provider”.

7 Another worth mentioning benchmark for EU foreign policy is the European Security Strategy (ESS) originally launched in 2003 to 1) identify global challenges and threats to EU security; 2) foster stability in its neighborhood (Balkans, Caucasus, the Mediterranean region and the Middle East, and; 3) seek the construction of a multilateral world order based on international law, peace and security (Mix, 2013, p. 4).

8 According to Haass (2017) the World Order 1.0 – built around the protection and prerogatives of states – is no longer sufficient to satisfactorily explain the dynamics of today’s globalized world.

To verify how EU has been tackling some of these challenges and, on the other hand, how they impact the defining features of EU as a Pluralistic Security Community, namely, values; capacity of response and predictability of behavior on security and defense issues, we have selected cybersecurity and migration as our independent variables. As depicted in the causal chain, these subjects were chosen for being good examples of transnational problems the contemporary international system is being confronted with and, in addition, issues that reflect the need to construct effective policy frameworks to restrain possible negative externalities stemming from these threats (VAN DER MEULEN; JO; SOESANTO, 2015; CHRISTOU, 2016; KASPAREK, 2016; RICHARDS; LASALLE; VAN DEN DOOL, 2017; CALAMUR; SCHULTHEIS, 2018; SCHMID-DRÜNER, 2019):

Figure 1 – Causal chain



Source: Authors (2020).

To accomplish the proposed task the research, methodologically quantitative and qualitative, firstly discusses some aspects of the Pluralistic Security Communities' conceptual framework to explain how the EU – this hybrid structure simultaneously combining intergovernmental and supranational features – was conceived. Then, by using primary and secondary sources, it analytically suggests propositions capable of pointing out causal relations between our dependent and independent variables.

2 From conflict to peaceful coexistence: Europe's path towards a Pluralistic Security Community

We begin this analysis from the assumption that European Union is a Regional Security Complex (RSC) or, in other words, a set of units (mainly states) whose major perceptions and security concerns are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another

(BUZAN, 1991; BUZAN; WÆVER; DE WILDE, 1998). The basic premise of this theoretical model assumes that RSC is a result of symbiotic interactions between material and ideational variables such as beliefs, identities, material capabilities, borders, distribution/perception of power, anarchy, and polarity, which gives the model greater analytical consistency and ontological density.

From this perspective, Buzan and Wæver (2003) have identified in the Post-Cold War world several RSC, although in different stages of maturation: North America, South America, Post-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Middle East, West Africa, Central Africa, Southern Africa, South Asia, East Asia and Europe, our object of analysis.

In this major structure, the epistemological role developed by relations of amity and enmity between their units as part of interactive processes of identity formation is of utmost importance for our effort in understanding European Union as a Security Community. Regarding the standards of amity-enmity, shaped by historical and societal dynamics, RSC can be classified within a continuum as schematically depicted in Figure 2. Thus, in the positive pole, friendly relations between units prevail and give rise to Security Communities where the expectations of change are always peaceful and war (or the threat thereof) is no longer an option for resolving conflicts among its members.

On the other hand, in the negative pole, these relations are tensioned by mistrust and fear resulting in conflictive trends. Between these poles, it is possible to observe the formation of Security Regimes, a hybrid configuration in which patterns of security interdependence continue to be shaped by the fear of conflict and use of armed violence or other extreme emergency measures. However, these expectations use to be contained by negotiated "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations" (KRASNER, 1982, p. 185-6) in this case, security-related issues:

Figure 2 – RSC as a result of patterns of rivalries and shared interests



Source: Queiroz (2012, p. 150).

As originally defined by Deutsch et al. (1957), Security Communities are composed of states that share fundamental values and behaviors to adapt their principles,

rules, and common institutions and processes of joint decision on behalf of peaceful coexistence. This concept was later brought back to the academic spotlights by Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (1998) who refined it by incorporating elements such as the role of shared identities as they can petrify and become relatively constant elements to be reckoned with, a crucial variable for understanding the dialectical contours of the alterity built on relationality between "Self" and "Other" (HARVEY, 2011).[9]

Adler and Barnett (1998, p. 37) highlight that "sometimes a community of states will establish pacific relations, sometimes a community will not. But those that do have formed a security community". In general, these communities may form a new political entity resulting from the formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single larger one, with some type of common government – Amalgamated Security Communities – or keep its members as independent units – Pluralistic Security Communities. In both cases, security concerns are notably marked by a Kantian social structure where the actors stop perceiving themselves as threats. For our purposes, in Pluralistic Security Communities it is noteworthy the core conditions for their existence: (a) compatibility of major values such as peace, commitment to democracy, the rule of law and human rights; (b) mutual responsiveness and; (c) mutual predictability of behavior.[10]

Therefore, taking into consideration these premises, it is noticeable the successful path of European integration towards a zone of stability and cooperation so far, one in which states and populations have come to share common norms of behavior and values in search of, amongst other things, a lasting peace as the outcome of a phenomenon labeled by Deutsch et al. (1957, p. 5) as "dependable expectations of peaceful change".

