future. These recommendations reflect the collective wisdom of the broad range of partners and stakeholders of UN peace operations with whom the Panel has consulted over the course of the past [seven] months. They aim to reflect the voices of people who are deployed to serve and protect; the experience and aspirations of regional partners with whom the UN must seek to work even more closely to collectively manage and respond to today and tomorrow’s threats; and the commitment of the broader community of nations to the maintenance of international peace and security. (JRH - Panel’s Chair).”

In a village in South Sudan, once again wracked by violence and a collapsed peace, a young girl still has high expectations. She expects that those blue helmets and the people who sent them will help her people find peace so that she can have a future. She is right to do so. And she is not alone. For Nyakhat Pal, and for the millions affected by conflict, United Nations peace operations – the United Nations - must unite its strengths and move forward to meet this challenge together.
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The Brazilian military performance in MINUSTAH: strategies to confront gangs in Haiti

Juliana Sandi Pinheiro

ABSTRACT: This article consists of a synthesis of part of the author’s doctoral thesis. It aims at analyzing the practices adopted by the Brazilian contingents of MINUSTAH to confront the Haitian gangs. The analysis was based on the concept of anomie and the description of the operational experience of the Brazilian Contingents of MINUSTAH. Interviews with mobilized military personnel were used as reference, as well as articles of military men and

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classified reports from the Ministry of Defense describing the employment of the Brazilian troops. The question lies on whether the *modus operandi* of the Brazilian troops when confronting the gangs in Haiti is innovating or not. A parameter for innovation may be the employment of the troops in both confronting routines and humanitarian aid activities without deviation from military function. MINUSTAH comprises the first Brazilian experience of use of force in tactical level in a mission of stabilization of the United Nations mainly guided by Chapter VII of the Charter. The Brazilian State wishes to be more than a mere contributor of troops to the United Nations peacekeeping missions. Reaching the main proponent status in efficient working methodologies employed in situations of high complexity in the peacekeeping missions context is a strategic achievement that places the country closer to the international decision-making process scenario.

**KEYWORDS:** MINUSTAH; Brazilian Army; Use of force; Strategy; Haitian gangs.

### Introduction

The action of gangs in the urban areas of Port-au-Prince, capital of Haiti, used to contribute to the political instability and polarization of the Haitian society\(^2\). Both the criminalization and the politicization of the gangs are symbols of the complexity of the Haitian scenario. The socioeconomic inequalities together with the

\(^2\) For example, see the remarks made by General João Carlos Vilela Morgero, Commander of the Brazilian Brigade, in the Final Report of Employment of the 2\(^{nd}\) Contingent. The report will be explored in more details in Chapter 6 of this thesis. When describing the reasons for the operational acting, General Morgero describes the complex Haitian scenario and how many actors (former military men, political leaders, criminal groups) associated to gangs as a way to pressure the institutions of the Haitian Government. Moreover, the UN Secretary General mentioned the role of gangs in the promotion of instability and political polarization in Haiti in his report of 16 April 2004 (S/2004/300) (page 7).
absence of government authorities have deprived a great part of the population of minimum living conditions to ensure security, food, education, health, among others.

This situation of crisis has been mediated by actions of the international community. However, there has not been a consensus on the approach to be used, especially concerning the gangs’ issue. This article proposes an analytical approach to describe and analyze the practices of the Brazilian Army in confronting the gangs in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Such approach presents actions primarily devoted to the area of security, but with elements that promote the presence of civilian organizations, civic-social actions and quick impact projects to improve the living conditions of the Haitian population.

The question lies on whether the *modus operandi* of the Brazilian troops when confronting the gangs in Haiti is whether innovating or not. A parameter for innovation may be the employment of the troops in both confronting routines and humanitarian aid activities without deviation from military function. To answer these questions, Employment Final Reports of Brazilian Contingents of MINUSTAH were analyzed.

