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As the Graduate Program in Military Science, conducted by the Meira Mattos Institute of the Army Command and General Staff School, the Meira Mattos Collection seeks to build a bridge between academic researchers and military professionals involved in the field of Defense (RAMOS, FRANCHI, 2020). The construction of this space for dialogue presupposes giving a voice to this broad and diverse spectrum of actors (or giving a voice from one side to the other), so that ideas, arguments, research and research results can be presented and debated, being useful for both this epistemic community as well as for bodies and institutions directly involved with matters related to National Defense. Always remembering that "peer-validated scientific communication, constantly evaluated and re-evaluated, transfers credibility and legitimacy of the work performed" (NUNES, 2019. p.viii).

Thus, the professional works published here underwent prior selections and subsequent evaluations by their peers. Furthermore, Military Sciences and knowledge transversal to the use of the armed forces are a global field of study with secular historical roots (PINHEIRO DA CUNHA, MIGON, 2019. p.13). Most countries in the world have organized armed forces that face challenges of all kinds on a daily basis, seeking autonomous or customized solutions to their historical, geographic, geopolitical, economic, social contexts, among others. Knowing the realities in which they are inserted, how other armed forces are structured, prepared and used expands the knowledge of those who research and study Military Sciences. In this sense, the Meira Mattos Collection brings in this edition interlocutors from other countries, encouraged that military personnel from friendly nations contribute articles to this dialogue.

In this context, in the field of Geopolitics, from India, Manmeet Randhawa brings us the theme of border conflict in the article "*River Brahmaputra (Yarlung Tsangpo): a potential point of conflict between India and China*", a relevant topic for regional geopolitics with possibility of worldwide reflexes. Brazilians Marcelo Macedo de Oliveira and Ricardo Moussallem address, respectively, "*Aspects of Brazilian geopolitics in the view of General Meira Mattos*" and the "*South American Defense Council: failure or first step?*", two articles from the perspective of geopolitics that complement each other in their theory and practical application. On the same

path, another Brazilian official, Fabiano Lima de Carvalho, brings a reflection on the management of natural resources, the environment and geopolitics in the text "*Water as a polemological factor*", presenting scenarios and possible conflicts around this vital asset for the humanity.

In the field of Peace and Humanitarian Operations, two experiences presented by soldiers from developing countries: from Mexico, Alejandro M. Posadas Martínez, brings the article "*Evolution of the doctrine of peace operations and its implications for Mexico's foreign policy*"; and, from Nigeria, Jibril Aliyu Haruna Baba, deals with "*Managing Internally Displaced Persons and Strengthening Human Security in North East Nigeria*". Important contributions in the construction of knowledge in this area in which Brazil leads MONUSCO while coordinating the entire Operation Acolhida on the northern Brazilian border.

Complementing this edition, three current subjects with great adherence to Military Sciences dealing with Terrorism, Cybernetics and Leadership, offered by Ricardo Luiz da Cunha Rabelo, Brazilian official, who discusses the definition of terrorism and the current Brazilian legislation, presenting conceptual aspects and gaps necessary for the correct understanding, preparation and confrontation of terrorism. From Guatemala, Aram Albert Jordan Sandoval, in "*How Technology Is Controlling Our Critical Infrastructure, Civilians and Military Working Together to Minimize Cyberattacks*" presents a similar issue faced by Brazil in the construction of its cyber defense apparatus; and, finally, From Spain, Fernando Rocha y Castilla talks about "*Military leadership under stress*"; a subject dear to the military follow-up at all hierarchical levels of any Armed Force and a permanent focus of studies and follow-up. To the reader, the invitation for a good reading and our regards.

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Evolution of the peace operations doctrine and its implications in the foreign policy of Mexico

Evolución de la doctrina de las operaciones de paz y sus implicaciones para la política exterior de México

Abstract: The general objective of this paper is to identify the evolution of the United Nations Peace Operations doctrine and the implications it has had on the foreign policy of Mexico, during the period from 1848 to 2018, analyzing for this purpose the 104 Peace Operations deployed during those 70 years, making a comparative analysis with the foreign policy of the Mexican state developed during that period to determine if that evolution has had anything to do with the participation Mexico's intermittent Peace Operations and with its decision to increase, starting in 2015, the collaboration in pursuit of peace and international security in a determined and conditioned manner (humanitarian aid).

Keywords: United Nations Organization. Peacekeeping Operations. Special Political Missions. Peace Operations. Foreign Policy of Mexico.

Resumen: El objetivo de este artículo es identificar la evolución de la doctrina de las Operaciones de Mantenimiento de la Paz de las Naciones Unidas, y el impacto que han tenido en la política exterior de México, durante el período de 1948 a 2018, buscando ese fin de las 104 Operaciones de Mantenimiento de la Paz llevadas a cabo a lo largo de estos 70 años, haciendo un análisis comparativo de la política exterior del gobierno mexicano desarrollada durante este período con el fin de determinar si este desempeño tuvo algo que ver con la participación de México en las Operaciones de Mantenimiento de la Paz en movimiento y con la decisión del aumento a partir de 2015 la búsqueda de la paz y la seguridad, una decidida e impulsada (ayuda humanitaria).

Palabras-clave: Organización de las Naciones Unidas. Operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz. Misiones Políticas Especiales. Operaciones de paz. Política Exterior de México.

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1 Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to provide an additional point of view to the many exposed on the conditions that have allowed the Mexican state to participate or not in the United Nations Peace Operations, based on the general objective of identifying the evolution of the Peace Operations doctrine and the implications it has had on the foreign policy of Mexico, during the period from 1848 to 2018.

The research development was carried out through the descriptive method, gathering and analyzing diverse documents issued by the United Nations and various sources of consultation related to the foreign policy of the Mexican state, which allowed the elaboration of the document and its analysis to obtain the final conclusions.

The United Nations as depositary and guarantor of international peace and security, through various agencies and in particular of the Security Council, has had, from its creation and up to our times, the important responsibility of taking the necessary actions (from diplomatic to military) so that world stability remains in harmony, avoiding the suffering and serious damage that war brings to human beings.

The analytical and descriptive work starts from the deployment of the first "Peace Operation" in May 1948 for the Monitoring of the Truce in Palestine (UNTSO) to the Mission for the Support of Justice in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) in October 2017, analyzing the different tasks and documents that have driven the doctrine evolution of these operations, taking as a frame of reference the period of 69 years, in which there has been participation of the international community through the United Nations and Regional Peace Operations agencies.

In a first chapter, all the mandates of the 104 Peace Operations that include the Peacekeeping Operations and the Special Political Missions that have been deployed within the indicated period were analyzed, as well as the main documents that have promoted and compiled the doctrine of these operations.

On the other hand, in the second chapter, the foreign policy of the Mexican State was analyzed, from the year 1948 to 2018, orienting this analysis to the participation that Mexico has had in the international agreement of the United Nations, its policy principles and the deployment of personnel in Peacekeeping Operations.

Finally and derived from the information obtained, we conclude on what has been the influence of the doctrinal evolution of the Peace Operations and how determining the guiding principles of foreign policy, the development of international relations and the problems that Mexico has faced during the period have been.

2 ARGUMENT

2.1 Evolution of the United Nations Peace Operations doctrine

2.1.1 *The United Nations (UN)*

The UN is one of the most important international organizations in the world, currently composed of 193 countries out of 194 that make it up - the only exception is the Vatican City, which has the role of observer State (ACNUR, 2017).

It had its origin in The Charter of the United Nations (UNCH) signed on June 26, 1945 in San Francisco, United States of America. The article 1 of the UNCH establishes the purposes of the organization:

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: take effective collective measures to prevent and eliminate threats to peace, and to suppress acts of aggression or other breaches of peace; and to achieve by peaceful means, and in accordance with the principles of justice and international law, the adjustment or settlement of disputes or international situations that may lead to breaches of the peace; to promote friendly relations between nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and the right to self-determination of peoples, and take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace; to carry out international cooperation in the solution of international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian nature, and in the development and encouragement of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction based on race, sex, language or religion; and 4. to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends (UNITED NATIONS, 1945, n.p.).

The Charter of the United Nations is an international treaty through which the UN was founded, it establishes its purposes and principles, its members, its composition, the functions and powers of the 6 main organs that comprise it, as well as the procedures related to the peaceful settlement of disputes (Chapter VI), action in the case of threats to peace, breaches to peace or acts of aggression (Chapter VII), regional agreements (Chapter VIII) and the international regime of fiduciary administration (Chapter XII).

The agencies of the UN that have direct involvement in Peace Operations are the General Assembly, the Secretary General and the Security Council. The aforementioned council is composed of 5 permanent members and 10 non-permanent members, as established in Art. 23 of the UNCH¹. Among its functions and powers are the following:

¹ Permanent: The Republic of China, France, the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America and non-permanent for the period 2016-2018 Bolivia, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Countries Netherlands and Sweden and for the period 2017-2019 Côte de Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Kuwait, Peru and Poland (UNITED NATIONS, [2017]).

In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and recognize that the Security Council acts on their behalf. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII (UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION, 1945, n.p.)

On March 4, 2010, the Secretary General of the UN issued a bulletin in which the organization and functions of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) were updated, assigning it, among others, the following:

Directs, manages and provides political and policy guidance and strategic direction to all operations under its responsibility, which comprise all traditional and multidimensional peacekeeping operations with military and/or police components and which may include elements of peacemaking and peacebuilding, as well as certain special political missions as determined by the Secretary-General (UNITED NATIONS, 2010a).

On the same date, the Department of Field Support (DFS) was established by the Secretary General stipulating, among its organization and functions, the following:

Provide administrative and logistical support services to the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Political Affairs, following the instructions of the Secretary General, through the specific support provided to United Nations peacekeeping operations, special political missions and other presences in the field, hereinafter referred to as "field operations" (UNITED NATIONS, 2010a).

The Department of Political Affairs was established in 1992 under the direction of the Secretary General's office, with the functions of:

Strengthen United Nations peace-building efforts, observe global political events and advise the Secretary-General of the United Nations on issues of crisis prevention and management; It also provides support to the numerous envoys of the Secretary-General who participate in peace talks or crisis diplomacy work, and at the same time oversees the political missions of the United Nations on the ground, which are mandated to assist nations and regions to resolve their conflicts and tensions peacefully (UNITED NATIONS, 2014).

As can be seen, in the agencies described above manage all the activities aimed at the conception, planning, execution, supervision, control and logistical and administrative support of the Peace Operations, and it is through these that the rest of the structures of the UN and the contributing countries coordinate everything related to them.

2.2 Definition of Peace Operations

Peace operations can be defined as the totality of tools available to the United Nations to fulfill its fundamental purpose of ensuring international peace and security.

The Capstone Doctrine (2008), describes the main operations as follows:

Conflict prevention. Implies the application of structural or diplomatic measures to prevent intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from turning into violent conflicts.

Establishment of peace. Includes measures to address ongoing conflicts and generally involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated settlement.

Peacekeeping. It is a technique designed to preserve peace, however fragile, where the struggle has been stopped and to help implement the agreements reached by the peacekeepers.

Peace enforcement. It implies the application, with the authorization of the Security Council, of a series of coercive measures, including the use of military force.

Peace consolidation. It implies a series of measures aimed at reducing the risk of falling or relapsing into conflicts by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and laying the foundations for sustainable peace and development (UNITED NATIONS, 2008, p.17-18).

There are also special political missions that are defined as:

Political missions that participate in the work of prevention, establishment of peace and consolidation of peace after conflicts; These field operations, led by senior representatives of the Secretary General, provide an advanced platform for preventive diplomacy and other activities from a wide range of disciplines, with the aim of helping to avoid and resolve conflicts and support complex political transitions, in coordination with national actors and United Nations development and humanitarian agencies in the field (UNITED NATIONS, 2015)

For the foregoing, it is considered that "Peace Operations" is the most accurate and appropriate term to describe the global category of all types of operations operated

by the United Nations and regional organizations and that "Peacekeeping Operations"² refer only to a subcategory of such operations that now constitute a very small part of the general activities and, therefore, it is not a precise term for the general activities, since it does not include peace enforcement and peace consolidation (KENKEL, 2013), in addition to the fact that in these activities the Special Political Missions, so important in recent times, have not been considered.

2.3 Evolution of Peace Operations

The evolution of peace operations analyzed here was developed by grouping it into three periods, covering the first from its creation in 1948 until the end of the cold war in 1990; the second from 1991 until 1999, and a third group from the year 2000 until 2017, year of the deployment of the last peace mission.

Since the deployment of the first peace operation (Peacekeeping) on May 9, 1948 called the Commission for the supervision of the truce in Palestine (UNTSO) to that deployed in Central America on November 7, 1989, the UN deployed a total of 18 operations of the so-called traditional, mostly composed of military personnel (observers and small contingents), under chapter VI of the UNCH (Pacific Dispute Settlement), in strict adherence to the basic principles of action³ of this type of operations and once there was a peace or ceasefire agreement between the Nation States in conflict, so that the area deployed for United Nations personnel was to some extent safe. The classic tasks that they developed were the following:

- Observation, monitoring and reporting: using static publications, patrols, overflights or other technical means, with the agreement of the parties (UNITED NATIONS, 2008, p. 21);
- Supervision of Cease-fire and support for verification mechanisms (UNITED NATIONS, 2008, p. 21);
- Interposition as a buffer and confidence-building measure (UNITED NATIONS, 2008, p. 21).

During this period the Nation State had a preponderance over any other aspect as a subject of international law, however, derived from the changes in the global environment and the conflicts that arose, the United Nations evolved and adapted itself to the new challenges by deploying peace with certain particularities, as follows:

1. First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) Established in the Suez Canal, Egypt on Nov. 5, 1956, in order to supervise the cessation of hostilities, including the with-

2 "Peacekeeping operations" are defined by the UN as an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers (managed powers), managed by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security, while they are being treated of achieving lasting political solutions (TREJO GARCÍA; ALVAREZ ROMERO, 2007).

3 The basic principles of this type of operation are: the consent of the host nation, impartiality between the factions in conflict and the non-use of force by the United Nations troops (KENKEL, 2013).

drawal of armed forces from France, Israel and the United Kingdom from the Egyptian territory and, upon completion of the withdrawal, serve as a buffer zone between the Egyptian forces and the Israeli forces (UNITED NATIONS, 2003a).

2. **United Nations Temporary Executive Authority** (UNSF) It was established on Oct. 3, 1962 to maintain peace and security in the territory that was constituted in an agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands (UNITED NATIONS, 2003b).

3. The United Nations **Transitional** Assistance Group (UNTAG) was established on Apr. 1, 1989 to assist the **Special Representative of the Secretary-General** in ensuring the early independence of Namibia from free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations.

In the three operations mentioned above, the evolution of the doctrine of peace operations is shown, since to perform basically observation tasks, they assumed increasingly active tasks in the states in which they were deployed, always respecting the right to self-determination of each one of them.

Of the operations indicated (18), five of them remain deployed to date⁴.

The second study period began with the deployment of the Peacekeeping Operation on April 9, 1991 for the observation of a demilitarized zone on the border between Iraq and Kuwait (UNIKOM) and until the deployment of the Operation of Maintenance of the Peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) on November 30, 1999, during this period (9 years) the United Nations deployed a total of 42 peace operations (35 Peacekeeping and 7 Special Political Missions), characterizing this period for the attention of conflicts of internal character with greater preponderance than those of interstate nature, forcing the UN to make more flexible and adapt operations, becoming **Complex or Multidimensional Peace Operations**, ceasing to be purely military operations to integrate police personnel and civilians of various specialties in the missions. The framework of its action was based on the same principles of traditional operations (Chapter VI) and the deployment of operations with increasing frequency of operations under Chapters VII and VIII of the Charter of the United Nations began. These operations were carried out most of the time in an environment of violence, without the parties having reached a peace agreement. The basic functions of a multidimensional peacekeeping operation of the United Nations were:

To create a safe and stable environment while strengthening the capacity of the State to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights;

1. To facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective government institutions;
2. To provide a framework to ensure that all actors of the United Nations and other international actors develop their activities at the national level in a coherent and coordinated manner (UNITED NATIONS, 2008).

⁴ UNTSO (Palestine) since May 28, 1948, UNMOGIP (India-Pakistan) since January 24, 1949, UNICYP (Greece-Turkey) since March 4, 1964, UNDOF (Israel-Syria) from the 31st of May 1974 and UNIFIL (Lebanon) since March 19, 1978.

During this period, humanitarian assistance and protection of human rights became more important and the tasks to be developed were multiplied as follows: Monitoring of the ceasefire, ensuring the implementation of agreements, maintenance of law and order, repatriation of refugees, supervision of the demilitarization of areas, measures of chapter VII of the UN Charter, border monitoring, best practices, demobilization of combatants, humanitarian demining activities, organization and training of police forces, organization and supervision of electoral processes, reform of the legal and penitentiary system, professionalization of the armed forces, restoration of peace and national reconciliation, economic rehabilitation, establishment of transitional authorities, aid for the consolidation of peace, democratic stability, rehabilitation of infrastructure and rehabilitation of the country.

The peace operations in which the evolution in the tasks can be observed in a specific way and that therefore also generated a change in their doctrine are the following:

1. The United Nations Observer Mission deployed in the Republic of El Salvador on May 20, 1991 (ONUSAL), was **the first multidimensional peacekeeping operation** in which police and civil activities were established for the first time, and in particular concerning the **protection and promotion of human rights**.

2. The United Nations Protection Force deployed in Croatia on February 21, 1992 (UNPROFOR), is the **first mission involving regional organizations under the leadership of the UN** (European Community Monitoring Mission (EOM) and the Organization of the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) and also, the **first operation in which operations are authorized under Chapter VII** and the task of **protecting Humanitarian Aid also appears for the first time**.

3. The United Nations Observer Mission established in Angola on June 30, 1997 (MONUA), is the first operation in which a mandate to **assist in the consolidation of peace** was issued.

4. **The United Nations Interim Administration Mission** deployed in Kosovo on June 10, 1999 (UNMIK), becomes the first operation of its kind.

5. **The Transitional Administration Mission** deployed to East Timor on October 25, 1999 (UNTAET), is the first peace mission of its kind.

6. Seven special political missions are deployed for the first time in the countries of Angola, Burundi, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Somalia, Papua Guinea and Timor Leste.

During this period there were violent situations that exceeded the capacity of the deployed troops and would force a rethinking of the material resources placed at their disposal and the military restrictions for the fulfillment of their mandates:

The "**three great**" failures of peacekeeping in the 1990s include the lack of prevention or limiting the **Rwandan** genocide in 1994; its inefficiency in achieving political agreement, together with relatively strong military losses, in **Somalia**; and his failure to protect civilians and herself in **Bosnia**, symbolized by the 1995 Srebrenica massacre (KENKEL, 2013, p. 129, emphasis added).

The events that took place during these three operations urged the UN and the member countries to analyze and generate doctrine to prevent their recurrence. Of the operations of this period (42), only two continue to be deployed⁵.

The third period of study is between the years 2000 and 2017, in which the UN deployed a total of 43 missions (18 multidimensional Peacekeeping and 25 Special Political Missions). Peacekeeping operations are characterized by being deployed mostly under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to address intra-state conflicts of a political/religious/tribal nature and for having the protection of civilians as the highest priority in recent times and deployed under a more ambitious mandate under the figures of Consolidation and Stabilization of Peace.

Some characteristic missions of this period in which the evolution of the doctrine of operations can be appreciated are the following:

1. The United Nations Mission deployed in Liberia on 19 September 2006 (UNMIL) specifies for the first time a **mandate to protect United Nations personnel, services, facilities and equipment and to protect the population civilian who is under imminent threat of physical violence** (UNITED NATIONS, 2003c).

2. The **Hybrid Operation between the African Union and the UN** established in Darfur on July 31, 2007 (UNAMID), becomes the first operation of its kind.

3. The **UN Stabilization Mission** deployed in the Republic of the Congo on July 1, 2010 (MONUSCO). It is the first of its kind and the first that specifically establishes the protection of civilians as a priority in its mandate.

4. The **UN Multidimensional Integral Stabilization Mission** established in Mali on April 25, 2013 (MINUSMA), is the first of its kind.

Of the 43 operations of this period, 17 are still deployed, of which 7 correspond to Peacekeeping Missions⁶ and 10 to Special Political Missions⁷.

Although peace operations began in 1948, it was not until the beginning of the nineties (four decades later) and as a result of the new threats to international peace and security that studies began to be generated, reports and recommendations to make these operations more efficient, adapting them to the new tasks to be developed. The following is a chronological description of the most important documents generated by the UN in which proposals for improvements and initiatives that have generated the evolution of doctrine:

The Secretary General's Report on the work of the organization, "A PEACE PROGRAM" (Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping), June 17, 1992, presents an overview of the situation of the post-cold-war world scenario and makes an analysis and recommendations to strengthen the capacities of the UN; Defines the terms of Preventive Diplomacy, Establishment of

5 MINURSO (Western Sahara) since April 29, 1991 and UNMIK (Kosovo) since June 10, 1999.

6 UNAMID (Darfur) since July 31, 2007, MONUSCO (Republic of the Congo) since July 1, 2010, UNISFA (Abyei) from June 27, 2011, UNMISS (South Sudan) from July 9, 2011, MINUSMA (Mali) from April 25, 2013, MINUSCA (Central African Republic) from the April 10, 2015 and MINUSJUSTH (Haiti) from October 16, 2017.

7 UNSMIL (Libya), Sep. 6, 2011; UNAMA (Afghanistan), Mar. 28, 2002; UNSOM (Somalia), Jun. 3, 2013; UNOWAS (West Africa), Jan. 28, 2006; UNIOGBIS (Guinea Bissau), Feb. 23, 2017; UNAMI (Iraq), Aug. 14, 2003; UNOCA (Central Africa), Mar. 2, 2011; United Nations verification mission in Colombia, January 25, 2016; UNRCCA (Central Asia), May 16, 2007 and UNSCOL (Lebanon), Jul. 20, 2000.

peace, Maintenance of peace and for the first time cites related to the Consolidation of peace; It proposes the action of a preventive deployment and the creation of demilitarized zones prior to the start of hostilities, the creation of so-called peace protection units and indicates the need for greater commitment of the member states to provide military personnel, police and civilian, as well as adequate logistical means for peacekeeping operations; Likewise, it highlights the security of UN personnel and makes a series of recommendations to solve the financial problem faced by these operations (UNITED NATIONS, 1992).

The Supplement to "An Agenda for Peace": Position Paper of the Secretary General submitted on the occasion of the 50th. anniversary of the UN, January 3, 1995, establishes that qualitative changes in operations are more important than quantitative changes, describing these changes as the operational change faced by UN contingents as of the end of the Cold War when attending interstate affairs in which civilians are the main victims; the use of United Nations force to protect humanitarian operations and operations with negotiated agreements in which, in addition to military issues, a wide range of civil issues was resolved.

A series of measures are proposed to improve the tools of preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and peacebuilding; It also establishes some criteria on disarmament, sanctions and the power of the UN to carry out coercive actions and finally makes some recommendations regarding financial resources (UNITED NATIONS, 1995).

In the recommendations of the High Level Group on United Nations Operations (Lakhdar Brahimi), August 17, 2000, it is addressed that in the last decade (1990-2000) the UN have not lived up to the challenges and indicates that the key to success lies in political support, rapid deployment with a clear demonstration of strength and a good peacebuilding strategy. The report makes a series of recommendations regarding conflict prevention measures, peacebuilding strategy, peacekeeping theory and strategy, clear, convincing and viable mandates, information and strategic analysis, determination of deployment deadlines, military personnel, civilian police personnel, civil experts, rapid deployment capacity, logistic support and expense management. It also proposes some structural adjustments in the department of peacekeeping operations (BRAHIMI, 2000).

In the report of the high-level group on threats, challenges and change "A safer world: The responsibility we share" (Anand Panyarachun), December 2, 2004, an initial analysis is made of six groups of threats in the new century, as follows: Economic and social threats, such as poverty, infectious diseases and environmental degradation; The conflicts between States; Internal conflicts, such as civil war, genocide and other large-scale atrocities; Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons; terrorism and transnational organized crime. It deals in a particular way with each one of these threats proposing a series of measures from the point of view of prevention to face each of them; Address the role of sanctions; the use of force; the ability to impose peace; the consolidation of peace after a conflict and the protection of civilians, among others (UNITED NATIONS, 2004).

In the final document of the 2005 World Summit, the member states committed themselves to continue finding ways to implement the results of the Millennium Summit and to provide multilateral solutions to the problems of the following four areas: Development

(Special attention to equality among gender and the empowerment of women); Peace and collective security (peaceful settlement of disputes, use of force, Terrorism, maintenance and consolidation of peace, sanctions, transnational crime); Human rights and the rule of law (displaced persons, refugees, democracy, responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, as well as the rights of children. the UN (Establishment of a peacebuilding commission) (UNITED NATIONS, 2005).

The Publication of the Maintenance of Peace of the UN principles and guidelines "CAPSTONE DOCTRINE", January 18, 2008 is a doctrinal document on Peacekeeping Operations that consists of three chapters: In the first chapter we discuss what is related to the evolution of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, in the second it deals with its planning and in a third it talks about the art of executing the successful mandate; As the name implies, they contain a series of guidelines that allow us to know, understand and apply this type of operations (UNITED NATIONS, 2008).

The document called A new horizon was prepared by DPKO and DFS in 2009 and presents a guide on the development and evolution of Peacekeeping Operations during the period from 2000 to 2008, with a projection to the year 2010; It is a document that invites UN agencies and member countries to consider on what has been achieved and what needs to be done in relation to the proposals made in the Brahimi Report. It establishes 30 recommendations on which it intends to work to achieve unity of purpose, unity in action and unity for the future (UNITED NATIONS, 2009).

The report of the High Level Independent Group on Peace Operations: Combining our advantages in favor of peace - politics, alliances and persons dated June 16, 2015 establishes that, despite the great advances in operations, chronic difficulties persisted, so they made a series of proposals to improve them in the future, such as: Give priority to political solutions that go beyond military actions, prepare customized peace missions by making flexible use of the wide range of activities that are part of the peace operations and regulate the participation of regional organizations, among others (UNITED NATIONS, 2015).

2.4 Foreign policy of Mexico in relation to UN peace operations

2.4.1 Foreign policy principles

The foreign policy of Mexico is based on the normative principles established in Article 89, section X of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States, which establishes as faculty and exclusive obligation of the President of the Republic:

Direct foreign policy and celebrate international treaties, as well as terminate, denounce, suspend, modify, amend, withdraw reservations and make interpretative declarations about them, subjecting them to the approval of the Senate. In the conduct of such policy, the holder of the Executive Power will observe the following normative

principles: the self-determination of the peoples; the nonintervention; the peaceful settlement of disputes; the proscription of the threat or use of force in international relations; the legal equality of States; international cooperation for development; respect, protection and promotion of human rights and the fight for international peace and security (MÉXICO, 2018b, our translation).

These normative principles are the product of the historical evolution of the country and are the tool that various presidents of Mexico have invoked throughout history not to be an active part of the peace operations of the UN.

2.4.2 Secretariat of Foreign Affairs

For the fulfillment of the powers and obligations indicated for the Executive, this is supported by the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, to which corresponds according to Article 28 of the Federal Public Administration Law, to dispatch among other matters, the following:

To promote and ensure the coordination of actions outside the agencies and entities of the Federal Public Administration; and without affecting the exercise of the attributions that correspond to each of them, to conduct foreign policy, for which it will intervene in all kinds of treaties, agreements and conventions in which the country is a party; To intervene in relation to commissions, congresses, conferences and international exhibitions, and to participate in international organizations and institutes of which the Mexican Government is a part of [...] (MÉXICO, 2018a, our translation).

In this regard, several authors maintain that the foreign policy of the Mexican State does not obey a national public policy but is guided solely and exclusively by the decisions of the group in power.

2.5 Participation of Mexico in the United Nations and UN Peace Operations

Mexico, being one of the 51 founding countries of the Organization (signed its accession on November 7, 1945), has maintained a participation within the organization, in favor of international peace and security, highlighting those related to:

The peaceful solution of disputes; The fight against the Apartheid; The promotion of disarmament, in particular with the Treaty of Tlatelolco that established the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated area; The adoption of the Charter of Duties and Economic Rights; The promotion of the Extraordinary Period on Drugs, the elaboration of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Families, United Nations Conferences

held in Mexico; He has assumed the presidency of the General Assembly on one occasion and the vice president on 8 occasions, has participated in various periods in the Operations; He has been a non-permanent member of the security council on three occasions and since 1947 recognizes the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice [...] (MÉXICO, 2016, n. p., our translation).

The foreign policy of Mexico from the year 1945 to the present day has been characterized by the considerations described in the following paragraphs.

During the period from 1946 to 1969 (Miguel Alemán Valdés) "Mexican diplomacy begins to play a more important role in the face of the new world demands of the post-war period. In the post-war period, the kind of diplomacy known as multilateral or mechanisms of agreement begins to have relevance in the context of Mexico's foreign policy" (RAMÍREZ VASQUEZ, 2001), proof of this is the intense participation of Mexico in the United Nations during the aforementioned period, highlighting that:

He was president of the Sixth General Assembly in 1951; occupied the Vice Presidency of said assembly in the 2nd. and 3rd sessions (1945 and 147 respectively); He was a non-permanent member of the Security Council in 1946; he was part of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1950-1952; participated as a judge from 1946 to 1952 in the International Court of Justice and participated in the United Nations Military Observer Group in Kashmir (UNMOGIP) in 1949 with 4 Field and 2 Company Grade Officers of the Army and Air Force and in the Commission of UN Research in the Balkans (ONUSB) from 1947 to 1950 with a General, two Field Grade and one Company Grade Officer of the Army and Air Force (MÉXICO, 2016, n.p., emphasis added, our translation).

During the 18 years of Adolfo Ruiz Cortines (1952-1958) to Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964-1970),

to respond to the needs of a closed economic model, Mexican foreign policy maintained a relative passivity based on its traditional principles. Then, Mexico assumed a nationalist, legalistic and isolationist attitude to counteract the power of the United States and avoid possible interference in its internal affairs [...] (VELÁZQUEZ FLORES, 2007, our translation).

However, Mexico continued to participate in various forums of the United Nations, highlighting during this period that

[...] he was vice president of the General Assembly at the 8th and 16th sessions in the years 1953, 1961, respectively; he held the chair of the Economic and Social

Council (ECOSOC) in 1959 and participated as a judge in the periods 1955-1964 and 1964-1973 in the International Court of Justice (MÉXICO, 2016, n.p., emphasis added, our translation).

During the period of Luis Echeverría Álvarez (1970-1976) to José López Portillo (1976-1982), since 1970, international conditions changed significantly "giving a turn to foreign policy towards a more active performance taking as a central principle the ideological pluralism" (VELÁZQUEZ FLORES, 2007). The participation of Mexico in United Nations during this period was characterized by actively continuing since "he occupied the vice presidency of the General Assembly in the 29th and 36th sessions in 1974 and 1981, respectively; He was a non-permanent member of the Security Council from 1980 to 1981 and was a member of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) for the periods 1974-1976, 1977-79 and 1980-1982" (MÉXICO, 2016).

During the period of Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado (1982-1988) to Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León (1994-2000), Mexico faced recurrent economic crises and internal political problems. At the economic level, it began with the neoliberal model and at the political level, Mexican diplomacy intensified multilateralism to counteract dependence on the United States, strengthening its relations with Latin America. It is during this period (1987) that the guiding principles of foreign policy were raised to constitutional rank; during this period, the objectives of this policy were established to preserve national sovereignty and defend world peace, among others. Mexico participated in the organization of the United Nations:

Forming part of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in the periods 1983 - 1985, 1990-1992 and 1993-1995; participated as an ad hoc member in the International Court of Justice from 1982 to 1984; Participated in the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) from February 1992 to March 1993, with 120 police officers and in the Electoral Assistance in Timor Leste in 1999 and in Haiti in 2004; and assumed the vice presidency of the General Assembly in 52nd session in 1997 (MÉXICO, 2016, n.p., emphasis added, our translation).

Thanks to the arrival of a more democratic system with the coming to power of Vicente Fox Quezada (2000-2006), "Mexico almost immediately gained an increase in its capacity for international negotiation" (VELÁZQUEZ FLORES, 2007); In the National Development Plan, five foreign policy interests were established, including the one of "actively participating in the creation of an international system that promotes stability and cooperation, on the basis of international law, and that provides us with space for political and diplomatic action with other nations or regions" (VELÁZQUEZ FLORES, 2007). During this period, Mexico participated in United Nations "as an ad hoc member in the International Court of Justice in 2004; assumed the pre-

sidency in 58th session of the General Assembly in 2003 and formed part of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) for the periods 2000-2002 and 2005-2007" (MÉXICO, 2016).

During the period of Felipe Calderón Hinojosa (2006-2012) it was established in the National Development Plan 2007-2012 in its "Public Policy Democracy and Responsible Foreign Policy Axis" that the membership of Mexico in numerous forums and international organizations would offer conditions propitious to increase their participation in the construction of the new world order, that in order to resume international leadership, Mexico should be able to build solid and respectful relations with all nations, especially those of Latin America, with the objective of contributing to the efforts of the international community to extend the validity of democratic values and principles, fundamental freedoms and human rights, as well as sustainable development" (MÉXICO, 2007).

However, during the Calderón administration, the priority was the war against the drug cartels; therefore, other areas of political activity were relegated to secondary levels. This had an impact on Mexican foreign policy, whose design was not protagonist, since domestic politics had greater importance. "It deployed to Latin America a foreign policy of a personal nature, which would be called presidential diplomacy" (RODRIGUEZ AÑUEZ; PRADO LALLANDE, 2015). During these six years, Mexico participated in the United Nations "[...] as judge in the International Court of Justice in the period from 2006 to 2014" (MÉXICO, 2016, our translation); Was a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the period from 2009 to 2010 and he organized the United Nations Conference on Climate Change that was held in Cancun, Mexico on November 29 to December 10, 2010 and the meeting of the 7th Summit of the G- 20 that took place in Los Cabos, Baja California Sur, Mexico, from June 18 to 19, 2012, among others. "Calderón rejected the participation of Mexico in UN Peace Missions since the attention of his government focused on the internal situation and the fight against drug trafficking" (ARGÜELLES ARREDONDO, 2014, our translation).

Between 2012 and 2018, Enrique Peña Nieto headed Mexico, who in his fifth goal of the National Development Plan 2013 - 2018 "Mexico with global responsibility" established, among others, the following strategies:

[...] 6. To consolidate the role of Mexico as a responsible, active and committed actor in the multilateral sphere, promoting in a priority manner strategic issues of global benefit and compatible with national interests; 7. To promote a vigorous international cooperation policy that contributes both to the development of Mexico and to the development and stability of other countries, as an essential element of Mexico's role as a responsible global actor (MÉXICO, 2013, n. p., our translation).

2.6 Restarting Mexico's participation in Peacekeeping Operations

During 69th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization, the president of the republic presented, among other topics, the one related to Peacekeeping Operations, as follows:

Mexico values and supports the work of Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), as it is the instrument of the United Nations to provide direct support to countries that live or have come out of conflicts, and to help create the conditions for a lasting peace through reconstruction, humanitarian assistance and security. Mexico announced that it resumes its participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations, in which it has not been present since 1992. This new participation will be gradual, both in the number of personnel and missions and will pay special attention to situations of a humanitarian nature. For this, the Mexican participation will be conditioned to the existence of a cessation of hostilities framework, a clear mandate of the Security Council and the explicit acceptance of the State receiving the operation. The Mexican participation will be attached to the normative principles of the foreign policy of Mexico, and to the applicable constitutional framework (MÉXICO, 2014, p. 6-7, our translation).

As a result of the foregoing, several actions were implemented in the framework of Mexico's participation in Peacekeeping Operations, as will be explained below:

1. The contribution of personnel to the missions from April 2015 to October 2018, as follows: "50 field and company grade officers of the Army and Air Force in Haiti, Lebanon, Western Sahara, Mali and in Colombia in the special mission of the UN (4 of them military women). On January 12, 2018, the first military woman deployed in Peacekeeping Operations in the Western Sahara mission" (BIENVENIDA..., 2018, n. p., , our translation); "27 captains and junior officers of the Mexican Navy in the missions of Haiti, Lebanon, Western Sahara, Mali and in Colombia in the special mission of the UN" (BIENVENIDA..., 2018, n.p., our translation) and "A non-commissioned officer of the Federal Police was deployed in the United Nations Mission in Support of Justice in Haiti. (First participation since our country rejoined the peace operations in 2015" (REPÚBLICA DOMINICANA, [2018]).

2. Participation for the first time in history in the military parade commemorating the 208th anniversary of the independence of the country on September 16, 2018, in which the Armed Forces presented to the people of Mexico a representation of the personnel that has participated in UN Peacekeeping Operations.

3. The inauguration of the Joint Training Center for Peace Operations of Mexico (CECOPAM) on October 1, 2018, in which General Salvador Cienfuegos Zepeda, Secretary of National Defense stated that the Center:

Teaches in the first phase, the courses for United Nations Staff Officers and Military Mission Experts, and in a second phase, the courses for contingents, policemen, for civilians working in unstable environments and civil - military relations in the environment of the United Nations. That the implementation of this subject aims to train Mexican military, police and civilian personnel, and eventually foreign personnel, to perform efficiently in Peacekeeping Operations, to train units and circumstantial agencies of the Mexican Armed Forces, to generate doctrine for peace operations for the Armed Forces, within the scope of their competence; Maintains liaison with other similar institutions, within regional and multinational mechanisms for the exchange of experiences, good practices and lessons learned; and finally advises

the different branches, services and bodies of the Mexican Armed Forces on the inclusion of topics related to Peacekeeping Operations in their respective training programs (BIENVENIDA..., 2018, n.p., our translation).

It should be noted that Mexico is among the first contributors, since it occupies the 10th place in the regular budget of the UN with a pro-rata quota of 2.257 percent and is listed as the 23rd contributor to the budget of Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) with a share of 0.4515 percent. Mexico is the main contributor from Latin America and the Caribbean (MÉXICO, 2016).

Regarding its participation in humanitarian aid activities, Mexico has supported the international community through the organizations that are part of the UN as well as unilaterally through the deployment of its Armed Forces and other agencies of the federal public administration, highlighting the support in the following catastrophes: "earthquakes in Haiti and Chile in 2010. In the tsunamis of Indonesia in 2004 and Japan 2011, in Hurricane Katrina in the United States in 2005, in Hurricane Mitch in Central America in 1998, in the Ecuador earthquake in 2017, as well as in the forest fire in Nicaragua, in April 2018" (PELCASTRE, 2018). In addition to the previously stated support activities, through the Mexican Agency for International Development Cooperation (AMEXCID), humanitarian aid actions have been coordinated to various parts of the world with financial, material and Federal Government Dependencies and Federal Commission resources, like Electricity and the National Forestry Commission, among others (MÉXICO, 2017).

3 CONCLUSION

The UN Peace Operations initiated the development and evolution of its doctrine from the moment in which the first Peacekeeping operation was deployed in the year 1948, derived from the lessons learned and from the experiences lived during the development of the different tasks stipulated in the mandates and of all those experiences and observations made by the troops deployed in the field.

During the period from 1948 to 1990, the development of the doctrine was limited, since the places where Peace Operations were deployed were to attend interstate conflicts, in accordance with Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations and in strict adherence to the basic principles of action, with the participation of personnel and military units and the incipient activity of some civilians interacting under the rules of the military commander. In this period, deployments are made to protect nation states as a whole.

It is until the nineties that peace operations experience a faster evolution associated with the diversity of tasks that were added to address in a timely manner the growing need for deployment oriented mostly to address the problems generated by the intra-state conflicts of a political/religious/tribal nature in increasingly dangerous environments and many times without the consent of any of the parties; during the second half of this period, the

participation of police and civil personnel increases and the Special Political Missions appears to deal with conflicts in an integrated manner; a turning point in these operations were the experiences lived in Somalia, Rwanda and Kosovo, a situation that forced the United Nations to study and adapt the doctrine of operations to avoid the atrocities that took place in those countries. The deployment of operations begins under the figure of chapters VII and VIII of the Charter of the United Nations and the respect and promotion of human rights begins to be given greater importance.

From the year 2000 and up to date, the deployment of operations has continued with the attention of conflicts of interstate nature in its majority and as product of its doctrinal evolution are deployed with specific mandates in accordance with the existing problem, mostly under the figure of the chapters VII and VIII, predominating the Special Political Missions linked to the Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations. In this period, the protection of civilians, humanitarian aid activities and the participation of women in this type of operations are particularly important.

In order to compile the doctrinal evolution of the operations, starting in 1992, we begin with the presentation of reports and various studies in which a series of measures are proposed to improve its performance, with particular relevance being the so-called "A program for peace" presented by the Secretary General in 1992 and the so-called "Brahimi report" prepared in 2000, for presenting these documents a general outline of the situation in which the Peacekeeping Operations were at the end of the Cold War and at the beginning of the present century, respectively; Establishing in both reports a series of proposals tending to solve the problems presented by the aforementioned operations in their different spheres of action.