This achievement materialized through an increasing integration process that took place shortly after the end of World War II and, concomitantly, after decades of arduous processes of social construction of identities – this set of meanings that actors attribute to themselves in relation to others through cognitive interpretations and connections – is something unique. The European Union's feat is even more remarkable if we consider, as stated by Telò (2009, p. 3), that:

> never before in world history have a number of sovereign states, of which some were formerly mortal enemies, freely decided to collaborate within new institutions that are both supranational and intergovernmental, and to jointly exercise their sovereignty through interstate and transnational process rooted in their civil spheres.

9 For an updated discussion on the role of otherness in International Relations, mainly focused on the so-called radical otherness or alterity in the relationality between 'Self' and 'Other', see the contribution of Nordin and Smith (2019). By constructing a typology of four accounts of otherness, they explore sensitive issues such as domination and assimilation considering, as epistemological references, Chinese and Western thoughts.

10 There is a variety of typologies aiming at differentiating Security Communities based on the depth of their integration, cooperation, sense of community, peaceful change, and so on. For a good summary of these definitions see Laporte (2012, p. 6-12).

In light of the mentioned facts, the EU can be interpreted as the institutional personification of a common desire of some European states and populations to put an end to the succession of wars on the continent by giving up to use violence to resolve their disputes, thus making the EU a good example of a Security Community. It is also 'pluralistic' because it is not governed by a single government and a fully shared set of rules (LAPORTE, 2012, p. 4-5).

Nonetheless, the European Union's strategic environment has changed fundamentally over recent years and the classic notion of balance of power is no longer sufficient to satisfactorily keep the respect for sovereign attributes such as independent existence and autonomy. As previously said, international relations have entered into the so-called World Order 2.0, a conceptual framework developed by Richard Haass (2017, p. 2) to typify this emerging new operating system that "includes not only the rights of sovereign states but also those states' obligations to others" as the outcome of today's globalized and highly interconnected world marked by complex and disruptive challenges, some of them unprecedented.

From climate change and energy dependence to one of the major migration[11] crises ever seen since World War II; from the dramatic and messy Brexit negotiations to a strengthening far-right; from terrorist attacks on European soil to the cyberspace and its impending implications to security, EU has been facing uncertainties at this international architecture based on a variable geometry of power in which the destinies of several actors are interwoven in a context favorable to connections of varied order (BENDIEK, 2017; MATTHIJS, 2017; BISCOP, 2018; MITZEN, 2018).

For Pirozzi and Bonomi (2019) these aspects have contributed to generate increasing ambivalences in views and perceptions regarding the future of the Union. This trend was corroborated by a European Parliament's Eurobarometer's survey held in March 2018, demonstrating that most of the European citizens still support the EU, but also pointing out that the expectations are less straightforward.

In this sense, the survey's findings revealed that 62% of the interviewees believe that being part of the EU is a good thing and 68% perceive the membership to the Union as a benefit for their countries. In the meantime, interestingly, 50% alleged to see things in the European Union going in the wrong direction. These contrasting perceptions stimulated the ascension of Eurosceptic parties – both right and left-wing – as a political force that cannot be

11 Although commonly used interchangeably to explain the displacement of people, it is important to conceptually distinguish migration, immigration, and refugees, since public perception varies according to the imperatives underlying the movement of displaced persons. For the purposes of this article, we consider a) **migration** as "the movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border or within a State. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification; b) **immigration** as "a process by which non-nationals move into a country for the purpose of settlement" and, c) **refugees** "as persons who are outside their country of origin for reasons of feared persecution, conflict, generalized violence, or other circumstances that have seriously disturbed public order and, as a result, require international protection" (INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION, [201-]).

ignored as we could witness, for instance, in national elections in France (2017), Italy (2018) and Sweden (2018) amongst many other cases (SCHULMEISTER, 2018).[12]

Given this challenging environment, it is unavoidable to reflect if Europe's long peace is somehow at risk. Or, in addition, if the EU still exerts a power of attraction towards its neighbors through the norms and values which constitute its 'raison d'être' as a Pluralistic Security Community.

3 *Quo Vadis*, European Union? A brief overview

According to Ferguson (2014), Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Estratégicos (2018, p. 12) and Pirozzi and Bonomi (2019), EU's unit and, some would also say, values – mostly described in art. 2 of the Treaty on European Union[13] – began to dangerously deteriorating since the 2008 eurozone crisis.[14] In addition, problems arising from its borders, especially due to the increasing hostilities in its relation with Russia after Crimea annexation, exposed latent fragilities of EU capacity to take forward foreign, security and defense policies capable of effectively and permanently ensure peace in its international surroundings without depending on external support[15], mainly from the United States that have historically had a strong voice on European security issues through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (BISCOP, 2018 MIX, 2013; DUKE; VANHOONACKER, 2016).

