

The Relationship between Diplomacy and Military Power in the Grand Strategies of Barão do Rio Branco and Amorim

La articulación entre diplomacia y poder militar en las grandes estrategias del Barão do Rio Branco y Amorim

Abstract: A Great Strategy involves the coordination and direction of all the resources of a nation to achieve political goals, or at greater bias use of military power, the theory and practice of use and threatened use of organized force for political purposes. Favoring the latter bias, the “Grand Strategy of Baron”, implemented in the period in which he headed the Foreign Ministry, used sometimes military power of coercive and deterrent manner. The “Great Strategy of the Baron” is distinct from the “Great Strategy of Amorim”, mainly in the form of articulating diplomacy with the Military Power. The differences in these articulations, as well as the concrete gains resulting from each one, are perceived, initially by the realistic bias – Baron - and by the combination of several internationalist theories – Amorim. The “Great Strategy of Baron” was based on the increase of military hard power, which resulted in the Acre issue. The “Great Strategy of Amorim” was guided more in Brazil’s international insertion by increasing its “soft power”, but which did not achieve a perfect synthesis between diplomacy and defense. Therefore, this research has the objective to highlight the “different forms of articulation” between diplomacy and defense.

Keywords: Great Strategy. Diplomacy. Military Power. Rio Branco. Amorim.

Resumen: Una gran estrategia implica la coordinación y dirección de todos los recursos de una nación para lograr objetivos políticos, o el uso del poder militar, la teoría y la práctica del uso y la amenaza del uso de la fuerza organizada con fines políticos. Favoreciendo este último sesgo, la “Gran estrategia del Barão do Rio Branco”, puesta en práctica en el período en el que estuvo a la cabeza de Itamaraty, utilizó con frecuencia el poder militar de manera coercitiva y disuasoria. La Gran Estrategia del Barão es distinta de la Gran Estrategia de Amorim, principalmente en la forma de articular la diplomacia con el Poder Militar. Las diferencias en estas articulaciones, así como las ganancias concretas de cada una, son percibidas, inicialmente por el sesgo más realista – del Barão – y por la conjugación de varias teorías internacionalistas – de Amorim. La “Gran Estrategia del Barão” fue guiada por el aumento del hard power, lo que resultó en ganancias concretas, como en la cuestión de Acre, la “Gran Estrategia” de Amorim fue guiada más por el aumento de su “soft power”, pero que no logró una síntesis perfecta entre diplomacia y defensa. Así, este trabajo propone evidenciar las “diferentes formas de articulación” entre diplomacia y defensa.

Palabras Clave: Gran Estrategia. Diplomacia. Poder Militar. Barão do Rio Branco Amorim.

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1 Introduction

In a general and conceptual sense, strategy can be defined as a way of thinking about the future, integrated in the decision-making process, based on a formalized and results-articulating procedure. As the concept of strategy comes from the military field, a closer definition of this field is the art of coordinating the action of the military, political, economic and moral forces involved in the conduct of a conflict or in the preparation of the defense of a nation or community of nations to achieve future goals.

A grand strategy, on the other hand, involves coordinating and directing all the resources of a nation to achieve political goals, or under a more militaristic bias, the theory and practice of using and the threat of using organized force for political purposes (LIDDELL HART, 1967).

Thus, the strategy at its national level deals with decisive political and institutional issues for the defense of the country, such as the objectives of its Grand Strategy, also addressing properly military problems, derived from the influence of this Grand Strategy in the orientation and operational practices of the three Forces (BRASIL, 2008).

We understand that developing the postulates of a “Great Strategy” is essential, therefore, for Brazil to reach its aspirations as a global player. Throughout the republican history of Brazil, different strategies for international insertion were adopted, articulating and combining national foreign policy with military power.

Although according to Freedman (2013) the meaning of strategy allows a series of definitions, one of the parameters of evaluation of its impact is the comparison between the result before its adoption, with reference to the balance of power, and the real result that prevailed after the implementation of the strategy.

We chose in this article to work with two of these strategies, which represent different worldviews. The first, called the “Great Strategy of the Barão do Rio Branco”, refers to the beginning of the 20th century and was promoted during the period when José Maria da Silva Paranhos Jr., was the head of the Itamaraty. He sought international insertion through a “pragmatic Americanism”, a pragmatic bandwagoning¹ on the United States of America at the hemispheric and global level (VALENÇA; CARVALHO, 2014, p. 70), while internally articulating foreign policy with the use of military hard power, in a coercive and negative deterrent manner. The second strategy is the “Grande Amorim Strategy”. In it, peace is the premise underlying Brazil’s international insertion (AMORIM, 2016, p. 175), articulating foreign policy and defense policy through the strengthening of soft power and the relative reinforcement of military hard power, in intensity smaller than that proclaimed by the Barão do Rio Branco. It can be said that this articulation was based more on a combination of internationalist theories, while the Barão do Rio Branco presents more realistic elements in his Grand Strategy.

We investigated these great strategies from the internal and external conjunctures regarding the power at the time, as well as from the worldview perceived by its articulators. For

¹ *Bandwagoning* is the union of weaker states around a strong leader state so that, through this alignment, greater relative gains can be obtained in the international system. Rio Branco aimed to contribute to the transformation of Brazil into a regional power and later world power. This bandwagoning strategy could be changed, with the greater acquisition of relative power.

that, we explored, through an ideographic methodology (LEVY, 2008, p. 4) historical episodes and fragments of discourses that illustrate these structures. Such a method allows to work each event as a separate ideographic case, in order to understand its importance for the argument now constructed without, however, generalizing or formulating broad universally applicable hypotheses. Considering the very different historical and political scenarios faced by Barão do Rio Branco and Amorim, mainly within the ethical limits of the use of armed force for political purposes, the adoption of such a method is relevant. Thus, we do not seek to compare these two great strategies, but to highlight the different forms of articulation between diplomacy and power, especially the military.