During the first years of life of the UN, the Mexican government participated in a preponderant manner in various forums of the organization, particularly during the administration of President Miguel Alemán Valdés (1946-1952), in which military observers were sent to the first Peacekeeping Missions deployed in the Balkans between 1947 and 1950 and in Kashmir in 1949. After the aforementioned period, Mexico demonstrated its pacifist vocation and in strict adherence to its guiding principles of foreign policy, especially that of non-intervention, actively participate with the deployment of personnel from 1950 and until 1992 (42 years), in which, as president, Carlos Salinas de Gortari ordered the participation of 120 policemen in the operation deployed in the Republic of El Salvador. Other participations were Timor Leste in 1999, being President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León and in Haiti in 2004 under the presidency of Vicente Fox Quezada, in electoral assistance activities with civil personnel of the Federal Electoral Institute.

The statement made by Mr. Enrique Peña Nieto, President of Mexico on September 24, 2014, during the 69th session of the General Assembly, regarding the resumption of participation in Peacekeeping Operations, sets a precedent in the history of the foreign relations of the Mexican state, and reaffirms its commitment to international peace and security. In the aforementioned statement, the President of Mexico established the conditions for such participation: It will be done gradually, paying special attention to situations of a humanitarian nature, the existence of a cessation of hostilities, the existence of a clear mandate and the express acceptance of the receiving state. As of October 2018, 78 elements have been deployed (77 from the Armed Forces and one from the Federal Police), of which 11 were women.

Derived from the foregoing, it can be concluded that the evolution of the UN Peace Operations since its creation and until 2018, has not been decisive for the participation of the Mexican state in this type of operations, since this decision has obeyed domestic situations and based on the judgment of the power group in turn. In the concept that such participation has always been in accordance with the guiding principles of Mexico's foreign policy (Non-intervention), in addition to the fact that at present the country's capacities are being sought through the deployment of humanitarian aid activities, a branch in which that the Mexican Armed Forces and other agencies of the public administration have had an outstanding participation in different parts of the world.

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River Brahmaputra (Yarlung Tsangpo): a potential flashpoint between India & China

River Brahmaputra (Yarlung Tsangpo): Un potencial punto de conflicto entre India y China

Abstract: China and India are the two most populated countries on earth siting astride the Great Himalayas. Also, they are the fastest growing economies and hence extremely resource hungry. Energy and water being the key resources to guarantee sustained economic growth, both countries are developing diplomatic and military capacities to have secure access to these resources. Recently, both the powers have shown unprecedented political assertiveness and resource aggressiveness on the issue related to water sharing of an important Himalayan river, namely, Brahmaputra. This seemingly conventional political issue is essentially interlinked to complex existential concerns like water security for burgeoning population and industry, food security and sustained economic growth for both the countries. This paper aims at examining the stated water sharing dispute between India and China with a view to ascertain the likelihood of it becoming a flashpoint for an all-out military conflict between the two Asian giants.

Keywords: Water Security. Water Wars. Water Diplomacy. Behavior of Riparian States.

Resumen: China e India son los dos países más poblados del planeta, situados en el Gran Himalaya. Además, son dos países con las economías de crecimiento más rápido y, por tanto, con extrema necesidad de recursos. Siendo la energía y el agua los principales recursos para garantizar el crecimiento económico, los dos países están desarrollando capacidades diplomáticas y militares para tener acceso a esos recursos. La cuestión relacionada al agua es más regional e implica conflicto de intereses con países vecinos. Recientemente, ambos fueron asertivos políticamente y agresivos al mismo tiempo con recursos sin precedentes en la cuestión de compartir el agua de un importante río del Himalaya, el Brahmaputra. Este artículo tiene como objetivo examinar la disputa declarada de compartir el agua entre India y China, con el objetivo de verificar la probabilidad de volverse un punto crítico para un conflicto militar total entre los dos gigantes asiáticos.

Palabras-clave: Seguridad hídrica. Guerras por agua. Diplomacia del agua. Comportamiento de los Estados Ribereños.

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“Water security for us is a matter of economic security, human security, and national security, because we see potential for increasing unrest, conflicts and instability over water.”

Hillary Clinton (U.S. Secretary of State, March 22 2011, World Water Day)

1 Introduction

India and China are two ancient civilizations connected in time but distanced in almost every other aspect. What has insulated the two civilizations is not any traditional animosity but impregnability of the mighty Himalayas. These vast mountains were also the traditionally accepted frontiers between the two nations with its resources peacefully shared by the local population on either side. This concept of ‘frontiers’ was neither common nor well understood by the Western colonial powers, who tempered with these proven boundary arrangements and left a legacy of conflict between nation states by delineating borders without balancing geographical realities to social actualities. Consequently, in spite of a bloody war in 1962 and several local military conflicts and standoffs, the issues of boundary and disagreement on sharing of water resources nestled in the Himalayas continue to hyphenate the Sino-India relationship even after seven decades of Independence. Sino-Indian relations have become further complex in the last few years. In spite of consistently increasing bilateral trade, relations continue to be strained due to environment of mutual suspicion, economic competition and border disputes. It has been widely noted by political scientists that the coexistence of India and China in the international state system is highly unusual in that they both aspire to superpower status and share a border. Both sides have attempted to repair their relationship with various confidence-building measures (CBMs) like reciprocal state visits, signing of various bilateral agreements, joint military exercises, and strengthening of bilateral trade. However, these CBMs have been undermined by intermittent crises which flare up over the historical disputes. The most recent and important is the anxiety stirring up between the two countries over the critical issue of alleged Chinese diversion of rivers flowing into India.

China with a population of 1.3 billion is one of the driest nations in the world and is extremely water thirsty. Challenged with acute shortage and disproportioned and inverse distribution of water resources within its boundaries, diversion of existing waters, rejuvenation of existing river systems and control over new fresh water sources is a compulsion for China. India on the other hand accounts for about 17% of the world’s population but only 4% of the world fresh water resources (POPULATION, 2018c). Distribution of these water resources across the vast expanse of the country is also uneven. Continued population growth is putting enormous pressure on its water resources. With no proportional increase in availability and an ever increasing

demand, water security for India is emerging as an issue of extreme urgency. The remedy to this predicament for both, China and India lies nestled in the glaciers of the mighty Himalayas. With nearly fifteen thousand glaciers and vast snow cover measuring approximately 1,400 cubic kilometres in volume, Himalayas are the largest fountainhead of freshwater resource and a strategic common to India, China, Nepal and Bhutan and Bangladesh.

What is of vital significance is that China controls the trans Himalayan region of Tibet through which most of the rivers originating in Himalayas flow, thus making it the upper riparian state¹. Over the past decade, China has started building dams over Brahmaputra river for hydroelectric projects. Ever since, there has been an increase in political assertiveness and resource aggressiveness between China and India, relating to water sharing of Brahmaputra. The recent debates in China concerning enhancement of the scope of South-North diversion project to include Brahmaputra waters have now raised the anxiety levels in lower riparian states of India and Bangladesh to a new level. In an era where growing economic ties are the only hope of thaw in the deteriorating Sino-India relationships, a socio-political issue involving livelihood of population of 100 million Indians is likely to generate sparks that may start an unstoppable fire.

2 SCOPE

This paper will examine the Sino-India water dispute over Brahmaputra River for its potential of becoming a flash point of a full scale military conflict between China and India. As wars are complex matters, the analyses process cannot be restricted to water scarcity and security dimensions of the dispute alone. Comprehensive analyses must therefore include additional factors that are likely to influence the political decision making of the two states when water security is threatened. Following factors will be analysed in the paper:

- Water security and historical perspective of water wars.
- Water scarcity challenges in India and China.
- Dynamics of Brahmaputra dispute.
- Political environment and importance of popular sentiments in India and China.
- Economic environment and cost of war.
- External powerplay by third party.
- Technology as a possible war preventer.

1 Tibet lies in a region known as Trans Himalayas. As the term suggests, Tibet lies beyond the main Himalayan range. The Trans Himalayan region itself is an ill-defined mountain region covering an area of about 1,000 km (600 miles) and having a width ranging from 225 km (140 miles) to about 32 km (20 miles). In Tibet lies the river valley region extending for about 1,000 km from west to east. The Brahmaputra River (known in Tibet as the Yarlung Tsangpo) flows from west to east through most of this region. The Tibetan plateau is the source of some of the biggest rivers in the Himalayas. The Brahmaputra, Indus and Satluj are three Trans Himalayan rivers that originate in Tibet, cut across the main Himalayas making fearsome gorges and then flow towards the plains.

3 WATER SECURITY: WATER SCARCITY

As per the UN definition, Water security is defined as “The capacity of a population to safeguard sustainable access to adequate quantities of acceptable quality water for sustaining livelihoods, human well-being, and socio-economic development, for ensuring protection against water-borne pollution and water-related disasters, and for preserving ecosystems in a climate of peace and political stability (UNITED NATIONS UNIVERSITY, 2013)”. The keyword here being “safeguard”. This article focuses on the military consequence of initiatives being undertaken by China and India to safeguard its water resources. Water is one of the most critical components of the earth’s ecosystem. Without water there will be no life. From sustaining human bodily functions to balancing climate, supporting agriculture and industrial development, water is serving exponentially more people and many usages. This makes access to clean and reliable water supply crucial to human survival and sustainable progress. The WWDR is an annual and thematic report that focuses on different strategic water issues each year and aims to provide decision-makers with the tools to implement sustainable use of our water resources. It also includes regional aspects, hotspots, examples and stories, making the report relevant to a broad range of readers, at different levels and in different geographical areas. Unfortunately, fresh water is an increasingly scarce and precious resource. Less than 2.5 percent of all water on earth is fresh water and almost 50% of it is in the form of polar ice and high-altitude glaciers around the world. With increasing consumption, pollution, and climate change, this marginal amount is further declining at a rapid pace. “Global per capita freshwater availability has plummeting more than 60 percent since 1950.” It is reported that at the turn of the millennium in 2000, more than one billion people did not have access to clean drinking water (UNITED NATIONS, 2018).

According to a recent article co-authored by the chair of the Department of Water Engineering at the University of Twente in the Netherlands and a water scarcity expert from the Johns Hopkins Water Institute, approximately 66 percent of the world’s population, or more than four billion people, live in areas under severe water scarcity. Of these four billion people, one billion live in India, and 900 million live in China; the majority of their populations thus live in areas of severe water scarcity (HOEKSTRA; MEKONNEN, 2016). In 2006, a World Bank Working Paper on water scarcity claimed “China will soon become the most water-stressed country in East and Southeast Asia.” Water scarcity is also linked to food availability. Agriculture accounts for 70 percent of all global water consumption, compared to 19 percent for industry and about 11 percent for drinking. The Strategic Foresight Group, a prominent India-based think tank that publishes extensively on climate change and environmental issues, projects both India and China will face a 30 to 50 percent decline in rice and wheat yields by 2050 due to “the cumulative effects of water scarcity, glacial melting, disruptive precipitation patterns, flooding, desertification, pollution, and soil erosion” (SHALIZI, 2006).

3.1 WATER WARS: DO NATIONS FIGHT WAR OVER WATER?

Those concerned with the water crisis and its future are divided essentially into two schools. One school indicates that water, as a source of conflict, is more likely to be the case within countries than between them. It focuses on water as a source of cooperation and as an impetus for scientists and political leaders to use modern science and advanced technology to create new solutions and seek suitable alternatives. The other school argues that water scarcity, as a source of conflict, will increasingly be inter-state in nature and examines water-induced conflicts. This school, however, makes it clear that “water resources have rarely been the sole cause of conflict” but should be viewed as a “function of the relationships among social, political, and economic factors, including economic development.” This school also evaluates the role of water as a tool and weapon (both political and military) in conflicts caused by other factors. There is no clear empirical evidence suggesting water as a primary trigger to a major war between two nation states. The Pacific Institute, a Think Tank has created a 5000 year timeline categorizing conflicts related to water where water was used as ‘trigger’ and/or ‘weapon’. The database lists 551 conflicts all across the world². While the database does indicate 224 conflicts where water was the trigger, most of them come out as small intrastate feuds and others being limited to skirmishes or show of force. Interestingly, the database shows use of water a weapon in large number of conflicts world over to achieve a favourable and/or quick culmination to the conflict and also to force own terms on the adversary. Water may be used as a weapon during a conflict and not initiate the conflict perse.

Figure 1 - Historic Perspective of Water Conflicts Across the World



Source: Pacific Institute (2019).

2 Founded in 1987 and based in Oakland, California the ‘Pacific Institute’ works to create a healthier planet and sustainable communities. We conduct interdisciplinary research and partner with stakeholders to produce solutions that advance environmental protection, economic development, and social equity in California, nationally, and internationally.

A similar sentiment is echoed by Juha Uitto, at the United Nations Human Development Program, and Aaron Wolf, professor of geography at Oregon State University. In their report they argue that while only one war and seven cases of acute water-related violence are known, there have been more than 3,600 water related treaties over the years, reflecting a strong record of cooperation over conflict on issues related to water (UITTO; WOLF, 2002)³. Notwithstanding the lack of empirical evidence on the subject, large number studies and articles published by experts on water scarcity and future of water wars indicate weaponization of water with certainty of it becoming the trigger for future wars (HILL, 2016). Arguments prophesying inevitability of water wars are gaining wider acceptance world over with both, Governments and militaries. The subject is being discussed and debated extensively in international forums and military institutions alike.

More and more literature supporting the possibility of water wars is coming to fore and the idea is getting reinforced like never before. In absence of empirical evidence from past, scholars are modelling their future risk assessment on the predicted data of water usage and scarcity in future along with behavioural response of individuals, societies and Governments to the effects of scarcity. It is to be understood that while in the past water security largely had an economic dimension with respect to a state or region, the predicted scarcity in future will have a more direct consequence to the extent of existential crisis, where billions of people are going to not have access potable water. Despite considerable evidence of cooperation over water usage, a number of arguments link water scarcity and armed conflicts. While states have not fought exclusively over access to water, increased water scarcity, when combined with other factors such as upstream-downstream positioning, sovereignty linkages, and political instability, may lead to war. China and India may not be an exception to this rule

3.2 WATER SCARCITY CHALLENGES IN INDIA

India accounts for about 17% of the world's population but only 4% of the world fresh water resources. Distribution of these water resources across the vast expanse of the country is also uneven. The increasing demands on water resources by India's burgeoning population and diminishing quality of existing water resources because of pollution and the additional requirements of serving India's spiralling industrial and agricultural growth have led to a situation where the consumption of water is rapidly increasing while the supply of fresh water remains more or less constant. The water demand projection for India is a matter of concern.

3 The seven cases are: between India and Pakistan in 1948 over access to the Indus basin; between Syria and Israel in 1951 over Israeli water projects in the Huleh basin; between Egypt and Sudan in 1958 over the Nile River; between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1963-1964 over water in the Ogaden desert; between Israel and Syria in 1965-1966 over Arab plans to divert the Jordan River; between Iraq and Syria in 1975 over the Euphrates; and between Mauritania and Senegal in 1989-1991 over grazing right along the Senegal River. See Wolf (1998, p. 256).

The World Bank in its 1999 report indicates that the overall water demand will increase from 552 BCM (Billion Cubic Metres) to 1050 BCM by 2025, which will require the use of all available water resources in the country. The per capita water availability according to the report has dropped from over 5,000 cubic metres per year in 1947 to less than 2,000 cubic metres per year in 1997 and by 2025, this figure will further drop to 1,500 cubic metres per year, which is well below the level at which water stress is considered to occur. The report also lists six of India's 20 major river basins below the water scarcity threshold of 1,000 cubic metres per year (FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 2018c). The McKinsey Report (2009) suggests that by 2030, water demand in India will grow to almost 1.5 trillion m³, principally driven by population growth and the domestic need for rice, wheat and sugar. According to the Report, the current water supply is approximately 740 billion m³ (2030 WATER RESOURCES GROUP, 2009).

The interplay of food, energy and water within the complex context of population increase, rising standards of living and resource constraints poses interlocking challenges to sustainable environmental policies. Clearly, water security in India is deeply linked to development and economic growth of the country. A growing need to synchronise internal water management measures with external riparian policies is thus critical. Although India has low per capita water consumption, it lags in the efficient use of water across sectors. Continued population growth and the impact of global warming along with inadequate conservation and huge wastage are putting enormous pressure on water resources. With no proportional increase in water availability and an ever increasing demand, water security for India is emerging as an issue of extreme urgency. Most of India's northern rivers originate in Tibet. China annexed Tibet in 1950 and gained control over the Himalayan glaciers of the region where some of the world's largest rivers originate and flow to South and Southeast Asia. China has strengthened its political and economic control over Tibet where India and China have a complex, unresolved boundary dispute. There are widespread fears in India that China's diversion of waters of the Yarlung-Tsangpo, to meet high demand in its arid north, will cause hydrological imbalance in the northeast part of India and shortage in Bangladesh, which in turn will impact riparian relations.

3.3 WATER SCARCITY CHALLENGES IN CHINA


China is an extremely thirsty country and is one of the world's driest nations. With a population of 1.3 billion and much of its rivers polluted and silt-ridden, water undoubtedly has become a prized strategic asset. In 2004, China's available water per capita was one of the lowest in the world for a populous country, meanwhile, the demand for water is growing more than 10 percent annually in Chinese cities and more than five percent annually for its industries (SHALIZI, 2006). This precipitous decline in available water has worsened an already critical shortage in drinking water for China's huge population. More than 25 percent of all Chinese

are without access to drinking water. Almost half of China's 668 largest cities are short of water with 108 identified as "serious" and 60 as "critical." By 2030, the Chinese government predicts the country's annual freshwater shortage will reach 200 billion cubic meters (PAK, 2016). China's worsening water shortage is exacerbated by increased pollution on a historic scale. Due to the shortage of water resources in China, the groundwater plays a key role in providing drinking water for China's huge population. 70 percent of China's population of 1.3 billion drinks groundwater. Out of 660 cities in China, more than 400 cities source their drinking water from groundwater. More than 80 percent of China's underground aquifers, which supply 70 percent of the country's drinking water, are polluted. More than half of China's population drinks water contaminated with organic waste. More than 75 percent of surface water flowing along China's rivers is unsafe for drinking or fishing, and 30 percent is unsuitable for agriculture and industry (LIN, 2016). China's water problem has a stark regional dimension as well; the south has the preponderance of water while the north has the higher demand. This has created a significant regional disparity that is getting worse with time. While 45 percent of China's population and 60 percent of its agriculture are in the north, the region has only 13.8 percent of the fresh water. In per capita terms, the amount of available water in the north is about 25 percent of that available in the south. To correct these imbalances, China has embarked on a massive water transfer project known as the South- North Water Diversion Project. Started in 2002, the project consists of three planned routes: the eastern, central, and western. More on this issue will be discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

4 THE BRAHMAPUTRA WATER DISPUTE

The Brahmaputra is one of the major rivers of Asia which flows through China, India and Bangladesh. Out of its total length of 2,880 km the River covers a major part of its journey in Tibet as Tsangpo. Tsangpo or the Brahmaputra flows 1625 km in Tibet parallel to the main range of Himalayas before entering India through Arunachal Pradesh near Gelling. Before entering India, the river passes Pi (Pe) in Tibet and suddenly turns to the north and northeast and cuts a course through a succession of great narrow gorges between the mountain Gyala Peri and Namjabarwa (Namcha Barwa). In India the river flows through the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, West Bengal, Meghalaya, Nagaland and Sikkim comprising a total basin area of 197316 sq. km which is 5.9% of the total geographic area of the country (GOSWAMI, 2008). The river is known as the Siang in Arunachal Pradesh. The Siang River meets two other major tributaries, Dibang and Lohit in the west of Sadiya, at a place named Kobo. From this confluence point, the river is known as the Brahmaputra till it enters Bangladesh. Out of the total catchment area of the river, 50.5% lies in Tibet, 33.6% in India, 8.1% in Bangladesh and 7.8% in Bhutan. In India the journey of the river Brahmaputra is 918 km long. It holds special importance for Indian economy as it accounts for almost 29 percent of all surface water in India's rivers and encompasses roughly 44 percent of India's total hydropower potential (GOSWAMI, 2008).

Figure 2 - Map of Brahmaputra River



Source: Brahmaputra River (2018c).

On the China's end, its development activities on the Brahmaputra are currently limited to building series of hydroelectric dams. China has announced plans to construct four dams along the Brahmaputra in Tibet. One of these facilities, namely, Zangmu Dam, is currently operational and has a total installed capacity of 510,000 kilowatt hours. A more controversial use of the Brahmaputra lies in China's proposal to divert the river to meet domestic needs, especially for irrigation. As mentioned earlier, China currently faces serious water scarcity challenges at a national level. China's limited water resources are unevenly distributed further, this situation has been exacerbated by factors such as weak pollution controls, poor conservation efforts, and inefficient irrigation methods. To remedy this great north-south water divide, China had started a massive South-North Water Diversion Project to transfer a total of 38 to 48 billion cubic meters of water annually. Officially announced by China's State Council in 2002, the project called for diverting waters along three different routes—an eastern route, a central route, and a western route. The water diversion projects along the first two routes are already completed and are transferring water from China's Yangtze and Han Rivers in the south to the Yellow River in the north. The third route is still under development. It will divert tributaries to the upstream portion of the Yangtze River in western China to the Yellow River (GLEICK, 2008). Over the past three decades, various Chinese scholars have proposed diverting the Brahmaputra as a remedy above and beyond the official South-North Water Diversion Plan. The best-known plan, put forward by a senior researcher at the Yellow River Water Conservancy Commission in 1990, envisions diverting the river via a series of canals and dams through Sichuan Province and into the Yellow River. Other plans have been proposed and studied by scholars at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Yangtze River Commission, and

elsewhere (SAMARNAYAKE; LIMAYE; WUTHNOW, 2016). Although no proposal has been officially endorsed, some Chinese and foreign scholars contend that China's water shortages may become so severe that the government will have no choice but to attempt to tap into the Brahmaputra. For instance, water scarcity, combined with the effects of climate change and desertification, may become so intense that a more radical scheme to divert the Brahmaputra will be needed. Similarly, a failure of the South-North Water Diversion Project to alleviate water shortages in northern China could make a plan to divert the Brahmaputra "very tempting" for PRC authorities.

Figure 3 - Current and planned routes of the South-North Water Diversion Project



Source: Samarnayake, Limaye, Wuthnow (2016). Map drawn by Mike Markowitz.

India views China's strategic river diversion plan of Brahmaputra waters in Tibet with great trepidation as these upstream activities will reduce both, the runoff and hydro-power potential India can expect from the Brahmaputra River (DHAWAN, 2017). As a lower riparian, India feels vulnerable to the water diversion and storage projects planned on the Yarlung- Tsangpo. Riparian issues always have political connotations. The implementation of river policies, even when purely design-related to the linking of rivers or constructions of dams and barrages, are undertaken within a political context. Riparian states differ in their views of what cooperation entails for them and not surprisingly, a power game ensues. Politically in India, the basin is spread over 22 parliamentary constituencies comprising 12 in Assam, 4 in West Bengal, 2 in Arunachal Pradesh, 2 in Meghalaya, 1 in Sikkim and 1 in Nagaland.

South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers and People (SANDRP) is an informal network working on issues related to rivers, communities and large scale water infrastructure like dams:

their environmental and social impacts, their performance and issues related to governance of rivers and dams (SANDRP, 2018). With greater focus on economically integrating the Far East states into mainland India, this news of China's projects is not a good one for India population and politicians alike. India and China have a long-standing border dispute. China lays claims on substantial parts of India, particularly in Arunachal Pradesh through which the river Brahmaputra flows. The boundary issue comes in the way of meaningful cooperation on water issues. India is concerned that China will use water as a tool to pressurize India and to extract concessions on the boundary question. Given the environment of distrust between the two countries, it is hard to imagine that India will accept China to be a responsible upper riparian player. Further, there is no clear accepted international law on shared waters and China was among the only three countries that voted against the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Water Courses in the UN General Assembly in 1997. This casts shadows on any claims made by China on adhering to the international principles of good neighborliness towards the riparian nations in the region. Therefore, as water resources of Tibet add salience to China's resource aggressiveness towards India, potential of water issues becoming catalysts for conflict between the two giants is likely to increase. India on its part is also seeking to utilise Brahmaputra waters to rejuvenate its shrinking Ganges basin and to overcome frequent flooding problems through an ambitious 60 rivers interlinking project. With such political and economic stakes, India sees damming and diversion of Brahmaputra waters by China as an unacceptable loss of control over a strategic common. While the political issues swirling around China and Tibet are complex, there is no denying that water occupies centre stage in China's interest in Tibet and therefore, China's position on utilization of Tibet waters is likely to have a significant bearing on the bilateral relations between the two countries. Further, China's hardening position on Arunachal Pradesh (India) has formally linked the water dispute to that of sovereignty. Chinese claim on Arunachal Pradesh is not a mere rhetoric. In laying claims to Arunachal it is claiming the almost 200 million cusecs of waters resources in the state. It is a different matter whether or not the transfer of waters is technically feasible. This position of China has altered the dynamics of the border dispute. From being a regular riparian issue affecting 3% of Indian population residing in Brahmaputra basin, it has now become a matter of national pride for 1.2 billion Indian citizens, who may be ready to pay any price for it.

4.1 INTERNAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT: ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF POPULAR SENTIMENTS

As discussed earlier, Himalayas have traditionally functioned as impermeable border between India and China precluding any perceivable trans frontier overrun of social and political values. Consequently, the two civilisations evolved as if located on two separate continental shelves. Markedly, while communist ideology was growing roots in China in mid 20th

century, at the same time, India was embracing representative democracy on the other side of the hill. Interestingly, while the world went through an intense cold war standing polarised on these exact political values, China and India remained non-aligned and have no history of military conflicts/ unrest or mutual diplomatic criticism based on each other's preferred political orientation. Notwithstanding the aforesaid, all is not well on the political front, the challenges to the political stability for both the countries are not external but from within. More so for China than India.

China. China is formally a multiparty state under the leadership of Communist Party of China (CPC). While most western scholars argue that the political system lacks the vital ingredient of universal suffrage, theoretically the argument does not hold ground. All the adult citizens of Peoples Republic of China are permitted to vote albeit for election of Deputy of National Party Congress and the local/village heads only. Thereafter the election system adopts the hierarchical model of indirect-election (CHINA'S, 1949). While exponents of Chinese political system can continue to argue that the model is democratic, there is no denial of the fact that it is marred with intrinsic flaws and has fostered centralisation of power with CPC. Having learnt lessons from disintegration of USSR, where there was no provision of rewarding citizens for their contributions, Chinese leaders went on to refine their political model to include individual's prosperity alongside national growth. This measure alone has paid rich dividends and has resulted in upliftment of 800 million Chinese out of poverty (CHINA..., 2017). Magnificent as this may sound, it has interfaced 800 million informed, well-travelled and politically more conscious/ interested Chinese with a seemingly archaic political system they are not permitted to question. This arrangement is potentially volatile. Recent surveys show that these citizens expect good governance from the political dispensation implying sustained economic growth, good job opportunities, contemporary infrastructure, access to clean water, pollution free environment and robust healthcare system. Noticeably, issues like unification of China, diversion of Tibet waters and military conflict with India either find no mention in the list or are too relegated to be considered (Chinese population is seemingly more sensitive to resource sharing and military conflicts related to Japan and United States of America). Having said that, CPC leadership cannot be seen as a weak disposition by abandoning the idea of unification or silently accepting increased military presence of other players in its so called backyard. Consequently, to remain domestically unchallenged, the political leadership of China must walk the fine line of fuelling nationalistic feelings without entertaining the idea of a war in the near future. While the issue of water shortage concerns the wellbeing of the citizens of China, they are unlikely to be emotionally obsessed with water from Tibet Plateau as they have never had an access to this resource. Also, many citizens are likely to evaluate this initiative for its economical prudence and adverse environmental implications and therefore may not show enthusiasm in the first place, leave aside seeking a war over it.

India. India is the largest democracy of the world and had 814.5 billion politically participative voters exercise franchise in 2014 elections⁴. Like in any good democracy, population of India plays a pivotal role in driving political agendas and shaping policies in the country. Indian population though extremely nationalistic, is diverse in religion, culture and ethnicity. Therefore the issues influencing Indian electorate range from livelihood security (issues concerning land, water, employment, price of commodities etc), religious and culture freedom to nationalistic issues like Governments' response to nations adversaries challenging India's sovereignty or unfair trade practices and monetary policies of the Western world. Understanding this game, Indian political parties, particularly when in power have traditionally sought refuge in blaming external players (foreign countries, particularly neighbours) for all that ails India. This has established a unique political imprudence where the political masters twist facts and arbitrarily fan the nationalistic feelings and EQ of uneducated/ uninformed voters to cover own failures in governance. Indian citizens are traditionally known to react aggressively and emotionally towards issues related to clash of interest with other countries, particularly China and Pakistan. Further, the instant case of water diversion from river Brahmaputra implies reducing the supply of water to the population used to utilising it for its social and economic survival. In the country where rivers are equated worshipped as goddesses and revered, the issue is way more personal and a matter of survival for many. Therefore, any act of diversion or even the promulgation of the idea of diversion of waters of Brahmaputra will invite a serious reaction from the 80 million voters of the affected region in particular and billions of others across the country in general. A call for an all-out war to restore national pride and legal rights may occupy the political centre stage in India. Be that as it may, Indian Government has never displayed irrationality in dealing with situations stimulating military conflict and has persistently demonstrated great maturity in calibrating its response on both. diplomatic and military level, even when the popular sentiment is known to be inclined for a military solution. India's controlled yet effective response to repeated provocations of Pakistan based terrorist organisations stands as testimony of it. Further, the East Bengal refugee crisis of 1971 is an important case in point. Indian Government showed no urgency in responding to the internal and external provocations for an immediate war with Pakistan. The decision to get involved militarily was a considered and informed one with many additional motivations driving the defining the campaign than merely the humanitarian crisis of refugees (RANJAN, 2016).

4.2 ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT: WAR VS SUSTAINED ECONOMIC GROWTH

China. As discussed above, Chinese political system has evolved from being conformist communists to a tolerant capitalist communist model. This transformation has paid

⁴ Available at: https://www.eci.nic.in/eci_main1/current/GE-2014%20Color%20with%20maps_%2005032014.pdf. Access in: 12 Sep 2018.

rich dividends to China for over 40 years but now the story is changing and there are costs to pay to keep the growth trends positive. Shrinking GDP growth, massive wave of deficit spending, ageing population, compulsions to address environmental issues, modernisation of armed forces etc are few of the many challenges likely to upset the apple cart of Chinese growth story. Even though China has grown at a spectacular rate in the past, it is still far from becoming a global super power and there is a fair possibility that it may grow old before growing rich (ZILIBOTTI, 2017). Chinese economy continues to be fragile and any challenge to its sustained growth is likely to have direct and corresponding effect on critical issues like trade volumes, employment, innovation, infrastructure growth, welfare schemes, and defence spending thereby causing dissatisfaction amongst population and decline in influence of China in global affairs. Both the outcomes are potentially risky scenarios for CPC. Consequently, economic wellbeing of China is likely to remain the primary focus of the party and a key to its unchallenged existence. Given such compulsions, war is a burden China can ill afford and a sentiment its political disposition is least likely to encourage in the near future.

India. The Prime Minister of India, Mr Narendra Modi in his speech to the people of India on independence day, 15 Aug 2018, stated that Indian economy is an elephant that has begun to run (INDIAN, 2018). Thereby implying that the Indian economy has finally taken off the blocks and it is time for India to reap the true benefits of globalisation. Growth story of Indian economy has not been as spectacular as that of China. It has taken a while for the drivers of economy to align well for India and now the domestic indicators and global sentiments are extremely positive and promising. Having said that, the economy is still in a fragile state and therefore Indian government would like to maintain uninterrupted focus on sustenance and strengthening of this momentum in the coming years. War with a strong adversary being the worst kind of interruption. While such may be the intention, there are salient differences in the economic make up of India and China. While Chinese economic story is based on manufacturing and services, Indian economy, though led by services and industrial sector, has a very large employment and consumer base in rural areas dependent on agricultural income. It is noteworthy that while the share of agriculture in GDP is only 17%, it provides employment to over 60% of the population and is therefore the single most important influencing factor in Indian politics (INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, 2020). Further, to the population linked with agriculture, economic issues are closely associated with security of land holdings, availability of water and preservation of cultural traditions. Any compromise or threat to the aforementioned issues has the potential of stirring up major political and internal security challenges. After land, water is the most critical resource for Agriculture activity and therefore rivers are seen as socio-economic resource by the Indian population. Alarming as these figures appear, the story for Brahmaputra basin is not as dynamic as the Ganges basin. Only 3% of Indian population inhabits Brahmaputra basin with the land area being 6% of the country. Further,

agricultural activity in this region is not as robust as that in Ganges basin and therefore, *prima facie*, the issue is not of much economic importance to India. Bangladesh, with 70% of its population residing astride Brahmaputra perhaps has greater economic dependence on the river. This being said, like China, India also needs Brahmaputra waters to rejuvenate Ganges Brahmaputra basin where 40% of its population resides (DE STEFANO; DUNCAN; DINAR et al., 2010). Consequently, it has formulated a major river interlinking project at national level involving 60 rivers, of which Ganges- Brahmaputra linking is one part. The idea behind interlinking of rivers is to deal with the problem of drought and floods afflicting different parts of the country, while decreasing farmers' dependency on uncertain monsoon rains. Unlike the Chinese South – North water diversion project, this endeavour is inclusive and involves other two riparian states viz, Nepal and Bangladesh. Given this new dimension, the population involvement and economic activity linked to Brahmaputra acquires mammoth dimension with trans-border interests. China's unilateral decision to divert Tibet waters may be play a spoiler for this dream project and cause angst to Governments and population alike.

4.3 MILITARY CAPABILITIES: COST OF WAR

Economic drivers and political compulsions alone cannot drive a country to war. Military capability is a key factor to be considered when assessing such a possibility. China and India are two military powers that have a history of military conflict and prolonged border unrest. Armed forces of the two countries have motivation to baggage to spur them towards conflict, but both the armies are also extremely responsible and under direct political control of the state.

China. Peoples Liberation Army (including its other two service components) is a 2.6 million strong professional army. With a sustained defence spending of approximately 2 % of GDP on defence and focussed development of defence industry, China has managed to transform PLA from a force limited to defending own borders to as a modern military with regional reach and global aspirations (STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, [201-?]). Recent initiatives involving force restructuring, transformation of People Liberation Navy (PLN) from Brown water to Blue water navy, augmentation of Cyber and Electronic Warfare capabilities, formulation of Strategic Forces Command (SSF) and successes in quantum computing are steps aimed to achieve the aforementioned aspirations. Be as it may, the Chinese military dream of defeating India in a military conflict has few major challenges. Firstly, any conflict with India has to be fought over the mighty Himalayas and/or in Indian Ocean. Both battlefields continue to impose geographical restrictions on application of force on. Therefore, in spite of being a technologically superior force, PLA is unlikely to be able to deliver a decisive defeat on Indian Army in either of fronts and achieve any rewarding end state. Secondly, PLA is referred to as an untested army. In order to establish itself as a professional and strong force, nothing but decisive defeat of

Indian Army will be acceptable to both PLA and CPC. A stalemate will in all probability be considered as victory for India and therefore will adversely affect the image of PLA as a military force and China as a super power globally. This is likely to result in immediate reduction of China's clout in the region. Lastly, any war with an adversary like India will leave PLA weakened for a considerable period of time, This may not be acceptable to CPC given the fact that the state and population considers USA and Japan higher priority enemies than India and the challenges with both these adversaries are far from removed.

India. Indian armed forces are 1.4 million strong. It is a battle hardened force with wide experience of combat. Indian soldiers are known to be more adaptable to hardships. With 2.5% of GDP dedicated to Defence expenditure, Indian Armed forces have modernised themselves and enjoy considerable technological edge over its immediate neighbours and is fast closing in on China. Supported by geographical realities, Indian armed forces enjoy an edge in defending their country along the Himalayas and in Indian Ocean region against China. However, given the technological and numerical edge PLA enjoys, the effects of the same geographical constraints will be even more pronounced for Indian armed forces, should India undertake a trans-border venture against China based on its integral military capability. In either case, war with China will come at a huge military and economic cost for India. Pakistan, India's western adversary will be the natural beneficiary of the conflict, a situation unlikely to be acceptable to Indian government, population and armed forces alike.

4.4 EXTERNAL DYNAMICS: ROLE OF THE THIRD PLAYER

Today's world order is different from the cold war era dynamics where competitors did not nurture economic relations with each other. Globalisation has intertwined the political and military interests of countries across the world based on economic arrangements. It is no more prudent for two competitive powers to go to war and destroy each other if their economies are supportive and deeply interlinked. In such scenarios, it may be pragmatic for one for these powers to consider arranging for a third player to engage its competitor in war with an aim to weaken its ability to consider any military option against it. This scenario has a great applicability in present day geo-political environment relating China.

USA and China are large trade partners having a complex and paradoxical economic relationship. While the two countries have complementary interests on economic front, they are contenders as world powers. As China progresses on its path of realising its dream of becoming a world power, it is challenging the world economic order aligned preferentially to Western powers since end of World War -II on multiple fronts. In most significant initiatives, it is aggressively seeking restructuring or annulling of the established trade and financial system in the world and is determined to make its currency fully convertible. Scholars feel that challenge to dollar is a reason enough for USA to initiate a

direct military conflict with China and the best time to do so is today since China has still not developed enough military might. Be as it may, scholars also feel that with large No of complex and interrelated issues, a direct military conflict between USA and China is not the best option. In such a scenario, it might chose to include a third player in the game to balance out China. China has settled its land border disputes with almost all the neighbours but India and Bhutan. On-going disputes with Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam and Brunei involve Island territories or EEZ issues. Taiwan is a legacy and sensitive issue involving unification of China. It is noteworthy that almost all the neighbours of China less Russia, North Korea, Bhutan and India have a defence treaty with USA. In case of China entering military conflict with any of its neighbour other than those mentioned above, USA will get directly involved in war with China that it doesn't want. Out of Russia, North Korea, Pakistan, Bhutan and India, Russia and Pakistan are aligned towards China and Bhutan is not strong enough to challenge China's might. This makes North Korea and India the most suitable options for acting as proxies.

While both these countries are nuclear powers and have strong armies, what sets North Korea apart from India is the irrationality factor. North Korea is unlikely to be a reliable partner to initiate a military conflict with China on behalf of US as it may not cede the escalation control to USA. Also, in its present form, both India and North Korea do not have the military capacity to engage China for a protracted period. USA will have to support the chosen player with large amount of contemporary military hardware and provide technological support in fields of intelligence and surveillance. US congress may not be comfortable to approve such support for North Korea. On the other hand, Indian armed forces are subordinate to political masters and are known to not undertake unilateral decisions without approval of political hierarchy of the country. Also, Indian political disposition is unlikely to take an irrational decision based on external provocation and will act only on issues that concern own national security. It is therefore possible that a conflict between China and India may erupt in short term on an issue only directly affecting the population of India for which popular sentiment will get formulated through aggressive mainstream and social media campaigns thereby compelling the political masters to take firm action against China. Such developments may be preceded by generous military aid and strategic information sharing cooperation arrangements between India and established powers. It may be wise to note that should a scenario like this get enacted, Brahmaputra water dispute may turn out to be the flashpoint that caused it.

4.5 TECHNOLOGY: REVERSE OSMOSIS TO REVERSE THE WARS

Ever since the advent of International trade, shipping has been the preferred way of transporting goods. This preference had led to large number of commercial cities mushrooming along/ near the coastlines world over. Over the years these cities have grown

in size and numbers and have become the hub centres of commercial activity of their respective economies. Possibility of better job opportunities and good quality of life has prompted migration of population from hinterland to these cities in almost every part of the world, with China and India being no exception. 60 % of Chinese population is concentrated along the East Coast of China. China's 1.3 billion people live in 12 coastal provinces, along the Yangtze River valley, and in two coastal municipalities — Shanghai and Tianjin. Along China's 18,000 kilometres of continental coastline, population densities average between 110 and 1,600 per square kilometre. In some coastal cities such as Shanghai, China's largest with 17 million inhabitants, population densities average over 2,000 per square kilometre (PERCENTAGE, [201-?]). GDP contribution of this region is proportionally higher. However, the combined burden of population, industry and agriculture makes the demand of water disproportionately higher in the region. This disproportionate geographical distribution of water and high consumption rates in the GDP rich coastal areas is what has prompted the billion dollars' South-North water diversion project. Unlike China, population in India is concentrated along the Ganges and Brahmaputra plains. Even though the water consumption pattern is not as askew as China, commercial cities like Mumbai, Kolkata, Vizag are draining the lakes and rivers in hinterland and polluting those passing through them.

Advent of internet has given an unimagable boost to evolution of technology as humans are converging interests and sharing ideas like never before. Scientists today are dreaming of colonising Mars and evolving technology to artificially create water on the Red planet to support life. Perhaps it is time world leadership looked at the challenges closer home and diverted some potential war dollars, likely to be spent on fighting wars over water security, to support research in developing efficient technology for more economical and commercial scale conversion of ocean water to fresh water. This will not only meet the thirst of population and businesses concentrated along the coastlines, but also release pressure on the scarce freshwater resources in hinterland, thereby making them available for agricultural purposes. Today, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Israel are employing this technology to overcome their water woes, it may be wise for China and India to invest in refining and adopting this technology than spending large sums on water diversion schemes and/ or war inspired by the agenda of water security agenda.