The response came on 28 June 2016, with the adoption of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) which redefined the normative framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Under the motto "Shared vision, common action: a stronger Europe", EUGS – the main document on strategic security since the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) –

12 In France, Marine Le Pen rose within the ranks of the National Front (FN), a party founded and previously led by her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen. Le Pen's campaign defended France's exit from the eurozone based on FN's traditional concerns about security and immigration. Le Pen lost the presidential run-off by a 20-point margin to Emmanuel Macron, but the National Front party won a seat in parliament for the first time. In the 2018 Italian general election for choosing over 900 members of its two houses of parliament, voters opted for anti-establishment parties such as the Five Star Movement (5SM) and the anti-illegal migrant League party, both sharing a skepticism about Italy's relationship with the European Union. Finally, general elections held in Sweden in September 2018 elected the 349 members of the Riksdag, and smaller parties, including the far-right, made gains at the expense of the major ones. The anti-immigrant party, Sweden Democrats, won 17.6% of the vote, up on the 12.9% it scored in 2014. On the other hand, the governing Social Democrats, led by prime minister Stefan Löfven, saw their score fall to 28.4%, the lowest since 1917.

13 Respect for human dignity; freedom; democracy; equality; the rule of law, and respect for human rights (PARLAMENTO EUROPEU, 2018).

14 The European sovereign debt crisis also referred to as the eurozone crisis, began in 2008 as a combination of complex factors and structural problems such as the collapse of financial institutions, high government debts, real estate market turmoil, and property bubbles. Looking for a financial bailout, seventeen Eurozone countries agreed to create the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in 2010 and 2012, respectively, to assist them with the debt crisis that reached its peak within that period.

15 For Mandelbaum (2017) Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2014 – as part of Putin's need for public support to sustain the regime he presides – put an end to the post-Cold War European peace. He also points out that "Putin claimed that Russia's actions were necessary because the Euromaidan revolution stemmed from a Western plot to isolate, humiliate, and ultimately destroy Russia" (MANDELBAUM, 2017, p. 109). Since 2014, the EU suspended regular bilateral summits with Russia (Partnership and Cooperation Agreement). Although EU-Russia relations remain strongly interdependent, the EU has applied a "selective dialogue" approach combining a policy of progressive sanctions with attempts to reach a diplomatic solution to the conflict in eastern Ukraine.

advocates the adoption of a strategic autonomy to pursue EU's own interests without being constrained by other states. According to the Global Strategy, a resilient EU would have two main characteristics: 1) the ability to avert external risks and dangers and, 2) the capability to stabilize its neighboring states (BENDIEK, 2017, p. 14).

In a nutshell, EUGS was designed to respond by means of a 'principled pragmatism' to an increasingly conflict-prone external environment and to internal divisions capable of jeopardizing the coherence of the EU's external action, thus, reconciling its self-interests and normative commitments.

Additionally, amid anxieties and uncertainties unleashed by rising doubts concerning the US president Donald Trump's commitment to European security (MANDELBAUM, 2017, p. 108), the EU launched its Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), an initiative aimed at setting out a new level of joint action in the pursuit of a renewed strategic direction on security issues by pooling the defense efforts of 25 of the then EU's 28-member states through new and flexible agreements.[16]

For Smith (2018), although all these efforts respect NATO's primary role in European defense and, at least theoretically, give room for more practical EU-US collaboration regarding crisis management and security assistance operations, they also reveal the EU increasing willingness to forge its own path in this domain.

In line with these facts, defining critical priorities on security and defense is at the heart of EU concerns. In this regard, the EU Global Strategy has established terrorism and organized crime; illegal migration; cybercrime; and energy security as essential priorities to be addressed aiming at defending the Union's citizens, its territory and infrastructure and the supply of critical needs in the face of inside and outside threats (CONTE; CLERCK-SACHSSE, 2018, p. 142).

And, for our purposes, as previously stated, we have selected cybersecurity and migration as our objects of analysis for being issues endowed with high capillarity and, accordingly, capable of generating negative transboundary effects.

As highlighted by Krishna-Hensel (2007) cyber threats globalize because they universalize and equalize. They affect all users, transactions, and dataflows regardless of location or political persuasion. Since networks are cross border organisms, the security of networks is only possible through supranational solutions.

In this regard, cyberspace stands out as one of the newest domains of international activity, one endowed with remarkable potential for both conflict and cooperation. As previously pointed out, in an international order marked by unprecedented flows of information and communication, where states and nonstate actors are integrated into a comprehensive global cybernetwork (HAASS, 2017, p. 6), the digital realm is intimately connected to foreign policy, intelligence, security and defense issues, and the EU is not immune to this trend.

16 It is noteworthy that even with all European NATO allies accomplishing the agreed commitment of spending two percent of their GDP on defense (as they have promised to do by 2024) they would still be dependent on the United States aid for the deployment of their forces (BISCOP, 2018).

On the other hand, violent political and social conflicts have as one of its major consequences forcibly migratory movements generally triggered by the use of force, persecution or coercion, thus, making forced migration originating from places like Syria, Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, South Sudan, and Yemen a potential security issue not only for their immediate surroundings but for international society as a whole.[17] As a result, the global population of forcibly displaced people increased to 68.5 million, compared with 65.6 million in 2016 (UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, 2018, p. 4).

