

Insecurity and economic development in Nigeria: Boko Haram insurgency in perspective

Inseguridad y desarrollo económico en Nigeria: la insurgencia de Boko Haram en perspectiva

Abstract: The Nigerian authorities have been contending with insecurity in the insurgency, banditry, cyber warfare and especially terrorism. Accordingly, efforts have been made by the Federal Government of Nigeria to tackle these security threats particularly against the *Boko Haram Terrorist* (BHT). The efforts include non-kinetic measures of economic incentives and strategic communications to degrade support for the sect's dastardly acts. Where these failed, kinetic measures which entail military and paramilitary operations have been utilised to defeat the threats. However, some challenges have militated against the efforts employed by Nigeria to curb insecurity. It is against this background that this research seeks to conduct a detailed qualitative analysis of secondary data using triangulation method to draw logical conclusions. The objective of the study is to analyse the effect of the insecurity due to BHT on the ED of Nigeria and suggest strategies to address the challenges for enhanced ED.

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Resumen: Las autoridades nigerianas han luchado contra la inseguridad en la insurgencia, el bandidaje, la guerra cibernética y especialmente el terrorismo. En consecuencia, el Gobierno Federal de Nigeria ha realizado esfuerzos para enfrentar estas amenazas a la seguridad, especialmente contra el *Grupo Terrorista de Boko Haram* (BHT). Los esfuerzos incluyen medidas no cinéticas de incentivos económicos y comunicaciones estratégicas para disminuir el apoyo a los actos cobardes de la secta. Cuando estas fracasaron, se utilizaron medidas cinéticas que incluían operaciones militares y paramilitares para derrotar las amenazas. Sin embargo, algunos desafíos militan en contra de los esfuerzos de Nigeria por contener la inseguridad. Es en este contexto que esta investigación busca realizar un análisis cualitativo detallado de datos secundarios utilizando el método de triangulación para sacar conclusiones lógicas. El objetivo del estudio es analizar el efecto de la inseguridad debido al BHT en el ED de Nigeria y sugerir estrategias para abordar los desafíos para alcanzar un ED perfeccionado.

Palabras clave: Inseguridad. Desarrollo económico. Terroristas de Boko Haram.

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1 Introduction

The history of human civilization is replete with conflict and warfare which have resulted from nations' quest to safeguard the sovereignty and wellbeing of their citizens. The global security environment from early XIX to late XX centuries was shaped mainly by external threats that resulted in inter-State conflicts. This defined the conflicts of the 2^a World Wars through to the end of the Cold War era. However, the contemporary security environment post-cold war has witnessed a shift in the spectrum of conflicts to intra-State, precipitated by internal threats from non-state actors. Notwithstanding the enduring nature of warfare, its character (as alluded by Sun Tsu) is 'constantly changing' as characterized by the nature of post-cold-war conflicts which include terrorism, insurgency, banditry, and cyber warfare amongst others (BARBER, 2000). These security threats have effects on safety and wellbeing of citizens, commerce, education, employment, and other socio-economic activities. Nations therefore, aim to develop strategies to mitigate their peculiar security threats to foster an enabling environment for national development.

Security is the freedom from danger and threat to a nation's ability to protect and develop itself, promote its cherished values and legitimate interest to enable it improve the well-being of its citizens (UMARU; PATE; HARUNA, 2015). It is also a situation where every citizen in a country can go about their daily activities without fear or any form of threat to lives and belongings (IGBUZOR, 2011). This implies that people must not only be protected from external attacks but also from devastating consequences of internal upheavals such as unemployment, hunger, diseases, ignorance, homelessness, and socio-economic injustices. The antithesis of security can be characterized by a vulnerability to harm and loss of life, property, or livelihoods. Insecurity, therefore, has the potential to disrupt human needs, resources, production processes, critical infrastructures, services and product outlets which are essential catalysts for Economic Development (ED).

ED refers to the achievement of sustained rates of growth on income per capita to enable a nation expand its output at faster rates than its population growth (TODARO; SMITH, 2014). It involves growth and improvement in the areas of safety and security, agriculture, health, education, industry, trade, and transport among others. It ensures the promotion of the entire system of production, human capital development and investments for overall national growth. Therefore, Krueger et al. (2016) describe ED as change in the nation's economy involving qualitative as well as quantitative improvements. Nevertheless, national efforts towards achieving ED are often impeded by the identified security threats which include insurgency, terrorism, banditry, kidnapping and economic sabotage amongst others. This situation can erode the development efforts of the population thus, highlighting the importance of security as a panacea for ED in any society.