When considered as a whole, the doctrines used by the Brazilian Army in Haiti have been contributing to the creation of conditions, within the Haitian society, that enable changes in attitude and mentality in order to facilitate the introduction of development and security solutions. Certain circumstances regarding Psychological Operations, which were employed to bring the Brazilian soldier closer to the Haitian population, were found in Employment Final Reports, as well as ways to put an end to the Haitian people’s support for the

Poverty and conflict are typical components of societies in crisis which tend to gather dissatisfactions among political leaderships and the population, leading to the spread of protests of national and international order. However, the criminal cooptation of people done by gangs or political groups that make use of this resource, hinders the opposition social actions putting their independence and legitimacy at risk. Thus, there is a hard-to-solve paradox. Although the actions exclusively directed to the security field reduce the immediate impacts of the conflict violence, they tend to be innocuous or not very effective to solve the structural dilemmas that contribute to poverty and inequality.

Therefore, strategies of confronting gangs that contain elements of humanitarian support and the promotion of development to combat those criminal groups can be an effective way of achieving a balance zone between the UN peacekeepers and the civilian population. In this context, a positive Brazilian Army approach when confronting the gangs in Haiti may lie on the fact that the functions to be carried out by the contingents, which are typically military, include humanitarian support works along with robust combat operations. Few States are able to provide innovative methodologies that are successful when dealing with diffuse problems as seen in the Haitian society. This article offers an analytical approach directed to the critical exposition of the practices of the Brazilian Army in Haiti, especially concerning the confrontation of gangs.
Methodological considerations

This thesis is based on a research that was accomplished in two phases. The first phase was a bibliographical review with theoretical and conceptual focus, which supports each chapter of the thesis. The second phase comprises the research done in Brasilia and in Rio de Janeiro with the Ministry of Defense, the Land Operations Command of the Brazilian Army, the Brazilian Army Command and General Staff College, and the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center. Throughout this phase, the “Brazilian Battalion Employment Final Reports” of each Brazilian Contingent that operated in Haiti were obtained and analyzed. There were only a few exceptions that will be mentioned later, applying content analysis. Moreover, interviews with Brazilian generals that commanded the military component of MINUSTAH, along with articles and studies of Brazilian officers who served in the mission, complement the analysis of the Final Reports.

The thesis that underlies this article aims to analyze the practices of confronting Haitian gangs consolidated in the ‘strategies’ of employment of the Brazilian Contingents in MINUSTAH. To this end, the Brazilian Battalion Employment Final Reports of the Brazilian Contingents that operated in Haiti for 10 years (from 1 June 2004 to 4 December 2014, in a total of 20 contingents) were obtained. It is important to highlight that the Final Reports of the 1st, 3rd, and 13th to 16th Contingents were not made available by the Ministry of Defense (The reports of BRABAT 2 - Brazilian Battalion 2 - of the 14th and 17th Contingents are included in the researcher’s material). Thus, a total of ten reports could not be seen, which did not invalidate this analysis, since 16 others were checked. It is important to remark that after the earthquake in January 2010, from the 12th to the 17th Contingents, MINUSTAH started to have two Brazilian Battalions, with one Final Report each.
### Table 1 - List of Employment Final Reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTINGENT</th>
<th>REPORTED PERIOD</th>
<th>AUTHOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>December 2004 - June 2005</td>
<td>General João Carlos Vilela Morgero</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td>December 2005 - June 2006</td>
<td>Colonel Luiz Augusto de Oliveira Santiago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>June 2006 - December 2006</td>
<td>Colonel Paulo Humberto Cesar de Oliveira</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th</td>
<td>December 2006 - June 2007</td>
<td>Unavailable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th</td>
<td>June 2007 - December 2007</td>
<td>Colonel Julio Cesar de Sales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th</td>
<td>December 2007 - June 2008</td>
<td>Colonel Luiz Guilherme Paul Cruz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th</td>
<td>June 2008 - December 2008</td>
<td>Colonel Pedro Antônio Fioravante Silvestre Neto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th</td>
<td>December 2008 - June 2009</td>
<td>Colonel Fernando Sampaio Costa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th</td>
<td>July 2009 - January 2010</td>
<td>Colonel João Batista Carvalho Bernardes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th - BRABAT 1</td>
<td>January 2010 - July 2010</td>
<td>Colonel Otavio Santana do Reis Barros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th - BRABAT 2</td>
<td>January 2010 - July 2010</td>
<td>Colonel Luciano Puchalski</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th - BRABAT 2</td>
<td>February 2011 - September 2011</td>
<td>Colonel Henrique Martins Nolasco Sobrinho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th - BRABAT 2</td>
<td>December 2012 - April 2013</td>
<td>Colonel Sinval dos Reis Leite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th</td>
<td>June 2013 - November 2013</td>
<td>Colonel Zenedit de Mota Fontoura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th</td>
<td>December 2013 - June 2014</td>
<td>Colonel Antídio David de Oliveira Junior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th</td>
<td>June 2014 - December 2014</td>
<td>Colonel Vinicius Ferreira Martinelli</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: elaborated by the author, based on the Employment Final Reports
These reports are confidential and have restricted circulation. Its availability was granted by the Brazilian Army High Command after one and a half year of negotiations and requests made by the author to the military units in charge (Ministry of Defense, Army High Command, Land Operations Command). On 30 April 2015, the author received the first part of the reports. The choice of the documents was done as the successive contacts with the military organizations were made, mainly the Land Operations Command (COTER, acronym in Portuguese), Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center (CCOPAB, acronym in Portuguese) and the Brazilian Army Command and General Staff College (ECEME, acronym in Portuguese). Such units enabled a better understanding of the military practice, especially regarding the operational environment of missions and the way the military personnel report their activities.

