Studies about the ground military presence: the Indian case as a challenge for Brazil

Estudios sobre la presencia militar en tierra: el caso indio como desafío para Brasil

Abstract: This study aimed to analyze the Indian case of force design and the military presence on the ground, as a challenge for the permanence of the strategy of the presence of the Brazilian Army. The article looks at the dynamics of Indian military reorganization in the face of its threats and the integrity of its territory. Regarding methodological procedures, the research relied on the documents of the India Ministry of Defense Annual Reports, The Official Home Page of the Indian Army, GlobalSecurity.org repository, British forum Intelligence Fusion/ Indian geopolitics, and Army and Nation: the military and Indian democracy since independence. With the study of the Indian case, it is possible to perceive a model of land military organization strongly focused on the occupation of the North-Northeast part of the country, a densely populated region neighboring the main external threats (China and Pakistan), which are priority in defense planning that are considered the most significant threats to national interests and the integrity of the territory.

Keywords: Military Presence. Land Force. War. India. Borders.

Resumen: Esta investigación tuvo como objetivo analizar el caso indio del diseño de la fuerza y la presencia militar en tierra, como un desafío a la permanencia de la estrategia de la presencia del Ejército Brasileño. El artículo señala la dinámica de la reorganización militar india frente a sus amenazas y la integridad de su territorio. En cuanto a los procedimientos metodológicos, la investigación se basó en el uso de documentos ubicados en los Informes Anuales del India Ministry of Defence Annual Reports, The Official Home Page of the Indian Army, repositorio GlobalSecurity.org, British Intelligence Fusion / Indian geopolitics forum, and Army and Nation: the military and indian democracy since independence. El estudio del caso indio muestra un modelo de organización militar terrestre fuertemente centrado en la ocupación de la parte Norte-Noreste, una región densamente poblada, donde se encuentran las principales amenazas externas (China y Pakistán), prioritarias en la planificación de la defensa, y porque se consideran las amenazas más significativas para los intereses nacionales y la integridad del territorio.

Palabras-clave: Presencia militar. Fuerza Terrestre. Guerra. India. Fronteras.

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1 Introduction

Considering the investigative context of the adequacy analysis of the Strategy of Presence in Brazil, and based on diverse sources, our objective was to study the emblematic Indian case as a challenge for the Brazilian Army, particularly with regard to the capacity of force and the deployment of the ground troops in India, an Asian country with which Brazil has sought to establish a diplomatic and strategic relationship. Methodologically, the research was based on the analysis of several documents. Among the sources already mapped and preliminarily analyzed, the following stand out: India Ministry of Defense Annual Reports, The Official Home Page of the Indian Army, GlobalSecurity.org repository, British Intelligence Fusion/Indian geopolitics forum, 'Army and Nation: the military and Indian democracy since independence', among others.

The documents received qualitative treatment. The intratextual analysis was used to investigate the bibliography and documents produced by the Indian and Brazilian Armies, whose written records were considered as part of the discourse to be understood and questioned regarding the intentions of the historical subjects, the role of the military and the evolution of the organization of the force. It is necessary to consider that every document carries a discourse, a construction, and cannot be seen only as a record that reproduces the truth. A text is not dissociated from its production context, and they can either talk about the past or bring information behind the words.

India is an extensive country that integrates most of the Indian subcontinent of Central Asia. With an area of 3.28 million km², the country has an estimated population of 1.353 billion people (UNITED NATIONS, 2015) making it the second largest in the world, surpassed only by China. Due to its size, territory and population, since its independence in August 1947, India has turned into a regional power, geopolitically antagonized with Pakistan, a neighboring country created in the same process by dismembering a portion of Indian territory from mostly Muslim population. This antagonism has resulted, in the last 70 years, in four Indo-Pakistani wars, without resolution of the fundamental disputes. Both countries have nuclear weapons.

Brazil and India have, simultaneously, similarities and differences, which directly impact the structuring of their armies and territorial distribution of their respective military units. Among common aspects between the two countries, exploratory colonization; large population; territorial extension and climate stand out. Other characteristics differentiate the two countries, such as India's alignment with the USSR in the Cold War, religion, form of government and nuclear capability.

2 India: between threats and the ocean

In 1947, the British recognized the independence of British India, which was divided into two independent dominion states: the Indian Union, with a Hindu population, and Pakistani dominated by Muslim population (KHAN, 2007). The Partition, as the process

became known, was marred by extremely violent urban conflicts and disturbances, particularly in the state of Punjab, resulting in hundreds of thousands of deaths and forced migration of millions of people (TALBOT, 2009). The conflict that resulted in the formation of the two countries began when the Muslim League of India, under the leadership of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, demanded autonomy for predominantly Muslim population areas, which later evolved into the claim for an independent Muslim country, Pakistan (JINNAH, 2020).

