The strategic culture of Brazil applied to Haiti as a case study: a brief interpretation

La cultura estratégica de Brasil aplicada a Haití como estudio de caso: una breve interpretación.

Abstract: Throughout its history, the Republic of Haiti has been the scene of constant institutional instability, it has lived with corruption, acute social problems, epidemics, earthquakes, coups, and an unfavorable situation that has impeded its development, especially from the perspective of human rights. As a result of the instability in the country, in 2004, MINUSTAH was created under Brazilian leadership, in order to pacify the State, whose Brazilian troops stayed in Haiti for thirteen years. In another analytical perspective, but whose objects of study converge to a common point, in 1977, Snyder conceptualizes strategic culture, and from this point of view several authors interpreted and reinterpreted the concept. Based on Snyder and the other theorists who succeeded him, the article aims to identify the set of variables with which the Military Forces mirrored the Brazilian strategic culture in Haiti. The research is descriptive, explanatory, bibliographical and documentary. The conclusions point to the fact that the strategic culture of the military presented the following profile: offensive, defensive, with traces of flexibility, humanity, leadership, among others.

Keywords: strategic culture; Haiti; social situation; operational employment; leadership.

Resumen: A lo largo de su historia, la República de Haití ha sido escenario de una constante inestabilidad institucional, coexistiendo con corrupción, agudos problemas sociales, epidemias, terremotos, golpes de Estado y una situación desfavorable que impidió su desarrollo, especialmente desde la perspectiva de los derechos humanos. Como resultado de la inestabilidad en el país, en 2004, se creó la MINUSTAH bajo el liderazgo brasileño, con el fin de pacificar el Estado, cuyas tropas brasileñas permanecieron en Haití durante trece años. En otra perspectiva analítica, pero cuyos objetos de estudio convergen en un punto común, en 1977, Snyder conceptualiza la cultura estratégica, y desde esta perspectiva varios autores interpretaron y reinterpretaron el concepto. Con base en Snyder y otros teóricos que lo sucedieron, el artículo tiene como objetivo identificar el conjunto de variables con las que las Fuerzas Militares reflejaron la *cultura estratégica brasileña* en Haití. La investigación es descriptiva, explicativa, bibliográfica y documental. Las conclusiones apuntan a que la cultura estratégica de los militares tuvo el siguiente perfil: ofensiva, defensiva, con rasgos de flexibilidad, humanidad, liderazgo, entre otros.

Palabras clave: cultura estratégica; Haití; situación social; empleo operativo; liderazgo.

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1 INTRODUCTION

The Republic of Haiti, hereinafter Haiti, had a phase of insurgency during the presidency of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, which began with his victory in the elections of the year 2001, culminating in his deposition in 2004.

With the aim of restoring order in Haiti, the United Nations, through the United Nations Security Council, created, in 2004, a peacekeeping mission: The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), as a result, military and police troops from several states were sent, with the participation of Brazilian forces whose leadership of the mission were designated to Brazil. After thirteen years, the mission ended in 2017 (SILVA; PAULA, 2017).

The Brazilian participation in Haiti is in line with the edition of the National Defense Strategy (NDS) of 2008, as the singular forces must be able to act, singularly or jointly, in international operations, on an expeditionary basis, of peace operations or humanitarian aid, to follow through commitments assumed by the country. In particular, the Brazilian Army (EB) must also have the capacity to project power to act in the context of these operations under the mandate of multilateral organizations (BRASIL, 2008, passim).

The United *Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations* (DPO) published, in December 2003, The Guide to Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations[1] (Guide), due to the need for United Nations peacekeeping operations to adapt to new challenges, whose document is basic to those who participate in a multidimensional peacekeeping operation, emphasizing a growing demand for peacekeeping missions in the multidimensional format, in which the following components operate: the military; the police; civil affairs; rule of law; human rights; humanitarian issues; reconstruction of the country, among others (FAGANELLO, 2013), therefore, said Guide was a core element of the tactical – operational multidimensionality of Brazilian forces in the pacification of Haiti.

Two important norms stand out: the Brahimi Report – the first recommendation document - which considered the relevance, in the context of a peacekeeping operation, of the observance of principles of *holly trinity*[2]: the *consent*, the *impartiality* and the *minimum use of force*. This concerns planning and meticulous implementation of the rules of engagement to protect civilians and personnel involved in the mission and humanitarian assistance.

