

# Expeditionary force capability: improving the Brazilian military

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## ABSTRACT

This paper intends to bring a strategic perspective about the current military Expeditionary Force (EF) concept under development by the Brazilian Army and its contributions to improving Brazilian military capacity. Brazilian interests, national policies, and strategies are presented as references to the fields of domestic and international relations. An overview of the interaction between foreign and defense policies is shown in relation to the Brazilian interests in support of the concept of force projection. The present definition of EF is explained as it has been studied in the Brazilian Army. In the sequence, diplomatic, military, and economic elements of the Brazilian national power are presented to better understand the strategic context of an EF. The narrative also presents an expeditionary employment option under a United Nations' peacekeeping mission framework to illustrate a likely use of this military capability, as well as some of the author's recommendations to better organize a contemporary EF in Brazil.

**Keywords:** Capability; Brazilian Army; Expeditionary Employment.

## RESUMO

O presente artigo visa trazer perspectiva estratégica sobre o conceito de Força Expedicionária (FE) em desenvolvimento no âmbito do Exército Brasileiro e suas contribuições para melhorar a capacitação das Forças Armadas brasileiras. Interesses, políticas e estratégias nacionais são apresentados como referências para o nível doméstico e das relações internacionais. Uma visão geral da interação entre as políticas externa e de defesa é exposta como forma de apoiar o conceito de projeção de força. A presente definição de FE é explicada como tem sido estudada pelo Exército Brasileiro. Posteriormente, elementos diplomáticos, militares e econômicos do poder nacional são apresentados para que se possa entender melhor o contexto estratégico da FE. A narrativa também apresenta a opção de emprego expedicionário no âmbito da estrutura de operações de paz das Nações Unidas para ilustrar um uso possível desta capacidade militar, bem como algumas das recomendações do autor para melhor organizar a FE contemporânea no Brasil.

**Palavras-chave:** Capacidades; Exército Brasileiro; Emprego Expedicionário.

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## Introduction

On September 2013, the Brazilian Army Commander approved a document issued by the Army General Staff entitled “The Brazilian Army Transformation Concept 2013-2022 (BATC).”<sup>1</sup> The BATC was established as the initial milestone for the current Army transformation process,<sup>2</sup> which began in 2012. In the document, the Brazilian Army presents its strategic concept for the near future, some assumptions and premises, the Army’s vision, and the expected evolution of its land forces. In the topic “Preparation and Employment of Land Forces,”<sup>3</sup> the

Brazilian Army affirms its need to increase its deterrence and power gradually, from a regional dimension in South America to a position on the international stage.

The BATC also affirms that the Army must be prepared to organize and deploy a contemporary Expeditionary Force (EF) to support Brazil’s interests and foreign policy. This EF must be able to conduct full spectrum operations at the brigade level, and is planned to be deployable by 2022.<sup>4</sup> It is said that Brazil’s National Strategy of Defense (NSD) and Military Doctrine of Defense (MDD) will shape the engagement of the Brazilian Army and the armed forces in this EF scenario.

This paper will analyze the context of a contemporary EF, outlined as necessary in the BATC, and its contributions to improving present Brazilian military capacity. This Strategy Research Project (SRP) initially presents Brazilian interests, national policies, and strategies as a framework for the concept and development of a modern EF. Following

this, some perspectives about the interaction among foreign and defense Brazilian policies are presented to demonstrate national interest in support of the concept of force projection. In the sequence, the purpose of an EF and its capabilities are presented as they have been studied within the Brazilian Army. Some diplomatic, military, and economic elements of Brazilian national power are briefly presented to better understand the strategic context. The concept of EF capability, as a way to improve the Brazilian Military, is presented throughout.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, this narrative presents an expeditionary employment option for a peacekeeping mission framework within the United Nations (UN) as a way to illustrate a likely use of this capability, as well as some of the author’s recommendations to better organize a contemporary EF.

Historically, the Brazilian Armed Forces have practiced EF capabilities and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). In 1942, Brazil joined the Allies to fight against Germany during World War II after Axis submarines sunk Brazilian merchant ships in the Atlantic. Later in the war, Brazil organized the First Brazilian Expeditionary Force that fought under the United States Fifth Army in the Italian Theater against the Axis Forces. The concept, building, and employment of an EF during this conflict represented a remarkable national effort that transformed the Brazilian Military into a twentieth-century force in the aspects of doctrine, training, logistics, organization, and leadership. Over time, “the Brazilian Expeditionary Force became a source of national pride.”<sup>6</sup> This historical example constitutes a useful reference because it

<sup>1</sup> *Concepção da Transformação do Exército*, in Portuguese. Author’s note.

<sup>2</sup> *Exército Brasileiro*. (The Brazilian Army). Gabinete do Comandante do Exército. (Commander’s Cabinet) *Concepção da Transformação do Exército*. (The Brazilian Army Transformation Concept). Portaria Nr 1.253, de 05 de Dezembro de 2013. Brazilian Army document EB 64536.027630/2013-99. (Brasília, DF, Brasil: Brazilian Army, December 05, 2013), 34.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 36.

<sup>5</sup> This author intends to bring the topic of a Brazilian EF capability to the level of study and comprehension of senior military leaders at the strategic level. He does not intend to define specific ways to improve the country’s military capacity as a whole. This last subject, *per se*, requires a deeper analysis than a SRP construct permits. It will also require the use of classified information, not allowed in these pages. Author’s note.

<sup>6</sup> Riordan Roett, *The New Brazil* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 32-33.

demonstrates that it is possible to increase the country's military power and project Brazil's influence overseas through the organization of an effective EF.

In 1947, Brazil started to participate in PKO around the world under the recently created UN Organization. The first peacekeeping mission involved sending military observers to the Balkans region. Ten years later, a Brazilian infantry battalion, "The Battalion Suez", was sent to the Middle East's Sinai Desert to join the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and supervise the cessation of hostilities between Egypt and Israel. Since then, Brazil has participated in many peacekeeping missions in support of UN resolutions in distinct parts of the world – Europe, Africa, Asia, and Central America. Since 2004, Brazil has assumed a leadership role in some UN peace operations<sup>7</sup> like MINUSTAH (United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti) and UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon). As a result, PKO serves as an apt reference for the modern implementation of an EF.

