

BRAZIL'S PROJECTION OF POWER AS A PEACEKEEPING FORCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS (UN) IN AFRICA

A PROJEÇÃO DO PODER DO BRASIL COMO FORÇA DE PAZ DAS NAÇÕES UNIDAS (ONU) NA ÁFRICA

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ABSTRACT

The main objective of this article is prompting discussion about the effects of the current Brazilian foreign policy of Brazil's participation in the international scenario by sending troops to join the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force in Africa. The central question of the study is to identify, discuss and validate the existence of intrinsic aspects of Africa, which should be considered in the decision making process for the use of Brazilian troops in peacekeeping operations on the continent. For this purpose, bibliographic research on the foreign policy of Brazil, the Brazilian participation as a UN peacekeeping force, and UN peacekeeping missions in Rwanda, Mozambique, Angola, South Sudan and Haiti were performed. A field survey with armed forces personnel was carried out as well. The survey involved former members of recent and / or ongoing peacekeeping missions in order to identify and validate the most important aspects for planning military operations on the African continent in the context of UN peacekeeping operations, and yet the experiences and lessons learned in Haiti with the United Nations Stabilization Mission In Haiti (UNSTAMIH). From the performed study, it was noted that Africa has intrinsic aspects in the cultural and infrastructural fields, which, in addition to policies of management operations implemented by the UN, strongly impact the planning and risk analysis for possible employment of Brazilian troops on that continent, particularly in actions of "protection of civilians". In conclusion, some key points are highlighted as a problem of tribal culture of the society, the training of national armies on the continent, poor infrastructure and conduction policy of UN missions. Some thoughts on the Brazilian Army as a foreign policy tool and its most significant entry in Africa through the UN Peacekeeping Forces are also featured here.

Keywords: Regional Security Complex. Africa. Foreign Policy. Brazilian Army. Peacekeeping Operations.

RESUMO

O principal objetivo deste artigo é suscitar a discussão sobre os reflexos da atual política externa brasileira no cenário internacional através do envio de tropas para integrar as forças de paz da Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU) atuantes no continente africano. A questão central do trabalho é identificar, discutir e validar a existência de aspectos intrínsecos à África, que deverão ser considerados no processo decisório para o emprego de tropas brasileiras em operações de paz neste continente. Para tanto, foi realizada uma pesquisa bibliográfica referente à política externa do Brasil; às participações brasileiras como força de paz da ONU; e às missões de paz da ONU realizadas em Ruanda, Moçambique, Angola, Sudão do Sul e Haiti. Foi realizada, também, uma pesquisa de campo junto aos militares das Forças Armadas (FA), ex-integrantes de missões de paz recentes e/ou em curso, a fim de identificar e validar os aspectos para o planejamento julgados mais importantes para a condução de operações militares no continente africano, no contexto de operações de paz da ONU, e ainda as experiências e ensinamentos obtidos no Haiti com a Missão das Nações Unidas de Estabilização no Haiti (MINUSTAH). Do estudo realizado, pôde-se constatar que a África possui aspectos intrínsecos nos campos cultural e de infraestrutura, os quais, somados a características políticas de gestão das operações implementadas pela ONU, impactam fortemente os planejamentos e a análise de risco para o possível emprego de tropas brasileiras neste continente, particularmente em ações de "proteção de civis". Na conclusão, são destacados como pontos-chave do problema a cultura tribal da sociedade, a formação dos exércitos nacionais no continente, a precariedade da infraestrutura e a política de condução das missões da ONU. São também apresentados alguns pensamentos sobre o Exército Brasileiro como instrumento de política externa e sua entrada mais expressiva na África através das Forças de Paz da ONU.

Palavras-chave: Complexo Regional de Segurança. África. Política Externa. Exército Brasileiro. Operações de Paz.

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I INTRODUCTION

Participation in UN peacekeeping operations for a long time has been seen as an important and effective tool for power projection in the international scenario. Thus, since the second half of the 20th century, Brazil has been using this tool aiming at power and influence projection in regions of interest seeking to achieve of its political objectives.

As a UN founding member, Brazil has been pursuing the achievement of the chief purpose of this organization which, as stated in article I of the United Nations Charter, is to maintain international peace and security. To this end, all United Nations member countries are required to assist the UN in any action taken (article 2, paragraph 5 of the UN Charter).

According to Fontoura (1999), since the thirties Brazil has been taking part in peacekeeping operations, and since 1957 on behalf of the UN, by joining the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) deployed in the Sinai desert and in the Gaza strip. Since then, Brazil has already been present in 33 peacekeeping operations (WIKIPEDIA, 2015).

As a result of this historical involvement, added to the excellent relations between the diplomatic segment and the Armed Forces, Lannes (1998) underlines the professional quality of Brazilian military personnel and the effective of the use of military power as a foreign policy tool:

This relationship has significantly contributed to the high level of management of the activities of the military personnel deployed. Every time an opportunity came up, our troops, **especially the Brazilian Army**, evidenced their high level of technical-professional qualification, with performance recognized internationally, making the best of a valuable military experience that has become a factor of utmost importance that has been a critical factor to the increase of their motivation and professionalism indexes. All this, in a scenario that ratifies the effective use of **military expression as a Brazilian foreign policy tool** (LANNES, 1998, p. 15, text highlights by the author).

As a result of this experience and professionalism in peacekeeping operations, Brazil leads, with significant success, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which has been used to build support to Brazilian foreign policy aiming at a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and which, according to Rebelo (2004, p. 147), is a long lived aspiration of the Brazilian Government.

