

THE POLITICS OF FINANCING PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS¹

LA POLÍTICA DE LA FINANCIACIÓN DE LAS OPERACIONES DE MANTENIMIENTO DE LA PAZ

A POLÍTICA DO FINANCIAMENTO DAS OPERAÇÕES DE MANUTENÇÃO DA PAZ

EDUARDO UZIEL²
JOÃO A. C. VARGAS^{3*}

ABSTRACT

The article outlines a framework for United Nations peacekeeping operations from the standpoint of negotiations on their funding. After analyzing how the Organization's policies evolved to provide resources for its peace missions, it analyzes the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, where administrative and budgetary debates take place. It then discusses the manner in which the distribution of the costs of peace missions, as embodied in the scale of contributions, is negotiated. A debate is held on how the budget process is going, with emphasis on negotiating groups and how budget preferences affect operations. Other aspects of the work of the Fifth Committee affecting peacekeeping operations are mentioned, and the relationship of the Fifth Committee with other bodies deciding on peace missions is examined, with examples of topics being discussed among the various decision-making forums of the United Nations.

Keywords: United Nations. Peacekeeping Operations. Budget Process. Multilateral Policy.

RESUMO

O artigo traça um quadro das operações de manutenção da paz das Nações Unidas do ponto de vista das negociações relativas a seu financiamento. Após fazer um histórico de como evoluíram as políticas da Organização para prover de recursos suas missões de paz, analisa a Quinta Comissão da Assembleia Geral, foro onde ocorrem os debates administrativos e orçamentários. Discute, em seguida, a maneira pela qual é negociada a repartição dos custos das missões de paz, corporificada na escala de contribuições. É feito debate sobre como transcorre o processo orçamentário, com ênfase nos grupos negociadores e na maneira como as preferências orçamentárias afetam as operações. São mencionados outros aspectos do trabalho da Quinta Comissão que afetam as operações de manutenção da paz e é examinada a relação da Quinta Comissão com outros órgãos que decidem sobre as missões de paz, com exemplos de temas disputados entre os vários foros decisórios das Nações Unidas.

Palavras-chave: Nações Unidas. Operações de Manutenção da Paz. Processo Orçamentário. Política Multilateral.

RESUMEN

El artículo traza un cuadro de las operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz de las Naciones Unidas desde el punto de vista de las negociaciones relativas a su financiación. Después de hacer un historial de cómo evolucionaron las políticas de la Organización para proveer de recursos sus misiones de paz, analiza la Quinta Comisión de la Asamblea General, foro donde ocurren los debates administrativos y presupuestarios. A continuación, discute la manera en que se negocia el reparto de los costes de las misiones de paz, corporizada en la escala de contribuciones. Se debate sobre cómo transcurrir el proceso presupuestario, con énfasis en los grupos negociadores y en la manera cómo las preferencias presupuestarias afectan a las operaciones. Se mencionan otros aspectos del trabajo de la Quinta Comisión que afectan a las operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz y se examina la relación de la Quinta Comisión con otros órganos que deciden sobre las misiones de paz con ejemplos de temas disputados entre los diversos foros decisorios de las Naciones Unidas.

Palabras clave: Naciones Unidas. Operaciones de Mantenimiento de la Paz. Proceso Presupuestario. Política Multilateral.

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² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil (MRE) Brasília, DF (Federal District), Brazil

³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil (MRE) Brasília, DF (Federal District), Brazil

* The opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Brazilian government. The authors thank Luiz Feldman for his suggestions in the previous version of this article. ⁴ El autor es el comandante del ejército brasileño, actualmente sirve en el Comando de Artillería del Ejército - Porto Alegre-RS (Rio Grande do Sul) - Estudiante de Doctorado en Ciencias Militares IMM (Instituto Meira Mattos) / ECEME (Escuela de Comando y del Estado Mayor del Ejército).

"War is the continuation of peace.
But with much more money"
Millôr Fernandes

INTRODUCTION

The use of peacekeeping operations is one of the most visible aspects of the work of the United Nations. When successful, these missions can help end conflicts and prevent humanitarian tragedies of greater proportions. They are also one of the most important aspects of the work of the United Nations - and of the most costly ones. By 2016, the total cost of peacekeeping operations reached \$ 7.89 billion. It is not surprising that States' positions on these missions, their operations, and the desirability of creating and closing them are strongly influenced by their financial implications. Thus, understanding the political dynamics surrounding peace missions requires a clear understanding of its financial dimension and how it relates to the more ostensibly political dimension.

It is up to the United Security Council to decide when to set up and how to structure United Nations peacekeeping operations. The limits of their activities, the tasks they must carry out, the number of troops they have and, above all, the extent to which they can use force, are decided by the CSNU (United Nations Security Council). But none of these tasks can be executed if there are no financial resources to finance the troops, to acquire equipment, and even to write the guidelines and rules of engagement that guide the *peacekeepers*. It is up to the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, to take all financial decisions on peacekeeping operations.

The decision-making process on the financing of peace missions is a complex political game between various forums on the decision, implementation and supervision of these operations. As Philip Cunliffe has pointed out, it is a system that divides responsibilities between different bodies, with their own procedures and composition, and which reflects concrete disputes over control of the United Nations peacekeeping apparatus. Each country or group of countries does not passively accept decisions but contributes to "a politically active, dynamic organization that is in flux and subject to numerous pressures from both within and without" (CUNLIFFE, 2009, pages: 324-325)⁵.

As a first arena, at the political-substantive level, the CSNU decides when and how to intervene in a conflict situation. When it does so through peacekeeping operations, it is aware that it will generate financial costs for the execution of its decisions, but these are not predefined, nor can

they be deducted automatically of the structure and mandate of the missions. In this context, the Fifth Committee emerges as a second arena at the political-financial level, where it will be debated how much to spend, how to spend and who will pay for those expenses. While there is a reasonable consensus on the usefulness of peace missions, there is no clarity among the members of the United Nations on how to finance them. The debate on funding is therefore used as a second instance to give priority to divergent aspects of the mandate of the missions or to try to eliminate points seen as undesirable (CLAUDE, 1963, pages: 833).

The reasons why States support peace missions vary according to their relative position on the international scene. They may be seeking influence or limiting the costs of acting with their own troops in distant crises; have an interest in strengthening the United Nations or in ensuring the security of their regions; seek positions in the Secretariat or reimbursements for the assignment of troops. These motivations have a bearing on the way in which states act in financing decisions (UZIEL, 2006, pages: 96-100; UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 2006).

