the courses at CCOPAB, transmit knowledge to the personnel in the unit of the preparation, based on MOU, CPTM and STM.

It may be concluded that, during the phase of centralized preparation, BRAENGCOY has EBOP as a tool to achieve its full capacity to accomplish the Peacekeeping Mission in Haiti. Due to the knowledge that has been shared, the company reaches the phase of centralized preparation and is then able to be certified as a unit capable of accomplishing missions in operational environments abroad. Thus, the Engineering branch, the Army and Brazil are well represented, leaving their mark on the works they build.

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ABSTRACT: UN PKOs have proved great adaptability and significantly contributed to the successful settlement of disputes and their decline along two recent decades. Today, however, there is evidence of an uncomfortable reversion of some trends and a generalized concern for the changes that might affect PKOs capability to respond to conflicts. The spread of extreme violence between regional conflicts and the growing demands for changes from the populations have been pressing Governments and the international system to respond to these new challenges. UN PKOs make an effort to reach their objectives; changes are needed to adapt them to the new circumstances and to ensure the raising efficiency and the appropriate use in the future. It is true that if UN keeps its current status quo, it has its credibility and efficiency affected, mainly in terms of providing peace and security, conflict prevention and settlements of disputes, overexposure of personnel in risky areas and management capabilities, among others. From that viewpoint, UN Secretary-General established the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, in order to focus on issues confronting Peace Operations and Special Political Missions such as: change of nature of conflicts, evolution of mandates, challenges to the good offices and to Peacebuilding, managerial and administrative arrangements, planning, partnerships, HR, POC, operational capabilities of uniformed personnel, performance and others. The Panel was based on many sources to support the analysis and recommendations, on previous studies with similar objectives, visits to capitals and specific areas, deployed mission areas in the field and several contributions from Member States and international institutions. By means of great accuracy, this research made the establishment of a sequential
coherence possible, providing meaning to the information presented in the final report. The implementation of the Panel recommendations greatly depends on the decision and will from various actors. Nevertheless, the decision of the Secretary-General for the realization of the study indicates a strong goodwill from the authority to support the implementation. It is expected that the recommendations come into effect in nearly two decades.

KEYWORDS: peace operations; changes in conflicts; credibility; efficiency.

In April 2014, three-year old Nyakhat Pal walked four hours leading her blind father and two dogs to a UNICEF-WFP rapid response distribution center in Pagak, Upper Nile State of South Sudan. When Nyakhat heard the UN was providing vaccines, food, water and sanitation supplies at the center, she hurried.

They walked those four hours through harsh and dangerous terrain. The area has seen serious fighting between opposition forces and the South Sudanese army, and peacekeepers of the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) have been deployed to protect the civilian population, and create a zone of safety. At the end of the journey, Nyakhat got what she had been looking for; she received life-saving supplies before heading back to her village, another four hours by foot.

Nyakhat’s story is at the heart of what the United Nations was created for, 70 years ago: “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights and in the dignity and worth of the human person”. And today, Nyakhat’s story still represents what the United Nations stands for - as well as for its shortfalls.
The Organization will remain relevant to the extent that it responds effectively to the expectations of people experiencing great hardship, sometimes in remote and inaccessible places, and who yet demonstrate enormous resilience, pride and bravery.

The Organization will remain legitimate to the extent that it acts as a voice for the unheard, seeking their views and ensuring their full participation.

The Organization will remain credible to the extent it is served by leaders and staff who demonstrate courage, integrity, compassion and humility, and who act upon the norms, principles, and values upon which the Organization was founded.

For many, peace operations are not simply something the United Nations does but what the United Nations is.

Picture 1 - Nyakhat and her father
The work of the Panel over the past six months has been driven by the desire to take a dispassionate look at UN peace operations to ascertain their relevance and effectiveness for today and tomorrow's world.

We hope that the analysis and recommendations contained here will live up to the spirit and the letter of the mandate entrusted to the Panel by the Secretary-General and to the expectations of Nyakhat and others: that the Organization will be there with them, for them.

1. Initial considerations
   a) Reasons for a new study on Peace Operations:

   HIPPO was established by the UN Secretary-General on 31 October 2014. Amid the reasons which triggered this new study, the ones to be highlighted are:

   1) Words by the Secretary-General:

   “The world is changing and United Nations peace operations must change with it if they are to remain an indispensable and effective tool in promoting international peace and security.