Our argument is developed in three stages, in addition to this introduction and a brief conclusion. In the first section, we address the meaning of the Great Strategy and its relationship with Power in International Relations. Then we present the Great Strategy of the Barão do Rio Branco, its characteristics, actions and directions followed. In the third section, we address the Great Strategy of Amorim, exploring the same elements previously discussed in the Great Strategy Barão do Rio Branco also addressing these parameters.

2 What is Grand Strategy? Power in International Relations

There are many classic definitions of what Strategy is. Moreira (2010, p. 2) presents some:

The use of engagements to achieve the objectives of war (Carl Von Clausewitz); the art of distributing and applying military means to achieve policy objectives (Liddell Hart); the art of the dialectic of force or, more precisely, the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills, using force to resolve their disputes (André Beaufre); general plan to use the capacity of armed coercion – in combination with economic, diplomatic, psychological instruments, to effectively support foreign policy, by ostentatious, hidden and tacit means (OSGOOD and TUCKER, 1967); the use that is made of force or its threat of employment for the purposes of politics (Collin S. Gray); art of preparing and applying power to conquer and preserve objectives, overcoming obstacles of all kinds (BRASIL, 2007, our translation).

Moreira (2010) points out that these definitions deal with the relationship between available means (power, strength) and ends (politics), which guide various aspects of the binomial security and defense of the State.

The study and practice of the Strategy had a great impetus in the 1950s, after the 2nd GM, mainly in European and American affairs. Formerly closely linked to the military establishment, it became the object of study by civilians. The researches and studies carried out that had the security, the defense and the use of force against the political objectives were conventionally called Strategic Studies.

Figueiredo (2015) explains that, since politics is the epistemological essence of Strategic Studies, these, in a strict sense, are concerned with the use of force by political

communities in their relations, thus approaching the Clausewitzian concept that politics is the guiding intelligence and war is only an instrument. There is, according to Paret (2001), no other possibility than to subordinate the military point of view to the political one. This means the prevalence of reason² on the surprising Clausewitzian trinity. Therefore, it would not be possible to separate strategy and politics, since the former functions as a bridge between military means and political objectives, which requires specialists in Strategic Studies to know both political issues and military operations.

The Grand Strategy can be understood as a path from the present to the future, which combines and articulates foreign policy and defense policy, in the Grand Policy, for the pursuit of national interests (FIGUEIREDO, 2015). Therefore, this should include efforts that must be combined to guarantee national sovereignty, security, defense and development, providing the use of the various facets of Power in the international system.

In this interrelation of concepts, “power” is dear for theoretical and political debates in the field of International Relations, especially for those with a realistic orientation. Understood from different perspectives and references, its concept is not a consensus among academics and policymakers.

Its definition is the result of several theoretical and political debates, with different orientations. Considering the worldviews proposed in the major strategies worked on in the next section, and seeking to maintain analytical coherence, we maintain the conceptual debate about power restricted to realistic and liberal approaches. In this dispute of interests between nations, “power” is a central variable. Hans Morgenthau (1962) understands that power implies man’s control over the minds and actions of other men. This idea would be reflected at all levels of social relations, from individuals to states - politics, therefore, would be a form of power struggle. In this way, power takes on a central role in theory and everything would derive from it, including obtaining and operationalizing non-material elements, such as prestige. Power is thus a reflection of politics.

The same view of the political character of power is shared by Raymond Aron. According to Aron (2002), power would combine material issues, such as territories and population, and non-material issues, such as prestige and glory, and underpin the international aspirations of States: the greater the power of a State, the greater its ambitions. This notion returns to Morgenthau’s second principle, that the concept of interest is defined in terms of power, reverberating its centrality, in its different manifestations and forms, in the decision-making process of States.

Aron (2002, p. 24) also discusses the “capacity of a political entity to impose its will on others”, and Weber (1964, p. 175) prescribes that power, in a generic way, can be understood as “The probability that one person or several will impose their own will in a social action, even against the opposition of other participants in it”.

Martin Wight assumes a different position, discarding the non-material dimension of power in the constitution of powers, arguing that international politics is not concerned

2 The reason is probably the most important component of the surprising trinity. Just as victory has its political consequences, so it has defeat. A defeat in the war is, in the first place, a defeat of politics, because the policy that caused the defeats was wrong: it had made a judgment against the real war against the nature of the latter. (ARON, 1976, p. 165).

with influence: power is not influence. Power is a material, concrete element that resolves major issues of international politics. Furthermore, non-material elements could not be considered as constituting power, as they would not help the State to become a great power (WIGHT, 2002).

Corroborating Wight's writings, John Mearsheimer (2007), understands that power is formed by material components and would reduce the levels of insecurity in the State. Faced with a state of permanent competition at the international level, power would not be objective in itself, but would lead to the survival of the State. Among the different objectives of the States, the biggest one would be to achieve hegemony³, essentially a material desire, so as not to be threatened by peers. Other objectives could be pursued through a combination of power and diplomacy, according to their convenience - which would reflect the influence of classical realists.

It is unlikely to associate Mearsheimer with a liberal perspective, but the possibility of combining power with other policy tools opens space for the debate of liberal perspectives on power. Liberally inclined authors suggest that the policy of power can be replaced by cooperation and greater interdependence between states. This would lead to international stability through international organizations and other forms of inter-state relations in the pursuit of national goals.