## Brazilian Strategic Framework

Ronaldo Lundgreen (2002), a former Brazilian Army General, affirmed that Brazilian national interests are categorized as vital, important, and peripheral.<sup>8</sup> The vital interests are national sovereignty, protection of Brazilian citizens and patrimony, and social and sustained development. The important interests refer to perfecting functional democratic institutions, development of free trade, and consolidation of South America as a zone of peace and security. The peripheral interests are mainly defined as increasing Brazilian participation in global decision-making processes and the

<sup>7</sup> Brazilian Federal Government. Ministry of Defense. Relações Internacionais (International Relations). Missões de Paz (Peace Missions). [www.defesa.gov.br](http://www.defesa.gov.br) (accessed in 14 January 2016).

<sup>8</sup> Ronaldo Lundgreen. *A Brazilian Security Strategy*. Strategic Research Project. (United States Army War College, Carlisle, PA: 2002). Page 3-4.

performance of significant roles in the international arena.<sup>9</sup> It is reasonable to assume that modern and capable military forces with a high level of readiness such an EF are necessary to defend all three categories of Brazilian national interests.

Brazilian culture characteristically references national documents to frame a political, and military situation from the highest level of governance to the most local. First in importance is the *Brazilian Federal Constitution*<sup>10</sup> because it defines the principles for country's International Relations (IR). They are national independence, the prevalence of human rights, self-determination of the peoples, non-intervention, equality among the states, defense of peace, peaceful settlement of conflicts, repudiation of terrorism and racism, cooperation among peoples for the progress of mankind, and granting of political asylum.<sup>11</sup> These principles set the stage for all policies and strategies, including those of the Brazilian Army.

The Brazilian *National Policy of Defense (NPD)*<sup>12</sup> (2012) presents the country's vision of the international system. According to the NPD, the international order must be based on democratic values, multilateralism, cooperation, limitation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and also in the constant search for peace

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil (1988), in Portuguese. Author's note.

<sup>11</sup> Câmara dos Deputados do Congresso Nacional do Brasil (House of Representatives – The Brazilian National Congress), *Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988 (The Brazilian Constitution of 1988)*, Article 4. 35<sup>th</sup> Issue (Brasília, DF: Biblioteca Digital da Câmara dos Deputados – Digital Library, 2012), 11.

<sup>12</sup> The current Brazilian Policy of Defense was approved by the Congress under the Decree Nr 5,484, 30 June 2005, and it was updated in 2012, under a new name: National Policy of Defense. It is basically the same document. The main intention is to connect the concepts of Defense and Development in the process of Brazilian national policy formulation. A unique National Policy with two main branches: development and defense. Author's note.

among nations.<sup>13</sup> Brazilian policies and actions as outlined in the NPD aim for the renovation of international decision bodies, like the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in pursuit of legitimacy, representativeness, and efficacy.<sup>14</sup> Brazil also defends international law and peaceful resolution of disputes.

The NPD clearly defines national defense objectives. These objectives are to defend Brazilian citizens, national goods, resources, and interests abroad; to contribute to regional stability mainly in South America and the South Atlantic; and also to contribute to international peace and security.<sup>15</sup> There is a particular orientation to use military deterrence in conjunction with diplomatic efforts. That orientation asks for the permanent development of modern military capabilities and national mobilization to have troops in a high level of readiness, which are also some of the basic characteristics of an EF. Another clear aspect of Brazil's defense objectives from the NPD is that "Brazil must have the capacity to project military power with the goal to participate in UN missions, [...] and in arrangements of collective defense, by national interests and the basic principles of national foreign policy."<sup>16</sup> An EF clearly constitutes a military means to achieve some of the above Brazilian defense goals.

The Brazilian *National Strategy of Defense (NSD)*,<sup>17</sup> issued in 2008 and updated in 2012, has determined that the Brazilian Armed Forces must be prepared to face growing responsibilities in international military operations to support foreign policy demands. The NSD defines the employment of the Brazilian Armed Forces in preparation for hypothetical wars or conflicts. One of

these hypothetical employments is the joint participation of Armed Forces in international operations in support of foreign policy.<sup>18</sup> The NSD also presented a 'peacekeeping' framework to prepare and employ national military forces, under UN or regional multilateral organizations, according to the national interests since the strengthening of a collective security system is beneficial to world peace and national defense."<sup>19</sup> This idea is understood as a clear indication of a need to improve Brazilian military capacity in order to accomplish Brazilian interests expressed by national policy and diplomacy, as well as those held by wider security communities such as the UN. Dealing with external threats to Brazil, the NSD affirms that it is necessary to organize Brazilian Armed Forces following the concept of "capabilities," not against any possible enemies or specific adversaries.<sup>20</sup> The document constitutes the impetus for the capabilities planning methodology behind the future EF mentioned in the BATC.

The NSD also defines the Brazilian Army's strategic objectives. Objective Five declares that the Army must have the capacity to project power utilizing expeditionary land forces, peace mission troops, or humanitarian assistance to support international agreements or to defend national interests,<sup>21</sup> which helps Brazil's issues projecting multidimensional power. This objective was the initial reference for the current Brazilian Army initiative to plan and organize an EF defined in the BATC.

The Brazilian *White Paper on Defense (WPD)* (2012) aims to disseminate the broad concept of the NSD with medium and long-

<sup>13</sup> Brazilian Federal Government. Ministry of Defense. *Brazilian National Policy of Defense. Política Nacional de Defesa*. (Brasília, DF: 2012) 9-36.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, 29-30.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, 32-33.

<sup>17</sup> Brazilian Federal Government. Ministry of Defense. *Brazilian National Strategy of Defense. Estratégia Nacional de Defesa*. (Brasília, DF: 2012) 37-155.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, 122.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid, 59.

<sup>20</sup> Glauco Corbari Correa, *A Política de Defesa no Brasil no Século XXI*, (Brazil's Defense Policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century), *Coleção Meira Mattos* v.8, n.31, p.29-38, Jan. / Abr. 2014 (Rio de Janeiro, RJ: Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército – The Brazilian Army Command and General Staff, 2014), 33.

<sup>21</sup> Brazilian Federal Government. Ministry of Defense. *Brazilian National Strategy of Defense. Estratégia Nacional de Defesa*, 79.

term perspectives, and it also explains the defense budget in a multi-year planning process.<sup>22</sup> To describe Brazilian strategic posture and context, the WPD affirms that the country's foreign policy considers dialogue and international cooperation as essential ways to overcome obstacles, to conjoin efforts, and to strengthen mutual trust among international states versus military coercion. Brazil emphasizes the good relationship with countries in its near geopolitical environment, including South America, the South Atlantic region, and West African countries.<sup>23</sup> This environment is characterized as the inner region or sphere of potential EF operations to defend vital Brazilian interests.