Nonetheless, after almost ten years since the MINUSTAH was first activated, with the number of Brazilian troops doubled at the time of the Haiti

earthquake, the Brazilian Army started to reduce the number of troops involved in the mission, going back to the contingent deployed before the earthquake, while at the same time starting to consider strategies for withdrawal and completing the mission in Haiti.

On the other hand, success in Haiti and the willingness of the Brazilian foreign policy to cooperate with the UN have been prompting the United Nations to consult the Brazilian Government about the possibility to have Brazilian troops joining recent peace keeping operations, such as those in South Sudan, Lebanon and Mali.

In this scenario, through official documents like the Defense White Book (LBD) and the National Defense Strategy (END), Brazilian foreign policy has evidenced to be interested in increasing Brazilian participation in the United Nations peacekeeping missions, and this presents to the Ministry of Defense, and more specifically the Armed Forces, especially the Brazilian Army, the inferred task of carrying out now the preliminary studies, in order to be prepared to indicate the peacekeeping mission best suited to the participation of Brazilian troops.

Considering that nowadays half of the ongoing peacekeeping missions around the globe are underway in the African continent (UNITED NATIONS, 2015), it can be reasonably said that there is a significant chance that, within a relative short period of time, Brazil may find itself involved in the deployment of troops for peacekeeping operations in Africa.

This is the core focus of the issues discussed in this article intended to bring to the table the most relevant aspects to be considered in the course of the studies that, ultimately, will lead Brazilian troops to fight for peace in the African continent. In view of this scenario, are the experience and the lessons learned in Haiti fully applicable? Are there other components of the problem that are intrinsic aspects of the African continent? Will the risks be similar to those faced in Haiti? Will the aspects that led to success in Haiti be found in this new mission?

The purpose of this article is to prompt discussion about these issues, which will certainly be brought to Brazilian society as the Brazilian State looks for a more aggressive insertion into the international environment through the UN peacekeeping operations.

To this end, the literature focusing on the Brazilian foreign policy, the current UN policy and the peacekeeping missions with Brazilian participation in Haiti and Africa were researched. Case studies were also carried out about the UN peacekeeping missions in the African continent in addition to the field survey conducted with former participants of peace keeping missions.

The study was limited to the identification of the most relevant aspects that must be taken into consideration for Brazilian Army operations in Africa, and offers in the conclusion some of the ideas that should be included in the operations planning agenda.

2 DEVELOPMENT

2.1 Methodology

The methodology adopted for this work is based on qualitative research: (a) literature, based on research and analysis of the official publications of the Brazilian government, official UN publications, reports on peacekeeping missions, books, papers, websites, among other; and (b) field survey, where questionnaires presented to current members of the Armed Forces and former participants of peacekeeping missions, in order to assess and analyze the views of these military on the issues involved in the use of Brazilian troops in the African environment, and also its correlations to the their deployment in Haiti.

As a result of the documentary research, the United Nations mission in Rwanda (1993), Mozambique (1993), Angola (1996) and South Sudan (2011) were selected for a brief cases study, focusing on the search for ideas to be used as inputs to the issues targeted by the work.

The Delphi method was used for the field survey, with two rounds of questionnaires sent to the selected officers, with the second round of questionnaires sent just to the officers selected as specialists, thus enabling the consolidated identification of the most important aspects with an impact on the task of planning for the use of Brazilian troops in the African continent, as well as validation of the lessons learned from the deployment of troops in Haiti.

Thus, questionnaires were sent to 90 officers and were all answered. For the second round 50 officers were selected as specialists, who were sent a specific questionnaire and this also resulted in 100% of questionnaires answered. The questionnaires were submitted to officers who took part in peacekeeping missions, especially in Africa and Haiti.

The technique used for data assessment was a mixed questionnaire with closed questions, in order to enable respondents to select a single answer, stating the level of significance assigned to each one of the approached aspects. This questionnaire also included open-ended questions allowing selection of more than one answer. At the end of the questionnaire a field provided to enable us to make the most of the professional experience of the surveyed universe.

2.2 Survey results

2.2.1 Brazilian policy for peacekeeping operations

Along history, Brazil has been favorable to participation in peace operations. Currently, in its official documents, Brazil has been making clear that it is determined to increase Brazilian participation in the

United Nations peacekeeping operations. This stand is closely linked to Brazil's wish to obtain a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). According to this rationale, during the seminar on Brazil's Foreign Policy for the 21st century, sponsored by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Commission (CREDN), in 2002, at the time of the discussion on the issue of Brazil and the United Nations International security system, this subject was approached by the Representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE), Minister Luiz Augusto de Araújo Castro, who said:

Insertion of the country into the international system is critical to the Brazilian foreign policy. I refer to the United Nations System, the South American System - created by the closing of the last century - and other organizations [...] along the years, Brazil's participation in multilateral agencies has been a **critical vector of our foreign policy**, independent from changes in the administration, ideology or political orientation (CASTRO, 2003, p. 141-142, text highlights by the author).

[...] in the specific case of the United Nations Security Council, Brazil was one of the first countries to propose an increase in the number of its permanent and non permanent members, both for the developed and the developing countries. Our Country has been pointing at its willingness and keen interest in becoming one of the new permanent members of the Security Council [...] Brazil understands that it has the required conditions and is **willing to assume the responsibilities** of a permanent member of the Security Council. While this does not happen, Brazil has been taking an active part in the endeavors of the United Nations and the Security Council [...] Brazil has been taking part in the United Nations peacekeeping operations since it was first established and, more recently, has been assigning priority to operations in Portuguese speaking countries. We were present, with large contingents, in Angola, in Mozambique, and recently in East Timor. [...] I am convinced that in the near future we must find the budget and financial resources that will allow an increased participation by Brazil in the United Nations Peacekeeping operations (CASTRO, 2003, p. 147, text highlights by the author).