This reinforces Kalevi Holsti's perception that power has a relational character. Power consists of a relational position that characterizes the interaction between two parts, so that one of them would have the ability to constrain the other to do something that, otherwise, it would not do (HOLSTI, 1964). Although he denies the centrality of the concept of power in International Relations, he adds that power would better explain the processes of relationship between the actors, not the focus of their actions. Therefore, the act of influencing becomes central to the study of international politics and it is from this that a definition of power is best deduced.

Similarly, Schuessler & Baldwin (SCHUESSLER, 2017) point out that any definition of power as control will only have meaning when the scope and domain of power can be presented. In order to understand the impact of power on social relations, it is necessary to identify that the influence of one actor on another is related to specific themes, with results derived from this relationship.

This brings Barry Buzan's criticism closer to the concept of power and its centrality in international relations. Buzan (1991) points out that the greatest quality of the concept of power is also its greatest weakness. The concept focuses on the reality of anarchy through the observation of the capacities of the units that make up the system. Such thinking would identify not only the main functionality of anarchy, but also the motivation of state units, so that policy-makers define the means and ends for their actions. The strategies and ways in which power is operationalized, therefore, reflect the preferences and opportunities of States in their

3 Hegemonic state, according to Belligni (2008), refers to the Nation-State, a power that exerts a preeminence not only military, but economic and cultural, conditioning the options to be followed, due to its high intimidating and coercive potential. Keohane (1984, p. 34) reiterates that the hegemonic state "is powerful enough to be able to maintain the essential rules that govern relations between states, and that it has the determination to maintain them".

social relations, not just a crude manifestation of their military capacity to the detriment of their opponents.

From these readings and considering an operational definition to be applied to our argument, we understand as power the way in which one State influences the behavior of another within its own interests. It consists of material components, such as military power, and non-material components, such as reputation, that affect trust between the state and its peers. Thus, it is possible to read military power and diplomacy as tools at the disposal of decision-makers to proceed with their foreign policy strategies.

The operational concept of power that we use allows the debate of its scope based on views that derive from hard and soft power. In order to understand the two great strategies analyzed in this article, such flexibility becomes important. Therefore, it is important to briefly explain what we understand as military power and diplomacy.

According to Nye (2002), military power is able to offer bases for the promotion of governmental policies inasmuch as it offers foreign policy strategies, adding to Foreign Policy instruments that allow the exercise of coercive diplomacy so that the State reaches its goals. interests.

Consequently, military power is liable to be employed either directly in the form of physical violence to impose the will of one state on the other, or to be employed indirectly, using its credibility and potential to intimidate or deter the opponent.

In this version of indirect use, military power needs a material and credible base, in which armaments stand out, in order to enable a political discourse that will affect the persuasion, coercion or coercion of the opponent. Thus, military power is an inseparable element of state power, although there are other forms of power that make up national power, such as political, economic and psychosocial.

Regardless of the definition of power and its use, the thread that connects them is their relational character, in which the agent with the least capacity for power will have the option of resisting the one that imposes it. This will result, in most cases, in a negotiation between the parties, since the “weakest” agent can reach an agreement that makes him yield less. In this sense, this assignment of rights takes place directly proportional to this difference in power for the stronger.

The tension between hard and soft power appears frequently in contemporary International Relations literature. The distinction promoted by Nye (2012) is repeatedly mentioned to distinguish two different forms of manifestation of power. According to him, while hard power is characterized by being a coercive power involving economic and military power, soft power is conceptualized as a notion of “behavioral power” and is based on the cultural aspects manifested by the States. A correct strategy of power that achieves a successful policy, called smart power, depends on a correct combination of hard and soft resources (NYE, 2012).

Although the distinction between soft and hard power is attractive, becoming a popular jargon among analysts and field theorists, this separation is merely pedagogical, being perceived among more traditional theorists with a realistic and liberal inclination. In this way, diplomacy and military power go hand in hand with a dispute of States' interests in the international system, diplomacy being understood as the art of convincing (*convaincre*) without the use of force, and

the strategy for the implementation of military power, the art of winning (*vaincre*) at the lowest cost. Therefore, according to Aron (2002, p. 24), “complementary aspects of the unique art of politics - the art of conducting relations with other States to achieve national interest”.

Therefore, in terms of the argument developed in this article, cooperation and deterrence are discussed as a result of the application of power and diplomacy, which involve the most diverse relational aspects of the elements of hard and soft power.

In this understanding, the cooperation-deterrence binomial, when associated with these two types of power, would mean the integration of networks of diplomacy, defense, development and tools of soft and hard power in a winning strategy, called, by Nye, smart power. This could be seen in the application of the Great Strategies of Barão do Rio Branco and Amorim. Thus, by combining diplomacy and military power, albeit at different scales and priorities, such binomial was applied in favor of greater international insertion that reflected nuances in Brazilian foreign policy in these two historical moments.

It is what we tried to analyze in the next sections, that is, how the Great Strategies of Barão do Rio Branco and Amorim presented themselves, representing the political will of the conjugation of the National Power in all its spheres and instrumentalizations.

3 Barão do Rio Branco's Grand Strategy

José Maria da Silva Paranhos Jr., the Barão do Rio Branco (1845-1912), became known for the way that a nation should conduct its foreign policy, according to its grandeur and ambition on the international stage. In his words: “It is possible that, renouncing equal treatment ... some will resign themselves to signing conventions, in which third, fourth or fifth order nations are declared and confessed. Brazil cannot be of that sort” (BARÃO DO RIO BRANCO apud RICUPERO, 2000, p. 27).