Brazil has also declared that it looks for a participative and inclusive global community, and has promoted the idea of "cooperative multipolarity" that synthesizes Brazil's perception of a future multipolar structure of power in the world.<sup>24</sup> In this particular strategic context, Brazil's international participation must orient to consolidate new ways of governance that better represent multipolarity; with final goals of peace and security in the world and the well-being of mankind.<sup>25</sup> This cooperative aspect of WPD reinforces the idea that an EF must be designed to support peace and security as defined in *national* interests under *international* constructs like UN.

The Brazilian WPD asserts that national defense combines cooperation and deterrence with a high level of readiness and modern capabilities to face some presumably international crises. Brazil must have a defense capacity according to its economic, political, and strategic stature today and in the future. If Brazil's economy has become bigger today than some years ago, it is

<sup>22</sup> Glauco Corbari Correa. A Política de Defesa no Brasil no Século XXI. Brazil's Defense Policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. 31.

<sup>23</sup> Brazilian Federal Government, Ministry of Defense. *Brazilian White Defense Paper. Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional*. (Brasília, DF, Brasil: Governo Federal, 2012), 16.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, 32-33.

reasonable to assume that its military must become stronger in order to support more comprehensive interests in the world. Then, the country will be respected and relevant in the international arena, be able to preserve national resources and keep its peaceful tradition in the world.<sup>26</sup> Brazil's strenuous effort for relevance in the international arena will require the ability to grow not only economically, but also militarily in a sustained and peaceful way. An example of this military growth is a modern and effective EF.

Both Brazil's policy and strategy promote cooperation in South America. The pursuit of common goals is seen in the recent creation of the "Union of South American Nations (União das Nações Sul-Americanas: UNASUL)"<sup>27</sup> and mainly through its "South American Defense Council."<sup>28</sup> South America looks for a community of security,<sup>29</sup> based on common historical experiences, similar development challenges, and shared democratic values. As a result of this relationship and cooperative approach, Brazil would not intend to employ an EF in the region.

The Brazilian *Military Doctrine of Defense (MDD)* (2007) constitutes an important reference to understand some future military options under the current military doctrine. The Brazilian Armed Forces are employed in war situations and non-war situations.<sup>30</sup> Under this reference, a future EF

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, 33.

<sup>27</sup> União das Nações Sul-Americanas, in Portuguese. Author's note.

<sup>28</sup> Conselho de Defesa Sul-Americano, in Portuguese. Author's note.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid. This concept was presented by Karl W. Deutsch in the end of the 1950's, in his book *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area – International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*. According to him, a community of security would emerge among states in a region when the idea of war as a solution for political disputes was obsolete and unthinkable. Author's note.

<sup>30</sup> Brazilian Federal Government. Ministry of Defense. Policy, Strategy, and International Affairs Branch. *Military Doctrine of Defense. Doutrina Militar de Defesa. MD 51-M-04* (Brasília, DF: 2007), 43.

must be prepared to operate in support of both options, simultaneously or not. The first option can be defined as the employment of military force to defend the State and the homeland, by the use of violence in its fullness. It is licit to affirm, in this particular case, that an EF will be employed to defend Brazilian existential and vital interests. The second option is explained as a limited use of force (violence), i.e. the military power is used in a limited way and under specific circumstances. In this second option, an EF may be utilized in operations under the auspices of international organizations, and in support of the Brazilian Foreign Policy<sup>31</sup> during peacetime or in a crisis.

Glauco Correa (2014) affirms that the [unwritten] Brazil's Grand Strategy aims to keep South American and South Atlantic stability, a multipolar structure of international power, multilateralism, regional integration, and Brazilian sovereignty in the context of global management and a new world order.<sup>32</sup> To reach these goals, Brazil must manage its policy of defense to support cooperation and alliances with power projection and deterrence.<sup>33</sup> Again, a contemporary EF constitutes not only a way but also a useful tool to accomplish a portion of this Grand Strategy in a balanced way.

In the aspect of strategy, General Carlos de Meira Mattos (1913-2007), a World War II veteran and a Brazilian strategist, provided some guidance for an indigenous military strategy.<sup>34</sup> First, it must be preventive, with a defensive attitude. Second, this strategy must factor in Brazil's geopolitics, including three distinct regional branches: the South Atlantic Ocean, the River

de La Plata Region, and the Amazon.<sup>35</sup> Meira Mattos also affirmed that an extra-continental war, with an EF, would have special political aspects, which would be distinct from previous Brazilian regional strategic considerations.<sup>36</sup> Therefore, a contemporary EF would be established as part of a country alliance instead of a regional employment of that military force.

Regarding alliances and coalitions, it is important to note that "all alliances are coalitions, but not all coalitions are alliances."<sup>37</sup> Alliances are a more permanent structure requiring treaties and signatures in accordance with international law to take effect. Coalitions and tacit partnerships imply mutual responsibilities with a more informal linkage. State leaders, politicians, generals, and strategists will choose between "formal or informal ties, depending on governing factors and requirements."<sup>38</sup> Today Brazil participates and is a founding member of several international organizations like the UN, the Organization of American States (OAS), UNASUL, among others. As General Meira Mattos affirmed, a contemporary EF will probably support an existing international body, or function under a new coalition that Brazil's force will join to support national interests.

## Foreign Policy

Since its independence in 1822, Brazil has never developed a significant and relevant defense structure. The Brazilian Armed Forces, besides their victorious lead in the existential War of the Triple Alliance (1865-1870) against Paraguay and during WWII, were historically conditioned to participate in the domestic agenda of politics, national integration, and development rather than a military force as an international coercion

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Glauco Corbari Correa. *A Política de Defesa no Brasil no Século XXI. Brazil's Defense Policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.* 36.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Carlos de Meira Mattos. *Estratégias Militares Dominantes. Sugestões para uma Estratégia Militar Brasileira (Military Strategies. Suggestions for a Brazilian Military Strategy).* (Coleção General Benício Volume 239, Publicação 550 (Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1986), 89.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> John M. Collins. *Military Strategy. Principles, Practices, and Historical Perspectives.* (Washington, DC: Brassey's Inc., 2002), 240.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

tool. João Alsina, Jr. (2009) argued that there is a preponderance of diplomacy over the armed forces in Brazil as a result of a conciliatory national identity in conjunction with a persistent global power polarity arrangement.<sup>39</sup> This combination does not allow Brazil, a regional power, to project its multidimensional power beyond the region.<sup>40</sup> About this issue, João Alsina, Jr. asked the relevant question: “what are the instruments that Brazilian military power has to support contemporary national foreign policy?”<sup>41</sup> The organization of an EF is an initial answer to this question. It is not a complete response, but a step forward regarding force projection.