The Partition's violent nature created an atmosphere of hostility, resentment and mistrust between the two countries, which hampered their diplomatic relations and sparked four armed conflicts.

In 1947, the two countries contested the ownership of the state of Jammu and Kashmir (also known simply as Kashmir, or by the acronym J&K), originally a Muslim-majority kingdom but which, since before the Partition, had been ruled by a Hindu Maharaja. The dispute resulted in the outbreak of the first war between the two countries, which would end in 1948, after the intermediation of the United Nations (UN). A ceasefire was established and India gained control of approximately two-thirds of the territory, including the Kashmir valley, Jammu and Ladakh, while Pakistan gained control of Free Kashmir (Azad Kashmir) and Baltistan (RAJU, 1992) .

Despite diplomatic efforts to try to resolve the question of Kashmir and reduce tensions in the region, the two neighbors faced each other again in 1965. The brief conflict ended after diplomatic intervention by the world powers. While the US and Britain cut off all military supplies to both countries, the Soviet Union offered military aid to both India and Pakistan. Considering the pressures, the two neighbors submitted to a new ceasefire, and their troops returned to their original positions (LYON, 2008).

In 1971, India and Pakistan waged their third and biggest war, this time due to the dispute over East Pakistan, a region separated from Pakistan by about 1,600 km of Indian territory as well as cultural, linguistic and economic differences. The Indian victory resulted in the independence of East Pakistan, which became Bangladesh. Under the Simla Agreement, signed in 1972 after the Pakistani surrender, a Line of Control was defined in Kashmir, and the two parties agreed to settle their disputes through diplomatic channels (INDIA, 1972).

A factor that aggravated the latent antagonism and caused more instability in the regional geopolitics was the acquisition of the capacity to produce and operate nuclear weapons by the two countries. Having started their nuclear programs and tests in the 1970s, in 1998, India and Pakistan carried out detonations of nuclear devices in a space of a few days, joining the select group of countries that possess nuclear weapons.

The two neighbors, now nuclear powers, faced each other again in 1999 in yet another dispute over the Kashmir region, when Pakistani militia infiltrated through the Line of Control and occupied Indian territory in the Kargil district. India responded quickly, expelling Pakistani militants, while accusing the Pakistani government of supporting the invasion. In addition to a new Pakistani defeat, the Kargil War, as the conflict became known, represented a diplomatic break between the two countries (MACDONALD, 2017).

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In addition to the problems with Pakistan, a brief border conflict between India and China in 1962 also demonstrated the fragility of the geopolitical balance in the region. The main cause of the war was the dispute over a border territory between the two countries in the high mountains of Aksai Chin, in the Himalayas. After repeated border skirmishes, on 20 October the Chinese launched an attack and two days later they had taken over all contested territory. Despite fears of a widespread Chinese invasion of India, this threat did not materialize, and after two months, Beijing decided to end the conflict and maintained effective control of the mountainous region. The war had, as a consequence, significant changes in the Indian armed forces, in order to prepare it for similar conflicts in the future (MAXWELL, 1970).

As we can see, the security challenges facing India are varied and complex. India has two unstable borders. The country has gone through four conventional border wars in addition to the undeclared war in Kargil. In recent years, particularly in Kashmir, Indian military forces have been fighting insurgency and terrorism perpetrated by militant groups and terrorists, possibly sponsored by neighboring Pakistan. At the same time, various insurgencies, fueled by tribal and ethnic aspirations, are being fought in various parts of the country. It is in this volatile environment that the Indian Army is forced to fulfill its roles in diverse operational conditions and across the spectrum of conflicts, and to do so, it seeks to organize the capacity of military ground forces to meet these demands.

3 Organization and employment of ground force

Although military activities and institutions have been present in the Indian subcontinent since antiquity, the origins of the country's modern army date back to the military component of the East India Company, created in 1776 to provide security for English merchant enterprise. Later, with the deepening of colonization, this force became the British Indian Army and small armies from different principalities with greater autonomy, which, after independence in 1947, merged (SINGH, 1993).

The British Indian Army was essential for maintaining the hegemony of the British Empire, both in its territory and in other parts of the Orient. In the course of the 19th century, its troops fought and provided security in the Anglo-Burmese, Anglo-Sikh, Anglo-Afghan and Opium wars, the latter in China (RAUGH, 2004).

In the first half of the 20th century, before independence, the Indians played an important role in the success of British forces in both world wars. During the first conflict (1914-1918), around 1.3 million Indian soldiers fought on different fronts, accounting for around 64,449 dead or missing in combat (GREAT BRITAIN, 1922). In exchange for Indian support in the war, the United Kingdom signaled to the National Congress of India a self-governing status, but, after the conflict, the commitment was not fulfilled, resulting in the strengthening of a pro-independence movement in British India.