Such fame was constituted through the operationalization of a foreign policy motivated, mainly, by the belief that a nation should conduct its foreign policy according to its greatness and ambition in the international scenario.

The affinity of the Barão do Rio Branco with the military field associated with the 19th century zeitgeist, marked by philosophical, scientific and artistic currents that lent legitimacy to the war, opened space for the use of military power as a way of resolving disputes and making the interest stand out Brazilian national. These are the premises that support its Grand Strategy, reflecting the gains that Brazil had at the beginning of its republican period. Its foreign policy represented the articulation between diplomacy and power, allowing Brazil to achieve regional prominence. Thus, its Grand Strategy involved the instrumental use of military power as a propellant of strategies to achieve the objectives of national interest.

The Barão do Rio Branco's relationship with military power has professional, academic and family bases (ALSINA JÚNIOR, 2015). His father, Visconde do Rio Branco, was Minister of the Navy in the Marquês do Paraná's conciliation cabinet (1853-1856), also leading the 21st Empire cabinet (1871-1875), formed by the Conservative Party. Between 1893 and 1898, he was plenipotentiary minister on a special mission in the United States

of America (USA), from 1898 to 1900, plenipotentiary minister on a special mission in Switzerland and from 1900 to 1902, plenipotentiary minister in the German Empire - a time when Germany was fighting naval race against the United Kingdom, highlighting the impacts of Maritime Power on the aspirations of a great nation. In addition, the first work produced by Rio Branco was about the life of Barroso Pereira, commander of the frigate Imperatriz. His vein as a military researcher would remain evident in other works, such as "Episodes of the Silver War" and the biography of Barão do Sêrro Largo. Finally, several close relatives were members of the armed forces, which provided close contact in their social circle with the military and their families, including Luiz Alves de Lima e Silva, Duque de Caxias.

Rio Branco's performance at the forefront of Brazil's foreign policy was permeated by episodes that explain his Grand Strategy of seeking greater international insertion and the construction of Brazil as a regional power. The refusal to assume the role of a marginal nation in international politics ended up influencing the very dynamics of Brazilian foreign policy, directly impacting on the long-term objectives sought by the country, autonomy and relevance (SANTOS, 2018). Cooperation and deterrence operated as legitimate political tools to sustain Brazilian international operations. The option for cooperation should be seen as a political action, in the search for the expansion of the country's power, prestige and economic gains in the international system (MORGENTHAU, 1962). Similarly, deterrence operated complementarily to the achievement of the objectives set, serving as a guarantor that threats and promises would be carried out (ARON, 2002, p. 519). The following are some episodes that illustrate these assertions.

The issue of Acre is a central event for the understanding of the Baron's Great Strategy. According to Bandeira (2000), the concession of Acre to the Bolivian Syndicate aroused reactions in Brazil and in the South American community. It delivered a significant area to American companies, which could be considered a US meddling and its big stick policy⁴ in the region. The presence of foreign power in South American territory was also perceived by civil society, starting, for example, from the cartoons on *Jornal do Brasil*. In them, "Uncle Sam" represented in the figure of a teacher who raised the paddle against Bolivia and asked: "Whose Acre is it, girl? Say it out loud to be heard even in Brazil". Bolivia, represented by a student, replied with terror: "But I am tired of saying ... Acre is Your Lordship's, Mr. Master" (BANDEIRA, 2000).

According to Alsina Júnior (2015), the Barão do Rio Branco implemented the strategy of negotiating directly with Bolivia, avoiding involving other actors - and interests - such as Peru, which claimed part of the contentious territory for itself, and the United States, which claimed concern with the investments of its nationals. As part of this strategy, aware of the threat that constituted a possible direct US intervention in the matter, he negotiated compensation from the Anglo-American union. As the issue with the Bolivian Syndicate was under control, the tension peaked when the Bolivian president, General Pando Solares (1899-1904), determined military action. In return, Barão do Rio Branco requested the sending of troops to the region to President Rodrigues Alves (1902-1906), rejecting the threat. The successful use of

⁴ This policy was based on the premise, in President Roosevelt's own words, that "with soft speech and a big stick, you will go far". This was the US negotiating style to avoid conflict and show its military might on the American continent.

the combination of military power and diplomacy highlighted the pragmatism of its Grand Strategy, guaranteeing Brazil to annex territory larger than England.

Another episode that illustrates the Great Strategy of the Barão do Rio Branco was the Naval Refitting Program (1904-1910) in the First Republic (ALSINA JÚNIOR, 2015). The Program, at an approximate cost of three times the budget allocated to the Navy at the time, had among the episodes used to justify the need and urgency of the Panther Case. Panther was a German gunboat whose officers and officers, while moored in Itajaí, invaded Brazilian homes going after a deserter, disrespecting national sovereignty. The event provided a telegram from the Baron to Joaquim Nabuco, Brazil's first ambassador to the USA, in the following terms:

Sailors German gunboat Panther led by undercover officers, dawn 27 November disembarked Itajaí forced owner Hotel Comercio to deliver young refractory German Steinhoff military service they took prisoner on board. It is the result of the inquiry. Panther entered Rio Grande yesterday, where it will remain days. Try to provoke energetic monroists against this insult. I will demand delivery of convicted if formal act. If unattended, we will use force to free prisoner or we will sink Panther. Then whatever happens (ALSINA JÚNIOR, 2015, p. 261, our translation).

After the episode, three cruisers were sent to intercept Panther. However, due to the condition of Brazilian ships, they were unable to reach the German ship (ALSINA JÚNIOR, 2015). The need for power projection, especially naval power, to guarantee the country's sovereignty, remained evident, motivating the modernization of the Navy.