After all, forced displacement of populations both within countries and across borders may dangerously undermine the resilience of communities of origin and host communities.[18] As European Union traditionally stands out as one of the most targeted migration destinies, the implementation of an agenda on migration and related issues shall be aligned to its security and defense policies in order to properly address common actions aimed at dealing with mass population displacement and conflict resolution. That said, last but least, the question is: to what extent cyberthreats and migration can pose risks to UE's core values as a Security Community?

4 European Union Cybersecurity Policy

The European Union has had many challenges in formulating policies that are acceptable to all its members. In some instances, common policies have led to fractures in the group of nations. In a specific area, however, there is a greater consensus amongst the members. Europe's information networks and its critical infrastructures are of significant concern for the future of the EU (EUROPEAN UNION, 2013).

The EU has accorded top priority to the formulation of a common cybersecurity protocol. Where cybersecurity measures have been put forth, it has been far more effective in linking the various efforts initiated by individual nations, with a consensual protocol. The main challenge has been to oversee cybersecurity governance that had been the responsibility of individual member states for the most part (CHRISTOU, 2018).

The increase in cyberattacks with the implications for business and government, as well as, the possible impact on essential services that can be disrupted through network failures has provided urgency to this issue. Simultaneously, the interconnectedness of digital networks and infrastructures has raised awareness for the implementation of common protocols in response to cyberthreats. In this regard, in accordance with the European Commission, ransomware attacks have increased threefold between 2015 and 2017, the economic impact

17 According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 68% of the world's refugees in 2017 came from five countries: the Syrian Arab Republic (6.3 million), Afghanistan (2.6 million), South Sudan (2.4 million), Myanmar (1.2 million) and Somalia (986,400). Syria had the largest amount of new internal displacements due to conflict and violence in 2017, with 2.9 million internally displaced persons. On the other hand, the United States of America was the world's largest recipient of new individual applications (331,700), followed by **Germany** (198,300), **Italy** (126,500), and Turkey (126,100) (UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, 2018).

18 Are considered forcibly displaced persons not only refugees and asylum seekers who look for protection in other countries, but also, and indeed mainly, individuals who have been displaced within the borders of their own countries.

of cybercrime rose fivefold since 2013 and 87% of Europeans see cybercrime as an important challenge for EU's internal security (EUROPEAN COUNCIL, 2020).

In 2016, the European Commission established NIS (Network and Information Systems) a cybersecurity cooperation group. The principal responsibilities of this body were to formulate EU-wide legislation on cybersecurity and promote the exchange of information between the member states to coordinate an effective response to cyber incidents.[19]

On a practical level, the group was to be assisted by an incident response network tasked with monitoring and neutralizing cyberthreats as they emerged. Envisioned as a cooperative framework to deal with the challenges of a cyber world, this body represented a recognition of the importance of coordinating the reactions of individual states. Thus, states were required to:

> (1) Create a national strategy on the security of network and information systems, "defining the strategic objectives and appropriate policy and regulatory measures."
>
> (2) Identify all public and private operators of "essential services" – across energy, transport, banking, financial market infrastructure, health, water, and digital infrastructure sectors – and define "appropriate security measures" as well as thresholds requiring organizations to report any security incidents they suffer to national authorities. The same goes for all online marketplaces, cloud computing services, and search engine providers, excepting small businesses.
>
> (3) Maintain national computer security incident response teams – a.k.a. computer emergency response teams – "to rapidly react to cyber threats and incidents" as well as work closely with other EU member states' CSIRTs (Computer Security Incident Response Team). Such activities will be coordinated by the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security, a.k.a. ENISA.
>
> (4) Participate in a new "Cooperation Group" between member states designed "to support and facilitate strategic cooperation as well as the exchange of information, and to develop trust and confidence," backed by forthcoming European Commission recommendations on improving cross-border cooperation in the wake of a major online attack. (SCHWARTZ, 2016).

Ongoing efforts to further ensure effective responses have resulted in the projected network of certification centers, industrial competence and research centers, and risk management capacities. Among the many initiatives was the development of an

19 For additional information, see Parlamento Europeu (2016).

open-source database for threat management and providing citizens tools for ensuring data privacy.

Interestingly, the sensitivity to cyberthreats is only one element of the cooperative cyber initiatives of the EU. A corollary is the determination to benefit from the opportunities of the new technologies. Through certification of new devices, promoting a digital single market, and digital single gateway, the European Commission proposes to give individuals and businesses the tools for making informed decisions and formulating advantageous policies.

The cybersecurity certification framework was designed to facilitate the mutual acceptance of certified products by member states. The reasoning underlying the certification initiative was that a set of common standards would facilitate the development of "interoperable products" thereby enabling networks with highly differentiated nodes to operate securely. The affirmed aim of the measure was to build consumer trust in technology products located throughout a single digital marketplace.