Military power constitutes one of the pillars of a state influence, to coerce others in the international system. Military power cannot be ignored as a viable option for a state in an anarchical international order. Brazilian diplomacy is conciliatory, and the country’s foreign policy interest is to maintain regional stability in South America. Moreover, in the absence of perceptible external threats to territorial sovereignty, Brazil did not historically apply significant investment to develop its Armed Forces. However, this conciliatory emphasis cannot exclude coercive military options which reliable military power provides.<sup>42</sup> In this particular approach and as affirmed above, the capacity to plan, organize, and deploy a

modern EF in the region fits well with the concept of Brazil as a South American stabilizer because it improves force projection capability, which is an indirect way of deterrence in the region.

In addition to a more explicit use of military power, this author understands that the Brazilian defense and national foreign policy must also be more declarative than currently because it is not possible to foresee all outcomes in the international arena. In the global sense, Brazil must be prepared to use military power as a tool to defend its interests because military power is a necessary component of international power status as shown through that of the United States, Russia, China, India, the United Kingdom, and France. Having a relevant and capable force projection capability through an EF will raise the Brazilian Armed Forces’ global relevance among other international powers.

Regarding the Brazilian Armed Forces participation in the national decision-making process, the Brazilian Army is considered a relevant political actor domestically and internationally.<sup>43</sup> It is also important to say that the Brazilian Armed Forces are “a highly professional military establishment which has constantly updated its strategic thinking in both normative and tactical terms.”<sup>44</sup> The recent Brazilian Army’s decision to plan and organize a joint EF using the concept of military capabilities and following the state’s NSD orientation is an “aim point” to direct the institution’s present and future goals. It can be considered a natural affirmation of leadership in this area of expertise and reveals the planned future of a permanent national institution under a transformational process. As a result, use of a modern EF combines Brazil’s ability and political relevance with a compatible military power.

<sup>39</sup> João Paulo Soares Alsina Jr. O Poder Militar Como Instrumento da Política Externa Brasileira Contemporânea (Military Power as a Brazil’s Contemporary Foreign Policy Tool). *Revista Brasileira Política Internacional (The Brazilian Magazine of International Politics)*. Volume 52, n. 2 (Brasília, DF: December 2009). 182. Available from <[http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci\\_arttext&pid=S0034-73292009000200010&lng=en&nrm=iso](http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-73292009000200010&lng=en&nrm=iso)> (accessed on 17 Jan 2016).

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid, 173.

<sup>42</sup> Augusto W. M. Teixeira Júnior & Fábio R. F. Nobre. *Política Externa e Poder Militar no Brasil: Universos Paralelos. (Foreign Policy and Military Power in Brazil: Parallel Universes)*. *Revista Política Hoje (Politics Today Magazine)*, 241-250 (Recife, PE, Brazil: 2009). 245  
<http://www.revista.ufpe.br/politicohoje/index.php/politica/article/viewFile/43/33>. (accessed in 17 Jan 2016)

<sup>43</sup> Ibid, 246.

<sup>44</sup> Kai Michael Kenkel, “Brazil,” in *Providing Peacekeepers. The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions*, ed. Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013), 344.

On the international stage, the Brazilian author and professor Oliveiros Ferreira (2015) affirms that one future and possible scenario for the utilization of a Brazilian EF is in Syria, under a UN PKO.<sup>45</sup> Based on Brazil's past participation in peace missions in other conflicts, and the current restriction of Brazilian military power to inside the country, Brazil has enough soft power to contribute to peace in the Middle East.<sup>46</sup> Oliveiros Ferreira also affirms that country's involvement in Syria constitutes a dangerous move for Brazilian diplomatic, military, and national interests because Brazil could be asked to perform a subordinate mission to the Western Powers, known as a "Sipahi" mission.<sup>47</sup> Sipahi, according to Oliveiros Ferreira, is a term that comes from the colonial era in India and refers to an international state that looks for prestige in the international arena, instead of developing actual military and economic instruments of (inter)national power. Oliveiros Ferreira concludes that Brazil must first increase its military power internally in order to preserve its prestige and then transform it to real power,<sup>48</sup> i.e. the indigenous capacity to intervene according to Brazil's initiative and interests. This author understands that this transformation can be completed through a modern EF.

It is significant to note that genuine power is necessary to promote the national interest.<sup>49</sup> "The path to security and survival for the international actor is to develop its military resources through growth and to form

alliances to balance the power of others."<sup>50</sup> Celso Amorim (2014), a former Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, affirms that "the counterparty of an independent foreign policy is a robust defense policy."<sup>51</sup> This statement is important to reinforce that the indigenous development of force projection capabilities constitutes one of the necessary steps forward in order to expand the Brazilian military power.

## A Contemporary Expeditionary Force

The initial reference for a modern Brazilian EF was presented in the current issue of NSD. In 2012, the Brazilian Army developed a force design study named "Project of Military Force."<sup>52</sup> The study was focused to define what the Brazilian Army would be as an Armed Force in accordance with the projected country's international posture and the world situation in 2030. Among other important conclusions, the document asserts that Brazilian soldiers must be qualified and trained to participate in military missions abroad.<sup>53</sup> Force design study also affirms that it is necessary to increase the Army's capabilities of readiness, logistics, and mobilization expertise to face modern conflicts. This strategic premise<sup>54</sup> supports the Brazilian foreign policy.

The document "Project of Military Force" also defines new capabilities the Brazilian Army should reach in order to accomplish its constitutional mandate to

<sup>45</sup> Oliveiros Ferreira. "Do Prestígio ao Poder" ("The Long Way from Prestige to Power"), *O Estado de São Paulo*, Brasil, December 23, 2015. <http://opinio.estado.com.br/noticias/geral.do-prestigio-ao-poder--um-arduo-caminho, 10000005556> (accessed in 20 Jan 2016).