Insecurity has a profound effect on ED of various countries around the world. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the US for instance had significant costs estimated at

about \$90 billion (KUNREUTHER; MICHEL-KERJAN; PORTER, 2003). In Europe, the March 11, 2004 Madrid train bombings set the Spanish government back by 'more than €211.58 million (\$249.66 million); out of which, 63.4 per cent corresponds to the loss of 191 human lives and injuries caused in almost 1600 people affected directly by the attacks' (BUESA et al., 2006). In Africa, according to a 2015 study by the Institute for Economics and Peace, crime, and violence in South Africa carried a high economic price of \$66.7 bn (R989 bn), equivalent to 19 per cent of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (HOW MUCH..., 2016). All these adversely impacted the overall ED of the affected countries.

Within the last 2 decades, Nigeria has been plagued by numerous security challenges which have adversely impacted its ED. These range from the Boko Haram Terrorist (BHT) insurgency in the North East (NE), armed banditry and kidnaping in the North West (NW) and the farmers and herders' crises in the North Central regions of the country. Others are secessionist movement in the South East and South West and crude oil bunkering in the Southern regions. The Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) employed various kinetic and non-kinetic measures in addressing these myriads of security challenges. Kinetic efforts are those that require security forces to conduct combat operations while non-kinetic efforts include a broad set of options to include infrastructure development, economic stimulus and humanitarian aid (D'ANTONIO et al., 2014). One of the non-kinetic efforts was the Amnesty Programme in the Niger Delta Region (NDR) in 2009. Others currently in place aimed at socio-economic development through poverty reduction include the N-Power and Trader Moni programmes. Some of the kinetic efforts which are ongoing include Operation DELTA SAFE against pipeline vandalism and crude oil theft in the NDR and Operation HADIN KAI (OPHK); a Counter Terrorism Counterinsurgency (CT-COIN) operation in the NE against BHT. Similarly, Operation SHARAN DAJI was initiated in NW Nigeria against banditry and kidnapping. Notwithstanding, insecurity has remained generally rampant necessitating review of FGN's efforts and approaches in combating the security threats hindering ED.

This research would be limited to insecurity in Nigeria occasioned by BHT activities in the NE vis a vis its impact on ED. The paper would rely heavily on information obtained from secondary sources which include textbooks, journals, magazines, seminar papers and articles from newspapers and internet websites. This would be critically analyzed using descriptive method of documentary analysis to draw logical conclusions. The rationale for the choice of the sources was to make up for the non-use of questionnaires and interviews. Accordingly, the data generated from the secondary sources were analyzed using triangulation method (exploiting multiple sources to increase validity of results), with all the relevant issues such as research problem, research questions and research objectives listed in the form of themes and sub-themes. Inferences were later drawn from the documentary records to explain the issues under investigation for validity and reliability. The research methodology is qualitative in nature, adopting descriptive analysis.

2 Overview of insecurity and economic development in nigeria

2.1 Concepts of Insecurity and Economic Development

Insecurity as a concept is not new to societies and has existed over time. Nevertheless, it is pertinent to have a clear understanding of security in order to grasp the meaning of insecurity. Adofu & Alhassan (2018) perceive security as a social contract in which the people willingly surrender their right to the government which oversees their survival. Similarly, McGrew (1988) opines that the security of a nation hangs on two important pillars; firstly, the maintenance and protection of the socioeconomic order against internal and external threats and secondly, the promotion of a preferred international order which minimizes the threat to core values, interests, and domestic order. This clearly points to the need of the Armed Forces to secure against external aggression and to the importance of law enforcement agencies to maintain internal order. To this end, Nwanegbo & Odigbo (2013) see security as efforts by a nation to contain internal/external aggression, control crime, eliminate corruption and enhance growth towards improved quality of life for every citizen. Based on the foregoing, insecurity could be seen as the absence of security as discussed above. It is a condition where vulnerability to harm, loss of life, property or livelihood exists (ACHUMBA; IGHOMEREHO; AKPOR-ROBARO, 2013). This is characterized by vulnerability of an individual or group to danger or harm against which they cannot take defensive action.

In conceptualizing ED, it is noteworthy that growth and development are generally known to mean increase in both quantity and quality of available resources. Nonetheless, to Thirlwall (1999), development implies change in the process of economic and social transformation within the countries. It often follows an orderly sequence with shared characteristics across countries. Also, Todaro and Smith (2014) delineated the 3 basic societal objectives namely life-sustenance, self-esteem, and freedom. They surmised that life-sustenance is concerned with the provision of basic needs, self-esteem (feeling of self-respect and independence) and freedom (peoples' ability to determine their destinies). It is to be noted that all the foregoing concepts makes humans the ultimate beneficiaries of development through their inter-relations with the society to transform the environment. Therefore, the whole essence of development is to improve the potentials and capacities of mankind to overcome challenges and generally enhance the conditions for existence.