The second - the Capstone doctrine -complements the Brahimi Report from a human rights perspective in that it highlights the need for mandates to be conceived from the perspective of International Human Rights Law, notably the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human

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1   Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations. Subsequently, in 2015, the MD edited the pacification Operations Manual in which it approved the doctrine of pacification operations in order to guide the activities and use of force elements "in single, joint, combined and/or multinational operations necessary for military cooperation or coordination with civilian agencies, in an interagency environment" (BRASIL, 2015, p.1-2).

2   The expression coined by Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams to designate the three basic principles, interdependent and indispensable to a peacekeeping operation arising from the experience of UNEF I. Cf. Bellamy; Williams (2010) and Uziel (2010).

Rights. In addition, it prioritizes the integration of human rights programs during the mission and the performance of premature human rights peacebuilding activities that aspire to the socio--economic restructuring of the country, thus, by demarcating the multidimensional *core business of peacekeeping operations* of the United Nations, the doctrine internalizes human rights, such as security operations, DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and reintegration), rule of law, implementation of quick impact projects and humanitarian assistance (FAGANELLO, 2013).

For Brazilian Army General Floriano Peixoto, peacekeeping missions have a fundamental purpose, as they provide regional solidarity to the country that performs it. This role was designated to Brazil in order to restore the political-social structure of Haiti (VIEIRA NETO, 2017), on the other hand, the employment of Brazilian troops provided aggregation of professional and personal experiences, in order to positively impact the image of the Brazilian military apparatus (FONTOURA; UZIEL, 2017).

The article aims to identify the variables of strategic culture - values, beliefs, attitudes, behavior–, in short, the cultural DNA of the Brazilian military in Haiti.

Therefore, this article will focus on the following axes of understanding: basic concepts of strategic culture, political and social antecedents of Haiti, operational employment of Brazilian AF, and finally, the author's final considerations, with the remark that the article begins with the understanding of strategic culture in order to provide a broad view of the concept, conductive to be applied in the light of the participation of the Brazilian federal security forces outside Brazilian territoriality, as well as the understanding that the academic and doctrinal production on Haiti, is the responsibility of the military researchers, experts in military studies, it is very dense and rich, *ipso facto*, unfeasible to exhaust the reflections in the space assigned here, but which will serve as motivation for other research.

2 BASIC CONCEPTS OF STRATEGIC CULTURE

The concept of strategic culture has been internalized by Snyder (1977), in the current of Strategic Studies, in which it represents the total sum of ideas, conditioned emotional responses and common behavior patterns that the members of a *national strategic community* absorb through instruction and share in relation to *nuclear strategy*.

Snyder's theoretical formulation started from the tension between the two nuclear powers of the time in the context of the Cold War: The United States of America (USA) and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), meanwhile, later, the initial concept that Snyder formulated was extended by other thinkers who focused on the subject.

In this sense, the strategic culture of a state is a product of its history, geography and political culture, and represents the incorporation of attitudes and behavioral patterns of the most influential voices – the political, military and/or public opinion leaders (BOOTH, 1990). In this context, the political culture corresponds to the set of beliefs and feelings, in addition to attitudinal variables, that promote order and meaning to a political process, clarifying the rules and assumptions on which the behavior of its actors is based (ALMOND; VERBA, 1963),

but also result from assumptions that frame their choices about international military behavior, in particular those relating to decisions to go to war, the nature of warfare, i.e. options are adopted *offensive, expansionist* or *defensive*, with a degree of acceptance of wartime deaths (ROSEN, 1995 apud LANTIS; HOWLETT, 2007).

In this theoretical construction, this culture is anchored in behaviors that come from common experiences and narratives that model collective identity and relationships with other peoples, whose behaviors determine the appropriate ends to achieve collimated security objectives (JOHNSTON, 1995 apud SCOBELL, 2004), therefore, the culture of a people is directly linked to its identity – the set of meanings that actors attribute to themselves in relation to others (JOHNSTON, 1995).

Black (2012) ratifies the views of Booth, Almond and Verba, but understands that the set of variables that make up the strategic culture exerts influence on the power policy of a country, in the same way, Gray (2013) ponders that this culture is supported by factors of: *first order -* geography and historical experience – *second order -* the concepts, resources employed and behaviors (customs) – and those of *third order* – the social, political, economic, technological and military impacts.