In spite of the unfulfilled promises, during World War II (1939-1945) Indian contribution to the Allied war effort was even greater. Altogether, some 2.5 million Indian soldiers have strengthened British combat power in Europe, the Mediterranean, North Africa, the Pacific, China and Southeast Asia (KAUSHIK, 2010,).

With the independence of British India in 1947, the British Indian Army was divided between the two newly created nations, India and Pakistan. The Punjab Frontier Force, a military organization organized to patrol the state during the violent Partition process, was dissolved. Four of the ten Nepalese Gurkha regiments, originally belonging to the British Indian Army, were transferred to the British Army, and the others were absorbed by the new Indian Army (MARSTON, 2009, p. 469-505).

From a legal point of view, the Constitution of India, enacted in 1950, unlike the Brazilian one, does not define the structure or mission of the country's armed forces or ground forces. The only reference to the armed forces appears in Part XI, which regulates the relations between the Union and the States, by establishing, through constitutional amendment No. 257-A, of 1978, the assistance to States through the deployment of the armed forces or other forces of the Union (INDIA, 2007).

The Ministry of Defense of India has, in its organizational structure, the Department of Military Affairs, responsible for the Armed Forces of the Union (Army, Navy and Air Force), the headquarters of the Ministry of Defense and is responsible for integration and coordination work between the three forces (INDIA, [200-]).

The structure and mission of the Indian Army are defined by the Indian Army Doctrine published in October 2004 (INDIA, 2004). According to the document, the Indian Army consists of the ground component of the Armed Forces of India, which "exist to maintain the ideals present in the Constitution" of the country (INDIA, 2004, p. 9).

The mission of the Indian Army is thus defined:

> Primary Role. Preserve national interests and safeguard sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of India against any external threats by deterrence or by waging war.
>
> Secondary Role. Assist Government agencies to cope with 'proxy war' and other internal threats and provide aid to civil authority when requisitioned for the purpose. (INDIA, 2004, p. 9).

From this perspective, the Indian Army doctrine defines as its mission the defense against external and internal enemies as well as cooperation in civil affairs. To fulfill its mission, doctrine mandates that the Indian ground force develop and incorporate the capabilities to:

- Effectively project deterrence and dissuasion through the medium of strong, well-structured combat capability.

- Be prepared to engage in and conduct all types of military operations, singly or jointly, in the entire spectrum of conflict.
- Provide the requisite land forces component of the Strategic Forces Command.
- Provide aid to civil authority when called upon to do so for maintenance of law and order, humanitarian aid and assistance during disasters and calamities or any other circumstances including maintenance of essential services.
- Participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations in consonance with India's commitment to the United Nations Charter.
- Be prepared to render military assistance to friendly countries when required to do so. (INDIA, 2004, p. 10).

The range of responsibilities assigned to the Indian Army bears several similarities with the constitutional missions of the Brazilian Army, including the defense of the homeland and acting to guarantee law and order. Furthermore, same as in Brazil, the Indian Army is doctrinally prepared to cooperate with civilian authorities in emergency cases and participate in the UN peacekeeping operations.

To carry out the tasks established by the current legislation in India, the army chief of staff, effectively the ground force commander, is seconded by a deputy chief and advised by two deputy chiefs of staff, one of whom is responsible for training and for information systems, and the other responsible for planning and other systems. The command structure of the Indian Army is relatively small, having on the staff as high-level advisors, the Adjutant General, the Military Secretary, the Master General of War Supplies, the Chief Engineer and the Lieutenant General, all at the rank of lieutenant general.

In the operational plan up to the brigade level, the Indian Army is structured in the following levels:

- Commands: The Indian Army has six operational commands and one training command, each headed by a lieutenant general.

- Corps: A command usually consists of two or more corps. The Indian Army has fourteen corps, also commanded by Lieutenant Generals, each composed of three or four divisions. There are three types of corps in the Indian Army: attack (strike), containment (holding) and mixed.

- Divisions: Each division is led by a major general, and consists of three or four brigades. The Indian Army currently has forty divisions, including four RAPID Divisions (Reorganized Army Plains Infantry Division) capable of night combat, eighteen Infantry Divisions, twelve Mountain Divisions, three Armored Divisions and three Artillery Divisions.