2.2 Theoretical Link Between Insecurity and Economic Development

Theories abound to serve as lenses to explain insecurity and ED such as seen by Wendt (1999) to include Development Theory, Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare Theory and the Frustration-Aggression Theory (FAT) amongst others. This study will however be hinged on the FAT developed by John Dollard et al. (1939), flowing from which Wendt (1999) believes


that aggression results from blockage or frustration of a person's efforts to attain a goal thereby causing aggression. Relatedly, if the cause of the frustration cannot be confronted, the aggression shifts onto an innocent target manifested through violence. The FAT can thus be used to explain riots, insurgent activities, and revolutions. In economic sense, the theory attempts to explain the correlation between poverty and insecurity, implying that emergence of conflicts especially in developing countries is caused by the prevalence of poverty. It further predicts that ED will be hindered in an environment of insecurity as currently witnessed through BHT activities in NE Nigeria, with wide possible range of policy responses for mitigation. It is in this regard that FA Theory was chosen as the theoretical framework for this study.

2.3 Historical Background of Boko Haram Insecurity in North East Nigeria

The Nigerian National Security Strategy (2019) identified several threats in the country's domestic environment which undermine the well-being of its citizens. These include terrorism, banditry and militia activities manifested through kidnapping, armed robbery, and cattle rustling. Others include vandalism of critical national infrastructure, crude oil theft and illegal bunkering resulting from poverty induced socio-economic challenges (NATIONAL..., 2019). Of all the security threats bedeviling Nigeria, the BHT clearly tops the chart as the most potent. According to Adamu (2010), Islamic extremism in Nigeria dates back to the 1970s when Mohammed Marwa led an uprising known as Maitatsine Movement in Kano (ADAMU, 2010). He noted that the movement orchestrated a major uprising in the early 1980s that led to wanton loss of lives and property in Northern Nigeria after Mohammed Marwa's death. In 1995, Abubakar Lawan established the Ahlussunna Wal Jama'ah Hijra or Shabaab Group (Muslim Youth Organisation) in Maiduguri, Borno State (SOYINKA, 2012 apud COMOLLI, 2015). The group was a conservative non-violent Islamic movement.

In 2002 however, Lawan left Nigeria to pursue further Islamic Saudi Arabia and in his absence, a committee of shaykhs appointed Mohammed Yusuf as leader of the sect (COMOLLI, 2015). Under Yusuf's leadership, the group adopted various names like Muhajirun, Ahlis Sunnahwal Jama'a and Nigerian Taliban, among others, while their relationships with international organisations are contained in **Figure 1** (Big Allied and Dangerous Data, 2013). Their ideology according to Stohl (2004) is premised on an orthodox Islamic teaching which treats anything western as completely un-Islamic. It is the rejection of these (Western) institutions that earned the group its popular name - *Boko Haram*, literally meaning Western Education is forbidden. Nevertheless, the group prefers to be called by its real name - *Jama'atu Ahlissunnah Lidda'awati Wal Jihad*, meaning People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad (COMOLLI, 2015). The core objective of BHT is to replace the secular Nigerian State with Islamic Sharia Law while its ranks is filled with disaffected youths, unemployed graduates and destitutes mainly from Northern Nigeria.

Figure 1 – BHT Relationship with International Organizations



Source: Big Allied and Dangerous (2013 apud CIBRA, 2018, p. 36).

According to Comolli (2015), Yusuf led the first spate of violence on Christmas Eve 2003 in Kanama and Geidam, Yobe State, when the sect attacked public buildings and police stations. They later attacked Bama and Gwoza police stations in Borno State on 21 September 2004, killing several policemen and stealing arms and ammunition (ADAMS, 2004). He related that, it was in July 2009 that BHT attacks took a new dimension, when they staged a major revolt in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states, where they attacked police stations, prisons, government offices, schools, churches, and mosques. A Joint Military Task Force operation was launched in response, leading to the arrest of Yusuf and his subsequent death in police custody. The sect consequently went underground and re-emerged in 2010 under the leadership of Yusuf's former second-in-command, Abubakar Shekau as a more dynamic and vicious insurgent group

fighting the Nigerian State for the revenge of the death of its pioneer leader (ADAMS, 2004). The group under Shekau transformed into a monster that spread terror across Nigeria through strings of armed assaults, assassinations as well as suicide and vehicle borne Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks against soft targets. Some of these, as compiled by Comolli (2015) from 2011-2014, are chronicled in **Table 1** below.

Table 1 – BHT Attacks in Nigeria from 2011 to 14.