In this conceptual convergence, a strategic culture is the sum of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, patterns of common behavior, attitudes, beliefs and feelings that the Brazilian Army soldiers showed in Haiti, thanks to their professional training in Brazil acquired in military educational institutions and in the constant daily training.

In addition, it will also be considered the vision of strategic culture from the perspective of Rosen (1995 apud LANTIS; HOWLETT, 2007), that is, the moment in which the material forces positive in Article 142 of the Federal Constitution (Brazil, 1988) adopted a strategic posture offensive and/or defensive, even with a degree of acceptability of deaths during military operations.

3 BRIEF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF HAITI

Haiti was one of the first regions conquered and colonized in the modern Eurocentric culture, living with the genocide and ethnocide of the indigenous populations, and after their extermination, the enslavement of Africans was implemented in the midst of epidemics, malnutrition, massacres and mistreatment, destruction of the environment and the set of social problems arising, including mass deportations (GRUZINSKI, 1999).

In this context of instability, the country received the stabilization efforts of the United Nations in 1993 with a view to structuring the democratic institutions of the state. Thus, the implementation of the mandate of the UNMIH (United Nations Mission in Haiti) aimed at the return of the country to constitutional normality, suspended since the coup in 1991, when there was the military coup that ousted Jean-Baptiste Aristide and lifted Raoul Cédras to power. The UN mission and the pressure of the embargo at the time of the Clinton administration (USA), with the acquiescence of the Organization of American States (OAS), determined that Cédras signed the agreement *Governors Island,* admitting Aristide's return to government (MORREL, 1993).

But, in 2004, President Aristide

> fled the country into exile amid mass street protests and an armed rebellion against his increasingly despotic rule. He left behind a *nation ravaged by political wars and environmental crises*, with a treasure practically emptied by *years of corruption and theft* (DEIBERT, 2017, n. p., emphasis added).

As a result of this constant picture of abnormality, for Lucena (2013), Haitian society is hostage to two variables that are inductors of political instability in the country: social segregation and persistent economic dependence on the social structure, a remnant of a colonial heritage, in this sense: "in the sad condition of the poorest country in the New World - the only one to integrate the list of Least Developed Countries (LDCs), according to criteria of United Nations agencies – *Haiti presents dilemmas of immense complexity*"(SEITENFUS, 2008, P.51, emphasis added). As if the poverty situation was not enough, the country became vulnerable to exogenous interests, thanks to its strategic position for trade, suffering from routine exchanges of presidents through military coups and chaotic elections (MENDONÇA, 2017).

Therefore, given this social chaos, MINUSTAH is created by Resolution 1. 542, September 30, 2004 (NACIONES UNIDAS, 2004a), viewing to replace the multinational emergency force, approved by Resolution 1. 549 of June 17, 2004 (NACIONES UNIDAS, 2004b), both of the United Nations Security Council, viewing to ensure stability during the power vacancy in Haiti due to the departure of Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

Resolution 1. 542 aimed to impose peace[3], provided that the principles of sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity are respected, in turn, Resolution 1. 549 mentions Liberia and the propagating aspects of violence caused by the presence of mercenaries, proliferation and trafficking of weapons and mineral, vegetable and 'human' elements, as well as non-state actors, since it is a converging nuclear element for the transversal and multidisciplinary use of forces.

Ipso facto, ab ovo, this is the conjuncture that the Brazilian military forces faced in Haiti.

4 OPERATIONAL EMPLOYMENT OF BRAZILIAN AF

Initially, with the establishment of MINUSTAH, General Augusto Heleno Ribeiro Pereira of the Brazilian Army assumed command of the Peacekeeping Forces. The 1st contingent had the effective of 1,200 men and in the Brazilian participation during the 13 years of presence in Haiti 11 (eleven) Brazilian officers – generals commanded the troops. Of these, 4 reached the top of their careers: generals Heleno, Elito, Ramos and Leal Pujol, the last, former commander of the EB (Brazil, 2017).

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3   In paragraph 7 of the resolution, the UNSC establishes the mandate to be carried out by the members of MINUSTAH, justifying its decision in the light of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. See Naciones Unidas (2004a, p. 2).