This would be challenging, given the existence of various cybersecurity certification rules amongst the individual member states. To this end, a series of penalties for breach of compliance and inadequate security protocols was recommended to reinforce the required outcome of the EU cybersecurity Act. A related complication involved the legal liabilities in case of a data breach occurring when cross border data transfers between the EU and nations outside the common market were involved via an EU certified device. European Commission cyber initiatives go beyond the member states to include foreign entities like Google and Facebook to report security breaches that are likely to affect their operations in Europe.

To reach these goals, new legal options as well as an emphasis on existing international law has been emphasized. As a corollary, there has been a move to encourage cooperation between the private and public sectors in sharing information, identifying threats, and coordinating solutions to crises. Since most of the infrastructure is privately owned, governments are beholden to industry for access. This is designed to ensure, among other things, the competitiveness of European industries and businesses. This is the logical response to recognizing the growing importance of the on-line economy, as more and more transactions occur via the cyber channels replacing the traditional brick and mortar commercial spaces.

In addition, securing payment systems from identity theft and other criminal activity is given the highest importance to protecting the financial sphere. Securing commercial transactions remains a particularly challenging environment due to the continuously evolving nature of the threats. While individual member nations have their own secure systems, the cross-border threats require a coordinated response at the EU level. It is this rationale that is driving the efforts to integrate cyber policy in the EU and to build a consensus on the need for a cooperative policy.

The common cybersecurity policy is linked to the Common Security and Foreign Policy and its scope is still being worked out to define the specific conditions under which it is to be activated as well as the scale of the attack which would trigger its

launch. The borderless character of the threats places the risk in an entirely undefined realm. Risk assessment is consequently much harder under these circumstances.

In addition, the security dimension is complicated by the extensive reliance on foreign technology suppliers such as China which has a large market share of telecoms networks in several member states. As the cheapest source of 5G technology, it is difficult to overlook Chinese importance to modernizing communications. The contradiction inherent in such a situation lies at the heart of efforts to integrate cybersecurity systems.[20]

It is evident that economic incentives for cybersecurity are not the primary driving force behind cyber cooperation. Significant impetus comes from national security considerations which provide urgent motivation for integrating cyber defenses across the EU. Much of this initiative is conducted in a closed security environment as policymakers and technicians confront the pressure to not only deal with current crises but also face the daunting challenge of anticipating future attacks on the infrastructure and weapons systems. This constitutes an arena for consensus-building which continues to remain an elusive goal of European integration. Preparing a common cyber defense across its membership remains a high priority and one which has a realistic prospect for success.

Cyber defense is also confronted by the increasing number of ransomware attacks on individuals and businesses that have cost the EU member countries upwards of "1.6 percent of their GDP or $41.3 billion annually for the EU as a whole" (SPRING, 2016). Overall, the EU lacks precise information to accurately estimate the total revenue loss from cybercrime due to the absence of standardized measures and criteria for estimation.

It is cited as all the more of an imperative to coordinate and develop common policies and approaches towards having an effective deterrent in place. Policymakers have concentrated on risk-driven inventive and flexible strategies for cyber defense. Reflecting on the seriousness of their efforts, the European Commission further developed clarifications in the 2018 regulations, identifying the criteria that determined who would be designated an OES (Operator of Essential Services) that would be required to comply with laws and penalties for non-compliance. Essential services include energy, transport, health, water, as well as digital infrastructure.

In emphasizing EU wide criteria for complying with these guidelines, the commission recognized that greater efficiency could be achieved by clarifying the parameters of regulation to ensure uniformity of result. The document provides detailed principles to enable states to meet the basic objectives set forth. As an override of the existing state measures, this further serves to consolidate the cyber defense strategy of the EU. The directives serve to characterize risks, by classifying them, and in defending against cyberattacks, to reduce the frequency of these vulnerabilities.

20 In the fierce competition for leadership in this highly strategic market, the Chinese are at the forefront and 5G technology is one of the instruments for implementing the "New Silk Road", Beijing's great foreign policy project. China's Huawei is the leader of the 5G sector and controls almost 30% of the global market. On the other hand, the Nordic companies, Ericsson and Nokia, are alternatives for the bloc.

Finnaly, the significant effect that disinformation has had on public discourse and on voting behavior in several instances has been an area of concern. The EU already possesses a range of instruments to protect electronic communications networks and in combination with its code of practice on disinformation, a self-regulatory mechanism as well as the sanctions regime of May 2019, some progress is expected in this domain.

5 The Migration Policy in the European Union

The migration policy of the European Union is closely tied to the underlying rationale of creating a unified European entity in the aftermath of World War II. The concept has its basis in the historical forces that molded European identity following the period of national conflict. Europe found itself confronting fundamental questions regarding nationalism, borders, citizenship, and ethnicity as the societies devastated by conflict tried to move forward with a new vision.