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Sebastião Roberto de Oliveira. *The Brazilian Armed Forces 2030: Exporting Security and Influence*. Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, April 1, 2015), 7.

<sup>50</sup> Sebastião Roberto de Oliveira. *The Brazilian Armed Forces 2030: Exporting Security and Influence*, 7. Apud Joseph S. Nye, Jr. *The Future of Power* (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2011), 28.

<sup>51</sup> Celso Amorim, "The International Order and the Defense Policy", public speech, Brazilian Army Staff College, Rio de Janeiro, RJ, February 24, 2014.

<sup>52</sup> Projeto de Força do Exército Brasileiro, in Portuguese. Author's note.

<sup>53</sup> Exército Brasileiro (The Brazilian Army), *Projeto de Força do Exército Brasileiro. PROFORÇA. (Brazilian Army's Force Design Study)*, (Brasília, DF: 2012), 11.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid, 15.



defend the country. One of these capabilities<sup>55</sup> is to project effective military power with a modern EF. Conceptually, that force must be able to deter and respond to a regional crisis and to support International Peace globally, mainly under the UN construct. Based on that force design study, General Enzo Martins Peri, then the Brazilian Army Commander, issued the previously explained BATC, which was the formal and initial order to conceive, develop plans, and organize an EF, among other initiatives.

The concept of Force Projection is presented in the Brazilian Army Field Manual EB 20 – MF – 10.102 – “Military Doctrine of Land Forces.” Force projection equates to the capability to utilize military power in a determined place, with opportunity, to conduct a military operation to defend national interests, as well as the capability to sustain this power for a reasonable period. Additionally, this force will be joint and multinational, under a combined structure and a specific operational commanding officer.<sup>56</sup> One of the Brazilian Army’s management challenges today is to bring this expeditionary doctrinal concept to fruition.

The Brazilian WPD recommends the initial use of the *Naval Infantry Corp*<sup>57</sup> as a capable and EF. The Naval Infantry Corp can be used in international peace operations or humanitarian assistance.<sup>58</sup> In this situation, it is reasonable and logical to assume that the Brazilian Army and the Brazilian Navy will work together with the Brazilian Air Force to develop a joint concept for an indigenous EF. The current Brazilian line of operation used in the MINUSTAH is a useful and reliable reference to this joint concept.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid, 21.

<sup>56</sup> Exército Brasileiro (Brazilian Army), Estado-Maior do Exército (The Brazilian Army General Staff), EB 20 – MC – 10.102 – Doutrina Militar Terrestre (Land Forces Doctrine), (Brasília, DF: 2014), 7-3.

<sup>57</sup> Corpo de Fuzileiros Navais (CFN) da Marinha do Brasil, in Portuguese. Author’s note.

<sup>58</sup> Brazilian Government. The Ministry of Defense. *Brazilian White Defense Paper. Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional*. (Brasília, DF, Brasil: Governo Federal, 2012), 95.

The main Brazilian Army doctrine references to an EF appear in recent documents issued in 2014 with strong references to the previous national policies and strategies. The doctrine illustrates the above joint measures, noting that “beside operational commands, EF or peace forces may be defined as joint or singular structures to conduct military operations outside national territory. They can integrate a military allied structure or be under an international body or organization.”<sup>59</sup>

The Brazilian Army Command – in coordination with the Ministry of Defense – will define the required capabilities and particularities to be considered in the planning, organization, and employment of an EF, in accordance with the region and the mission strategic context.<sup>60</sup> Ministry of Defense states that an EF will require a precise mission, particular troops, equipment, and a specific intent such as a UN mission or a declaration of war. Under a coalition of nations, Brazilian Army doctrine affirms that an EF will be required to be under a multinational joint-combined command. It will be necessary to have interoperability in command and control; techniques, tactics, and procedures; doctrine; communication systems; information; electronic warfare; and logistics. Training and exercises<sup>61</sup> must be conducted with possible allied forces.

In September 2015, the Brazilian Army Land Forces Command (BALFC)<sup>62</sup> conducted an international seminar to debate

<sup>59</sup> Exército Brasileiro (The Brazilian Army), Estado-Maior do Exército (The Brazilian Army General Staff), EB 20 – MF – 10.103 – Operações (Operations), (Brasília, DF: 2014), 4-24.

<sup>60</sup> Exército Brasileiro (The Brazilian Army), Estado-Maior do Exército (The Brazilian Army General Staff), EB 20 – MC – 10.202 – A Força Terrestre (Land Forces Component) (Brasília, DF: 2014), 6-2.

<sup>61</sup> Exército Brasileiro (The Brazilian Army), Estado-Maior do Exército (The Brazilian Army General Staff), EB 20 – MF – 10.102 – A Doutrina Militar Terrestre (Land Forces Doctrine), (Brasília, DF: 2014), 3-3.

<sup>62</sup> Comando de Operações Terrestres do Exército Brasileiro (COTER), in Portuguese. Author’s note.

the concept of a contemporary EF.<sup>63</sup> In the event, the BALFC led operational level discussions about other countries' similar experiences with military experts from France, Russia, Spain, the United States, and the United Kingdom.<sup>64</sup> Some of the Brazilian Army prospective world scenarios indicated a tendency of the current friction areas in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia to persist and be transformed into large conflicts that threaten world peace and security.<sup>65</sup> These conflicts can generate an international intervention throughout UN that can request Brazil's participation in the decision-making process and project military power through an EF for a specific region other than Brazil's regional sphere of influence. It is assumed that this scenario is relatively possible and most likely since South America has reached regional stability. A possible UN PKO deployment constitutes one of the main reasons to cultivate a high readiness EF in Brazil.

One assumption used by the Brazilian Army in the recent seminar was to follow an international military trend to prepare and deploy a joint EF with a *modular type structure*. The main objective of this force is to conduct military operations in the broad spectrum outside national territory. There is no intention to transform the Brazilian Army into an expeditionary army as whole. In this context, the Brazilian Army foresees one regular infantry battalion as the initial step to be reached shortly. The brigade level expeditionary force is aimed to form by 2022.