5 CONCLUSION

This article examined the possibility of a military conflict between China and India based on the issue of water sharing of river Brahmaputra. Diverse set of important factors related to political, economic, social and military domains were analysed. The following salient points emerge:

- a) River Brahmaputra has alternate water sources independent from the Tibetan glaciers controlled by China. Any water storage and/ or diversion project undertaken by China will not alter the river conditions to the extent the being perceived. Also, the technical feasibility of the undertaking South North water diversion as planned by China remains suspect.
- b) China and India are responsible and rational states with stable political environment. Historically, important decisions like war have not been driven merely by popular sentiment. Both the states are known to resolve complex issues diplomatically and prefer peace over war.
- c) Even though China and India are the fastest growing economies, the prevailing economic conditions do not favour war.
- d) Geographical realities (Terrain conditions of Himalayas and distance of India Ocean from mainland China) are real and favour the defender. Experience of US Army operations in Afghanistan and Vietnam clearly highlight the same. Therefore, while technological superiority may help China surmount some of the challenges posed by difficult terrain and long sea lines of communication, but a decisive victory against India in Himalayas and Indian Ocean will continue to remain a farfetched reality in near future.
- e) Security dynamics for China and India are extremely complex and involve additional players that may seek benefit from a conflict between the two nations. China cannot afford to weaken itself militarily and compromise on its super power image by not achieving decisive victory in a military conflict. India, though well supported by geography as a defender, does not have the capacity at present to start a war and go on offensive against China.
- f) Majority of the economic activity and population of India and China is concentrated along the coastline. It may be more cost effective for the two countries to invest in emerging technology of converting ocean water to quench the thirst of their large cities along the coastline than go to war over it.

An aggregated view of these factors indicates that unlike oil, water is a resource required to sustain life and businesses alike. Like oil, its security is paramount for a nation and reason enough to go for war. Having said that, war in itself is a complex matter and is seldom driven by a singular agenda. A stable political environment comprising of rational and peace favouring political leadership and population will invariably prefer the path of diplomacy and cooperation to solve water security issues, over war. Therefore, water scarcity by itself is unlikely to be the cause of war. However, when coupled with other factors like unilateral diversion of transnational rivers by the upper riparian state, emergence of popular

sentiment linking water insecurity to issues of national sovereignty and pride, availability of external stimulus in terms of international recognition to own cause and military support and concurrent decreasing political stability in the affected states, the war may emerge as a preferred option. In the case of China and India, occurrence of such a scenario is not an impossibility. Consequently, it is in interest of the two nations in particular and world peace in general that an amicable solution for sharing of Brahmaputra water is found at the earliest. It should be an arrangement that offers win-win conditions to both.

“The earth, the land and the water are not an inheritance from our forefathers but on loan from our children. So, we have to handover to them at least as it was handed over to us.” Mahatma Gandhi apud Dhawan (2017).

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The definition of terrorism and the current brazilian legislation

La definición de terrorismo y la Legislación Brasileña vigente

Abstract: Terrorism is a tough challenge to the security of the 21st century. Different countries, powerful or emerging ones, are facing terrorist attacks. As the term “terrorism” assumed a negative meaning in a general way, and it also lacks a clear and a worldwide accepted definition, the use of a biased definition may fit into political interests to condemn any opposing political movement. Therefore, this paper argues that it is essential to develop internal legislation in accordance to a neutral and phenomenological perspective regarding terrorism. From this perspective, this paper concentrated in identifying the core constituent elements. After that, these core aspects were compared to the Brazilian legislation against terrorism, focusing on the Law nº 13.260/2016. The findings of this paper indicate that there are some gaps or mistakes in Brazilian current legislation. Therefore, this paper recommends some changes to the Brazilian legislation.

Keywords: Terrorism. Brazilian legislation. Definition of terrorism. Legal coherence.

Resumen: El terrorismo es un gran desafío para la seguridad en el siglo XXI. El término “terrorismo” ha asumido de forma general un significado negativo, y también carece de una definición clara que sea aceptada mundialmente. Este artículo argumenta que es esencial desarrollar una Legislación interna de acuerdo con una perspectiva neutral y fenomenológica con relación al terrorismo. A partir de esa perspectiva, este artículo se ha concentrado en identificar los elementos constituyentes centrales del desarrollo histórico del terrorismo, bien como de las definiciones académicas comunes de terrorismo, de modo a que se alcancen las características sine-qua-non del terrorismo como fenómeno. En seguida, esos aspectos centrales se compararon a la Legislación Brasileña, con enfoque en la Ley nº 13.260/2016. Las constataciones de este artículo indican que existen algunas lagunas o errores en la Legislación Brasileña vigente que pueden llevar a una falta de coherencia del marco jurídico en comparación con la perspectiva fenomenológica académica. Por tanto, este trabajo recomienda algunas alteraciones en la Legislación Brasileña.

Palabras-clave: Terrorismo. Legislación Brasileña. Definición de terrorismo. Coherencia jurídica.

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1 INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is present in modern society since the French Revolution, when, at the end of the XVIII century, the means used by the empowered government to achieve its political objectives were based on the summary elimination of opponents by the death of guillotine. This practice spread fear amongst all political class, once it was not clear who could be the next target of those decisions. Because of this, as it will become clear during this paper, that period of government became known as “Regime de la Terreur”, the meaning that later gave birth to the term “terrorism”, being used to describe a similar phenomenon.

Throughout the history, it is easily observed the occurrence of terrorism in different countries, carried out by groups with varied motivations, often with a great impact for affected societies and governments. From the end of the World War II, throughout the “cold war”¹, the threat represented by terrorist actions was also present, following the global and regional contexts, performing the merely tactical role on the achievement of political and strategic objectives of the parties in conflict. During that period, the planning process, the execution, the target selection, and the desired effects (objectives) of terrorist organizations incorporated new patterns that conditioned the phenomenon “terrorism”, which still posed a significant threat to the involved countries, mainly in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America.

After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Soviet Union, the global order was structured around the existence of a hegemonic power, the USA, whose unparalleled military potential was known and recognized by the world after the 1st Gulf War, in 1991. This aspect encouraged USA opponents not to try to beat its military force directly in the battlefields, but, instead, through small-scale confrontations, within the context of irregular warfare. This new way of confrontation gathered the tactics, techniques, and procedures of guerrilla warfare, insurgency, and also of terrorism. Among these three methods, the terrorism presented the best cost-benefit relation, with considerably less risk, as well as the smallest initial investment to begin actions, and the most touching effect considering the global audience.

At the same time, terrorist actions multiplied around the world, achieving an international scale, what presented the main threat for western countries, all of them counting with large military apparatus, and, often, counting also with a well-structured array of security forces. Undoubtedly, the fact that characterizes the pattern of this period is the attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center, in the heart of the USA, in September, 11th of 2001. This attack was conducted by a non state organization, Al-Qaida, based inside Afghanistan, with ramifications in different countries of the Middle-East and

1 After the WWII, a forty-five lasting global order was formed based on a bipolar dispute led, for one side, by the United States of America (USA), and, for the other, by the Soviet Union. Since both of them were nuclear power States, and a nuclear conflict would result in a mutual destruction, their confrontation happened indirectly, through third actors, such as proxy States, in a context that was described as ‘cold war’.

Africa, and supposedly supported by other states. After this shocking attack, Spain became a target of Al-Qaida terrorist attacks, followed by United Kingdom (UK), France, and Italy.

Nowadays, there is frequent news reporting cases of terrorism in newspapers, on television, or on the internet. Recent attacks conducted by the auto-proclaimed group Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) shocked by the violence, cruelty, and, mainly, by the random character of chosen victims. As soon as the phenomenon acquired an international character, the terrorism spread its functional activities throughout different countries, increasing its capacity to act simultaneously in different countries, as well as enhancing the possibilities of recruitment, fund collection, and procurement of critical resources. As a consequence, many different countries face illegal activities related to terrorism, such as money laundering, recruitment, extremist violence propaganda, training bases, and smuggling of weapons, explosives, or other resources required by terrorist attacks. Some other States are accused of providing safe haven for wanted terrorists. Therefore, terrorism is undeniably a present threat to a great number of countries around the world, including Brazil, and many different government authorities are engaged in an effort to stop this criminal activity for the safety of modern society.

Around the question of preventing and combating a criminal activity, there must be considered the legal framework that gives legitimacy for security forces to act and protect the society. Thus, the first question that a legislator must ask is: what does define the illegal act? After that, legislators work to define a conduct that must be avoided, since it is not acceptable by the society, and attribute a penalty for those who break the law. Considering that the rule of law is established, the efficiency of a law is largely affected by its coherence with the definition used to describe the respective criminal action. When this action is simple and well defined, it is easier to build a strong body of law to avoid it. On the other hand, when the criminal action is complex, it is difficult to address all conditions that may define such behavior, giving uncertainty to judge an action or, better, to prevent it from happening. This is exactly what occurs with terrorism, a complex phenomenon that has been happening internationally and in different manifestations.

Therefore, considering the vulnerability presented currently by any country, including Brazil, to the terrorist threat, this paper tries to identify in what way Brazilian legislation against terrorism matches a phenomenological (unbiased) definition of terrorism. That means identifying possible conceptual gaps or mistakes in Brazilian legislation against terrorism that could enhance the threat or undermine the effort to prevent and fight it.

In order to achieve this objective, this research is divided into three parts. In the first part, this paper studies the historical evolution of the meaning of terrorism so as to understand the dynamic of conceptual evolution and to identify the main traits that have defined terrorism throughout the history. After that, with this historical support, it analyzes, still in the first part, several academic definitions to establish the “*sine-qua-non*” elements which permit identify the phenomenon among other extremist violent acts. In sequence, the research will analyze, in the second part, the current Brazilian legislation against terrorism,

focusing on the recently approved Law nº 13,260/2016 (BRASIL, 2016) which regulates a constitutional² dispositive that considers terrorism as a serious crime, being not subject to amnesty or act of grace. In the third part, from the comparison of the analyzed legislation to the definitional elements of terrorism, this paper identifies possible gaps or mistakes in this legislation. Finally, at the conclusion of this paper, some recommendations are presented in order to strengthen the support of Brazilian legislation to the effort developed by joint inter-agency security forces in Brazil to prevent and fight terrorism.

The methodology used to conduct this research focused on a qualitative perspective, and an inductive approach, through the collection of documental and bibliographic sources of recognized authors in the international academic environment. In order to develop the elements that define terrorism, this paper looked into the concepts presented by Alex P. Schmid, Bruce Hoffman, Louise Richardson, and Boaz Ganor, among others. These authors were chosen because they are the most prominent academic voices in the western hemisphere, exactly the part of the world with which Brazil is more likely to interact in order to coordinate efforts, being essential the conceptual convergence among these countries. The analysis of Brazilian legislation against terrorism was executed through the collection of primary sources of official documents.

The major finding of this paper is that a comparison between the main traits of terrorism and the legislation revealed some gaps or mistakes that can lead to a lack of coherence of legal framework with the academic phenomenological perspective. Therefore, the Brazilian legislation needs to refine the definition of terrorism, reinforcing the core aspects of the academic definition, and also restating what is not terrorism, avoiding misunderstandings which could block the effort to prevent the occurrence of terrorism.

2 A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF TERRORISM

What is terrorism? The words bring with itself an exact meaning, expressing a common understanding of a subject, a fact, an action, or at least a qualification of these. However, some words, as it synthesizes complex facts or phenomenon, may lead to a different interpretation.

To reach a common definition about this subject, or at least one that satisfies the majority of countries is still a not overcome challenge. Two main ideas dominate debates whenever this discussion is conducted: the first one is about the necessity of developing a consensual definition, and the second idea gravitates towards the relative subjectivity that a given definition is interpreted.

Those who defend the needless of a consensual definition of terrorism state that each country has already developed a legal framework which covers all acts considered terrorism, being efficient to prevent and to judicially treat all infractions of the law, such as homicide, robbery, kidnapping, among others. Even though those crimes are present in the

2 Article 5º, item XLIII. (BRASIL, 1988, p. 13).

penal body of law, it must be recognized as more solid and sound the theory according to with terrorism differentiates itself from other crimes because of its political nature, and indeed do not attack other citizens (who may suffer the consequences of those acts), but the National State, and, as a consequence, its sovereignty, heavily impacting its basic and social functions.

Additionally, still within the context of the first idea, terrorism is an international phenomenon (GREGOR, 2013), spreading its functional activities through different countries. Nowadays, it is indeed common to observe terrorist organizations recruiting simultaneously from more than one country, while it keeps training bases in other countries, and gets funds from illegal activities developed in a third country. Therefore, it is urgent that the international community reaches a consensual understanding regarding terrorism so as to unify efforts to fight this phenomenon in a simultaneous and coordinated way.

The second idea that undermines the effort to reach a common definition of terrorism is the relativism around the interpretation of a fact. Therefore, their defenders use to say that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter, as shown by Boaz Ganor (2010):

The statement, 'One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter,' has become not only a cliché but also one of the most difficult obstacles in coping with terrorism. The matter of definition and conceptualization is usually a purely theoretical issue—a mechanism for scholars to work out the appropriate set of parameters for the research they intend to undertake.

Analyzing this argumentation with attention, and giving substance to the point of view of Boaz Ganor, it leads to a consideration that this idea only thrives if the study of terrorism and its considerations do not focus on the act itself, but on the people who drive it or on the morality of the pursued goals. It is not acceptable that an analysis loses its focal point and fails in recognize that terrorism is the means used to achieve an end. On the other hand, freedom or liberation of a region may be the end pursued. Thus, it is not correct to compare a means, terrorism, to the end, freedom (SCHMID, 2011).

As it is stated by Alex P. Schmid (2011), the problem of definition is a crucial element in the attempt to coordinate international collaboration. As a consequence, this research will keep its focal point on the phenomenological observation, with analytical distance, conducted impartially, with the exemption, and critical independence. This is the reason to study the historical evolution of the terrorism meaning, in order to understand the dynamics of its evolution and identify the core of its definition. After that, it will be possible to point out the main characteristics that define the phenomenon.

2.1 THE EVOLUTION OF THE MEANING OF “TERRORISM”

This word was popularized during the French Revolution and, on the contrary to its contemporaneous meaning, terrorism had a positive connotation at that time. The “*Regime de la Terreur*” of 1793, from where came the term still used nowadays, was adopted as a means to promote the order in the middle of a period of relative anarchy and instability that followed the French Revolution. Hence, unlike terrorism is commonly understood today, meaning a revolu-

tionary activity conducted by marginalized groups, the “*Regime de la Terreur*” was conceived as an instrument of governance to promote the stability of the Revolutionary State, by intimidating counterrevolutionaries, subversives, and all other dissidents whom the new regime regarded as “enemies of the people”. The death by guillotine, proclaimed from the State instruments on service of the Revolutionary Government³ was a powerful lesson conveyed to any who might oppose the revolution or grow nostalgic feeling for the “*ancien regime*”, all of them considered “traitors to the revolution” (KERR, 1927 apud BRINTON, 1928).

The “Regime of Terror” ended when Robespierre announced to the National Convention that he had a new list of traitors. Fearing that their names could be on the announced list, extremists and moderates gathered unified to repudiate the regime and its leader. As a result, Robespierre and his closest followers were all sentenced to same death by guillotine, just like the former condemned by the regime, roughly a total of forty thousand. This was the way that “terror” arrived at its end, and, from that moment on, “terrorism” would be associated with the abuse of power, with criminal implications. This term was first used by Edmund Burke in 1795, in a critic to the French Revolution, when he described: “Thousands of hellhounds called Terrorists. Let loose on the people”, (LAW, 2009, p. 65)⁴.

One of the most significant results of the French Revolution was the political awakening in Europe, inspiring national movements, which led to the creation of new States, and to the repulse feeling to absolutist monarchic regime⁵, as it happened in Germany, Italy, and later in Russia. At the same time, social and economic changes imposed by the industrial revolution, and a consequent exploration of the working class (which used to keep a distance from politics, or was alienated from the process) established the ideal environment to the emergence of new ideologies. During this period of intense change in Europe, the concept of terrorism expanded and evolved.

In the middle of national, liberal, and anarchical movements, one of the emerged revolutionary concepts was developed by the Italian republican extremist *Carlo Pisacane*. He defended that the propaganda of ideas was an illusion. For him, the ideas resulted from facts, not the other way around. In this way, his theory of “propaganda by deed” reasoned that the violence was necessary not only to attract attention to the cause, but also to inform, educate, and position the mass (audience) as support to the revolution.

Despite not achieving the desired success against the Bourbon dynasty, on the north of Italy, *Pisacane* inspired other movements, such as the Russian *Narodnaya Volya*, which proposed, at the end of the 19th century, power limitation to the Tsar, with the adoption of

3 The Revolutionary Government was comprised by the Committee of Public Safety (elected by the “convention” and from then the effective governing body), and the General Security Committee, which controlled the police and justice, being subordinate to the Revolutionary Court. On the basis of the “law of the suspects,” the traitors of the revolution were sentenced to guillotine death, a powerful message to regime opponents” (KERR, 1927 apud BRINTON, 1928).

4 Letter IV to Earl Fitzwilliam.

5 Even though the United Kingdom had already been governed by a Constitutional Monarchy since 1688, with the triumph of Glorious Revolution, and the approval of the “bill of rights” in 1689, as well as the “Act of Settlement” in 1701, the other European countries started to challenge, or at least limit, the monarch’s “divine power” only after the French Revolution”.

a Constitutional Monarchy. This group refined the theory of “propaganda by deed”, conducting a selective targeting of specific individuals whom the group considered the embodiment of autocratic, oppressive state⁶, avoiding unnecessary deaths; an idea expressed by the group collective believe: “not one drop of superfluous blood” should shed in pursuit of aims, however noble or utilitarian they might be (HOFFMAN, 2006).

Even though it was dismantled, the Russian group added meaning to the term terrorism, bringing a moral concern to adequate the means used to the pursued ends. Ironically, the success obtained with the Tsar Alexander II assassination in March, the 1st of 1881, led to its end. After the assassination, the full weight of the Tsarist state fell on the heads of the group. As a contribution from the Russian group, the tactic of using more than one perpetrator to attack the target and with the second using explosives that provoked the death of both the Tsar and the group agent, Narodnaya Volya inspired other revolutionary groups. To the nascent anarchist organization, it provided a model to be emulated.

Following those actions, the anarchist movement applauded the death of the tyrant Tsar and, at the height of euphoria, founded the “International Anarchist” movement. Whilst the movement inspired a revolution in global proportion, the lack of material and capacity of coordination permitted only isolated actions, executed by small cells, what turned it difficult to the police to detect, inspiring fear of unjustified proportion within the population. Furthermore, the notorious bombing attacks were systematically directed against Heads of State, or Heads of Government, such as the assassination of US President William McKinley⁷ in 1901 and so many others around the world⁸. Despite these acts had little impact, both in domestic and regional politics, the anarchist movement gave its contribution to the development of terrorism in the conceptual field with the maintenance of the idea of directing the action against a selected target, avoiding collateral damage to the objectives pursued⁹.

In the middle of the nineteenth century, overlapping the existence of the anarchist movement, some movements developed in Europe, whose motivation was nationalist. One of the most active was the Irish movement, initially known as the “Fenian Brotherhood” and the “Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood”, which operated from Ireland and Irish groups that migra-

6 The group positioned against terrorism in open, democratic societies. In 1881, for example, the executive committee of Narodnaya Volya publicly denounced, for this reason, the alleged anarchist political motive behind the assassination that year of USA President James Garfield. According to the group, terrorism could be justified only in extreme circumstances, denouncing all such movements in countries that permitted “normal political activity” (WARDLAW, 1989, p. 23).

7 McKinley was assassinated by a young Hungarian refugee, Leon Czolgoaz, who, even though was not a member of an anarchist movement, was definitely influenced by it. This action led the US Congress to approve a law banning all known anarchists, or any other person who opposed to an established govern.

8 Besides McKinley, the anarchists attempted against the life of the German Kaiser in 1878; killed the President in 1894 and the King Umberto I, in 1900, both from Italy; the Austria-Hungary Empress Elizabeth, in 1898; and the Spanish Prime Ministers in 1897 and 1912.

9 Another important contribution of the anarchist movement to the development of terrorism was the dissemination of instructions on the preparation and use of explosives, as well as the planning and execution of attacks (“how to” or “do-it-yourself” manuals). Doctrinal production has influenced the organization of terrorist cells and the execution of terrorist attacks around the world. The use of tools of information technology is recognized as one of the predecessors on the use of “information revolution”, experienced in the present century, for the doctrinal dissemination of tactics, techniques, and procedures of terrorism” (HOFFMAN, 2006).

ted to the United States¹⁰. In that context, Jeremiah O'Donovan Rossa, leader of the United Irishmen, was arrested and sentenced to life in Ireland, being released after abuse evidences in prison, being exiled to the United States.

In exile, O'Donovan resumed his subversive activities, with the support of Patrick Ford, editor of the "Irish World" newspaper, the main vehicle used to spread the ideas of the movement. The direct association of a media vehicle with the Irish Republican movement, which advocated the action of small groups (the Skirmishers) as a way of inflicting damage on British economic development and forcing the Government to give in to the idea of Irish independence, was a recognition of the media power¹¹ when used in favor of terrorist actions on an international scale. In the same way, it shows that the ill-treatment of eventual terrorists kept under the care of States has the potential to strengthen the appeal for recruitment and adherence to the revolutionary cause, something that today is seen as a stimulus to terrorist actions in France, in Belgium and, against the United States, in other countries.

The *modus operandis* of the United Irishmen (*Clan na Gael*) was based on the action of small groups and the formation of a money fund to finance the "skirmishers fund", asking for contributions through the Irish World. The execution of attacks directed against the London Underground and Railway stations, with the use of homemade bombs and primitive time-delay fuses detonators, although not aimed at reaching the innocent users of those means of transportation, ended up marking "the impossibility of controlling the effects of an attack", at least with those characteristics, and, consequently, the abandonment of the dominant view among the anarchists, in order to avoid the shedding of innocent blood. Undoubtedly, terrorism, with this, began to acquire a negative and objectionable trait, making the defense of its acts increasingly more difficult.

In the same environment, with a nationalist motivation, just before World War I, a group of Bosnian Serbs, known as *Mlada Bosnia* (Young Bosnians), rose against the tyrannical rule of the Austrian-Hungarian Habsburg monarchy over the territories of the Balkans, who concentrated a population with Slavic origins in its majority. In one of the group's most famous action, Gavrilo Princip, one of its members, assassinated the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand, initiating the sequence of events that would culminate with the outbreak of World War I. The aspect considered new in this case was the external support offered by ultranationalist Serbian groups (*Narodna Obrana* - People's Defense), in the name of pan-Slavism, to the Young Bosnians.

Although the connection between the Serbian government and the subnational groups was not clear, in 1911 a faction of the *Narodna Obrana* separated and founded another group (Union of Death), better known as the Black Hand. This group was largely composed of Serbian military personnel, such as the head of the Serbian General Staff Intelligence Department, Colonel

10 The action from the territory of the United States can be considered the first effect of the diaspora of nations, or of the migratory movement, to the development of terrorist activities. The support, through ideas, financing, recruiting, or even hiding wanted members, will be essential for the globalization of the terrorism phenomenon.

11 Together, O'Donovan and Ford developed a new strategy for the republican movement, stated in the column signed by Ford in the edition of December 4th, 1875: "We are not advising a general insurrection on the contrary, we should oppose a general insurrection in Ireland as untimely and ill-advised. But we believe in action nonetheless. The Irish cause requires a little band of heroes" (BEINER, 2014, p. 210).

Dragutin Dmitrievich. This is not to say that the Serbian government controlled or manipulated the Bosnian movement, nor did it support the plan drawn up by the Black Hand. Yet, while maintaining the revolutionary significance of terrorism, a parallel can be made to what is now termed state-sponsored terrorism, when a foreign government smuggles, stimulates, funds, and provides training to a terrorist movement.

Although it is only a semantic differentiation, some researchers use the term “terror” to refer to acts perpetrated by states, while reserving the term “terrorism” for acts carried out by subnational groups. This classification, however, reveals the concern to differentiate the (causal) author of the phenomenon, being the source of large dissension about the definition of terrorism, since it removes the focus of the phenomenon itself. Indeed, there is no sense in keeping this difference when pursuing the intrinsic characteristics of terrorism as a phenomenon.

From 1930, the meaning of terrorism underwent a new change and was then related to acts of violence conducted by authoritarian governments against the citizens of their own country. This was the case in Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and the Stalinist Soviet Union. In the first two examples, the formation of pro-government groups, the “brown shirts” and the “black shirts”, was used as a weapon to intimidate and coerce the opponents of the regime. Stalin used the system of successive purges to acquire supreme powers by eliminating the opposition, especially the ones considered the most prepared, intelligent, and capable of leadership. It should be noted that, unlike the French terror regime, the measures cited were not launched at a political moment of crisis or chaos and still characterized abuse of the exercise of power, keeping the negative bias from the end of the regime of terror of Robespierre.

According to Bruce Hoffman (HOFFMAN, 2006), similar events occurred when the so-called squads or extermination groups, in conjunction with flagrant political intimidation of opponents, were the instruments of right-wing dictatorial governments, such as in Chile and Argentina, or even elected governments, such as in El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia, and Peru, these latter during the violent left-wing revolutionary movements in the 1980s. The same could be said of the current situation in Venezuela, where the elected government promotes intimidation, through pro-government groups and state agencies, against opponents, dissidents, and labor leaders.

After World War II, several revolutionary movements inspired by freedom appeared against the colonialist or imperialist powers. In the same way, countless movements had the inspiration, or the veiled support of the two hegemonic world powers, the United States of America and the Soviet Union. It was in this context that the so-called “liberation wars” were born, with a widespread use of terrorist attacks to promote the achievement of the political objectives, such as forming a new state, changing the regime of government, overthrowing a certain government ruler, or expel an occupation force from a country. Faced with the negative connotation that the term terrorism had developed, the so-called terrorist movements assumed, at that time, politically neutral designations, such as “freedom fighters”¹², “revolutionary”, or “urban guerrilla”.

¹² Yasser Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, addressed the United Nations General Assembly in a speech on November, 13.

During the 1960s and 1970s, the understanding of the term terrorism continued to contemplate the revolutionary context, but it also began to contemplate the actions of nationalist and ethnic-separatist groups, in addition to the several movements with strong ideological and political roots, characteristic of the cold war period when revolutionary groups resorted to terrorist actions to attract local, regional, and even international attention to their causes. Already during the 1980s, the bipolar dispute environment had reached its climax and the Kremlin's strategy of promoting the expansion of the socialist regime through sub-national groups that were against the prevailing political-economic order had been denounced by the writer Claire Sterling (1982) in her book "The Terror Network".

It was also at that time that several suicide bombings were directed against diplomatic representations and US military targets in the Middle East, all attributed to state-sponsored organizations that could not openly and directly combat the United States, but resorted to terrorism to target them and discourage them to continue defending their objectives in the region. Examples of these regimes are Syria, Iran, Iraq, and Libya. One such attack was the bombing of a US military base in Beirut on October 23rd, 1983, killing 241 US soldiers, an attack attributed to Hezbollah, which was supposedly sponsored by Iran and Syria¹³.

As a consequence of these facts, the concept of terrorism expanded even more, including, and sometimes, confounding with revolutionary and guerrilla movements. The fluidity of the concept, according to the perspective of the one who judged the act, allowed to deliberately labeling violent actions as terrorists, taking advantage of the negative meaning assumed by the term terrorism.

The concept of terrorism became even more imprecise when, in the 1990s, terrorist activities linked to criminal activities, such as "narcoterrorism", and the "gray area phenomenon" emerged.

Narcoterrorism, although not limited to this meaning, was conceived to designate movements, according to the conspiracy theory launched by Claire Sterling, which was orchestrated by Moscow and used the drug traffic to enable or accelerate the achievement of intended objectives, according to the French criminologist and specialist in terrorism, *Xavier Raufer*. While the concept was consistent with the work of various "Marxist-Leninist" groups linked, for example, to the Soviet Union, Cuba, Bulgaria, or Nicaragua, other criminal groups began to establish strategic alliances with terrorist and guerrilla organizations or even began to use violence to achieve political goals. The growing power of drug cartels in Colombia and Peru, as well as their continued attempts to discredit elected governments and the political system of these countries, are classic examples of this trend.

The gray area phenomenon, in turn, constituted a theory to designate the complex and uncertain nature of the threats characterized by subnational groups in the post-Cold

13 The 1983 truck bombing of a US Marine Corps base, which was part of a United Nations multinational force to secure a ceasefire in Lebanon, left 241 US soldiers dead. Its authors were not determined, but the investigations attributed its execution to Shiite Muslims, Hezbollah representatives, linked to Iran and supported by Syria. (FRANK, 1987, p. 24-152).

War period. In fact, military doctrine in various countries had to adapt to a new set of threats, whose actions did not constitute acts of war, according to the understanding consolidated throughout the twentieth century but was also sufficiently destabilizing to characterize the situation of peace. In short, they demanded a military response, without a clear declaration of war. It is during this period that military operations of “no war” or “other than war” arouse.

In the midst of this period, terrorism assumed an immense complexity, being not seen as an individual phenomenon of subnational violence to assume a multidisciplinary pattern, constituted of several constituent characteristics in an environment of violence.

This trend did not begin abruptly at the end of the twentieth century but developed throughout the century. Notably, Claire Sterling, Bruce Hoffman and David Rapoport (2004), three scholars and authors of literary works on the subject, point, for example, the Mini-manual of the Urban Guerrilla¹⁴, written by the Brazilian *Carlos Marighella* in 1969, as a work that served as a backbone for the structuring of several terrorist organizations around the world, such as the German group *Baader-Meinhof* and the Italian organization *Brigada Rossa*. In the document, Marighella devotes part of his manual to defining himself as an “urban guerrilla”, establishing a list of the guerrilla’s personal qualities, showing a clear effort to differentiate him from a mere terrorist¹⁵. As already described in the text, another designation that members of terrorist organizations or sympathizers preferred to use for themselves was “freedom fighter,” of better accepted connotation, because of the status of the struggle for liberation against the invader.

The September 11th, 2001 terrorist attack on the United States, by the way it was conducted and by the result achieved, ended up sealing the negative connotation attributed to terrorism, linking it to activities stemming from radicalism, extremism, the inability to live with diversity, or with the need for the approval and acceptance of a point of view defended by the organization, regardless of majority thinking.

In conclusion to the historical analysis, the term terrorism had a positive meaning during the nationalist and anarchic movements at beginning of the 20th century, when terrorists used to proudly state their difference from common criminals. At that time, the attacks were centered at those authorities invested with the power that terrorists were fighting against, always trying to overthrow a government or to change a regime. However, when the violence of actions started to be addressed against citizens, by randomly attacking members of a society, who were not the center of power that terrorists were trying to overthrow, movements lost the legitimacy, and the term “terrorism” acquired a negative meaning. Those movements, with nationalist motivations, seeking independence or autonomy, incorporated also the ideological bias, whilst keeping the pursuit of political objectives. This situation led terrorists to define themselves in a different perspective, giving emphasis to the legitimacy of

14 “To be called an aggressor or a terrorist in Brazil is now an honor to any citizen, for it means that he is fighting, with a gun in his hand, against the monstrosity of the present dictatorship and the suffering it causes” (MARIGHELLA, 1969 apud HOFFMAN, 2006, p. 21).

15 Although not the original version of the Mini-manual of the Urban Guerrilla, this document is referenced in several literary works and, in digital form, available in electronic sites. A version of this document, obtained and compared.

the objective pursued, in an attempt to escape from the negative meaning of terrorism, as well as the term was to be used to label violent acts from opponents to delegitimize them.

In sum, the evolution of the terrorism, according to its meaning, shows the constant presence of use of violence to spread fear, or panic, in order to change the behavior of an audience in support of desired political outcomes.

2.2 THE ACADEMIC APPROACH TO DEFINE TERRORISM

The term terrorism has no precise or widely accepted definition. Academics, politicians, security experts and journalists, all use a variety of definitions of terrorism. Some definitions focus on the terrorist organizations' mode of operation. Others emphasize the motivations and characteristics of terrorism or the "*modus operandis*" of individual terrorists.

Working with many different perspectives confuses the audience and may serve to a specific interest. Virtually any especially abhorrent act of violence perceived as directed against society – whether it involves the activities of anti-government dissidents or government themselves, organized crime, people engaged in militant protests – is often labeled as "terrorism" (HOFFMAN, 2006).

In attempting to establish the meaning of terrorism, resort to the dictionary definition does not prove productive. The Aurelio Dictionary, although it enjoys great authority and respect in the Portuguese language, presents a little revealing definition and nothing substantial: "Terrorism: A way of coercion, combat or threatening by the systematic use of terror." In search of greater precision, one could look up, in the same dictionary, for the vernacular terror: "1. State of great dread. 2. Awe" (FERREIRA, 2008, our translated).

Even in other languages, dictionaries have very historical or even very literal definitions, as Hoffman has recorded in his book *Inside Terrorism*, by the example of the definition found in the Oxford English Dictionary:

Terrorism: A system of terror. 1. Government by intimidation as directed and carried out by the party in power in France during the revolution of 1789-94; the system of terror. 2. gen. A policy intended to strike with terror those whom it is adopted; the employment of methods of intimidation; the fact of terrorizing or condition of being terrorized. (OXFORD, 1971 apud HOFFMAN, 2006, p. 3).

As can be seen, the definitions are very vague, the first being connected to the historical fact itself, which retains the origins of the term terrorism. The second meaning presents at least the fear-inducing characteristic present in terrorist actions, but it has

such a wide meaning that it admits its corresponding attribution to a great variety of violent acts, even if they are not properly acts of terrorism.

The attempt to establish a definition of terrorism that can be accepted anywhere in the world, regardless of the interests involved, may raise the question of the necessity of this measure, as shown in the introduction of this paper. In truth, this goal, with such audacity, sounds as impossible; suggesting, in substitution, the highlight of essential characteristics that constitute a terrorist action, which allows any State, or institution, to construct a precise, coherent and impartial definition. Accordingly, to point out the main elements that define the phenomenon, this paper will resort to academic impartiality of recognized researchers.

Therefore, as it was observed during the study of the evolution of the meaning of terrorism, and considering that its meaning assumed a negative connotation, as well as the self-denying behavior that supposed terrorists developed in their defense, it was developed a new “rhetoric battle” around the classification of a fact as terrorism. Indeed, as stated by Brian Jenkins (1980, p. 1), to classify an act as terrorism implies a moral judgment. In order to avoid the moral judgment of an action, evaluating its perpetrators, or the pursuit objectives, the research will concentrate on the phenomenological analysis of the action, especially in its intrinsic characteristics, which can distinguish this event from others.

The 2011 Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research provides 261 definitions for the word terrorism. How can a word have so many different interpretations? Bjørgo (2005, p. 1), argues that this is due to the fact that terrorism is “an extremely complex set of phenomena, covering a great diversity of groups with different origins and causes”. Nowadays, terrorism includes not only the action, but also raising funds, gathering critic resources to use in action, staying invisible to security forces, using false documents, using information technology (IT) to communicate inside and outside the organizations, among other activities, all of them requiring a degree of attention as criminal activities related to terrorism.

Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman (1988) in “Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature”, analyzed 109 different definitions of terrorism, the result of a survey conducted with recognized authors and researchers, within the context of the study of the phenomenon, belonging to the academic environment. From its analysis, the authors analyzed and tabulated the 22 elements that appeared most frequently in the definitions studied, according to Table 1, described below:

Table 1 – Frequency of present elements in 109 definitions of terrorism

Element	Frequency (%)
1. Violence, force	83,5
2. Political	65
3. Fear, terror emphasized	51
4. Threat	47

Element	Frequency (%)
5. (Psychological) effects and (anticipated) reactions	41,5
6. Victim-target differentiation	37,5
7. Purposive, planned, systematic, organized action	32
8. Method of combat, strategy, tactic	30,5
9. Extranormality, in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian constraints	30
10. Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance	28
11. Publicity aspect	21,5
12. Arbitrariness; impersonal, random character; indiscrimination	21
13. Civilians, noncombatants, neutrals, outsiders as victims	17,5
14. Intimidation	17
15. The innocence of victims emphasized	15,5
16. Group, movement, organization as perpetrator	14
17. Symbolic aspect, a demonstration to others	13,5
18. Incalculability, unpredictability, unexpectedness of occurrence of violence	9
19. Clandestine, covert nature	9
20. Repetitiveness; serial or campaign character of violence	7
21. Criminal	6
22. Demands made on third parties	4

Source: Schmid e Jongman (1988, p. 5-6).

At the end of this exhaustive exercise, Schmid asks “whether the above list contains all the elements necessary for a good definition”. The answer he presents is “probably no”. It might bring frustration or lead to a conclusion that it is impossible to reach a consensus regarding the elements that define terrorism. That is the reason that this paper focus on the act itself, isolating it as a phenomenon, and avoiding confusion because of intervenient or dependent variables. Some of the elements presented on the table are closely related, or keep the same meaning to one another, while others refer to external aspects of the action. It partially explains the apparent failure of Schmid and Jongman at that time.

Nevertheless, the effort to define terrorism persisted with Schmid. He conducted other researches publicized in 2004 and continued trying to reach a consensus. Thus, Schmid arrived at a conclusion of ten elements that provide a fair and good enough description of what, in common academic view, can be said to constitute terrorism:

1. The dual character of the term terrorism (this paper uses the phenomenological character once it focuses on the fact, not seeing it as a philosophy or an ideology);
2. Threefold context (confirming this research position, do not differentiate or exclude contexts from the phenomenological study);
3. Perpetrator as a source or agent of violence (terrorism demands an agent to deliberately and intentionally execute the action that causes terror, fear, or panic);
4. Political (terrorism is political, not merely “criminal”, or “psychotic” violence – it will be discussed deeply furthermore);
5. Violent act (the use of violence or the threat to use violence is the generator of terror, fear, or panic. Without violence, terrorists cannot send their message);
6. Threat-based communication (behind the violence, there is a random factor of targeting with violence that works in benefit of transmitting a terrorist message. A terrorist action is a way to communicate through the use of violence);
7. Differentiation between direct civilian victims and the ultimate target audience (the direct victim of violence is different from the ultimate target. For this, anyone can become a victim of terrorism. Additionally, it brings up a discussion of whether a target is a lawful combatant or an innocent civilian. It requires a deeper consideration, which will be conducted in this paper afterward);
8. Terror, fear, dread (the deliberate act of violence is designed to produce a psychological effect out of proportion to its physical result. To achieve this, the terrorist cleverly exploits the inherent bias of the news value system);
9. Intent (terrorist action demands intention to execute the violent act and to generate terror. It cannot come from an unprovoked act);
10. Campaign (a single act can strike temporary terror in a target population. To have some chance of becoming effective, it requires a campaign of terrorist attacks) (SCHMID, 2011, p. 76-83).

Coherent with his long research, Schmid presented in 2011 (23 years after his first large attempt to define terrorism), through a book edited by him, *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*, an academic consensual definition for terrorism:

Terrorism refers on the one hand to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and noncombatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties (SCHMID, 2011, p. 86).

After a thorough and careful job conducted by Schmid, it is worth checking other academics definitions of terrorism before this paper reaches its partial conclusions. Thus, according to Louise Richardson (2007, p. 20, italics by the author), Terrorists are subnational actors who violently target noncombatants to communicate a political message to third parties. Bruce Hoffman (2006, p. 40, italics by the author) defines terrorism “as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change”. Boaz Ganor (2010, p. 4, italics by the author) in his turn defines terrorism as “the intentional use, or threat to use, violence against civilians or against civilian targets, in order to attain political aims. Finally, David J. Whittaker (2003, p. 5, italics by the author) concludes that “terrorism, in the most widely accepted contemporary usage of the term, is fundamentally and inherently political. It is also ineluctably about power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and the use of power to achieve political change. Terrorism is thus violence – or, equally important, the threat of violence – used and directed in pursuit of, or in service of, a political aim”.

In this sense, looking into the definitions presented by the distinguished authors cited above, it is possible to identify three convergent points of their definitions, which also are the elements that this paper points as the ones in which the majority of the academics would agree: use of violence, civilian targets and political message (or objective).

The first element is violence “If an act does not involve violence or threat of violence, it is not terrorism” (RICHARDSON, 2007, p. 4). Violence or the threat of violence is so symbolic to terrorism because it is the instrument used to instill fear, to terrorize a target audience, and with this, attain psychological objectives. The use of violence or threat to use it comes from the idea of “propaganda by deed”, as shown during the analysis of the evolution of the meaning of terrorism, and, since then characterizes the way terrorists sensitize an audience, causing fear and panic. As Schmid stated, few academic pieces of research dispute that terrorism is a special form of use of (political) violence without moral restraints.

The destructive acts themselves are criminal offenses outside the context of war and tend to qualify as war crimes in a context of war if civilian’s adnoun-combatants are deliberately targeted. The violent act is generally meant to be ‘exemplary’ and serves the aim of intimidating, impressing or coercing third parties linked, directly or indirectly, to the victims. (SCHMID, 2011, p. 78).

Through the use of violence, a group, or movement obtain compliance from a society and pressure a government to act according to the terrorist desire, as shown by Kydd and Walter (2006, p. 50):

terrorist violence is a form of costly signaling. Terrorists are too weak to impose their will directly by force of arms. They are sometimes strong enough, however, to persuade audiences to do as they wish by altering the audience’s beliefs about such matters as

the terrorist's ability to impose costs and their degree of commitment to their cause. Given the conflict of interest between terrorists and their targets, ordinary communication or "cheap talk" is insufficient to change minds or influence behavior. If al-Qaida had informed the United States on September 10, 2001, that it would kill 3,000 Americans unless the United States withdrew from Saudi Arabia, the threat might have sparked concern, but it would not have had the same impact as the attacks that followed. Because it is hard for weak actors to make credible threats, terrorists are forced to display publicly just how far they are willing to go to obtain their desired results.