Emerging from all this soul searching were divisions reflecting different experiences and ideologies and groupings mostly identified as East European and West European. Societies formed and re-formed and eventually The Maastricht Treaty, officially known as the Treaty on European Union (TEU), marked the beginning of a new stage in the process of integration. The Treaty was signed on 7 February 1992 by twelve countries that consisted of Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The treaty was ratified following referendums in some instances and resulted in the establishing of the European Union in 1993. As more countries joined the alliance, the cause of European integration continued to advance.

As previously said, the integration laid the foundations for a single currency, the euro, and significantly expanded cooperation between European countries in a number of new areas, that included, European citizenship giving citizens the right to reside in and move freely between the Member States, a common foreign and security policy, and a decision to foster closer cooperation between police and the judiciary in criminal matters.

European integration remained a high priority of the new alliances and agreements that followed the TEU. Since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, European countries have advanced in growing closer to each other while some areas such as economic and fiscal policies remain at the national level. European leaders have agreed on additional steps to promote further integration between European states on important issues including economic and monetary union, defense, and immigration.

The Dublin Regulation facilitated the application for asylum in the first EU state where the migrant was registered. This was protested by the Greek government and aid agencies which argued that the EU should restructure the Dublin Regulation so that asylum-seekers could be more evenly distributed amongst the various members of the EU. The current system unfairly placed the burden on five countries – Greece, Italy, Spain, France, and Germany – which received most of Europe's asylum applications. Greece, for example, received 70 times as many claims as Hungary, a country of comparable size and wealth.

This resistance to this situation resulted in the disruption of existing open border agreements such as the Schengen protocol[21] and led to several border closings (COLLETT, 2018).

Responding to criticism of the original convention, the Dublin III Regulation which came into effect in 2013 sought to limit the number of places where asylum petitions could be submitted. The "Visegrad" countries, or V4, (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia)[22] have not been receptive to any modifications of the agreement and have been strongly resisting the suggestion of equitable distribution. Consequently, the Regulation was suspended temporarily during the 2015 migration crisis and sustained by the ECJ (European Court of Justice) in 2017 (COLLET, 2018).

The V4 group calls for more effective control of the Mediterranean borders, and it is precisely the existing fragilities on border controlling one of the reasons why V4 rejects the policy of compulsory quotas for refugees and the way in which financial support for the subject is being applied. As expected, the Group is particularly concerned about the migration route of the Western Balkans.

But it is worth mentioning that V4 is not the only one that has reacted negatively to migrants, since other countries, mainly from Eastern Europe, have criminalized them, which has generated fierce frictions within the Union. In any case, the problem is clearly demonstrative not only of the absence of common cultural criteria on humanitarian issues but it also draws attention to the risks of a system collapse (CENTRO DE INVESTIGACIONES Y ESTUDIOS ESTRATÉGICOS, 2018, p. 13).

The sense of unreasonable requirements was further enhanced by the perceived inequity of the Lisbon Treaty which suggested a centralized leadership and an emphasis on human rights and democracy promotion in the pursuit of foreign policy, while also enforcing binding rules for withdrawal from the European Union (SCHMID-DRÜNER, 2019). This has interrupted the ongoing attempts to create a united Europe in which territorial identities are subservient to a cooperative construct of a supranational economic entity that is beneficial to all.

It has also resulted in the emergence of a wave of ethnonationalism in several countries which can only be understood about the migrant crisis that appears to have provoked this reaction. The grand European concept of a borderless region sharing peace and prosperity across a multiethnic environment and moving past the historical divisions of nation-states has always had challenges. Nevertheless, it is in response to the unchecked mass migration that the existing fault lines gained prominence as individual societies resisted the imposition of migrant populations on them by central edict.

21 In the Schengen Area, people, tourists, and other persons legally present on the EU territory can freely circulate without being subjected to border checks. Since 1985, it has gradually grown and encompasses almost all EU countries and a few associated non-EU countries.

22 Bringing together some Central Europe's countries that share cultural values and common roots in diverse religious traditions, the Visegrad Group – formed on 15 February 1991 – reflects their efforts to jointly work in fields of common interest such as environment, internal security, defense, science and education, transportation, tourism, energy, and information technologies.

On the other hand, migration has benefited from the encouragement it has received through the primacy of global sensitivities towards humanitarian issues. One of the defining features of the present migrant scene is the liberal reception extended by several nations eager to establish their altruistic credentials as open and enlightened societies.

Nations seek to establish their global credentials by asserting their generosity and openness toward human suffering. Thus, leaders have initially opened their societies to unrestrained charity. Subsequently, some of the early responsiveness has been revisited when it has been discovered that the practicality of absorbing masses of individuals faces many obstacles both logistically and from the perspective of public opinion. Unplanned assimilation has belatedly led to an examination of the basic premises of migrant reception and in many instances the evaluation is ongoing.

Differences towards migration and open borders associated with the free movement of peoples in Europe has been straining the normative structure that was originally conceived of, and, in addition, these rifts are becoming more established in the aftermath of the adoption of a non-binding Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration in Marrakech by the United Nations Organization[23].

