Decision-making and complexity in the interagency environment: a theoretical–conceptual survey

Toma de decisiones y complejidad en el entorno interagencial: un estudio teórico-conceptual

Abstract: The central focus of this article is the complexity of the decision-making process in the interagency environment. To this end, via a theoretical-conceptual discussion, the variables that increase the complexity of interagency decision-making will be presented. In the interagency context, the decision-making environment tends to be fluid and singular, with each interaction occurring in a unique way and without pre-established parameters. This particular approach to decision-making, in the presence of multiple actors, introduces additional complexity to the process, whose success depends on reaching an agreement on the group's objective and, thus, minimizing the impact of limited rationality.

Keywords: Decision-making Process, Decision Theory, Complexity, Interagency Environment.

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Resumen: El debate central de este artículo trata de la complejidad del proceso de toma de decisiones en el entorno interagencial. Para ello, a través del debate teórico-conceptual, se presentarán las variables que hacen el entorno decisorio interagencial más complejo. En el contexto interagencial, el entorno decisorio tiende a ser fluido y singular, donde cada interacción ocurre de manera única, sin parámetros preestablecidos. Esta manera particular de toma de decisiones, en presencia de múltiples actores, aporta una complejidad aún mayor a este proceso, cuyo éxito depende de un consenso sobre el objetivo a lograr por el grupo, minimizando el efecto de la racionalidad limitada.

Palabras clave: Proceso Decisorio, Teoría de la Decisión, Complejidad, Entorno Interagencial.

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1 INTRODUCTION

In Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, the main character faces the dilemma of choosing which path to follow. One of the story's most iconic dialogues occurs between Alice and the Cheshire Cat:

> "Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?"
> "That depends a good deal on where you want to get to," said the Cat
> "I don't much care where—" said Alice.
> "Then it doesn't much matter which way you go," said the Cat (Carroll, 2010).

This passage illustrates that there is not a single path, but multiple ones, each determined solely by the chooser. Such plurality of possibilities, along with the complexity inherent in them, makes decision-making more difficult, exerting greater pressure on the decision-maker who seeks "certainty." These certainties do not exist. The decision-making process involves human variables because it is social, value-laden, and interactive. Thus, it is necessary to recognize that access to purely rational methods is limited. Nevertheless, human beings tend to perceive themselves as logical, and therefore considering non-rational ways of deciding often encounters a difficult barrier to overcome. Sigmund Freud (1996), discussing instances of the human psyche (Id, Ego, and Superego), argues that the Ego, when connected to emotions of the Id, transforms them into a socially acceptable form with the regulation of emotions by reason (the pleasure principle). Alves (2016), while acknowledging that passions are not inherently harmful to human beings, emphasizes they become a significant challenge if left uncontrolled. He further argues that passions can only be managed with reason, by means of analysis and reflection.

This pursuit of rationality in decision-making has led to several theories that employ mathematical models to justify and predict the probability of different events and how individuals are likely to act under uncertain conditions. These models even address potential consequences of human actions, establishing axioms designed to provide criteria to evaluate and predict behavior, particularly in uncertain contexts. Etner, Jeleva, and Tallon (2009) compile a body of literature on decision-making theories that examine how ambiguity influences human choices.

Notably, this collection of studies on decision-making generates an intense debate about human behavior, which cannot be objectively observed (Etner; Jeleva; Tallon, 2009). This gap in knowledge creates space for advanced experimental research and theoretical modeling (Etner, Jeleva, & Tallon, 2009). However, no matter how comprehensive these studies may be, it is evident they cannot eliminate the subjective element of individuals—an aspect that strongly influences the decision-making process. What Etner, Jeleva, and Tallon (2009) observe is that the authors of these models—such as Ellsberg (1961), Ghirardato and Marinacci (2000), and Schmeidler (1989)—acknowledge possible courses of action that individuals might take when facing risk. But these remain only presumed behaviors, not certainties, which are so often sought.

This derivation of mathematical logic as an attempt to explain the logic of human thought was already present in the discourse of René Descartes and Plato, and it continues to influence Western thought to this day. Both agree with the idea that only reason can provide true knowledge, in contrast to the senses, whose data are considered unreliable.