   As we approach the 15-year anniversary of the Brahimi report, we must acknowledge that peace missions today are increasingly called on to confront politically complex and challenging conflicts, often in volatile security environments where operations are directly targeted.

   We must take stock of evolving expectations and consider how the Organization can most effectively advance peace, assist countries caught in conflict and ensure that our peacekeeping operations and special political missions remain strong and effective in a changing global context.” (31OUT14)
2) Words by the Panel’s Chair:
“Since then (31 oct 14), the Panel has considered a broad range of issues facing peacekeeping and special political missions, including the changing nature of conflict, evolving mandates, good offices and peacebuilding challenges, managerial and administrative arrangements, planning, partnerships, human rights and protection of civilians, operational capabilities for the uniformed personnel and performance.” (16JUN15).

3) Terms of Reference (TR) of the Panel:
“Both peacekeeping operations and Special Political Missions (SPMs) are impacted by the changing global context for peace and security. More often than not, the United Nations today is confronted with cycles of repeated violence, weak governance and recurring instability.

Peacekeeping Operations were once deployed primarily into post-conflict situations with peace agreements in place. Today, they are increasingly mandated to operate where there is no peace to keep. The majority of field personnel (civilians and military personnel) work in countries where fighting is ongoing, and are increasingly the target of attacks.

SPMs have often been deployed to similar contexts, trying to broker agreements with parties that are frequently fragmented and unwilling to engage in a meaningful negotiation.

Both the changing nature of conflict and the changing role of peace operations have required the UN to adapt and respond.”

4) Executive Summary of the Report:
“UN peace operations have proven highly adaptable and contributed significantly to the successful resolution of conflicts and to a declining number of conflicts over two decades. Today, however,
there is evidence of a worrisome reversal of some of this trend and a widely shared concern that changes in conflict may be outpacing the ability of UN peace operations to respond. The spread of violent extremism, overlaid onto long-simmering local or regional conflicts and the growing aspirations of populations for change, is placing pressure on governments and the international system to respond. As UN peace operations struggle to achieve their objectives, change is required to adapt them to new circumstances and to ensure their increased effectiveness and appropriate use in future.

A number of peace operations today are deployed in an environment where there is little or no peace to keep. In many settings today, the strain on their operational capabilities and support systems is showing, and political support is often stretched thin. There is a clear sense of a widening gap between what is being asked of UN peace operations today and what they are able to deliver. This gap can be – must be – narrowed to ensure that the Organization’s peace operations are able to respond effectively and appropriately to the challenges to come.”

Besides these points, many other inputs can be considered to characterize the need of change of the Organization in relation to Peace Operations, such as the voices coming from the following sources: C-34 (Special Committee on Peace Operations), Member States, Regional Organizations, Government and related Institutes, featuring a harmony concerning the composition of the Panel. The fact is that the UN, keeping the present status quo, has its credibility and efficiency committed, especially in providing peace and security, conflict prevention and solution, excessive exposure of its personnel in risky areas and managerial capacity, among other aspects.
b) Referencials for changes:

The Panel based itself on many sources to substantiate its analyses and recommendations. However, it referred to many previous studies related to similar purposes, identifying their constitutive arguments, successes and difficulties. This research enabled, in a certain way, the possibility to establish a sequential coherence which would give meaning to what is being offered in the present report of HIPPO.

Therefore, the analyses and conclusions expressed in the following documents were of great importance:

1) Brahimi Report, 2000;
2) the publication “UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines” (Capstone), 2008; and

The approach of these documents will be done in this text, since they are considered to be in the domain of those who tackle Peace Operations.
**c) Pragmatic Aspects:**

In order to facilitate the implementation of its recommendations, the Panel has consensually decided:

1) that the analyses and recommendations (mainly) should have a specific address, such as: Secretary-General, Security Council, Member States, General Assembly, Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), Police Contributing Countries (PCCs), etc. Therefore, the recommendations were not “launched” without the respective addressee;

2) create feasible recommendations, always considering low cost (or “zero cost”) in its implementation; and

3) propose the engagement of more robust actors in the employment options of military capacities, besides the prerogative of participation in the decision-making process.