The Fifth Commission is dominated by the cleavage between developed and developing countries. The former, whose share of resources account for a large part of the total budgets of peace missions, have an incentive to limit the duration and scope of missions and to fight for restricted budgets (even if they do not meet the needs of the operation). The developing States are the largest contributors of troops and, generally, the host countries of operations, and have a majority of the votes in the General Assembly. This dynamic generates, in the decision-making process on the financing of peacekeeping operations, frequently incompatible demands (CUNLIFFE, 2009, page: 329; FETTERLY, 2006, page: 400; COLEMAN, 2014, pages: 14-17).

This article analyzes the structure, discussions and decision-making practices of the Fifth Committee as the forum responsible for financing peace missions. Its purpose is to present the basic concepts and dynamics of the process, without analyzing in more depth its history or its implications for the performance of the United Nations, nowadays. In the first part of the article, a brief history of financing policy is given. The second describes the Fifth Committee and its practices. In the third part, the distribution of the costs of peace missions is analyzed. In the fourth, we debate how the budget process takes place.

In the fifth part, some other aspects of the work of the Fifth Committee, affecting peacekeeping operations are mentioned. In the part six, it is examined the relationship of the Fifth Committee with other bodies that decide regarding peace missions.

⁵ A/C.5/71/18, page: 3.

1. HISTORY OF THE FINANCING OF PEACE MISSIONS

The Fifth Committee was established in 1946, at the first regular session of the General Assembly (AGNU), as one of the standing committees of the AGNU dealing with financial and administrative matters, including the budget and scale of contributions of the member states. Thus, the provisions of Article 17, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Charter of San Francisco (UNITED NATIONS, 1946, pages 37 and 54)⁶.

Since the late 1940s, the Fifth Committee has been called upon to decide on the budget of the peace missions that have emerged with UNTSO in the Middle East and the Military Observer Group United Nations in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). These missions consisted of small numbers of observers and did not engender controversial debates, being included in the regular budget of the United Nations. Discussions on the financing of peace missions became more complex in the early 1960s, when it was necessary to decide on the costly and controversial operations in Suez (UNEF I) and Congo (ONUC) (UNITED NATIONS 1996, 36-37, 142 and 183-184).

In the early 1960s, the United Nations was polarized between the Soviet and Western blocs, which sought to instrumentalize the Organization for its purposes and to hamper the initiatives of the opposing bloc. At the same time, the countries that came out of decolonization had their own agenda for the debates. In the face of the veto of the URSS (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in the Security Council, the United States appealed at various times to the General Assembly to carry forward UNEF and ONUC (United Nations Operation in Congo).

In retaliation, the URSS (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), its allies, and France refused to pay the portion of their budget contributions for these operations, leading the Organization to the brink of bankruptcy - financial and political. In the words of Inis Claude at the time: "the United Nations finds itself over-committed in political terms, which explains the fact that it is under-supported in budgetary terms" (CLAUDE, 1963, page: 836).

The crisis extended from 1961 to 1965: the deficit in the finances of the Organization caused by the default of the URSS (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), France and its allies was so great that it threatened the very existence of the United Nations. The gravity of the situation has led to a series of innovative measures, sometimes drastic, to preserve the financial health of the Organization, such as consulting the International Court of Justice on the

legality of default and the issuance of "United Nations United Nations "to cover the expenditures"⁷.

The resolution of the crisis came about through a tacit agreement between the major powers, which also included some demands from the other members of the Organization. On the one hand, it was agreed that the AGNU (United Nations General Assembly) would no longer create peace missions; only the CSNU (United Nations Security Council) could do so, ensuring that operations would be established and its mandates shaped only with the consent of the five permanent (P-5) veto-holding members. On the other hand, it was recognized that it was indisputably to the AGNU (United Nations General Assembly) to determine the missions budget. Although reluctantly, the URSS (which would continue to delay payments until the mid-1980s) and France acknowledged that the CSNU (United Nations Security Council) has no competence in the budget area and that the United Nation members are obliged to pay the amounts determined by the Fifth Committee.

In addition, two mechanisms have been suggested in that context for the financing of peace missions: (1) each mission would have its own budget, separate from the regular budget of the United Nations; (2) the calculation of the financial contribution of States for peacekeeping operations would be different from that for the regular budget, with additional costs for the permanent members of the CSNU (United Nations Security Council), which served the interests of the small and medium-sized countries, unwilling to bear the which many considered to be United States political adventures and allies⁸.

This second aspect was consolidated in 1973, in the context of the apportionment of contributions to fund UNEF (United Nations Emergency Force) II. Specifically, for peace missions, it was decided that in view of the "special responsibilities" of the five permanent members of the CSNU (United Nations Security Council) for the maintenance of international peace and security, they should pay a larger share of the budget for peacekeeping operations than they paid to the regular budget - even if it is up to the Security Council to establish operations. Developing countries, given the high cost of peacekeeping missions, would benefit from discounts corresponding

⁷ Resolution 1739 (XVI), "The United Nations financial position and prospects", of 12/20/1961.

⁸ For the legal aspects of the crisis, see Gross (1963); for political analysis, see Claude (1963) and Schricke (1985, pages: 272-274); on bargaining with the medium and small powers, see McDermott (2000, pages: 82-85). The disputes at that time also demonstrated to the Western bloc the loss of its control over the AGNU (United Nations General Assembly), due to the accession of new members. Developed countries have increasingly invested in so-called "voluntary contributions", which are not analyzed by the Fifth Committee; see Graham (2015).

⁶ Article 17: "1. The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization; 2. The expenses of the Organizations shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly. "

to the absorption of costs by the P-5 (below, the issue will be dealt with in a more detailed way)⁹.

The financing of peacekeeping operations went through yet another defining moment in 1985. Feeling pressured as a loser in AGNU (United Nations General Assembly) voting and having to pay more than a quarter of the entire budget of the Organization, the United States Congress imposed restrictions on the financing of peacekeeping operations. Retaining part of their contributions, as was done by the URSS (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) and France two decades earlier.

Through financial pressure and negotiation, the United States obtained a General Assembly resolution recommending budget cuts and improvements in the decision-making mechanisms of the Organization on budgetary issues. Its biggest victory was to agree that the Fifth Committee "should continue to make all possible efforts with a view to establishing the broadest possible agreement [of member states]" before taking decisions⁹.