According to Vieira Neto, many experts are dedicated to the study of the phases of the Brazilian experience in Haiti, and according to the different moments of the national reality there is the following escalation:

> (i) *2004/2005*: setting, initial engagement and reordering of the operational structure and training; (ii) *2005/2007*: pacification; (iii) *2007/2009*: consolidation of pacification; (iv) *2009/2010*: earthquake; and (v) *2010/2017*: post-earthquake recovery and return of the country to normality (VIEIRA NETO, 2017, p.16, emphasis added).

The period from 2004 to 2007 was characterized by an intense activity of gangs in Haiti, which threatened the success of the stabilization of Haiti and the UN mission. The strength of these gangs and its interconnections with the political structure, especially in Cité Soleil, have leveraged impacts on the socio-economic structure and routine of the Haitian population, culminating in the employment of hard power by the MINUSTAH troops *vis-à-vis* to armed groups (Brazil, 2017): here the strategic culture *offensive* bias is manifested.

In the particular case of the pacification of Bel Air, Cité Militaire and Cité Soleil, there were the following actions: arrest of gang leaders; seizure of large quantities of weapons, ammunition and drugs; conquest of the confidence of the population; creation of a favorable environment for the activities of humanitarian agencies and NGOs; return pari passu of essential public services and business activities and routine life; and the taking office of President Jovenel Moise on February 7, 2017 **(**Brazil, 2017).

Therefore, it can be considered that the hard power – or *offensive employment of strategic culture of offensive hue* (ROSEN, 1995 apud LANTIS; HOWLETT, 2007) – was characterized until the 2nd phase (2005 – 2007), when effectively the forces operated, predominantly, under Chapter 7 of the UN, in order to pacify manu militari the chaos that reigned in the war region.

Moreover, there is no doubt that

> by joining the UNSC package of actions and measures with respect to Haiti in 2004, the Brazilian government legitimizes the use of force in its foreign policy for the solution of a political-institutional crisis in a member country of the United Nations (PINHEIRO, 2015, p.91, emphasis added).

With this look, the hard power is evidenced, a face of the strategic culture conducted in Haiti: that of offensive character.

On the other hand, from the 3rd phase (consolidation of pacification), the strategic culture was revealed, predominantly, in a *defensive composition,* soft power, especially when the intense work of recovering Haitian structures in the face of the earthquake took place.

Particularly, in both cases, for the application of the concept of strategic culture given by Rosen, Lanttis and Howlett, in regard to the doctrinal use of Brazilian troops in Haiti, the terms war and conflict are equivalent in that, in one or the other case, there were clashes between the state forces of the Brazilian state and the Haitian gangs. The common dynamic that involved them was the tactical use of weapons of war, which claimed lives, therefore, it can be considered

that effectively the use of the Brazilian clausewitzian military apparatus in that country came to life in light of the ideas of these authors.

Brazil's choice for *peace path of conflict* demarcates the profile of the country through doctrinal thinking converging with the fact that the maintenance of peace, protection of Human Rights and construction of negotiated solutions to common problems are the most effective way to bring states closer and solve problems through multilateral means (SÁ, 2015). National external action, with grocian instrumentality, approaches international norms, especially international law, with democratic principles and *resolution favoring dialogue in order to avoid conflict* (Feat, 2017), therefore, it is visualized the *defensive conformation* of strategic culture.

In addition, national foreign policy is typical of an emerging power, excluding major world decisions, meanwhile, adopts the following strategies: act through multilateral institutions; support the international framework; and maintain "good citizenship" in international relations, *prioritizing cooperation* and aspiring to the weakening of the isolated action of the great powers (KENKEL, 2010), as a corollary, ratifies the *defensive nature* of strategic culture as it prioritizes cooperation and appreciation for multilateralism over confrontation.

Moreover, the Brazilian motivation in the employment of peace operations aims, among other objectives, to "demonstrate *ability to mobilize*" (UZIEL, 2009 apud KENKEL, 2011, p. 29, emphasis added).

Ipso facto, it is established the clear predominance of the use of Brazilian force in a modeling of a *defensive strategic culture* in proportion as it aspires to the "peaceful resolution of conflicts", converging with Article 4, VI, of the Political Charter (Brazil, 1988), in order to prioritize the "cooperative space", in this regard, it maintains, by similarity, an approximation with item IX of the article itself: "*cooperation among peoples for the advancement of mankind*". In the wake of this exegesis, the *flexibility*, manifested by *mobilization capacity* the employment in an atypical scenario of the Brazilian forces, because, for the first time, in a peacekeeping mission, in charge of the UN, they were employed outside the tradition of Chapter 6.