**The Independent Panel**

**a) Composition:**

The choice of the panel members was a personal prerogative of the UN Secretary-General, taking into account the geographical distribution and previous experience of the candidates. Having that in mind, the group formed was very heterogeneous in its personal qualifications, but with great homogeneity in terms of having experience either in the UN environment or in other international organizations. The group, during the functioning of the Panel, worked in a harmonic and respectful way, which highly influenced the results, since the decisions were consensual, consistent and with great concern in relation to the impact on what it was intended to reach.
The following personnel were part of the HIPPO:

1) JOSÉ RAMOS-HORTA (East Timor) – Chair of the Panel;
2) AMEERAH HAQ (Bangladesh) – Vice-chair;
3) ABHIJIT GUHA (India) – Lt Gen (Ret.);
4) ALEXANDER ILLITCHEV (Russia);
5) ANDREW HUGHES (Australia);
6) B. LYNN PASCOE (USA);
7) FLORIANO PEIXOTO VIEIRA NETO (Brazil) - Lt Gen (Ret.)
8) HENRIETTA JOY ABENA NYARKO MENSA-BONSU (Gana);
9) HILDE F. JONSON (Holland);
10) IAN MARTIN (United Kingdom);
11) JEAN ARNAULD (France);
12) MARIE-LOUSIE BARICAKO (Burundi);
13) RADHIKA COOMARASWAMY (Sri Lanka);
14) RIMA SALAH (Jordan);
15) YOUSSEF MAHMOUD (Tunisia); and
16) IWANG XUEXIAN (China).

It is fair to highlight that the high performance of the group and the outstanding working environment amongst its members were maximized by the exceptional performance of the Chair, who with a great deal of wisdom, experience and engagement, conducted it towards the results achieved in consensus. His reputation and acceptance in all visited places and authorities with whom the Panel connected were obvious and contributed to strengthen the consistence of the group as a whole.
b) Dynamics of the works:

1) Integration: discussions and methodology

The Panel was initially divided into five groups, according to the areas of specific expertise and personal interest of the members, aiming towards deepening the research and initial writing of the report texts. This composition was undone after the first draft. From then on, the subjects were distributed among the groups for research and a more refined design of the texts.

The themes were discussed in person, by videoconference or by e-mail. A e-library in the UN site was created to gather all the material researched, received from external sources or ordered from experts.

The working environment during the discussions were of camaraderie, respect and professionalism, in which there was not a situation that could tarnish the integration of the group. The definition of the texts, during all the phases of the Panel, was reached in a consensual manner.

2) Travels

HIPPO established, from the beginning of its works, a travel agenda to contact authorities, different organizations, academia, think tanks, civilian society, non-governamental organizations, etc. This option had the deliberate intention to listen to the voices of people and entities from different regions, reaching out for a better integration with whom, in practice, dedicates themselves to Peace Operations.

The Panel, in its totality or partially, carried out four types of travels, as follows:

a) meeting of the Panel in New York, USA, in the UN HQ or in the Greentree Estate (private property used by the UN for work
meetings), in a total of six meetings to discuss the themes and write the corresponding texts;
b) regional consultations in all continents: Africa (Ethiopia), Asia (Bangladesh), Latin America (Brazil) and Europe (Geneva);
c) visit to the capitals of the following countries: China, United States, Finland, France, India, Japan, Holland, Pakistan, Russia, Rwanda, Switzerland, United Kingdom and Turkey; and
d) missions in the field: MONUSCO (DR Congo), MINUSMA (Mali), UN Logistics Base (Brindisi/Italy) and UNOWA (Daka).

The dynamics presented, at the end, allowed the Panel to reach to findings aligned with questions that affect most peace missions. These findings were included in the analyses of the report and, especially, in its recommendations.
The report

a) Research mechanisms

The harmony observed in the travels was also extended to several consultations carried out by HIPPO, in the following modalities:

1) surveys with Permanent Missions (PM): the Chair of the Panel issued correspondence to all PMs, on 11 Nov 14, requesting suggestions to the ongoing work up to the end of January of that year. In total, HIPPO received 60 (sixty) proposals of present tendencies of conflicts, mandates, challenge to good office, administrative arrangements, partnerships, human rights, protection of civilians, capacities and performance;