This clause has been understood as requiring unanimity, which is rarely broken. Although not specifically referring to peace missions, this "unanimity rule" significantly modified the operations budget negotiations by giving all members of the General Assembly the possibility of veto (ARMSTRONG; LLOYD, REDMOND, 1996, pages 113 -116).

The last major change in the peacekeeping budget decision-making process was AGNU Resolution 49 / 233A of 1994. The thaw in relations between the United States and the URSS (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) started under Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s led to a depolarization of the Security Council - and a massive growth in the number of peace missions. At first, as had been the practice in the previous forty years, the Assembly dealt with the budget of the missions ad hoc and at different times, according to the period of the year in which they were established. As this practice became increasingly problematic and costly, it was decided that all peace missions would have their individual budgets considered annually by the Fifth Committee and that their fiscal year would run from July from one year to the next June, of the following year.¹⁰

⁹ See the resolution 3101 (XXVIII) of 11/12/1973, available at: <<http://bit.ly/2N18hGS>>. Accessed on: July 11, 2018.

⁹ Paragraph 7 of Resolution 41/213, "Review of the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations", 12/19/1986.

¹⁰ Read also the document A/41/49 and Mills (1989).

¹⁰ The regular budget of the United Nations, in turn, is biennial, and follows a fiscal year from January to December. Available at: <<http://bit.ly/2N18hGS>>. Accessed on: July 11, 2018.

¹² The term "special political missions" refers to a set of United Nations civilian missions of various types, ranging from special envoys (eg the Personal Envoy of the Secretary General to the Western Sahara) to field missions, very similar with peacekeeping operations, albeit without a military component (eg the United

2. STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONING OF THE FIFTH COMMITTEE

The Fifth Committee is a *committee of the whole*, that is, all 193 members of the United Nations have the right to speak and vote. It meets in three annual periods of deliberation, in October-December ("main session"), March and May-June (first and second "reconvened sessions"). In the latter, the budgets of the peace missions, as well as other administrative and financial aspects related to the operations, are debated and adopted. Between 40 and 50 per cent of the resolutions adopted annually by the Fifth Committee concern peacekeeping operations or special political missions¹². The work of the Fifth Committee takes place in three types of meetings: formal, informal and "informal informal ones".

At the formal meetings, reports and proposals are presented by the Secretariat and senior members of the delegations make speeches outlining lines, which are recorded in minutes. In the informal meetings, the "experts" (for example: less senior diplomats) attend to negotiate the text of the resolutions. Although interpretation services are available between the official languages of the United Nations and there is a coordinator who conducts the work, there is no record. Finally, "informal informal" meetings are discussions between small groups of experts aimed at overcoming controversial points in the debates, with no record, interpretation or other formalities of the kind.

In these various formats, the Commission scrutinizes the budget proposals prepared and presented by the Secretariat. A resolution text is negotiated for each peace mission in which the amount allocated to its operation is specified and specific repairs and changes are made in its budgets (SURA, 2012). It also negotiates broader resolutions on issues that apply to all peace missions (in particular the resolution on "cross-cutting issues") and regarding the costing

of the support provided to these missions from the seat of the Organization (the resolution on the "support account").

The large number of items in the Fifth Committee makes it difficult for all representatives of the 193 members of the Organization to participate in all negotiations. Much of the negotiation thus takes place on the basis of "negotiating groups" - groups of countries that adopt common positions and designate

Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan). There is intense discussion within the United Nations on the use and management of these missions, particularly as regards the need for the Secretariat to give greater support to political missions more closely related to peacekeeping operations. Read the reports: *Review of arrangements for funding and backstopping special political missions (A/66/340)* and *Overall policy matters pertaining to special political missions (A/70/40)*.

one or more delegates to represent them in dealing with specific issues. The main negotiating groups are the Group of 77 and China (G-77); the European Union and CANZ (Canada, Australia and New Zealand). Some countries, such as the United States, Russia and Japan, are not part of any group, but participate actively autonomously.

The G-77 is a developing country grouping that emerged from the First United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD in 1964) and acts as a negotiating group in a number of multilateral forums, particularly those related to development. It now has 134 members - that is, 69.4% of the members of the United Nations - which include countries such as Brazil, China, India, all countries in Africa and Latin America (except Mexico) and most Asian countries.

In the Fifth Committee, the G-77 has given priority to issues such as financing for development projects; equitable geographical representation in the hiring of staff by the Secretariat; the interests of troop-contributing countries and host countries in discussions on peacekeeping operations; and preserving the role of the General Assembly in decision-making (with skepticism, initiatives of the Secretariat that do not have the backing of member states or the increasing use of so-called "voluntary contributions" that allow projects to be implemented without approval of resources by the Fifth Committee) (see SENA, 2009, SWART, 2010).

The G-77 acts as a negotiating group for almost all issues dealt with by the Fifth Committee, with the exception of specific peace mission budgets. In this context, due to the very specific interests of the host countries in relation to these missions, the G-77 does not adopt a common position. Most members of the G-77 negotiate these budgets on a national basis, with the exception of the African countries they negotiate as the "African Group". However, in other issues relating to the financing of peace missions, such as resolutions on cross-cutting issues or on the support account, the G-77 negotiates together.

Countries that do not participate in any negotiating group - such as United States, Japan or Russia - are acting on the Fifth Committee nationally, although they may have affinity with one or another group. In particular, the United States and Japan, as the two largest contributors to the regular budget in absolute terms, tend to have fairly well-placed positions with the European Union on attempts to reduce the United Nations budget.

3. THE CONTRIBUTION SCALE

Another important task of the Fifth Committee on peacekeeping operations is to elaborate the scales of contributions, which stipulate the percentage that

each country has to pay from the Organization's budget¹¹. There are two scales of contributions: one applies to the regular budget of the United Nations and the other to the budgets of peacekeeping operations. They are established every three years; the most recent were adopted in December 2015 for the period from 2016 to 2018¹².

The regular scale is built on the principle of "ability to pay" - countries pay sums proportional to the wealth of each. The determination of "ability to pay" is based on a complex methodology whose central element is the participation of each country in the Gross National Income (RNB) worldwide, but also takes into account other factors such as RNB (Gross National Income) *per capita* and external debt. There is also a ceiling for contributions from the relatively less developed countries (0.01%) and a maximum amount of 22%, which benefits only the United States.