Other events followed in the wake of the Panther incident, reflecting the importance of military power as a support for foreign policy. One of them was the crisis in Venezuela (ALSINA JÚNIOR, 2015), in which the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy imposed a naval blockade for the Venezuelan government to make the payment of debts. This type of operation clashed with the Monroe Doctrine. However, the United States was afraid to intervene, as the use of military force to pay debts was politically acceptable at the time.

In order to embarrass the United States, encouraging him to intervene, the Drago Doctrine emerged, proposed by Argentina and named after its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Luis María Drago (1902-1903). According to Souza (2008), the Drago Doctrine condemned coercive debt collection, accusing this instrument of leading the weakest nations to ruin, including the submission of their governments to more powerful nations.

However, the Barão do Rio Branco did not support the Drago Doctrine, aligning itself pragmatically with the USA. He understood that Venezuela, like other South American countries, was a financial debtor to Brazil. The refutation of a collection instrument based on regional solidarity did not interest Brazil, which argued, in the last instance, that military power would decide conflicts of interest between States, above international treaties. His position echoed one of the principles of Morgenthau's political realism - that of autonomy in the political sphere to the detriment of other areas, such as law (MORGENTHAU, 2003, p. 22-23). The

crisis was eased after naval exercises carried out by the American squadron in the Caribbean, when military power acted as a deterrent.

This event and others that occurred as chancellor (1902-1912) evidenced a pragmatic worldview, according to the realistic paradigm. His Grand Strategy laid the foundations for the development of Brazilian power and its projection at the international level, in order to make it a relevant actor at the regional and hemispheric level. In it, Brazil acted selfishly and according to the logic of self-help, placing its national interests ahead of other nations. In this view, it was unacceptable for a state to condemn itself not to be a protagonist. The articulation of foreign policy with credible and robust material components of power was a necessary tool for its success. There was a recognition of morality in political action and a refusal to align with the moral aspirations of another nation, preventing moral excess (MORGENTHAU, 2003). The unfolding in the litigation in Acre and in other disputes necessary for the consolidation of the country's borders showed the success of the strategy adopted by the Barão do Rio Branco. The use of hard power, in its relational aspects, was a central element for the achievement of national interests, at the time.

4 Amorim's Grand Strategy

The conception of Grand Strategy for Celso Luiz Nunes Amorim derives from his intellectual training and professional practice, in different sectors and representations both in the diplomatic field and in the sphere of the federal government. His rhetoric expresses a Kantian bias (CERVO, 2008, p. 28), with a strong predilection for a multilateral, institutionalist and resistance policy related to the option for the use of military power as a coercive element. The emphasis on cooperation and soft power is very noticeable, as will be shown below, in central points of his thoughts throughout the positions of chancellor (2003-2010) and Minister of Defense (2011-2014).

Amorim highlights the promotion of "development, the reduction of inequality and the eradication of poverty as central aspects for the defense and security of the country" (AMORIM, 2016, p. 45-46). Given the absence of border disputes or military threats in the Brazilian surroundings, he believes that the defense policy of a peaceful country, especially in relation to its neighbors, should be strongly based on cooperation. In this understanding,

[a] Conformation, under the aegis of democratic principles and practices, of a **grand strategy**, based on the articulation between the axes of foreign policy aimed at sovereign insertion in the world and the **defense policy that balances cooperation and deterrence**, requires that each one of us get out of your "comfort zone" - your field of study and work - and bring your interest and curiosity closer to our partners and interlocutors at the "other end" (AMORIM, 2012, p. 15, our translation and highlight).

The rupture of precepts traditionally associated with defense, such as the predominance of military power, would not prevent the promotion of the cooperation-deterrence binomial. This

would prove to be active in collective initiatives, appropriate to that time. To this end, he cited the development of multilateral initiatives, such as (i) engagement in cooperation forums such as UNASUR, with its Defense Council (CDS), which would represent a qualitative leap for security and defense cooperation; (ii) the 1st Advanced Defense Course aimed at training civilians and military personnel from the countries of South American nations, promoting the development of South American defense thinking based on the concepts of cooperation and integration; and (iii) the intention to reinvigorate the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS) (AMORIM, 2016).

Multilateralism reflected a prevalent worldview, since the establishment of an independent foreign policy, drafted between 1961 and 1964 and, effectively put into practice, by Azeredo da Silveira (1974-79), during the Geisel government. His strong institutional inclination was also present during his presidency of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)⁵, between 1995 and 1999. At the time, Amorim actively participated as a Brazilian representative in the discussions about the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime nuclear weapons. He served directly on the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which produced a report for the adoption of measures in the area of disarmament and containment of the arms race, acting as a spokesman and main articulator of the Brazilian position in adhering to the Non- Nuclear Proliferation (NPT) (FGV, 2015).

In fact, the institutional design of the UNSC represented the intention of the great powers of the time to continue the acquired status quo, maintaining the logic of the sovereign states together with a transformation project based on progress, reason and the democratization of international relations. This utopian thought was represented by the theory of perpetual peace⁶, subsequently adapted to the theory of democratic peace⁷ (HERZ; HOFFMANN, 2004).

In the specific case of the NPT, its signature can be correlated with the institutional-liberal view of the 1990s. The proposed argument suggested that multilateralism in international politics would induce the worldwide ordering of security, consolidating confidence measures of universal scope, resulting in two main changes. The first was Brazil's adherence to almost all acts of disarmament. The second, in the structuring of a military power that acted primarily in cooperative, rather than coercive, support for foreign policy actions (CERVO, 2002; CERVO, BUENO, 2011). This thesis had among its managers the then President Fernando Henrique Cardoso and its chancellors, Luiz Felipe Lampreia and Celso Lafer.