2) contributions from institutes, regional organizations, civil society and think tanks, as follows: Ministry of Defense/Brazil, Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Brazil, CCOPAB/Brazil, Pandiá Calógeras Institute, Igarapé Institute, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), International Peace Institute (IPI), Stimson Center, United Nations University, Center of International Cooperation, Group of Friends of Mediation, Interpol, CLINGENDAEL (Netherlands Institute of International Relations), Brill Nijhoff, The Danish Institute for International Studies, Global Protection Cluster, SIPRI, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), No Violent Peace Force, Princeton University;

3) workshops: Protection of Civilians (London and Amsterdam), Use of Force (Amsterdam and NY), Revision of Case Studies (Bangladesh), WPS/Woman, Peace and Security (NY);

4) UN organs: DPKO, DFS, DPA, Secretariat, Security Council (SC), 4th Committee (Special Political and Decolonization), 5th Committee (Administrative and Budgetary), C-34
(Peacekeeping Operations), Specialists (OSAGI) of Resolution 1325 (WPS), Advisory Group of Experts to Review the Peacebuilding Architecture, Group of Force Commanders (FC), Group of Chiefs of Missions (HoM/SRSG);

5) travel reports generated by the Panel's Secretariat, comprising the several regional tendencies;

6) studies requested from several organizations on specific themes which may interest the Panel; and

7) specific bibliography (UN/EIDMS Virtual Library), gathering all documents produced by the members of the Panel and other received from external sources.

HIPPO believes that the consultation mechanisms used and the criteria established for the travels contributed to assure better legitimacy, representativity and credibility in the analyses carried out in the report, and, therefore, to the recommendations given.

b) Evolution of the works:

The following steps, which were part of the whole work of the Panel will be presented. This makes it possible to observe the logical sequencing that allowed, by the end of seven months, the conclusion of the work, having the formal delivery of the Report to the Secretary-General on 16 June 15.

1) 1st Step (Nov 14): initial definition of the research field

In this phase, the Panel dedicated itself to the definition of the parameters that would define the future themes of the Report and, therefore, it used as initial base the own Terms of Reference for the constitution and guidelines issued by the SG who, at several
opportunities, requested the group to be “bold and creative” in its analyses and recommendations. As already mentioned, the Panel looked close into previous documents which served for the same purpose, cementing the position in the maintenance of consolidated references; however, it tried to give value to essential fundamentals, such as coherence, pragmatism, permanence in time (two decades), economic viability, representativity and approach level (strategic), among others that the reading of the Panel implies.

The Terms of Reference included the following topics for HIPPO’s consideration:

a) mandates (doctrine and adaptation to the needs of the terrain);

b) political frameworks (including the participation of women) and good offices;

c) operations in volatile environments;

d) peacebuilding, stabilization, restauration and extension of the State authority;

e) authority and responsibility;

f) mission planning;

g) partnerships;

h) Special Political Missions (SPM);

i) promotion of human rights and protection of civilians;

j) required capacities for the military personnel; and

k) uniformed personnel performance, accountability, Rules of Engagement (ROE) and caveats.

It is important to emphasize that the Report went further than it was defined in the Terms of its constitution, incorporating contributions collected in travels and in the different consultation
mechanisms used.

1) 2nd Step (DEC 14): definition of the Work Groups.

2) The constitution of the five groups to design the initial draft followed the criteria of proximity of the members to the themes, but also taking into account the personal interest. This phase concentrated on research, analyses of present trends, UN reports and of other organizations, personal contacts and internal discussions.

3) 3rd Step (JAN 15): definition of the themes of the initial draft and beginning of the text designing.

4) 4th Step (APR 15): conclusion of the 1st draft having the discussions of the Panel and external inputs as its base.