The specific scale of peacekeeping operations was consolidated in 1973 in recognition of the growing importance of these operations in the United Nations budget and the special responsibility of the permanent members of the Security Council for the creation of such operations (see section 1 above). While the way in which regular scale is adjusted to reach the scale of peacekeeping operations has changed over the years, the basic principle has always been that permanent members pay an extra fee and the developing countries receive corresponding discounts (DEN HARTOG, 2003, pages: 109-117).

The current methodology for calculating the scale of peacekeeping operations was approved by Resolution 55/235 and updated every three years thereafter, most recently by Resolution 70/246. It divides the states into ten "levels", according to the following table:

¹¹ In drawing up the scale, the Fifth Committee is advised by the Committee on Contributions (CoC), composed of 18 experts elected in their personal capacity. The Committee meets once a year to prepare its report, which serves as a basis for the deliberations of the Commission. See the website: WWW.un.org/en/ga/contributions.

¹⁴ Resolution 70/245, "Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations" and Resolution 70/246, "Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of United Nations peacekeeping operations", both of 12/23/2015.

¹² Prepared on the basis of Resolution 70/246, "Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of United Nations peacekeeping operations", 12/23/2015. Both the criteria of the levels and the percentages of discount were defined through a political negotiation.

Level	Countries	
A	The five permanent members of the Security Council	None; these countries pay an additional fee corresponding to the discounts received by the other countries.
B	All countries that do not fit into any of the other levels (essentially developed countries that are not members of the Security Council).	None; these countries pay the same percentage in the regular budget and in the budget for peacekeeping operations.
C	Brunei, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Singapore - considered developing countries but with gross national income (RNB - Gross National Income) per capita above double the world average, these countries were nominally selected to integrate level "C" in resolution 55 / 235).	Discount of 7.5% in relation to your quota in the regular contribution scale.
D	Countries whose RNB (Gross National Income) per capita is less than twice the world average.	20% discount on your regular contribution scale
E	Countries whose RNB (Gross National Income) per capita is less than 1.8 times the world average.	40% discount on your regular contribution scale
F	Countries whose RNB (Gross National Income) per capita is less than 1.5 times the world average.	60% discount on your regular contribution scale
G	Countries whose RNB (Gross National Income) per capita is less than 1.4 times the world average.	Desconto de 70% em relação à sua cota na escala de contribuições regular

Level	Countries	
H	Countries whose RNB (Gross National Income) per capita is less than 1.2 times the world average.	Discount of 80% or 70% in relation to its quota in the regular contribution scale, and the country may opt for the higher or lower discount
I	Countries whose RNB (Gross National Income) per capita is less than the world average.	80% discount on your regular contribution scale
J	Relatively less developed countries	90% discount on your regular contribution scale

By 2017, the countries with the highest quotas in the scale of contributions of peacekeeping operations are¹³:

Classification	Country	Quota on the scale of operations contributions of peacekeeping
1º	United States	28,4691%
2º	China	10,2502%
3º	Japan	9,68%
4º	Germany	6,389%
5º	France	6,2878%
6º	United Kingdom	5,7753%
7º	Russia	3,996%
8º	Italy	3,748%
9º	Canada	2,921%
10º	Spain	2,443%
11º	Australia	2,337%
12º	South Korea	2,039%
13º	Netherlands	1,482%
14º	Switzerland	1,14%
15º	Saudi Arabia	0,9932%
16º	Sweden	0,956%

¹³ Elaborated on the basis of United Nations (2015a).

Classification	Country	Quota on the scale of operations contributions of peacekeeping
17°	Belgium	0,885%
18°	Norway	0,849%
19°	Brazil	0,7646%
20°	Austria	0,72%

The scale of contributions gives a number of indications on the dynamics of peacekeeping budget negotiations. One important issue is that certain countries pay a much larger proportion of these operations than the others, and would therefore have some incentive to try to reduce their budgets. Another issue is that by comparing the list of major troop contributors to peacekeeping operations (UNITED NATIONS, 2017) with this contribution scale, only two countries (China and Brazil) rank in the top twenty on both lists. This suggests that sets of countries concerned about the size of their financial contributions to peacekeeping operations and those concerned about the protection and well-being of their troops employed in that mission have little intersection - which hampers the necessary convergence of interests for the consensual approval of budgets of peacekeeping operations.

4. THE NEGOTIATION OF PEACE MISSION BUDGETS

The annual budget of a peace mission results from a long process, with four phases of negotiation, which will be explored in this section. The first phase of negotiations is not strictly budgetary, but it is crucial: this is the definition by the Security Council of the mandate of the peacekeeping operation: its duration, how many military and police officers will be involved, what tasks to play. As stated above, the tacit agreement reached to end the Organization's financial crisis in the 1960s provides that the Council does not decide on the budgetary aspects of peace missions. However, in discussing the mandate of a mission, Council members are aware that their decisions will have budgetary impacts. Those members who are more concerned with reducing the Organization's expenditures are therefore led to make substantive decisions based not only on the needs on the ground, but also on the cost they think such decisions might have for their treasuries.

The second phase of negotiation, usually unconfirmed, occurs within the Secretariat. Upon receipt of a mandate for a Security Council

peacekeeping operation, the Secretariat shall prepare a report of the Secretary General containing a proposed budget for that mission. The preparation of this report involves various parts of the Secretariat, including mission members (in the case of existing peacekeeping operations) and Secretariat staff in New York who deal with missions in their substantive aspects (Maintenance Operations Department DPKO), logistics (Department of Land Support - DFS) and properly financial (Department of Administration - DM). These units of the Secretariat have different perspectives and interests: the task itself may consider that task X is the most important and deserves additional funding, while the DPKO considers that task Y is more relevant, and the DM (Department of Administration) wishes above all to present a lower budget proposal than that of the previous year in order to the costs of other missions. Thus, the Secretary-General's report is the result of a negotiation between these units and, often, the informal influence of member states (MARTINS FILHO; UZIEL, 2015, pages: 120-124).

The third negotiation phase occurs when the report is submitted by the Secretariat to the ACABQ¹⁴. The ACABQ is composed of 16 members, elected in personal capacity¹⁵.