- Brigades: The brigade is composed of about 3,000 soldiers and commanded by a brigadier. An Infantry Brigade, for example, has three infantry battalions, in addition to several support units. In addition to the brigades of the different divisions, the Indian

Army also has five Independent Armored Brigades, fifteen Independent Artillery Brigades, seven Independent Infantry Brigades, one Independent Parachute Brigade, three Independent Anti-Aircraft Defense Brigades, two Independent Air Defense Brigades, and four Independent Engineering Brigades. These independent formations operate directly under corps commanders (INDIA 2020b).

Its headquarters are located in the Indian capital, New Delhi, under the orders of the army chief of staff.

The Indian Army defines its military doctrine as

> [...] a particular policy taught or advocated; a set of principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of national objectives. Military doctrine can be defined as 'a formal expression of military knowledge and thought that an army accepts as being relevant at a given time, which covers the nature of current and future conflicts, the preparation of the army for such conflicts and the methods of engaging in them to achieve success' (INDIA, 2004, p. 3).

According to Christopher Clary, throughout history Indian military doctrine can be divided into five phases, each with specific characteristics: from 1947 to the 1962 war (defence in depth without mechanized forces); after the 1962 war to the 1971 war (defence supplemented by counterattack); from 1971 to the involvement of the army in counterinsurgency operations until the end of the 1980s (war of maneuvers with the increase of mechanized units); the acceptance of counterinsurgency roles in India's war with Pakistan in 1999 (unconventional light infantry-based counterinsurgency missions with conventional mechanized warfare); and from the Kargil War to the present era (limited war under the nuclear spectrum, known as Cold Start) (CLARY, 2018).

Cold Start doctrine (CSD) was formulated after the failure of the Indian Army to mobilize quickly in response to the December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament. India's mobilization along the Line of Control in Kashmir took place at too slow a pace, which allowed the Pakistan Army to mobilize and deploy 300,000 troops in the contested region. Having missed the strategic surprise, Indian forces withdrew after a 10-month stalemate.

As a result, the CSD was formulated in 2004 to facilitate rapid and decisive smaller-scale conventional offensive operations on Pakistani territory in the event of a Pakistan-sponsored asymmetric attack on Indian soil, before the international community can actively intervene and before the attack. Pakistan feels compelled to launch nuclear retaliation attacks to repel an Indian invasion (GADY, 2019).

The most recent doctrinal evolution of the Indian Army was published in 2018 under the name Land Warfare Doctrine (LWD) (INDIA, 2018), following the release of the first Joint Doctrine of the Armed Forces of India, effective in last year.

Based on Indian Army capabilities, doctrine for the first time discusses emerging technologies in the context of future wars. It also aims to institute deterrence through punitive attacks at the tactical level. Its value lies in the clarity with which it identifies the spectrum of combined threats, particularly from China and Pakistan, indicating that the Indian ground force's posture has been planned with the assumption of the worst-case scenario, and marking a clear shift in threat planning, previously centered on a single front, for a strategy that brings the perception of a double front.

LWD lays the groundwork for the acquisition of new and modern means, responding to the changing nature of warfare, introducing, for the first time, the search for resources for the use of artificial intelligence and directed energy weapons. The new doctrine prioritizes, among other capabilities, cyber warfare, electronic warfare, psychological warfare, special forces, the ability to project power and operational readiness (INDIA, 2018).

In addition to employment in conventional warfare, India has a stated policy of not using nuclear weapons, and has developed a nuclear doctrine based on minimal credibility of deterrence. In August 1999, the Indian government released a draft doctrine that stated that nuclear weapons would be for deterrence only and that India would pursue a policy of retaliation only. The document also maintained that India would not be the first to launch a nuclear attack, but would respond with punitive retaliation if deterrence failed (FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, 2002). In January 2003, New Delhi released its official nuclear doctrine, which was based on the 1999 draft, albeit with some differences. Among them, the suggestion that India could use nuclear weapons to retaliate against attacks using chemical and biological weapons, and that Indian retaliation for any nuclear attack would be massive (RAJAGOPALAN, 2016). Importantly, India has not signed the Complete Test Ban Treaty or the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, although it is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Faced with a troubled North-Northeast border, full of threats and jealous of the nuclear capacity and its military forces, the Indian Army was deployed throughout the territory in order to respond to the country's defense needs.

4 The Ground Military Presence in India

India with a diverse geography, ranging from the peaks of the Himalayas to the coast of the Indian Ocean, and a history stretching back five millennia, is a constitutional republic, made up of 29 states, each with a substantial degree of control over its own matters; six territories with less autonomy; and the territory of the national capital of Delhi.

Its vast population, the second largest in the world, corresponds to approximately one-sixth of the global population. In spite of this immense population, the demographic density of the country is extremely variable, with population concentrated in the North-Northeast regions, particularly along the Ganges River. In South-Central India, population density is low, reaching, in the states of Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka less than 250 inhabitants/km².