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<sup>63</sup> Exército Brasileiro, (The Brazilian Army), Comando de Operações Terrestres (The Brazilian Army Land Forces Command), [http://www.eb.mil.br/en/avisos?p\\_p\\_id=56&p\\_p\\_lifecycle=0&p\\_p\\_state=maximized&p\\_p\\_mode=view&p\\_p\\_col\\_id=column-1&p\\_p\\_col\\_count=1&\\_56\\_groupId=10138&\\_56\\_articleId=6722754](http://www.eb.mil.br/en/avisos?p_p_id=56&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_state=maximized&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id=column-1&p_p_col_count=1&_56_groupId=10138&_56_articleId=6722754). (Accessed in 18 Jan 2016).

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Exército Brasileiro, (The Brazilian Army), Centro de Estudos Estratégicos do Exército (CEEEx) (Center for Strategic Studies), Cenários para Emprego de Força Expedicionária (Scenarios for the Employment of an Expeditionary Force), Lecture at "Seminário sobre Força Expedicionária – COTER", (Brasília, DF: 2015).

The present concept of an EF is based on a standard infantry brigade structure and will be prepared under a *capabilities-based planning* construct. Regarding capabilities, the Brazilian Army General Staff defined this planning as "the process to select military forces based in the evaluation of the real necessities to defend the country; and setting the capabilities that will be necessary to fulfill these requisites, considering the regular Defense Budget."<sup>66</sup> In this context, capability means "a required force ability to accomplish a task or mission."<sup>67</sup> Present military capabilities<sup>68</sup> defined for an EF are strategic readiness, military superiority, support to the Brazilian Federal Government, command and control, logistic sustainment, interoperability, protection, information superiority, and cyber operations. The BALFC also reaffirmed that the Brazilian Army will participate in joint force projection operations through a land force component.<sup>69</sup> The land force structure will have an operational command, and a land forces component organized in combat, support, and sustainment units. These units must be modular and interoperable.

## Instruments of National Power

The interrelationship of Brazilian diplomatic, military, and economic elements of national power is an important approach to understanding the complex environment of an EF that will deploy to attend the Brazilian national interest abroad. According to João Alsina, Jr. (2009), there is an inadequate level of articulation between the national policy of

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<sup>66</sup> Exército Brasileiro (The Brazilian Army), Estado-Maior do Exército (The Brazilian Army General Staff) Centro de Doutrina do Exército (The Brazilian Army Doctrine Center). *Nota de Coordenação Doutrinária: Planejamento Baseado em Capacidades (Doctrine Note on Capabilities-based Planning)*. (Brasília, DF: 15 July 2014), 1-12.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Exército Brasileiro (The Brazilian Army), Estado-Maior do Exército (The Brazilian Army General Staff), EB 20 – MC – 10.102 – Doutrina Militar Terrestre (Land Forces Doctrine), (Brasília, DF: 2014), 7-4.

defense and the foreign policy in Brazil.<sup>70</sup> There is also a low level of priority to defense on the domestic agenda and a non-declared orientation to not feed discussions about foreign policy, defense, and respective budgets.<sup>71</sup> João Alsina, Jr. also believes that defense and foreign policy must be more harmonious<sup>72</sup> to allow Brazil to emerge on the international stage in a more assertive way.

In the military element, the capacity to project power through the employment of an EF has many positive effects. Besides a natural regional deterrence, it brings new military capabilities and helps to develop doctrine, training, leadership, logistics, and organization of the Brazilian Armed Forces. This positive outcome was observed in Brazilian military history, not only after the country's participation in WWII but also in some other UN PKO that Brazil took part in modern times. Regarding readiness, it is important to note that Brazil does not intend to have an EF permanently deployed abroad. A robust and well-developed capacity to perform a temporary expeditionary mission can be the real focus of organizing this type of military structure, and this ability will increase global perceptions of Brazilian military power. Moreover, because Brazil participates in the UN and some other important international bodies, the employment of an EF under the UN flag is one of the most likely and reasonable scenarios to enact a modern Brazilian EF. A UN mission will constitute an opportunity for Brazil to demonstrate power and influence in the world arena.

In the economic aspect of national power, it is reasonable to affirm that the organization of an EF is not a huge and difficult financial question for Brazil. Since it has been defined as a priority to the Armed forces at the high-decision political level, a

<sup>70</sup> João Paulo Soares Alsina Jr. *O Poder Militar Como Instrumento da Política Externa Brasileira Contemporânea (Military Power as Brazil's Contemporary Foreign Policy Tool)*, 185.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

specific account has been set in the National Treasury in order to provide funds for that specific federal government program. The Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces will be able to manage it, in coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Treasury.

Furthermore, the development of force projection through an EF among other military capabilities can be a beneficial commercial opportunity for the Brazilian defense industrial base. The Ministry of Defense is sufficiently able to define and develop this concept through its subordinate "Secretariat for Defense Products" in order to have aspects of research and development firmly connected to the national industrial production and integrated to the Armed Forces logistics.

As a partial conclusion, Brazil has a strong and reliable diplomacy and growing world-class economy. However, its military instrument of national power is mainly internally focused and needs to develop a greater capability to contribute to a more balanced national strategy on the international stage. The development of a capability to project military power through an EF is a strong step forward to multidimensional power projection.

## UN Missions

Brazil has a long tradition in UN PKO and they are well suited for a Brazilian EF. As noted earlier, it is assumed that Brazil will keep its traditions of foreign conduct and continue to seek ways to contribute to peacekeeping missions. It is expected that Brazil will "increase the debates around these missions without abandoning its repudiation of the use of force and including a focus on development issues and civilian capacities."<sup>73</sup> However, the model of a contemporary EF can be applied in this context because some

<sup>73</sup> Kai Michael Kenkel, "Brazil," in *Providing Peacekeepers. The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions*, 336.

possible UN peace missions scenarios in the Middle East or North Africa<sup>74</sup> will require a robust military force in order to maintain peace and bring regional stability.

The main motivations for Brazil's participation in peace operations will be under political, normative, and institutional categories. Financial and security concerns will play a negligible role.<sup>75</sup> Today, the Brazilian Armed Forces "have approached peacekeeping from the standpoint of maximizing institutional gains."<sup>76</sup> Peace operations under the UN flag are a chance for a long-term deployment in a theater, which provides training and combat experience in most cases. These operations also constitute opportunities for new employments after Cold-War era internal counter-insurgency missions.<sup>77</sup> However, peacekeeping missions are not conventional combat operations, and there is a limit to gain military experience in this environment. Despite this understanding of a Brazilian EF in the UN framework, this author perceives that a future EF must be prepared to deploy for full spectrum operations, not only a peace mission approach.