Serial	Date	Event	No Killed	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
1	16 Jun 11	First ever suicide bombing in Nigeria targeting the Police Headquarters	unspecified	
2	26 Aug 11	Suicide attack against the United Nations building in Abuja (100 wounded)	25	
3	Sep 11	Assassination of Baba Fugu (late Yusuf's In-Law) for offering negotiations	1	
4	Nov 11	Series of attacks in Yobe State	150	
5	25 Dec 11	Suicide attacks at Saint Theresa Catholic Church in Medulla, Niger State	unspecified	
6	20 Jan 12	Multiple attack in Kano State including Prison (50 – 100 prisoners escaped)	250	
7	Jan 12	German engineer Edgar Fritz Raupach is kidnapped in Kano (killed in May)	1	
8	8 Apr 12	Easter Sunday suicide bomb attack in Kaduna.	unspecified	
9	26 Apr 12	Bombing of This Day building in Abuja and Media Outlet in Kaduna	unspecified	
10	6 Oct 12	Three Chinese workers are killed in Maiduguri	unspecified	
11	16 Feb 13	Kidnaps of 7 foreigners working for Setraco in Bauchi (executed 10 Mar 13)	7	
12	18 Mar 13	Bombing in Sabon Gari, Kano	Over 70	
13	16-17 Apr 13	BHT attack on JTF in Baga, Borno State	Over 185	
14	6 Jul 13	BHT attack on a school in Mamundo, Yobe State killing school children	25	
15	28 Sep 13	BHT attack on College of Agriculture in Gujba, Yobe State killing students	40	
16	Dec 13	Attack on Maiduguri Airport and Air Force Base destroying two helicopters	unspecified	
17	14 Apr 14	BHT abducts nearly 300 schoolgirls in Chibok, Borno	unspecified	
18	14 Apr 14	Twin bombs detonated by BHT in Abuja.	88	
19	1-3 Jun 14	BHT attack in the Gwoza area.	Over 200	
20	25 Jun 14	A bomb attack on Banex Plaza in Wuse, Abuja	21	
21	23 Jul 14	Bomb blasts in Kaduna	82	

Source: Comolli (2015).

3 Implications of insecurity on economic development in the north east of nigeria

Terrorism, insurgency, armed banditry, and kidnapping occasioned by BHT have adversely impacted ED of NE Nigeria in several ways. Some implications include worsening safety and wellbeing of citizens, threat to food security and poor micro-economic indices as discussed below.


3.1 Safety and Well-Being of Citizens

The incessant BHT attacks in NE Nigeria has impacted safety and well-being of the citizens with adverse effect on socio-economic activities in the area. For instance, Muazzam (2014) related that the BHT attack on Federal Government Girls College in Chibok, Borno State resulted in the abduction of over 230 female students. Also, the UNDP, 2020 (NORTHEAST..., 2021), estimated that the BHT insurgency in the Northeast has killed about 350,000 people since it began in 2009. Ironically, both Christian and some Muslim faithfuls are afraid to go to their places of worship out of fear of BHT attack. Some members of the National Youth Service Corps posted to Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states had to abandon their national duty due to fear of attacks by BHT (AWOJOBI, 2014). Hence, the worsening safety and well-being conditions resulting from BHT attacks has caused local inhabitants to desert the NE region with attendant effects on commercial activities which are key enablers for economic growth. This has displaced businesses and other socio-economic activities with the consequence of decline in GDP of the states in the region that snowballed into an overall stunted ED in Nigeria.

3.2 Threat to Food Security


The Food and Agricultural Organization (c2021) noted that agriculture currently employs about 70 per cent of the labour force in Nigeria making it a major socio-economic activity especially in the country's Northern region. However, BHT activities in NE Nigeria have forced farmers to abandon farms and markets due to risks to their lives, thereby posing a huge threat to food security and socio-economic development in the region. It is worthy to note that agricultural production has a multiplier effect on ED. For example, some farm produce serves as raw materials in the value chains for agro-allied industries while their by-products have various uses including poultry and fish feeds as well as other applications (ABDULWAHAB, 2020). Nevertheless, the period between 2009 and 2014 recorded a plummeting of agricultural contribution to the GDP economic index from 37.3 - 19.1 per cent (THE WORLD BANK, c2021). Details are in **Graphic 1**. Although according to Statista (2021), this figure has improved to 22.19 per cent of Nigeria's GDP in 2021 (see **Graphic 2**), the effect of BHT activities greatly impacted socio-economic activities of the region leading to rising inflation and unemployment.

Graphic 1 – Agriculture (% of GDP), 2009-14.



Sorce: The World Bank (c2021).

Graphic 2 – Agriculture (% of GDP), 2019-21



Sorce: Statista (2021).

3.3 Poor Macro-Economic Indices

Over the years, Nigeria's macro-economic indices have remained low owing to the identified security threats. Some of these indices include increasing unemployment, rising inflation, endemic poverty and slowed development, out of which the first 2 shall be elucidated.