With such a large population and territory, and due to its own nuclear capacity and its main antagonists, Pakistani and China, the Indian Army has 1.2 million active members and 990 thousand reservists, totaling a force of about 2.1 million men and women (GLOBAL FIREPOWER, 2021), whose main task is to protect the borders with Pakistan and China, as well as to provide domestic security, often threatened in Jammu and Kashmir, and in the North-Northeast from the country. With its immense strength, the Indian Army is the second largest in the world, surpassed only by the Chinese military (THE WORLD'S..., 2019).

Conceptually, the Indian armed forces do not have any document that defines a Strategy of the Presence as defined in Brazil, although its employment doctrines, with emphasis on the LWD, guide the coordination of ground military forces.

Faced with threats to the North-Northeast of the country and the need to develop counterterrorism operations, the Indian Army does not deploy its combat power and its military units according to the concept of the Strategy of Presence[1], but concentrates its forces geographically in the upper third of the country's territory, coincidentally the area with the greatest population density and in contact with its antagonists: Pakistan and China.

With the concentration of military forces present predominantly in the North-Northeast of the country, the Indian Army deploys in this region four of the six operational Commands (five, if considered the Central Command, responsible for the logistical support of the land force). In the Center-South, a region with a lower population density and with a reduced threat level, there is only one operational command (the Southern Command), one of which has less combat power, consisting of two bodies and five divisions. Such territorial distribution clearly privileges the real threats on the country's northern borders, to the detriment of carrying out an equitable occupation throughout the entire national territory.

Among the operational commands, similar to the Brazilian Military Area Commands, the Central Command, headquartered in Lucknow, does not have subordinate first-line units, and concentrates the logistical activities of the Indian Army.

The Eastern Command, based in Calcutta, is prepared for internal defense actions and patrolling the eastern border. Geographically deployed in a region of high mountains, it is composed of three corps with nine subordinate mountain divisions and an independent infantry division, responsible for counterinsurgency operations in the Assam valley (GLOBAL SECURITY, 2021a). The short border war with China in 1962 determined that, regardless of the advance of electronic communications, greater command and control should be exercised from geographical proximity. The Eastern Command, which was installed in Lucknow, about 1,100 kilometers from Walong, after the experience of the conflict, was moved to Calcutta, and Lucknow became the headquarters of the Central Command.

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1   Conceptually, we use the Brazilian definition, defined in the Manual C 124-1 Strategy: "Presence strategy - characterized by the military presence, in the national territory and its extensions, in order to fulfill the constitutional purpose and subsidiary attributions, effected not only by the careful articulation of military organizations in the territory, but also, mainly by the capacity of rapid displacement to any region of the country, when necessary (strategic mobility)" (BRASIL, 2001, p. 3-11).

The prestigious Western Command is the most important large unit of the Indian Army, responsible for defending an area considered "hot", between the borders with China and Pakistan, which includes the regions of Punjab, Rajasthan, Delhi and part of the Jammu Valley (INDIA, c2021). Headquartered in Chandimandir, its combat power comprises three corps, to which six infantry divisions, an armored division, a RAPID division, three armored brigades, a mechanized infantry brigade, an engineering brigade, and an anti-aircraft defense brigade are subordinated. An artillery division also reports directly to Western Command.

The experience of the 1965 and 1971 wars against Pakistan demonstrated that the area under the responsibility of the Western Command was too vast for effective command. As a result, in 1971, the large unit was disbanded, and Northern Command was created, based in Udhampur, which took over one of the most volatile areas in India, encompassing Kashmir and Ladakh. The Northern Command is responsible for the defense and security of India's main area of conflict, the J&K region, mountainous and historically conflicted with Pakistan since the 1947 partition. Based in Udhampur, the Command has three corps under it, five infantry divisions, two mountain divisions and an artillery brigade. Due to regional instability, its main mission involves counterinsurgency and counterterrorism (INDIA, 2020b).

A considerable area of the border with Pakistan is under the responsibility of the Southwestern Command, created in 2005 after restructuring of the Indian Army. Headquartered in the historic city of Jaipur, capital of Rajasthan, and focused on conventional combat, the Southwest Command is strongly structured, with two corps, two infantry divisions, two RAPID divisions, two mountain divisions, one armored division and an artillery division. It also includes large units such as an armored brigade, an engineering brigade and an air defense brigade (GLOBAL SECURITY, 2021d).

The Southern Command is the only one of the Indian Army not territorially articulated with the North-Northeast borders under threat from Pakistan and China. It is a large command focused on the less densely populated and less vulnerable area of India. Based in Pune, in terms of territory/combat power, it is the weakest command in the Indian Army, comprising two corps, to which two infantry divisions are subordinate, one armored division, two RAPID divisions, one armored brigade, one brigade of mechanized infantry and an engineering brigade. It also includes an artillery division directly subordinate to the Southern Command (GLOBAL SECURITY, 2020).