Today, the Brazilian approach to peacekeeping, as an emerging power, has become more instrumental and has run counter to dominant powers' interpretations of the goals and scope of peace operations.<sup>78</sup> Nevertheless, Kay M. Kenkel (2013) affirms that Brazil will *probably* focus on development-heavy peacebuilding missions where the very robust use of force is not necessary and where the country can take a leading role.<sup>79</sup> Kay M. Kenkel (2013) also affirms that Brazil "will likely participate

only in those missions which do not openly align with established 'Western Powers' agendas."<sup>80</sup> As an international actor with experience at the nexus of security and development,<sup>81</sup> Brazil has emphasized this nexus as a primary factor of success for a UN peace mission. The use of a Brazilian EF would reinforce the security side of this relation.

## Peace Missions

Brazil has developed the concept of "responsibility while protect"<sup>82</sup> that applies to a military force under the UN flag. The *responsibility while protect* means not to create more regional instability than that which the force is trying to diminish or cease.<sup>83</sup> Four pillars sustain Brazil's position in UN peacekeeping missions: security, institutional strength, national reconciliation, and development.<sup>84</sup> These elements require balance not only in the Brazilian continuing agenda at the UN – sustained development and clean energy – but also within Brazilian diplomatic and military actions in the field.

Generally speaking, there are two current possible options for Brazil to participate in a UN peace mission. The first is a 'robust and multidimensional' PKO, under Chapter 6 of the UN Charter. The second is a "Peace Enforcement" multi-dimensional operation, under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. The Brazilian PKO in Angola and Mozambique during the 1990's, East Timor in 2000, and current deployments in Haiti and Lebanon constitute examples of UN missions that contributed to the Brazilian national interest. In Africa, the essential interest was to provide security in Brazil's inner circle and today, in Haiti and Lebanon, the principal interest is not only to provide security but also to project Brazilian influence in the

<sup>74</sup> This author does not intend to study some possible scenarios for peace operations in this paper. His intention is only to bring this subject to analysis in the near future. Author's note.

<sup>75</sup> Kai Michael Kenkel, "Brazil," in *Providing Peacekeepers. The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions*, 336.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid, 345.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid, 353.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> Brazilian Federal Government, Ministry of Defense. *The Brazilian White Defense Paper*, 36.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

international arena. All these cases are reasonable examples of the employment of a joint Brazilian military force abroad to support national and diplomatic interests. These examples set conditions and a historical framework that can support the development of a contemporary EF to be used to defend national interest via the UN or directly, if necessary.

The Brazilian Army uses the concept of ‘Pacification Operations’ in its doctrine. According to the Brazilian Army Field Manual EB 20 – MF – 10.103 – Operations,<sup>85</sup> *pacification (or peace) operations* are primarily associated with the Chapter 6 of the UN Charter. Some specific UN missions can run under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter in order to allow the execution of a UN mission in a particular conflict and environment where a national state (or absence of a formal state) is incapable of providing security, maintaining public order, and unable to set the conditions for a sustainable peace process. In the second case, a more robust military force will be required, and this situation constitutes the chance to employ an EF.

*Pacification Operations* constitute military joint and interagency operations (multinational, if they run in a coalition or under the UN construct) with the utilization of military power to defend national interests in some specific and well-defined environment.<sup>86</sup> In accordance with characteristic Brazilian conciliatory strategy, these operations will use limited coercive attitudes to keep or restore public order and social peace in the host country during an imminent threat to institutional stability, or in a natural or man-made catastrophe. These attitudes can be combined with pro-active actions to consolidate the peace process, and to reconstruct that particular country or region. The Brazilian Army’s doctrine also affirms that offensive, defensive, stabilization,

and governmental support are some types of military missions that can be conducted within peace operations.<sup>87</sup> The critical factors of success are legitimacy – provided by the UN mandate – and credibility – provided by effectiveness and the well-management of the stakeholder’s (UN, international community, Brazilian people, and host country) expectations.<sup>88</sup> In this meaning, the employment of an EF will contribute to bringing peace to the host country.

## UN Capability and Readiness

Recently created, the UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) forms a reference in preparation of the countries’ contributions to UN peace forces. It can be used to shape some required capabilities of a contemporary EF. The PCRS “aims to establish a more predictable and dynamic process of interaction between the UN Headquarters (UNHQ) and the Member States for ensuring readiness and timely deployment of quality peacekeeping capabilities.”<sup>89</sup>

The PCRS also points to improve efficiency, readiness, and predictability between UNHQ and the Member States, and to provide a single window for the selection of a Troop/Police Contributor Country (TCC) for deployment – which would be Brazil, in a hypothetical UN PKO mission. The PCRS methodology defines clear criteria and four levels of force readiness, from one (low) to four (high). Level four means ‘Rapid Deployment Level’ (RDL) with forces deployed within 30/60/90 days of the request made by the UNHQ. The *four level concept* is a useful way to connect the current UN operative procedure to the incoming strategy of a Brazilian EF because this author assumes that the future force will be defined and

<sup>85</sup> Brazilian Army (The Brazilian Army), Estado-Maior do Exército (The Brazilian Army General Staff), Field Manual EB 20 – MF – 10.103 – Operations. (Brasília, DF: Exército Brasileiro, 2014), 4.19-20.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

<sup>89</sup> United Nations (UN), “United Nations Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) overview.” <https://cc.unlb.org/UNASAS%20Documents/PCRS%20Overview%20Aug%202015.pdf> (accessed Feb 19, 2016)

prepared to deploy in similar terms and under similar military capabilities. Based on this UN framework, this author believes that an EF is a useful and wise way to establish a stronger and modernized military capacity in Brazil, to better project military power, and to increase Brazil's influence in the world.

Additionally, strategic leadership constitutes a remarkable aspect when addressing UN missions.<sup>90</sup> Regarding relevant competencies for a strategic leader in charge of a multidimensional PKO, the Brazilian Army General Wilson Lauria's (2009) SRP constitutes a useful reference.<sup>91</sup> General Lauria analyzes the concept of meta-competencies proposed by Leonard Wong. The following meta-competencies were considered significant for leader development and assessment. They are identity, mental agility, cross-cultural savvy, interpersonal maturity, world-class warrior, and professional astuteness.<sup>92</sup> The future commander of a Brazilian EF has to have these competencies well developed in order to be effective and successful in a UN Peace mission.