5) 5th Step (up to JUN 15): improvement of the drafts (6 versions).


c. Areas of Study (essential changes):

The Panel decided to design the Report taking into consideration four principal pillars, from where the document was expanded in its analyses and recommendations, as summarized below:

1) reestablishment of the precedence of the political aspect: HIPPO tried to make clear that peace is neither reached nor sustained only by military or technological engagement, but through political solutions. In this regard, Peace Operations must be deployed as part of a more enhancing political process, within which the UN takes a leading role;

2) Peace Operations as a more flexible tool, shaped for each situation: the Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions must not be differentiated, but adjusted to the terrain
needs, under a single name “Peace Operations”;

3) strengthening of partnerships: studies and discussions led the panel to understand that the future of Peace Operations is in the establishment of well-structured and adequately supported partnerships, in material and financial resources, especially regionally, with the African Union and Economic Committees. The partnerships must be expanded in the areas of development, human rights, peace and security, in the attempt to prevent conflicts and in their solutions, when it is the case;

4) Peace Operations more centered on the area of the mission and on the people: such redirectioning will demand more engagement from the UN HQ to make operations deployed for each context possible. In summary, Peace Operations must serve and protect people more.

d) Main recommendations:

Regarding this topic, the recommendations which are more relevant, within the effort to summarize what is meant when writing this text, will be listed. Therefore, its highlight is far from being a more dedicated reading to the body of the Report, with focus on the analyses that are part of these and of the other recommendations. As seen before, it is relevant to point out that, in the Report, all the recommendations are addressed to specific UN sectors, in order to make its implementation easier, as decided.

1) Conflict Prevention and peace mediation:

a) must be redeemed as a priority. The Panel proposes the SG to hold international forums with the involvement of governments, regional organizations, civil society and the global economic community to exchange experiences and
agree upon approaches which integrate conflict prevention, governance, development and human rights; and

b) the SC must engage earlier when considering threats, including in partnerships, and be open to analyses and recommendations of the SG when in situations that may threaten international peace and security.

2) Protection of Civilians:

Picture 4 - Reunião do CS na ONU

![Picture 4](image)

Picture 5 - Troop action in Protection of Civilians

a) this activity must engage all the members of the mission, local government and humanitarian agencies, maintaining the primary responsibility under the host country;

b) in relation to contributions of unarmed actors in the
protection of civilians, the missions must work closer to local communities and NGOs (national and international), in the building of environments of protection;

c) recommendations to the Secretariat:

- present clear and open evaluations, options and necessary resources to the SC;
- alert the SC when resources and capacities are not adequate to the terms of the mandate;
- ensure TCCs/PCCs that all the uniformed component be adequately trained, equipped and commanded to the responsibilities of protection of civilians; and
- update initial evaluations and present to the SC proposals to modify plans, mandates and resources;

d) all the national caveats, besides the restrictions accepted by the Secretariat in the mission planning, must be considered as disobedience to the command; and

e) when the SC authorizes the deployment of forces which do not belong to the UN, the conditions for the performance report and responsibility for the actions must be established.

3) Use of Force:

Presently, the use of Force is related to three contexts:

- ceasefire monitoring in hostile environments;
- implementation of peace in difficult operations environments and exposed to collapse;
c) “management of conflicts” where there is no viable peace process or where the process has failed.

As it can be seen during the reading of the Report, for each context there is a special approach.

The recommendations related to the Use of Force can be summarized as the following:

a) Member States must ensure that the contingents are adequately equipped, trained and capacitated to respond to threats, supporting them with the use of force in a preventive manner in self-defense and protection of civilians;

b) when UN troops are deployed where there is no viable peace process, the SC, the Secretariat, regional actors and Member States must work to promote the political process and regularly revise the viability of the mission;

c) UN troops should not engage in counter-terrorism operations (CT) due to its composition and nature. This type of operation must be directed to regional forces or ad hoc alliances;

d) the exceptional deployment in partnerships for CT must be carefully defined by the mandate (work division);

e) the UN must establish a “vanguard” capability and an integrated HQ structure for rapid deployment in new missions;

f) the UN must develop a “modest” rapid response capacity to crises, as well as a list of regional quick response forces (bridging forces) or of State Members; and

g) so the operations can be more consistent, the Panel recommends the strengthening of the analyses, strategy and
planning processes, through the establishment of a small group of analysis and planning directly connected to the SG.