In this context, the “Brazilian Battalion Employment Final Report” holds the most complete description of the events and the circumstances which involve the employment of Brazilian troops in Haiti. These documents comprise the corpus of the analysis, i. e., the set to be subjected to analytical procedures based on rules of comprehensiveness (it includes all field reports available so far), homogeneity (it refer to the object of this study) and relevance (the documents are suitable as source of information in order to match the goal that raises the analysis) (Bardin, 2011, p. 126-128).

Having as a reference the practices or activities of confronting the Haitian gangs by the Brazilian troops, one can outline as an index of the content analysis of the reports the “citation of opposing forces” (for example, gangs and former military personnel). The work of the military forces in MINUSTAH comprises the confronting of opposing forces. However, it is possible to soften its emphasis with the citations
in the report of “humanitarian support work” mentioning, for instance, “Social Civic Actions” (ACISO), “civil-military coordination” (CIMIC), “quick impact project” (QIP), “humanitarian aid”, “humanitarian action”, among others. In this context, the frequency that the words “gang” and “former military personnel” are softened by the terms that relate to “humanitarian support work” in the Employment Final Reports, serves as an indicator for the analysis of the modus operandi of the Brazilian troops and of the security situation, since the Reports describe the main operational activities of each contingent. The more references to the confronting of opposing forces are made, the more sensitive the security situation is. The more the humanitarian support work is emphasized, the more the military function will be deviated from its original one. Nevertheless, the better the security situation will be, as it may be the reason for the positive results of the confrontation of the opposing forces by MINUSTAH troops, including the Brazilian Contingents. The content analysis of these reports allows these hypotheses to be verified.

The theoretical and conceptual framework is divided into four sets of approaches and each one is presented in a specific chapter of this thesis. These chapters deal with conceptual aspects of the gangs issue in the Haitian society (Chapter 2), of the theoretical concepts of the UN peacekeeping missions (Chapter 3), of the strategic contemporary complex (Chapter 4) and of the institutional aspects of the involvement of Brazil with MINUSTAH (Chapter 5). These chapters contribute to the analysis made in chapters 6 and 7 which focus on the description of the operational experience of the Brazilian Contingents of MINUSTAH.

This article synthetically covers part of the discussion done in chapters 1, 2, 6 and 7 of the thesis. The analysis of the employment
final reports of the Brazilian Contingents enabled the identification of the Brazilian *modus operandi* that gathers actions of confronting opposite forces with the execution of humanitarian works. Moreover, the position of the Brazilian military personnel towards the critical Haitian scenario and the operational difficulties experienced by the MINUSTAH troops can be seen in the reports. The hypothesis of the Brazilian troops’ operational versatility guides the analysis work whose result is discussed in the conclusion.