The pressured government, however, as it has the monopoly of the legitimate use of force (including lethal force), may decide to use it against the violent perpetrators of the act to protect the society, causing an escalation on violence and maybe leading to overreaction by security forces. As a consequence, the violence of terrorism has second and third effects which are the main objectives of violence. Nevertheless, only violence is not enough to point to the occurrence of terrorism.

The second element is the political message or objectives that terrorism tries to communicate through the violent acts. For years, media has reported terrorism as the use of violence without any goal beyond revenge, or desire to produce fear in an enemy population (KYDD; WALTER, 2006, p. 51). However, one must recognize that Terrorism is not merely "criminal" or psychotic violence, it must have political objectives. In political science, Schmid explains, politics is usually defined in terms of one or several of the following concepts: policy, power, authority, state, resource allocation and/or conflict (SCHMID, 2011, p. 77). It is essential to differentiate common criminal violence from terrorism, and determining the political nature of terrorism is indeed one of the most important distinctive elements. As it presents a quite broad concept, the context of an action will classify its political aspect. Kydd and Walter (2006, p. 52, italics by the author) developed a study considering the goals of terrorist actions, where they concluded: Although the ultimate goals of terrorists have varied over time, five have had enduring importance: regime change, territorial change, policy change, social control, and status quo maintenance.

The five enduring terrorist goals present a political nature that, even though do not limit the possible objectives, give context to the interpretation, as the authors continued explaining each one of them:

Regime change is the overthrow of a government and its replacement with one led by the terrorists or at least one more to their liking. Most Marxist groups, including the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) in Peru have sought this goal. Territorial change is taking territory away from a state either to establish a new state (as the Tamil Tigers seek to do in Tamil areas of Sri Lanka) or to join another state (as Lashkar-e Tayyiba would like to do by incorporating Indian Kashmir into Pakistan). Policy change is a broader category of lesser demands, such as al-Qaida's demand that the United States

drop its support for Israel and corrupt Arab regimes such as Saudi Arabia. Social control constrains the behavior of individuals, rather than the state. In the United States, the Ku Klux Klan sought the continued oppression of African Americans after the Civil War. More recently, anti-abortion groups have sought to kill doctors who perform abortions to deter other doctors from providing this service. Finally, status quo maintenance is the support of an existing regime or a territorial arrangement against political groups that seek to change it. Many right-wing paramilitary organizations in Latin America, such as the United Self-Defense Force of Colombia, have sought this goal. Protestant paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland supported maintenance of the territorial status quo (Northern Ireland as British territory) against IRA demands that the territory is transferred to Ireland (KYDD; WALTER, 2006, p. 52-53).

Observing the five goals showed by Ibid. (2006, p. 54-55), it is particularly difficult to find the relation between “social control” and political message. Even the authors recognize that in a table, placed at pages 54 and 55, there is no terrorist organization, among the 42 Foreign Terrorist Organizations recognized by the US State Department, and listed there that pursued social control as their objective. However, they warn that that list is not exhaustive, nor representative of all terrorist groups, and add that some domestic groups are more interested in social control. Disputing the argument presented by the authors, this paper proposes that social control can be a secondary objective of a terrorist organization, as a tool to intimidate, to provoke a reaction, or to force compliance of a group in order to obtain the government maintenance of status quo (keeping a policy), or to force government to change its policy. Therefore, social control will not be sought alone, but correlated to other political objectives, and thus this paper will consider as a context of political objectives to define terrorism, only the other four presented by Kydd and Walter (2006): regime change, territorial change, policy change, and maintenance of status quo.

The third element is the targeting of civilians. The threat-based communication of terrorist deeds works only because anyone can become a victim of terrorism, being this random factor what gives strength to the message. Targeting civilians or civilian targets is the element that sets it apart from other forms of violence. Richardson (2006, p. 6) states that “The final and most important defining characteristic of terrorism is the deliberate targeting of civilians. This is what sets terrorism apart from other forms of political violence, even the most proximate form, guerrilla warfare”. When defining this characteristic, this paper, in the same way that Richardson and also Ganor indicate, prefers to use civilians, instead of designating as innocents, or non-combatants.

‘Innocent’(as opposed to ‘civilian’) is a subjective concept, influenced by the definer’s viewpoint, and therefore must not be the basis for a definition of terro-

rism. The use of the concept “innocent” in defining terrorism makes the definition meaningless and turns it into a tool in the political game (GANOR, 2010, p. 4).

Richardson agrees with Ganor and shows how the term “innocent” can lead to different interpretations, giving room to relativism:

Terrorists have elevated practices that are normally seen as the excesses of warfare to routine practice, striking noncombatants not as an unintended side effect but as a deliberate strategy. They insist that those who pay taxes to a government are responsible for their actions whether they are Russians or Americans. Besayev declared ‘all Russians fair game because they pay taxes. They give approval in word and deed. They are all responsible’. Bin Laden similarly said of Americans, ‘He is the enemy of ours whether he fights us directly or merely pays his taxes’ (RICHARDSON, 2006, p. 6).

Considering all these arguments, it does not present importance whether the political objectives of a group are considered just, or morally justifiable, if this group deliberately targets civilians in order to achieve those ends, it must be classified as terrorism, no matter one supports or likes their objectives.

Most terrorists consider themselves freedom fighters. . . Whether they are fighting from repression or freedom to impose a repressive theocracy, to suggest that a freedom fighter cannot be a terrorist is to confuse ends and means. The fact that terrorists may claim to be freedom fighters does not mean that we should concede the point that all citizens of a democracy are legitimate targets because they have the option of changing their government. and therefore responsible for their governments’ actions (RICHARDSON, 2006, p. 9-10).

After taking into consideration all academic arguments, as well as the evolutionary meaning of terrorism, this research will define terrorism as the deliberate use of violence, or threat of violence, to target civilians, or civilian targets, to achieve political objectives. Even though the definition with which this paper will work seems to be too narrow for a complex phenomenon, as well as for all academic arguments considered, there must be considered that all academic studies give context to the legislator produce the law, and to the Judicial system apply the fair judgment. Even Schmid (2011, p. 85), one of the most respectful researchers about terrorism, when discussing a definition of terrorism that could be accepted by everyone, argued that “Such a full consensus will never be reached. Yet what we can hope for is that a majority of academic analysts can agree on the core elements”. As a consequence,

since this paper will compare a widely accepted academic definition with anti-terrorist legislation, it must be considered that the text of legal documents defines a criminal act that must be avoided for the sake of life in society. Such text is written within a context and clearly states what the criminal action is. Therefore, working in a consensual academic definition with this objective, a not too large text with the elements that define the action might be better understood, as well as more efficiently applied. Furthermore, according to cultural characteristics, or regional context, the other definitional elements recommended by Schmid may be added to the article of that law, in form of paragraphs and items, in order to refine the definition or clarify any needed aspect.

Finally, in this sense, it is also important to avoid confusion and to register in the body of the law what terrorism is not. In Schmid's opinion, this list should contain the following ten elements:

1. mere acts of property damage, as well as acts of sabotage such as interrupting the flow of an oil pipeline, even when the saboteurs are engaging in acts of terrorism on other occasions;
2. attacks on military installations, aircraft, navy vessels, barracks, and the like, which are guarded, even when those who attack military installations or personnel are otherwise also engaging in acts of terrorism;
3. attacks on police stations and armed police on patrol during an armed conflict in zones of combat;
4. cases of collateral damage where the targeting of civilians was not deliberate (e.g. when an attack on a police station misfires and civilians are (also) victims);
5. cases of attacks on secular or religious symbols unless such an attack is combined with the victimization of people (an attack on a church known to be empty would not qualify; an attack on a church, mosque or synagogue where people are sheltering would);
6. certain types of assassinations, for example, when the direct victim is the only target, as opposed to de-individualized murder where the victim serves only as a message generator to reach a wider audience;
7. acts which if a situation of war existed would not qualify as war crimes, nor be crimes against humanity or grave breaches of the laws of war;
8. guerrilla warfare activities that are not war crimes, crimes against humanity or grave breaches of humanitarian law;
9. acts of legal use of force by legitimate authorities to impose public order when acting with restraint and in proportion to the threat and within the boundaries of the rule of law;
10. acts of (collective) political violence which are spontaneous, as in riots, demonstrations and other forms of public protest and dissent; industrial action (strikes) and revolts (SCHMID, 2011, p. 84).

3 THE BRAZILIAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK AGAINST TERRORISM COMPARED TO ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND ACADEMIC DEFINITION

From the legal perspective, Brazil addresses terrorism in its higher legal document, the Federal Constitution, approved in 1988. In its Article 4, the country establishes the repudiation of terrorism as a principle of the Federative Republic of Brazil, showing, with a list of other nine principles, the conditions to fight this threat internally, or to cooperate with others in this subject:

Article 4 – The international relations of the Federative Republic of Brazil are governed by the following principles:

- I. national independence;
- II. prevalence of human rights;
- III. self-determination of the peoples;
- IV. non-intervention;
- V. equality among the States;
- VI. defense of peace;
- VII. peaceful settlement of conflicts;
- VIII. repudiation of terrorism and racism;
- IX. cooperation among peoples for the progress of mankind;
- X. granting of political asylum (BRASIL, 1988, p. 11).

Following this article, the constitutional text still deals with the subject in the Article 5, item LXIII, stating that the practice of terrorism shall be considered by law as non-bailable and not subject to grace or amnesty, and their principals, or agents shall be held liable (BRASIL, 1988, p. 13).

Similarly, in the international context, Brazil has signed, among others, the Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism in 1973, from the Organization of American States, which was ratified by Brazilian Congress only in 1999¹⁶:

The contracting states undertake to cooperate among themselves by taking all the measures that they may consider effective, under their own laws, and especially those established in this convention, to prevent and punish acts of terrorism, especially kidnapping, murder, and other assaults against the life or physical integrity of those persons to whom the state has the duty according to international law to give special protection, as well as extortion in connection with those crimes (ORGANIZAÇÃO DOS ESTADOS AMERICANOS, 1970).

¹⁶ Brazil is a signatory of international treaties that promote the fight against terrorist practices and is therefore subject to them. This is the case of: Brasil (2000, 2002, 2005). For example. However, as they are not the subject of this research, they will not be listed or analyzed.

All international agreements signed and ratified by Brazil expressed the intention to cooperate with the international effort to prevent and punish acts of terrorism. Nevertheless, even though the Federal Constitution and international agreements address terrorism in their texts, recognizing it as a crime that must be repudiated, as well as its authors must be submitted to the justice, the national legal framework typified this crime only in 2016, approving the Law number 13,260 in the March 16th of 2016, a few days before the beginning of the Olympic Games in Brazil.

This law is the main Brazilian legal instrument to put in practice the intentions expressed in the Constitution and in international agreements. For the first time, Brazilian legislators defined terrorism as:

Article 2 – Terrorism consists of the practice by one or more individuals of the acts foreseen in this article, for reasons of xenophobia, discrimination or prejudice of race, color, ethnicity and religion, when committed with the purpose of provoking social or generalized terror, exposing danger to a person, property, public peace or public safety. (BRASIL, 2016, translated by the author).

The definition presented by this law was so open and poorly framed that the legislator felt the necessity to clarify the concept, giving a list of the acts that must be considered terrorism on § 1º of Article 2º:

§ 1º – The acts of terrorism are:

I. use or threaten to use, transport, store, carry or bring with oneself explosives, toxic gases, poisons, biological, chemical, nuclear or other means capable of causing damage or causing mass destruction;

II. (VETOED);

III. (VETOED);

IV. to sabotage the operation or to seize, with violence, a serious threat to the person or using cybernetic mechanisms, the total or partial control, even temporarily, means of communication or transportation, ports, airports, railway or bus stations, hospitals, health homes, schools, sports stadiums, public facilities or places where essential public services operate, power generation or transmission facilities, military installations, oil and gas refining and processing facilities and institutions banking and its service network;

V. attempt against the life or physical integrity of a person: Penalty - imprisonment, from twelve to thirty years, in addition to the sanctions corresponding to the threat or violence (BRASIL, 2016, translated by the author).

After reading and analyzing the definition of terrorism in this law, it is clear that the legislator did not take into consideration the academic perspective of terrorism, nor the historical evolution of its meaning.

Looking into the definition of the crime presented on the heading of the Article 2, it is possible to see that from the three elements that characterize the phenomenon terrorism in the academic environment, the use of violence is present through the interpretation of the acts listed as terrorism on the paragraph. On the other hand, there is no provision of the threat of use of violence, which proved to be important means to instill fear, keeping the random character of their victims.

The other essential element to define terrorism, the civilian nature of targets is poorly addressed. In fact, the nature of targets is listed, instead of being defined as civilian persons, or civilian targets. The legislator opted for giving an exhaustive list of possible targets that permits identify an act as terrorism, but, according to this research, the civilian nature of the target is essential to differentiate terrorism from other types of political violence, and therefore must be characterized on the definition.

Finally, the third definitional aspect of terrorism, its political message, was not mentioned in the text of the law, which makes it difficult to differentiate terrorism from other types of crimes. Instead of it, the legislator presents some motivations, related to xenophobia, or discrimination for ethnic and religious reasons, since that the perpetrator has the intention of generating social terror. This is arguably a wide concept for any purpose and does not keep coherence with the political nature of terrorism.

Furthermore, this law has been criticized by lawyers and law researchers and academics because this law also criminalizes the preparatory acts in its Article 5, “Carry out preparatory acts of terrorism with the unequivocal purpose of consummating such a crime” (translated by the author). The critics state that the preparatory acts are part of “Iter Criminis”, also known as “Path of Crime”, which deals with the steps of the agent to commit a particular crime. (BRASIL, 2016). Thus, first, there is the cogitation, which is when the agent plans in his mind the typical fact. Subsequently, the preparatory actions, which refer to the moment when the agent begins to obtain the necessary means for the practice of the crime. The following step is the execution actions, which is treated when the agent begins to practice the crime; and finally the consummation when the agent reaches its objective.

As a consequence, some researchers defend that this provision is indeed illegal, but the problem here is merely definitional. As the law fails to identify the threat of use of violence at the same level of the use of violence when defining terrorism, the legislator made it not clear that the crime of terrorism is yet on its execution once a person has a plan of action, and has already gathered the means to execute a violent action. As it was made evident during the analysis of academic definitions of terrorism (item 2.2 of this paper), the threat of use of violence has an important function to keep the random possibility of attacking anyone, anywhere, at any time. Therefore, if the law definition of terrorism had included the “use of violence, or the threat of use of violence”, there would have no necessity to state in the law that the preparatory acts are punishable, once the designated preparatory acts are actually the execution of terrorism, as explained before. Notwithstanding, it is crucial to characterize the

threat to use violence, with solid evidence of the intention (planning, communication), the material to be used, and the capability to execute the plan, causing some sort of damage, or putting civilian persons or civilian targets at risk.

Additionally, the legislator found it necessary to determine what is not to be terrorism, as it is in § 2º of Article 2 of the law:

§ 2º – The provisions of this article do not apply to the individual or collective conduct of persons in political, social, trade union, religious, class, or professional categories, directed by social or demanding purposes, in order to question, criticize, protest or support, with the purpose of defending constitutional rights, guarantees and freedoms, without prejudice to the criminal classification contained in law (BRASIL, 2016, translated by the author).

With this provision, as it is understood by this paper, the legislator expresses its thorough care in order not to mistake the definition of the criminal action, warning that persons of social movements or class organizations, when are demanding purposes in a democratic regime, should not be considered terrorists. Besides this aspect, it is essential to assure the freedom of assembly and speech, as some of the imperative aspects of the rule of law. This same issue was presented by Schmid (2011), following the advice of Thomas H. Mitchell who, given the heterogeneous nature of the terrorist phenomenon, suggested that a definition of terrorism must clearly establish what terrorism is not (SCHMID, 2011, p. 84).

However, the text of the § 2º, Article 2 grants law protection for eventual terrorist actions from that group of persons, what does not keep coherence with the academic idea about the subject, since the academic research recommended not to consider terrorism only the “acts of (collective) political violence which are spontaneous, as in riots, demonstrations and other forms of public protest and dissent; industrial actions (strikes) and revolts.” (SCHMID, 2011, p. 84, italics by the author).

This means that once a movement with social, political, or labor (or any) motivation begins a legit action, and it spontaneously turns into a violent action, it must not be considered terrorism. This is because terrorism must be the deliberate use of violence, with a previously developed plan and assembled material. Therefore, considering this specific lack of coherence with academic definition of terrorism, this paragraph grants a safeguard for those listed persons to practice terrorist actions under the protection of the law, which cannot be considered adequate.

Nevertheless, the anti-terrorism law brings important aspects to criminalize terrorism. As it became a multidisciplinary action, when addressing this issue, it is imperative that the related activities also be criminalized. This what this law does when defines as illegal and punishable the actions in support of terrorist actions, such as: the association to terrorism Article 3º (to promote, to provide assistance); to recruit; Article 5º to give protection or hide terrorists; Article 6º to provide, offer, obtain, guard, or store resources for the planning, pre-

paration, or execution of acts of terrorism; to take part in specific training; to raise funds, to cooperate to raise funds, or collaborate to money laundering (BRASIL, 2016).

4 RECOMMENDATIONS

The approval of the Law 13.260/2016 is a significant step towards Brazil's intentions expressed in its Constitution and international agreements signed over the past. After a thorough research of the definitional aspects of terrorism, as well as their comparison to the main legal instrument of Brazilian legal framework, this paper presents some conclusions and recommendations in order to strength the judicial security and enhance effectiveness to the fight against terrorism.

First of all, it is essential that the law defines terrorism addressing the three main elements that allow anyone to identify an act as terrorism: the use of violence and the threat of use of violence; to attack civilian persons or civilian targets; and the political message intended with the actions. It means to replace the Article 2º of the law for a text that presents all the three elements listed here. As a suggestion, it is presented the following definition: "terrorism is the deliberate use of violence, or the threat to use violence, to attack civilians, or civilian targets, in order to achieve political objectives" (BRASIL, 2016).

Considering that the definition needs to explain what the political objectives are, the suggestion is to establish a group of objectives that characterize the crime against the State, or its sovereignty, as it was presented by Kydd and Walter (2006). This idea should be a paragraph of the article that defines terrorism. As a proposition, it could include: § 1º - The political objectives referred on the head of this article should represent an aggression against the State, whether being Brazil or other countries, including I – Regime Change; II – Territorial Change; III – Policy Change; and IV – Status Quo Maintenance.

Further research into the definition of what can be considered "political objectives", deepening the meanings to the findings of Kydd and Walter (2006), may give even more accuracy to the constituent items of the proposed law

Additionally, as the definition of terrorism contains the three elements of the academic definition, it is not necessary to keep the list of actions that must be considered terrorism, being recommended suppress the § 1º of Article 2º. The same way, as the criminal definition upholds the threat of use of violence as important as the use of violence, it is not necessary to keep Articles 5º and 10º on the text of the law. If it is decided to keep it, it must avoid the expression "preparation actions", replacing it by "the threat of use of violence, characterized by previous planning, communications or other actions of coordination for a terrorist act, or the property of the correspondent material to be used". On the other hand, it is essential to keep the ideas expressed in § 1º and 2º of Article 5º.

Finally, it is recommended to adequate the definition of what terrorism is not, as the § 2º of Article 2º, passing it to be written in this suggested way: "in order to assure the freedom to assemble, and the freedom of speech, acts of collective political violence, as an

unplanned spontaneous consequence of riots, demonstrations, strikes, and other forms of public protest and dissent must not be considered terrorism”.

As a conclusion, it must be considered that keeping coherence with an impartial academic definition, Brazil will assure better conditions to cooperate in an international effort to eliminate this global threat, as well as it will have the acknowledge and authority to avoid, or to disapprove biased definitions regarding terrorism. This step will reinforce Brazil’s role in the regional and global order, showing the traditional impartiality that characterizes its foreign relations policy throughout history.

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Military leadership under stress

Liderazgo militar bajo estrés

Abstract: There is a lot of published theory about the skills, qualities and abilities that a leader should have to be followed faithfully by his subordinates, but there is very little written about which ones are really important, those that he must have inescapably and without which that person could not be a true leader. It is also easy to make decisions when there is time, when there is nothing at stake because we are in peacetime or it is an exercise. In this research, I intend to investigate what are those qualities that a leader must have, first in general terms and second especially when under pressure or when the decision can result in people dying or when they are in a complicated scenario such as the current missions of Iraq or Afghanistan. In this regard, I want to get into what stress is, what stress means to a soldier and how he copes with it and if there are special techniques to train resilience and be able to make stronger and better prepared leaders in the Officer and NCO Schools of the countries of our environment. In addition to that, I want to analyze if it is true that there is what it is called "loneliness of a leader" and just in case, investigate what are the main supports that a leader should have to handle that isolation, that loneliness when taking important decisions.

Keywords: Stress. Resilience. Leadership. Intuition. Error. Loneliness of a leader.

Resumen: Hay mucha teoría publicada sobre las habilidades, las cualidades y las capacidades que un líder debería tener para ser seguido fielmente por sus subordinados pero hay muy poco escrito sobre cuáles son las realmente importantes, las que debe tener ineludiblemente y sin las cuales esa persona no podría ser un auténtico líder. Además es fácil tomar decisiones cuando hay tiempo, cuando no hay nada en juego porque estamos en tiempo de paz o es un ejercicio. En este estudio pretendo investigar sobre cuáles son esas cualidades que debe tener un líder, en primer lugar en términos generales y en segundo lugar especialmente cuando se está bajo presión o cuando la decisión puede traer como consecuencia que muera gente o cuando se está en un escenario complicado como es el de las misiones actuales de Irak o Afganistán. A este respecto, quiero entrar en lo que es el estrés, que significa el estrés para un soldado y como lo afronta y si hay técnicas especiales para entrenar la resiliencia y poder hacer líderes más fuertes y mejor preparados en las Escuelas de Oficiales y Suboficiales de los países de nuestro entorno. Además, quiero analizar si es cierto que existe lo que llaman "Soledad del Mando" y en su caso investigar cuales pueden ser los principales apoyos que puede tener un líder para manejar ese aislamiento, esa soledad, a la hora de tomar decisiones importantes.

Palabras-clave: Estres. Resiliencia. Liderazgo. Intuición. Error. Soledad del mando.

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1 INTRODUCTION

Warren Bennis, one of the leadership gurus, said: "Leadership is like beauty, difficult to define but easy to perceive when you see it" (FERNÁNDEZ CARREÑO, 2011, p. 2, our translation). And this is the main problem professional soldiers encounter, that we talk about something that is difficult to define and what we don't all understand the same. You perceive it when you have a boss who commands with ease, that when he speaks he has that charisma that makes us look at him carefully and follow him in what he orders us, especially because we are convinced that it is what should be done, but it is certainly not a characteristic that all the bosses that we have met have, some because they are shy others because they are not accustomed to command troops or feel themselves more comfortable in teaching positions or as analysts.

Commanding men and women is a difficult task, requires a lot of dedication, being close to your subordinates, knowing what are the dreams, challenges or problems of those people you are addressing, knowing that each person has a different attitude towards the life and that on many occasions you will be required to bring them up and give them a great motivation so that in the key moments they are one hundred percent involved in the mission and not with their heads in their own troubles.

The leader is made, without any doubt, although it may help that by genetics he already has a predisposition, by his physical capacity, empathy or common sense and the only way for a person to become a true leader is by having experiences in which he is able to observe other Chiefs, living moments where he has to take decisions in front of his men, where he suffers the same vicissitudes as his subordinates, enduring physical, mental fatigue and where he may acquire skills to give orders at any moment regardless of the place or situation. Besides that experience, the detailed knowledge of his men and women, the situation or the moment, it will give him a thing called INTUITION that will probably also be important to be a good leader. The main reasons for this research go along that line; find out which are the fundamental qualities that a leader must have to be able to take consistent decisions and discover which are the best supports a leader may have especially during stressful times or under big pressure.

Training, training and more training is clue for being updated in combat procedures and the best way to build up a team where everyone trusts everyone.

When you are on a real mission, there are many times when there are risks, times when you have to take really important decisions that can cause the death of your men and women or follow them all alive, times when the pressure and stress drown you but you have to make a quick decision and your subordinates are waiting for you to guide them ... in those moments when you feel lonely, you are afraid to screw up and make the wrong decision because your men will follow you equally. In your mind is the fear of being wrong and this error can lead to losing some of them, ultimately to fail them as a leader. This is a secondary reason for the investigation, trying to take away the fear of error, to take the decision they don't expect, to manage stress in those situations. At last time during the research I will try

to find new ideas that may help officers' schools to form leaders who are able to command with ease in this era of asymmetric fighting that is normally carried out in urban environments and where you don't know when it is a citizen or an enemy the person you meet on the street.

Summarizing, during the investigation that I am going to carry out, I intend first to conduct interviews with well-known Spanish leaders, high-ranking military officers who lived special circumstances in complex missions, then I will conduct some questionnaires that will be answered by students of the Staff Course and the General Officer's Promotion Course that are being developed in my country from where I intend to extract some interesting facts about leadership in complex scenarios or under stress

Later, by reading in detail books of famous international leaders, usually American Generals and specialized books on decision making under great stress and stress management in different circumstances, I want to draw conclusions that will determine how to handle this stress in complex scenarios.

2 DISCUSSION

Lieutenant General Frederic J. Brown stressed that: "the genuinely new demands of leadership have been presented from the events of 9/11".

As of that date, the expectation of fighting an enemy in an exclusively conventional way is over, we have been in a decade in which the new operating environment requires leaders to become familiar with another type of combat in which the areas of operations are mixed, urban and rural, the enemy is difficult to see because he is camouflaged among the people, sometimes he is a citizen and at other times a fighter who plays as he pleases with social networks showing real or false images in a world in which western societies are not ready to afford collateral damages.

"The strongest does not live longer, but the one that best adapts" and this saying reflects the importance of "adaptability" in current operations that present many complex challenges for which there are no solutions that could have been studied in any military school. The doctrine goes far behind technology and ways of fighting and no longer provides any solution to the problems you encounter in the areas of operations. Our enemies have greatly improved their capabilities, get easily very advanced technology and know how to exploit our weaknesses.

Some books talk about adaptive leadership, about the importance of creating a cohesive team that can be trusted in critical moments but for a leader all that is not enough. There is concern for people themselves, how to manage a team made by people in which everyone has a life, a family, a problem, emotions, dreams and uncertainties. Preparing leaders to face these challenges is not an easy task, they must be continually tested, trained in difficult situations in which they have to solve the problems and trying to get them under pressure and stress.

The center of gravity of any army in the world is the combatant, and everything in his support is usually the first priority (UNITED STATES, 2019). Training, good equipment and

motivation are basic needs to carry out any mission, but above all of this, it's need a person who leads you, who leads the team, a man or woman in which the team has total confidence and the one that you would follow above all, even if it would be precise to give what the most precious thing a human could give in the name of his nation...the life itself.

Humanity always needed leaders although models have been different throughout history, they have always existed and will always exist. It is often said that there are physical differences between the leaders and those who follow him but more than physical, they are psychic; self-confidence, serenity, focus and motivation are the most pronounced differences between one and the others.

This is precisely what the leadership is about; in inspiring confidence, in giving security to the team that the decisions that are taken as rare as they may seem are the right ones, especially in critical situations.

There are a big number of qualities that can be demanded from a leader or that can be assumed to have them, although they do not always show them, the most typical are; honesty, integrity, decision-making ability, technical preparation, good shape, long-term vision, set specific goals, be enthusiastic and transmit that stimulus to his or her team, have charisma, be demanding with them and with himself, be consistent, but amongst of all these and others, we want to find those considered the really important ones to be true leaders and especially in complicated situations. We must not confuse leadership with the ability to command, being a leader is much more than that, it has to do with your abilities to inspire confidence and commitment as well as to motivate your team at all times.

We are not talking about leaders of large Units because normally they will always have time to make a decision, they will have an advisory team and even if they are under pressure, it will never be the same as the heads of small Units that are fighting Talibans or Al-Qaeda warriors in each corner of a small lost village and have to take decisions in a hostile environment and very close to the enemy. It is here that we are going to emphasize, in the Chiefs who lead small Units in combat zones.

The Commanders also have to fight very often against the excess of information and with the need of the superior Chiefs to know each movement that his Unit makes. In many cases, decisions based on information received from higher levels must be made. In this case, advanced technology can be a problem because they give you so much information that it takes you a long time to read and process it, thus delaying decision making. And sometimes one dreams of getting a piece of that vital information to arrive just to be sure you take the right decision and makes your subordinates wait and wait (ROGERS, 1994). This is the typical case that we have technologically very advanced means that make us delay the decision making process due to the volume of information or by waiting for that part of information that can give us the solution to a problem. We must prevent our leaders from being prisoners of technology and being able to take decisions more quickly, more intuitively and imaginatively.

This is reflected in several western doctrine books, the leader must in many occasions quickly make decisions based solely on his judgment and common sense not having to wait for a detailed analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the different lines of action.

On the other hand, the need to know of the superior commanders often interferes with your ability to command, the constant questions of what has happened, how you have reacted, how many are injured etc ... limit your ability to decide and alter your mood, taking you sometimes to stress.

At Officers and NCOs' schools, chiefs of small or medium size units are formed through a rigid method of planning and decision-making that is practiced on numerous occasions in classrooms or rock-drills in which orders take time to be distributed because they reach too much limits detailed of what is intended, leaving the chiefs of subordinate units little space for their imagination or intuition and that once in the exercise does not respond to the fluctuations of the combat re-issuing new orders and so on (THE PRUSSIANS..., 2010).

Leaders are people who have acquired experiences participating in real missions, suffering the same vicissitudes as their subordinates and have been motivated by someone, some charismatic Chief they had and who left them a good mark and somehow follow a style similar to his, adapted to the new times. But in any case it is essential to be willing to offer motivation to your team and offer passion in everything you do.

It is when you realize that not only the acquired knowledge and its application are enough, in addition to that there is a way of being, of seeing things, of sharing with others, you have to be one hundred percent authentic, do not try to imitate anyone, with your failures and your successes but always passionate about what is coming (FERNÁNDEZ CARREÑO, 2011). The leader has to carry out two main tasks; direct and command towards the achievement of an objective. Direct that we can define as the way to carry out resources and ideas and command that is the way to guide people and join all the efforts.

As director, he assigns the objective to be achieved and the purpose that is intended to be achieved by assigning tasks and coordinating the actions to reach it. These are fundamentally technical knowledge.

As commander, he combines and coordinates efforts to unite the results of what the subordinates have achieved with their own in order to achieve the final objective, which requires knowledge of how to motivate, influence, delegate and demand what are fundamentally human abilities.

Very important here is not to lose orientation towards achieving the ultimate goal of the superior command.

The true leader has AUTHORITY ... not because he is the Chief or the highest rank, but because he has earned it with his example, with his dedication, with his personal preparation and his team will always follow him, he has earned everyone's respect, there are no gaps in internal relationships and the team endorses his moral authority. In this case, you have to run away from the toxic leader, the one who rules only because he has the rank and believes he has always the reason, the one who is usually despotic and unreasonable. It is what is called POTESITAS .. it is the

established power, which is obligatory to obey. That boss who depends on how every morning comes that may be heaven or hell or that boss who shouts, threatens, humiliates or slanders. That kind of bosses who want to reach a goal and don't care about the means or the ways to reach them that boss who always demands and never rewards (REED, 2005).

Another fundamental quality of a true leader is COMMUNICATION, he must be very detailed in this aspect, he must make very clear to his subordinates what the mission is, which is intended, why, how, when, if it is part of a major operation or not, what are the escape routes, possible interferences, what to do in case of doubt. A general said that subordinates often seem to listen to what you are saying but most of the time they do not get to hear more than half so you have to be patient, talk to them repeatedly, repeat to satiety all that is important for them to know and avoid the superfluous. You must not die drowning in vain things.

The third fundamental quality is the MOTIVATION and this is a difficult challenge of a true leader. Keep your team ready, eager to act whatever the mission is, with initiative, with positive mentality. All this can be achieved, being close to them, knowing them very well and having absolute confidence in them and their abilities and having said that so many times. The commander has to know in detail the life of each one, their dreams or their problems, whether they have family or not and talk to them, give them the option of choosing to give their version of things, remembering that a handshake, a word of well done or keep it up, are fundamental to their self-confidence.

If I summarize these three fundamental qualities, the leader is the person who is able to inspire, motivate and impress his team due to his special faculties, the confidence he inspires, his way of achieving the objectives, his ability to act and express himself and the faith he generates in his subordinates.

However, this is easy to apply in exercises or low risk situations. When we add the component of stress, or danger, or the feeling of being in a great disadvantage in relation to the enemy or that you don't know where the threat may sudden pop up from is when you really have to be a leader, your decisions may cause very serious troubles to your team.

How stress materializes, how it affects your physical condition or your relationship with other people or in this case decision making, is something that we will deepen next.

Stress is characterized, for creating situations that exceed the tolerance limits of people who are exposed to them (BARDERA; GARCÍA-SILGO; PASTOR, 2014).

Leadership is becoming very important in the teaching and training of military commanders and military psychologists have been preparing this issue for some time trying to create models for stress management and talking about training programs aimed at developing the innate and acquired resilience capacity of people facing physical or psychosocial stress, where they talk about group cohesion, teamwork, positive climate of the team but do not address the aspect in areas of operations or complex scenarios.”

There is already a similar modern military concept known as "RESILIENCE" to which the Royal Academy of the Spanish language defines as "the human capacity to flexibly assume borderline situations and overcome them" (RESILIENCIA..., 2020, n.p. our translation).

These same psychologists explain that there are internal factors that have demonstrated modulating effects on health and performance, which can be biological, such as physical strength that includes physical training, healthy diet and healthy lifestyle and psychophysiological, such as self-control, affection; positive thinking, realism, acceptance or self-awareness; altruism; spirituality (related, or not, to religion); and the experience. Some internal factors are directly related to having positive interpersonal relationships or giving and receiving social support while others are able to control and reduce the physiological responses of anxiety in stressful situations.

Stress usually produces a feeling of tiredness and fatigue, headaches, sleep disorders (insomnia, hypersomnia, nightmares, etc.), sweating, excessive dry mouth, which results in combat in lack of attention and concentration, rigid thinking, nervousness, anxiety, obfuscation, wrong decision making, mental blockages, increased reaction time and less efficiency that often leads to aggressiveness and anger.

All these symptoms being the Chief can be transferred to the general environment of the team, manifesting then an alteration in the general mood that can lead to personal conflicts, boredom, unjustified sadness and cynicism.

When in a complex environment, soldiers have episodes of all these types but under the leadership of the commander, they keep those symptoms under control without knowing it, but they have them latent and can jump at any time in case of a degradation of the situation. Excessive heat, fatigue, hours of uncertainty and risk undermine each other's mental strength and there is no time to rest, or to escape from what is around you, this is a real combat. There comes the true leader who at that time should increase the degree of flexibility to relax the environment, talk to the people on his team and have them on hand trying to ask and involve them in decision making. Important qualities are the ability to actively face complicated situations, be optimistic that clearly dampens tension, have good mood, have emotional intelligence, empathy but the fundamentals are TRUST AND SELF CONFIDENCE in oneself, and UNION AND COHESION of the team. No matter what we do, where or when ... but together!

There is an important link between experience and self confidence that usually includes training and technological competence. All these values provides the leader the knowledge to make intuitive decisions but it is also desirable that at all levels of command, it is essential to achieve team cohesion, a very valuable factor in achieving effectiveness and promoting the initiative of subordinate commanders.

INTUITION is the other one of the most important values that a leader should have in complex situations. Although it may seem that it is very fragile value since it is only based on feeling or perceptions, according to our research, yes, it is very important for the decision-making process of any person.

Let's understand what intuition is, or perhaps is not and if it has any impact on decision making process. Then we can assess its relevance and look at ways of developing it. We will go in deep into this due to it's always controversial. Webster's Dictionary defines intuition as "the immediate knowing of something without the conscious use of reasoning" (ROGERS, 1994, p. 39). In many reports has also been described as "instinct" or "hunch." The problem with these

words is that they lead you to perceptions of the senses that have no academic endorsement. The problem of trying to develop intuition in our future leaders lies in their own experiences, which requires analyzing and paying attention to non-visible details that makes it difficult to accept decisions made only by intuition. This type of teaching is not well developed and therefore it is not yet credible to take it as a subject to teach or practice.

Intuition or hunch is much more widespread in commercial activities than in the military itself where that intuition can cause the death of people or allow them to stay alive. On the other hand, not all solutions are in high-level computing machines or software. The difficulty lies in its lack of scientific credibility.

Lieutenant General César Muro said that instinct is very important because it gathers all your experience, your preparation and your skills as Chief, since you are quickly able to weigh the advantages and risks and make an imaginative decision. You have to think about the opportunity it gives you but also be prepared to assume a mistake. That quickness or mental agility is clue to decide before the enemy does so and be in better condition than him for the next phase. It is said that Winston Churchill had an intuitive leadership in contrast with his main assessor during the second world war, Sir Alan Francis Brooke, that provided him a safety net being very pragmatic..

Major General Smith (UK Army) said he only once made an “instant decision” in the Gulf War (ROGERS, 1994, p. 40). Although this might suggest that decisions made by deep analysis are more the norm and the preferred and safer way of coming to decisions for the battlefield commanders, this is arguably incorrect as the situation during the “IO&hour” war did not require such instant or intuitive decisions to be made at division level,.., The use of instinct or intuition in decision making is related to lack of information and time available and is more useful in battle command than in battle preparation,

Experience says that once a commander has received his orders and mission, he will use intuition to decide on his plan. This will be a rapid process that will be based on his experience and knowledge, emphasizing the effect he wants to have on the enemy.

We need our armies to produce leaders with an intuitive sixth sense that guides their decision making on the complex modern battlefield. Is part of the past that leaders have an “attritionalist” attitude, leading their soldiers into combat relying totally on material superiority and unimaginative approach.

There is a phrase that I consider very well written by Marshal Castello Branco that says: “Ao chef nao cabe ter medo das ideias, nem mesmo das ideias novas. E preciso, isto sim, nao perder tempo, empreende-las e relaiza-las até o fim” (The Chief should not be afraid of ideas, not even new ideas. It is necessary not to waste time, undertake them and relay them to the end.)

It is said that Hitler was an intuitive leader too that succeeded at the very beginning in the France and Russian front showing a certain genius but at the end that intuition failed resoundingly. Without a doubt, leading with intuition alone is something that has a great risk

Beverly Alim Metcalfe, senior lecturer in organizational psychology at Leeds University, said that intuition is, in reality, often not spontaneous decisions at all, but the

result of rapid thought. Although this is undoubtedly correct, it prompts the question, “thought based on what?” The answer to this question must be centered on knowledge and a wealth of past experiences. Therefore, intuition is about sifting rapidly through your memory bank of past experiences in order to make decisions.

In the British Army Field Manual its described also the importance of the momentum, surprise and above all an ATTITUDE OF MIND. This attitude of mind is particularly important when looking at the activities of the leaders.

The US Army Field Manual, speaks that in essence, maneuver warfare can be broken down into two components. First, the physical ability to move and apply force faster than the enemy, which in simple terms relates to equipment and technology, and second, on the speed of decision making. If all things are equal, then decision making relative to the enemy becomes all important.

It follows from this that the commander must be unpredictable, imaginative and instinctive and must weigh the factor of surprise as critical to his plans. To achieve this, a commander needs initiative or “command pull” based on intuition rather than “staffpush”, which is aknowledge into the more analytical approach to command

Leaders must know their team capabilities and limitations, must be well trained, competent and technologically advanced to make intuitive decisions

Although intuition is a feeling, a special ability, we have to try by all means to train future officers to use this sixth sense in which to lean to make decisions in complex scenarios. To train intuition we have to rely on uncertainty. Promoting rapid decision making is vital for many Units that fight on different fronts.

As intuition relies on knowledge, when it comes to forming leaders it is important that we may train them in a large number of situations that allow them to have a good background from which they can then take lessons and have them as personal experiences that will be very valuable in future occasions. Within this training, it would be good to force them to have to make intuitive decisions in which they would sometimes make mistakes. It is already known that you learn more from mistakes than from successes and giving this type of training to future leaders could be interesting and motivating at the same time.

Finally, it is clear that leadership styles must change and adapt to the new ways of conflicts and the operating environments in the current crises, the leadership styles that served in other times right now are questioned. If we think about the complexity of the scenarios and the use of new technologies that offer the possibilities to show what is happening in the other part of the globe in a matter of seconds, and this can be commented by thousands no matter the country, race or religión, free to say, criticize or claim whatever they want. We have to think that our leaders, their teams, and their families are exposed to that fast and harmful criticism which can also affect team cohesion (BURPO, 2006).

The Chiefs to whom I have had the opportunity to interview, commented on a detail that is true and is not often discussed in the publications, the LONELINESS OF A LEADER. It is generally said, the higher rank you are, the more lonely you just feel and that is because on many occasions the Chiefs have to make decisions assuming great risks in places where there are many variables that are not known. The Chief is always responsible for success or failure.

The more you raise, the less friends you really have, General Carlos Prada 2018 Irak Force COM, said. Many people talk to you but in a vain and sometimes interested way. During my Command, I had a good friend, subordinate with whom I used to have coffee some nights, he tried to tell me his point of view about the operation and some events that happened, against which I always thought I had good arguments until I realized that it takes courage to hear the truth that one does not want to see. It suited me very well to realize that sometimes you live too self-centered and have a distorted view of what was happening out there.