Thus, the change in Brazil's international insertion model, thought by Cardoso and a large part of his state bureaucracy, met the thinking of the elites, who believed in a country destined to have a significant role and recognized by the great systemic powers (SOUZA, A., 2002). The signing of the NPT⁸ itself, without the necessary counterparts

5 The UNSC is made up of five permanent and ten temporary members. The five permanent members who have veto power in their resolutions are: USA, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom (UK).

6 Perpetual peace is a philosophical project by Kant that, in short, has as its core the faith in the force of reason in front of power. It was based on the creation of a universal organization and constitution, which would guarantee a lasting peace among all.

7 The theory of democratic peace supports the idea that democracies generally do not, and liberal democracies never or almost never go to war with each other.

8 It is important to note that Brazil, even today (2020), has not adhered to the Additional Protocol to the NPT, which establishes strict international control and is subject to international inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the Brazilian Nuclear Program for enriching uranium for peaceful purposes.

for an emerging state, such as Brazil, can be considered as a negative point that made national sovereignty relative.

In the Lula government (2003-2010), Amorim (2016, p. 57) pointed out that regional political dynamics changed over the course of the 20th and 21st centuries and, therefore, the way of relating to neighbors. Elements such as national soft power, based on “the so-called peaceful nature and an ability to understand complex situations experienced by other countries”, and the role of the military in Peace Operations, in Law and Order Guarantee operations, and in the preparation for the fulfillment of their basic tasks, they pointed out that the historical stage of persuasion of the security of the South American countries by extra-regional powers would be surpassed (AMORIM, 2016, p. 94-95). This part highlights the dubiousness of Amorim's thinking - the acceptance of a foreign policy that is more participatory in the great world and regional agreements, but which relativized national sovereignty without major counterparts, as in the nuclear case.

In “A defense policy for the future” (AMORIM, 2016, p. 131), Amorim proposes that the concept of a Grand Strategy refers to the need to use the full range of resources, not just military, at the disposal of the State for the maintaining their security either during a conflict or to guarantee peace on terms that are favorable to them. Roughly speaking, this would be the correspondence between the means and the political ends of a State, both internally and externally (AMORIM, 2016, p. 133). In this speech, Amorim pointed out that the highest priority of Brazilian foreign policy and that it was present in defense policy would be South American integration (AMORIM, 2016, p. 136). As a consequence, the defense policy would combine a strongly cooperative strategy in the regional environment with a global strategy of deterrence of denial (AMORIM, 2016, p. 149).

In the speech “Hardening Brazil's soft power” (AMORIM, 2016, p. 159), Amorim stressed the thesis that the existence of nuclear weapons to guarantee peace and security would be a fallacy. He proposed that Brazil's international insertion be guided by a Grand Strategy that combines soft and hard power, that takes into account not only the national interest, but also that of our partners and allies. This strategy would be guided by “a robust defense policy that is the indispensable support of a peaceful foreign policy” (AMORIM, 2016, p. 179). Based on this reasoning, he argued that Brazil should strengthen all facets of power, but clearly differentiating the different functions, although complementary, from soft power and from robust power. However, he prioritized soft power in resolving disputes.

For Amorim, the premise of Brazil's international insertion is based on peace. Brazil has not had border disputes with its neighbors for more than 100 years, because the national land and sea borders were and have been defined through negotiation (VALENÇA, 2018). The occasions when Brazil participated in wars were preceded by foreign aggression. Thus, “the attention of the Brazilian people would be focused on overcoming great internal challenges: economic development and social justice” (AMORIM, 2016, p. 175). In these terms, he emphasizes that Brazil has inscribed in its own constitution the duty to use nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes and that the design of the Brazilian nuclear submarine is restricted only to its propulsion. Furthermore, Amorim protests the attempt to completely disarm the relatively unarmed and not contemplate the disarmament of the nuclear powers.

As for the request for a permanent seat at the UNSC, Brazil took firm diplomatic actions in international politics, however, more based on soft power, such as: a) Brazilian diplomacy tried to mediate the nuclear agreement between Iran and the western powers, which he ended up being boycotted by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, even after the acceptance given by President Obama; b) the protagonism was sought in the peace negotiations between Israel and the Arab countries; c) was a relevant actor in the creation of the G-4, of IBSA; d) the establishment of UNASUR and its CDS could be seen as embryos of a concept, still dormant, of the Regional Security Complex, in order to lead the South American regional bloc; e) Brazil's greater role in MINUSTAH with the assumption of the position of force commander in 2004; and f) a stronger African policy, which could be seen with the appreciation of the CPLP and African forums, such as the African Union⁹ (AU), the Gulf of Guinea Commission, the G-7 best friends from the Gulf of Guinea.

In this way, the Grand Amorim Strategy sought to strengthen the country as a regional leader in the South Atlantic, despite the diversities of the South American continent and the not-so-consolidated commercial and strategic relations with Africa. The institutional strengthening of the various multilateral forums existing in the region, combined with the feeling of belonging of the member states were applied in an attempt to break with the tradition of hemispheric security arrangements led by central powers, such as the USA (VALENÇA, 2016).

Rubens Barbosa (2011) criticizes the main priorities of this foreign policy, mainly regarding the expected results in the reform of the UN, especially in the UNSC; the more assertive policy towards neighbors in the strategic environment, which did not produce the expected results in terms of regional integration; and in more intense bilateral and multilateral South-South relations, which added little commercially and which were slightly above the percentage of 2002 (final year of the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration), which would have left the developed nations in a secondary position.

These assertions can be relativized and understood as “glass half full or half empty”. In fact, bilateral trade relations with the countries of the South and with the countries of the North are very important to the traditional objectives of PEB and have continued to happen.