Despite the large proportion of members who signed the treaty, the event was marked by the withdrawal and absence of several key players from the EU. Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, and Slovakia have pulled out of the process. Europeans were increasingly concerned that the governments were losing control of their borders and having to subjugate national interests to a centralized policymaking process (CALAMUR; SCHULTHEIS, 2018).

Proponents have argued that while immigration was a matter of state sovereignty, it also required a greater level of interdependence between countries. Germany, in keeping with its initial enthusiasm for limitless admission of migrants, predictably argued in favor of the UNO initiative and strongly favors an EU wide solution. Nevertheless, individual members of the EU seek different approaches. Germany prefers to send refugees back to their first country of landing. The States that are the landing points for refugees coming from Libya and North African territories have overflowing camps that cannot absorb the sheer volume of migrants.

There is a general agreement that tighter borders should be enforced and the EU should fund staging centers along the North African coast where asylum seekers could be sorted out from economic migrants. While waiting for this plan to be practically implemented, the immediate focus has been on dealing with the refugees who are already in Europe (HENLEY, 2018). Migration continues to remain a central issue in EU relations as its efforts to have a common policy come up against deeply ingrained differences in historical traditions, between political backgrounds of Eastern and Western states, and between its wealthier and poorer members.

23 The Intergovernmental Conference to adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration took place in Marrakech, Morocco, on 10-11, December 2018.

6 Final Remarks

Amid advances and setbacks since European countries started to cooperate economically in 1951, the bloc has expanded, laying the foundations of "an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe", as envisioned by the Treaty of Rome (1957), thus, giving rise to an audacious economic unification project based on supranational principles or, additionally, in accordance to our conceptual framework, a Pluralistic Security Community constructed on expectations of peaceful coexistence.

However, more than six decades on, in times of increasing uncertainties, this Security Community has been facing several threats in the World Order 2.0, some of them potentially capable of putting at risk achievements hardly obtained, amongst them, one of EU's greatest symbols of normative power: its long peace. And, more than ever, in order to protect institutions, interests, beliefs, and values in a context whose existing arrangements seem to be increasingly inadequate in dealing with contemporary issues (HAASS, 2017, p. 7), a broad sense of community is required.[24]

Notwithstanding the ideals and logic underlying the concept of a unified Europe, it is clear that achieving consensus on key policies in the contemporary environment is something that is a work in progress, after all, the EU is a dynamic agent, constantly evolving at the pace of major geopolitical changes in the international system. However, despite the efforts, for the European Union the timing could not be more challenging (and, maybe, worse).

Even with the growing optimism demonstrated by Brussels after the announced end of the eurozone debt crisis in 2017, some of the EU's economies remain fragile. It would be premature to say that the eurozone has already left the crisis behind and the risk to the cohesion of the monetary union no longer exists. Rapid normalization of EU-Russia relations is unlikely since Ukraine remains a key obstacle where no quick progress is to be expected, a crisis that has escalated due to the European support to anti-Russian political movements. Besides, Moscow continues its "saber-rattling" towards the volatile Caucasus as a response to some countries' attempts to strengthen their ties with the West.

As mentioned, we should also take into consideration the ascension of anti-establishment parties, on both the right and the left, as a relevant political contesting force of the European integration, a phenomenon that is gaining ground, especially in Central Europe. This trend has already materialized in some EU's member states such as Poland, Hungary, Austria and Slovakia that rapidly slid toward to the so-called "illiberal democracy", according to Zakaria (1997, 2019) a kind of democratically elected regimes often re-elected or reinforced by referenda that ignore the constitutional limits of their power and deprive their citizens of basic rights and liberties.[25]

24 In opposition to the arguments advocating the existence of a broader sense of community/identity, political theorists such as Brown (1995, p. 100) point out that this is a longstanding and seriously problematic epistemological issue because a sense of being 'We' always requires an 'Other' against which to define itself.

25 Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, in power since 2010, stated that the time has come for a state based on more traditionalist values: the liberal state must give way to the rise of an illiberal state.

As to our objects of analysis, in a nutshell, the possibility of cyberthreats stemming from state and non-state actors such as hacktivists, terrorist and extremist groups calls for more structured coordination among EU members to properly understand what the digital realm is and, on the other hand, to build the trust needed to foster solid cybersecurity governance (CHRISTOU, 2016). Secondly, the refugee crisis has exposed deep divisions across the continent over immigration with relevant consequences, thus, demanding a more flexible and agile manner of dealing with this reality and, accordingly, a less dogmatic vision of the EU in order to make it more resilient to the threat of fragmentation.

Gathered, all these issues, along with many others that were not addressed here, portrait a Europe that seems to be at the brink of a crisis where pressures on States, communities and societies are increasingly rapid and disruptive, a situation that, in turn, invites us to revisit our main question: after all, to what extent cyberthreats and migration can pose risks to UE's core values while a Pluralistic Security Community?