It can be easily evidenced that, in practice, the Brazilian foreign policy and rationale provided the necessary support to the process of furthering the participation of Brazilian troops in the United Nations peacekeeping operations. This political aspiration was fulfilled in 2004, when Brazil was placed in command of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), rising then to the position of leading player in the international security system.

The leadership of the MINUSTAH, added to mission success along almost ten years, gave Brazil significant visibility in the environment of the United Nations, and the Brazilian has been trying to maintain this position. To this end, Decree 6.703 was issued in

December of 2008, whereby approval was granted to National Defense Strategy and clear targets were set for the country, with respect to the peacekeeping operations.

Promote further training and participation of the Armed Forces in peacekeeping operations, joining the UN Peace Corp or region multilateral organisms I. **Brazil must increase participation in peacekeeping operations**, whether sponsored by the UN or by region multilateral organisms, in line with national interests expressed in international commitments (BRASIL, 2008, p. 62, text highlights by the author).

On the other hand, by issuing the National defense White Book in 2012, the Brazilian central government evidenced that the possibility of reducing the size of the MINUSTAH was already envisaged when the theme "Brazil's participation in peacekeeping missions" was approached, underlining that:

A excellent example of the Brazilian participation in peacekeeping missions is the presence of the Brazilian forces in Haiti, since 2004, in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, generally known as the MINUSTAH [...] Coordinating with the UN and the USAN/UNASUL countries that are part of the Mission, **Brazil is planning for a gradual withdrawal of its troops** as the Haitian government starts to show be willing to and capable of ensuring the security of that country (BRASIL, 2012, p. 162, text highlights by the author).

Hence, we can see that the Brazilian government has now reached a turning point, as while envisaging a gradual decrease in the number of service men deployed in Haiti - the most important Brazilian peacekeeping mission - it intends to increase participation of Brazilian troops in the UN peacekeeping missions and remain as a leading player in the UN environment. This political decision will certainly generate significant reflexes to the Armed Forces, and especially, to the Brazilian Army as, ultimately, it will be responsible for acting as an instrument of the Brazilian foreign policy in foreign lands.

It is, therefore, pertinent and appropriate to prompt discussion around the theme: what challenges lie ahead in peacekeeping missions where Brazilian troops will be involved? What relevant aspects should be taken into consideration by military planners in order to minimize risks to Brazilian soldiers?

2.2.2 The United Nations in Africa

The introduction to the African scenario described in 2005 by Major General Lélío Gonçalves Rodrigues da Silva, former Force Commander of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), can be said to be still really up-to-date, when he wrote:

With the end of the Cold War, apparently, the universal peace ideal was much closer, and the

world would then be able to experience a new era of stability and progress. Unfortunately, these hopes did not come true, and an alarming sequence of regional and multinational conflicts ensued, arising out of racial, ethnical, political, economic or tribal conflicts. **In the specific case of the so called Sub-Saharan Africa, problems always came up from tribal issues**, with their origin dating from the European colonization, when actual mosaics of native tribes speaking different languages, with different origins and customs were broken apart or gathered inside artificial borders arbitrated by the colonizing powers. In some cases tribes were split by these borders, separating their members and their families in different colonies. In other instances, tribes that, for centuries, had been fighting each other were brought together in the same colony. Eventually, when these colonies became countries, the internal problems could be foreseen, once the century old antagonism between tribes is a permanent source of conflict for them (SILVA, 2005, p. 3, text highlights by the author).

Likewise, Ambassador Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães describes refers to the formation of the peripheral African states as follows:

The first large area South of the Sahara was artificially fragmented into numerous States [...] Even because of their strategic significance, such States were victimized by prolonged and destructive **tribal and civil wars** encouraged by the hegemonic powers (GUIMARÃES, 2007, p. 23, text highlights by the author).

It is in this complex environment that the United Nations has been undertaking peacekeeping missions intended to prevent, or at least, keep the regional conflicts under control, as well as to deal with the emergency humanitarian situation. Notwithstanding, the UN has been successful in all instances, considering that it was unable to stop the terrible crises seen in the first half of the nineties, involving Somalia, the genocide in Rwanda and in the former Yugoslavia.

These crises resulted in two radical changes in the way armed conflicts were prevented and managed, particularly in the African continent. The first one was the United Nations decision to mandate inclusion as a focal point of its resolutions on the peacekeeping operations, the priority to be assigned to actions aimed at the protection of civilians, as can be evidenced in the joint study published by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs:

Over the last two decades, the world has witnessed armed conflicts marked by systematic violence and mass atrocities against civilians, and has increasingly looked to the United Nation, and in particular to UN peacekeeping operations, to prevent and halt such crimes. **The failures of missions to provide security in complex crises such as Somalia, and to protect civilians from mass atrocities in Rwanda**

and Bosnia, tested the fundamental principles and capabilities of UN peacekeeping operation and demonstrated **that reform was urgently required**. [...] As a part of this evolution, ten UN peacekeeping operations have been explicitly mandated to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence [...] The link between the protection of civilians and peacekeeping mandates is central. First, the **safety and security of civilians is critical** to the legitimacy and credibility of peacekeeping missions. Second, the protection of civilians is critical component for a sustainable political peace (HOLT; TAYLOR; KELLY, 2010, p. 2, text highlights by the author).