**Haitian gangs: anomie and deviant behaviour**

The History of Haiti and the origin of the socio-structural crisis the country has been going through since its unsuccessful democratic transition are described in two important references: *The Prophet and Power* by Alex Dupuy (2007) and *Haiti: The Aftershocks of History* by Laurent Dubois (2012). The sociopolitical experience, the dilemmas of economy and the cooperation and intervention of the international community are elements which are usually attributed to the historical process that, in general, resulted in the chronic Haitian crisis. However, there are few published references that have built data on Haitian gangs. This article is based on the studies of Athena Kolbe (2013), David Becker (2011) and Robert Muggah (2010), and Dziedzic and Perito (2008).

The present data of Haiti show a convulsed society in its economic, political and social problems. According to Merton (1938), this poor cultural integration relates to the constant social convulsions and crime. The basic perspective of individual progress that boosts life in society is almost non-existent in the Haitian society due to the lack of institutional opportunities. As a result, there is social instability and pathological and antisocial behavior tendencies of many people and their representative bodies.
According to Merton (1938, p. 680-681), there is a correlation between crime and poverty. A consequence of poverty is the limitation of opportunities. Although there is not a clear cause that links poverty and social exclusion to armed violence in the great urban centers, in Haiti, as well as in Brazil, one can notice the association of these three factors (poverty, social exclusion and violence) that reinforce one another so as to constitute a hard-to-solve vicious circle. While each form of violence has its local impact, there are also national and global factors of the Haitian society that allow the use of the concept of anomie as a macrosociological explanation for the problem of gangs.

In Haiti, the democratic transition process which started in the late 1980’s did not consolidate the state structures of support to the needs and expectations of the people. On the contrary, anomie, in this context, is the resulting instability of the breach of the regulatory order that ensures coexistence rules in society. Since the fall of Duvalier’s dictatorship, various factions of the local elites have competed for the primacy in the State management, without guaranteeing, however, that this structure offers people legal and social support.

On one hand, Haiti lacks institutions that offer people equal opportunities for social mobility or the simple guarantee of rights, as seen in Merton (1938). On the other hand, as seen in Durkheim (1999, 2000), the lack of “normal” interactions between the Haitian State institutions and the population over time does not permit coexistence rules to be built, resulting in deregulation and the consequent state of anomie. Breaking this dysfunctional paradigm is a complex task which depends on the cooperation among the Government and Haitian institutions and the international community.

According to Kolbe (2013, p. 3), although the international community defines gangs as urban armed groups, for the Haitian
population they are “political associations”, “community groups” or simply “bases”. However, the specialized unit of the Haitian policy to deal with these groups is called “anti-gang unit”. According to Becker (2011, p. 141), the gangs usually take advantage of the people’s support, since they are considered guardians from an abusive government in terms of security. In this context, the gangs are self-sufficient units that grow when not confronted, mainly in a lenient environment of a weak State.

According to Becker (2011, p. 139-140), the Haitian gangs operate within a basic set of rules. They work as “entrepreneurs of violence” using the political instability to obtain money and power, thus recruit more supporters. These members may even include political benefactors who see in the gangs their ability to mobilize votes or to obstruct the electoral process. The evolutionary path of the gangs in Haiti followed a relatively linear progression. The gangs act to defend their space so that they can act with impunity. Once established in a zone, they form a base to expand their activities, especially kidnappings. These groups have easily consolidated their authority because since very early they have recognized the needs of the Haitian people. Therefore, they have built a network of social support for its members. In addition, there are few alternatives for unemployed young Haitians who are in those groups as a means of subsistence.

Anomie is a social dysfunction that needs to be addressed by, for example, encouraging the establishment of well-ordered social relations which over time can serve as a foundation or build institutions that meet the aspirations of ascension and social progress. Therefore, the desired stability needs initiatives which are able to promote attitudes prone to the sociopolitical and economic development of the nation.
The activities carried out by the Brazilian troops within MINUSTAH have encouraged changes of the population’s attitudes towards the gangs, supporting and strengthening the Haitian institutions. It is a pioneer action in the United Nations peacekeeping operations which is seen in details in the next section.