To respond to this question some methodological caveats shall be considered. Firstly, the selected objects of analysis represent only a small sampling of a broader continuum of factors that combined are more likely to result in rupture by jointly contesting the defining elements of this Security Community, namely, its values; capacity of response and predictability of behavior on security and defense issues. So, when isolated, they are, ontologically, only pieces of this puzzle. However, regardless of this limited extension of their explanatory capacities, they may be relevant indicators of potential trends that the EU must be prepared to deal with. But, again, to what extent? As next described, based on the achieved inferences, some causal connections between the EU Pluralistic Security Community's values/interests and externalities related to the objects of our analysis could be delineated.

As to cyberthreats, we may assert that there is wide awareness about the need for common protocols in response to this menace and, accordingly, a recognition of the importance of integrating cyber defenses across the EU as a high priority. As seen, these perceptions tend to converge into agreed actions for the defense of Union's citizens, territory, infrastructure, and supply of critical needs, despite the recognized difficulties in overseen what had been the responsibility of individual states for the most part.

Concerning mutual responsiveness and predictability of behavior on this issue, the evidence demonstrated a greater consensus amongst EU members on cybersecurity governance as the main challenge in this domain once the task demands coordinating cooperation between the private and public sectors in sharing information and identifying threats. As one of EU top priorities, the formulation of a common cybersecurity protocol gained a more robust shape with the creation, in 2016, of a cybersecurity cooperation group (Network and Information Systems) and, shortly after, with the 2018 European Commission regulations, thus, consolidating

the cyber defense strategy of the EU through directives aimed at characterizing risks of cyberattacks in order to reduce vulnerabilities.

Finally, regarding cyber threats, some key-issues not addressed in these pages will, certainly, deserve attention in forthcoming research. This is the case of "narrative wars" and the resulting exposure of citizens to large scale disinformation. In this sense, it should be noted that the European Commission is working to implement a comprehensive set of actions to tackle the spread and impacts of misleading and outright false information (Action Plan Against Disinformation[26]) and to ensure the protection of European values and Institutions.

About migration, this has been a sensitive issue that led to a disruptive wave of ethnonationalism movements in several countries. It is worth highlighting that defining the so-called European identity is far from being a simple task. Some would even say that European identity, in fact, never existed and the alleged current identity crisis triggered by migration and other threats is something confined in the scope of political discourses. On the other hand, also important is the conceptual understanding of identity as a social construction that depends on several factors capable of influencing this common sense of belonging, a feeling that may vary in time, for instance, as a response to a given specific situation as the cases of immigration crisis from Syria and Libya.

Without entering into deeper aspects of the relational logic of 'Self' and 'Other' that underpins much of this discussion, we assume the premise that over time some characteristics may solidify as elements of collective identity – although not perennially, as suggested by the facts. That said, in this case, we advocated that the observed conflictive perceptions amongst UE members on the problem have acted as a contestatory element of one of its core defining features: a borderless region sharing peace and prosperity across a multi-ethnic environment.

One of the explanations for this situation European integration is facing lies in the noticeable clash between two ontological ideas – nation-state and federalism – leading, in its turn, to a stalemate: some EU core values were conceptualized under the influence of a 'federalist paradigm' while their implementation should be achieved within the scope of nation-states. This two-layered framework, as highlighted by Kaplan (2018), feeds trends such as the sensitivity of European nations towards their sovereignty and the rise of Euroscepticism in the integration process.

These facts bred ideational fractures and, concomitantly, intensified the resistance to the ongoing project of Europe as a supranational entity in countries such as Italy, Hungary, Latvia, Slovakia, Austria, Poland, Czech Republic, thus, testing EU's resilience as an element of collective stability. As a result, we have witnessed the erosion of open border agreements such as the Schengen Protocol due to, amongst other things, the uneven enforcement of migrant's reception rules within the EU. This is an aspect that certainly deserves attention given its effects on the EU's responsiveness and predictability of behavior on this issue.

26 For additional information see European Commission (2018).

In turn, the EU Global Strategy stands out as a pragmatic response to these facts because it is less ideological in relation to EU Pluralistic Security Community's values and more realistic about its interests or, as defined by Biscop (2016), EUGS is the materialization of a Realpolitik with European characteristics. This perspective means that the EU shall increasingly act as a non-threatening driving force endowed with the capability to deal with normative diversity – and its values-interests dilemma – outside grand abstractions.

In other words, differently from the European Security Strategy, EUGS delivers a more resilient and cautious plan of action considering the complexity and comprehensiveness of the EU's foreign policy. And, in doing so, maybe, for the first time, the EU has been able to assertively define vital interests (EU's citizens and territory security, prosperity, democracy, and a rule-based global order) that have been transformed into political priorities through EUGS.

Finally, considering the inferences, it would be premature, and not advisable, to assert that the outcomes originating from the factors analyzed would represent irreparable risks to European peace and values as a community. But in a wider ontological context – as parts of a combination of externalities – this set of issues could potentially fragilize the ideational pillars upon which the EU Pluralistic Security Community was built notwithstanding the efforts undertaken so far to deal with the challenges of World Order 2.0.

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