Descartes offers a vigorous defense of reason, criticizing the role of emotions and asserting that reason is the means by which reality can be dissected into its essential parts, thereby freeing human beings from falsehood. Reason would thus liberate the intellect obscured by emotions and the senses (Lehrer, 2010). Since emotions do not originate in the intellect, they do not produce clear and distinct ideas and are regarded in Cartesian thought as confused forms of thinking. Within Cartesianism lies the pursuit of an exact method for attaining indubitable truth, with an emphasis on the deductive method and intuition as means to reach such truth and, ultimately, knowledge. Passions, in themselves, are not inherently negative, but they must be managed so as not to become harmful. This control of passions occurs with reason, by means of analysis and reflection (Alves, 2016).

Plato, in the myth of the charioteer presented in the dialogue *Phaedrus* (Plato, 2016), uses the metaphor of the mind as a chariot drawn by two horses, symbolizing the division between reason and emotion (Rodrigues, 2013). The underlying idea is that the mind operates in two separate spheres, with the charioteer responsible for balancing the horses as he drives the chariot: one horse represents passions, being impulsive and governed by desire, while the other symbolizes reason, truth, and light. The charioteer, representing the human being, is capable of dealing with these two antagonistic forces that are in constant conflict (Lehrer, 2010; Rodrigues, 2013). Hence, the role of reason is to control emotions and direct them toward a life of harmony. For Plato, human beings become enslaved by feelings and ruled by impulses, acting foolishly, when allowing the horse representing emotion to run freely (Lehrer, 2010; Rodrigues, 2013).

Lehrer (2010) highlights that this conception of human nature has a practical consequence: the attempt to "erase" feelings and emotions from the decision-making process. However, as Damásio (1996) argues, this claim is based on a false ideal and rests on a crucial error, since studies observing the brain have concluded that without emotion there can be no reason.

Feelings allow human beings to assimilate information that cannot be directly comprehended—what we often call intuitive knowledge. It is necessary to seek the balance of Plato's charioteer, adjusting both emotions and rational thought to assess the situation. Thus, constructing the choice of a solution to a given problem involves analyzing viable alternatives and anticipating future effects, while also considering the emotions elicited by each option. It must also be recognized that consequences occur at a particular moment and within a specific context, and that any change in circumstances may alter these consequences and affect the outcomes of the chosen alternatives (Skagerlund *et al*., 2021; Tversky; Kahneman, 1981).

This last point becomes even more relevant when considering situations involving multiple actors, such as the case to be analyzed throughout this study. In interagency decision-making environments, decisions tend to exhibit fluid characteristics, without predefined parameters, in which each interaction unfolds in a unique way (Hura *et al*., 2000). Such singularity

adds an additional layer of complexity to the decision-making process, surpassing that of decisions made by isolated and unilateral actors.

Cooperation among different agencies is an increasingly employed strategy in public administration to reduce government spending, as many agencies have complementary competencies and often compete for resources (Raza, 2012). Therefore, it is necessary to recognize that each agency has a particular expertise—a strength that makes it better equipped to conduct a mission effectively.

Being a complex situation, involving multiple actors with diverse cultures and ways of operating, joint action in the interagency model presents significant challenges. However, these challenges tend to be mitigated by a shared commitment to pursue a common benefit with the organization of activities according to the demands and capacities of the agencies involved. This process involves a high degree of variables that directly or indirectly influence the success or failure of interagency cooperation. Based on the theoretical-conceptual framework, this study aims to present variables involved in cooperation among different actors, seeking to establish a link between the complexity of the context and its influence on the decision-making process. To support the argument developed here, the theoretical discussion will begin by addressing the limitations of rationality in decision-making. Subsequently, specificities of the interagency environment will be presented, along with elements that contribute to the increased complexity of this context.

2 DECISION-MAKING AND THE MULTIPLICITY OF CHOICES

Some authors who study the decision-making process, such as Bazerman (2004) and Simon (1972), divide it into decision phases. However, regardless of the number of phases—six or eight, depending on the author—there seems to be a consensus that the core of the decision-making process lies in the set of activities that generate courses of action leading to the optimal decision, namely: searching for existing solutions; selecting decision criteria; evaluating the consequences of alternatives based on the previously chosen criteria; and the choice itself, which is then ratified and accepted. It should be noted this process occurs simultaneously and results from a continuous deepening of the analysis of alternatives, focusing more on eliminating those that are completely inappropriate than on establishing all possible courses of action (Mintzberg; Raisinghani; Théorêt, 1976).