It is noteworthy, however, that the use of hard power, specifically military force, was not neglected by Amorim. Following current understanding, both in contemporary international politics and in international law, the use of force is ultimately possible, once other solutions have been exhausted.

This position is reinforced, discursively, based on his idea of how the Defense Policy of a peaceful country should be guided in order to seek a peace strategy, but that had a credible deterrent power to be able to say no when national interests are thwarted by other powers.

at sea, on land and in the air, Brazil must be ready to deter threats or aggressions from any quarter of the globe. Hence the importance of the investments we have made in new submarines, patrol ships, armored vehicles, border monitoring

⁹ The AU was created on 07/09/2002, succeeding the Organization of African Unity (OAU), founded on 05/25/1963.

systems, transport planes and, now, in fighters, among many others. [...] today we know that a democratic, developing and independent Brazil in the world must have the support of a robust defense, indispensable to a great peace strategy (AMORIM, 2013, p. 2).

Its position, therefore, is compatible with Brazilian international aspirations in the first two decades of the 21st century. For Amorim, securing a prominent place in Brazil in international politics will depend on the democratic and judicious formulation of a “Great Strategy that balances soft power and robust power in appropriate doses” (AMORIM, 2016, p. 182). With this, it is important to emphasize the link of its Grand Strategy with the theory of smart power of Nye (2012). However, it is curious to see that Amorim, in his main speeches, does not mention the term smart power. Possibly, in order not to copy a strategy used by the USA, from the Obama administration, in order to denote greater independence in the choice of its policies (VIOLANTE, 2017).

In his speech “The Grand Strategy in a naval power in a world in flux” (AMORIM, 2016, p. 243), Amorim states that Brazil has a clear interest in world peace and must contribute to preserving it, given its vocation as a “provider of peace” country (AMORIM, 2016, p. 244). To that end, the country must adopt a Grand Strategy that combines foreign policy and defense policy. In this sense, diplomacy would correspond to the first line of defense of national interests. This would include, but would not limit, reflection on the challenges and definitions of national interests. Therefore, external interference that aimed to demarcate the limits of Brazilian action, in favor of its political objectives, would not be accepted.

Amorim (2016, p. 263) also questioned whether “it would be up to Brazil to continue to play a secondary role in the global scenario, submitting itself to the strategy of the dominant power and seeking, at most, to extract advantages from a subordinate association”. He emphasized, in this speech, that cooperation is the main objective of defense policy in the Brazilian strategic environment. With that, he concluded, through ZOPACAS, that the bordering countries of the South Atlantic join efforts to leave the South Atlantic free of nuclear weapons and all kinds of strange rivalries to this environment (AMORIM, 2016).

The defense of multilateralism in international politics, more than being a principle of Brazilian foreign relations, is an important tool to combat the uncertainties of hegemonies that tend to unipolarize in the international system. This is reflected in the assertion that “[...] and, for the rest of the world, the Brazilian stance will be one of deterrence, among the neighbors it should be of cooperation. [...] cooperation is the best deterrent for friendly states” (BRASIL ..., 2014, p. 7).

The cases and events mentioned suggest that, for Amorim, the Great Strategy of Brazil involves the use of all components of power available to the State, not just military resources to maintain its security. This conception would involve both the conflictive dimension of international politics and the peace-building process. It is clear that its strategic conception has been based on the Kantian premise that inserts the country internationally for the defense of peace.

In this position, despite the greater incentive in some strategic projects to increase national military power, which were launched or reactivated with the support of the FFAA's Articulation and Equipment Plan (PAED), after a short period of national geopolitical construction, in the years 1990, the soft power of diplomacy prevailed compared to military power (VIOLANTE, 2017).

This return to major strategic projects in the defense area, including incentives to the national defense industry, showed the relevance of a geopolitics more focused on the South Atlantic. However, Cervo and Lessa (2014) point out discursive contradictions and the results of this strategy, which it declined as to its assertiveness from 2011 to 2014, not releasing itself from the dependence on economic and technological interests of the central powers. Regardless of the greater assertiveness in matters of defense and security, Brazil adopted a policy of non-confrontation, even for its lower hard power, when compared to other emerging powers. Therefore, the desired permanent seat at the UNSC did not occur.

This Grand Strategy implemented by Amorim is justified, in the short term, because Brazil does not have significant traditional / interstate threats to the territory and its maritime sovereignty. However, this scenario can change quickly, given the natural wealth existing in its jurisdictional waters, such as, for example, the recent discoveries of the Brazilian Pre-Salt, which even cross the limits of the national Extended Continental Platform.

Therefore, if the path of parallels was not found, in an imperfect synthesis between foreign and defense policies, in the 1990s, as stated by Alsina Júnior (2003), the articulation between diplomacy and military power was not consistent with its rhetoric. The Grand Strategy, in the period in which he held prominent positions in the Foreign Ministry (1995 to 1999), as chancellor (2003 to 2010) and as Minister of Defense (2011 to 2014) did not turn into more concrete gains.

5 Analytical synthesis and final considerations

The Grand Strategy to which the Barão do Rio Branco and Amorim referred can be framed, keeping their idealizations and practices, anachronically, to the concept of Liddell Hart (1967), that is, “in the art of distribution and application of the military means to reach policy objectives”. In fact, what Liddell Hart (1967) proposed again was that the strategy was not only based on the direction of all military resources, but also on the use of all resources, military or not; or even, according to Saint-Pierre (2010), in a broader strategy that would serve to give meaning to the execution of a policy that would have the role of coordinating and directing an entire nation or the resources that it would provide to achieve a political objective, as war, for example.