This decision to prioritize the actions aimed at protection of civilians impacted all the United Nations agencies and, consequently, the operations carried out by the military component of the peacekeeping missions. This can be evidenced in a document issued in 2011 by the Policy Study and Development branch of the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which includes a statement from the President of the United Nations UN Security Council:

The Security Council reaffirms its commitment regarding the protection of civilians in armed conflict, to the continuing and full implementation, in a mutually-reinforcing manner of all previous relevant resolution [...] in particular that resolution 1894 (2009) marked a significant step in providing guidance to ensure the effective protection of civilians on the ground. [...] The Council stress the importance of ensuring engagement by senior mission leadership on the protection of civilians, with a view to ensuring that all mission component and all levels of the chain of command are properly informed of and involved in the mission's protection mandate and their relevant responsibilities. [...] The Council emphasizes the importance of improving pre-deployment training for peacekeeping personnel on the protection of civilians (UNITED NATIONS, 2011, p. 3, text highlights by the author).

Thus, specific training is currently provided to all members of a peacekeeping mission involving the United Nations policy of protection of civilians in armed conflicts, which has been appearing as a potential source of tension between the civil and the military components of the peacekeeping mission, once, ultimately, it is the latter that will be tasked with the effective protection of endangered civilians.

The second relevant change was evidenced in the attitude of the African countries that started to strive to create and/or revive their own national bodies to handle the solution of conflicts in the region. The developed countries also changed their stand towards participation of their troops in the African conflicts, by providing support to the engagement of African continent countries. This fact is underlined by Fontoura (1999, p. 183):

The developed countries are also discussing the issue, probably motivated by the need to devise courses of action capable of eliminating the risk of having to

send troops, while at the same time, without giving rise to internal criticism for being seen as simply abandoning Africa to its own fate [...] Additionally, the United States, France the United Kingdom have been developing independent efforts for training of the troops of the African countries and, in some cases, supplying certain non-lethal equipment, with the purpose of preparing them to take part in peacekeeping missions.

We must, however, bear in mind that the armed forces of the African countries, particularly those in Sub-Saharan region, lack troops qualified to take part in peacekeeping operations. Their capabilities are extremely limited and mutual distrust between the African states and dependence on external resources continue to exist.

Fontoura (1999, p. 185) also underlines that the United Nations concern about the support afforded by the United States, France and the United Kingdom to certain African states could fuel an arms race in Africa, in view of the political instability problems existing in that continent: several ethnical groups compete for power in a same country and many countries harbor mutual distrust and enmities.

Also according to Fontoura, France is engaged in the development of a more intense military training program with African countries, especially involving the French speaking ones, keeping military troops deployed in these countries. It were precisely these French troops that, according to Vines (2013, p. 102) have enable the speedy intervention in Mali, in January of 2013, in face of the apparent inability of the African Union (AU) to set up a peace force to face the challenges posed by the crisis.

For being current and pertinent to the subject, the issue about the peacekeeping operation in Mali, deserves a more detailed study. Once authorized by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) was established by the African Union, in December of 2012, even before the intervention by French troops. Nonetheless, after the deployment of French troops in Mali and AU actions pressing the UNSC to approve supply of emergency logistics aid to AFISMA, in April of 2013, the Security Council passed a resolution establishing the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), a specific UN mission to that was to replace the AFISMA.

This scenario evidences the enduring predicament faced by the African security organisms in leading the solution of regional conflicts through peacekeeping missions and, also for the UN to continue as the primary manager of peacekeeping operations in that continent.

Therefore, as a result of the historical-social evolution of the African continent and of the problems faced by the African states in managing security in the region, as shown in Figure 1 below, it is in Africa that the UN conducts half of its active peacekeeping operations around the world.

Figure 1. Current UN peacekeeping operations

Peacekeeping operations
What is peacekeeping?
Current operations
» MINURSO, Western Sahara
» MINUSCA, C.A.R.
» MINUSMA, Mali
» MINUSTAH, Haiti
» MONUSCO, D.R. of the Congo
» UNAMA, Afghanistan
» UNAMID, Darfur
» UNDOF, Golan
» UNFICYP, Cyprus
» UNIFIL, Lebanon
» UNISFA, Abyei
» UNMIK, Kosovo
» UNMIL, Liberia
» UNMISS, South Sudan
» UNMOGIP, India and Pakistan
» UNOCI, Côte d'Ivoire
» UNTSO, Middle East

Current peacekeeping operations

There are currently 16 peacekeeping operations led by the [Department of Peacekeeping Operations](#).



Source: United Nations (2015).

Thus, besides to the fact that, as stated in the National Defense White Paper (BRASIL, 2012, p. 35), to the Brazilian government Africa is a strategic environment of priority interest, it can be inferred that if by sending troops Brazil comes to take part in another peacekeeping mission of the United Nations, there are significant chances that this operation will take place in African soil. This is why it is so important for us to conduct prior studies of the intrinsic aspects of the African environment and should be considered to select and plan the use of Brazilian troops.

Another important conclusion to be reached has to do with current UN policy for the use of troops in peacekeeping missions, where the focus is the protection of civilians, and the developed countries normally limit their contribution to logistics support and military training, with the compositions of the troops left to the other countries. In this scenario, it must be absolutely clear to the military commander of the peacekeeping operations that the main challenge he will have to face will be the constant search for dialogue and consensus with the civilian component of the mission, as in the context of this type of operation the civilian-military relations require increased effort and coordination, in order to prevent it from becoming a source of stress and from generating negative impacts on the military action decision making process.

Last, it is appropriate to underline that the long-lived presence of the United Nations in the African continent, through peacekeeping missions and humanitarian relief aid, contributed to the appearance of the so-called “dependence syndrome”, also known as the “African syndrome”, mentioned by Dr. Peter Nyaba:

The asymmetrical interaction between the providers and the receivers of relief aid, in this humanitarian aid relationship, induced and reproduced the **dependency ‘syndrome’** in many communities [...] (NYABA, 1997, p. 54, text highlights by the author).