The decision-making process interna corporis in order to integrate the EB with MINUSTAH was supported in the *provision of solidarity* to a country in the Brazilian geopolitical zone of influence and in the increase of Brazil's multilateral participation, especially in the *acceptance by the international community to delegate to the Brazilian military the leadership of the* Mission (NASSER, 2012).

As a result, the use of Brazilian troops revealed the following indicators of strategic culture: solidarity, trustworthiness and respect, because the international community delegated to Brazil the leadership of all the forces of the respective countries that were in Haiti.

Similarly, the crucial factors for the success of the Brazilian Military Force were: *adaptability vis-à-vis* the disaster caused by the earthquake, a *capacity for initiative* of the officers at the head of the actions and the *intense training,* in order to win the respect and admiration of the military troops of other states and the civilians of NGOs (PINHEIRO, 2015).

Thus, traces of the strategic culture are: adaptability, initiative, high degree of professionalism, because of the effective preparation of the Armed Force in the day to day of its constitutional tasks in Brazil, impacting exogenous recognition.

To Braga[4] (2017), the following missions fell to the Brazilian Force, among others, in the table below, from the perspective of strategic culture:

Table 1 – Missions versus strategic culture (Defensive x Offensive)

MISSIONS	DEFENSIVE	OFFENSIVE
1. Day and night patrols (on foot, motorized and mechanized).	-----	X
2. Escorts and security of humanitarian aid convoys.	X	-----
3. Protection of authorities.	X	-----
4. Security for major events (soccer match between Brazil and Haiti).	X	-----
5. Blockades, strong points and control points.	-----	X
6. Control, monitoring and protection of popular demonstrations.	X	-----
7. Negotiations to avoid conflict between rebel groups.	X	-----
8. Humanitarian aid (in the face of fires and floods).	X	-----
9. Military operations against armed gangs.	-----	X

Source: the authors based in Braga (2017).

In the case of MISSION 1, Braga (2017, p. 39, emphasis added) confirms: "in all cities, patrols were part of the routine of all contingents. *Until April 2005, more than eight thousand patrols had already been carried out* by the MINUSTAH military force", therefore, the exegesis that was predominantly characterized by the use of *offensive modeling of strategic culture* to the extent that, until April 2005, the troops operated at the beginning of the pacification phase, according to the phasing previously presented by Vieira, in the light of a logic of Chapter 7, therefore, of war, in the military operation of a patrol, especially at night, armed combat is always imminent.

MISSION 5 featured tactical actions of a primarily *offensive* nature, given the imminent possibility of contact via fire exchanges with the gangs in defense of these *tactical points* that define the mission, therefore, the *strategic offensive culture* is punctually identified.

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4   See Braga (2017, p. 39). The author, at the time, was Rear Admiral (Marine) Carlos Chagas Vianna Braga.

In the specific case of MISSION 9 – *Military operations against armed gangs* –, strategic culture is essentially based on the *offensive character* in the first three years in which Brazil resorted to the use of force in order to ensure the fulfillment of the mission and credibility in its performance (BRAGA, 2017), *although no deaths occurred in combat with the gangs* (MENDONÇA, 2017), a fact that testifies to the high level of professional preparation of Brazilian troops.

The other missions have a *defensive texture* regarding the characterization of its strategic culture, but in any case, given the possibility of enemy fire, of a *defensive context* the troops would immediately move to *offensive dynamics (culture)*.

In particular, paragraph 8 – *Humanitarian aid* (in the face of fires and floods) - is centered on *defensive dynamics* in proportion to the fact that there was no possibility of armed clashes, given the chaotic nature of the population affected by these events, in addition, in BRABAT 1 of the 12th Brazilian contingent, the NGO World Vision and the WFP carried out the largest humanitarian aid operation in Haiti.

Rasquini and D'oliveira (2017) when it comes to *humanitarian aid* (item 8), in an effort to maintain peace, while the victims were rescued from the catastrophes, decisions were changed to the extent that there was a smaller contingent in the capital and the delivery of supplies through the Brazilian Air Force was accounted for, therefore, it is identified in totum a strategic culture settled in *solidarity* and aligned with human rights, so as to nullify the aggressive, offensive character.