A peculiarity of the organization of the Indian Army seems to refer to questions of social organization. Indian caste system is among the world's oldest forms of stratified social organization. The system that divides Hindus into rigid hierarchical groups based on their karma (work) and dharma (hindi word for religion, but here it means duty), it has generally been accepted for more than 3,000 years, mitigating disputes and claims for social improvement (WHATS..., 2019).

The concept of "single caste" or "pure" regiments emerged during the British era, which was based on its own categorization: the warrior class. However, after indepen-

dence, India continued with these regiments based on class and regions of origin, due to the history and ethos of the units. Despite this, it is not possible to say that the Indian Army is based on caste. There are "mixed" and "fixed" units, such as the Grenadiers or the Mahar Regiment. The four grenadier regiments have subunits of Jats, Muslims and Dogras. Likewise, the Rajputana Marines have an equal mix of Rajputs and Jats, while the Rajput Regiment is mainly composed of Rajputs and Gujars, in addition to Muslims and Bengalis. The other combat units, such as Armored Corps and Artillery, also have several examples of "pure" units. However, supporting units such as Engineering, Ordnance and Communications are units composed of soldiers of "all castes".

The Indian Army has several regiments and units named after castes, communities and regions, full of traditions gained in battle, such as Jat, Sikh, Rajput, Dogra, Mahar, Gurkha and others. It is important to emphasize, however, that regiments based on castes or regions are not predominant throughout the army, but are located in a combat zone and some specialized units (MANDAL, 2019).

Despite this rigid millenary system, the Indian Army acts as a factor of social cohesion, as it makes no distinction between castes to recruit its members. India does not resort to conscription or compulsory military service, and citizens interested in joining the Indian Army do so voluntarily. Recruitment in the Army is broad, and every male citizen, "regardless of caste, class, religion and domicile, is eligible to serve in the Army, as long as he meets age, education, physical and medical standards" (INDIA, 2020a). Recruitment is carried out year-round through an open volunteer system, published in local newspapers two weeks prior to enlistment date.

Another factor present in the Indian Army that contributes to national cohesion was the incorporation of women into its ranks. Inspired by Indian Army nurses who fought in World Wars I and II, where 350 of them were killed, imprisoned or declared missing in action, in 1988 the army organized the Indian Military Nursing Service. In 1992, the Indian Army began inducing female officers into non-healthcare roles (INDIA, 2019a). Despite the incorporation of women into the Indian Army, on a date close to the date the Brazilian Army inaugurated its selection of the female military corps, they occupy until now only administrative or support positions, staying far from the combat ranks. This policy has been the result of campaigns and public discussions (KARAT, 2014) on expanding the inclusion of women in combat roles, as it already occurs in other armies in the world as well as the Indian Air Force, where women are already qualified as air force fighter pilots.

As the Indian Army Doctrine states, the Indian Army's secondary mission is "To assist government agencies in dealing with "proxy wars" and other internal threats, as well as to provide assistance to the civilian authority when requested." In this perspective, the Indian ground force has, throughout its history, cooperated with the country's civil authorities, becoming in addition to its dissuasive and operational capacity, a "Political

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Army". According to Fernando Rodrigues, this occurs when, due to the deficiencies of other government agencies and institutions:

> The army ends up assuming a role that belongs to other national actors, with responsibility for conducting public policies, which, in a way, provokes an accommodation of the political class, represented by the convenience and connivance of the State with this type of action (RODRIGUES, 2020, p. 51-64).

On different occasions, the Indian Army led or participated in subsidiary activities in response to the demands of society and at the request of civil authorities, assisting in public disaster relief, road construction, rescue of people in areas of difficult access (often in the mountains of the Himalayas) (INDIA, 2019b, p. 179-180). A classic example occurred in September 2014, with the operations Megh Rahat and Sadbhauna, when Northern Command troops rescued more than 20,000 people stranded and displaced by a heavy flood caused by monsoon rain in the state of J&K (DUTTA, 2014).

In the first few months of 2020, the Indian Army was also asked to cooperate with measures taken by the government to combat the Covid-19 pandemic. India's social isolation and lockdown, affecting some 1.3 billion people, is the largest national policy response of its kind to the ongoing pandemic in the world. The Indian Army deployed its troops across the country to collaborate with law enforcement authorities and ensure that blockade rules were followed, in addition to establishing field hospitals to help the population (PANDA, 2020).