Its main functions are to examine budget proposals, advise the Fifth Committee and consider audit reports. Upon receipt of a budget proposal from the Secretariat, ACABQ members discuss the proposal among themselves and with representatives of the Secretariat and prepare a report of the Committee which summarizes the Secretariat's proposal and makes recommendations to the Fifth Committee on how to deal with that proposal - suggesting additions, cuts and changes.

The ACABQ, although little studied, is crucial in the budget process. Its reduced size facilitates further discussion of the Secretary-General's proposals (compared to the Fifth Committee). The fact that its members act in a formally personal capacity (and not as representatives of their countries) and in closed meetings facilitates the negotiating process, including by offering fewer opportunities for certain states to exert pressure to influence the process. In addition, since most ACABQ members are former delegates to the Fifth Committee, there is considerable accumulated knowledge of the budgetary and financial aspects of the United Nations in the Committee.

The last negotiation phase takes place in the Fifth Committee, usually during the second

¹⁴ Access the website: www.un.org/ga/acabq and Singer (1957).

¹⁵ Although elected in their personal capacity, the distribution of seats in the elected ACABQ is done in a way that preserves a certain geographic representation - in addition, the Committee always has a national of each of the permanent members of the Security Council.

reconvened session, in May and June of each year, so that budgets are approved until July 1, beginning of the new fiscal year. For each peace mission, the Secretary-General's report containing the budget proposal and the ACABQ report commenting on the Secretariat's proposal are presented to the Fifth Committee at a formal meeting. In the days and weeks that follow, a series of informal and "informal informal" meetings are held for Fifth Committee members to discuss the Secretariat's proposals and ACABQ (Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Matter) recommendations, to seek further clarification from the Secretariat, and to negotiate a resolution that will contain its final decision on the budget.

The Fifth Committee's budget resolutions are based on the ACABQ recommendations. They usually contain a paragraph that "endorses" the report of the ACABQ. The endorsement, in the Commission's practice, means the formal adoption of the recommendations contained in that document. When the Commission wants to reject an ACABQ recommendation, it usually includes a clause in the resolution that "takes note" of the specific paragraph of the ACABQ report containing the recommendation to be rejected. Resolutions also contain other routine arrangements (formal authorization for the Secretary-General to cover from the countries the resources needed to cover the mission budget) and specific (recommendations and specific requests to the Secretariat for that mission).¹⁶

What, in practice, are the issues discussed in relation to each peace mission by the Fifth Committee? There is the funding itself - how much money is allocated to specific mission activities.

But there are also other budgetary and administrative aspects, such as the efficient use of resources by missions (human resources, money or other material resources such as vehicles) and the quality of the information presented by the Secretariat.

While the deliberations of the Fifth Committee are in theory on how to properly implement the mandates determined by the Security Council, the resources to implement politically controversial mandates and missions are inevitably subject to a very detailed degree of scrutiny by certain delegations in the Commission.

After this issue was explained, the total cost of these missions is the main contentious element in peacekeeping budget negotiations, with developed

countries generally pushing for less spending and developing countries resisting cuts that they consider unnecessary, excessive or arbitrary. Proposals for "cross-cutting" that is, to reduce the budgets of all peacekeeping operations by a certain percentage, regardless of the specific needs and circumstances of each mission.

5. THE ACCOUNT OF SUPPORT AND CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

In addition to negotiating the specific budgets of each peacekeeping operation, the Fifth Committee also discusses a number of other matters relating to these operations. Two of the most important are the support account and cross-cutting issues.

The support account was created in the early 1990s in the context of expanding peacekeeping operations. It serves to finance the support provided to these missions from the headquarters of the Organization - not only the salaries of staff members dealing with the issue in New York, but also other expenses, such as travel, consultants

and space rent. Today, the support account - of more than \$ 327 million dollars¹⁷²⁰ - finances nearly 1,500 United Nations positions, including the vast majority of positions in DPKO (Maintenance Operations Department) and DFS (Department of Land Support)¹⁸. The main difference between the positions and activities of the Secretariat financed by the regular budget and those financed by the support account is that the support account is paid according to the scale of contributions of peacekeeping operations - so that the permanent members pay a higher proportion of costs and developing countries, pay a lower proportion.

When negotiating the support account budget, the Fifth Committee decides on the structure of the DPKO. Strengthening or weakening the different parts of this Department - for example, units dealing with military or gender issues or demining - can have a concrete impact on the functioning and evolution of peace missions. For example, if the unit in charge of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) has many staff and resources, it can produce further guidance on how the missions will implement DDR mandates; include more concrete proposals on DDR (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration) in reports of the Secretary General to the Security Council; and to maintain more intensive dialogue with States on how to strengthen such programs. In the medium and long term, the resources invested in this

¹⁶ For an example of a resolution approving the budget for a peacekeeping operation, see Resolution 70/274, "Financing of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo", June 17, 2016.

¹⁷ A/C.5/71/18. ²¹ Resolution 70/287, "Support account for peacekeeping operations", dated 17/6/2016, and documents A / 70/837 and A / 70/751.

¹⁸

unit could make DDR (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration) an increasingly present and developed element in the mandates of peacekeeping operations¹⁹. As the various elements of a mission occupy different places in the priorities of the states, there is a dispute between the negotiating groups on which aspects will receive more resources.

The Fifth Committee negotiates almost every year a resolution on "cross-cutting issues" relating to peacekeeping operations, for example, issues affecting all these operations. These themes include staff and recruitment; biddings; employment of specialized skills, such as aircraft, military engineering or unmanned aerial vehicles; and combat sexual abuse and exploitation in peacekeeping operations²⁰.

The resolution on cross-cutting issues is less crucial than the budgets of specific operations: without the approval of budget resolution for a mission, that mission would cease to function; if there is no resolution on cross-cutting issues, the missions will continue. But the resolution on cross-cutting issues is important in enabling member states to guide the work of the Secretariat on the administrative aspects of peacekeeping operations as a whole. There is a permanent tension in the United Nations - in the Secretariat, in the CSNU (United Nations Security Council), in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) and in the Fifth Committee - to deal, on the one hand, with each peace mission based on its circumstances and specific needs, and, on the other hand, provide greater consistency, predictability and uniformity for all these operations. The resolution on cross-cutting issues is the main means by which the Fifth Committee directly influences the evolution of peacekeeping operations as a whole.

6. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE FIFTH COMMITTEE AND OTHER BODIES REGARDING PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

The tension between the Security Council and the Fifth Committee precedes and goes beyond the question of peace missions, but has found its first major point of contention in this area - a multilateral version of the political slogan elevated to the condition of legal adage according to which *no taxation without representation*²¹. In other words, it is revealed in the relationship between these two organs a dynamics between the plenary assembly and the oligarchic committee, which itself is dominated by its permanent members.

The Charter of the United Nations does not make clear how to fund the collective security mechanism originally envisaged in that document, which provided for military forces that would be made available to the United Nations by its members. Apparently, Article 42 measures would be funded from the provisions of the agreements described in Article 43, which the CSNU (United Nations Security Council) would approve. As the permanent members were expected to make the largest military contributions, they would also pay their financial counterparts.

The URSS (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) made every effort to ensure that the expenses of peace missions were controlled by the Council, where it had veto power, but the negotiating process of the mid-1960s resulted in the assertion of the power of the General Assembly. It was a political compromise in which the URSS (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) eventually yielded to the preference of the Afro-Asian-Latin American bloc (GOODRICH; HAMBRO; SIMMONS, 1969, pages: 157-163).

There have been rare cases, as in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and in Western New Guinea (UNSGF), in the 1960s, when the UNSC took decisions on mission budgeting but were exceptions, linked to the voluntary contributions that sustained them²⁶. Since the 1980s, with the growing unwillingness of the United States with the United Nations decision-making processes, in particular in the Fifth Committee, there are recurrent plans for the Council to gain ground in the budget area. However, the General Assembly usually react assertively against

¹⁹ One issue that the United Nations is currently facing is the mismatch between the size of the support account and the number of peacekeeping operations. The AGNU (United Nations General Assembly) has repeatedly reiterated that the support account should "broadly correspond to the mandate, number, size and complexity of peacekeeping missions," but in recent years, despite the reduction in budgets and the number of civilians and military personnel the support account has continued to grow (A / 70/837, para. 11). The Fifth Committee instructed the Secretary-General to submit, in 2018, a comprehensive study on the support account to address this issue (resolution 70/287, paragraph 10).

²⁰ For example, in the last decade, the Fifth Committee has not adopted resolutions on cross-cutting issues in 2008, 2009, 2013 and 2014.

²⁴ All these themes are contained in the most recent resolution on cross-cutting issues, Resolution 70/286.

²¹ For a brief history of this expression, see regarding: Palmer (2003).

²⁶ Funding of United Nations activities through so-called "voluntary contributions" - instead of the mandatory contributions determined by the scales of contribution - is a phenomenon that goes back to the creation of the Expanded Technical Assistance Program (EPTA) in 1949, but has grown very important in the last decades, with potentially harmful implications for the governance and legitimacy of the United Nations. See Graham (2015, 2017) and Vargas (2017).

such attempts to change the political bargaining that allows a minimum of consensus on the existence of peacekeeping operations as an instrument of the Organization. Thus, when in 2003 the CSNU (United Nations Security Council) indicated to the Secretariat that it should consider a particular mission to be eligible for funding from the regular budget, the Fifth Committee adopted Resolution 58/275, that: "[r]eaffirms [...] the role of the General Assembly, as set out in Article 17 of the Charter of the United Nations, as the organ to consider and approve the budget of the Organization, as well as the apportionment of its expenses among Member States". It is now accepted that the Secretariat will provide the CSNU (United Nations Security Council) with estimates of how much it would cost an operation, provided that it is not for that body to decide on budget and that the missions should be structured according to the mandate to be fulfilled and not with the expenses that would be desirable (GOODRICH; HAMBRO; SIMMONS, 1969, pages: 164-165; MCDERMOTT, 2000, pages: 85-87)²².

In the governance of peace missions, the Fifth Committee also systematically interacts with the Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations (C-34), which discusses "the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects"²³.

In its origin, in the decade of 1960, the Committee was established just to deal with the financial-budgetary issue in which the political-constitutional crisis of the United Nations is traversed. Its evolution gradually led the C-34 to devote itself mainly to normative themes of peacekeeping operations, unable to find a solution for the financial (CLAUDE, 1963; UZIEL, VARGAS, 2011).

There are a number of matters within the competence of the Fifth Committee on which the C-34 takes a stand but can not take concrete decisions, such as staffing issues, financial aspects and even combating sexual abuse and exploitation on peace missions. Practical relations between the two bodies have in recent years been complementary, and C-34 reiterates annually "that the Fifth Committee is the

appropriate Main Committee of the General Assembly, entrusted with responsibility for administrative and budgetary matters" (UNITED NATIONS, 2015b, pages: 65/67)²⁴. In the annual discussions of the two bodies, the basic understanding is that the C-34 will make exhortative statements, establish general rules and give political guidance; the Fifth Committee is responsible for taking specific decisions on budgetary and administrative matters and allocating resources - which is seen as totally forbidden to the Special Committee. The distinction between the powers of one and the other is not so precise, as in the case of the resolutions on cross-cutting issues of the Fifth Committee discussed above. In many cases, the Special Committee may indicate a problem or concern in the area of competence in the Fifth Committee, without however suggesting the way to deal with it. The dynamics between the two bodies may become even more complex when the Secretariat submits proposals for the restructuring of its organs charged with dealing with peace missions²⁵.

In defining the budgets of peace missions, the Fifth Committee also deals directly with the Secretariat, which is responsible for formulating budget proposals for peacekeeping operations on the basis of mandates established by the Security Council and C-34 and its own support structure to the missions.

The Secretariat, in addition to providing budget proposals in writing, the Secretariat is at the disposal of the Fifth Committee to provide additional clarifications at informal meetings (MARTINS FILHO; UZIEL, 2015, pages: 120).

The Secretariat is far from being neutral in its work. Already at the proposal stage, there is pressure from the States to ensure that peacekeeping operations of their direct interest receive greater resources. In the actual Sabbaths to which its members are submitted in the Fifth Committee, there are often informal arrangements for countries to ask specific questions and receive answers that have already been combined - to increase or reduce resources allocated to an area of a particular mission or headquarters in New York. In general, there is a perception in the Fifth Committee that the Secretariat is poorly transparent and favors certain courses of action according to the priorities of its bureaucratic policy. Thus mandates determined by intergovernmental bodies are not translated in a homogeneous way, and can be expanded or restricted in budget proposals, with concrete impacts on the ground (MARTINS FILHO; UZIEL, 2015; SWART; MARTINETTI, 2007, pages: 2-3).