Thus, this has contributed to the increased complexity of peacekeeping operations in the African scenario, where the general population of the “failed states”² see the UN and, particularly of the military component, as responsible for promoting a secure environment for all, failing to challenge or require action by the security institutions of their own States.

2.2.3 The peacekeeping operation in Africa – A brief case study

Four peacekeeping missions conducted by the United Nations will be discussed in this section, with the purpose of specifically highlighting the subject matters related to the issues raised by the proposed theme. It is important to underline that this will be a brief study, where just the identification of the key challenges faced by the military forces is sought as well as the most important lessons learned during the operations.

a) Peacekeeping mission in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)

According to Silva (2005), initially Brazil took part in the United Nations Operation for Mozambique (ONUMOZ), in 1993, just by sending military and law enforcement observers. However, also according to Silva (2005), in 1994, enforcing central government decision to meet the request from the UN, the Brazilian Army deployed a company of 170 paratroopers and comprising also engineering, communication and logistics elements.

This force was employed as UN peacekeeping troops for approximately six months and it was initially headed by a Brazilian general acting as Force Commander. This facilitated the preliminary contacts and planning and also contributed to a safer implementation phase of the operations.

Freitas (1997, p. 13) says that the deployment of Brazilian troops was carried out in three different echelons: the precursor, sea and aerial echelons. After the arrival of the precursor and sea echelons, a convoy

² See: <http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estado_falido>. Access on: Fev 10., 2013.

was assembled to travel inland. Along this route, the poor conditions of most of the 600 kilometers to be covered resulted in damages to the materials loaded in the vehicles.

About the logistic planning to take new supplies to the troops he says:

The limited number of resupply flights, the precarious conditions of region roads, the shortage or lack of local resources and the large number of missions carried out are all factors to be taken into consideration for this evaluation (FREITAS, 1997, p. 17).

And, as a conclusion about logistics support to the success of the operation he says: "Resupply coming from Brazil becomes critical to maintain operating conditions and the morale of the troops" (FREITAS, 1997, p. 47).

About the military operations of the ONUMOZ, Major General Lélío Gonçalves Rodrigues da Silva, former Force Commander of the peacekeeping mission in Mozambique, in 1994, underlines that the use of civilian aircraft is vulnerability-generating factor for the operations:

As the aerial support was to be provided by unarmed civilian aircraft, the Military Division was totally deprived of fire support [...] the Airborne Unit was to be composed of civilian aircraft hired by the UN/New York in a tender. Hiring of light civilian helicopters and cargo planes was also planned. The aircraft would be fully manned by civilian crews working under commercial contract rules, with problems arising out of the number of flight hours hired and the lack of commitment to the operational military operation. [...] In sum, the aerial support planned for the armed troops was clearly faulty, even before the operations started (SILVA, 2005, p. 81).

And, he concludes about the troops deployed on the ground:

Lack of fire support would render the armed troops highly vulnerable to a possible resumption of hostilities in Mozambique, which appeared as quite possible in the early days of the mission [...]. For the same reasons, the capacity the Military Division had to engage in combat or defensive missions was equally reduced (SILVA, 2005, p. 82).

Therefore, along the research it was clearly evidenced that the use of civilian aircraft to support the military operations constitutes a major vulnerability factor, contributing to increase the risk to the troops deployed on the ground. This, added to the precarious conditions of the Mozambique road system ended by compounding the logistics problems faced by the peacekeeping operation.

Another important issue raised by General Lélío while acting as Force Commander in Mozambique is related to the fact that training of African officers differs significantly from the one provided in Brazil, which

ultimately adversely impacts the joint actions that are required in peacekeeping operations.

On the other hand, the tribal culture component is evidenced in this conflict as, according to Neiva Filho (1995, p. 185-186), in Mozambique the ties between man and their land acquires a mystical aspect. Land is their connection to their family, their origins and their ancestors. The whole family idea is linked to the land occupied and land inheritance is an extremely important institution to the ethnic groups. Hence, being forced to leave behind their family territories as a result of the political impositions enforced at that time, forced abandonment of their family territories generated a profound discontent among the local populations.

Also about the causes of the conflict in Mozambique, Colonel Neiva, who acted as a military observer in the ONUMOZ, notes that:

In some villages, the central power imposed administrators from ethnics groups that rivaled with the local ones. This resulted in great humiliation to the old mwene (kings) and their families. [...] Other sources of conflict were the ethnical differences and the tribalism that were still latent after years of Portuguese colonization (NEIVA FILHO, 1995, p. 186).

It is, however, in the conclusion that Colonel Neiva ratifies the core issues approached in this work when he mentions that:

The Mozambican conflict resulted from a combination of three factors: external interference, mostly from Southern Africa countries within the context of the cold war; regional or **ethnical** differences accentuated as the war progressed by the **communication and transportation problems** [...] (NEIVA FILHO, 1995, p. 199, text highlights by the author).

Thus, it can be reasonably concluded that in the Mozambican conflict, that resulted in the ONUMOZ, the aspects related to local culture, communication problems and the use of civil aviation in military operations were factors and, most certainly, generated limitations and risk to the troops employed as the United Nations peace force.

b) Peacekeeping operation em Angola (UNAVEM)

According to Fontoura (1999, p. 202), in the peacekeeping mission in Angola named United Nations Verification Mission in Angola (UNAVEM from August 1995 to July 1997), Brazil contributed with an infantry battalion (800 men), an engineering company (200 men), two advanced health care stations (40 physicians and assistants) and approximately 40 officers from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Brazil has also supplied law enforcement and military observers. The Brazilian troops were named COBRAVEM.