5 North-Northeast Border Security and Counterinsurgency

Although there has been nominally no conflict with Pakistan since 1999 and with China since the brief war in 1962, India's North-Northeast border, shared with these two countries, remains a priority in defense planning, considering they are the most significant threats to Indian national interests and territorial integrity. With greater intensity in Jammu and Kashmir, actions by Pakistani-sponsored terrorist groups have been recurrent, prompting the Indian Army to strengthen its combat power and border surveillance in the region.

The Kargil war, in 1999, coincides with the acquisition of nuclear capacity by India and Pakistan, which may offer an explanation for Pakistan's option to, after the conflict, no longer confront India with its military forces at the J&K, but to encourage the activities of militias and terrorist groups, including within the Indian territory.

On December 13, 2001, a terrorist attack was launched against the heart of power, the Parliament of India in New Delhi. The perpetrators belonged to Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, two Pakistani terrorist organizations, and left a toll of nine dead, most of them

Indian security agents, in addition to the five terrorists. The attack heightened tensions between India and Pakistan (TERRORISTS..., 2021). The Pakistanis, however, denied involvement and condemned the attack.

Around midnight on February 18, 2007, two bombs detonated on the Samjhauta Express, a train service linking Delhi, India, to Lahore, Pakistan. The explosions took place near Diwana, 80 kilometers north of New Delhi, and left 70 people dead and dozens injured (DOZENS..., 2007). The governments of India and Pakistan condemned the attack, and officials on both sides speculated that the perpetrators intended to halt improving relations between the two nations, as the attack came just a day before Pakistan's foreign minister, Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri was to arrive in New Delhi to resume peace negotiations with the Indian leadership (NAQVI, 2007).

Between 26 and 29 November 2008, the biggest terrorist attack in the history of India was launched against Mumbai (Bombay), the country's financial capital. Ten Pakistanis associated with the terrorist group Lashkar-e-Tayyiba stormed different buildings in Mumbai, killing 164 people, including many foreigners (TERROR..., 2008). Nine of the terrorists were killed during the security forces' crackdown on the attacks. The attacks only ended three days later, on November 29, when Indian security forces managed to take control of all the locations attacked. Pakistan once again denied involvement and condemned the attack, which did little to improve relations with India.

On February 14, 2019, Pakistani terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed carried out a suicide car bomb attack in Pulwama, J&K, which resulted in the death of more than 40 Indian police officers (PULWAMA..., 2019). India retaliated with air strikes behind the Line of Control (PAKISTAN..., 2019), and Pakistan shot down an Indian aircraft and captured the pilot. These actions significantly increased tensions between the two regional nuclear powers, but days later the Indian pilot was released, reducing tensions (ABHINANDAN..., 2019).

The spread of terrorism and insurgency actions in the Jammu and Kashmir region, to the detriment of conventional warfare and under the latent nuclear threat, is a focus of constant concern for the Ministry of Defense and the Indian Army. In its 2018-19 annual report, the ministry shared the analysis of the situation of the most conflicted area in India:

> The situation at J&K remained volatile. Our work throughout the LoC and inland, along with additional forces, has made it easy for security forces to maintain the momentum of operations against terrorists. Inland, Pulwama, Shopian, Anantnag and Kulgam districts continued to be the center of terror-related activities. Throughout LoC, areas south of the Pir Panjal ranges remained violent due to frequent ceasefire violations, while infiltration attempts north of the Pir Panjal ranges continued (INDIA, 2019b, p. 18).

In order to neutralize this 21st century threat, defined in the India Army Doctrine as the "war by proxy" [of the Pakistanis, through terrorist groups and insurgency], the Indian

Army continues to concentrate its forces in the northern portion of its territory (INDIA, 2004,).

The Indian Army has been involved in counterinsurgency/counterterrorism operations almost continuously since the country's independence. Their training has been active in operations of this nature in the Northeast since the 1950s, and in Jammu and Kashmir since 1990. To address such threats, the Ministry of Defense issued in 2006 the Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations, dedicated specifically to counterinsurgency, counterterrorism and the so-called "proxy wars" (INDIA, 2006).

The doctrine follows three principles: a) limitation of the use of force; b) isolation of the guerrilla/ terrorist force from the population; and c) obtaining control of the area (INDIA, 2006). Army doctrine is also quite clear on the limited role of restoring normalcy and then letting the political establishment find a solution to the issue or issues underlying the insurgency.

Since the 1990s, the Indian Army has undertaken several counterinsurgency operations in the J&K region, and despite the difficulties inherent in this type of combat, it has been successful in maintaining the Line of Control and order in an extremely unstable territory. With the spread of terrorist actions since the end of the Kargil War, new challenges are presented to the Indian Army, which, aware of the lessons learned, dedicates a considerable portion of the training of its troops for this type of activity.