The decision-making process is thus structured based on the idea that behind the behavior of the decision-maker lies a rationality that entails consistent, objective, and logical choices. It is assumed that by clearly defining a problem with specific goals—regardless of its complexity—a solid choice can be made, selecting the alternative that will maximize the achievement of the intended objective (Mintzberg; Raisinghani; Théorêt, 1976).

However, Herbert Simon (1987, 1997), Dan Ariely (2008), Max Bazerman (2004), and Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1981) agree that this form of rationality, as traditionally formulated, is a fallacy since it assumes a perfection that does not exist. There is an optimistic view that believes in humans' innate capacity to process information, which ignores Ariely's (2008) observation that we are less rational than we assume. Conversely,

this does not imply that these irrational behaviors lack meaning for the individuals who exhibit them; on the contrary, they appear to be systematic and predictable according to Simon (1987, 1997).

Bazerman's (2004) proposal, therefore, is to conceive rationality as a process aimed at achieving an optimal outcome by assessing factors and the individual's ability to assign probabilities to potential results, thereby reducing the uncertainties involved in the process—what the author refers to as "risk preferences" (Bazerman, 2004). Conversely, Dean and Sharfman (1993) argue that rationality is characterized by the pursuit of information that provides alternatives which, once analyzed, will influence the final decision.

However, Simon (1972) and Ariely (2008) question the assumption that an individual is capable of analyzing all available data on a given subject. This becomes even more challenging in complex situations, in which multiple factors influence the perception of the scenario. Herbert Simon (1972) developed the theory of bounded rationality, which states that humans have limitations in searching for and analyzing data, understanding the intentions of actors involved in the decision-making process, and predicting all possible consequences. Simon (1972) also incorporates the role of uncertainty in decision quality. Uncertainties refer to information that individuals should possess but do not, which interferes with the ability to anticipate the occurrence of a future event and its consequences.

In addition to the impossibility of fully analyzing all potential consequences, the quality and quantity of available information are factors that affect the rationality of the decision-making process. Herbert Simon (1997) also emphasizes the importance of understanding the human factor, as individuals bring their values, personality, and worldviews into their institutional reality.

Among the inherent human characteristics that affect the decision-making process is intuition. Simon (1987) defines it as an unconscious processing of information. It does not rely on logical reasoning or a conscious learning process, but is often a reflection of the moment when emotions and memory connect, producing a new perspective on reality.

Intuition allows the decision-maker to form mental interconnections that guide the search, acceptance, rejection, and analysis of data. These connections occur unconsciously and not necessarily logically, producing a holistic view of the facts. Since information does not need to be processed analytically, decisions can be made more quickly. Simon (1987), Kahneman (2003), and Barnard (1971) recognized the value of intuition in the decision-making process, understanding that it is not a supernatural occurrence. During decision-making, in which intuition is prominent, a mental extrapolation of accumulated and relevant prior experience—or fragments of that experience—occurs, transferring insights from past situations to the present.

Although it may appear irrational, as it contradicts commonly known and shared logic and involves an unconscious process of forming connections from new information, intuition exhibits a holistic and interdependent character. Knowledge is generated via unconscious associations or the mental rearrangement of previously collected data, enabling the possibility of better decisions (Simon, 1987).

What is relevant, however, is that all decisions reflect, to some extent, people's feelings. Rational logic is relevant, but the emotional and intuitive system cannot be disconnected. It should also be noted that each individual perceives the decision-making process differently. Chauí (1999) argues that perception is always an experience imbued with meaning, with its particular sense connected to the individual's life history, forming part of their experiences and worldview. Thus, perception involves the entire personality of the individual, their desires and passions, carrying both evaluative and affective qualities. According to Penna (1982), to perceive is to know situations and objects through the senses, based on the principle that, to be perceived, the object or situation must be proximate in time and space, and the individual must have direct or immediate access to it.