²² Regarding the controversy that led to Resolution 58/275, see: *Budget for the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (A/58/598)*, paragraph 3; on the limits of CSNU (United Nations Security Council) budget action, see, for example, *United Nations (2004b)*.

²³ Resolution 2006 (XIX) of 18/2/1965, paragraph 3. Available at: <<http://bit.ly/2utn9LN>>. Accessed on: July 11, 2018.

It has also become a practice to reiterate Rule 153 of the AGNU (United Nations General Assembly) procedures: "The General Assembly shall not require the adoption of a General Assembly Assembly unless it is accompanied by an estimate of expenditures prepared by the Secretary-General. No resolution in respect of which expenditures are anticipated by the Secretary-General shall be voted by the General Assembly until the Administrative and Budgetary Committee (Fifth Committee) has had an opportunity of stating the effect of the proposal upon the budget estimates of the United Nations ". Available at: <<http://bit.ly/2uu3YpQ>>. Accessed on: July 11, 2018.

²⁴

²⁵ Compare, for example, the C-34 report to the 69th AGNU (UNITED NATIONS, 2009) and the resolution on cross-cutting issues of the same session, Resolution 69/370. See regarding: Uziel and Vargas (2011, pages: 178-179).

Another body whose work impacts on the negotiation of budgets for peacekeeping operations by the Fifth Commission is the Contingent-Owned Equipment (COE)²⁶ Working Group³¹. The Working Group emerged from a process initiated in 1994 to establish clearer criteria for reimbursement to troop contributors for the equipment their military carries on mission. It meets every three years to discuss equipment standardization, repayment value and other related issues. It is open to the participation of all members of the United Nations (generally represented by the military) and makes its decisions by consensus. Its reports are submitted to the Fifth Committee (accompanied by a report by the Secretary General and ACABQ). Once endorsed by the Fifth Committee, the decisions of the COE Working Group have a significant impact on the budget of peace missions if they suggest - as is often the case - higher reimbursements for equipment to troop contributors.

The interrelationship between the various bodies in the field of financing peace missions can best be understood by means of two examples: rapid impact projects and the readjustment of reimbursement for participation in peace missions.

Rapid Impact Projects (QIPs) are small projects (digging a well, recapturing a stretch of road, rebuilding small bridges, etc.) that can be carried out quickly by peacekeepers or their reduced cost, with the aim of winning the sympathy of the local population for the United Nations. This instrument was first introduced in the field of peace missions in the Brahimi Report (A / 55/305-S / 2000/809), 2000, with a recommendation that it be used in the first year of the mission (UNITED NATIONS, 2004a, page:1, 2013, pages: 2-4). While developed countries viewed QIPs (fast impact projects) with little enthusiasm, large troop contributors, almost all developing countries, understood their usefulness and, from the outset, pushed for their use to be less restrictive (UZIEL, 2006).

In 2004, C-34 recommended that peacekeeping operations be authorized to carry out such projects also in the second year of the mission (A / 58/19, para. 91). It was a compromise formula among those who wished to allow the use of QIPs (fast impact projects) unlimitedly and those who did not want to see them executed beyond the first year of each mission. In that same year, the establishment of MINUSTAH in Haiti created for Latin American countries, its great contributors and political support, a growing interest in this type of project, particularly relevant in a poor country such as Haiti²⁷.

Latin American troop contributors, and in particular Brazil, have come to advocate that the QIPs (fast impact projects) could be implemented beyond the two-year deadline. Since it was impossible to change the previous limitation decision in C-34, they were eroded. Through the Haitian group of friends, they inserted a request in the CSNU (United Nations Security Council) resolutions for MINUSTAH to continue to implement QIPs (fast impact projects). Given the Council's determination, the Secretariat and the Fifth Committee started to allocate the necessary resources²⁸. Even though MINUSTAH was an exception, the implementation of QIPs (fast impact projects) after the second year of the mandate increased the pressure for the policy to be changed and that all missions of peace, they could do the same. As a result, on the recommendation of ACABQ, the Fifth Committee, in its resolution on cross-cutting issues in 2007, established that "funding for quick-impact projects for the third year of a mission and beyond may be required confidence-building activities, in which case a needs assessment should be conducted"²⁹.

The intergovernmental bodies' interest in the subject has led the Secretariat to devote renewed attention to the QIPs (fast impact projects). In 2007, based on the Fifth Commission's draft resolution, it produced its first official QIPs (fast impact projects) policy, a document that aimed to guide the implementation of such projects by peace missions (UNITED NATIONS, 2007)³⁰. In the following years, the document was revised on several occasions (UNITED NATIONS, 2013), including on the basis of a study of the lessons learned from project implementations. Official policies on QIPs (fast impact projects) produced by the Secretariat are the result of the decisions of the Fifth Committee, the C-34 and the Security Council,

Group, see United Nations (UNITED NATIONS, 2014, pages: 4-11).

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29 Regarding Brazil's support for the inclusion of QIPs in peace missions over its mandate, and not only in the early years, see Kenkel (2013, page: 100) and document available at <<http://bit.ly/2N8AIIIM>>. Accessed on: 11 July 2018. At the beginning of MINUSTAH, Latin American troop contributors were organized in order to influence CSNU (United Nations Security Council) decisions in Group 2 X 4, which in time evolved to 2 X 9. Resolution 1840 (2008) recorded, in preambular paragraph 14, the group's recommendations contained in document S / 2008/640, including that of conducting QIPs (fast impact projects). Subsequently, CELAC advocated the inclusion of QIPs (fast impact projects) in MINUSTAH mandates. See, for example, document available at: <<http://bit.ly/2JhA4e3>>. Accessed on: July 11, 2018.

30 The first CNSU (United Nations Security Council) decision in this regard was Resolution 1702 (2006), which operative paragraph 17 stated: "MINUSTAH Requests to continue to implement quick impact projects". Available at: <<http://bit.ly/2mcCbXe>>. Accessed on: July 11, 2018.

34 Resolution 61/276, Cross-cutting issues, of 6/29/2007, section XVIII, paragraph 6.

35 Resolution 60/266, "Cross-cutting issues", dated 6/30/2006, section VIII, paragraph 3.

26 Compare, for example, the C-34 report to the 69th UNGA (UNITED NATIONS, 2009) and the resolution on cross-cutting issues of the same session, Resolution 69/370. Read about Uziel and Vargas (2011, pages: 178-179).