3.3.1 *Increasing Unemployment*

The heightened insecurity in Nigeria has greatly impacted the source of livelihood of the citizens especially in the NE where agriculture and commercial activities have been hard hit. The unemployment situation has been further worsened in 2020 due to the COVID 19 pandemic. Chronological data from the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics (NBS) shows consistent rising rate of unemployment in the past years. The unemployment rate in the country was put at 33.3 per cent at the end of 4th Quarter 2020 but is estimated to slightly drop to 32.5 percent at the end of 2021 (VARRELLA, 2021). This situation is more so in the NE states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa with unemployment rates of 33, 38.4 and 34 per cent respectively (NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 2020a). It is pertinent to note that unemployment further exacerbates insecurity as jobless youth become readily available for recruitment into criminal activities that hinder ED. Consequently, Nigeria needs to device more measures to curb insecurity as well as boost socio-economic activities in the country to reduce unemployment.

3.3.2 *Rising Inflation*

Over the years, inflation which according to Encyclopedia Britannica (INFLATION, 2021) is - an inordinate rise in the general level of prices - has gradually increased due to rising insecurity which has disrupted agriculture and other socio-economic activities by causing scarcity. The result was that all sectors of the market including food, clothing, housing, and furnishing were affected by this worsening inflation and increase in the costs of commodities (NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 2020b). Nigeria's annual inflation rate measured by the Customer Price Index (CPI) eased to 18.12 per cent in April of 2021 for the first decline since August 2019. This figure represents a slightly lower rate from a four-year steady rise to 18.17 per cent in March 2021 (TRADING ECONOMICS, 2021). Graphic 3 gives the graphical representation of rising inflation from Aug 20 to Jul 21. Inflation tends to generally reduce the purchasing power of individuals with the potential to increase criminality in the society thereby exacerbating insecurity which hinders ED.

Graphic 3 – Rate of Inflation from Aug 20 - Jul 21



SOURCE: TRADINGECONOMICS.COM | NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, NIGERIA

Source: Trading Economics, 2021.

4 Current efforts towards mitigating effects of insecurity on economic development in the north east of nigeria

The effects of BHT insecurity earlier identified have taken a toll on the Nigerian economy especially in the NE region. At present, the government has many ongoing non-kinetic and kinetic efforts targeted at mitigating their impact on the overall ED in Nigeria. Some of these efforts will be discussed successively.

4.1 Non-Kinetic Efforts

The combined effects of insecurity in NE Nigeria have increased poverty and hunger in the region. This made the FGN to advance economic and social investment schemes as part of the non-kinetic efforts. Nigeria established the National Social Investments Programmes (NSIP) in 2016, to tackle poverty and hunger across the country through equitable distribution of resources to the vulnerable (NIGERIA, 2016). Some of the schemes under the NSIP include the N-Power program to assist young Nigerians between ages 18-35 years to develop skills and given stipend of N30,000 (\$60) per month. Another was the Government Enterprise and Empowerment Programme which is a micro-lending intervention that targets traders, artisans, enterprising youth, farmers, and women in particular, by providing non-interest loans of between N10,000 and N100,000 (\$20-200) to beneficiaries. Since commencement in 2016, the NSIP has supported more than 4 million beneficiaries across the country (NIGERIA, 2016).

Additionally, the Nigerian Ministry of Labour and Employment initiated a social program in 2020 to employ 1000 artisans each from the 774 Local Government Areas (LGAs) of the country, (AS THE..., 2020). As at 24 Jun 21, about 413,630 Nigerians drawn from rural communities and mostly itinerant workers in different LGAs have benefited from the program (AGBAKWURU, 2021). All the identified efforts above are envisaged to stimulate socio-economic activities in order to reduce poverty and hunger. The government has also been undertaking sensitization and advocacy programmes in print, electronic and social media as part of strategic communications to discourage acts that are inimical to the nation and foster peace. There is need to strengthen non-kinetic measures that would support and give the desired effects to kinetic efforts in tackling insecurity in NE Nigeria.

4.2 Kinetic Efforts

Nigeria is presently conducting several operations to stifle the security threats across the nation. For instance, Operation WHIRL STROKE was created to combat farmers and herders' clashes in the North Central region while Operation HADARIN DAJI was to tackle kidnapping, armed banditry and cattle rustling in the Northwest region. Relatedly, Operation DELTA SAFTE is protecting critical national oil and gas infrastructure in the Southern region, while OPHK which is a CT-COIN operation is battling BHT insurgency in the Northeast. Other kinetic lines of operations through paramilitary security agencies include border control by the immigration and customs services and normal policing duties by the civil police and the civil defence corps.

Despite the various kinetic efforts advanced by the government to nip the prevalence of security threats in the bud, more needs to be done. An example is the lack of synergy between the military and other paramilitary lines of operations where some agencies tend to work independently leading to poor coordination of efforts and slow momentum of operations. The FGN may consider central coordination and streamlining of all kinetic lines of operations through a hub such as Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA). The challenge also exists of porosity of borders being exploited by the criminal elements to smuggle small arms and light weapons (SALW) into the country which has continued to fuel the BHT insurgency. There is thus the need to mitigate these challenges to effectively curtail insecurity for improved ED.