The operational experience of the Brazilian contingents of MINUSTAH

The mobilization of the “Brazilian Brigade”, 2nd Contingent, was from December 2004 to June 2005. The 1st Contingent had been prepared to act according to Chapter VI of the UN Charter. However, the worsening of the security situation, as described by the UN Secretary General\(^3\) demanded the revision of the *modus operandi* of the Brazilian brigade. Then, they began to operate based on Chapter VII of the Charter from the 2nd Contingent on.

It is not possible to determine precisely if the posture of the operational troops of MINUSTAH, including Brazilian contingents, has any relation with the worsening of the situation in the field. Though, it is important to highlight that the operational force of the mission only reached the desired level assigned by the UN mandate after a year of mobilization. The Employment Final Report of the 1st Contingent was not made available for this analysis. However, the reduced personnel plus the wide area of responsibility of the Brazilian

\(^3\) In the 18 November 2004 report (S/2004/908), Kofi Annan claims that the security situation had worsened, mainly in Port-au-Prince (p.2). The main threat came from armed groups that defied and confronted the Transition Government. Violence was heavily present in the action of former military personnel that tried to assume HNP positions. There were mainly demonstrations for the ex-president Aristide with shootings and ways blocked in Port-au-Prince, especially in the slums of Bel-Air and Cité Soleil, considered strongholds of the ex-president's sympathizers.
Brigade brought operational consequences for the troops that needed to prioritize actions among the set of possible operations (MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, Employment Final Report, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Contingent, 2005, p. 26). It can be noted that since the beginning of the mobilization, the Brazilian troops needed to adapt their \textit{modus operandi} to handle their area of responsibility.

According to General Augusto Heleno, interviewed by the author on 17 March 2011, the greatest doctrinaire contribution of the Brazilian Command in MINUSTAH to all the United Nations peacekeeping operations based on Chapter VII of the Charter, are humanitarian actions carried out by the military personnel, which contribute to obtain people’s trust and solidarity actions with the local population. He admits that these assignments are not traditional tasks of the military forces. However, he points out that these measures, considering the absence or impossibility of others to operate in situations of crisis, would be an efficient way to balance the peacekeeping mission and the local population\footnote{General Augusto Heleno Ribeiro Pereira in the lecture entitled “Peacekeeping Operation in Haiti”. It was promoted by the Secretariat of Monitoring and Institutional Studies (SAEL, acronym in Portuguese) of the Institutional Security Cabinet of the Presidency of Republic (GSI/PR) that took place in Palácio do Planalto on 14 October 2005.}.

The Employment Final Reports of the Brazilian Contingents of MINUSTAH show that this attitude of the Brazilian troops follows the operational guidance of the Force Commander and that humanitarian actions were conducted by the Brazilian Contingents even without support from the civilian command of MINUSTAH.

The employment of the troops was simultaneous in confronting actions and in humanitarian support works. It even happened in operations related to combating gangs. In previous UN peacekeeping operations
missions in Haiti, the troops did not have to deal with the gangs issue the way MINUSTAH had been performing. The knowledge that the opposing forces that the UN troops would fight were mostly composed of gangs was only learned when the troops were in the field and by means of their action. Thus, the *modus operandi* of the Brazilian Contingents needed to be adapted.

The Employment Final Report of the 3rd Contingent has not been made available for analysis. Such period can be considered a sort of *turning point* for MINUSTAH military operations. The risk of losing control in vital areas of Port-au-Prince imposed a more aggressive operational posture from the troops.

The 3rd Contingent had to deal with the worsening of the security situation. Captain Marco Aurélio Gaspar Lessa (2007, p. 87), who could access the Employment Final Report of this period, claims that the 3rd Contingent of the Brazilian Battalion went to the operations area with the hard mission of substituting the Brigade during the electoral period in times of increasing violence in Port-au-Prince. The environment was unstable, authorities of MINUSTAH and of the United Nations, in New York, were uncertain in relation to the security conditions to hold the elections in 2005 and the Security Council was not confident about the extension of the mandate.