General Luis Cortés, 2017 Irak Force Com, well-known in Spain, said that you have to be close enough to people to stay connected to what is really happening out there and they perceive, but distant so they do not forget that you are the boss. In his words, it is true that there is a lot of loneliness, at night I was in my office at about 55 degrees of temperature and I spent there hours planning, preparing reports, thinking about how the mission was unfolding and I think that my best support for the time to decide, they were, without a doubt, the experience of having been in other missions, of having lived hard moments in all ranks that gives you a self confidence in your actions and therefore in decision making and always knowing WHAT IS THE FINAL OBJECTIVE.

During the investigation, I found several testimonies of leaders who were in combat zones such as Iraq or Afghanistan and who deployed without having received a clear mission. We were so involved in supporting each other, in advancing on patrol by providing mutual support that sometimes I was not sure why, or for what. In some cases it took him years to get to tell it publicly and he never told his men because he wrote the missions to himself out of shame of not knowing what his mission really was.

Alastair Campbell (Tony Blair's head of communications) said in his book "Winners" that "when you're sick and tired of hearing the same old message, other people are just about getting it".

In this respect from the operations carried out in the last conflicts, there is a lesson learned that cannot be forgotten. You need to have a clear, attainable mission and you have to explain it well to your entire team over and over again. Make sure that everyone is clear about the mission, that they understand it and not only that they repeat it as robots without knowing what is really inside.

In this new era, psychological training of our leaders becomes increasingly necessary. They have to learn to develop certain psychosocial skills so that they can be effective when facing with one adverse situation after another in which their life and those of their team could be in risk. The idea is to integrate military capabilities with mental, emotional and behavioral skills to improve and strengthen the resilience of combatants.

These mental abilities should focus on enhancing factors that have positive effects on morale, performance, effectiveness and personal satisfaction, which should expand the traditional combat training that improves not only combat techniques and procedures, fatigue resistance and hardening in general, with psychological training that can be performed in short periods of time intensively or over several months, as well as in a group that is the most common or individual, focused mainly on making decisions, to take fear of error and make mistakes. and secondary to the coexistence of a group in situations of high risk in combat and stress effects. To achieve this, a dynamic and interactive methodology must be used, avoiding the typical conferences in which only the coach or psychologist speaks and carrying out drills of practical cases with the team members, in which the members of the team can speak, identifying which are the situations or the things that most stress each one. Obviously this has to be done with small groups so that a wide variety of situations can be trained, improve personal resilience, subsequently sharing the experience and analyzing it with the psychologist or coach.

It would be an excellent support to be able to count on the advice of people who had such experiences in combat, where they can narrate in detail the psychological factors that affected them at all times both the leader and the rest of the team and learn from their own experiences, comments and suggestions.

It is clear that forming leaders is not an easy task in any army in the world, it would be impossible to try to build up teams that had no personal problems or families that would not affect their performance and with great physical and psychological resistance to carry out the most complicated and risky missions.

We absolutely need well-prepared leaders, physically and psychologically. If they come from the military schools without related background, we are forced to train them and the better way is to make them spend as much time as possible with their team, train them in the most varieties of possible scenarios and try immerse them in complex situations where have little time to react, assuming that the reality is much harder and changing than you can never expect.

3 CONCLUSIONS

After having studied all the qualities and skills that a leader is supposed to have, having reviewed questionnaires of young Commanders who lead Special Teams in Operations such as Irak or Afghanistan, some of them being known for their strong leadership and after having read in detail the interviews conducted with older people who were once military leaders and who had the opportunity to command big units in complex scenarios, I conclude that the most important qualities a leader has to have are **AUTHORITY, COMMUNICATION AND MOTIVATION.**

Authority gained with its exemplarity, with its dedication, its style of doing things and the confidence that inspires in its people. Communication, in both directions from top

to bottom and from bottom to top where a leader has to know his team perfectly and know how to express clearly what the objective is, how they will achieve it, when, and the possible alternatives they may have. Motivation to reinforce each other's confidence, correcting them when they do things wrong or congratulating them when they do it well, and stimulating them to make comments or give suggestions when asked in order to make them to feel part of the team and of the decision making process.

But when the leader has to command and take decisions in difficult situations, when the lives of people are at stake in those complex scenarios in which we are currently moving and the Chief has to give orders and remain calm under enemy fire or in situations of great stress, then, the leader has to rely on his own SELF-SECURITY, which has forged the passage of time and experiences, in the INTUITION that will allow him to choose the momentum to take the right decision and COHESION of his team, which makes no one doubt the decision taken by the Chief, and the team in each situation remains together. This is one of the most important lessons learned in Operations, we can do it in many ways butLET'S DO IT TOGETHER !!!

It is true that the loneliness of the Chief exists, and that it is necessary to know how to fight it and the first thing that a leader must do in those difficult moments is listen to the opinion of his advisors or subordinates, and then decide having always in mind WHAT IS THE FINAL OBJECTIVE OF THE OPERATION and the best support of the leader in taking decisions will be his self confidence and in his own intuition.

How to manage stress is another factor to take into account, the soldier when acting under stress suffers physical and chemical reactions in his body that make him feel tired, fatigue, excessive sweating, dry mouth and can lead to a state of great nervousness and to make quick and wrong decisions. The leader must also show his presence in the bad moments and do his best to keep the team together and cohesive, trying to reduce tension and giving to every moment the importance it should have. Under great pressure he should talk calmly with the team members, reduce their anxiety, listen to their opinions and make them see that being nervous or excited is not the best solution.

To conclude and as a final conclusion of the research, it is recommended that the Academies for Officers and NCOs should introduce the psychological training of future leaders with interactive methods that were able to set practical cases in situations of stress, in small groups where a wide variety of possible situations could be trained, based on the experience of former combatants, who should act as advisors in which they could comment on their own feelings and their good or bad experiences, forgetting the typical boring lectures in which you don't really learn much.

The Armies need leaders adapted to the wide variety of operating environments we face, with a great military, technical, human and psychological capacity We need to be able to produce leaders with broader and more sophisticated educational and service experience to intellectually confront new threats while thinking strategically into the future (SMITH, 2005).

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Aspects of Brazilian geopolitics in the vision of General Meira Mattos

Aspectos de la geopolítica brasileña en la visión del General Meira Mattos

Abstract: With the end of the Cold War, the acceleration of the globalization process promoted a multipolarity in International Relations (IR). General Meira Mattos, as military and political scientist has studied the main brazilian issues involving its development. His concern is about bring Brazil to the same level of development nations in the world. The intellectual always stood out by deep analysis, the military commitment to the country. His literary works have joined lucid evaluation of past, critical view of the present and future preview. Bearing these elements in mind, this paper tried to give a few dimension of the General Meira greatness Mattos' thought by examining the application of his beliefs in Brazilian reality.

Keywords: Geopolitics. Development. Policy. National Defense.

Resumen: Con el fin de la Guerra Fría, la aceleración del proceso de globalización promovió una multipolaridad en las Relaciones Internacionales (RI). El General Meira Mattos, como militar y político, estudió los principales temas brasileños que involucraron su desarrollo. Su preocupación es llevar a Brasil al mismo nivel que las naciones desarrolladas del mundo. El intelectual siempre se ha destacado por el análisis profundo, el compromiso militar con el país. Sus obras literarias se unieron a la lúcida evaluación del pasado, visión crítica del presente y el futuro. Con estos elementos en mente, este artículo trató de dar una dimensión del pensamiento del Gran General Meira Mattos examinando la aplicación de sus creencias en la realidad brasileña.

Palabras-clave: Geopolítica. Desarrollo. Política. Defensa Nacional.

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1 Introduction

General Meira Mattos was born in the city of São Carlos-SP, on July 23th, 1913. Attended Military School of Realengo, seating as a cadet in 1933. During his existence, served with primacy, in the Army. This whole time that Brazil needed, in peace and war; attended, with brilliance on several military and civilian courses; played several relevant functions, using uniform or not, devoting himself to the barracks and schools, until get to the command of the prestigious Agulhas Negras Military Academy and Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.

His military career was marked by the collection of national and foreign distinctions, extolling your exemplary trajectory of soldier. Among the many Orders of Merit and medals, the honored, Meira Mattos had justified special pride in the Bronze Star Medal of United States Army, conquered by his bravery during WW II.

Respected lecturer, shared their knowledge in Brazilian and North American Universities; assumed, with distinction, the Vice-directory of the Inter-American Defense College in Washington-DC.

Finally, in 1977, nearly half a century after joining the Army, Carlos de Meira Mattos, Major General since 1973, was, according to the law, transferred to reserve.

He died on January 26th, 2007, in São Paulo, leaving a collection of articles and books almost mandatory reading for all those who are interested in geopolitics and related affairs.

Among his works on geopolitics highlights: *Projeção mundial do Brasil* (1960); *Brasil – geopolítica e destino* (1975-1979); *A geopolítica e as projeções do poder* (1979) e *Uma geopolítica pan-amazônica* (1980). Besides the works mentioned, Meira Mattos has published several articles in the following journals: *A defesa Nacional*, *Boletim Geográfico*, *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* e *Revista Del Colegio Inter- Americano de Defensa*.

In the case of the Brazilian reality, for General Meira Mattos, threats include the exposed borders, political instability and socio-economic weaknesses. In the solution of these problems, the well-being of Brazil depends, essentially, of national development. Only through the development and power that this development provides can be preserved the safety and progress of the nation. In this sense, therefore, development and power are means for obtaining national security.

2 Fiction State x Real State

General Meira Mattos stated that the State is, first of all, a tangible reality, alive and demanding. This reality are easements arising from your territory, your people and their political and legal institutions, responsible for conform to the aspirations of the people and the requirements of the territory. Defending yet, along with other political scientists, the National State should not be smothered by abstract Institutions or those copied from other countries.

Among the scientists who have treated this matter, there are Alberto Torres¹ and Oliveira Viana². Both have revealed your non-conformity with the abstract nature of the bargain mentality of Brazilian problems.

The thought of Alberto Torres stood out for objectivism and concern for geographic factor in formulation of political solutions and constitutional structure.

His work sought to provide answers through scientific methodology based on actual research of national problems. His revolt against the delay it is evidenced in the words following:

There is no one capable to deny that politics downgrade to a state of disarray and bitterness is difficult to overcome. To order material in Brazil, in relation to the public, does not represent things more than a true state of stagnation, in which the indifference and skepticism from dropping, with a tendency to this sort of resignation that will committing suicide the people (MATTOS, 2011a, p. 240, our translation)

Alberto Torres struggled against this stagnation of spirits, that resignation of wills, this inability creator. In his studies, proposed a model of organization, using a methodology for the assessment of national realities, in order to achieve integrated planning. His method of evaluation and formulation of a national policy became known as Decision Making Process.

For its turn time, in the works of Oliveira Viana it is possible see a criticism against the empty mentality of the elites who influenced public life brazilian. From 1930, the geography and the aspirations of the national majority began to be considered. A geopolitical vision of Brazil came back to contribute with solutions of problems, as the text bellow:

I know that some question the concern about brazilian reality – and ask: where is it? Of course you can't find with the methodology we adopt. Because that reality can never be sought in books coming from France, England, the United States and Russia; and yes we did studies about ourselves, about our country, our society, in the light of social science, with objective criteria, using the results of these investigations to improve our decisions (MATTOS, 2011a, p. 239, our translation)

Oliveira Viana believed that with scientific methodology would be possible to react against the old analogy of appearances, facing the people as an autonomous collective, structured shape, constituting one of the main pillars for the development of the country.

1 Alberto Torres (1865 - 1917) was a politician and a Brazilian social thinker who was concerned about national unity and the organization of the Brazilian society. In his work, he opposed the ideas of socialism and individualism as incompatible to the Brazilian reality.

2 Francisco José de Oliveira Viana (1883 - 1951) was a Brazilian professor, jurist, historian and sociologist. His work, versing about the formation of Brazilian people, has the merit of being one of the first which endeavored to address the subject under a sociological and differentiated view.

3 The strategic position and the outlook for Brazil

In the politics-military scenario of the globe, by virtue of our geographical position, we are bound to the strategy of two large areas of the American continent and South Atlantic. These direct bindings, however, define responsibilities in geostrategic framework on the planet that need recognition.

Brazil occupies almost half the South American territory, with a protruding released to the Afro-Eurasian mass. Such reality incorporates the country, inextricably, to global strategy for two capital military plans for the security of the West. The first, the defense of the American continent, the second, the maintenance of the strategic Atlantic Bridge, linking America to Afro-Eurasian (MATTOS, 1960, p. 43).

Neither of these two plans has a character only. In both, by imposing physically impossible to circumvent, the country occupies a predominant role. These are the geostrategic imperatives of the world Brazil projection. There is no way to escape the fate that puts, in Atlantic-Africa, shed the line of immediate coverage of brazilian coast, concludes General Meira Mattos (MATTOS, 2011a, p. 43).

Within the framework of defence and continental strategy matters more to Brazil than any other area of the globe. Because there, Brazil must protect its own territory from the horrors of war. Once lost the Atlantic dimension of Africa, there will be no more mission of security, in fact will face the war inside. For instance, an average rockets installed in Senegal can achieve wide strip of brazilian northeastern surface (MATTOS, 1960, p. 45).

In short, it's worth remembering the importance of Africa in the framework of the brazilian strategy. In the field of continental Africa strategy is worth its position of intermediate base for the military actions between America and Eurasia and their valuable energy and mineral wealth.

Brazil, besides having a favorable geographical basis and well articulated, has a people with the capacity required to create a national potential. Meets, however, that the society organizes itself in order to coordinate efforts in support of legitimate national interests.

Geography and geology not denied conditions for Brazil to develop fully. Fit the immense physical wealth put Brazil in the service of brave wills and wits capable.

It is necessary that the national elites have always present, despite the possibilities more optimistic, the great warning of Toynbee (1947)³ to analyse the success and the collapse of civilizations: "After a stage of growth, some human societies have collapsed for the loss of the creative power of minorities, leaders that ends by magic force to influence the uncreators masses and attract them".

According to the General Meira Mattos, if Brazil wants the course of fate of grandeur, must strive to improve education at all levels. Such a commitment will provide the country in

3 Arnold Joseph Toynbee was a British historian, philosopher of history, research professor of international history at the London School of Economics and the University of London and author of numerous books about power and politics.

quality and quantity, enlightened elites, with airy mentality, imbued with the spirit of overcoming it must be the prerogative of Nations (MATTOS, 2011a, p. 50).

According to the idealized projections for Meira Mattos, the country would achieve in the first decade of the 21st Century, the mark of 200 million inhabitants. However, the absolute number would mean something positive by itself. The intellectual preparation of the population wouldn't be essential for the success of the Brazil-Power project.

In Brazil's future, there will be no room for the "colonialist complex", responsible for bring some unfit and poor solutions. The development of metallurgy, exploration and oil industry and increasing hydroelectric potential has proved that the country has the necessary requirements to achieve great goals and develop your potential.

4 The feasibility for the Brazil power

After the surge of development, known as the Brazilian Economic Miracle⁴, has become concerned about the position of Brazil in the international scene.

This scenario of prosperity aroused the interest of some foreign scholars, including Professor Brzezinski, of Columbia University, whose thought is described below.

Brazil will become an important power. In this way will have to think systematically about what kind of international system want to help create. On the other hand, it imposes the need to know more details about international problems and their possible solutions. With power comes responsibility, and that cannot be tackled assuming essentially rhetorical positions. A world order based on cooperation of a larger number of powers might be preferable to bipolarity (MATTOS, 2011a, p. 165, our translation).

According to Ronald Schneider⁵, of Queen's University in New York, Brazil, a country of continental size, possessor of immense resources and rapid economic growth requires maintaining a high degree of social and political stability. The country is following a global and regional strategy systematically increased power, influence and prestige. Moreover, it has taken advantage of its geographical and economic position to engage in a multifaceted program, among the South American countries.

Even in the 1970s the General Meira Mattos drew attention to compare Brazil with nations like China, Japan and India, concluding that the country has the geopolitical conditions favorable to the development.

4 The Brazilian Miracle (portuguese: milagre econômico brasileiro) refers to exceptional economic growth in Brazil during the rule of the Brazilian military government. During this time (1969-1973) the average annual GDP growth was close to 10%.

5 Ronald Schneider was born in Minneapolis, and went to school in Valley City, North Dakota. In 1954, he graduated from Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois. He ranked at the top of his class at graduation. He received his Master's Degree in political science from Princeton University in 1956.

Brazil, with 8.5 million km² and a population of 208 million inhabitants, has a territory/population ratio in favor to develop its full potencial. It should be noted once again that the concept of overpopulation is not absolute value because it depends on the positive State's performance in the economic and social field, education, health, among others. Second Organsky⁶, a large population may be as much a social tragedy as an instrument of potentiality. Interestingly, the professor believes that the figure of 200 million is the minimum quantum necessary for a country to be a contemporary power.

As for the industrial, technological and scientific capacity, Brazil will depend on national capacity in maintaining the focus on solving issues that hinder or prevent the full development of these capabilities. The objective to be sought should be self-sufficiency and less dependence on sectors considered strategic.

On this subject, the General Meira Mattos had argued that China, Brazil and India were in full development revolution, while Japan and Western European countries were already in possession of modern industrial technology. The renowned scholar believed that Brazil and China would be the best would maintain continuity conditions of their programs. China would follow the path of socialist development in a closed society; Brazil, in its turn, follow the guidance of capitalist development in the context of an open democratic society.

With regard to the internal cohesion, the importance of geopolitical ties of solidarity in terms of ultimate loyalty to the nation. Modern nationalism condenses on the survival of the nation as integrated group and concerned with the common good.

Brazil, though it is a relatively young country, it has full integrated into a single national soul. Has unit of language, religious belief and acceptance of a racial joint. All people in the vast Brazilian subcontinent, vibrate with the same intensity on the Flag and the National Anthem, get excited with relevant historical events and cheering the conquest of great goals.

In short, the possibilities of Brazil becoming a world power will depend on correct political, economic and social performance. From the military point of view, the General believed that the country would face an international competition in many fields and that would require a military force capable of deterring and provide tranquility for development (MATTOS, 2011a, p. 174).

5 The national power second Meira Mattos

After World War I, the great powers became worried in conduct research more objective and less rhetoric aimed at conceptualization and measurement of power. Studies of this nature were, until then, restrict to the specialists in political science of the universi-

⁶ Abramo Fimo Kenneth Organski (12 May 1923 – 6 March 1998) was a professor of Political Science at University of Michigan.

ties, which developed with admirable erudition, but away from reality agitated by increasingly frequent conflicts and dominated by new weapons and instruments of psychological pressure.

The military power has lost little by little its importance in case of international conflicts; while the economic and psychosocial expressions of national power gained prominence. Political power, almost always dragged by the military during the war, began to assume a leadership role by being the only one able to coordinate the three expressions: psychosocial, economic, and military.

In the early years of the activity of the Superior School of War⁸ issued a initial conceptualization of power that has allowed the development of studies.

“National Power is the integrated expression of every means that the nation has for the moment considered to promote in the infield and in external and national objectives, despite the existence of antagonism”.

It is to be noted that the concept of power of Superior School of War⁷ which in general terms is similar to that of similar schools in the Western world, when says that “power is the integrated expression of all means.”, suggests the amount of means, because the word “means” induces the idea of material resources. Hence the simplification that some are saying that “power is the sum of means at the disposal of a nation”.

For General Meira Mattos, the power is defined as the ability of someone to impose your will on others, both psychologically as physically, and this concept is expanded to include a thorough contribution of Brazilian power possibilities relation to other big States.

The assessment of relative national power is made by Meira Mattos using the following formula: $Pp = (C+E+M) \times (S+W+P)$. In that:

Pp = noticeable power of States

C = critical mass-population and territory

E = economic capacity

M = military capacity

S = state’s strategic concept W = will

P = ability of persuasion

Observing Meira Mattos’ thoughts is possible to note the ideathat the ends do not justify the means, besides the interdependence between the principles of ethics and the exercise of power requires the engagement in a process of continuous evaluation (MAT^TOS, 1977, p. 31).

In the light of these ideas, Meira Mattos supporting democratic processes, arguing that free societies are ruled by instruments of persuasion, based on the conviction, in spontaneous participation and the sense of social obligation; while in the totalitarian, closed societies, usually occur the instruments of coercion and revitalization of charismatic myths (MAT^TOS, 2011c, p. 231).

⁷ The Superior School of War was created in August 1949 and it is an Institute of high studies of Defense Policy and Strategy. The School aims to develop and consolidate the knowledge required for the performance of functions of direction and advice to the national defense planning.

However, associated with those feelings are their democratic freedom and restrictions should be accompanied by development authority. The General described it would be necessary to use moderate authority to stimulate the modernization of Brazilian society.

Development, said Meira Mattos, results of the modernization of national sectors, such as: technology, social benefits, citizens' participation, industrial production, government efficiency and the national territory integration. "Brazil has the resources, the will of the people and the leadership necessary to be among the most prosperous nations of the globe" (MATTOS, 1975, p. 101-102, our translation).

Nonetheless, the ubiquitous theme of power predominates in the work of Meira Mattos and stresses the importance of the development to the achievement of national goals. The development leads to power and without power every society becomes an inert body, unwilling, unable to satisfy its own reason.

In short, leaving the table of political realism, Meira Mattos described the security problems of Brazil, prescribing as a medicine, a strong dose of power. For this, the General had recommended that the solutions were based on geographical realities: "[...] the territory makes the life of a State and limited their aspirations. Geography conditions, making it difficult, inspire, stimulate and finally present a challenge. It forces a human group to react to geographical conditions: the group reacts and triumphs or is destroyed" (MATTOS, 1977, p.105-106, our translation).

According to the General, national greatness is revealed when the nation mobilizes the power and the will to meet the challenges of your environment. Geographically unfavorable regions as existing in Brazil, challenge the character of the nation. On the other hand, the overcoming of old biases and unfavorable environmental conditions will restore hope, ideals and national redemption.

Meira Mattos held still emphatically that Brazil had the conditions to aspire to a place among the great powers of the world, a theme that is repeated throughout its work. Judges also that Brazil will perform this jump to achieve power and fully developed within the Western influence of "democracy with authority" (MATTOS, 1975, p. 71-73, our translation).

Second Meira Mattos, the development of Brazil would entail the burden of great responsibility in relation to aspects of external security. As a result, the country should develop your military might in order to protect national interests, which, in terms of economy and geostrategic will get world range.

The new position of Brazil as power would require the consolidation and expansion of the strategic role of the country, especially in two areas of interest: the South Atlantic and the Amazon Basin. For the renowned geopolitics, the fate of the country would be inevitably conditioned by both continental influences how much. As a result, the general recommended a careful study of the situation, including the positions to be occupied in case of threat and which international alliances can be performed.

Alongside this need for military security in the region of the South Atlantic, Meira Mattos saw the need to ensure the maintenance of maritime trade access to external markets. For this, advocated an ambitious program of construction of merchant ships and war. With the

protected trade routes, in addition to the exploration of new resources from the continental shelf and maritime band, the general stated that the Brazilian would make the South Atlantic development one of the most prosperous regions of the world (MATTOS, 1977, p. 119 - 123). Meira Mattos believed that the power of Brazil over the coming decades would be insufficient to overcome the threats to security in the region referenced above. Recommended a joint Brazil-United States naval presence, since the two allies have similar strategic interests in the Atlantic, as well as the creation of a community of Southern Cone or a Treaty of the Organization of the South Atlantic.

Second Mattos, the modern concept of national power should cover not only the strength of a material State, but also your ability to influence the conduct of events. There is no doubt that these two values: power-force (material) and power of influence (psychological) are interdependent. Without the power-strength there is the power of influence, but without this, empties the power-strength. Both, in modern conflicts, are subject to national and multinational influences of pressure and back pressure.

The outcome of the Vietnam War well worth as proof that the power-strength is not enough. The United States lacked the capacity to influence, not only in order to convince its allies to the righteousness of its cause, but, mainly, in the mind of their own. Didn't matter the superiority of overwhelming power in the material field, when in the psychological area war was lost by the American Government's inability to manage issues that explain the real necessity of that conflict.

6 General Meira Mattos and the Amazon

Initially we highlight that General Meira Mattos never served in Amazon. At that time were few opportunities in career offered to do it, the effective Northern Army came to little more than a thousand men. The strategic design, then in force, made the southern region, and the operating device was articulated to face countries included in Platinum compounds, inheritance of confrontation geo-historical between the Portuguese and Spanish colonizations around the Silver Basin.

His careful sensitivity Amazon's issues was formed from the combination of factors, including: the broad vision of the world, wide and deep general culture, dedication to geopolitics and the themes of national interest. The contact with people who shared a love for Amazon-region's like General Rodrigo Otávio, Military Amazon Commander, between July 1968 and March 1970, also contributed.

Among the matters related to the Amazon, the development deserved most attention. Meira Mattos identified greed by foreign Nations or international organizations, due to sparse population and unexplored mineral wealth as the greatest problem. Responding to this geographic threat, Mattos dismissed foreign immigration, as a solution, recommended the increase of the local population. Other aspects that deserved attention were the factors of internal rebellion and military blockade of coastal stations and the mouth of the Amazon, additional strategic concerns to Brazil.

The dependence of the coast can be summarized: this policy of continentality, to be effective, will need to create an interior less dependent on maritime trade. Will have to ensure a certain level of economic interdependence to the regions connected to large continental masses, favoring the creation of a self-sufficient society (MATTOS, 1980, p. 136, 148, 166).

The prospect of great wealth also aroused the interest of Amazon by Meira Mattos. According to the General, the discoveries of manganese, iron ore, copper and uranium would make possible the development and settlement of the interior, resulting in the discovery of other new riches and the expansion of a latent potential in something real.

The benefits from the development would extend to all Amazon countries representing, truly, a gain for all of South America.

Finally, Meira Mattos imagined the Amazon basin as the core of South America.

Stated that in Brazil the heart of the problem of awakening of the continent would be centered on the Amazon. Held that Brazil enjoys a privileged position by the fact of owning its territory adjacent to the course of exit to the ocean.

For this development, the General held that the orientation of the Brazil's brotherly exchange without isolating itself from their neighbors of Spanish language.

Our diplomacy readjusted, in recent years, our strategic lines, lending greater importance to the policy of rapprochement with our continental neighbours. We strengthened our ties with South American Nations, through regional and subregional agencies. We began the mobilization of the major Nations of the Amazon basin to a Treaty of Cooperation. And, finally, we alerted our neighbours for the importance of a readjustment with the Brazil for all benefits (MATTOS, 1980, p. 139, our translation).

Ranking as a challenge, the efforts on behalf of the Amazonian development, Meira Mattos considered the Brazil's onslaught to the West similar to the United States, Russia and Australia. These Nations sought to conquer and occupy your own territory, integrating the maritime and continental portions completely. This process revealed the importance to adopt an effective transport strategy, ability to materialize projects within the context of geography and a political determination of the State to consider these issues. This determination does not translate in the work of a Government, but in the line of continuity of national projects, whose course maintains a path consistent with the future, independent of the politicians who are in power.

The national civic consciousness gives Amazon the character of one of the most indisputable symbols of our sovereignty. However, in the 21st Century, Brazil has not completed internal expansion, and half of its territory waiting to be occupied and integrated into the national society. Nowadays, the heart of the problem of the awakening of continentality is centered on Amazon. Thus, the General summed up this issue, whose geopolitical significance seems even misunderstood by some authorities.

In a world where, in the year 2030, the population will have increased by two billion inhabitants and will be consuming twice as many natural resources, this unfathomable source of nature has to be clearly associated with the Brazilian sovereignty in the imagination of the international public opinion, avid for questioning our ability to manage what is already considered as a world heritage. It is essential and urgent task, because Amazon has at least three important roles to play (VILLAS BÔAS, 2013, p. 9).

The first will be to provoke the elevation, in exponential scale, national power, from the time when the country is equipped to make institutional and materially the rational exploitation of its natural resources, which still await a complete identification, delineation and quantification.

The second is the large contribution to the natural vocation of continental leadership, which we can not shirk. The Brazilian Amazon is bordered by seven countries, has access to the Atlantic and Pacific oceans and connects with the Bolivian Altiplano, the Silver Basin and the Orinoco and, in Brazil, with the Northeast and the Midwest.

The full sovereignty of Brazil in Amazon is precondition to the integrationist project. This process, in so far as they advance through the construction of a vital transport and communications infrastructure, will lead to the exponential growth of the importance of the Amazon in the continental context. Is predictable that cities like Belem and Manaus, because their location, the first as a gateway to dense river mesh and the second for the central geographic position, will consolidate itself as industrial, logistics and services.

The third, finally, stems from the condition shown by Amazon to house answers and solutions to some of the main problems afflicting humanity: climate change, environment, renewable energy and shortage of fresh water.

As known, General Meira Mattos died in 2007, twenty seven years after the first edition of "A Pan-Amazonian Geopolitics". It is possible that has accompanied the demise of everything he saw and somehow helped to build. Probably experienced the same nonconformity that assaults us to see so much potential for natural resources being wasted, unassisted and isolated population, Indians being victims, rather than agents of the processes that concern them, and environment being degraded (VILLAS BÔAS, 2013, p. 31).

Maybe, what it would cost to understand today, would be the fact that-in both the establishment of internal development plans, as in collective actions among the South American countries, the geopolitics continues to be disregarded. The volatile motivations still have presided over these relationships and that the historical teachings of the Amazonian epic have been ignored till today.

7 Final considerations

There is a reality that cannot be ignored in the quest for modernization and growth of the Nation. The development of a country the size of Brazil falls on the exercise of power. This is involuntary phenomenon and even inevitable in some cases.

According to Meira Mattos, development of Brazil will result in burden of major responsibilities, especially the field of external security. Brazil has the conditions to become a world power in the 21st century, independent of its vocation or taste for power. The nation should be prepared to exercise that power and protect national interests, economic and geostrategic dimensions will acquire a world range.

Ensuring security will be more effective if Brazil being able to strengthen continental and extra-continental alliances in order to defend ideas and common interests. In the context of these alliances, it is necessary to consider the weight of the economy and the geostrategic position of Brazil.

The preservation of peace on the continent and in the world should be a concern of brazilian foreign policy. The stability and tranquility of the world represent the fulfillment of the country's pacifist vocation and the security environment essential to social and economic progress.

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Water as a polemological factor

Water as a polemological factor

Abstract: This work, based on the historical study of the conflicts caused by the control of water and in the analysis of the evolution of international treaties on the subject, seeks to predict consequent scenarios of the struggle for this resource in the future. In this context, this work take into account the technological development that will optimize the exploitation of existing reserves and, thus, can turn water management into a point of approach for the people, instead of a reason for the outbreak of wars; analyzing, in particular, the diplomatic effort to find peaceful solutions for the exploitation of the shared basins and the technological development that allows the increasingly efficient use of this finite resource. Finally, this work concludes predicting scenarios of possible conflicts in the future, as well as verifying which tools can be efficient to become the existence of water reserves a reason for union between peoples and not the reason of future armed confrontations.

Keywords: War Resources. Water Conflict. Water Diplomacy. Transboundary Waters. Water Security.

Resumen: Esta investigación, basada en el estudio histórico de estos conflictos causados por el control del agua y el análisis de la evolución de los tratados internacionales sobre el tema, busca predecir escenarios futuros derivados de la lucha por el acceso al agua. En este contexto, este trabajo tiene en cuenta el desarrollo tecnológico que optimizará la explotación de las reservas existentes y, por lo tanto, puede convertir la gestión del agua en un punto de enfoque para la población, en lugar de una razón para el surgimiento de guerras. Para ello, analiza, en particular, el esfuerzo diplomático por encontrar soluciones pacíficas para la explotación de cuencas compartidas y el desarrollo tecnológico que permite el uso cada vez más eficiente de este recurso finito que es el agua. Finalmente, este artículo prevé, en su conclusión, escenarios de posibles conflictos en el futuro, así como verificaciones de qué herramientas pueden ser eficaces para hacer de la existencia de reservas de agua una razón de unidad entre los pueblos y no la razón de futuros enfrentamientos armados.

Palabras clave: Recursos de Guerra Conflicto Hídrico Diplomacia Hídrica. Aguas transfronterizas. Seguridad Hídrica.

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


1 Introduction

"Water is the new oil" (PICKENS, 2008)

When looking at the planet from space, it is a fact that its name should be 'Water' instead of 'Earth', because the gigantic oceans that dominate the image of the third celestial body orbiting the Sun make the continents seem like mere islands and an inadvertent observer could conclude that there are no problems in terms of water resources since the 'blue planet' would have an abundance of water to supply its inhabitants.

However, Human being has been fighting for water for millennia because 97.45% of the total existing on the planet is salt water, while of the 2.55% of fresh water, almost 74% is in the form of ice, 25% is found in aquifers that are difficult to access (underground) and only 1% is superficial fresh water, that is, only 0.025% of the planet's water is available for easy consumption (Graph1).




Source: The author (2020).

The situation is even more complex because this small amount of water suitable for human consumption is irregularly distributed, causing water scarcity to affect all continents and, as can be seen in the list of conflicts due to water, has been the cause of various crises throughout history.

The graph below (Graph2), based on data obtained from the Water portal of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), compares the current availability of water resources with respect to the population glo-

bally and allows to clearly observe the irregularity of its distribution, since Asia with 60% of the population owns 36% of the water resource; Europe has 12% of the population and only 8% of the water resource; in Africa, 13% of humanity lives and has 10% of the water; On the other hand, 8% of the population resides in North and Central America and enjoys 15% of the water resource; and, finally, South America, which has only 6% of the world's population, but owns 26% of the total water resources.

Graph2 – Comparison between population and water availability



Source: The author (2020).

In addition, there are at least 273 multinational river basins in the world, with 214 shared between two countries, 36 between three countries and 23 between four or more countries. Nearly 50 countries have 75% or more of their territory as part of international river basins and it is estimated that between 35% and 40% of the world population lives in these basins, since many of these water systems are being used until its exhaustion, as for example the Yellow rivers in China, Ganges in India and Nilo in Africa, which are below their historicalmarks.

According to the United Nations (UN), currently about 1.3 billion people do not have sufficient access to water suitable for consumption, since, although the exploitation of water is perhaps one of the activities in which Mankind has tried to use all their ingenuity and capacity, has not always imposed the rationality on its use, being easily detectable problems of access to drinking water sources that have numerous communities and populations throughout theplanet.

As the amount of water on the planet remains relatively constant, the population explosion, urbanization, the disruption of public order, the mismanagement of an irreplaceable resource and the vertiginous industrial and agricultural development of the last half century are generating unprecedented pressure on the finite sources and resources of water, which has not been accompanied by policies and necessary actions that guarantee the coherent use and preservation of said sources, causing hundreds of conflicts.

To all this, the influence of climate change and the contamination of springs due to the action of Mankind is added, which will generate an increasingly intense imbalance between demand and supply, converting, according to several economists, scientists and geopolitical strategists, water in the new oil.

For these experts, it is a fact that humanity will not be able to count on water forever and, just as at the end of the 20th century there was an oil crisis, the beginning of the 21st century can go down in history due to the water crisis, because scarcity would produce an increase in the prices of a resource that in developed countries has always been abundant and cheap.

According to a 2007 report by the consulting firm Sustainable Asset Management in Zurich, in 1900 the total water consumption worldwide was about 770 cubic kilometers. Currently, the figure is 3,840 km³ and it is estimated that it will exceed 5,000 km³ by 2025 (EL AGUA..., 2008, n.p.).

Of course, economic interest will generate tension and, if today all military analysts are unanimous in pointing to oil as the cause of various conflicts, nothing more logical than perceiving that the same can happen with water as its importance as a resource grows exponentially. There will be rivalries between countries for access to water sources and international mediations will be necessary to avoid possible conflicts.

The average citizen has not yet realized the importance of the issue, because he has always thought of water as "a free good", due to the ease of access through the pipes, allowing them to take long baths and not manage their consumption. This happens because most of them do not know (or are not affected) the problems that already exist in regions of Africa and Asia, in which women need to walk, on average, 6 kilometers to collect water.

In addition, the average use of water is 200-300 liters per person per day in most countries in Europe and less than 10 liters in countries such as Mozambique. In Tajikistan, almost one third of the population takes water from irrigation canals and ditches, with risks of contamination and people living in the suburbs of Jakarta, Manila and Nairobi pay between 5 and 10 times more for water than those who live in luxury areas in those same cities or in London and New York.

The importance of the above for this work is in the fact that a study published in the journal *Nature* by the Earth Institute of the American University of Columbia shows the relationship between water scarcity and war.

Analyzing the "El Niño" phenomenon, which in cycles of three to seven years leads to an increase in temperature and decrease in rainfall, the researchers found that, in the 90 countries affected by the climatic phenomenon between 1950 and 2004, the risk of civil war has doubled, from 3% to 6%.

According to Mark Cane, climate scientist from Columbia University, "only lack of water does not cause wars. There are social, political and economic factors that must be taken into consideration, but where there are latent tensions, that can be the necessary spark" (HSIANG; MENG; CANE, 2011).

Thus, rich countries such as Australia suffer with the phenomenon, but the possibility of a civil war is almost zero, while the civil war that killed more than two million people in Sudan in 1963, 1976 and 1983 is clearly related to the severe droughts caused by “El Niño”.

This paper aims to analyze this problem, based on past events to try to predict possible conflict scenarios, as well as to verify the extent to which society’s awareness of the issue and technological advances can turn water management into a point of approximation for the peoples, instead of a reason for the outbreak of wars.

In resume, in the last 70 years the world population has tripled and the use of water has multiplied by six, as a result of industrial and agricultural development. However, the amount of fresh water has not changed.

The lack of water and its contamination are already considered by many experts as a global threat. The situation is already so dramatic that, in developing countries, 80% of diseases and one third of deaths are related to contaminated water and lack of hygiene.


2 Water conflict

2.1 In The Past

The aforementioned list of conflicts due to water presents 551 incidents related to disputes over water throughout history, of which 136 were conflicts involving the use of weapons.

From his analysis it can be verified that, although all the regions of the world are represented, since the 1980s there has been a clear concentration in areas with water scarcity, since, as can be seen in the following graph (graph 3), 50% and 24% of the incidents occurred in Asia and Africa, respectively.


Graph 3 – Distribution of incidents by water since 1980



Source: The author (2020).

This relationship is even clearer when this data is compared with the global availability of water (Graph 3) and its evolution since 1980, which shows the degradation of water reserves in Africa and Asia (initially more serious in the Middle East, but since 2000 the situation is also worrying in India-Pakistan), based on data retired from ‘Global Trends 2015: a Dialogue About theFuture with Nongovernment Experts’, published in 2000.

Figure 1 – World Water Availability 1980-2015



Source:National Intelligence Council, 2000 p. 29.

January 2017, the US National Intelligence Council defends that:

[...] half of the world’s population will face water shortages by 2035, according to the UN. Rising demands from population growth, greater consumption, and agricultural production will outstrip water supplies, which will become less reliable in some regions from groundwater depletion and changing precipitation patterns. More than 30 countries—nearly half of them in the Middle East—will experience extremely high water stress by 2035, increasing economic, social and political tensions (National Intelligence Council, 2017, p. 24).

The lack of data on Egypt is also a relevant factor, because its dependence on the waters of the Nile (cause of the war with Sudan in 1958) is known to all and already in 1979, Muhammad Anwar Al Sadat, then President of the country, declared that “water was the only aspect that could lead Egypt to enter the war again” (CONFLICTOS...,2006, n.p.).

Thus, Mahmoud Yacoub, an officer of the Egyptian Army that concluded the General Staff Course of the Armed Forces in Spain, reviews some conflicts in Africa that had water as the main cause (MAHMOUD YACOUB, 2010):

- 1958: between EGYPT and SUDAN for the use of the Nile. It was resolved with a treaty between the countries.
- 1964: ETHIOPIA and SOMALIA discussed for the underground water resources in the Ogaden Desert.
- 1975: tension between ANGOLA and SOUTH AFRICA in order to protect the water resources obtained with the Gove Dam built on the Kunene River in ANGOLA.
- 1978: between EGYPT and ETHIOPIA, because the latter wants to build dams at the head of the Blue Nile. The discussion persists until today.
- 1986: SOUTH AFRICA supported a coup d'etat in LESOTHO after having passed a water law that harmed the South African Republic.
- 1988: CUBA supported ANGOLA against SOUTH AFRICA by attacking the Caluenque dam.
- 1999: NAMIBIA, BOTSWANA and ZAMBIA, for access to water in the Zambezi river basin. The discussion was taken to the International Court of Justice.
- 1999: terrorist attacks in ANGOLA caused 100 deaths around four wells in the central region of the country.

Furthermore, the reasons for the conflict between India and Pakistan, which dispute the Kashmir Region (1947-1960), are confirmed, taking into account that the formation of the two States left the basin of the Indostán River divided between them. At the same time (decades of the 50s and 60s), Israel, Jordan and Syria, for their part, disputed the control of the Yarmuk and Jordan rivers. Years later, still in the Persian Gulf, Iraq had conflicts with Iran in the 1980s and, in 1991, during the Gulf War, the supply and sanitation systems of Baghdad were damaged by the clashes between the Allied and Iraqi forces.