Both perception and limitations of intelligence—here defined as an individual's intellectual characteristics, such as the ability to think, interpret, and understand—along with each person's capacity to process information, affect their ability to determine the optimal solution. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) argue that a problem can be approached in countless ways, all of which are influenced by norms, personal traits, and the decision-maker's habits. Thus, the chosen alternative is the one that seems to be the most acceptable or reasonable; that seemingly offers the greatest utility; that presents a result framed as a gain rather than a loss; and that best satisfies the individual's performance needs, even at the expense of the optimal solution (Bazerman, 2004; Dean; Sharfman, 1996; Tversky; Kahneman, 1974; Tversky; Kahneman, 1981).

Thus, rationality in decision-making is always an intention, but it is constrained by limits and restrictions imposed by an individual's capacity to process data and access knowledge and memory. According to Simon (1997), this explains why the decision-making process always takes place within an environment of bounded rationality.

3 VARIABLES IN THE INTERAGENCY COOPERATION ENVIRONMENT AND THEIR IMPACT ON BUILDING SUCCESSFUL ACTION

The literature highlights that factors such as organizational culture, trust, leadership, communication networks, and material, financial, and personnel resources are crucial in building a genuine and robust relationship between agencies. These complex variables strongly influence the development of a beneficial relationship among agencies involved in the process (Bardach, 1998, 2001; Beatrice, 1991; Hura *et al.*, 2000; Marcella, 2008).

One of the main challenges for interagency cooperation is the need to establish a harmonious relationship between organizational cultures that have different procedures, personnel training methods, tactics, techniques, policies, resources, and organizational structures, even if these are often complementary.

Other culture-related factors that also affect the development of a more complementary relationship include aversion to uncertainty and preference for risk (Ariely, 2008; Bazerman, 2004; Dobelli, 2013). These factors become more prominent as actors, who deal with them in different ways, need to work together, making the potential for disagreement and differing

expectations regarding the course of action likely to influence the strategy for addressing the situation at hand.

The differences between doctrines and concepts related to the use of force and operational methods are also an important variable that must be addressed to reduce existing frictions and misunderstandings. The absence of doctrines and regulations follows the same pattern. However, it should be noted that efforts to mitigate such contrasts are far from trivial.

Regarding interagency cooperation, the dilemma of integrating different organizational cultures arises when the focus shifts to building trust among agencies. Trust is understood with the concepts of interdependence and risk, meaning it is necessary to recognize that, without the assistance of others, the proposed goals cannot be achieved, even if there is an initial feeling of vulnerability (Bradach; Eccles,1989). This is a key point, because without the belief that members of the other organization will carry out actions previously planned and assigned to their agency according to their competence, the relationship between agencies is at risk.

The point of concern becomes the extent to which each agency is willing to trust its strategies, systems, and equipment to others. Any impediment or limitation results in barriers to information sharing, a crucial element for the success of a joint operation aimed at promoting integrated security.

For trust to be built in a solid and reciprocal manner, leadership is essential, as it legitimizes participants and reinforces the idea that efforts of each agency are interconnected. Even when different strategies are employed, the goal remains a common agreement. The role of each agency in achieving the shared objective must be recognized, considering the specificities and legal competencies of each organization, without neglecting the individual objectives of each agency (Bardach, 1998; Bouzo, 2017; Cerávolo, 2014).

Marcella (2008) argues that when agencies share equal decision-making power and responsibility, they tend to work more effectively. This is achieved by means of trust fostered by strong leadership, which, among other things, promotes the creation of a communication network based on objective and reliable information sharing (Cerávolo, 2014).

The absence of a central agency overseeing interagency operations, or of an established regulations covering procedures that span multiple agencies, results in a lack of standardized practices in both routine and crisis situations, affecting the consistent commitment to information sharing. Additionally, each agency appears to have its own structure in every region it operates, making each cooperative effort unique and developed from scratch. The lack of standard procedures hinders the progress of interagency cooperation due to the absence of an institutional memory that could streamline the process (Hura *et al.*, 2000).

Another factor that increases the complexity of interagency cooperation is that financial, material, and personnel resources are often scarce and contested among agencies. This is exacerbated by the fact that, most of the time, agencies are engaged in activities beyond the ongoing cooperative effort and therefore need to rationalize the best way to allocate their resources (Beatrice, 1991).