4) Peace Sustainment:

a) this primary activity demands engagement of the international community to avoid the return of the conflict; the peace process does not end with ceasefire, peace agreement or elections. The Panel listed seven weaknesses in the international approach that need to be improved;

b) the SG with the support of Member States must make an effort to concentrate all parts of the UN system, ensuring a joint answer to the necessities of countries in conflict; and

c) there are many other additional recommendations on support to UN authorities involved in the process and evaluation of collective efficiency; financing; local cooperation between the mission and UNCT (UN Country Team); independent reviews about the results accomplished; national reconciliation, justice and human rights; and security sector reform.
5) Development of the National Police:

   a) the Secretariat must development guidelines and training aiming at developing and reforming the local police, based on the national capacities, including support from specialized teams and use of civilian experts;

   b) PCCs which support the national effort in the development and reform must extend their rotation cycles for 12 months;

   c) to promote the availability and efficiency of Formed Police Units (FPU), the Secretariat must expand the list of contributions and partnerships and support PCCs in the pre-deployment preparation and improvement in performance; and

   d) the UN Police Division organizational structure must be restructured to better support the national polices.

6) Peace Operations Planning:

   a) the Secretariat must strengthen its capacity to analyze the dynamics of conflicts in local, regional and national levels to make the designing of strategic policies possible. Therefore, the Secretariat must immediately establish a strategic capacity of analysis and planning, reporting directly to the SG;

   b) the Secretariat must ensure that the analysis and the planning of the mission
include detailed assessments, not only in relation to politics and dynamics of conflicts and threats to civilians, but also to the operational challenges related to climate, terrain and infrastructure, ensuring a real integration between the Office of Military Advisory (OMA) and the Department of Field Support (DFS);

c) the Secretariat must ensure that the system of analysis and planning start as soon as possible, having a severe assessment of the situation and analysis of the conflict as the basis; and

d) other related recommendations to the conduct of the planning process by skilled leaderships; initial deployment to provide a capacity of analysis in the mission area; dialogue among all the actors involved; strengthening of the capacity of analysis of the missions; and independent evaluation of results.

7) Mandates:

a) The SC must authorize mandates with basis on a clear analysis of the situation and on the political strategy, taking the assessments of necessities and viability of their implementation into consideration;

b) the mandates must be sequenced and prioritized as a regular practice for an initial period of six months. This format reduces expenses and ensures that the missions are adjusted to the necessities of the terrain;

c) to delineate the mandates that adjust necessities and capacities, the establishment of “triangular discussions”
(Security Council, Troop/Police Contributing Countries and Secretariat) is proposed; and

d) during the renewal of the mandates, the consultation must be open to the missions so that the terms can be adjusted to the reality in the area.

8) Rapid Deployment:

a) the Secretariat must propose to the Member States the adoption of “vanguard capability” and integrated HQ for quick deployment in new missions; and

b) the Secretariat must consult the Member States and regional organizations about the options for a capacity of regional and global rapid deployment, including as “bridging forces”.

9) Quickness in the mobilization and better capabilities:

a) the Secretariat must present options to the SG and to the General Assembly (GA), highlighting the reduction in the generation of forces and time to deploy can be reached with different measures or resources;

b) the SC must provide political support to the process of UN force generation;
CCOPAB and Peace Operations: perspectives, reflections and lessons learned

c) SC’s members, especially the permanents, as well as other Member States with the capacities needed, are stimulated to offer their troops to UN Peace Operations and provide the missions with essential resources, signalizing their support in particular to the mandates of protection of civilians;

d) the Secretariat and the GA must search for the evolution of the reform of TCC/PCC reimbursement system and, in particular, develop options of reimbursement to Member States for a capacity beyond only the equipment used nowadays and troops. The Secretariat must implement the awarding reimbursement system immediately; and

e) the Secretariat must develop an strategy to generate troops and police officers based on gender, stimulating TCCs/PCCs to implement Resolution 1325.

10) Development of capacities and performance:

Picture 12 - Troops in Operations

a) the Secretariat and the Member States must integrate the existing initiatives in a singular framework of development of capacities and performance;

b) in relation to command and control, the selection of troops for Peace Operations must take national caveats into consideration when deciding if these troops must or not be accepted as contingents;

c) any restriction beyond what has been accepted by the Secretariat in the beginning of the mission should not be tolerated, but immediately reported to the Secretariat; and
d) Force Commanders and Police Commissioners must report situations when orders are not accomplished and report them to the General Headquarters;

e) when the situation changes quickly and a new level of preparation is necessary, the Secretariat must clearly explain the new demands to the TCCs/PCCs and the mission command must do the same in relation to the contingents; and

f) the Secretariat must review the processes of the report and information of the missions to make them timely, of high quality and accessible.