5 Challenges involved in curbing insecurity for enhanced economic development in north east of nigeria

Having examined the current efforts employed by Nigeria to mitigate the effects of insecurity on ED, there is need to highlight some challenges it faces towards achieving its end-state of restoring peace in the nation. The challenges include duplication of roles of security agencies, negative use of social media, porous borders and inadequate integrated data management systems. These are evaluated in the succeeding paragraphs.

5.1 Duplication of Roles of Security and Law Enforcement Agencies

The Nigerian Security and Law Enforcement Agencies (NSLEA) are mandated to enforce the laws governing the federation in order to maintain internal security. The main NSLEA include Nigeria Police Force (NPF), Department of State Services, Nigeria Immigration Services (NIS), Nigeria Customs Services (NCS) and in special cases, the Armed Forces of Nigeria. Over the years, additional agencies such as the Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC), Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) as well as Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) among others, were created to address specific issues deemed overreaching for the NPF. Nevertheless, the Police Acts were not amended to excise the roles of the new agencies thereby creating overlap of functions among the agencies. This has hampered coordination of the efforts by NSLEAs to combat insecurity as manifest through relentless inter-agency rivalry and struggle for relevance and supremacy. As a result, the NSLEAs are unable to effectively mitigate the negative impacts of insecurity on socio-economic development.

Despite the creation of FRSC and NSCDC to complement the NPF, the security of forest reserves for instance was not explicitly assigned to any agency. The forest reserves, therefore, became safe havens for insurgents, armed bandits and other violent criminals who have devised ways to evade the NSLEAs in perpetrating their acts. Another example of duplicity of functions is that of the ICPC mandated to rid Nigeria of corruption through lawful enforcement and preventive measures (INDEPENDENT CORRUPT PRACTICES AND OTHER RELATED CRIMES COMMISSION, c2021) and EFCC which is responsible for economic and financial crimes in Nigeria (ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRIMES COMMISSION, c2021). The rivalry between the 2 agencies has the potential to jeopardize some cases bordering on economic crimes. There is therefore the need for the FGN to streamline the roles of the existing security agencies to bridge gaps in legitimacy and enhance their efficiency to mitigate existing and emerging security threats.

5.2 Negative Usage of the Social Media

Negative use of social media is a challenge to curtailing insecurity in Nigeria. Tanimu (2010) posits that globalization has aided the BHT insurgents in creating a medium for the growth of insurgency through the use of its tools. The sect carved a niche for itself by spreading its messages through the internet and other global media such as satellite television. Their demands and goals are made known to potential insurgents, who may be inspired to imitate them having been stimulated by elaborate accounts of their acts on the media. BHT Also uses camcorders to record videos preaching their ideology and false propaganda messages of successes recorded against Nigerian security agencies. Additionally, they record videos of public executions and beheading of captured victims, all of which are uploaded onto the internet as a media campaign at the tactical level with tremendous strategic impact.

This brought them to the international limelight to the extent of catching the attention of Al-Qaeda. For instance, during an interview in 2012, the sect's spokesman Abu Qaqa was quoted as saying 'Al-Qaeda are our senior brothers, we enjoy financial and technical support from them' (MILITARY..., 2003). Therefore, negative usage of the social media occasioned by globalization is an enabler for insurgency which necessitates strategic communication by FGN for enhanced ED.

5.3 Porous Borders

Porous borders constitute a challenge to combating insecurity in Nigeria. It has a land border of 4,047 km with the neighbouring Republics of Benin, Niger, Chad and Cameroon with most of it physically unmanned. In 2014, the NIS disclosed that the country had over 1400 illegal as opposed to only 86 legal entry points along the borders (GEORGE, 2014). For instance, a conservative estimate indicates over 250 footpaths from Nigeria's Borno, Adamawa and Benue states lead into Cameroon (OJEWALE, 2021). These hidden tracks provide unfettered passage to insurgents and smuggling of SALW into Nigeria. Border porosity has remained an important factor for BHT's survival, offering it a lifeline to external support from transnational groups in the form of SALW, training, radicalisation, and funding (ONUOHA, 2013). Since the manpower required to effectively patrol and monitor Nigeria's vast expanse of land border is inadequate, BHT has leveraged on this lacuna to ferry logistics across to its fighters in Nigeria. Thus, there is need to formulate a Border Security Management Strategy (BSMS) to tackle influx of insurgents and SALW for enhanced ED.

5.4 Inadequate Integrated Data Management Systems

Inadequate integrated data system has posed a challenge to Nigeria in combating insecurity. At present, various databases on Nigerians are held by Ministries Department and Agencies (MDAs) that are yet to be centrally integrated for planning purposes. For instance, the FRSC and NIS only maintains biometric data of Nigerians with drivers' licence and international passports respectively while the National Population Commission (NPC) holds outdated demographics obtained from the last projection of 2006. Also, commercial banks hold biometric data known as Bank Verification Numbers, linking all accounts operated by individuals. This data is also limited as it captures data only on Nigerians that have bank accounts. All these databases held by MDAs can only be useful for identification, planning of socio-economic activities and intelligence if integrated into a central database.