## General Recommendations

It is cardinal to create a permanent working group between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to study the organization of an EF outlined in the BATC. The BALFC can be the leader organization to coordinate the military aspects of the doctrine, organization, training, and equipping of the EF. It is also essential to create a special account in the Brazilian Federal Budget, under the Ministry of Defense rubric, to provide specific funds to organize an EF. Equally important is to intensify language training – mainly in English and Spanish – for

<sup>90</sup> This is an important USAWC contribution to the development of this author's personal critical thinking. Author's note.

<sup>91</sup> Wilson Mendes Lauria. *Strategic Leadership Competencies for Peacekeeping Operations*. Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2009), 2-3.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

junior and senior officers, and also non-commissioned officers in all Brazilian Armed Forces in order to develop the fundamental skills of safe and reliable communication in a joint and multinational environment.

It is suggested to conduct the training of a future EF using all distinct environments provided by the Brazilian territory. The goal is not only to train the aspects of joint full-spectrum military operations per se, but also to train the Ministry of Defense structure in the aspects of strategic movement, deployment, and transportation. It is strongly advised to organize the EF in one region of the country and move it then to another distant region to perform an operational training mission. Brazil's large physical dimensions will work as a useful space to train some basic command, control, and logistical competencies for a reliable EF.

In a different level of the same training framework, this author indicates integrating joint EF knowledge with experiences from MINUSTAH, UNIFIL, and from some other countries – France, Spain, per example – with expertise in these expeditionary operations. The BALFC, as affirmed before, can lead this task due its familiarity with land forces missions. The “Brazilian Joint Center for Peace Missions”<sup>93</sup> constitutes another important defense organization that can bring expertise in this area.

It is important to increase cooperation between the Brazilian Armed Forces and some other specific partner countries in the military areas of command and control; tactics, techniques, and procedures; doctrine; information operations; electronic warfare; and logistics. The goal is to have a modular EF able to be deployed in a multinational environment without any operational gap and or lack of military performance. In the context of a multinational force under a coalition, it is significant to develop the concept of interoperability. The future Brazilian EF has to be able to receive other international troops

<sup>93</sup> Centro Conjunto de Operações de Paz do Brasil (CCOPAB) in Portuguese. Author's note.

under its operational command, and the force may be required to deploy as a future division land forces command. In addition to a multinational force deployment, it is suggested to consider international scenarios that will request military counterterrorism capabilities in the structure of the EF.

The Brazilian Armed Forces, mainly the Army, must improve the capacity to train and equip future ‘full-spectrum expeditionary brigades’ in a more comprehensive manner than the current way to prepare and deploy the Brazilian Military Contingent in Haiti, which is mainly focused on peace missions. At last, but not least, this author recommends that the Brazilian Army speed up the organization of the EF and look for a 2020 term goal versus one in 2022. This recommendation intends to bring focus and unity of effort to this challenging strategic enterprise.

## Conclusion

The current NSD defines that the Brazilian Armed Forces must be prepared to face growing responsibilities in international operations to support national interests. A strong political will is necessary to bring that document statement to reality. An EF constitutes a safe and solid step for making the NSD effective.

A contemporary EF, outlined as necessary in the BATC, can contribute to improving Brazilian military capacity because it will bring new capabilities such as readiness, effective interoperability, and force projection to the Armed Forces, mainly the Army, in the near future. Furthermore, an effective EF capability will allow Brazil to present maturity in the international arena.

Brazil needs to “be prepared to expand its influence globally by applying all instruments of national power.”<sup>94</sup> In regards to military power, a contemporary EF will develop a set of military capabilities that can be used to defend the country’s national

<sup>94</sup> Sebastião Roberto de Oliveira. *The Brazilian Armed Forces 2030: Exporting Security and Influence*. 7.

interests or to support Brazilian diplomatic objectives. Developing a contemporary EF constitutes a secure step to increase Brazilian military capacity in a well-ordered way and without interference in South American political regional stability.

The capacity of projecting military power through an EF constitutes a real competitive advantage for Brazil in the world. This new military capability must reach a level of proficiency comparable to other developed countries like the United Kingdom, Spain, and France in order to allow Brazil to have a more balanced national power and gain a more active voice in the world. The EF is a military avenue for the support of the Brazilian interest of selective engagement<sup>95</sup> – an option for country’s strategic adjustment<sup>96</sup> – through active participation in the contemporary international system.

A real and confirmed ability to project military force, such as under the UN flag, can also help the Brazilian aspiration to have a permanent seat on the UNSC that has been a continued national interest of Brazil. In this particular case and some similar situations related to the country’s international relations, it is expected that Brazilian Defense and Foreign Policies should become deeply harmonized to face the twenty-first century's challenges in the international arena, particularly in the organization of an EF. If an effective Brazilian EF was organized in the past (WWII), it is reasonable to say that it can be well organized in the present or the near future.

In the use of an EF under the UN flag, Professor Oliveiros Ferreira’s previous statement is a remarkable point to define that Brazil cannot be a global “Sipahi” state to current international powers. From the informational angle, the Brazilian people need to understand that there is a large difference

<sup>95</sup> Ibid. 23.

<sup>96</sup> Sebastião Roberto de Oliveira. *The Brazilian Armed Forces 2030: Exporting Security and Influence*, 23, Apud Robert J. Art, “Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement,” *International Security* 23, no.3 (Winter 1998-99), 79.

between international prestige and having real decision-making power in the world. Force projection through an EF can contribute to close this gap and is a stable step to building a strong military capacity that is a real foundation for international power.

In conclusion and in a motivational manner, this author foresees an eminent future for the Brazilian Armed Forces. The organization of an EF and the capacity to project military power where and when necessary constitute important missions that can be effectively performed by the current military in order to deliver a better Army<sup>97</sup> – and Armed Forces – to the next generation of Brazilian sailors, soldiers, and airmen.

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<sup>97</sup> Valério Luiz Lange, “An Integrated Work Team. The Brazilian Army and the Defense Industry Complex”, in *Brazilian Defence Policies – Current Trends and Regional Implications*, ed. Joám Evans Pim (London, UK: Dunkling Books, September 2009), 174.





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