11) More agility in the mission support:

a) Member States must work with the Secretariat to develop a future model of logistic support for the mission which operates in environments of high risk of uncertainty of occurrences to ensure higher tactical mobility and military control over the available means; and

b) Secretariat and Member States must review the accomodation standards and remove limitations related to military aviation to allow higher tactical mobility.

12) Global training architecture:

a) global architecture of partnerships must be better established, strengthening the system of training certification to help identify certain limitations within the Member States; and

b) the training in environments of higher operational engagement (assymetrical) must be intensified, including the deployment of Mobile Training Teams.
13) Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda:

a) the missions must integrate experts in gender within all the functional components which need knowledge on the subject. The Mission Gender Advisor must be in the Office of the Head of the mission, to whom he/she should report directly;

b) the missions must have complete access to Resolution 1325 and to others which tackle the same theme, with support received from DPA and DPKO on the subject; and

c) the Secretariat must ensure that the meetings between the SG and heads of mission address indicators of performance related to gender.
14) Leadership:
   a) the selection of senior leaders must be based on merit, taking competencies and skills necessary to the job into account;
   b) the participation of women in UN high level positions must be enhanced, including in the terrain;
   c) the geographical representation of UN senior leaders must keep regional representativity; and
   d) new leaders (senior and junior) must go under induction programs, as a complement to the performance follow-up.

15) Security and crises management:
   a) the Secretariat must review the implementation of the UN security administration system to ensure its adjustment to contemporary threats;
   b) when necessary, the missions without the military component must be provided with small units of military or police guard;
   c) the Secretariat must establish a medical performance framework for Peace Operations, including well defined standards for the civilian and military capabilities; and
   d) the Secretariat must develop a doctrine of crises management for Peace Operations; the UNCT must have plans and procedures, including mass loss and several incidents plans, frequently reviewed and exercised.
16) General Headquarters:

a) the recommendation is based on the convenience of adjusting to UN HQ in search for higher efficiency, integration and efficacy of the inter departmental arrangements, with zero cost. Thus, the Panel presented a proposal of joining DPA, DPKO, DFS and PBSO in a structure of “peace and security” with the creation of opening of Under Secretary-General responsible for these areas (UNSGPS); and

b) permanence of the present USG for the “economic and development” sectors.

17) Other recommendations:

a) the UN must provide better logistic and financial support to the African Union to cover expenses with deployment of personnel from that region;

b) the UN must reinforce the “zero tolerance” policy for cases of sexual exploitation and abuse. Immunity should not be taken as impunity. In the Report, there are numerous recommendations on the waive of immunity, responsibility, system of victims aid, human rights, etc;

c) creation of a specific account for Special Political Missions, as soon as possible;

d) removal of imposed limitations to military aviation, with authority given to the FC for its use for the benefit of mobility (operational and logistical);
e) use of technology related to the needs of missions, with special emphasis on: security, immediate alarm and capacities related to Protection of civilians, health and welfare; and troops' accommodation;

f) evaluation of the environmental impact as part of the planning of new missions;

g) emphasis on the constitution of strategies to plan, recruit and finance of communication teams to ensure better contact with local communities, using modern technology.
Final considerations

a) Implementation:

The implementation of the recommendations of HIPPO depends on the decision and willingness of several actors, such as: the Secretary-General, Security Council and State Members. However, the decision of the Secretary-General to have this study carried out shows a strong good will that this authority has to support this execution. As highlighted before, the expectation is that these recommendations come into effect in approximately two decades.

In order to offer concrete options of implementation, DPKO created a working group under the responsibility of the Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training (DPET), with ongoing studies to support the decision process.

The Panel understands that the pragmatism, the consistence and the direction of the recommendations are features which will help the implementation of the Report.

b) Last words-gathering efforts:

The following words, transcribed from the final parts of the Report, summarize much of what has been exposed on its pages, of better Capacitation of the Organism, strengthening partnerships and of the importance to be given to the peoples:

“Ambitious mandates, difficult political and operational landscapes, intractable conflicts and high expectations are intimidating hurdles for contemporary peace operations. The recommendations contained in this report aim to better prepare UN peace operations to meet these and other challenges in an uncertain