It should be noted that terrorist acts with water resources are a constant and occurred on 57 occasions: since 1748, when the East River ferry station in Brooklyn (USA) was set on fire and neighbors in New York accused those in Brooklyn having provoked it as a protest for an unjust distribution of rights over river water; until 2010, when a remote-controlled bomb hidden in a water truck killed three people in the Afghan province of Khost, near the border with Pakistan.

2.2 In The Present

At this moment, incidents of global importance are not occurring, but regions such as Somalia, which has experienced the worst drought in decades since 2011, tend to be the focus of conflicts caused by the exploitation of refugees, which makes the situation even worse, by itself, is already exasperating.

However, in almost all continents there are latent conflicts related to water. In Asia, the main conflict continues to be the one concerning the border between India and Pakistan and the control of the basin of the Indostán River. In addition, part of the reason why the Chinese do not accept the independence of Tibet is due to the importance of its water resources for China - the Tibetan plateau has large reserves of water in glaciers and the sources of ten of the largest rivers in Asia, including Yellow, Yangtze, Mekong, Brahmaputra and Salween.

Likewise, in the Middle East the problems of the use of the waters of the Jordan, Tigris and Euphrates persist, added to the ethnic resentments and to the dispute between different clans and religions. In short, it is a region that concentrates diverse polemological factors: religion (Arabs vs. Jews), the imbalance of oil reserves, which are gigantic in some countries, and the lack of water.

In Africa, in addition to the eternal problem of the Nile, there are constant local conflicts as a result of the scarcity or maldistribution of water. For its part, in America, the recent border conflicts between Peru and Ecuador were not fully resolved and both countries are still faced with the growing difficulty of accessing water.

Finally, Europe, although it does not have conflicts over water at present, is affected because its allied forces fighting in Lebanon, in a certain way are involved with this problem (dispute over the control of the Golan Heights and the Jordan and Hasbani rivers).

2.3 In The Future

To predict scenarios, obviously we must bear in mind that water is essential for human life and for social development; the availability of accessible fresh water is, as already mentioned, only 0.025% of the total existing on the planet; and many countries share water resources, either because their borders were established based on rivers, or because the vast majority of them start in one country and pass through other states before emptying into the ocean.

As the world population is expected to increase from 6,900 million in 2010 to 8,300 million in 2030 and reach 9,100 million by 2050, it is estimated that by 2025, 1,800 million people will live in countries or regions with absolute water shortages and two thirds parts of the world population could do so under conditions of water stress¹.

Only this population increase is already enough factor to aggravate the problem in the most conflictive areas, being able to become the racket to trigger a conflict over water.

1 Defined by the UN through the water/population relationship. An area will experience water stress when its annual water supply falls below 1,700 m³ per person. When that same annual supply falls below 1,000 m³ per person, then there is talk of water scarcity. And absolute shortage of water when the rate is less than 500 m³.

The problem is not only the lack of fresh drinking water, but also the poor management and distribution of water resources and their methods of exploitation. Thus, at the beginning of the year 2000 Fortune magazine announced: “Water promises to be in the 21st century what oil was in the 20th century. A precious commodity that determines the wealth of nations” and, a year before, the World Bank’s vice president, Ismail Serageldin, had warned that “the wars of the next century will be for water”(NOTTEBOHM, 2005).

Thus, the possibility of this resource becoming more and more the subject of disputes is as clear as its transformation into a very lucrative business: dams, irrigation channels, potabilization and desalination technologies, sewage systems and wastewater treatment, in addition to the bottling of water, which exceeds in profits the pharmaceutical industry. Pollution of water courses or their variation for their energy use can also be a source of conflict.

Vera Bolaños (2010), in a prospective analysis, argued that the following regions may be scenarios of conflicts in the future, particularly because they have latent problems for decades or centuries:

- Valley of the Nile: three countries maintain rivalry for the control of their waters: Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia. The country with the greatest difficulty is Egypt, whose agricultural production depends on 95% of irrigated land and has a population that reaches 64 million inhabitants. 85% of the flow of the Blue Nile that arrives in Egypt originates in Ethiopia, a country that will have an estimated population of 130 million inhabitants by the year 2025. Something similar happens with the waters of the White Nile, which have their origin in Sudan, with a population of 29 million inhabitants and a population growth rate of around 3% per year. Egypt does not admit any relevant change in the flows of the Nile, being able to consider it “casus belli” with Sudan (where the water passes) and Ethiopia (origin of more than 80% of the springs of the river). The accelerated increase of the population in the area is an aggravating factor, in addition to the fact that Sudan (recently dismembered in two) presents a constant instability in the last twenty years.
- Hindustan Basin: India and Pakistan, although they have always respected the essence of the Treaty signed in 1960 for the distribution of the flows, remain under stress mainly due to the colossal population increase in the region.
- Jordan Valley: the basins of the Jordan and Yarmuk rivers are disputed by the societies of Jordan, Syria, Israel and Lebanon. These countries use between 95% and 100% of the annual water supply. The case of Jordan is the most serious, since only 5% of their lands receive enough rainfall to be used in agriculture and only 10% of their agricultural lands are under irrigation. Syria, on the other hand, has the disadvantage that 90% of its waters originate from international sources coming from its neighbors Turkey, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon and Jordan. In 1967, one of the causes of the Arab-Israeli war was precisely the dispute over the water of the aquifers of the Golan Heights. Because it is a historically warlike region, water is just one more reason to light the wick of the true powder keg that constitutes the region, although it is considered that the ambitious desalination program undertaken by Israel will alleviate the pressure on resources.

To these regions, Guisández Gómez (2010) added:

- **Gambia Valley:** The Gambia depends on the water policies of Guinea and Senegal (the strongest in the area) regarding the river that gives it its name.
- **Mekong Valley:** Vietnam's dependence on the Mekong River that starts in China and passes through Myanmar, Thailand, Laos and Cambodia can be a cause of future frictions, particularly with the last two countries mentioned.
- **Okavango Valley:** the Okavango River was born in Angola and passes through Namibia before entering the territory of Botswana. In 1996, when Namibia suffered a severe drought and tried to divert the river, a conflict almost broke out.

Mateo y Álvarez de Toledo (2008) considers, in addition, the following regions:

- **The Guaraní Aquifer:** 132 million years old, is the third largest known in the world, after the Nubian Sandstones and the Northern Sahara, both in North Africa. Located under the territory of four countries (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay), it has an area close to 1,200,000 km², a larger area than Spain, France and Portugal combined. Its exploitable volume (from 40,000 to 50,000 km³, equivalent to four times the total annual demand of Argentina) is so high that there are suspicions that it may have been considered a strategic world water reserve by the United States.
- **Tigris and Euphrates Valley:** Turkey started a project (Güneydogu Anadolu Projesi - GAP) which consists of a series of 22 dams chained for electricity production and irrigation of large areas and involves a decrease in the flow of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers (which are born in Turkey), with the consequent protests of Syria and Iraq. It is one of the largest hydraulic projects in the world and will cause a significant decrease in the volume of water reaching Syria and Iraq (between 30% - 50% in the next 50 years), as well as the water quality that already presents high salinity index. This will particularly affect Syria, as this river is responsible for more than half of its water supply. The situation will tend to be complicated when it is analyzed that the growth rate of the country's population is 3.8%, so it must double in 20 years. Something similar happens with Iraq, located downstream to Syria, with a population that will amount to 52 million by the year 2025.
- **Antarctica:** is one of the largest reserves of hydrocarbons, minerals and fresh water worldwide. Its sovereignty is claimed by seven countries (New Zealand, Australia, France, Norway, United Kingdom, Chile and Argentina) and is subject to the Antarctic Treaty, signed in 1959, prevented the economic or military exploitation of the area for 50 years. Still, there is a dispute between the main powers for the sovereignty of the area and, therefore, its resources.
- **China:** the problem with Tibet remains and, in addition, a country that owns 22% of the world population and only 6% of the water reserves has to consider water a strategic resource. Its main rivers (Amarillo and Yangtze) are already contaminated and the problem can be aggravated if the forecasts that the Himalayan glaciers can disappear by the global increase in temperature by the year 2035.

The paper of Mahmoud Yacoub, an officer of the Egyptian Army that concluded the General Staff Course of the Armed Forces in Spain, reinforces that the “Nile represents the greatest risk of conflict linked to water in Mediterranean Africa” because it’s “located in an area arid or semi- arid in which agriculture is impossible without the presence of the river. The Nile is the only source of life for the 82 million Egyptians” (MAHMOUD YACOUB,2010).

Mahmoud Yacoub also states that “in 1959, Egypt and Sudan agreed that Egypt would use annually 55 billion cubic liters of water from the Nile. Half a century ago this quota was more than enough, but since then the population has almost doubled and today to 70 million people.” Consequently, since 1929 Egypt (and the then colonial power, Great Britain) has been negotiating with the other countries touched by the Nile to prevent the execution of works that limit the passage of water to Egypt and “until today Cairo holds this position, including the armed threat in case of transgression.”

In addition, this officer argues that the danger of water becoming an outbreak for an armed conflict in Africa is great because as it appears in the Human Development Report published for the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 2005: “There are greater probabilities of obtaining violent results in societies marked by deep polarization, weak institutions and chronic poverty”.

Beyond that, it’s necessary to add that in 2011, was discovered the aquifer “Alter do Chão”, in the Amazon Region, which become the largest aquifer in the world - the volume is 3.5 times larger than that found in the Guarani Aquifer (ALISSON, 2014). This reserve has a volume of 86,000 km³ of fresh water, which would be enough to supply the world population, around 100 times. This new aquifer can increase external interest for the Amazon Region, add one more reason to environment speech talking about the importance of this region for the Earth and increasing the number of NGOs “worry” about its protection.

A despite of these predictions, it must be set the catastrophism outside, as stated by Lena Salamé, Coordinator of the Resolution of Water Conflicts of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and responsible for the Day World Water Summit 2009, “there are very few water conflicts between states, contrary to what may seem” (CUANDO..., 2009, n.p.).

In this sense, the next topic will address the tools that will allow the dispute over water to be resolved by building “bridges” between peoples and not with the use of force of arms.

3 Tools to manage water crises

3.1 Current Situation

The shortage of water is a phenomenon not only natural but also caused by the action of the human being. There is enough potable water on the planet to supply 6,000 million people, but the resource is distributed irregularly (six countries receive almost half of the continental water, led by Brazil with more than 12% and Russia with 10%), Much of it is contaminated and managed unsustainably (SHIKLOMANOV, 2000).

According to the UN, close to 1.2 billion people, almost one fifth of the world's population, live in areas of physical water scarcity, while another 1.6 billion face situations of economic water scarcity, that is, they live in countries that lack the necessary infrastructure to transport water from rivers and aquifers.

This shortage constitutes one of the main challenges of the 21st century. Over the last century, the use and consumption of water grew at a rate twice that of the population growth rate and, although we cannot speak of global water scarcity, the number of regions with chronic levels of lack of water increases every year.

Add to that the climate change, with its alterations in the seasonality and in the periodicity of the episodes of rain, snowfall, thaw and evapotranspiration. As a consequence, the world suffers more and more with floods and long-term droughts, becoming a gigantic challenge for water managers when it comes to foreseeing the conditions to specify the distribution of water resources.

According to the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC), another influential factor is the warming of the Earth. The Report of Expert Meeting on Climate Change, Land Use and Food Security, occurred in Rome between 23-25 January 2017, defends that “climate-induced changes in precipitation directly affect the amount of water entering water basins. Variations in temperature, radiation, humidity and wind speed affect evapotranspiration, resulting in dryer river basins” (ELBEHRI et al., 2017, p.4).

Furthermore, the report argues that:

[...] most regional studies project a decrease in water availability as a result of climate change well into the future. Projected food demand increases imply increased demand for irrigation, but global projections based on water supply offer divergent outcomes and irrigation acreage may decrease because of reduced supply. In hotspot regions with acute water scarcity, reduced freshwater in areas that are currently irrigated may indicate that irrigation has to be abandoned altogether (ELBEHRI et al., 2017, p.4).

Due to the above, various entities are dealing with this issue, among which are:

- The World Water Council (WEC): a discussion platform established in 1996 at the initiative of recognized specialists in water matters and various international organizations. It organizes the most important event in the field: the World Water Forums, which are already in their eighth edition: Marrakech (Morocco, 1997), The Hague (Netherlands, 2000), Kyoto (Japan, 2003), Mexico City (Mexico, 2006), Istanbul (Turkey, 2009), Marseille (France, 2012), Gyeongju and Daegu (South Korea, 2015) and Brasília (Brazil, 2018). Its mission is “to promote awareness, build political commitment and trigger action on critical water issues at all levels, to facilitate the efficient conservation, protection, development, planning, management and use of water in all its dimensions on an environmentally sustainable basis for the benefit of all life on Earth” (WORLD WATER FORUM, 2018, n.p.).

- UNESCO also has an intergovernmental program of scientific cooperation in hydrological research, management, education and capacity building related to water resources called the International Hydrological Program(IHP).
- The research program of the Oregon State University called Program in Water Conflict Management and Transformation (whose website² allows access to various articles that were used in this article).

In addition, the UN celebrates World Water Day on March 22, with the intent to disseminate, educate and raise public awareness about the care that must be taken with the water used to live and avoid devastating consequences on the environment.

Almost half of the water in drinking water supply systems in developing countries is lost through leaks, illicit connections and vandalism. In China, the aquifer water tables in the north have dropped thirty-seven meters in thirty years and, since 1990, it has dropped by one and a half meters each year. The internal Aral Sea, in Central Asia, has already lost half of its extension.

In the world water industry, whose estimated volume is 400 to 500 billion dollars, there are people, such as businessman T. Boone Pickens³, who defend that "water is the new oil". They are opposed by activists and governments who think that water is a basic right and, therefore, should not be treated as property.

3.2 Diplomacy

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) has identified that, since 805 AD, more than 3,600 treaties related to water resources were signed, revealing that water disputes can be handled diplomatically. In fact, in the last 50 years only 37 serious disputes have been computed that included violence, in comparison with the 150 treaties that were agreed upon (GOROSITO ZULUAGA, 2006, p.36), proving that many of the crises do not go beyond verbal threats and postures adopted by Heads of State, looking for a lot more influence on your own electorate than to resolve the situation.

While the disputes are usually caused by the volume of water or the unilateral construction of infrastructures, the agreements cover a greater variety of issues such as hydroelectric power, the quantity and quality of water, economic development or joint management.

Due to its importance, negotiating for water is a long and complex process. Each water basin has a multitude of specific characteristics, both physical (geography, ecosystem, climate, etc.) and social (demography, history, culture, etc.), so that it is difficult to reach common parameters for these negotiations.

2 Available at: <https://transboundarywaters.science.oregonstate.edu/>. Access on: May 4, 2020.

3 He owns more water than any other individual in the US and plans to build a pipe network to sell water to the city of Dallas..

In the last decades, several legal agreements on the subject of water sharing were negotiated, even among the most implacable enemies. It should be noted that these agreements were maintained even when the negotiation was interrupted and conflicts were triggered.

There are several examples of diplomacy action to prevent wars, such as the position of Israel and Jordan, which, since 1955, with the help of the United States, have held frequent talks about the distribution of the Jordan River, despite being until recently in a legal situation of war.

Two years later, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam (with the support of the United Nations) have been able to cooperate since 1957 within the framework of the work of the Mekong River Commission and have held technical exchanges during the Vietnam War.

The same happened in the negotiation between India and Pakistan that survived two wars, in order to fight against poverty and promote economic development in the region, promoting equitable use and the use of water resources in common.

The discussion process usually takes time. The Hindustan agreement took ten years; the Ganges, thirty and the Jordan, forty years! But, off course, it's nothing if we think about the gain obtained when to build trust between the countries involved.

On October 26, 1994, a Peace Treaty was signed between Jordan and Israel (the second peace agreement signed since independence), in which one of the main issues addressed was the river basin of the Jordan and Yarmuk rivers and the groundwater of the Arava. Israel agreed to transfer 50 million cubic meters of water annually to Jordan and, instead, has reached a series of bilateral agreements on the multilateral basin.

In 1997, the United Nations approved the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. This Convention is the only treaty governing shared freshwater resources that is of universal applicability and establishes the following:

Article 4

Parties to watercourse agreements

1. Every watercourse State is entitled to participate in the negotiation of and to become a party to any watercourse agreement that applies to the entire international watercourse, as well as to participate in any relevant consultations.

2. A watercourse State whose use of an international watercourse may be affected to a significant extent by the implementation of a proposed watercourse agreement that applies only to a part of the watercourse or to a particular project, programme or use is entitled to participate in consultations on such an agreement and, where appropriate, in the negotiation thereof in good faith with a view to becoming a party thereto, to the extent that its use is thereby affected [...].

Article 5

Equitable and reasonable utilization and participation

1. Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. In particular, an international watercourse shall be used and developed by watercourse States with a view to attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof and benefits therefrom, taking into account the interests of the watercourse States concerned, consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse.

2. Watercourse States shall participate in the use, development and protection of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. Such participation includes both the right to utilize the watercourse and the duty to cooperate in the protection and development thereof, as provided in the present Convention.[...].

Article 8

General obligation to cooperate

1. Watercourse States shall cooperate on the basis of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, mutual benefit and good faith in order international watercourse.

2. In determining the manner of such cooperation, watercourse States may consider the establishment of joint mechanisms or commissions, as deemed necessary by them, to facilitate cooperation on relevant measures and procedures in the light of experience gained through cooperation in existing joint mechanisms and commissions in various regions (UNITED NATIONS, 1997, p. 4-6).

It's important to highlight two key principles to guide nations in relation to shared watercourses: "equitable and reasonable use" and "optimal and sustainable use", in addition to promoting cooperation among neighbors.

In 2001, Palestinians and Israelis agreed to reduce attacks on water-related infrastructure. Since then, Israel has provided the agreed water with the Palestinian Authority, managing it through a coordination committee.

In November 2002, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights approved General Comment No. 15 on the right to water, stating that "the human right to water is indispensable to lead a life in human dignity" and on July 28 of 2010, through Resolution 64/292, the General Assembly of the United Nations explicitly recognized this right.

All these treaties seem to show that the possibility of conflicts arising from the water dispute is unlikely; but as Aaron Wolf, professor in the Department of

Geosciences at Oregon State University and director of the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, says:

[...] there are no guarantees that the future will look like the past; water and conflict are undergoing slow but steady changes. An unprecedented number of people lack access to a safe, stable supply of water. Two to five million people die each year from water-related illness. Water use is shifting to less traditional sources such as deep fossil aquifers and wastewater reclamation (WOLF et al., 2006, p.5).

However, two probable scenarios for water disputes that will be key elements in future negotiations can be proposed:

- Territorial appropriation - through the purchase of land with natural resources (water, biodiversity), or through military conflict.
- The privatization of water - since large corporations have come to control water in much of the planet and it is speculated that, in the coming years, a few private companies will have a monopoly of almost 75% control of this vital resource for life on the planet.
-

This last scenario is verified analyzing the sales of pure bottled water: between 1970 and 2000, the sale of water grew more than eighty times - in 1970 it was a billion liters and in 2000 it reached 84 billion, with gains of 2.2 one billion dollars.

3.3 Technology

Unless a global effort is made to improve our understanding and knowledge of the planet's water resources, its management in the future will face even greater uncertainty and risk.

More than 60% of the global population growth between 2008 and 2100 will occur in Sub-Saharan Africa (32%) and South Asia (30%). Together, these regions are expected to account for roughly half of the world's population by the year 2100.

First, we must abandon the idea of the majority who only seem to care about the amount of water available, when it would be reasonable to place the quality at the same level.

With respect to the uses and exploitation of sources, direct human consumption is still small compared to other uses. Only 10% - 12% of the drinking water of the globe is used directly by human beings. The industry uses twice as much, while the agricultural sector is responsible for 70% of total consumption.

In addition, a huge amount of drinking water is lost through distribution systems; According to the World Bank, 32,000 million cubic meters of water are lost annually due to leaks and damage to aqueduct systems.

Because the increase in wealth in emerging economies, in particular China, will mean a gradual and constant increase in the consumption of food, especially meat⁴, it will be essential to develop new technologies that are capable of maximizing efficiency in the use of this resource and respond to the growing demand for food and other agricultural products.

Some countries are already treating the water used to make it drinkable again. There are also initiatives to improve agriculture dependent on rainwater, develop plants that are more resistant and able to withstand longer periods of drought; replace "abundant" irrigation systems, in which much water is wasted, by more efficient systems such as "trickle down"; modernize the old infrastructure, which wastes immense volumes of water every year; and stimulate individual savings.

On the supply side, there are plans to exploit new water sources through investments in desalination processes, whose technology has improved a lot in the last three decades thanks to the use of reverse osmosis, in which sea water flows through through a membrane that extracts its salt.

Meanwhile, high fuel consumption has prevented desalination plants worldwide from achieving the same success as in the Middle East. But, the improvements introduced in membrane technology and energy saving could change the scenario.

By way of comparison, a new \$ 300 million plant north of San Diego will have an energy expense to produce 1,000 gallons of drinking water equivalent to \$ 1.10. In one of the old plants, the cost of production was \$ 2.10.

It should be noted that Spain was the first European country to build a desalination plant in the Canary Islands almost 40 years ago and is one of the largest users of desalination technology in the western world. Spanish companies are leaders in the design, engineering, construction and operation market of new desalination plants around the world and operate in regions such as India, the Middle East and North America.

According to some economists, a factor that would accelerate the development of a more efficient water system is precisely the object of the wrath of the environmental movements: privatization.

The need to develop more sustainable practices for the management and efficient use of water resources has substantially changed the sensitivity and public attention in this regard in the last decade. However, economic criteria and policy-based approaches still govern decisions on the development of water resources in most local, national and international spheres. The response of management strategies to the potential threats of climate change is an opportunity to implement more sustainable policies and practices regarding resources.

4 World hydrological scenarios in the future


Water is fundamental for socioeconomic development and, if we properly analyze the possible future of water (availability of resources, reliability and the evolution of demand in response to external pressures, etc.), we will obtain a valuable tool for those responsible for the

⁴ Beckett and Oltjen of the Department of Animal Sciences at the University of California estimate that 3,700 lt of water is needed to produce 1 kg of beef.

decision making in sectors that are traditionally not considered part of the water sector: food security, health, energy, land development planning, etc.

It is estimated that to cover the water demand of the 6.250 million inhabitants, to which we have arrived, 20% more water would be necessary (FRERS, 2005). The conflict occurs between those who believe that water should be considered a commodity or tradable (such as wheat and coffee) and those who express that it is a social good related to the right to life

Figure 2 – Global Water Scarcity in 2025



Source: National Intelligence Council, 2008, p. 55.

The figure 2 shows the water shortage in 2025, estimating the areas in that is most probably to present problems due to lack of water resources. These are: the US border - Mexico, North Africa (particularly the Vale of the Nile), the India - Pakistan border, the China - Tibet dispute and the MiddleEast.

In addition, Patrick Johnson (2014) suggests, in an article published in a Canadian Intelligence Publication to pay attention in this three situations:

- The Brahmaputra River (China-India): The Brahmaputra River is a 2,900 km river that originates in Tibet and flows through India's Arunachal Pradesh state before merging with the Ganges and draining into the Bay of Bengal in Bangladesh. It is considered an important resource in all three countries that it flows through: for energy-hungry China, it provides hydroelectricity; and for India and Bangladesh,

a key agricultural lifeline in otherwise overpopulated and arid region. The tension is caused by the possibility, second some experts, that the Chinese projects of power plants in Tibet will reduce the flow of the Brahmaputra in India, compounding an already tenuous water situation in the affected areas.

- Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and the Nile River (Ethiopia-Egypt): In 2011, the Ethiopian government announced plans to build the ‘Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam’ – a \$4.1 bn, 6,000MW-capacity hydroelectric dam on the Blue Nile near the border with Sudan. The dam is meant to capitalize on Ethiopia’s considerable hydroelectric potential and provide electricity for not just Ethiopians but regional populations as well. The potential impact on water supplies, particularly downriver, is a grave concern in Egypt; which, unlike neighboring Sudan, has consistently opposed the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam from the start. In August 2017, the Ethiopian government disclosed that the construction of its Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam had reached 60 percent completion rate (ETHIOPIA’S..., 2017).
- Ilisu Dam and the Tigris River (Turkey-Iraq): Turkey’s Erdogan government has been keen to push through the final part of its long-running Southeastern Anatolian Project: the Ilisu Dam on the Tigris River near the border of Syria. The Southeastern Anatolian Project entailed the construction of some 22 dams and 19 hydroelectric plants in the Tigris-Euphrates basin, so this is an international water conflict that has existed for quite some time. Iraq has historically enjoyed the lion’s share of these rivers’ waters, which have historically supplied the seasonal marshlands needed to grow food. But these waters have been receding over the past decade, even well before the Ilisu Dam’s completion. In fact, northern Iraq and Syria are currently experiencing droughts so protracted that some analysts are questioning whether or not they have contributed to the rise of ISIS in the region. Some of the more extreme projections hold that, owing to a combination of climate change and upstream dam activity, the Tigris and Euphrates rivers won’t have sufficient flow to reach the sea by as early as 2040.

Furthermore, under the current climate change context, by 2030, almost half of the world’s population will live in areas of water stress, including between 75 and 250 million people in Africa. In addition, the scarcity of water in arid or semi-arid areas will cause a displacement of refugees of between 24 and 700 million people.

The change in the diet has had the greatest impact on water consumption in the last 30 years. For its part, agriculture contributes to climate change with its share of greenhouse gas emissions, which also affects the planet’s water cycle, adding another element of uncertainty and risk to food production. Predictions indicate that by 2030, the regions most affected by food shortages due to climate change will be South Asia and Africa.

Thus, in order to achieve global food security, the following will be necessary:

- To produce more nutritious food with less water, through innovative technologies that guarantee a more sustainable food production. These technologies are necessary to improve crop yields; to implement efficient irrigation strategies; to allow the reuse of wastewater; to find smarter ways to use fertilizers and water; to improve crop protection; to reduce losses after harvest; and to develop a more sustainable livestock and marine production.
- Strengthen human capacities and the institutional framework, with the purpose of holding those responsible for poor water management accountable.
- To improve the value chain, carrying out efficient water reuse strategies in all phases of the process, from production, harvest handling, processing, retailing and consumption, to distribution and trade. This could help to guarantee the environmental requirements associated with water in those cases where the reuse of treated water is not culturally accepted for other uses.

Of course, we must take into account the discovery of new technologies that, by increasing the efficiency of water exploitation, in addition to allowing greater savings in the consumption of water resources, will reduce the catastrophic consequences of these predictions.

To this we must add, the increasingly strong awareness of the population that adheres to the campaigns for an adequate use of water, changing customs and avoiding the waste of this vital resource for Man.

In this context, several scholars are producing works to bring this issue to the agenda of the world society and we must highlight two important concepts: Virtual Water and Water Footprint. Virtual Water⁵ - John Anthony Allan, a researcher at King's College London and the School of Oriental and African Studies, created the concept of "Virtual Water" in 1993 when he studied the concept of "Virtual Water" in 1993 when he studied the importation of water as a solution to the resource shortage in the Middle East. The concept can be simplified as being the water contained in the products, that is, the water used to produce them and, in addition to developing the theory, the British scientist also created a method to calculate it accurately. Thus, for example, to obtain a piece of cheese of 500 grams would require about 2,500 liters of water. Allan remembers that citizens not only consume water when they drink or shower, but also when they eat or dress and, from the sum of the products consumed and their equivalence in virtual water, it can be said that each person spends between 2,000 and 5,000 liters of water per day. The customs of the country in which they live also affect the consumption of virtual water, so it is estimated that an American spends about 2,500,000 liters of virtual water annually (7,000 liters / day), more than three times as much as a Chinese who consumes 700,000 liters per year (1,920 liters per day). In virtue of the practical applications for the concept, such as the so-called "virtual water trade", the Stockholm International Water Institute, awarded the English scientist for having valued that the theory of virtual water "enhances the use of trade to alleviate the water shortages in some regions and more efficient use of water resources" (STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL WATER INSTITUTE, c2012-2015).

5 Data obtained on the site of the Stockholm International Water Institute. Available at: <http://www.siwi.org>. Access on: May 4, 2020.

Water Footprint⁶ - In 2002, Arjen Hoekstra, whilst working at the UNESCO-IHE Institute for Water Education, created the water footprint as a metric to measure the amount of water consumed and polluted to produce goods and services along their full supply chain. Water footprints can be calculated for an individual person, a process, a product's entire value chain or for a business, a river basin or a nation. They provide powerful insights for businesses to understand their water-related business risk, for governments to understand the role of water in their economy and water dependency, and for consumers to know how much water is hidden in the products they use. Most importantly, they help drive strategic action toward sustainable, efficient and equitable water use. Some examples:

- The production of one kilo of beef requires 15,000 liters of water.
- To produce a cup of coffee you need 140 liters of water.
- China's water footprint is around 1070 cubic meters per year percapita.
- Japan has a total water footprint of 1380 cubic meters per year percapita.
- The US water footprint is 2,840 cubic meters per year percapita.

14 Conclusions

The current tension generated by water unavailability can be synthesized as a classic economic problem since the resource is finite while the needs do not stop growing. The direct consequence of this is the substantial increase in the price of water, which will generate repercussions in the geopolitical, economic, social, military and environmental fields.

The human activity that has consumed the most water has always been agriculture and its productive intensification, based on the use of machinery, chemical fertilization, the use of phytosanitary products, the sowing of selected seeds and the spread of irrigation, caused an excessive increase of water inputs in agricultural production.

The 273 existing transboundary basins prove that water can be considered as the most natural representation of globalization, since it crosses administrative boundaries without a passport or documentation. The problem is a consequence of the historical use of water courses for the establishment of borders, in addition to the fact that rivers often cross different countries on their way to the sea.

Thus, shared waters can serve as a link between the parties, serving as a common point that stimulates cooperation and equitable distribution or, conversely, as a source of tension, becoming a reason for competition and rivalry.

There are several examples of the two situations, but as the worsening of the situation in the future is estimated, the possibility of a resurgence of these tensions and even the increase in the armed confrontation is great. This can be aggravated by the increasing contamination of springs that spoil part of the already small fraction of the water available for human consumption.

⁶ Data obtained on the Water Footprint Network site. Available at: <http://www.waterfootprint.org>. Access on: May 4, 2020.

It should also be noted that the economic valuation of water resources plays a preponderant role in the management of demand and in a better distribution among its various uses. Thus, the value of water resources depends not only on their quantity, but on at least four other factors: quality, location, access reliability and availability time.

Regarding conflicts, 'Annex A' shows the incidence of various terrorist attacks that, throughout history, used water as a vector of contamination or attraction for tricks or attacked its supply, as well as verifying that conflicts over the resource is usually regional and the scarcity of water can often serve as a fuse for the deflagration of a struggle that, in fact, has several other polemological factors.

The analysis of the possible scenarios, apart from the comparison between the availability of the resource with the projection of the population in the short term, allows us to affirm that the regions most prone to future water conflicts are: Egypt - Sudan, India - Pakistan and China - Tibet.

On the other hand, it is also perceived that the international community is increasingly aware of the problems arising from the mismanagement of water resources and there is an effort to optimize the diplomatic capacity in crisis resolution, as well as in the development of technologies able to avoid the current waste.

Regarding the first mentioned effort, there is a series of international law studies on the subject and the United Nations Organization, as the great world forum, established March 22 as International Water Day with the aim of promoting debate, disseminating good practices and encourage the development of new technologies, both for the most efficient exploitation of the resource, and for its use more efficiently.

This technological development is what will allow the survival of the Man, in spite of the growth of the population and the growth of the demand, because as the Secretary General of the UN said, on April 22, 2012:

in the next twenty years, the world will need at least 50% more food ... 45% more energy [...] 30% more water ... and many millions of new jobs. Our challenge at Rio + 20 and beyond is to adopt a holistic and integrated approach to these interlinked difficulties - an approach that focuses on interrelations so that solutions to a problem translate into progress in all of them.

This collective effort will allow water to continue to be the main resource of Humanity, as, in addition to having been the environment that allowed the emergence of life and have served as a means for the great navigators to expand knowledge to beyond their At the same time, there are hopes that it will serve more as a motivator for cooperation among peoples than as an obstacle that impedes mutual understanding.

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The management of internally displaced persons and enhanced human security in North East Nigeria

La gestión de personas desplazadas internamente y el fortalecimiento de la seguridad humana en el Nordeste de Nigeria

Abstract: Human security entails protecting people from severe and pervasive threats in ways that enhance their survival, livelihood and dignity. It broadens the understanding of security from territorial security to the security of people, particularly vulnerable groups such as IDPs who suffer emotional problems such as human right abuses, assault and loss of livelihood among others. These problems have raised the need for attention to the efficient management of IDPs for the enhancement of human security in NE Nigeria. This research therefore unravelled the strategies to mitigate the challenges against effective management of IDPs for enhanced human security in NE Nigeria. The main objective of this research is to appraise the management of IDPs for enhanced human security in NE Nigeria. Questionnaires which were administered to respondents were analysed using Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) AAEA.

Keywords: Nigeria. Human security. Internally displaced persons.

Resumen: La seguridad humana implica proteger a las personas de amenazas graves y generalizadas a fin de fortalecer su supervivencia, sus medios de vida y su dignidad. La comprensión de la seguridad se amplía de la seguridad territorial a la seguridad de las personas, en particular los grupos vulnerables como los desplazados Internos, que sufren problemas emocionales como violaciones de los derechos humanos, agresiones y pérdida de medios de vida, entre otros. Estos problemas han planteado la necesidad de prestar atención a la gestión eficiente de las PDI para mejorar la seguridad humana en el noreste de Nigeria. Por lo tanto, esta investigación desentrañó estrategias para mitigar los desafíos contra la gestión efectiva de las PDI para fortalecer la seguridad humana en el noreste de Nigeria. El objetivo principal de esta investigación es evaluar la gestión de las PDI para fortalecer la seguridad humana en el noreste de Nigeria. Los cuestionarios que se administraron a los encuestados se analizaron utilizando el Paquete Estadístico para Ciencias Sociales (SPSS) AAEA.

Palabras-clave: Nigeria. Seguridad humana. Personas desplazadas internas.

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1 Introduction

The Twenty First Century global community is confronted with contemporary threats including political upheavals, armed conflicts, trans-national organised crime and terrorism. Many of these threats have had adverse implications on the security and well-being of people. They have, unilaterally or in combination, engendered huge humanitarian crisis such as death, hunger, poverty and mass displacement of people. The forced migration of people from their homes has often resulted in the problem of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).

An IDP connotes any person that has been compelled to leave his or her place of abode, due to real or imagined threats, to another location within a country's border. The IDPs are distinct from refugees, who are people that have fled across an internationally recognized border to escape war, persecution or natural disaster (RUSSELL, 2016). According to a UNDP 1994 report, IDPs are exposed to threats such as disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, abuse, social conflict and political repression, especially when not well managed. In addressing these threats, the establishment of a robust mechanism for the management of IDPs becomes imperative. The management of IDPs is primarily a national government responsibility. It involves the utilization of available resources to address the problems inhibiting the safety, security and well-being of IDPs, hence human security.

Globally, the number of IDPs has been on a steady rise from 6.6 million in 2005 to over 40.8 million by December 2015, according to the 2016 Global Report on Internal Displacement (GRID). Bagshaw and Paul (2004), argue that the management of IDPs has therefore, increasingly become one of the most daunting challenges in recent times. In Pakistan, since 2004, conflict induced IDPs have resulted from fighting between the Pakistani Military and Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) such as al-Qaeda with adverse effects on human security. The IDPs have also resulted from sectarian violence and tribal clashes over resources. Specifically, conflict in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) Province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) resulted in 1,292,406 IDPs including 17,578 living in camps (UNHCR, 2016). These IDPs were faced with several problems including disease, loss of access to livelihood and other security threats that impinged on human security in Pakistan. Africa is home to over 13 million IDPs arising from disasters such as conflicts and complex emergencies, representing about one third of the global figure, according to the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), communities have over the years been exposed to waves of violence resulting in about 2.9 million IDPs with negative impacts on human security (STACEY, 2014). Due to the huge number of displaced persons and fragile nature of the national institutions, the management of IDPs has been taken up by the UN and other international organisations in DRC. These include the OCHA, UN High Commission for Refugees

(UNHCR), United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and International Organisation for Migration (IOM), amongst others.

In 2014 and 2015, about \$633,660,856 was expended by the international community on the management of IDPs in the DRC (INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CENTRE, 2016). These supports spanning across areas such as food, health, education and shelter were delivered through UN agencies, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and partner Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) such as Oxfam. According to the UN, several of these efforts are steadily yielding results with over 74,000 people from 20 villages in Katanga returning home between 2012 and 2014. The efforts of the Government at addressing the insecurity and management of the IDPs, in collaboration with her partners, have therefore enhanced human security in the DRC.

In Nigeria, armed attacks perpetrated by Boko Haram Terrorists (BHT) in the North East (NE) states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe have led to over 1,856,616 IDPs as of April 2016 (INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION, 2016). The IDPs spreading across the NE and North Central (NC) zones of Nigeria as well as the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) account for about 86.16 per cent of IDPs in the country, according to IOM. However, majority of these IDPs are located in Borno with 1,427,999 representing 76.9 per cent, followed by Yobe with 150,718 representing 8.1 per cent and Adamawa with 134,415 representing 9.4 per cent of the total figure. These IDPs suffer emotional problems associated with memory of fearful events, loss of livelihood, frustration, assault and human rights abuse, amongst others. The activities of BHT have also festered social vices such as crime, assassination and sexual abuse against the IDPs, particularly the children, which represent

53.72 per cent of the IDP population (OLUKOLAJO; OGUNGBENRO, 2017). These problems have raised the need for attention to the efficient management of IDPs for the enhancement of human security in NE Nigeria.

The Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) has been constrained in effectively managing the IDPs for enhanced human security in NE Nigeria. For instance, due to the absence of a clear and specific national policy on IDPs, the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) has remained the de-facto lead government agency (LADAN, 2016). However, IDPs have unique needs such as protection of their rights, which an emergency management agency such as NEMA cannot effectively provide. This has thus hampered the FGN's ability to provide a comprehensive support package that addresses the wide-ranging issues confronting IDPs in the NE. The purpose of this study, therefore, is to appraise the management of IDPs in the NE Nigeria in order to address pertinent issues impeding human security in the region. Thus, the main objective of this study is to appraise the management of IDPs for enhanced human security in NE Nigeria. Furthermore, the Alternate Hypothesis was used in the research to establish a significant relationship between management of IDPs and human security. The study was additionally elaborated by time, space and content.

The methodology of the study covers the type of research, sources of data, methods of data collection, sampling technique, sample population, method of data analysis and method of

data presentation. The field survey method was adopted to enable the researcher obtain views on the subject matter as well as examine responses from informed perspectives on the topic. Data for the research was obtained from primary sources such as questionnaires and unstructured interviews. Secondary sources such as books, conference reports, official publications, newspapers and magazines were also exploited. A combination of field method and document analysis were used for data collection, while the purposive non-probabilistic sampling method was used to select respondents in line with the objectives of the study. The data collected from the primary and secondary sources were analysed using the qualitative and quantitative methods of data analysis. The data obtained were presented in a descriptive and analytic form using tables, charts and graphs.

2 Literature review

The chapter presents a review of some relevant literature and provides a theoretical framework to guide the study. It also highlights examples of management of IDPs and human security from other countries in order to draw lessons. The 2 key variables in this study are management of IDPs as the independent variable and human security as the dependent variable.

Review of existing literature

Several studies have been conducted over the years on the management of IDPs and human security. However, most of these studies vary in approach, content, theories and methodology. The literature are reviewed with a view to identifying the gaps the study seeks to fill.

Adesote and Peters (2015) in their study, provided a historical comparative analysis of IDPs arising from conflict situations in Nigeria including those in NE Nigeria. Their work was descriptive in nature and interrogated the human security impacts of various cases of violence on IDPs. It also noted and proffered some options for government in addressing the myriad of challenges militating against the management of IDPs.


Daodu (2010) examined how the US and Nigeria have responded and managed IDPs. The main assertion of the study is that there is no difference between the handling of IDPs in the US and Nigeria. This was in spite of the inability of the emergency agencies to meet the peculiar needs of IDPs in both countries. Cohen and Deng (1998) conducted case studies of some countries in Africa, Eastern Europe and Latin America that have suffered severe problems of internal displacement. The result of their studies showed striking similarities in the challenges confronting the management of IDPs in these countries as well as the broader implications for national security.

All the reviewed works have made significant contributions to this field of study, by providing insights on the region-specific dynamics in IDPs management as well as their underlying issues. However, majority of the literature addressed the management of IDPs from a broader national security perspective, as against human security which is a component thereof. This leaves a knowledge gap on the effects of the managements of IDPs on human security. It is this gap that this study seeks to address by appraising the management of IDPs for enhanced human security in NE Nigeria.

Theoretical frame work

The theory considered most suitable for this study is the Hierarchy of Needs Theory (HNT), which seeks to explain the hierarchical nature of human needs as well as their interrelationship. The pioneer proponent of this theory was Abraham Maslow, who posited that “human needs are organised into a hierarchy of relative pre-potency (HOPPER, 2019). This hierarchy ranges from more concrete needs such as food and water, to more abstract concepts such as self-fulfilment. Maslow further stated that human beings were motivated by 5 categories of needs; physiological, safety, love, esteem and self-actualisation. Graph 1 below depicts Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs Theory.

Graph 1 – Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs Theory



Source: McLeod, 2018.

HNT is considered relevant to this study as it provides a basis for understanding the most essential needs of IDPs and how these could affect their management for enhanced human security in Nigeria.