The “Great Strategies” proposed by Rio Branco and Amorim, although they had the same political objective - to elevate Brazil to the forefront of nations - followed different paths, in several aspects, such as: in the pragmatic alignment with the USA and for the implantation a more diversified foreign policy; in the realistic world view versus a view more conjugated with other theories of international relations; the differentiated belief about which power, hard power or soft power, should be prioritized and strengthened; in placing, on the same plane or on a secondary plane, military power and diplomacy; and, finally, in the concrete gains that can

be identified as a result of the application of these strategies. As highlighted and emphasized throughout this work, the scenarios faced by each one also influenced the way in which the strategies were conducted, especially regarding the ethical limits of the use of armed force to achieve the objectives of the State. The ideographic methodology used here allowed us to explore such differences.

The Grand Strategy of the Barão do Rio Branco was based on a realistic view that the exercise of power is the central element for the pursuit of national interests. Thus, for this strategy, it is unacceptable for a State to “resign itself to signing conventions” that harm its political and strategic interests, as this would condemn it to be a third, fourth or fifth order State, according to the Baron's own words. Amorim's Grand Strategy is based, for the most part, on a participatory worldview and which had, especially during the period in which it held important positions in Brazilian diplomacy, alignment with Brazil's adherence to almost all international agreements, including acts of disarmament, linked to the restriction of the use of nuclear energy and the technology of launching long-range missiles, putting the possibilities and deterrence capabilities into perspective.

While the Grand Strategy of the Barão do Rio Branco showed, for historical examples, the importance of instrumental use and strengthening of hard power, which is in line with its full support to the Naval Refitting Program (1904-1910), the Grand Strategy of Amorim, although he mentioned a balance between soft and hard power, valued the former more, despite important investments in strategic projects such as the construction of conventional submarines and the nuclear powered submarine, of the fighters and freighters, in the FAB, and of the Guarani armored vehicle in the EB.

Amorim's appreciation of soft Power, associated with the persuasive negotiation and propagation of values, which in the Brazilian case was linked to the sympathy of its people, its propagated “peaceful” nature and an ability to understand complex situations experienced by other countries, had no direct connection with the national military, nor with the capacity to deter threats more strictly. This connection occurred in the somewhat late “revival” of strategic projects by the singular forces, and in cooperation in defense with friendly states in the strategic environment, which also reinforced their military hard powers. Its Grand Strategy was justified, in the context of its time, by the absence of interstate threats in the short term to Brazilian territory and jurisdictional waters.

The Grand Strategy of the Barão do Rio Branco gave priority to diplomacy, but also, in a very robust way, military power. He adopted a Clausewitzian stance in which war is the continuation of politics by other means, not hesitating, as in the case of Acre, to request the deployment of troops as a form of coercion to make national interests prevail. His phrase, in diplomatic negotiations that took place in 1904, sums up the analytics presented: “It is very good to discuss agreements with a squad behind it with credibility”. In another perspective, Amorim's great strategy, proclaims international insertion, denying, peremptorily, the development of nuclear weapons, affirming, despite established theories such as nuclear deterrence, that the thesis that they are the guarantee of peace and security would be a “great fallacy”.

With regard to concrete results, the gains achieved by the Rio Branco Grand Strategy were evident, such as the success in almost all border disputes and, mainly, in the issue of Acre, which added to Brazil an area larger than England. In turn, the Great Amorim Strategy, although it is lavish on initiatives, which have effected greater cooperation in Defense, as an effort to reinvigorate ZOPACAS, creation of the South American Defense Council and several south-south and north-south partnerships - such as the Brazil-France partnership for the construction of conventional and nuclear powered submarines -, its results were fluid and sparse, as they did not result in an increase in interoperability between the South American Armed Forces, much of it in precarious situations, or of improvement in combat preparation training. This situation was aggravated by the use, increasingly frequent, of the Armed Forces in Law and Order Guarantee operations, focused on the “war on drugs”, which were frequent throughout the Lula and Rousseff governments, and which contradicted their own speech.

In both strategies, **there was an articulation between foreign policy and military power**, although different paths and types of articulation can be identified. In a more evident articulation, presented by the Barão do Rio Branco, when combining in a more proportional way to foreign and defense policies, Amorim's Great Strategy favored the strengthening of soft power, with less emphasis on military hard power. In this articulation, the complementarity of military power with diplomacy was shown more rhetoric.

However, the national objective of aiming for a seat at the UNSC did not materialize or progressed concretely, within the Great Strategy of Amorim. It can be said that one of the main reasons for Brazil's acceptance as a candidate from Latin America in a possible reformulation of the UNSC is more the absence of sufficient military hard power for use when necessary, in the light of the decisions of this council, than an effective disagreement from its neighbors in the South Atlantic (VALENÇA; CARVALHO, 2014).

In conclusion, both strategies were consistent with the insertion of a medium and peripheral power that aims for greater power in the international system, given the internal and external political circumstances of their times.

As a perspective, it is believed that a new national “Grand Strategy” should strengthen the budget for defense investment, in the medium and long term, so that the modernization of the military Power is effective and allows the solidification of an Industrial Defense Base capable of to provide systems with high added value and an increasingly indigenous technological content.

It is worth noting, however, that today's technological innovations are evolving in ever smaller cycles. It is necessary to propose the updating of military power based on the tasks to be carried out: strategic, operational or tactical. The “Grand Strategy” should not be based on structured arguments for the acquisition of platforms that are constantly evolving. This is a trap in which strategy analysts and public policy makers feel constantly affected, especially in an environment of limited resources and, at times, contingent on defense.

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