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Thus, all these characteristics of interagency cooperation influence its development in a particular way, as the outcome will depend on different combinations of the conditions presented. These relationships exhibit multiple causality, which, depending on how the factors interact, may produce different effects. Furthermore, they enable various ways to achieve the same result, with no single path. Following its own logic, cooperation proves to be highly challenging, and its complexity is stimulating for those who seek to understand this approach to integrated security, which has already shown itself to be an irreversible path.

4 COMPLEX SITUATIONS INVOLVED IN INTERAGENCY COOPERATION AND THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

In complex decision-making situations, the role of passions becomes even more significant, as perception is altered by the individual's emotional state when faced with a given fact. When emotions are misaligned, the individual directs their attention and focus to a specific point that is often transient, thereby deviating from the primary objective. However, when emotions operate positively, they drive the individual toward the goal, functioning as a force that helps restrict and guide their focus (Simon, 1997).

Ariely (2008, p. 81, our translation) argues that "emotions can blur the boundary between right and wrong" and that, although we may believe experience allows us to predict how we would act, emotion can affect our behavior regardless of prior knowledge and practice. This has a direct impact on interactions with others during the decision-making process in interagency cooperation, since action often unfolds under moments of intense emotional tension, making it impossible to anticipate the reaction or behavior of individuals from other agencies in such situations.

Complexity also lies in the fact that objective reality is shaped by conditions imposed by social norms, meaning that events are interpreted according to what is expected rather than what they actually are. Added to this perspective is the fact that the subject's desire determines which features will be more readily perceived, thus influencing the decision-making process. As a result, what is most easily recognized is not always what is most relevant for better decision-making, which directly impacts the rationality of the process (Kahneman, 2003). This point can be observed in a cooperative setting when each agency focuses on addressing issues that are most salient and add greater value to its own capabilities. However, the action an agency seeks to pursue is not always the most suitable from the collective effort perspective. Due to perceptual bias, other aspects that may affect the success of the operation—because they fall within the scope of other agencies—often go unnoticed.

Simon (1997) further argues that, since the consequences of actions lie in the future, humans can only develop a superficial understanding of what may occur, to which they then attach values. Thus, choice is always directed toward a point of satisfaction rather than an optimal point. One chooses the best possible option among the possibilities available at that given moment (Ariely, 2008).

Simon (1997) and Ariely (2008) emphasize that decisions are influenced by the individual's expectations regarding the outcome. The anticipation of what one expects to

obtain as a result of an action generates a sense of pleasure and gratification. The more vivid this recollection is for the individual, the greater its impact will be on future situations. The same is also true for memories of negative consequences or the possibility of loss, as they tend to reduce the likelihood of making a decision that involves risks. When the proposed consequences of the outcome is presented in a positive manner—that is, when the description style is affirmative and conveys a sense of "certainty" rather than a high probability of occurrence—there is a tendency toward adopting a more risk-prone attitude (Ariely, 2008; Dobelli, 2013; Kahnemman, 2003, Kahnemman and Tversky, 1972). Regarding interagency cooperation, this point should be considered when an agency makes a proposal, as the likelihood of its suggestion being accepted increases if the proposition is understood as generating greater benefits than losses.

At this point, it is necessary to consider the complexity of decision-making rationality when the focus shifts to the group, as in the case of interagency cooperation. The first aspect to be understood is how the individual's goal relates to the group's objectives (Simon, 1997). The individual must recognize that their objective depends on the course of action of other participants, which are complementary. Thus, their choice is no longer independent; it must align with the criteria and pathways chosen by the surrounding context. Further, the alternatives presented by the group does not always fall within the individual's focus, nor are they fully aligned with the option that would best suit the individual's preferences. Since perception is particular and biased, the individual is not always able to grasp the whole. Thus, their choice may be determined by their belief about how the others will act, and they may refrain from choosing what truly satisfies them in an attempt to adjust to what they expect the group will decide. Hence, Simon (1997, p. 114) states that:

> Since his own decision, to be rational, must be related to his expectations rather than his wishes, he must aim not at that alternative among all those possible for the group which he prefers, but at that alternative among all those possible for him which he prefers.

The group issue thus emerges as an additional factor in the irrationality of the decision-making process regarding interagency cooperation, particularly when debating the best way to reach a minimum common denominator. Expecting another agency to act in accordance with one's own needs—or, more precisely, in the way one would like it to act—is a common mistake that interferes both with the expected outcome and with the prospects of reaching an agreement. It is a utopia. The ideal is to identify what each agency considers relevant, the points on which it will not compromise, and the common values and objectives that can be jointly achieved. Thus, each agency will understand its role and what is expected of it, enabling it to fulfill its function. In this context, rationality lies in equalizing the notion of "optimal" and in determining which alternatives can realistically meet this collective demand.