Examples of management of internally displaced persons and human security from other countries

Examples of the management of IDPs and human security from Colombia and Uganda were examined in order to draw lessons from the study. These countries were selected because they have experienced the impact of the management of IDPs arising from armed conflict on human security with similarities to the situation in NE Nigeria.

Management of internally displaced persons and human security in Colombia

Colombia has been involved in a civil war for over 50 years between the government forces and insurgent forces such as the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). These crises as well as operations against drug cartels have resulted to a large IDP population estimated at 6 million as at December 2014, representing about a tenth of the country's population, according to OXFAM (2012). Louise noted that several women and children were exposed to sexual exploitation, violence and malnutrition while majority of the children engaged as child workers reached about 1.1 million in 2014. The displacements resulted in loss of abode, loss of means of livelihood and impacted negatively on the well-being of the people. The Colombian Government however, made some efforts to address the challenges facing the IDPs. According to the US Commerce Department Bureau of Economic Analysis 2014 Report, the Colombian Government utilised resources from the growing economy, with an average GDP growth of 4.3 per cent per annum, to improve its support to IDPs. The Government also established a single registry for IDPs, which provided centralised information on the displacement dynamics for the judicious appropriation of funds and resources. These efforts of the Colombian Government at effectively managing the IDPs have thus gone a long way in enhancing human security in the country.

Management of internally displaced persons and human security in Uganda

In Uganda, the insurgent activities of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) resulted in over 1.5 million IDPs in 1998 (NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL, 2012). At the peak of the crisis in 2005, there were about 1.84 million IDPs living in 242 camps across 11 districts in Northern Uganda. Several local and international actors were involved in the management of the IDPs including the World Food Programme (WFP), which provided food. Others include

the UNHCR, which took up the protection role and the World Health Organisation (WHO) that provided health services. The UN Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF) focussed on children along with other UN agencies and NGOs that also took up diverse roles under the coordination umbrella of the national authorities.

As at 2005, a total of 539,550 IDPs had returned to their homes while an additional 381,000 moved to new sites closer to their homes by June 2007 (GOMEZ; GASPER, 2016). In October 2007, Uganda launched the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) for Northern Uganda as a 3-year framework to enable development and restore law and order in affected areas. The PRDP with a budget of \$600 million was built on 4 strategic objectives namely; consolidation of state authority, empowering communities, revitalising the economy and peace building and reconciliation. Due to the commitment of the government, the initiative received the support of other organisations. It facilitated the return of several IDPs resulting in the decrease of the IDP population to about 30,000 by December 2011. The PRDP, thus, improved the management of IDPs and enhanced human security in Uganda.

Lessons learnt from Colombia and Uganda

The lessons learnt from Colombia and Uganda's management of IDPs and human security includes political will and importance of policy framework.

Political Will. Political will and commitment to the plight of IDPs is a lesson drawn from the examples studied. The governments in Colombia and Uganda displayed strong commitment in taking lead roles in the management of IDPs in their countries. They set in place appropriate mechanisms, which facilitated the involvement of a wide array of actors to achieve sustainable results. The need for political will that unencumbers bureaucratic and administrative bottlenecks is therefore crucial.

Importance of Policy Framework. The importance of appropriate policy frameworks for the management of IDPs was underscored in Colombia and Uganda. The Victims Law in Colombia and National Policy on Internally Displaced Persons (NPI) in Uganda provided a useful platform for delineation of roles amongst stakeholders. These policies were further backed by relevant legislation that guaranteed the rights of IDPs, through damages and restitution, enabling stakeholders hold government to account. The policy framework, backed by legislation, thus spurred the commitment of government agencies involved in the management of IDPs and enhanced human security in these countries.

3 Presentation of research data

In this section, research data generated from the questionnaires and those obtained from relevant institutions are presented. Out of the 384 respondents, 330 were IDPs while 54 were humanitarian workers. It is pertinent to note that some of the questions were directed at the humanitarian workers only, based on the technical nature of the questions.

The issues associated with the management of IDPs and human security in NE Nigeria would be discussed. The analyses of collected data are also embedded in subsequent sections of this Chapter.

Issues associated with the management of internally displaced persons and human security in north east Nigeria

The issues associated with the management of IDPs and human security in NE Nigeria include policy framework, institutional capacity and coordination of assistance and support services. Others are Internal Displacement Data Management (IDDM) as well as the Return, Resettlement and Reintegration (RRR) programme. These are subsequently discussed within the context of the HNT.

Policy framework

Policy framework entails the plan of action, backed by appropriate legislation that forms the basis of making rules and guidelines that align the priorities of institutions in a state with overall national goals. In 2012, the FGN revised the draft NPI in line with the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons (ACPAI) to serve as a normative framework for preventing internal displacement and assisting IDPs across the country, including the NE. The revised NPI outlines the obligations of government, humanitarian actors and even host communities with respect to IDPs as well as implementation strategies for the management of IDPs towards enhanced human security. In line with its mandate, NEMA's efforts have thus been focussed on providing immediate basic needs of IDPs. This has resulted in limited attention to the medium and long term needs of IDPs, such as their rights and dignity.


This opinion was supported by responses from humanitarian workers in the field survey undertaken in this research, as depicted in Table 1 and Graph 2, on the influence of a NPI on the management of IDPs in NE Nigeria.

Table 1 – What is the Influence of Policy Framework Framework on the Management of IDPs in the NE?

Serial	Respondent	Response	Percentage
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1.	Highly Significant	33	61.1%
2.	Significant	16	29.6%
3.	Barely Significant	5	9.3%
4.	Not Significant	0	0
	Total	54	100

Source: Researcher's Analysis, 2019.

Graph 2 – What is the Influence of Policy on the Management of IDPs in the NE?



Source: Researcher's Analysis, 2019.


In the survey, 33 of the respondents representing 61.1 per cent, opined that a NPI is highly significant to the effective management of IDPs in the NE. Also, 16 respondents representing 29.6 per cent felt it was significant and 9.3 per cent believed it was barely significant.

Interestingly, no respondent felt that a NPI was not significant, underlining the importance of policy framework to the management of IDPs in the NE.

Internal displacement data management

The IDDM entails the systematic collection of data through assessments, documentation and registration to determine the size and characteristics of displaced populations. It facilitates access to basic rights, family reunification and helps to identify persons in need of special assistance. Several agencies including NEMA, in collaboration with International Office for Migration (IOM), SEMAs and other organisations are currently involved in IDDM in NE Nigeria. The NEMA/IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) assessments provide the major source of information on IDPs in Nigeria. It is conducted through interviews with household heads as well as detailed surveys and registration, including biometric capture with particular focus on IDPs in camps¹. The wide range of baseline information collected, at ward level, covers displacement history, access to basic needs, return intention and assistance received (INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION, 2016a). As at February 2016, eight rounds of DTM assessments had been conducted with increasing coverage and information on the displacement situation in NE Nigeria as shown in Graph 3.

Graph 3 – Coverage of Displacement Tracking Matrix Report I – VII



Source: International Organization for Migration, 2016.

The Round I Report covered only 66 LGAs and 445 wards while the Round VIII Report covered 218 LGAs and 1,350 wards translating to an increased coverage of over 200 per cent.

¹ NEMA, SEMA and IOM commence Registration and Biometric capture of IDPs in Borno State. Available at: <http://nema.gov.ng/nema-sema-and-iom-commence-registration-and-biometric-capture-of-idps-in-borno-state/>. Access on: Apr 28, 2016.

Return resettlement and reintegration programme

The RRR programme covers the support provided to IDPs to facilitate their safe return to their abodes or resettlement in new homes and reintegration into communities. Article 11 of ACPAI and Principle 28 of UNGPI require state parties to develop durable frameworks that ensure returns are voluntary with due attention to human security (UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, 2004, p. 14). It also advocates the full participation of IDPs in the planning and management of RRR.


The 2-year Emergency Assistance and Economic Stabilisation Plan (EAESP) was developed under the Presidential Initiative for the North East (PINE) in 2014. It was designed to facilitate RRR of IDPs in the NE through the employment of 150,000 youths in reconstruction activities (PINE Report, 2014). In July 2015, the FGN also released a Resettlement and Reintegration Plan (RRP) for victims of insurgency in the NE. The RRP was developed to, inter alia, address the immediate needs of the returning IDPs. The results of the field survey on the familiarity of IDPs and humanitarian actors with the FGN's RRR programmes are at Table 2 and Graph 3.5.

Table 2 – Are you familiar with the FGN's RRR programme for IDPs in the NE?

Serial	Response	Respondent	Percentage
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1.	Yes	31	5.8%
2.	No	362	90.2%
3.	Indifferent	17	4%
	Total	384	100

Source: Researcher's Analysis, 2016.

Graph 4 – Are you familiar with the FGN’s RRR programme for IDPs in the NE?



Source: Researcher’s Analysis, 2016.

Summary of research findings

This research set out to carry out an appraisal of the management of IDPs and its effects on human security in NE Nigeria. Based on the aforementioned, the following findings were made:

- a) Policy framework, institutional capacity, coordination of assistance and support services, IDDM as well as RRR are issues associated with the management IDPs and human security in NE Nigeria.
- b) There is too much emphasis on the emergency relief phase covering basic needs such as food and shelter with less attention to medium and long term issues facing IDPs in the NE.
- c) The current adhoc registration and documentation process does not facilitate a comprehensive approach to the management of IDPs thus impinging on human security in NE Nigeria.
- d) The management of IDPs in the NE has reduced access to education, led to food insecurity as well as compromised public health and communal relationships thereby impinging on human security in NE Nigeria.

- e) The effects of the management of IDPs on human security in the NE is also established by the results from SPSS as summarized in Table 3. This confirms the relationship set in place in the conceptual discourse.

Table 3 – Effects of the Management of IDPs on Human Security in NE Nigeria

Série	Management of IDPs (Independent Variable)	Attributes of Human Security (Dependent Variable)	Relationship to Human Security (Dependent Variable)
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1.	Access to Education	Economic	Significant Negative Effect
2.	Food Security	Food	Significant Negative Effect
3.	Public Health	Health	Significant Negative Effect
4.	Inter-Communal Relationship	Community	Negative Effect

Source: Researcher's Analysis, 2016.

These findings lend credence to the HNT propounded by Maslow. It underlines the primacy of human needs from the basic to the abstract, and how these could affect the efforts at managing IDPs to enhance human security.

Challenges militating against the effective management of internally displaced persons for enhanced human security in north east Nigeria

The challenges militating against the effective management of IDPs for enhanced human security in the NE include non-adoption of the NPI inadequate budgetary allocation and inter- agency rivalry. Others include absence of centralised database for IDPs as well as failure to adopt durable solutions for RRR. These challenges are discussed subsequently.

Non-adoption of draft national policy on internally displaced persons

The non-adoption of the draft NPI has hampered the effective management of IDPs for enhanced human security in NE Nigeria. It has prevented the employment of holistic strategies in the management of IDPs in NE Nigeria as outlined in the extracts of the draft NPI. The current approach has inadvertently concentrated government's efforts on basic physiological needs. This has led to support gaps in specialised areas such as means of livelihood, cultural identity, compensation, personal dignity and psychosocial care as captured in Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs in Graph 5.

Graph 5 – Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs



Source: Kasali, 2015.

According to Kasali, the higher needs of safety, belonging, self-esteem and self-actualisation are gaps arising from the current approach adopted in the management of IDPs in the NE. The non-adoption of the NPI has thus resulted in support gaps in specialised areas that impinge on human security in NE Nigeria.

Inadequate budgetary allocation


Inadequate budgetary allocation to statutory agencies involved in the management of IDPs has inhibited their institutional capacity to effectively manage IDPs in the NE. The annual budget allocation to the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons (NCFRMI) declined from 616 million naira in 2010 to 600 million naira in 2015. This was in spite of a converse increase in the number of IDPs in the NE from 307,000 to 2,100,000 within same period as highlighted in Table 4 and Graph 6.

Table 4 – Budget of NCFRMI 2011-2015

Serial	Year	Number of IDPs (Million Naira)	
1.	2010	307,000	616,090
2.	2011	550,000	473,956
3.	2012	750,000	521,333
4.	2013	982,000	604,965
5.	2014	1,080,000	616,093
6.	2015	2,100,000	600,000

Source: NCFRMI, NEMA, CBN, 2016.

Graph 6 – Budget of NCFRMI 2011-2015



Source: NCFRMI, NEMA, CBN, 2016.

Graph 6 reveals a net decrease in allocations to NCFRMI, despite the huge increase of over 584 per cent in the number of IDPs in the NE from 2010 to 2015.

Absence of centralised database for internally displaced persons

The absence of a centralised database on IDPs has made it difficult to obtain credible information on IDPs. A centralised and comprehensive database with aggregated displacement data such as age, gender and location that would facilitate attention to peculiar needs of IDP groups is unavailable. This has made it difficult to specifically target, plan and implement gender related programmes to address the needs of women, estimated to constitute 53 per cent of IDP population (DTM Report).

The absence of a centralised database has also prevented the exchange of information among stakeholders resulting in duplication of efforts with adverse effects on the humanitarian response in the NE. Specifically, Nafuta noted that the failure of Yobe State Emergency

Management Agency (SEMA) to share its database on IDPs enabled 192 IDPs in YBC settlement to simultaneously collect cash transfers from WFP and ICRC.

6 Strategies to mitigate the challenges in the management of internally displaced persons for enhanced human security in north east Nigeria

Some strategies are proposed in this study to mitigate the challenges of the management of IDPs for enhanced human security in NE Nigeria. These include review and adoption of the draft NPI, establishment of a National Humanitarian Intervention Fund (NHIF) and harmonisation of provisions in NEMA and NCFRMI Acts.

Review and adoption of the draft national policy on internally displaced persons

The review and adoption of the draft NPI could address the challenge of non-adoption of the draft NPI. This could help outline the obligations of government, humanitarian actors as well as implementation strategies for the effective management of IDPs and enhanced human security in NE Nigeria. It would designate an IDP Focal Coordinating Institution (IFCI) and help to delineate relief and protection support roles between agencies involved in the management of IDPs in Nigeria to cover existing gaps and eliminate overlaps. The Presidency could task the Presidential Committee for North East Initiatives (PCNI) to convene a meeting of stakeholders to review the draft NPI in line with current realities in Nigeria, drawing lessons from the situation in the NE. The review could also take due cognisance of UNGPI, ACPAI and all related obligations of Nigeria under international law.

Establishment of a national humanitarian intervention fund

The establishment of a NHIF in collaboration with the private sector could alleviate the challenge of inadequate budgetary allocation to agencies involved in the management of IDPs in the NE. This could address the funding gaps arising from dwindling government revenue. It could provide a sustainable funding alternative to agencies involved in the management of IDPs and enable them address institutional capacity gaps to enhance human security in the NE. It could also offer the private sector the opportunity to fulfil corporate social responsibility obligations and contribute to national development. The Presidency could task the Office of the Secretary to the

Government of the Federation (OSGF) to liaise with the private sector and other stakeholders to develop modalities for setting up the Fund.

Harmonization of provisions in national emergency management agency and national commission for refugees migrants and internally displaced person acts

The harmonization of the provisions in the legislative Acts establishing NEMA and NCFRMI could mitigate the challenge of inter-agency rivalry between the 2 agencies. The harmonisation could clearly delineate the roles of both agencies in terms of response phase and function thereby facilitating effective management of IDPs for enhanced human security in NE Nigeria. It could also facilitate positive engagement with international partners as well as engender coordination and collaboration in the delivery of support to IDPs. This would ultimately promote human security in the NE and across the country. The FGN could direct the Federal Ministry of Justice (FMOJ) to liaise with NEMA and NCFRMI as well as other relevant stakeholders for a review of their mandates with respect to IDPs. This review could also take due cognizance of all international legal and normative instruments applicable to Nigeria.

7 Conclusion and recommendations

This chapter comprises the conclusion and recommendations. The conclusion summed up the entire study providing a summary of major findings and deductions following the presentation and analysis of data collected. Thereafter, the recommendations of the study were presented.

Conclusion

The study examined the management of IDPs and human security in NE Nigeria. The study was anchored on the Hierarchy of Needs Theory and adopted the field survey method to obtain views on the subject matter. The study took a cursory look at the management of IDPs and human security in general before dwelling on the situation in NE Nigeria. It observed that despite several efforts towards the effective management of IDPs, several gaps that inhibit human security in the NE still exist.

The study examined some issues associated with the management of IDPs for enhanced human security in NE Nigeria. It identified policy framework as a major consideration for the holistic management of IDPs in the NE for enhanced human security in Nigeria. The study noted that there were several adhoc documentation efforts aimed at enhancing the management of IDPs and human security in NE Nigeria. It, however, observed that the absence of a coherent

mechanism for IDP registration, documentation and monitoring in the NE was hampering the delivery of support to the IDPs.

The study identified some challenges militating against the effective management of IDPs in the NE. This include the non-adoption of draft national policy on IDPs, inadequate budgetary allocation and absence of centralised database for IDPs. The strategies proffered to mitigate the challenges militating against the management of IDPs management for enhanced human security include the review and adoption of the draft NPI. This would cover existing support gaps and eliminate overlaps in the management of IDPs and could commence by Fourth Quarter of 2020. The establishment of NHIF in collaboration with the private sector could provide a sustainable funding alternative for the management of IDPs and enhancement of human security in NE Nigeria. This could commence by Second Quarter of 2020. Another strategy is the harmonization of provisions in the Act establishing NEMA and NCFRMI to delineate roles between both agencies. This could commence by the Second Quarter of 2020.

Recommendations

It is recommended that:

- a) The PCNI should commence the review and adoption of the draft NPI by First Quarter of 2020.
- b) The OSGF should establish the NHIF in collaboration with the private sector by Fourth Quarter of 2020.
- c) The FMOJ should forward draft bills on amendments of Acts establishing NEMA and NCFRMI to NASS by Third Quarter of 2020.

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How technology is controlling our critical infrastructure, civilians and military working together to minimize cyberattacks

Como la tecnología controla nuestra infraestructura crítica, los civiles y los militares trabajan juntos para minimizar los ataques cibernéticos

Abstract: The purpose of this document is to analyze the influence of technological development and how that development increases the risks in our critical infrastructure. When we study our state, we look around and see how technology is taking control of all our important and critical systems. So, It is necessary to find the way of minimizing the cyberattacks through all the possible ways that our state has, such as, the military cyber units, legislation, protocols of act, and the most important part: the civilians that work in private companies (banks, hospitals, the electricity company, and others). This work should do this with two main objectives: first, working together as one indivisible partnership against those threats, and second, trying to maintain the systems that form our critical infrastructure safe and secure. To develop this topic, Will be used the descriptive method, and it is collected the information from important works, such as, The National Cyber Security Strategy Policy (Guatemala, Mingob 2018), books about terrorism or cyber terrorism and some web sites that describe diagnosis of cyberattacks and how those cyber units have protected their critical infrastructure.

Keywords: Technology. Critical Infrastructure. Cyberattacks.

Resumen: El propósito de este artículo es analizar la influencia del desarrollo tecnológico y cómo este desarrollo aumenta los riesgos en nuestra infraestructura crítica. Cuando estudiamos nuestro Estado, miramos a nuestro alrededor y vemos cómo la tecnología está tomando el control de todos nuestros sistemas importantes y críticos. Por lo tanto, es necesario encontrar una manera de minimizar los ataques cibernéticos a través de todas las formas posibles que tiene nuestro estado, como las unidades cibernéticas militares, la legislación, los protocolos de acción, y la parte más importante: los civiles que trabajan en empresas privadas (bancos, hospitales, Compañía Eléctrica y otros). Este trabajo debe hacerlo con dos objetivos principales: primero, trabajar juntos como una asociación indivisible contra estas amenazas y, segundo, tratar de mantener seguros los sistemas que forman nuestra infraestructura crítica. Para desarrollar este tema, se utilizará el método descriptivo, y la información se recopila de trabajos importantes como la Política de Estrategia Nacional de Seguridad Cibernética (Guatemala, Mingob 2018), libros sobre terrorismo o ciberterrorismo y algunos sitios web que describen el diagnóstico de ataques cibernéticos y cómo estas unidades cibernéticas protegieron su infraestructura crítica.

Palabras-clave: Tecnología. Infraestructura crítica. Ataques cibernéticos.

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1 Introduction

Since the last two decades, technology had become a transversal axis in the human development. People use technology in our daily work, science, medicine, engineering and education, and many others. It had become an easy way to manage all our services around the world, e-banking, e-transportation, internet of the things, and we are right now very comfortable with it. Those facilities are our critical infrastructure (CARVALHO, 2016). Every country in the world has one and perhaps most of them are interconnected with each other.

As Paul Shemella in his book named “Fighting Back” explains something about motivations of terrorist acts will be paraphrase in understandable words like, most of those first world countries are getting concerned about how to maintain their systems safe and secure. They have created some public institutions (cyber units), who are fighting to minimize cyberattacks or fighting against hackers who might steal critical information, for money, personal assets, or even worse, destabilize a country or a group of countries who have strong relationships.

To start this work, it is necessary to answer this question: How can civilians and military work together in a strategical way to minimize those cyberattacks? during the development of this article, is compulsory find the way in which those main actors could work as a strategical team to fight against transnational threats.

In a new tech-world digging will be discover the meaning of critical infrastructure, its components, and the importance of maintaining that infrastructure safe and secure in order to let citizens have stable and dependable systems.

It is necessary to find a way to work together (Civilians and military) applying the international standards that include monitoring the infrastructure 24/7/365, avoiding and minimizing attacks and detecting and responding those transnational threats (protocols of action).

In this research report readers will find information about cyber terminology, the critical infrastructure generalities and components, international standards, and the national institutions that were created or improved such as the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERTS) and the Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRTs), (URVIO, 2017) that show the ethical way of monitoring, combating, and responding to cyberattacks and how they could affect our critical infrastructure.

Besides that, this research presents cases of study about two countries that are fighting against the cyberattacks in the same way, and both are creating strategies, specific laws on cybernetics, risk assessments and an awareness culture in their societies in order to protect their sovereignty and the honor of their nation. That information will be a source of study to minimize cyberattacks and how to prevent and combat those cyberattacks.

At the end to this research, it is expected from civilians and military to work as a national team in order to share experiences and for them to have a view of the nation about transnational threats such as cyber threats. Through sharing those experiences, they could work on new national defense strategies.

2 General characteristics

2.1 Cyber Defense: “Cyber defense is a computer network defense mechanism which includes responses to actions and critical infrastructure protection and information assurance for organizations, government entities and other possible networks. Cyber defense focuses on preventing, detecting, and providing timely responses to attacks or threats so that no infrastructure or information is tampered with” (CYBER..., 2019, n.p.), CND (computer network defense).

2.2 Critical Infrastructure: “Critical infrastructure is the body of systems, networks and assets that are so essential that their continued operation is required to ensure the security of a given nation, its economy, and the public’s health and/or safety. Although critical infrastructure is similar in all nations due to the basic requirements of life, the infrastructure deemed critical can vary according to a nation’s needs, resources and development level” (CRITICAL..., 2019, n.p.).

2.3 Cyberattack: It “[...] is deliberate exploitation of computer systems, technology-dependent enterprises and networks. Cyberattacks use a malicious code to alter computer code, logic or data, resulting in disruptive consequences that can compromise data and lead to cybercrimes, such as information and identity theft. [...] [and it] is also known as a computer network attack (CNA) (CYBERATTACK, 2019, n. p.).

2.4 Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT): it “[...] is a group of experts who respond to cybersecurity incidents. These teams deal with the evolution of malware, viruses and other cyberattacks (COMPUTER..., 2019a, n.p.).

2.5 Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT): is a team that responds to computer security incidents when they occur. An incident could be a denial of service or the discovering of unauthorized access to a computer system (COMPUTER..., 2019b, n.p.).

3 Critical infrastructure

3.1 Generalities

The concept of infrastructure started in the 80’s. It included the public sector services, such as, railroads, bridges, airports, public transportation, water supplies facilities, and all the resources that the states had inside their territory. They took an important part on the development of all the country. They provided what the population needed because, in that part of the history, the government had all the power of the country. However, the concept changed in the 90’s into a concept of National Security because the terrorist attacks increased dramatically.

The subsistence of the countries and their population development included national security, not only because of the meaning of the word, but also because they needed to close gaps between the terrorist attacks and the security of their critical and strategic infrastructure combined with critical information about their population and all of the state actives that states have.

They are the core of all the countries around the world. Then, after the events of 9/11 the concept of infrastructure changes again and despite of the facts, it appears now including the word “critical” not only for the public sector as in the 80’s, but for the new concept or the new way to talk about infrastructure.

One of the main challenges in this concept is resilience because this word goes beyond its meaning. It includes the capacity of those countries to give their people flexibility, adaptability, and many capabilities of change or redefining the way to react when the situation demands that kind of resilience.

Nowadays, the critical infrastructure concept turns into a huge challenge for all the countries around the world, because of the population increasement, the needs of communicating or making more electronic bank transactions, and the spread of technology that could take an important part in human life, and it has become a transversal axis in everybody’s daily routines.

The states will invest a lot of money in modern equipment, more severe policies, and more training for the people who will manage the new systems that will help them to keep those three aspects working as a whole in order to prevent some phishing information or to prevent some system intrusions.

Meanwhile, all of the national services (public and private) would work properly and giving their population all of the supplies and confidence that they need (O’ROURKE, 2007).

3.2 Components

The components of Critical Infrastructure directed to the public sector, the private sector, food systems, defense-industrial systems, national monuments, banking, financial systems, and many others that are taking an active part in all the countries.

They are vital for a country in order to provide their population with all the basic services, keeping the globalization process with other countries. This concept is not only for cyberattacks but also for natural disasters, economic recessions, lack of vital services, or weak countries. It is necessary to protect and maintain safe and secure every part of this infrastructure, because if one of these is missing the country would collapse in a very short term (O’ROURKE, 2007).

Now, one of the most important needs, is identifying the location of our strategic resources because they represent the most valuable actives of the country. These strategic resources have become a huge part of critical infrastructure and it is essential to monitor, protect, and identify where they are and how big or how useful they are. We should add them to the catalog of national infrastructure.

4 International standards

The International Organization of Standardization (IOS) plays an important role in cyber security and cyber defense because they present guidelines on how to manage and how to connect security and defense. It refers to working together, civilians and military. Then, those countries around the world need to work hard as a national team in order to create scenarios to help and find some national strategies and national policies to discuss some important challenges together, private and public sectors. Those standards have become invaluable tools for sharing information, knowledge, and experiences that contribute to keep the critical infrastructure safe, and to maintain credibility in technology. This way the population will use those in the best way they can in order to give a very clear spectrum of cyber security and cyber defense.

The following standards will present a guide on how to work in this new cybernetic world.

4.1 The IOS 27032

The IOS 27032 present some Information Technologies (IT's), about security techniques in order to empower a state in cybersecurity using the most important techniques and strategic points related to network security, internet security, and applications security. This standard intends to guarantee the network information interchanges so that they could face cybercrimes.

The first area of this guideline is approaching cyber space and cyber security issues in order to close gaps within different cyber space domains and give an orientation to approach common cyber security risks that include social engineering attacks, piracy, malwares, spywares, and other new malicious software.

That techniques guide has provided some skills on how to be prepared for malware attacks, detection and tracking attacks, and responses for those attacks.

The second focusing area is the most important one. It is called "collaboration" because it is necessary to be effective and efficient in order to share and interchange information and coordinate how incidents will be managed. This collaboration will be secure and trustworthy in order to protect the stakeholders' information. The standard includes system integration and interoperability in both ways (JUMBO VIVANCO, 2019).

4.2 The IOS 31000

The IOS 31000 according to (PALACIOS GUILLEM; GISBERT SOLER; PÉREZ BERNABEU, 2015) describes, in an understandable way, the meaning of risk management. Hence, in this case, it is very important to take advantage on planning or the decision-making process, because those states must be aware of cyberattacks, natural disasters, or any attack which destabilized countries.

It is necessary to make some risk assessments about our critical infrastructure without any restriction, but in a parallel way it is urgent to have a plan that assigns responsibilities to all the different sectors included and provide them with possible ways to prevent, mitigate, and recover on a different types of attack. It is also important to give them the opportunity to work in the same team, military and civilians, in order to protect the infrastructure and assist the risks together trying to minimize damages, especially if it is about a cyberattack because the damage could be immediate and calamitous. The consequences would be worse, for instance, if the cyberattack blocks the energy supplies or the banking sector or makes the critical infrastructure collapse.

4.3 IOS 27005

When one of the main targets is to protect the critical infrastructure, it refers to the information security risk management that present IOS 27005. It has been a reference framework about the methodology between risk management and information security, and it provides five important stages:

- a) The interior and exterior plan
- b) The definition of the organizational context (interior and exterior)
- c) The valorization of technological risks
- d) The treatment of technological risks
- e) Monitoring and a continuous development management process

First, a communication plan that would be spread in the interior and exterior of the critical infrastructure of the public and private sector, and through this plan, determine risks and objectives in order to present a brief on the advances in the process. The best way to spread that information would be using written material and training people on those aspects.

On the other hand, this communication plan would be made in order to create awareness and security, and the most important, to evidence the existence of risks.

This plan would have three different aspects to be considered: primary communication which includes general concepts, implications and advantages. Next, communication on the way. This aspect presents advances of risk managements in order to have feedback and support from the people who is working on the risk. And last, outcome communications that will try to share and spread the information that reached through this plan.

The second stage of risk management is an organizational context that integrates mission, vision, policies, strategies, roles, and responsibilities. The importance of this context is the order in which the critical infrastructure will be protected when a cyberattack comes, and find the limitations to protect all of the information systems, and how a national response team would accept the risk level and this way, they would determine those reaches and limitations that the critical infrastructure has.

The third aspect is the valorization of technological risk. In this stage, the national information actives could be identified and this way, it could determine which is the most

important one to be protected. It can also establish the threats that the critical infrastructure is being exposed to in order to mitigate the risks. This valorization could be about cost-acquisition, renovation, recovery, or maintenance. On the other hand, it is necessary to identify the critical infrastructure threats that could be physical, logical, or strategical, and according to their origin: natural, technical, accidental, or intentional. It would help to identify the risks of those threats and to determine the impact in all the stakeholders.

The fourth aspect is the way to deal with technological risks because in this stage it is required an evaluation of the damage in order to mitigate the risks and collateral damages. That action could be used to reduce, accept, and eliminate damages.

This plan needs to define policies and guidelines and create a command and control unit in order to accomplish the recovery tasks and get the critical infrastructure to its normal state. This way, all the services and trustfulness would be given back to the stakeholders.

And finally, the continuous improvement. Through this, change controls on actives, process, vulnerabilities, threats and policies could be created with the purpose of establishing the following actions and keeping management updated in order to evaluate indicators according to the ones that appear in exterior or interior plans (RAMIREZ CASTRO; ORTIZ BAYONA, 2011).

5 Protecting the critical infrastructure cases of study: federative republic of Brazil and republic of Guatemala

5.1 Guatemalan National Cyber Security Strategy

Talking about Guatemala, in 2018, the ministry of interior published the national cyber security strategy in order to provide the governmental institutions guidelines about a theme that only the ministry of defense and ministry of interior have approached. It is a necessity to let the rest of the state know about the trending themes on national security in order to create social awareness and the responsibility that those institutions have as public servers. It is also important to tell the Guatemalan population about the national security issues that they need to fight against and how to deal with them.

The national cyber security strategy, as it is mentioned in the abstract of this research (GUATEMALA, 2018), includes:

- a) Critical infrastructure
- b) Information and communication technologies
- c) Research and cyber incidents response
- d) Legal frameworks
- e) Governance
- f) Mission, vision, objectives, and others

First, this new strategy refers to the Organization of American States (OAS) in their resolution AG/RES 2004 “Adoption of a Comprehensive Inter-American Strategy to Combat Threats to Cybersecurity: A Multidimensional and Multidisciplinary Approach to Creating a Culture of Cybersecurity”. That resolution is the spearhead of the Guatemalan cyber security strategy model. That strategy literally says in its first five resolution points:

1. To adopt the Comprehensive Inter-American Cybersecurity Strategy: A Multidimensional and Multidisciplinary Approach to Creating a Culture of Cybersecurity, attached hereto as Appendix A.
2. To urge member states to implement the said Strategy.
3. To urge member states to establish or identify national “alert, watch, and warning” groups, also known as “Computer Security Incident Response Teams” (CSIRTs).
4. To place renewed emphasis on the importance of achieving secure Internet information systems throughout the Hemisphere.
5. To request that the Permanent Council, through the Committee on Hemispheric Security, continue to address this issue and to facilitate the coordination efforts to implement the Strategy, in particular the efforts of government experts, the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE), the Inter-American Telecommunication Commission (CITEL), the Group of Governmental Experts on Cyber-crime of the Meeting of Ministers of Justice or of Ministers or Attorneys General of the Americas (REMJA), and other appropriate organs of the OAS (ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, 2004, n.p., emphasis added).

This OAS resolution provides the guidelines on how Latin-America is facing the cyber security issues with a multidimensional and multidisciplinary perspective in order to create a cyber culture in the countries that are part of it. This organization is encouraging those latin countries to implement this strategy as their national strategy in order to create regional standards in cybersecurity. Those countries have their own way to detect, prevent, and respond to any cyberattack, but they do not have a common strategy that lets them work together in a multidimensional manner. The OAS encourages these countries to establish and identify Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) and Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) in order to integrate all this national, regional, and international teams as a huge team. Those teams will have a special trustable relationship in the way to share vital information against a cyberattack. Finally, the Interamerican Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE) will work as a coordinator for this strategy, meanwhile the other OAS departments would take part of the strategy when needed.

This strategy is the utmost important for the Guatemalan cyber security model because the transnational threats and the cyberattacks evolve, and daily electronic activities

take part in the digital zone, and the national systems are interconnected. It will be necessary to have a strategy that provides all Guatemalan sectors the opportunity to create technical frameworks and legal frameworks to strengthen the national and global cyber security. This strategy presents an important component with a great value, resilience. It will be necessary in order to reset as soon as possible all the services, avoiding with this recovery, the loss of information and collateral damages in order to protect the most valuable active in the country, its population.

This strategy was created in the beginning from a process that involved more than one hundred national and regional key actors from the different sectors of the Guatemalan society (military and civilians) according to the national security strategic plan (2016-2020), the national risks and threats agenda, and the nation security strategic agenda. This strategy analyzes the scenario that Guatemala needs in order to mitigate the risks and threats that are coming from the cyberspace.

The objectives that this strategy shows are oriented to strengthen the capabilities and the protocols of action from the institutions that are part of the national security system in Guatemala, assigning them the responsibilities to act based on a legal frame in order to maintain the rule of law in Guatemala.

Guatemala is involved in international frameworks that regulate the cooperation in terms of critical infrastructures, and, of course, they are led by the United States that is the first country to build a document related to the critical infrastructure protection. This document explains the necessity of creating a committee. This committee would evaluate terrorist attacks vulnerabilities in order to protect that infrastructure within a transnational dimension. Guatemala has many public infrastructures and other ones from the private sector, but they do not have the way to articulate all of them and the way to work with the best practices in information security procedures.

As a corollary of this strategy, Guatemala created two things after publishing this. The first one was a technical committee that includes the governmental sector, the private sector, the academies, the critical infrastructures, the financial sector, and the ITC's sector in order to reinforce the relations of collaboration, cooperation, and coordination among them, promoting analysis and initiatives that increase the cyber security ecosystem in Guatemala.

The second one, according to the Guatemalan governmental agreement 65-2019 the Informatic and Technology Command was created by the ministry of defense. This command is responsible for the coordination of all the cyber defense themes, working with national and international institutions that manage these topics and becoming a part of that national and international effort.

5.2 The Brazilian cybernetic threats

In 2005, after a long time without a defense policy in Brazil, the Brazilian government emitted a National Defense Policy (PND in Portuguese). The main objective of this policy is to create an awareness for all the sectors in the country, in order to defend the nation, and establish the strategical importance of the cybernetic sector. That sector should be stronger

because Brazil has many systems with vulnerabilities and they need to create more capabilities to avoid those vulnerabilities and to recover, as soon as possible, all their ICT's (information and communications technologies). That policy includes all the critical infrastructure security actions and enforces all the devices and procedures that help to reduce or to minimize vulnerabilities when they affect their national defense systems from cyberattacks. There are institutions in charge of that important challenge. Those institutions are: the Civil House or the Presidency, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Communications, the Ministry of Science and Technology, and the cabinet of Institutional Security (AMARAL, 2014).

The previous information is a proof that the Brazilian government is working with civilians and military, through their national strategic policy, in order to protect the defense systems from cyberattacks, and that work includes the protection of their critical infrastructure.

The policy is setting all the national sectors in the same direction, whether these are private or public sectors, and they will generate more capabilities in order to gain a lot of cybernetic knowledge. They are getting trained to prevent, to protect, and to respond to any national or international threat that could take Brazil into a critical situation that could cause the loss of their hegemony and leadership in cyber security and cyber defense in South America.

The Cabinet of Institutional Security built in 2010 the Green Book of cyber security, with the main purpose of creating a cyber security environment in order to protect the Brazilian society and the nation. This green book was made to face the new challenges and mutual agendas in the private, public sectors, academies, and the "third sector" referring to the private institutions but non-lucrative according to (what is the third sector) (¿QUE ES..., 2018).

It is an joint effort civilians an military for creating a common thought and build together the guidelines of cyber security with that vectors: politic-strategic, economic, environment, communications, technology, education, legal framework, international cooperation, transportation, water supply, finance and energy supply, and when located those vectors in the same pot they creating their critical infrastructure.

The most important thing for the cybernetic sector was to assign that huge responsibility to an armed force through the Ministry of Defense, and after that, they created a cyber defense command. That unit has the mission of contributing to increase the cyber security level. This cyber unit has the know-how in order to work with different sectors and the Brazilian society. That military unit is trying to focus in creating human resources, doctrine, and security enforcement with the purpose of offering the population a quick incident response, learned lessons, and protection against cyberattacks (AMARAL, 2014).

In 2012, the ministry of defense published a document that contained a new cyber defense policy. It established the way to run a military cyber defense system. This document was written to define the tasks of the armed force in order to prevent the internet and other networks from the criminal use, and to protect all the information data and the essential communications. With this policy, the Brazilian army was empowered and took all the cybernetic control in the whole country. That control includes the responsibility to gather with all sectors assigning them their own responsibilities in this national security theme.

It also included instructions on how to share information, protocols of action, and the immediate way to respond in case of a cyberattack, building with this control, trustable relations among those sectors and the army in order to give the first national alert and making the cyber security plan go on.

Immediately after a cyberattack a national response team will contact all of their members and provide specific information from the field in order to meet them as soon as possible depending on the type of cyberattack, place of events, main damages, and determine which could be the first decisions to make. One of key challenges is to mitigate the damage and to try to solve de problem immediately. With that reaction, the cyber defense unit will coordinate with other institutions that have the responsibility to investigate and criminalize this attack according to their legal framework.

This short description explains the first actions against a cyberattack, how to activate the cyber security plan, and the way to criminalize the cybercrime if it exists, or if this attack is part of a cyber terrorism issue in order to warn the Brazilian neighbor countries or countries around the world.

Nowadays, Brazil has a step ahead compared to its neighbors. It is very close to consolidate their cyber security and cyber defense system from the highest political level with a national coverage, represented by the National Security Cabinet, the Federal Public Administration, and the Ministry of Defense, who builds the politic-strategic link, to the lowest levels of army units. Those units work on operational and tactical levels in the cyber security and cyber defense system including in that level the civilians who work in middle and lower levels in all kinds of sectors in order to defend their national cybernetic interests.

In the cyber security and cyber defense system, the Cabinet that was mentioned in the last paragraph has the task to coordinate all the actions that affect the society, for instance, cyber security, information and communication issues, and the national critical infrastructure security.

The ministry of Defense oversees all the issues related to cyber defense and received orders as follows:

a) Strategic Level: The Ministry of Defense will be responsible for creating protocols that let them be a part of the legal framework according to their national laws and their international agreements of actions that get them involved in a situation of crisis or armed conflicts and peace keeping operations.

b) Operative Level: here the Ministry of Defense, as all of armies around the world, should be prepared to conduct military defensive or offensive operations in order to preserve their sovereignty and the honor of the nation. In this concept the Brazilian army also includes all the problems that affect their cybernetic environment (AMARAL, 2014).

With that important policy, the Brazilian ministry of defense and the Brazilian army are taking control of all the critical infrastructure around the country. They are the link between the national institutions and private companies that are interconnected and interchanging clas-

sified information from the people who are living in Brazil or the people who are making electronic transactions, in or out of the Brazilian boundaries. They are expecting the Brazilian government to provide them a high security level of their personal information in order not to be an objective for a cyberattack, or to get their information stolen (phishing), or to be victims of extortion from the organized crime.

The security level must be offered to those people in order to increase foreign investors and to make the business environment become more reliable. This way the Brazilian international trade will be more trustworthy.

On the other hand, the Brazilian government has a stronger critical infrastructure in order to conserve its natural resources in safe places and it also protects its strategical areas.

Nowadays, those strategical areas are being affected by organized crime and transnational threats that need to have these areas in order to increase their wealth.

That is why the national security team and the national defense team, combining their resources and capabilities, need to work together to become more powerful, and this way, they will detect, prevent, and respond to all the acts that could affect their national critical infrastructure and the systems that manage that infrastructure.