Nascimento (1996, p. 7) says that the origin of the internal conflict started with the independence of Angola, when the political movements, till then focused on the liberation from the Portuguese - the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) - started to compete for power, generating significant instability to the Angolan political process.

Megid Júnior (1995, p. 8) underlines that conflicts in the region happened one after the other at an alarming rate, with their seeds in the colonization when African nations with different languages, origins and customs were united or separated by the artificial borders arbitrated by the colonizers. He also affirms that Angola is mostly formed by the Bantu group, coming from the Ovimbundu Quimbundu and Bakongo tribes. Portuguese is the official language but seven dialects of African origin are also spoken. This tribal phenomenon is of one of the sources of internal tension and antagonism.

A study by Carneiro (1996, p. 41) shows that the COBRAVEM lacked a segment specifically designed for psychological operations, since at that time, the Brazilian Army was still engaged in the development actions related to this specialty, and the Brazilian troops came to feel that this type of support was needed in face of active use of this type of tool by the other parties involved in the conflict.

Among the experiences acquired in Angola in the course of the UNAVEM, Carneiro (1996, p. 43) highlights the importance of the organic engineering sectors of the peacekeeping force, in view of the efforts that are inherent to missions aimed at providing support to the whole group. He also stresses the significance of logistics support to peacekeeping troops in a non regular war environment where, generally, the air transportation and supply functions are outsourced.

It is important to note that, according to Carneiro (1996, p. 43), one of the obstacles faced by the Brazilian military in order to fulfill their mission was the flawed communication between the military and civil components of the mission, which adds to the discussion about the value of a Force Commander with professional capacity and political skills to build good relations with the civil branch of the peacekeeping mission.

About the work developed by the peacekeeping force in Angola, Francisco (2000) underlines that the significant efforts made by the Brazilian engineering company to maintain the road system necessary to support the mission by engaging in road repair works, bridge construction, demining and water purification, which further evidences the still current reality of the poor conditions of the roads for ground communication in the African continent.

As to the tribal conflicts as cause for the war in Angola in the nineties, the scenario where the UNAVEM was established can be initially identified in the research carried out by the then lieutenant-colonel of the Angolan

Army Simão Fernando, where the relationship between the political forces involved in the armed conflict is discussed:

Apparently driven by an identical objective - for Portugal to recognize the Right of Angola to independence, they always proved to be unable to join their efforts to form a common and, conversely, manifested permanent vocation for breach and even for armed conflict among them, due to the difference between the ideological regimes supported by them. More than anything, the unification failed because leaders were unwilling to jeopardize their own power. This reality was deeply rooted on ideological and social differences, stirred up by the intrigues fostered by the great powers [...] Angola was a really large colony, with geographically compartmentalized **ethical-linguistic diversities**, where the Portuguese colonial rule adopted the "divide for improved rule" (NIOCA, 2005, p. 32, text highlights by the author).

It was however, in the case studies and in the comparative analysis carried out by Durch (1993), of the evolution of the United Nations peacekeeping operations that the close correlation between the tribal culture and the conflicts in Angola is clearly evidenced:

Although both parties professed that they did not want to go back to war, ethnic divisions between UNITA and MPLA, whose respective power bases lay in the **traditionally rival Ovimbundu and Mbundu peoples**, became more prominent as their ideological differences waned. The continuing fear and mistrust **held the seeds of ethnic conflict** if the peace plan faltered, and it did (DURCH, 1993, p. 402, text highlights by the author).

However, this correlation is definitively consolidated by Nascimento (1996, p. 31) by saying that, in Angola, the roots of internal instability lie in the origins of the political movements that best represented the country. The MPLA, the FNLA and the UNITA fed their growth on the Angolan ethnic diversity, in a continent where tribal antagonism was always present. The MPLA grew in strength among the Kimbundu, on the East of the country, the FNLA found support on the Bakundu, on the North, and the UNITA came up among the Ovimbundu, on the South of Angola. Thus, since their earliest days, the Angolan political parties already harbored the seeds of country instability.

In his study Durch also approached the logistics problems faced by the UNAVEM troops while deploying the mission:

Logistics and transportation were also difficult. The country is vast, its few railways were badly damaged by war, and most roads were mined. The situation improved as mines were cleared off main roads, but air transport provided the only access to many parts of the country, especially during the rainy season (DURCH, 1993, p. 397).

Thus, to conclude this brief analysis of the UNAVEM, it can be concluded that the use of Brazilian

troops in Angola, the aspects related to tribal culture and in the poor conditions of the roads needed for logistics operations were evidenced in this African scenario, with a strong impact on the planning and implementation of the operations required for the missions to succeed.

Likewise, important lessons were identified with respect to the capabilities required from a peacekeeping force, such as specialization in psychological operations, organic engineering and military aviation resources once, according to Francisco: “It must be noted that the UNAVEM was in operation in complex and dangerous conditions because of the state of war state rising up in the country, **requiring flexibility and creativity**” (FRANCISCO, 2000, p. 29, text highlights by the author).

c) *Peacekeeping operation em Rwanda (UNAMIR)*

The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was established in October of 1993 to monitor a new cease fire between the Rwandan Government Forces (RGF), mostly formed by members of the Hutu ethnic group and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) headed by the Tutsi, a minority group in the ethnical melting pot of Rwanda (SILVA, 2004, p. 355).

The seeds of the conflict between the rival Hutu and Tutsi can be found in the historical evolution of the central Africa countries, most of all in Burundi and Rwanda, where the relationship between these two ethnic groups has always been a source of conflict, and a motive for segregation in castes. Historically, the Tutsi, the minority group in the region, ruled, both politically and economically over the Hutus. This situation worsened during the Belgian colonization, as they used the Tutsi as collaborators and intermediaries to rule over the Hutus. This scenario persists up to the end of the Second World War, when a Hutu-led revolution triggers a civil war that ultimately led to the establishment of an independent Rwanda with a Hutu president in office (SILVA, 2004, p. 355).