Quoting General Augusto Heleno, Major Rafael Novaes da Conceição (2014, p.6) says that the situation was so critical that the UN considered re-deploying its Multinational Interim Force (MIF), as in 2004, which would represent an enormous political-military failure for Brazil. The doctrines of employment of the Brazilian troops (that is, the know-how in operational terms) were crucial for the resumption of control and normalization of the Haitian governance. According
to Lieutenant-colonel Marcelo Chelinski Barreto (2007, p.63), there was not a specific doctrine for peace enforcement missions. Therefore, the actions were planned and carried out based on the doctrine of operations against irregular forces in urban environments. The maintenance of security was carried out by police-like operations with massive presence in the areas and implementations of civic-social actions (ACISO, acronym in Portuguese).

According to the Commander of the Brazilian Battalion,

the Brazilian experience in working humanitarian support activities along with military operations was a plus of this battalion in comparison with the other contingents. It was a visible fact that allowed the battalion to be treated differently in relation to the other forces (MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, Employment Final Report, 4th Contingent, 2006, p. 28).

The Brazilian approach to the Haitian case may have “Brazilianized” the Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC). The convergence of functions that are typical of civilians, but carried out by the military personnel, is added to the strategic design of the mission. It also includes protection of civilians and the military goal of acquiring people’s support to military operations. Therefore, the level of protection is likely to improve, related either to the civilian and military components or to the population itself. The practice of the civic-social actions and other services of humanitarian support done by the Brazilian troops in the UN-CIMIC context moves from an individual application of their own resources to be integrated to the broad range of the mission. This process does not occur without resistance from both parts. The military actors are conditioned to perform tasks that are exclusively military, whereas
the civilian components that act in peace missions tend to preserve their functions that originally would not be associated to strategic military objectives. Thus, the initiatives of the Brazilian Battalion in coordinating and searching for support in its actions with the civilian offices of MINUSTAH unveil the Brazilian practice.

The action of the Brazilian contingents aims to break the systemic domain of power the gangs have on the population. Therefore, the relevance of the humanitarian support works of the troops as there is “reluctance or resistance of some UN civilian agencies to work in pacified or stabilized areas, claiming lack of security” (MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, Employment Final Report, 5th contingent, 2006, p.47).

As a consequence of the level of security achieved, the Brazilian troops intensified the CIMIC actions “to accomplish the strategy of attracting the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people aiming to gain their trust and support the local leaders who were committed to the Haitians socioeconomic development” (MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, Employment Final Report, 6th Contingent, 2007, p. 24, emphasis added in bold).

The operational success of the Brazilian troops in Haiti can be attributed to the work of the “Psychological Operations Section”, whose activities not only covered the internal public but also the Haitian people inside the Battalion’s operations area. Regarding the internal public, this Section monitored the operational activities of the subunits. They made motivational films and posters that had an important role in preserving the morale of the troops. Regarding the Haitian people, an opinion survey was done to have a precise view of the Haitians’ acceptance towards the work carried out by the Brazilian Battalion in all the operational areas. It also served as basis
Brazil was decisively committed in Haiti. Since the beginning, the country has done more than just making the biggest military contribution or assuming leadership responsibilities of the Military Component. Brazil proposed projects of development, led political efforts, emphasized the requests for humanitarian donations, carried out diplomatic initiatives with the UN and acted firmly being a non-permanent member of the UNSC (United Nations Security Council). The Brazilian reputation as a benevolent country and committed to international peace was fairly reinforced in more than ten years of MINUSTAH.

The building of partnerships favors the distribution of efforts and humanitarian aid, thus making them more efficient. As the humanitarian support works started to take great part of the efforts of the Brazilian troops, this operational posture gained space and was consolidated after the earthquake. The coordination efforts in CIMIC go beyond the reach of civic-social actions, which have more limited implications, but which worked very well concerning the modus operandi of the Brazilian troops. The change in the scenario, instead of imposing a revision of the practices, was followed by the consolidation of the Brazilian humanitarian approach. As they were close to the people and the Haitian reality, the troops could be efficient in both the security and in humanitarian support.
From the analysis of Employment Final Reports, it can be inferred that MINUSTAH’s forces, including the Brazilian contingents, have been successful in the stabilization of Haiti, despite the critical periods of the early years of mobilization, mainly from 2004 to 2007. The content analysis of the Employment Final Report of the 20th Contingent shows that a great part of the activities conducted by Brazilian troops in Haiti have humanitarian approach, although the Brazilian view of employment of humanitarian support works by the troops are done for strategic-military objectives.