Ipso facto, it is inferred that the *solidarity variable* converges to the existence of a specific facet of the *Brazilian strategic culture*, similarly, can be identified with *defensive dynamics of its strategic culture*, given that it implies adopting a solution with less aggressive, offensive potential, which, in a certain sense, integrates the profile of the Brazilian.

In the area of BRABAT 1 were conducted, with the support of the Haitian National Police (PNH) and the United Nations Police (UNPOL), *Operation BOOMERANG*, which consisted of a siege and search and had the participation of the population, pointing out the criminals on the street, reporting them through a hotline, and *Operation LIGHTNING*, with actions of short duration, in order to show the presence of the military in a place where there was a confrontation with the population or between rival gangs (BRASIL, 2010), therefore, the actions are identified with MISSION 9, highlighting, even punctually, the Brazilian *strategic culture offensive character*.

According to General André Luís Novaes Miranda of the EB[5], at the time was in charge of the operational control over the Army troops of the 3rd contingent of the Haiti Battalion, thus interpreted the participation of the Armed Forces in that country:

> *It took some time for Brazilian troops to properly understand what it was like to act under the aegis of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.* Brazil had a *relative experience in peace operations, but almost always acting under Chapter VI,* with the exception of the army police platoon deployed in Timor - Leste. In these missions, the force was only authorized for self-defense (MIRANDA, 2017, p. 53, emphasis added).

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5   Currently, Gen. Novaes is the Eastern Military Commander and one of the newest and most active EB leaders.

In this context, the participation of the Brazilian military apparatus in Haiti produced a paradigm shift to the extent that the custom was to act under the cloak of Chapter VI of the UN Charter[6], however, for Miranda (2017), the aid comes from Chapter VII[7] the mandate of MINUSTAH was based on Security Council resolution 1542, which gave the military the task of providing security and stabilization of the country, among other activities, therefore,

> [...] the *Haiti Battalion had no option but to use necessary and proportionate force to clear roads blocked by adverse forces and to act against armed groups that victimized civilians* in their area of responsibility. *Also had to answer,* in a timely manner, to *various armed actions carried out against their own forces* (111 of them recorded in the daily documents sent to MINUSTAH command in the 3rd contingent alone). This way, each time the bases of these groups were identified, the Battalion troops, usually acting in conjunction with the PNH, organized operations for their dismantling and arrest of bandits, and *employed adequate and proportionate force whenever there was resistance to the progression of their groups.* With time, this was no longer necessary and these people preferred escape to confrontation (MIRANDA, 2017, p. 53, emphasis added).

In this configuration, it is identified with absolute clarity the *Brazilian strategic culture* with an *offensive* bias, a clausewitzian culture, therefore, under conditions of *making* war when necessary, participating in armed conflict in any degree of aggressiveness, because the very nature of weapons of war implies a degree of lethality. In addition, at first the Brazilian troops under the UN mandate, in the face of "various armed actions carried out against their own forces", responded to the *enemy fire*, so as not to be intimidated by the extremely hostile conjuncture in that country for the population and for the military forces.

As a corollary, the more forceful character *from the offensive dynamics of strategic culture* the fact that the Brazilian state accepted the conditions imposed by the UN for the participation of military forces abroad under the cloak of Chapter 7 of the Charter of the United Nations and the statute of the International Court of Justice:

> Art. 42 *If the Security Council considers that the measures provided for in Art. 41*[8] *it may, by means of air, naval or land forces, take such action as it deems necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.* Such action may include *demonstrations, blockades and other operations,* by air, naval or ground forces of the members of the United Nations (United Nations, [2009], p. 28, emphasis added).

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6   Cf. Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice. "Peaceful settlement of disputes" (articles 33 to 38).