In June of 1993 the United Nations increased its involvement in Rwanda by an attempt to negotiate and monitor a cease fire between the RPF and the Hutu administration forces in that country, but it was just when the peace agreement was signed by the warring parties and the UNAMIR was established, in October of 1993, that the situation was brought to temporary stabilization.

Among other provisions, the peace treaty that was to be monitored by the UNAMIR, required the establishment of a demilitarized zone between the contenders, RPF (Tutsi) and the Rwandan Armed Force (Hutu) and a Weapons-secure Area in the capital Kigali.

However, the military arm of the UNAMIR initially comprised only half of a Belgian battalion (400 men) and a contingent from Bangladesh with logistics elements (also 400 men), thus representing a fighting power that was not enough even for minimum adequate deployment in both of the areas to be monitored, considering also the need to maintain ground connections between the troops

and mission headquarters (DALLAIRE, 2004).

Therefore, it was just five months after the mission was started that the military force of the UNAMIR was increased to 2,548 servicemen authorized by the UN. Likewise, as certain issues existing between the contenders still had not been settled, peace agreement enforcement was also delayed and, consequently, the transition government was never inaugurated. It is in this scenario that Silva describes the dramatic development of the situation in Rwanda in 1994:

Once the Tutsi power had been overthrown, and using the death of president Juvénal Habyarimana in an air crash, in 1994, a long campaign of collective assassinations started then, encouraged by the media, the local Catholic Church and several state organizations. **Called to intervene, the UN, is lost in the middle of long diplomatic demarches** allowing at least 800 thousand people (moderate Tutsi and Hutu) to be killed, while thousand fled in inhuman conditions to the Republic of Congo/Kinshasa (SILVA, 2004, p. 355, text highlights by the author).

In 1993, as the first leads appeared evidencing the deterioration of the security situation in Rwanda, the UNAMIR Force Commander Major General Romeo A. Dallaire (Canada) warned the UN that greater involvement by the military powers (USA, France, England, etc) was urgently needed, through supply of more robust and effective military support in terms of both personnel and equipment (DALLAIRE, 2004, p. 372).

According to Dallaire (2004, p. 113), the UN had requested a military battalion of 800 men, with a company (125 men) equipped with armored vehicles on wheels. Belgium instead sent to the UNAMIR 450 paratroopers commandos carrying light weapons and limited logistic resources. These troops were deployed in Somalia in a peace-enforcement mission (Chapter VII of the UN Charter), which led them to display a really aggressive stance in the peacekeeping mission in Rwanda, under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. To complete this scenario, as former colonizers of Rwanda, the Hutu were not in a friendly disposition towards the Belgians.

Dallaire comments:

My small force was operating at maximum capability. I still had no effective reserve with which to respond to unexpected violent clashes and we were beginning to pick up the scent of a mysterious third force that seemed to be behind all killings and assassinations (DALLAIRE, p. 121).

Thus, it was in this highly complex and high risk environment, where several external components were involved, that the UNAMIR peacekeeping forces operated in Rwanda; with the United Nations bureaucracy, mistaken political and operational decisions and the chronic lack of resources contributing to unnecessary casualties, as by the end of 1994, UNAMIR was to witness the death

of 25 military killed in combat, including three military observers (DALLAIRE, 2004, p. 318).

In his book about his UN mission in Rwanda, General Dallaire underlines the serious problems related to logistic weaknesses that ultimately limited the operating capacity of the UNAMIR troops:

While Henry Anyidoho assured me that the Ghanaians would eventually be fully supplied, their equipment and stores were being shipped by slow boat from Ghana to Dares Salaam and then had to travel by vehicle across eastern Africa to Kigali, **a process that would take three months**. I needed troops kitted and functional and deployed in the demilitarized zone as soon as possible (DALLAIRE, 2004, p. 177, text highlights by the author).

In yet another narrative, Dallaire stresses the difficulties United Nations faced in managing the supply and the concentration of military resources for the UNAMIR:

As the month wore on, I became even more concerned about the condition of my force, The armoured personnel carriers I had requested months ago had arrived from the UN mission in Mozambique on January 30. I had requested twenty. Only five of the eight APCs that actually arrived were working order. They came with no mechanics qualified to operate them, no spare parts, no tools, and operating manuals in Russian.[...] The UN signed a transport contract with the lowest bidder, who hired inexperienced civilian drivers to convoy the vehicles over a thousand kilometers of African dirt roads to Kigali [...] (DALLAIRE, 2004, p. 181).

So, it is can be clearly detected that one of the factors that contributed to the failure of the UNAMIR military troops to achieve success was the UN inability to provide an effective logistics system to support the mission, and this inability is also related to the poor conditions of the connecting roads in the African continent. Likewise, the component of the conflict linked to the African tribal culture existed in the war between Hutu and Tutsi.

Another aspect raised by General Dallaire, which is relevant to this research, has to do with the mismatch between the evaluation of the crisis in Rwanda by the political level of the UNAMIR (New York/SRSG) and the Force Commander, when even despite the potential threats to the peace troops, the systematic killing of the civil population and the various warning reports from the military component, the troops were required to keep a "negotiation" posture, preventing the conflict from escalating.

Dallaire emphasizes:

I finally placed a call to New York by satellite phone. It wasn't secure but it was the only mean I had. [...] When I was done, he said, "UNAMIR is not, repeat not, to fire unless fired upon." I reminded him that our rules of engagement allowed us to intervene and use an escalation of force up to and including the use of deadly force to prevent crimes against humanity.