27 For a brief history of the COE (Contingent-Owned Equipment) Working

also taking into account the concrete experience of implementing such projects on the ground.

Another episode that demonstrated the interaction among various United Nations bodies in financing peacekeeping operations was the readjustment of the reimbursement paid to troop-contributing countries for each military that they send to such operations (the so-called "troop cost" - different of the reimbursement for equipment determined by the Working Group regarding the COE). In its 2011 report, C-34 recalled that the rate of reimbursement had not been adjusted since 2002 and that troop-contributing countries "expressed concern that this has placed a heavy financial burden on them, which they could jeopardize the sustainability of participation in peacekeeping operations". As a result, the C-34 acknowledged that "this issue will be given due consideration by the Fifth Committee" (UNITED NATIONS, 2011, page 51). The division of powers between the C-34 and the Fifth Committee created a situation in which the C-34 could point to the problem (since the financial question posed, from the point of view of troop contributors, the sustainability of participation in the missions) without dealing directly with the solution (financial matters falling within the competence of the Fifth Committee).

The Fifth Committee dealt with the subject in the same year, in its resolution on cross-cutting issues³¹. In the short term, it authorized a supplementary payment of \$ 85 million to troop-contributing countries in fiscal year 2011-2012 to help offset the lag in the value of troop cost. In order to provide a longer-term solution to the problem, he asked the Secretariat to establish a group of ten eminent persons (the "Senior Advisory Group" - SAG) to consider the issue.

The delay in setting up the SAG and finalizing its work required a new additional payment to troop-contributing countries for fiscal year 2011-2012 - this time in the amount of \$ 59,999,999³⁷. SAG (Senior Advisory Group) finally produced its report in October 2012 (UNITED NATIONS, 2012c). In broad lines, he proposed: conducting in-depth research to determine the average costs incurred by troop-contributing countries when sending their military to peacekeeping operations, and adjusting reimbursement based on the outcome of that search; the continuation of the additional payments until this new reimbursement system entered into force; and the creation of new incentives and sanctions for troop-contributing countries (for example: bonus payments for high-risk troops and reduced reimbursement for units that do not carry, the adequate equipment).

The Secretary-General and ACABQ have

prepared and submitted to the Fifth Committee their reports on how to implement the SAG proposals (UNITED NATIONS, 2012a, 2012b). The Fifth Committee approved the proposals and the new system (based on the results of the research) in 2014 - three years after the topic was raised in C-34³².

In both the QIPs (fast impact projects) and the change in the troop reimbursement system, the Fifth Committee's action on administrative and financial matters had a real impact on peace missions. In both cases, however, the Fifth Committee's action only took place after an "external stimulus" by the bodies dealing with the substance of peacekeeping operations - the Security Council and / or C-34.

CONCLUSION

In presenting the process by which peacekeeping operations are financed, this article sought to draw attention to an important but often overlooked dimension of these operations. Financing decisions result from political negotiations and not from mere accounting procedures. They have implications not only for how much money the States contribute to the United Nations but also for the functioning of the missions and, ultimately, their effectiveness as a tool to promote peace. In this sense, recent proposals to reform some of the aspects of the peacekeeping budget process, must be evaluated not only in terms of their financial and accounting impacts, but above all in relation to the possibility, that they help to strengthen the effectiveness and legitimacy operations³³.

At various times in recent decades, peacekeeping operations have been under financial pressure from the United States and other countries responsible for the largest absolute contributions to these operations. It is argued that the missions are too costly and that they need to be reduced or accelerated to reduce costs. In

³² Resolution 66/264, *Cross-cutting issues*, dated 6/21/2012, section V, paragraph 52. The amount of the payment resulted from a negotiation in which the representatives of the main troop-contributing countries wanted to maintain the same value per soldier than the previous year's supplement payment - which would result in a total value of \$ 60 million. The US wanted to avoid this value at all costs, fearing that two additional payments of the same value per soldier would set a precedent, which could even impact the deliberations of the SAG (Senior Advisory Group). At the end of the negotiation, they simply agreed to reduce by one dollar the sum requested by the troop contributors.

³³ Resolution 67/261, "Report of the Senior Advisory Group established under General Assembly resolution 65/289 to consider rates of reimbursement to troop-contributing countries and other related issues" of 05/10/2013 and Resolution 68/281, "Rates of reimbursement to troop-contributing countries", of 6/30/2014.

³⁹ Read the report: *Uniting Our Strengths for Peace – Politics, Partnership and People* (document A/70/95 – S/2015/446) and Coleman (2017).

³¹ Resolution 65/289, "Cross-cutting issues", dated 6/30/2011, section VI, paragraphs 69-74.

2017, it seems that a new series of pressures of this nature is starting to be perceived. (LYNCH, 2017).

The experience of the last decades has shown that reducing or terminating missions prematurely for financial reasons prevents them from fulfilling their goals and even leads to the resumption of conflicts in a short time. Failures of this nature tend to further weaken countries' willingness to invest their material and human resources in such operations, creating a vicious circle that could jeopardize the effectiveness of one of the most effective instruments ever encountered in dealing with conflict situations.

This does not mean of course, that peacekeeping operations must be carried forward without any concern for their costs. However, since the United Nations financial crisis of the 1960s, the decision-making on the financing of these missions in a collective manner, in the universal forum of the Fifth Committee, has been essential to the smooth running of these missions. Under these conditions, the importance of a transparent and universal budget process for the legitimacy and wide acceptance of these missions by the Members of the United Nations can not be minimized.

The unilateral insistence of some countries on reducing the budget for peacekeeping operations is not the only threat to the transparent and universal budget process. Another is the growing trend of employment of "parallel financing" or "voluntary contributions" in international bodies, to which peacekeeping operations have remained relatively immune today. The problem with these contributions is that their use is not discussed by the Fifth Committee: a country offers a certain amount of money and negotiates directly with the Secretariat how it will be employed. Erin Graham (2015, 2017) has drawn attention to how this trend subverts the truly multilateral character of international bodies. The potential growth of this trend in relation to peacekeeping operations would be of particular concern, since such operations may involve the use of force - probably the most sensitive issue on the international agenda - and may raise questions as to the legitimacy of activities carried out by these missions, while their approval was not approved yet, by the General Assembly.

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