7   Id. "Action in Case of Threat to Peace, Breach of Peace and Act of Aggression" (art. 39-51).

8   Article 41 does not involve the use of armed forces (see p. 28).

In this same direction, the success of Brazilian participation had the following diagnosis, which reveals several facets of the strategic culture[9], as the table below:

Table 2 – Variables *versus* indicators

VARIABLES	INDICATORS
1. Ethno – social identification.	African descent, poverty, everyday hardships, and political manipulation and exploitation.
2. Perception of the same social problems.	Social chaos, favelization, deprivation, pain. Similarity with the same public security problems: groups openly exposing their weapons; impunity for crimes, non-solution of crimes, exposed violence and contempt for human life.
3. Brazilian Soft Power[10].	With the support of FIFA, the so-called Game of Peace takes place on August 19, 2004 in the Haitian capital.
4. Operational capability of the troop.	Concern to accomplish their missions with minimal collateral damage.
5. Female participation.	More than 200 women made up the 26 contingents.
6. Employment of the mass.	Employment of personnel always superior to the threat, using as a basic element of employment the subunit. Concentration of large effective members in a small area.
7. Improvisational ability of the Brazilian soldier.	Adaptability to adverse situations.

Source: adapted from Brasil (2017).

Variable *ethnic – social identification* (1), in the light of the indicators listed, between the Haitian population and the Brazilian troops, especially the one that originated in Rio de Janeiro, leveraged the success of military operations, because, substantially, it subtly integrates the *defensive character of strategic culture* to the extent that there are commonalities between the sampling universes – the Internal, the *Other* (Haitian), and the external (Brazilian) -, therefore, with respect to the principle of otherness, in order to seek the solution of conflicts through dialogue.

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9   The author of the article will give an interpretation of the specific type of culture applied in Haiti in the light of the variables and indicators proposed in the table.

10   The term was first used by Edmund Mullet in 2012 in a meeting in New York. It has come to be defined by the international community the way in which the soldier acts in critical situations in front of the population. It denotes a striking facet of the personality of the Brazilian soldier: more docile and affable than that of other countries.

Variable *perception of the same social problems* (2), based on the indicators raised, on the other hand, the *offensive modeling* of strategic culture, to the extent that the Brazilian troops were accustomed to the employment of the Guarantee of Law and Order (GLO) in the hills of Rio de Janeiro, therefore, familiar with favelization, armed violence, topography, violent crime, that is, identical conditions found in Haiti, which facilitated military employment in the light of Chapter 7 of the UN.

In these interpretative contours, the Brazilian troops were highly praised, especially by MINUSTAH civilian leaders, due to their efficiency and ease in *communicate with local people* and by the option of *preference for peaceful solutions* based on information obtained through close contact with the population. Based on *culture affinity* and personal experiences among the troops and the Haitian population, the *Brazilian soldiers probably from similar developmental conditions* have a greater capacity to assess potentially dangerous situations in Haiti's favelas than their counterparts from developed countries who do not have such experience (KENKEL, 2010).

Moreover, variables 3 and 4, respectively, the *Brazilian Soft Power* and the *troop operational capability*, based on their respective indicators, give clues to the conclusion of the *defensive bias* of strategic culture, since the 'game of peace', as its name implies, suggests dialogue, peaceful relations, the search for dialogue, in order to disarm bellicose spirits, in addition, similarly, there was a clear and latent manifestation on the part of the military forces trying to avoid collateral damage to civilians in any clashes with local gangs.

Variable 5- *women's participation* - provides the mitigation of more aggressive dynamics in the context of the manifestation of strategic culture, especially in a country suffering, worn down by problems of internal violence, earthquakes and other hardships of a socio-political and cultural nature, therefore, the employment of women indicates a preference for *defensive option* at the expense of more aggressive actions, not least because there were no combatants in the female contingent, that is, women graduated from the Military Academy of Agulhas Negras (AMAN), thus being prepared for war, read: *offensive modeling* of strategic culture.

By another angle, variable 6 – *employment of the mass* - and its indicator - the *employment of personnel always superior to the threat* - suggests the possibility of *offensive dynamics of strategic culture*, as their respective indicator points to a high probability of clash between fractions, either by the use of lethal weapons and hand-to-hand combat, in the face of employment of larger effective members *vis – à – vis* the opposite side.

Finally, variable 7 – *improvisational ability of the Brazilian soldier* - and the respective indicator – *adaptability to adverse situations* - integrates the culture of the Brazilian, which can lead the operational use of the armed force to the two dialectical poles: offensive or defensive, depending on the situation.