In view of the aforesaid, the National Identity Management Commission (NIMC) was established in 2007 by the FGN (NATIONAL IDENTITY MANAGEMENT COMMISSION, 2007). Its mandate was to establish a harmonized National Identity Management System anchored on the unique National Identification Number (NIN),

which connects the various institutional databases under a single platform (NATIONAL IDENTITY MANAGEMENT COMMISSION, 2021b). As at 29 Jul 21, NIMC announced that it has captured more than 60 million unique NIN records in its National Identity Database (NID), (NATIONAL IDENTITY MANAGEMENT COMMISSION, 2021b). Additionally, the integration of biometric data from other MDAs had made tremendous progress. For example, a 31 Oct 21 deadline was set for linking all cellular phone numbers with NIN or else such lines would be blocked (AGBAKWURU, 2021). Accordingly, about 59.8 million unique NINs linked to an average of about 3-4 mobile numbers each. Also, the international passports and drivers' licence databases have been integrated with the NID where renewals or new issues of the documents involves linkage with the NIN. Despite these attempts by the FGN to integrate all the databases, the lack of a National Data Management Policy (NDMP) has hampered on full integration. This poses a challenge of accurate identification of citizens by NSLEAs towards curbing security threats.

6 Strategies to mitigate the challenges of curbing insecurity for enhanced economic development in north east of Nigeria

Sequel to appraising the challenges encountered in curbing insecurity for enhanced ED, it is important to suggest strategies to be employed by Nigeria to mitigate them. The proposed strategies are streamlining the roles of security agencies, development of strategic media initiatives, formulation of BSMS and NDMP.

6.1 Streamlining Roles of Security and Law Enforcement Agencies

The challenge of conflicting roles of NSLEAs can be addressed by streamlining their responsibilities. For instance, the establishment acts of the NPF, FRSC and NSCDC could be amended to clearly delineate their specific roles to enhance efficiency. The FGN could initiate an executive bill through the Attorney General of the Federation to amend the NPF Act to excise overlapping functions with FRSC and NSCDC. Synergizing their combined efforts thereafter would greatly improve efficacy of crime prevention. The NPF could also be adequately equipped to deal with internal security which would reduce the rate and duration of deployment for the military on that role.

Additionally, the NSCDC Act could be amended to ascribe it with the role of protecting all forest reserves in the country to prevent use by BHT and other groups for criminal ends. Also, the EFCC and ICPC could be collapsed into one stronger and more vibrant agency by bundling together and articulating their establishment acts. The resulting organization would be better positioned to efficiently tackle financial crimes and corrupt practices through elimination of duplication in both funding and efforts. These strategies would strengthen the coordination of security agencies and reduce the legitimacy gaps that make them unable to combat security threats.

6.2 Development of Strategic Media Initiatives

The development of strategic media initiatives would mitigate the challenge of negative exploitation of the social media by BHT in NE Nigeria. Strategic communication is the purposeful use of communication by an organization to fulfil its mission through identification of key concepts, audience analysis, goal setting and message strategy (HALLAHAN et al., 2007). In doing so, the FGN would seek to deny the BHT propaganda team a voice in order to prevent them from achieving publicity while undermining their credibility. BHT's secret supporters and rest of the populace would be targeted to hinder tolerance for their nefarious activities.

Thus, the developing a series of media initiatives such as Defence Website, Radio and Satellite TV stations would counter the insurgents' appeal as well as raise public awareness of their illegitimate claims. In this approach, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) could create a rapid response media team to address extremist messages in print, electronic media, and the internet. The team should also be able to take down propaganda video released by the sect to diminish the effect on morale of troops and the populace in general. However, for strategic communications to be successful, various organisations such as media-based NGOs, MDAs, media houses and religious leaders should be incorporated.

6.3 Formulation of a Border Security Management Strategy

The improvement of border security would undoubtedly address the challenge of border porosity in Nigeria. The vast land borders especially in the Northeast Nigeria with Niger, Chad and Cameroon largely remain porous due to the inadequate border control personnel and infrastructure. To this end, the FGN could evolve a BSMS which should include capacity enhancement for NIS and NCS, as well as improvement of relations regarding border control with neighbouring countries. To enhance capacity for border control, the government could shore up the manpower of the NIS and NCS with highly trained and dedicated personnel while also providing development interventions to border communities to win their hearts and minds. Most importantly also, is the need to avail the agencies with state-of-the-art surveillance equipment for remote monitoring of unmanned portions of the borders. In the area of improving relations with neighbouring countries, each could shift their posture from only focusing on preventing illegal entry of aliens and goods – for revenue generation – to also what leaves their countries. This practice would be beneficial to countries with shared borders in crime control. The BSMS would therefore, reduce the impact of proliferation of SALW into Nigeria and thus, improve security for enhanced ED.