The analysis of the Final Reports evidences the consolidation of two dynamics in terms of employment of the Brazilian troops in Haiti. On one hand, the pacification doctrines and the guarantee of law and order of the Brazilian Army adopted by the first Brazilian contingents proved to be effective for their use in UN peacekeeping missions. In case there was clear conformity between the operational environment and the reality for which the troops had been prepared. They lacked an appropriate doctrine to act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Therefore, the use of domestic doctrine, even facing similarities and differences in the Haitian scenario if compared to the Brazilian reality, proved to be a right decision.

On the other hand, there was an improvement of the employment techniques. With a process of military instruction in the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center, they had to comply to the doctrinaire reality of the United Nations and their peacekeeping missions. This evolution is clear in the way each Employment Final Report describes many operational situations, mainly in relation to the approach to civil affairs and to the performance of the CIMIC activities.
In summary, the employment ‘strategies’ developed by the Brazilian military personnel in Haiti contributed to the triumph of MINUSTAH mission. It has been confirmed by the discussions about its reconfiguration to a possible mission of political nature. Concomitantly to the employment in Haiti, the Brazilian Government created a joint training center, CCOPAB, to debate and improve the experiences gained in the field. The approach and working methodologies of the Brazilian military personnel are internationally recognized nowadays. Thanks to the effort of qualified professionals, the Brazilian Government has means to promote itself now as a relevant actor to solve crisis and international conflicts that involve the employment of troops in areas plagued by poverty and in fragile States.

Conclusion

This article analyzed the practices of confronting the Haitian gangs by the Brazilian contingents of MINUSTAH. To this end, the problem of gangs in the Haitian society was briefly checked based on the concept of anomie and the description of the operational experience of the Brazilian Contingents of MINUSTAH.

Since the second deposition of former President Aristide in 2004, the Haitian gangs have become centers for political disputes exerting strong pressure on the population through illicit means such as kidnapping, rape, arson, theft and trafficking, among other crimes. The instability caused by Haitian gangs represents an essentially structural problem of the Haitian society. Such problem has implications that do not relate to the context of security solely, but also to the profile of development of this society.
On one hand, the social practices of the Haitian citizens were not able to make rules that assured peace and social justice. Therefore, the state of anomie that contributes to a systemic instability of the Haitian Government remained. On the other hand, this lack of rules culminates with the constitution of dysfunctional institutions that do not provide tools for social mobility among Haitian citizens. Thus, it contributes to occurrences of behavioral pathologies that defy the existing standards even by means of delinquency. This perspective shows how the problem of gangs in the Haitian society is mostly structural. In the absence of official bodies, anomalously, these groups gain support from people when promoting means for social mobility among their members and social services for the unassisted citizens.

The Employment Final Reports of the Brazilian Contingents show how the troops tried to break the dysfunctional links that connected the gangs to the Haitian society through actions that combined coercive means to impose power and social and humanitarian impact activities. While coercive actions fought the dominance of the terror of the gangs, the social impact activities promoted means for emergency and humanitarian assistance in areas unassisted by the Haitian State. The UN operational doctrine clearly separates military actions from those to be carried out by the civilian component, which include humanitarian actions. However, the Brazilian confronting strategies added humanitarian and assistance functions to the military actions performed by the troops. The relevance of the action of the Brazilian troops to the positive results of the pacification of regions plunged in turmoil could only be noticed after the analysis of the Employment Final Reports of the Brazilian Contingents.