Moreover, when asked Mr Wills Mathias Cherubin, a Haitian citizen, 47 years old, UN interpreter with the Brazilian Battalion, the impression he had of the Brazilian soldier, he answered:

> When I started working with the Brazilians, I learned what an army is. I had seen, in other years, many other military men do bad things. Now, *I can say that the Brazilian Army is a school that teaches how to help others. I noticed in each Brazilian military, something more, a desire to do more than they can. The population collaborates with the Brazilian contingent because it knows that they are well intentioned* (sic). The people do not expect the military to solve their problems, but they do expect them to help them live with dignity (LESSA, 2007, p. 104, emphasis added).

The speech above exposes a strategic culture of *defensive conformation*, aggregating the following components of national culture: *collaboration, solidarity, otherness, professionalism, trust and respect.*

The participation of each contingent and the experience gained by them were key to the success of the following contingents. By the peculiarity of *imposition of peace*, military participation in MINUSTAH becomes a reference in Brazilian participation in UN missions (LESSA, 2007), that is, read: *offensive modeling* of *strategic culture.*

After all, although there is another understanding of this type of military employment conducted by the UN in Haiti, Dag Hammarskjöld, former UN Secretary General, considered peacekeeping operations in an imaginary

> *Chapter VI and a half"*, a solution to the adoption of measures aimed at *peaceful solution* the controversies and the *application of coercive measures,* however, is a topic that produces many discussions, so there is still no understanding about the meaning and scope of the term "*peacekeeping operation* (FONTOURA, 1999, p. 70-72, emphasis added).

In this sense, it identifies, *a priori,* that the use of Brazilian forces was in the light of the visions of Rosen, Lantis and Howlett: offensive and defensive options.

5 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The participation of the Brazilian state in Haiti, through its Armed Forces, determined, *roughly speaking*, a clipping of its strategic culture, because the use of Forces meets the thinking of Rosen, Lantis and Howlett, given that the state, for the fulfillment of the mission imposed by the UN, decided that the *choice* of use of AF was initially based on a *offensive dynamics* since the situation in Haiti was one of full conflagration between the *gangs* and the population, with the use of weapons of war, therefore, there was a glimpse of fighting between the Brazilian forces and the *gangs* specifically in the first two phases of the mission, from the 3rd phase, peacemaking consolidation, *roughly speaking*, the performance profile was modified, from an offensive style to a defensive option in terms of characterizing the strategic culture, therefore, with the mitigation of fewer military conflicts.

But also the Material Use of Forces represents Booth's thinking, since the elites – political and military - acquiesced to Brazilian participation in the context of Chapter 7 of the UN.

In addition, the following indicators are incorporated into this table: *strategic culture* employed in Haiti: collaboration, solidarity, otherness, flexibility, mobilization capacity, trust and respect in the Brazilian soldier, especially the belief in the leadership of commanders at all levels, in particular the generals, adaptability and initiative capacity of officers, these revealed in the dynamics after the earthquake, intense training, which reveals effective technical preparation and high degree of professionalism, and humanity.

It should be emphasized, moreover, that the participation of the Brazilian forces from the perspective of strategic culture, in the offensive and defensive models, counted on respect for the constitutional principle of the prevalence of human dignity, positive in the main international diplomas, notably in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, of December 10, 1948, and in the Brazilian Federal Charter of 1988, in particular compliance with Article 4, in which the forces were guided by the following principles, among others: prevalence of human rights; defense of peace; peaceful solution of conflicts; and cooperation among peoples for the progress of humanity, in spite of the fact that, however dialectical it may be, the state acted under the magnifying glass, initially, of Chapter 7 of the UN Security Council, however, when weighing the side effects of the use of troops on the population and the fulfillment of the mission delegated by the United Nations, the Haitians approved the *modus operandi* of the Brazilian Strategic Culture on Haitian soil. The attitudes, values, morals, ethics and sentience – the ability of beings to feel sensations and feelings consciously – of the Brazilian military were reflections of the excellent preparation and employment outside its territoriality.

Tour cout, the manifestation of the strategic culture of the Brazilian military forces contributed to put an end to the physical and inhuman aggressions suffered by the Haitian people, in the face of being, metaphorically, imprisoned in a *iron cage*, therefore, it gave them the option of a "rupture of the locks of this iron cage to go out, to burst outside, to aspire and breathe the sense of freedom that fills us when we assume and concretize the need to "squat" the world in which we live" (HERRERA FLORES, 2009, p.209, emphasis added).

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