6.4 Formulation of National Data Management Policy

The challenge of inadequate integrated data on Nigerians could be addressed by a NDMP. The policy would spell out the procedure for collection, storage, integration, harmonisation, and usage of biometric data among MDAs, and for security purposes. Firstly, the FGN could direct the NPC to conduct a national population census to avail the country with the dated demography as well as accurate data on employment and addresses of all residents amongst others. This would serve as a basis to update databases of all other MDAs especially the NIS and NCS to effectively enforce border control which is the bane of proliferation of SALW and influx of criminals.

Thereafter, the NIMC could aggregate and integrate all biometric information on Nigerians domiciled with other MDAs to serve as a basis to formulate and implement the NDMP. The synchronisation of all databases by the NDMP with access to phone numbers, bank accounts, NIN, drivers' licence and travel documents of Nigerians would assist NSLEAs in tracking and curbing security threats for enhanced ED. This rich databank would be invaluable for non-kinetic and kinetic efforts in tackling insecurity as well as intelligence gathering for an agency such as ONSA in safeguarding the nation's security.

7 Final considerations

The contemporary security environment post-Cold War witnessed a change in the nature of conflicts to intra-state occasioned mainly by internal threats from non-state actors. The security threats include insurgency, armed banditry, kidnapping, cyber warfare, sabotage, and terrorism. All these threats are rooted in common socio-economic denominators such as unemployment, extreme poverty, injustice, illiteracy, poor health care and lack of infrastructure. Insecurity in NE Nigeria has a profound effect on the safety and wellbeing of people due to fear of BHT attacks. Additionally, food security and commercial activities have been threatened as most farmers and traders have abandoned the region for safety of their lives. The situation has also occasioned increasing unemployment and inflation which further exacerbates insecurity as jobless youth become readily available for recruitment into criminal activities that hinder ED in the NE Nigeria.

The FGN has advanced several non-kinetic and kinetic measures to combat insecurity occasioned by BHT. Nevertheless, challenges abound such as duplication of roles of NSLEAs where the conflicting roles of some agencies created lacunae in legitimacy and elicited inter-agency rivalry as well as struggle for supremacy. Consequently, the joint efforts of numerous security agencies were inadequate to mitigate the negative impacts of insecurity on socio-economic development. Thus, the FGN could streamline the roles of security agencies with duplicitous roles by amending their establishment laws for greater efficiency. Furthermore, the protection of the vast forest reserves across the nation could be assigned to

NSCDC to dominate ungoverned spaces in the country which serve as hideouts for perpetrators of criminal acts hampering security.

Negative use of social media by BHT is also a challenge to the FGN in mitigating effects of the sect's terrorist acts. The use of cyber space by BHT to spread their ideological messages to potential insurgents, make demands to the FGN and solicit support from international terrorist organisations all attest to the sect's strategic impact thorough a well-coordinated media campaign. The MOD could create a rapid response media team to take down propaganda material released by the sect to diminish the effect on morale of troops and the populace in general. These strategic media initiatives could incorporate various other media-based NGOs, MDAs, media houses and the clergy.

Another challenge to the FGN's efforts at mitigating the effects of BHT insurgency is porosity of the country's borders. There are presently over 1400 illegal entry points along the Nigerian borders some of which provide unfettered passage for influx of insurgents and SALWs fuelling BHT insurgency. To address this, the FGN could evolve a BSMS to shore up manpower and enhance capacity of the NIS and NCS for border control while also providing state-of-the-art surveillance devices for remote detection. It could also renew relationship stance between Nigeria and other countries it shares common border with all in a bid to hamper BHTs freedom of illegal crossing of logistics is support of its activities.

Inadequate integrated data management also pose a challenge to the government's effort in curbing the effects of BHT insurgency on ED. The numerous MDAs identified independently hold databases which are neither harmonized nor linked for planning and intelligence gathering purposes in support of FGN's kinetic and non-kinetic efforts. The FGN could thus, organize a population census to get dated demographic data of all citizens followed by formulation and implementation of a NDMP by NIMC to collect and harmonize all databases held by MDAs. This would serve as a government databank for socio-economic planning and intelligence purposes by ONSA.

8 Recommendations

Having critically analysed the challenges impeding Nigeria's efforts in curbing BHT insurgency this article makes the following recommendations to enhance ED in Nigeria:

- a. FGN should amend the establishment laws of NSLEAs to streamline their roles.
- b. FGN should assign the protection of forest reserves to the NSCDC.
- c. The MOD should create a rapid response media team for strategic communication.
- d. FGN should evolve and implement a BSMS.
- e. NIMC should formulate and implement a NDMP.

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