However, when discussing groups, there is a particular feature of the decision-making process that further complicates it, referred to by Bazerman (2004) as the "curse of knowledge." This refers to the individual's inability to recognize that another person's knowledge about a subject is neither of the same type nor at the same level as their own. As a result, communication often becomes ambiguous, since it is assumed that the other's understanding is similar and

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therefore does not require further clarification. However, the other agency may not have the same amount of information nor the expertise to handle it as presumed, which hinders communication from taking place smoothly.

The issue of different understandings must be considered in light of how much an individual or group benefits from a given way of interpreting the situation at hand. Since each agency tends to view events from its own perspective, often being unable to see the same "fact" from a different point of view, it becomes essential to understand how attachment to one's own ideas—and the consequent difficulty in discarding them—affects the process. This understanding is fundamental when attempting to negotiate joint commitments to reach a common path.

Another point, referred to by Dobelli (2013), Bazerman (2004), and Ariely (2008) as the confirmation bias, affects the way one interprets the statements of others and has direct effects on decision-making. Confirmation bias is individuals' tendency to interpret new facts and reality with a lens that validates their worldview and patterns of thought. The capacity for self-criticism is diminished, as information contradicting one's own line of reasoning is dismissed, while the interpretation of events highlights only aspects that reinforce one's convictions and worldview. According to Lehrer (2010), this happens because perception of reality is distorted in a way that accentuates only elements that align with one's expectations regarding the topic.

Another phenomenon that undermines the notion of an unlimited mental capacity for decision-making is what Bazerman (2004), Ariely (2008), and Dobelli (2013) describe as anchoring: decision-making based on available facts in the environment, which serve as reference points from which choices are made. According to Lehrer (2010), this happens because the brain requires a reference or a known pattern that enables the filtering of overwhelming amount of data it is biologically unable to process. The first action or thought that becomes an "anchor" is formed arbitrarily, beyond the subject's control, and its influence can be perceived in both individual and group decisions, functioning as a parameter against which available options are evaluated.

Regarding interagency cooperation, the role of anchoring during the negotiation of actions is essential, as it shapes how each agency positions itself in relation to the statements and conduct of the other institution. The thought functioning as an anchor becomes the guiding thread for subsequent actions and attitudes when, for instance, the partner agency does not demonstrate reliable behavior. In such cases, information exchanges tend to be more filtered, preventing genuine transfer of data that would otherwise be crucial for more effective decision-making about how to proceed with the mission.

As Simon (1997) emphasizes, individuals carry their own conceptions of the world, which they integrate into their institutional reality, creating vocabularies and behavioral norms that influence their decision-making processes. Consequently, the perception constructed about one's interlocutor directly affects the way individuals position themselves when engaging in strategic dialogues. This is related both to institutional trust and to the role of leadership.

5 CONCLUSION

The decision-making process in interagency cooperation implies the acceptance of an agreement on the objective to be achieved by the group. If such agreement does not occur,

the rationality of the process becomes even more limited, as decision-makers will be unable to reach a consensus on which information is necessary to achieve the goal. Without this agreement, it is not possible to conduct a reliable analysis to guide agents' actions, nor is it possible to appeal to moral values to reach an understanding. Philosophers such as Descartes conceived morality as detached from emotion, whereby doing the right thing would be a consequence of logical reasoning. However, moral decisions, or "doing the right thing," require empathy—that is, considering the perspective of others—which necessarily involves emotions. In an interagency cooperation setting, this means considering the standpoint of the partner agency, acknowledging its goals, something only possible via a truthful flow of information.

It should be highlighted that recognizing decision-making as not being entirely logical and rational does not negate the existence of rationality within the process. Rational analyses are indispensable, as they provide the means to apprehend reality, and it is with the understanding of risks and uncertainties that available options can be properly evaluated. The integration of intuitive and rational resources is the central point of the decision-making process, enabling the coexistence of opposing elements that, when combined, offer a differentiated perspective on the reality being faced.

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