6 Final reflections

Brazil and India are developing countries that integrate international cooperation organizations, notably the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and the IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa Dialogue Forum), which encompass agreements of cooperation and alliances of different natures, including in the field of Defense.

Brazil and India have some similarities, such as the vast continuous territory (subcontinent), large population, significant social inequality, internal security problems from the perspective of guaranteeing law and order, the existence of large demographic gaps and the fact that both are regional powers. However, it seems that, unlike in Brazil, subsidiary actions and the recurrent use of the Indian Army as a "Political Army" do not divert the focus of the institution from the two main threats to the country in contemporary times: the monitoring of the North-Northeast border and the increasingly frequent counterinsurgency actions.

The study of the Indian case reveals a model of land military organization strongly focused on the occupation of the North-Northeast part of the territory, a densely populated region, where the main external threats are found (China and Pakistan), which are a priority in defense planning, because they are considered the most significant threats to national interests and the integrity of the territory. In addition to external threats, in the 21st century internal tensions have increased with the emergence of new threats, represented by the increase in

terrorism and insurgency in the Jammu and Kashmir region, with actions by terrorist groups sponsored by Pakistan, leading the Indian Army to strengthen its power of counterinsurgency operations and border surveillance in the region.

In Brazil, with a different trajectory of land force organization and threats different from the Indian ones, the Army reorganizations carried out between the 1960s and 1990s, in terms of troop deployment, prioritized the transfer of units and personnel to the Northern region (Amazon), the territory with existing demographic gaps and absence of federal government, far from the densely occupied and developed urbanized coast. These actions represented a continuation of the process of interiorization of the military forces, articulated with the interiorization of human occupation and the development of the State.

By studying the strategy of the Brazilian Army's military presence and comparing it with the Indian doctrinal evolution, we understand that the concern with the role of territorial presence is still valid, but the current model must be gradually revised in conjunction with technological advances in the field of communications and transport, and with the perception of new threats, planned on top of new capabilities. This advance should allow the presence combined with other military forces and permanent state security agencies, provided with great mobility, despite the lack of budget allocation. The Presence Strategy, within the national defense and security sector, must be effectively thought of as a system of interagency operations, with a joint operations command, with the capacity to act on the borders, and in the Guarantee of Law and Order.

At this point, it is important to highlight the importance of questioning the place of the Strategy of Presence in Brazil in the context of implementing Capacity-Based Planning (PBC), which requires joint planning. In this case, we must highlight the importance of thinking about "Joint Operational Commands", suggesting the Amazon as a laboratory for this proposal. When it comes to the Amazon, the military presence is considered an effective strategy to stimulate revival, maintain strength against non-state actions and guarantee regional public order (MARQUES, 2007).

However, it should be clear that the subject is quite complex, and that the current moment is favorable for maintaining the strategy in the Army planning, as long as there is a review of the concept of presence, articulating the idea of "being present", mainly, with the development of fast-moving capabilities. Moreover, the presence of the Brazilian Army at the borders must be ensured through the articulation of the elements of monitoring/control (SISFROM – SIPAM) and mobility, in the context of transformation of the Army. The strategy should effectively enter the industry 4.0 phase, using satellite and UAV technology.

Currently, the Special Border Platoons should be thought of as "intelligence sensors", and no longer as promoters of human occupation as they used to be in the past. In theory, we can say that the Amazon is already populated, but there are many places with low population density that need to develop.

From this debate, we realize that the definition of the strategy of presence is quite complex, because in a way, when talking about PRESENCE in Brazil, we have to consider diffe-

rent dimensions: one focused on Military expression and the other on the Political dimension. Moreover, the ground military presence is a strategy or state policy.

The first dimension concerns the need to be present as part of the defense of the territory, and especially because in Brazil there is no intermediary force capable of playing the role of "national order force", which results in the Army constantly called to exercise this function in the border area. In this type of presence, we cannot forget the Brazilian Army contribution to the Amazon population processes throughout our history, e.g. the construction of fortifications during the 17th and 18th centuries, the implementation of the military colonization system in the 19th century, the adoption of FT 90.

The second dimension of presence concerns the historic role that the institution has assumed as a bastion of Brazilian nationality. In this sense, the maintenance of military units spread throughout the territory, the maintenance of the Tiros de Guerras, the formation of reserves, among others, also function as "schools of civility and citizenship". This context makes the Army strategic planning difficult, when considering the maintenance of the strategy of presence in regions with a considerable degree of development.

Despite the differences related to external threats (much greater for India than for Brazil) and the Indian nuclear capacity, the case study addressing the country's army and its strategies contributed to the reflection on the future organization and deployment of the Brazilian army.

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