6 Conclusions

In order to make conclusions, it is compulsory to consider how technology is becoming an important part of the life of people around the world. Technology has made an increase of more than 50% of all the discoveries during the last century. It helps in all the daily activities as a transversal axis in science, domestic chores, military actions, and many others that include the critical infrastructure in all the countries.

Humans found a set of things that made their activities and even their lives easier in order to gain more time to do other activities. That is why those activities are the scope of this research because they need a way to provide more technological tools for people around the world. The software and hardware developers or the companies that have managed systems did not realize how dangerous those discoveries were not only because of the tools but also because of the way people use these tools.

Technological development should carry on, besides it, a big component of security in order to provide trustworthy connections and maintain the national security level on top in every country and collective security in their region.

After saying this, it is necessary to refer to the governments that created many institutions that have the responsibility to set up guidelines in order to provide cybersecurity for internal issues, and cyber defense teams to solve internal, external, regional and continental issues. Those institutions are combining their best efforts to work together, civilians and military, and now the new challenge is to work with many different agencies not only for sharing information but for building a common strategy to combat and mini-

mize cyberattacks too. Those attacks could affect the stability of any country and therefore, the stability of any region because most of their systems are interconnected to provide people e-banking, financial transactions, power light supplies, and many others, for instance, that should be secured through a national security level, and as a part of the government, it must be done inside the country.

In addition to this, it is necessary to talk about national security teams that play an important role in this security theme, because the Computer Emergency Response Team and Computer Security Incident Response Team are strategic tools for governments. They are the first defense line when a cyberattack takes place. Those teams have the capability to fight against an attack or attacks in order to prevent, combat, and respond to performing tasks that they are trained for.

Those teams work together in the private and public sectors. By taking advantage of their expertise, they will mitigate the collateral damage after an attack strike in any critical infrastructure area, and they have the responsibility to stop the attack, also the responsibility to take things to a normal status in a minimum amount of time. Those were the most important objectives when those teams were created.

On the other hand, those teams that are creating international standards must be taken into account in order to follow the rules of risk assessment that are an important part of this tool because, before those risk assessments, those governments did not know what their threats were, or how the critical infrastructure was composed, or what was their national security level. After having risk assessments, the international standards give them a precise guideline to make a strategical plan on how to prevent, combat and respond to a cyberattack, and how to recover the stability after that.

When talking about critical infrastructure its components cannot be put away. Those components are the reason of the nation and its stakeholders because they have no risk separately but when they work together like a gear in a country they become an important infrastructure that needs to be secured to provide at first confidence to people and also confidence to a region in order to invest and increase technological transactions in commerce, finances, banking, and other aspects. As shown in the body of this research, each country has its own critical infrastructure but at some point, these countries need to be intersected with the systems of other countries and this way, it becomes to be a goal to be protected by collective security.

It is important to say that it is necessary to review the critical infrastructure plan periodically so that the political-strategical level in the country keeps track on which institutions have been created, and check if they need to get inside their critical infrastructure and this way, they can keep their risk assessment plan updated.

To follow the logical order in this research, two countries that have almost the same issues and the same efforts to fight against cyberattacks were included. Those countries are the Republic of Guatemala and the Federative Republic of Brazil. Each of them owns problems, but they are assuming the difficult task of working together, civilians and military, private and

public sectors, as a team against those problems that they need to fight. They are working together in an interagency labor in order to minimize cyberattacks securing its critical infrastructure.

At the end of this research, it is necessary to highlight the need of the countries to provide a especial strategy to work together against cyber threats, but it is also necessary to create an awareness culture in all the societies because people are eyes of the nation on the streets and in the social networks. Since people and the social networks are in touch every day, they could provide important information to feed the national intelligence systems. All countries must deeply investigate the people who manage the critical infrastructure systems in order to have teams with a high level of confidentiality, honesty, and transparency.

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South American Defence Council: failure or first step?

Consejo de Defensa Sudamericano: ¿fracaso o primer paso?

Abstract: The Organization of American States (OEA) and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR), existing defense organizations until the creation of the CDS, have not evolved enough and lack legitimacy, since they are under clear american influence. There were several contributions from the new Council and some possibilities were glimpsed, some of which are very relevant, even if they still need more attention. This paper will analyze this topic, studying the meaning and results of the CDS until now, trying to build a perspective for its future, taking into account the current circumstances in South America (SA).

Keywords: South American Integration. South American Defense Council. UNASUL. Perspectives and results.

Resumen: La Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA) y el Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Recíproca (TIAR), organizaciones de defensa que existieron hasta la creación del CDS, no han evolucionado lo suficiente y carecen de legitimidad, ya que están bajo clara influencia estadounidense. Hubo varias contribuciones del nuevo Consejo y se vislumbraron posibilidades, algunas de las cuales son muy relevantes, aunque todavía necesitan más atención. Este artículo analizará este tópico, estudiando el significado y los resultados del CDS hasta el momento y intentando construir una perspectiva para su futuro, llevando en cuenta las circunstancias actuales en América del Sur (AS).

Palabras-clave: Integración Sudamericana. Consejo de Defensa Sudamericano. UNASUR. Perspectivas y resultados.

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1 Introduction

The new century brought with it some novel aspects, after the dramatic changes in the global scenario. The end of the Cold War, the fall of the Berlin Wall, globalization, the existence of a hegemonic nation and terrorism, among other acts and events, were fundamental in the strategy of the great nations and regional blocs.

The economic approach began to overcome the ideological. The world is reorganized fundamentally in blocks with emphasis on political and economic aspects. This tendency to block formation is being led by the great powers in the different continents. The most prominent emerging peripheral nations, by many called BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), continue to seek to define their areas of influence and regional power.

In 2008, the creation of UNASUL (Union of South American Nations) represented another contemporary South American attempt to expand integration in South America (SA)¹, under the Brazilian initiative. In this sense, in the same year, the South American Defense Council (CDS) was created, whose diffusion could allow the expansion of regional cooperation in military and scientific-technological matters. It is worth to observe the ideological and political alignment that was on the occasion of the creation of the CDS (LUIGI JÚNIOR, 2017). Brazil has led a bloc whose main Heads of State were left wing (Argentina, Paraguay, Peru, Ecuador, Chile, Bolivia, Venezuela and Brazil). In addition, the economy of these countries grew at a strong pace, due to the international value of commodities (MURRAY, 2012).

The CDS came after several attempts towards South American integration, marked by a recognized goodwill, by rhetoric and by little practical content. On the other hand, the lack of an adequate and shared policy for the subcontinent, which for almost the entire 20th century lived in the desert of the convergence of the interests of the great powers, raises doubts about the maturity of their relations for the adoption of an effective convergence of community efforts and objectives.

Nowadays, the scenario has changed economically and politically. The economies of the bloc countries are still recovering from the economic crisis of 2008 (GASPAR; SPINA, 2018), while protectionism has grown, in the midst of ideological divergences, mainly between Venezuela and the countries that have changed their government, since 2015, ideologically more right (QUIRÓS, 2017). Thus, just over a year ago, UNASUL, by changing its president, has frozen its activities, due to the lack of consensus in the election of the new General Secretary. In the same way, the CDS, as an organ of the UNASUL, is paralyzed at this moment.

The objective of this article is to generate holistic and integrating thinking about the future prospects of the CDS, taking into account its results, its future possibilities and leading with the new South American political and economic scenario.

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2 The road to the cds

To contextualize the geopolitical environment, it is worth remembering the characteristics of Spanish colonialism, which, due to its centralizing nature, have made it difficult to integrate its former colonies. The liberator Simón Bolívar led the pioneering integrationist attempt, in 1815, who had conceived a Gran Colombia (FEDOZZI, 2005, p.161) from the union of the viceroyalties of Peru and New Granada (it included the territories of Venezuela, Ecuador, Colombia and Panama).

During the nineteenth century, the integration of SA was mitigated, in large part, by geopolitical disputes and territorial demarcation, being strongly influenced by European and American interests. In 1889, Pan-Americanism emerges with the First International American Conference, held in Washington. These first steps around the unit revolved around the US, an emerging power that proposed protecting the entire continent (CERVO; BUENO, 2008).

At the beginning of the 20th century, there was still influence of the European defense industries in SA. The existing antagonisms, once again, were aggravated. In 1915, the ABC Treaty (Argentina, Brazil and Chile) was the first South American international instrument. It was motivated by the perception that the countries of SA, through the minimization of regional rivalries, could live in a situation of collaboration, rather than submit to the world powers. Since then, regional integration initiatives (CERVO; BUENO, 2008) adopted in SA, up to 1980, have been carried out in accordance with American interest, in the search for Pan-Americanism.

2.1 Economic and political integration

Thus, focused on the economic, there were some initiatives worthy of reference, as in 1948, when the Economic Commission for Latin America (CELAC) was established in Chile. One begins to think about a free trade area in Latin America and, shortly after, in 1960, in Montevideo, Uruguay, six South American countries, plus Mexico, joined the Treaty of the Latin American Free Trade Association (ALALC). Its objective was the increase of trade (CONSIDERA, 2006).

More specifically, the Andean Pact (Chile, Bolivia, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, and Ecuador) emerged in 1967, which evolved for the Andean Community in 1997 (without Chile). The Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO) was also created in 1995. International trade in Latin America, during the 1970s, grew an average of 20.8%, while between 1950 and 1970, only it was 5.4%, demonstrating the validity of the integration initiatives (UNCTAD, 1994).

The Treaty of Montevideo, signed in 1980, created the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), replacing the ALALC, with the participation of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.


Thus, in 1991, the Presidents of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay created MERCOSUL with a zone of free trade and partial customs union and, since 1995, with a Common External Tariff, serving as a basis for projects that included all SA. Beyond the commercial aspect, it played an important role in the consolidation of democracy (Democratic Clause), contributing to the continuity of political stability (FREIRE, 2016).

It is worth noting that the first meeting of the Heads of State of SA occurred in 2000, in Brasilia. From this meeting emerged the Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA), representing the important commitment of the twelve countries to develop, through physical integration, transport, energy and communications infrastructures.

On May 23, 2008, in Brasilia, the result of the evolution presented, the UNASUL emerged. Finally, SA came to have an international legal personality, at the beginning of its political, economic and social coordination. In this forum, in December 2008, the CDS was created, expanding defense cooperation.

This economic and political integration is fully backed by the population of SA. An expressive number of Latin-Americans, 77%, will support the economic integration. In Brazil, there are a high number, with 66% in accordance with this. In the region, the support for political integration initiatives, such as UNASUL, although still loud, is a bit smaller: 60% (CUÉ, 2016).

Figure 1- Percentage of population in favor of political integration



Source: Latinobarômetro, 2016 apud Beliz and Chelala, 2016, p. 22.

2.2 Integration of the military field

Trying to integrate into the defense area, the pioneer step was in 1890, when the First International American Conference launched the principle of "hemispheric collective security", which was consecrated, in 1942, at the Rio de Janeiro Conference, with the Inter-American Defense Board (IID). Established during the Second World War, it defined that: "[...] an attack

by a non-American State against an American State will be considered an attack against all the signatory countries." This led to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) and the Organization of American States (OEA), in 1948.

The OEA has absorbed the JID, TIAR and also the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The Rio Treaty demonstrated its ineffectiveness during the Falklands War between Argentina and Britain in 1982, as the USA, before a standoff between allied members of the Organization of the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) and the Rio Treaty, defined their most favorable position to the United Kingdom (SCHNEIDER, 2003).

The American Armies created, in 1960, the Conference of American Armies (CEA), for the exchange between the Armies of the Americas. In 1995, under the leadership of the USA, the Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas (CMDAs) was created.

MERCOSUL has allowed a relaxation in the area of security and defense in SA. The Mutual Trust Promotion Measures (MFCM), without excluding the USA, have been an instrument that brought the subcontinent closer, as well as the use of its Armies in peacekeeping missions (FREIRE, 2016). With the advent of UNASUL, military integration expands its list of activities, involving the entire subcontinent. With the CDS, in 2008, defense cooperation, previously focused on the level of the Armed Forces, was raised to the political level.

3 The time and the opportunity for the creation of the cds.

SA has been the last region in the world to organize politically around a common project, in contrast to the European Union (EU), the African Union, the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and other regional blocs. In all of history, until the creation of UNASUL, the Heads of State of AS met only six times, all after the year 2000, when there was the first meeting (GARCIA, 2010).

A first explanation will probably be in the strong power of magnetization of the relations that historically all the countries of the region maintained with the North. That was, until recently, the central and practically exclusive axis of the external relations of the South American countries (GARCIA, 2010). In this context, it is necessary to deepen the analysis on some points that show the opportunity of the creation of the CDS.

Since the end of the last century, we can observe the recent effort of the nations of the subcontinent to seek an alignment of their positions in international bodies and forums, such as the G-20 (fruit of the Brazilian initiative) and in the negotiations of the Doha Round. It is worth remembering the decision of the Summit of the Unit of the Latin American and the Caribbean, held in February 2010, to affirm its support for Argentina in the question of the Malvinas (COSTAS, 2010).

In 2008, when the creation of UNASUL and CDS, most of the Presidents (Luis Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil; Evo Morales in Bolivia; Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Fernando Lugo in Paraguay, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela; and Couple Kirchner in Argentina) were on the left wing and shared similar ideologies, with the exception perhaps of Colombia (Álvaro Uribe). At its gesta-

tion, 2008-2011, the scenario of ideological congruence coincides, exactly with the most effective years of that institution, from 2011 to 2014 (LUIGI JÚNIOR, 2017).

Also in the economic area, the timing was very appropriate. The countries of the region expanded their GDP at considerable rates (FIORI, 2013). Brazil was a reference and tried to expand its influence in the region:

At the end of the first decade of the 21st century, Brazil concentrated half of the South American population and was the main player within the continental geopolitical and economic board [...] in 2001, the Brazilian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was around 550 billion and was lower than the sum of the output of the other South American countries, which was around US \$ 640 billion [...] ten years later, the relationship changed radically: Brazilian GDP grew to reach approximately 2.5 trillion dollars in 2011, while the gross product value of the rest of South America was about 1.6 trillion dollars (FIORI, 2013, p. 36, our translation).

Such ideological alignment and the valorization of natural resources in the region were added to the concern with the emergence of the concepts of preventive and unilateral action by the United States since the September 11, 2001 attacks. The fact that the displacement of NATO troops to Afghanistan was the first case of action outside the traditional area of concern of the Alliance, much in addition to its geographical environment (AMORIM, 2009).

In the same way, South American leaders have shown their concern with the reactivation of the 4th US Squadron, designed to operate in the South Atlantic and the Caribbean (FRAGELLI, 2010, p. 497), even more because, as observed, "it coincides with the oil discoveries announced by Brazil on its continental shelf".

These examples are not a unanimous concern in the subcontinent, but they have served as an argument for many to advocate a greater capacity for deterrence and for the development of a greater synergy of the South American countries to ensure the defense of their natural resources and sovereignty. The CDS, in this context, was presented as a very appropriate tool.

This greater South American identity has been facilitated mainly by the approach of Argentina and Brazil. The Brazil - Argentina alliance is for UNASUL what the United Kingdom - France alliance was for the European Union. For many, the analysis made by the Wall Street Journal and published by the Argentine newspaper El Clarín (MOFFETT, 2010) would be unimaginable. The article showed that some Argentines are beginning to accept a Brazilian preeminence more naturally on the regional stage, due to the possible positive reflections for Argentina of Brazilian protagonism.

Another point that contributes to the expansion of military integration was the similarity and congruity of the defense policies of the AS countries, which are very similar in their aims and strategies, as the Comparative Atlas of Defense in Latin America / 2012 points out. Also in relation to internal security, there are great similarities in terms of constitutional precepts and limits (SOUSA FILHO, 2012).

Thus, it is possible to observe that, in 2008, there were many political, economic, ideological and military elements that showed cooperative intentions and aptitudes. In addition, the existing legal base contributes to the creation and operation of the CDS, expanding the integration of AS in the defense area.

4 The results and the effectiveness of the CDS

Deepening the analysis of the CDS, it's possible to observe that its structure provides that the Ministers of Defense of the countries in UNASUL work directly with the representatives of the highest level of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs (MRE), allowing a greater inter-ministerial integration in the issues inherent in defense. Thus, the defense issues start to be treated at the political level of the international scene.

The presidency of the council is rotating, corresponding to the same country that holds the presidency, pro tempore, of UNASUL. In accordance with what was established in the normative body, the CDS annually develops its institutional activities through the so-called "Action Plan", which is elaborated by the Executive Instance of the Council (the Deputy Ministers) and is set forth for the consideration of Ministers of Defense for its proper approval. Since its creation, the South American Defense Council has developed a set of activities under four thematic axes, namely: Axis 1 – Defense Policies; Axis 2 – Military Cooperation, Humanitarian Action and Peace Operations; Axis 3 - Defense Industry and Technology; and Axis 4 – Education and Training.

Thus, the CDS carried out, between 2009 and 2018, a series of meetings in its executive format (Vice Ministers of Defense) and Ministers of Defense. Interactions of representations of foreign relations and defense occurred, resulting in the various "action plans" and a distribution of tasks for the member countries. It is worth remembering some important initiatives of the CDS, as a result of the discussions and decisions that occurred in some of its meetings².

In March 2009, in Chile, the First Ordinary Meeting was held with the Ministers of Defense. The Declaration of Santiago de Chile established the objectives of: a) Consolidate AS as a zone of peace; b) Build a South American identity defense; and c) Generate consensus for regional cooperation in defense. In addition, the South American Center for Strategic Defense Studies (CSEED) was created in Buenos Aires. Even in this Meeting, the crisis between Ecuador and Colombia was successfully confronted, involving Venezuela (ARAVENA, 2012), which has resulted in a Colombian intervention in Ecuadorian territory to combat the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Colombia accused the other two governments of supporting the FARC.

The Extraordinary Meeting of the CDS of Quito, Ecuador, in November 2009, was the result of the Extraordinary Dome of the UNASUL of Bariloche, in August 2009, held to discuss the American bases in Colombia (Endnote 263, of 27/11/2009, from the MRE of Brazil).

² Taken from the official site of the CDS: www.unasurcds.org.

The CDS emerged, then, as an important forum for the discussion of sensitive issues, receiving from the South American leaders the order to build measures of mutual trust that would support regional peace and cordiality (Endnote 4162, of 08/28/2009, of the MRE from Brazil).

Since then, various meetings of the Ministers and Deputy Ministers of Defense of UNASUL have been held. From the reading of the Action Plans of 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 it is observed that some points were not attended to in their fullness, being, therefore, repeated in the following biennial plan. As of 2012, the Action Plan has been proposed annually and the official CDS website itself presents the evolution and achievement of the goals. The analysis of the 2012, 2013 and 2014 Action Plans confirms that they presented an effective and promising execution. On the other hand, as of 2014, with the change of protagonism in Brazil and the worsening of the economic crisis, the rate has been reduced, mainly, from 2017, with lack of consensus for the replacement of the Secretary General (LUIGI JÚNIOR, 2017).

An important advance obtained by the CDS was that, in the Superior School of War (ESG) of Brazil, the Advanced South American Defense Course (CAD-SUR) is taught to train both civilians and military personnel working in the defense area. The UNASUL countries, based on regional cooperation.

The complementary Institutions of the South American Defense Course are the Center for Strategic Defense Studies (CEED) and the South American Defense School

(ESUDE). The CEED, based in the city of Buenos Aires, Argentina, as of 2009, has carried out works aimed at distinguishing and reporting matters of interest such as: expenses in defense of the member countries of the bloc, inventories of military equipment of the countries, the institutionality of the defense sector, the gender policy in the defense, as well as the information of the military exercises carried out in the region (ARREDONDO, 2017).

The South American Defense School (ESUDE), located at the UNASUL facilities in the city of Quito (Ecuador), was created with the objective of monitoring and articulating the national initiatives of the member states for the training of civilians and military in matters of defense and regional security at strategic political level (ARREDONDO, 2017).

On February 28 2018, took place, through videoconference, the XIV Meeting of the Executive Instance of the South American Defense Council, the VIII Meeting of the Directive Council of the Center for Strategic Defense Studies and the IV Meeting of the Superior Council of the South American Defense School. The meeting was led by the Pro Tempore Secretariat of the CDS, Mr. Horacio Aldo Chighizola, Secretary of Strategy and Military Affairs of the Ministry of Defense of Argentina and involved the participation of delegations from the twelve member States of the Union of South American Nations, the South American Defense School and the Center for Strategic Defense Studies.

Some initiatives have prospered more strongly (ARREDONDO, 2017), acquiring supremacy in relation to others, so that some axes of action are maintained with greater energy and degree of activity, emerging proposals of broad consensus in relation to the topics described then: a) Homologation of Defense Expenses and measures of mutual trust; b) Compilation of data from the Military Inventories; c) Prevention exercises and responses to natural disasters in

the region; d) Common cataloging of the material of the Armed Forces; e) Cyberdefense and cybersecurity; f) Strengthening the concept of humanitarian law in the region; and h) Peace Operations, together with the implementation of UN Resolution No. 1325, for the integration of women in this type of operations.

5 Is there a future for unasul?


It is worth noting that the CDS was created and based on the structure of an organ with little maturity: UNASUL. The success and survival of UNASUL determine, in part, the CDS. Thus, an attempt will be made to build a prospective vision on that organ. Maid has been years, by Brazilian initiative, the UNASUL is paralyzed. The cause was the veto of Venezuela - like support of Bolivia, of Ecuador and Suriname - to the candidacy of Argentine embassy José Octávio Bordón for or position of General Secretary of Organism (OLIVEIRA, 2018).

Brazil and five other countries in the region (Colombia, Peru, Chile, Paraguay and Argentina) officially asked Bolivian Foreign Minister Fernando Huanacuni to find a solution that could end the current state of paralysis of UNASUL. Since January 2017, there have been no more meetings of foreign ministers, no summit of presidents, and there have been only a few thematic meetings. The last secretary general was former president of Colombia Ernesto Samper. He should have left office in mid-2016 but ended up staying until January 2017 (OLIVEIRA, 2018).

The picture is different today from the time of the creation of the CDS: leftist governments are a minority and, with the worsening of the political and economic crisis in Venezuela, the region became more polarized, unable to coordinate consensual policies. Thus, even more, it can be deduced that UNASUR needs to overcome some challenges: lack of tradition in the cession of sovereignty; great asymmetries, geography as an obstacle; low convergence of macro-economic policies; and more political than economic approach of certain countries.


Despite the political and economic paralysis of today, the data on the evolution of trade between the South American countries since the beginning of MERCOSUL, created in 1991, are relevant. As can be seen in the figures below, in 1990, AS was only the fifth most important commercial bloc with Brazil, with a deficit in the trade balance. This same region, ten years later, was already the first block, with a trade surplus of almost 100 billion.

Figure 2 – South Sudan Map.



Source: Geographic Guide, 2017.

Figure 3 – South Sudan Map.



Source: Geographic Guide, 2017.

Since its launch, there have been doubts regarding the performance of UNASUL due to the excess of bureaucracy, the overlap of regional bodies, the scarcity of financial resources and the difficulty, in the face of the cult of sovereignty and political vanities, of executing projects of infrastructure and energy integration. In order not to slow down or slow down, UNASUL needs to move urgently towards levels of supranational institutionality (BASPINEIRO, 2017).

Perhaps the example of the Pacific Alliance is a reference for pragmatism and real openness and increase of commercial relations (GUIMARAES, 2014). This Block has been more attractive than the UNASUL. The new President of Colombia, in his pose, has already admitted leaving the UNASUL, due to the results and little effectiveness against the crisis in Venezuela.

In addition to the IIRSA, the COSIPLAN (Council OF Infrastructure and Planning), is another UNASUL initiative (PADULA, 2014). It intends to attribute a strategic character and a political control to two projects of infrastructure integration, promoting energy integra-

tion, still has not presented effective results and capacity to create financing formulas for the projects. Without these advances, UNASUL will continue with limiting factors to its full operation and development.

Therefore, the region must discuss how to relaunch UNASUL, independent of the name. Right now, in the Venezuelan refugee crisis, Brazil and its neighbors have to decide how to act jointly and co-ordinately, or assist other nations and international organizations to act on their behalf. Brazil, after the presidential elections of 2018, has an important role in this fundamental project of integration. UNASUL already had this role before.

In June 2012, for example, the region has witnessed the dismissal of Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo for a summary proceeding. The fact was condemned by UNASUL that suspended Paraguay from the bloc. On the one hand, it demonstrates an internal crisis; on the other, it represents a coordinated action of the subcontinent in defense of democracy (FLECK, 2013).

In the same way, in 2008, in Bolivia, a separatist action has been revived in the Media Luna region (ZABOLOTSKY, 2018), with the attempt of emancipation and autonomy of four states in the most developed area of the country. Also in Ecuador, in September 2010, a state of emergency was decreed due to the serious crisis involving the police. Another example that makes explicit the need for a forum to discuss and avoid major crises is a possible friction between Bolivia and Chile, when the International Court of The Haia³ expresses your opinion about the Bolivian claim to obtain an exit to the sea via Chilean territory (OLIVEIRA, 2018). In all this cases, UNASUL was in the past, and could be in the future, an important forum to discuss these crises.

UNASUL is, at times, a reflection of the functioning of strictly intergovernmental schemes, in which the absorption of national policies ringed with differentiated and polarized positions among States ends up diminishing the dynamism of convergent wills. The lack of definition in processes where everything is decided by consensus paralyze the integrationist structures and purposes, as has been the case for many long months without the election of a General Secretary (BASPINEIRO, 2017).

6 Possibilities and contributions of the cds: advantages that can be obtained

The CDS is an organ of recent creation and, throughout its brief existence, has been presenting new forms of action that increase its relevance and its area of influence. Next, a series of possibilities will be analyzed, some of them not yet developed officially by the new Council, but which are of special interest for the south american nations.

An important possibility of the CDS is the **increase of the South American defense industries**. The fragility of the industrial sector and the consequent external dependence on defense products constitute a great strategic vulnerability for the region. Investments in technology bring relevant returns. History confirms the importance of this capacity in times of crisis, when the acquisition of MEM suffers political inferences (AGUIAR, 2013). According to the

3 The International Court of Justice, better known as the Hague Court, marked for October 1 the verdict over Bolivia's claim to compel Chile to negotiate a "sovereign exit" to the Pacific Ocean.

statistics of 2012, of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), purchases of weapons by SA grew by 150% in the last five years compared to the period between 2000 and 2004, while in the world the increase was of 22%. In the various CDS action plans, the development of the regional defense industry and technological capacity are essential points. This development necessarily depends on the success of the sector in Brazil⁴.

Examples of projects that can bring together collective efforts in the region are the Brazilian nuclear propulsion submarine, which has a contract with France for the development of a Brazilian prototype, with integral technological transfer (VILLELA, 2013) and the ambitious project of the freighter KC - 390. Confirming the idea of the CDS to increase the synergy of the efforts in MEM projects in AS, the KC - 390 has already attracted the interest of other nations in its chain of production and acquisition, such as Chile and Colombia. Argentina has already shown its willingness to participate, having entrusted five units, after having set up its Aircraft Factory in Córdoba (FADEA), proposing to participate as a supplier of parts of the KC-390.

Although small if compared to North America, Europe and Asia, the defense market in SA is presented as an option for the expansion of regional exports of defense products. In the period from 2000-2010, the countries of the region absorbed 56% of the Brazilian exports of MEM, compared to 25% in the 1980-1989 period and 11% in the 1990/99 period⁵. Defense cooperation contributes to share costs in research and development, increasing the volume of production and demand. Therefore, Brazil can coordinate the creation of a "technological park" for its war industry and create a regional "cluster" capable of meeting the interests of its neighbors (ODEBRECHT, 2010, p. 376).

Another possibility is that the **CDS can provide the subcontinent with increased bargaining power and regional deterrence**. The CDS, within a realistic vision of international relations, can increase its joint capacity to defend the common interests of SA in international forums. Despite not contemplating a classical military alliance, it allows joint positions to be adopted in the face of relevant situations, aligning the speeches and positions of its members in the discussions and agreements with other countries and blocs on the defense issue.

SA has availed much, worldwide, of multilateralism. Proof of this is their increasing participation in various issues of global impact, acting as a block. Following this reasoning, the CDS approaches its members in the discussion of defense issues, giving the feeling of unity to the other blocks. The economic blocs, invariably, end up dealing with security issues (GUERREIRO, 2009).

The CDS could add the weight of the collective that owns a block. With the increase in regional defense cooperation, some issues may be addressed in a coordinated manner by the

4 It is enough to observe the data of the document "The military balance of South America", 2008, of the CENM (New Majority Studies Center), which points out that Brazilian defense resources account for 53% of the regional total allocated to SA.

5 Data of the Department of Defense Industry of the Federation of Industries of São Paulo (FIESP) in the document "South American Integration in Defense: Perspectives and Challenges", 01/02/2012.

CDS and UNASUL. The definition of the limits of the maritime waters of exclusive exploration is an example of the variety of subjects in which the Council could conform the interests. It could converge on issues such as nuclear and exploitation rights over Antarctica, points that, even today, motivate discussions on the international stage (LA ARGENTINA..., 2009).

We could also imagine the **creation of a regional forum for the consolidation of peace and for relevant discussions without exogenous interference**. South America, despite being one of the least bellicose areas in the world, without major conflicts between its countries, still presents certain areas of friction that, at times, threaten to destabilize the region. In addition to this scenario, existing bodies, such as the OEA, for example, under the leadership of the United States, have not been efficient and supported. In this context, the CDS continues to gain prestige.

Another possibility of action for the new Council would be the **coordinated action against transnational crimes and the fight against drug trafficking**, without the influence of the United States. Many Armed Forces act to combat organized crime, including Brazil and, recently, Argentina (SPEKTOR, 2018). The South American nations already present some agreements and treaties to act jointly in the repression of transnational crimes.

It is worth mentioning some initiatives: the joint use of radars by Argentina and Bolivia on the border to detect drug trafficking; the reinforcement of the combined presence of the Armed Forces of Colombia and Brazil, in the border area (MONTEIRO, 2010, p. 192-195); and the "Abate Law", which allows in Brazil and Venezuela, the interception of aircraft that overfly, illegally, the airspace between both countries. In addition, the CDS can be the inducer of new coordination and treaties that allow a synergic action among its members.

SA has witnessed the emergence of new sources of tension, the result of the extrapolation of internal and migratory problems, generating delicate situations. The CDS could be **an instrument for the solution of crisis**. The refugees and displaced Venezuelans are examples of this. There are other sources that can generate tensions. Brazil and Paraguay still having problems in relation to about five hundred thousand Brazilians who own land on the Paraguayan side, known as "*brasiguaios*". Since 2006, the Bolivian government of Evo Morales has announced the departure of Brazilians from an area of 50 kilometers adjacent to the border with Brazil (PERIÓDICO DO SENADO, 2011). It is estimated that five thousand people live in the region.

The adoption of aspects of the European defense model and the creation of a South American peace force are advantages that can be seen in the CSD, which may have as a mirror other institutions of greater longevity, expanding its range of action and adopting successful policies, such as the synergistic actions on defense and foreign policy adopted by Europe.

The South American military integration policy would have two points in common with the European one. The first point would be the political and military convergence of two former rivals (United Kingdom and France in the case of EU would be Brazil and Argentina in AS). The second it was the strong influence suffered by the USA (LAMAZIÈRE, 2001).

The difficulties that the EU has to acquire a Common Foreign Policy or its own defense and security policy are well known. An important step for the EU, but one that has not yet had the desired effect, was the **indication of a foreign relations representative for the bloc**. The

CDS already brings together the Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs of the countries in their deliberations, and may, in the future, have a foreign relations representative to negotiate on behalf of the region.

One of the aspects of NATO is about **Civic Military Cooperation (CIMIC)**. Recently, Brazil and other South American nations have supported countries in catastrophes, such as the 2010 earthquake in Chile and the floods in Bolivia in 2012, with numerous practical demonstrations of regional solidarity.

The Armed Forces of CDS members are invariably called to help their nations in times of catastrophes. Thus, bringing together the defense portfolios of the various countries, the CDS could coordinate actions in this regard, equipping itself with the necessary instruments to carry out this task. Line (h) of Article 14 of the creation note of the CDS says: "Share experiences and support humanitarian actions, such as minefield retreat, prevention and mitigation of natural disasters and assistance to victims [...]".

Another aspect that should be discussed, within the scope of the CDS, is the incentive policies for the defense industry, which could be modeled on European policy. When analyzing the conclusion⁶ to which the European Commission has come, in 2006, when the juncture of its defense industry was studied, some problems in common with AS can be diagnosed and similar solutions can be glimpsed. Among the problems identified, there has been a need to improve financing conditions, market fragmentation and the opening of new consumer markets.

Another point that could be coordinated by the CDS would be the idea that nations concentrate on fewer activities than they do today. Thus, and seeking complementarity and synergy, they would **devote their attention to centers of excellence** that should be a consequence of a process essentially oriented to the market and to the peculiarities and capacities of the members of the CDS.

The CDS has as one of the main axes of its action plans the training and training of the South American military. In this sense, reference can be made to the efforts of various EU countries to adapt to the Bologna Process⁷ which seeks to homogenize degrees and studies, in general (not military). It is not a question of copying this process but of creating something similar for military teaching in AS, led by the CDS to facilitate the exchange and the creation of common study centers that serve the various Armed Forces of the CDS.

If on the one hand Brazil is not interested in the creation of a combined rapid-action regional military force, the proposal, of 2010, of the then president of Peru Alan Garcia, regarding the creation of a **South American Peace Force** should be analyzed. This proposal has received the initial support of Brazil and Chile. It is therefore necessary to study the recent history of the actions of the South American troops in peace missions. It is worth noting that in

6 Which seeks to homogenize degrees and studies, in general (not military). It is not a question of copying this process but of creating something similar for military teaching in AS, led by the CDS to facilitate the exchange and the creation of common study centers that serve the various Armed Forces of the CDS.

7 Process of Bologna is an agreement that in 1999 signed the ministers of Education of different countries of Europe, in Bologna. It is a joint declaration (the EU does not have competences in the field of education) that started a convergence process that aimed to facilitate the exchange of graduates and adapt the content of university studies to social demands, improving their quality and competitiveness.

the UN Charter, Article 52, does not prevent the formation of regional organizations for matters related to the maintenance of international peace and security.

The analysis of the use of the armies of the South American countries in peacekeeping missions is an instrument to confirm the degree of cooperation existing in the military area. In 2011, Brazil assumed command of the UN Naval Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), demonstrating that South America is increasingly being requested in this type of mission.

The United Nations Mission for the Stabilization of Haiti (MINUSTAH), led by Brazil, has the participation of several members of the CDS, stimulating the political convergence of these countries in forums such as the Latin American Association of Peace Operations (ALCOPAZ) and in the CDS. That MINUSTAH be the first mission of peace without the leading role of the main powers, urges the countries of the region to assume a greater commitment to regional and global security. The Binational Combined Peace Force Cruz del Sur (Chile - Argentina), already made available to the UN since 2010 to fulfill peace missions, is an example in this direction (BARRIOS, 2011).

Thus, it is possible to conclude that the European model presents some points that could serve as a model for the CDS. It is not a matter of forming a military alliance in the South Atlantic, but of having as a reference some policies and structures. The idea of a South American peace force under the coordination of the CDS also seems to be a very useful possibility, since a pre-existing and modular peace force would develop the doctrine and structures necessary to execute its work more efficiently, enhancing its performance.

Brazil, a true continent, with more than 200 million inhabitants (55% of the population of AS), more than 47% of the territory of the subcontinent (8.5 million square kilometers), and a GDP of more than 1.31 trillions of dollars (56% of the regional economy), stands out on the scene of the former Luso-Hispanic colonies. Analyzing the other regional blocs, throughout the world, it is necessary an agglutinative pole around which the other nations are associated (WEISE, 2010). Thus, probably, the CDS and UNASUL could **help the consolidation of the brazilian leadership and increase of Mutual Confidence Measures (MCM)**.

In addition to economic power, Brazil is looking for its space on the global board. Since the 1980s, it had been leading the Third World in the responses to asymmetries, notably the Group of 77 Meeting (Rio de Janeiro, 1983) and the rejection of the US proposal in the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), in 1986. Similarly, the SA - Africa (ASA) and SA - Arab Countries (ASPA) forums were created, as well as the IBAS (India, Brazil and South Africa). Between 2008 and 2010, it has opened 66 new Brazilian embassies and has diplomatic relations with all members of the UN (SOUSA FILHO, 2012).

According to traditional geopolitical views, the peripheral position of SA is clear. During the last hundred years, three geopolitical theories dominated international politics: the first is MACKINDER's "Heart Land", the second is SPYKMAN's "Rimland," and finally the theory of "Maritime Power", of MAHAN, in none of them has more significance or importance relative to global power (MATTOS, 1992).

Brazil sees scenarios favorable to increasing its influence at the regional and global levels. HUNTINGTON, in his book "The Clash of Civilizations and the New World Order", 1996, presents

LA in the same bloc, but without clear leadership. MAFRA, a Brazilian geopolitical thinker, presents the "Theory of the Cuaterno", advocating that, from the first quarter of the twenty-first century, the world would be divided into four blocks: North American, European, Asian and South American. The latter was initially composed of the South American countries and, subsequently, increased by the countries of Central America, the Caribbean and Mexico (MAFRA, 2006).

In this sense, Brazil could prove its ability to contribute to stability in its strategic environment, acting more directly in the resolution of regional crises. The proposal for the creation of the CDS was Brazilian, approving it in record time (about 10 months), after a series of visits developed by the then Minister of Defense Nelson Jobim. The breadth and diversity of relations built by Brazil in the last ten years prioritize SA, without abandoning traditional partners such as the US and EU, as well as being extended to new actors in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, not only in economic, but also in Defense (SOUSA FILHO, 2012, p. 119).

The international recognition of SA and its sovereign and independent policy, in synergy with the Brazilian efforts, opens spaces and opportunities in the complex world order. The CDS is more an instrument that reinforces this vision.

A natural contribution of the CDS, which is the result of all other contributions, is the **increase in Mutual Trust Measures (MCAs)** as transparency of defense expenditures increases and military cooperation is improved, reducing mistrust between its members. Joint action in peace and humanitarian actions, synergistic investments in the defense industry, discussion of crises at the regional level and integrated training of human resources are actions that generate growing ties of friendship in SA.

7 Final considerations

Initially, it was possible to note that the CDS resulted from a process of regional integration, which matured throughout the twentieth century and intensified greatly in the 21st century. South America was one of the last regions in the world to deepen political and economic cooperation with a broader coverage of the subcontinent. Defense integration has evolved and passed the phase of geopolitical rivalry and mutual distrust. In addition, before the CDS, it occurred at a level below strategic and policy decisions. The CDS allowed for greater cooperation in defense, raising the level of the discussions, with the participation of the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs.

The role of Brazil in this whole process was decisive and has brought, from MERCOSUL, a more independent and sovereign vision for regional integration. UNASUL represented a new scope for cooperation in SA, more ambitious and encompassing the area of defense, materialized by the CDS.

Both UNASUL and the South American Defense Council emerged at a time of political alignment between leftist governments with similar ideological bias. Likewise, the economic situation was highly appropriate, creating conditions to expand trade relations and investments

in the infrastructure of connection between nations, as well as allowing planning beyond the sovereign borders of the South American nations.

At the same time, UNASUR and CDS have shown timeliness in relation to a series of factors, among which the following are the approach of Brazil and Argentina and the sustainable growth of the economy and the international projection of Brazil. Besides this, we could observe the regional perception of exogenous threats to its natural resources; the search for a new space for congruence and the alignment of opinions in SA; and the maturity of relations and commercial exchange among the members of UNASUL.

Therefore, these favorable conditions, in the political and economic field, have changed radically since 2014, causing a weakening of the initiatives, which were still consolidated and tested in their first challenges for the solution of crises. Thus, from the Venezuelan crisis, the changes in the ideological visions of the South American governments and the low economic growth, UNASUL was paralyzed and runs the risk of extinction.

Regarding the effectiveness and results obtained by the CDS, it was verified that until 2014, the goals proposed in its action plans have been satisfactorily achieved. Then, the regional scenario and the perspectives of UNASUR have generated paralysis. Defense integration has increased, while some crises and frictions have been successfully addressed in this forum and UNASUL. Likewise, it has been able to implement important measures for the deepening of mutual confidence measures.

In addition, the CDS can make important contributions to regional integration, from its maturation, such as: increasing regional deterrence capacity; the increase of the South American defense industry; the increase and synergy in the fight against transnational crimes. It is important to remake other possibilities: create a regional forum for the discussion of relevant aspects and for the consolidation of peace; the adoption of some practices, duly adapted to South American reality, used by NATO and the EU; and the consolidation of Brazilian leadership.

In other hands, as an organ of UNASUL, CDS depends on the survival of this to proceed with your performance. The future of UNASUR is very foggy today, included some points that need a course correction. In this sense Brazil has a crucial role. South America has the challenge of building, by its own ideas and with the establishment of a particular geopolitical and defense thinking, a more integrated and prosperous subcontinent. This task is not performed overnight. It is the result of the maturity of the institutions and instruments of integration of the subcontinent that, despite the obstacles and difficulties, suggest that it is worth making this bet for the future.

The success of the CDS is a fundamental step in that direction for all that it contributes for the cooperation in the matter of defense and for the regional stability. UNASUL, in turn was more a step forward, as the organizations that will precede it. Therefore, with the necessary adjustments, this breadth of integration, across the subcontinent and encompassing defense, is a matter of time.

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