The UN official documents, as well as the Secretary General's reports, describe the implementation of humanitarian actions by the
troops, but do not point how this Brazilian practice was decisive for
the mission success. It can be seen that, even though the strategic
and doctrinaire conception of the UN in relation to the troops in Haiti
prevails, in real practice, the Brazilian troops developed operations
based on their own *modus operandi* with positive results for the
mission as a whole. That does not mean that the Brazilian Contingents
of MINUSTAH do not respond to the chain of command. It only
shows that the operations in UN peacekeeping missions are sensitive
to cultural and doctrinaire tendencies of the troop-contributing
countries. The *Force Commander* of MINUSTAH is always a Brazilian
general. Besides, the proactive posture of the Brazilian troops in
operational terms is due to the fact that the country has the biggest
military contingent deployed to Haiti and the Brazilian battalions are
responsible for the most sensitive areas of the Haitian capital, among
other reasons.

The content analysis of the Employment Final Reports show that
the references of confronting the opposing forces had been decreasing
over time. It reflects a significant improvement of the security in
the field. Moreover, the content analysis shows a sharp increase of
references to humanitarian support works carried out by the Brazilian
troops, even before the earthquake in January 2010, which testifies
the security improvement. In theory, acting in humanitarian support
works can be a deviation of the original military function of the
troops. However, in the case of Brazilian troops, the military aims
to be achieved with this type of practice evidence that there is no
deviation from the original military function, but the systematic
employment of troops aiming to achieve positive results in terms of
obtaining the so-called “human terrain” (the conquest of hearts and
minds). The employment of psychological operations, in this context,
is a strong indicator that the use of force by the Brazilian troops in MINUSTAH incorporates more subtle elements of the motivational field. It aims to promote changes in people’s attitude towards gangs and the UN forces acceptance by the Haitian society.

When the Final Reports mention the conquest of hearts and minds as a strategy of gaining the population’s support to the activities of the Brazilian troops, it is clear how much the contingents worked to cause the change of attitude among the involved parts. The development of psychological operations was a natural consequence of the interpretation the Brazilian commanders had of the Haitian scenario. It is an efficient strategy to break the power of the gangs and to promote MINUSTAH and the institutions of the Haitian State.

As the troops lacked a specific doctrine to act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in stabilization missions, the practices of confrontation of the Haitian gangs by the Brazilian troops were innovating. They proposed humanitarian actions to be developed by the military personnel, an operational posture supported by the Brazilian doctrines of guarantee of law and order and pacification.

Based on the doctrine of guarantee of law and order, the strategy of static points was applied to take back the control of regions affected in the Haitian slums. The doctrine of pacification, by the principle of people’s support, envisions that the conquest of hearts and minds is essential to the success of the operations that aim to promote a safe environment, an increase of essential and infrastructure services, the right attitude and the good communication among the members of the military component and the local inhabitants where the actions happen.

It is the first Brazilian experience with use of force at the tactical level in a stabilization mission of the United Nations mainly governed
by Chapter VII of the Chart. The Brazilian participation is not only contributing with troops and the Force Commander, it comprises a great cooperation effort in many sectors such as agriculture, education and health. The approach adopted by the Brazilian troops in relation to the Haitian scenario of chronic instability presents characteristics that enable the country as provider of development and security solutions for crises in fragile States as Haiti.

It was the first time in the civilian academic environment that a research could access important reports of the Ministry of Defense that describe operational activities of troops that are still mobilized. Future studies can analyze the implications of the employment of psychological operations in United Nations peacekeeping missions to gain the locals’ support, or how the civil-military coordination (CIMIC) is conducted in the Brazilian doctrine, as there is little literature on the subject.

Therefore, the Brazilian strategy for international integration has been successful in consolidating the reputation of regional leader and trustworthy partner because of its performance in MINUSTAH. Besides, the mobilization of contingents has contributed to the modernization of the Brazilian Armed Forces, ensuring that their personnel have a real combat experience. Brazil has a history of involvement with UN peacekeeping operations mainly guided by Chapter VI of the Chart. The participation in MINUSTAH marks an evolution of the Brazilian approach in relation to peace missions. Loyal to the tradition of moderate use of force based on the national doctrines of employment, the Brazilian troops demonstrated a high level of impartiality and reluctance to resort to violence in Haiti, what experts as Robert Muggah (2015, p. 14) call “Brazilian way of peacekeeping”.
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