He repeated that UNAMIR was not to fire unless fired upon - we were to negotiate and, above all else, avoid conflict (DALLAIRE, 2004 p. 229, text highlights by the author).

Most of all, the deterioration of this relationship between the political level and the military component came about because the UNAMIR had started the mission under provisions of Chapter VI of the UN Charter (peacekeeping), in an operational environment that quickly evolved into a peace enforcement scenario. However, when the mission was placed under provisions of Chapter VII, the UNAMIR lacked the military capacity required to protect the civilian population and to impose peace to the warring parties. Dallaire brought this fact to New York:

The force simply cannot continue to sit on the fence in face of all these morally legitimate demands for assistance/protection, nor can it simply launch into Chapter 7 type of operations without the proper authority, personnel and equipment (DALLAIRE, 2004, p. 307).

About the countries that agreed to send troops to the UNAMIR, Dallaire (2004, p. 375) says that a good number of African countries stated to be willing to supply troops to the UN to compose the UNAMIR: Ghana, Ethiopia, Malawi, Senegal, Zimbabwe, Tunisia, Nigeria, Zambia, Congo, Mali, among others. None of them, however, had available the logistics capacity to deploy and keep their forces without foreign support. On the logistics point of view, these forces were too weak for autonomous use, requiring support from first world countries. He also remarks that none of these nations was capable of leading a possible mass reinforcement action, in the event proved to be necessary, which would reinforce the credibility of the United Nations in face of the belligerents.

General Dallaire concludes his narrative about the UNAMIR failure to prevent the genocide in Rwanda, discussing the leading success factor, existing risks and the required personal skills:

Through our indifference, squabbling, distraction and delays, we lost a great many opportunities to destabilize the génocidaires and derail the genocide. I can easily delineate the factors that might have guaranteed our success, beginning with having the political and cultural savvy from start to ensure an effective military and civilian police presence on de ground in Rwanda [...] **reasonable administrative and logistical support of the mission**; a few more well-trained and properly equipped battalions on de ground; [...] Would have risked more UN casualties? Yes, **but surely soldiers and peacekeeping nations should be prepared to pay the price** of safeguarding human life and human rights. [...] I had never been in the field as a peacekeeper myself. I had no political expertise, and no background or training in African affairs or maneuvering in the weeds of **ethnic conflicts** in which hate trumps reason (DALLAIRE, p. 514-515, text highlights by the author).

Therefore, from the analysis of the UNAMIR, it can be said that this peacekeeping mission was remarkable for exposing the vulnerability of the United Nations in face its inability to respond quickly to moments of crisis, when the military component is normally left in deteriorated environments, with high risk to the troops deployed.

d) *Peacekeeping operation in South Sudan (UNMISS)*

The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has its seeds in its predecessor the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), initiated in 2005, when the peace agreement was signed by the Sudan government and the political representatives of South Sudan, who were members of the political party named Sudan's People Liberation Movement (SPLM) that acted with its armed branch, the Sudan's People Liberation Army (SPLA), the designation of the South Sudan national army (UNITED NATION, 2005, p. xi).

In 2005, as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between Sudan and South Sudan was signed, the process of peace already included a popular referendum in South Sudan to confirm the unity of Sudan or its definitive secession.

THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH SUDAN [...] 2.5 At the end of the six (6) year Interim Period there shall be an internationally monitored referendum, organized jointly by GOS (Govern of Sudan) and the SPLM/A, for the people of South Sudan to: confirm the unity of Sudan by voting to adopt the system of government established under the Peace Agreement; or to vote for the secession (UNITED NATIONS, 2005, p. 8).

By the end of the six-year term established in the CPA, in December of 2010, the referendum was carried out and the population of South Sudan chose the definitive secession from Sudan. In January of 2011, this result is ratified by the United Nations, and the work starts towards the organization of the process of declaration of independence and completed in June of the same year when the Republic of South Sudan came into being (WOLFF, 2012, p. 46).

Simultaneously to these events, feeling that its territorial interests had been countered and blaming the United Nations for the loss of a large portion of its territory, Sudan determines that all UN activities in the territory were to cease, causing full withdrawal of the UNMIS resources by June 30 of 2011. Notwithstanding, aware of the instability that prevailed in the region, and wishing to continue working in the consolidation of South Sudan as an independent country, the UN transfers the UNMIS resources to this new country and in June 8 of de 2011, establishes the UNMISS, which is ongoing (PANOZZO, 2011).

Basically, the objective of the UNMISS is to provide the necessary support to the government and the people of South Sudan in the establishment of the

minimum institutional structures needed to organize and enable South Sudan to operate as an independent country, as well as to consolidate the peace process with Sudan. The presence of the United Nations in South Sudan has also the purpose of keeping the security levels in the region stable, seeking to prevent any form of violence against the civil population.

In this scenario, theoretically, the Republic of South Sudan would be ready to start the process of construction of a free nation, with the authorities and the population working hand in hand and in orderly manner towards the development of the country where, with UN support, it would be able to obtain the capabilities needed to consolidate the independence.

This, however, is not happening, as now, relatively free from the threat represented by the Armed Forces of Sudan on the North, counting on support from certain segments of the population of South Sudan, the political and military elites shifted the focus to the internal contradictions resulting from the historical evolution of the nation, which starts to nurture conflicts between the different tribes existing in the country and competing for power (JOHNSON, 2011).

Doctor Peter Adwok Nyaba, a South Sudanese scholar who studies the political evolution of South Sudan, remarked in 1997, that:

The in fighting that has recently been experienced among the **ethnic groups in South Sudan is deeply embedded in the history of our people**. In the past, it was reinforced by colonial 'policy of divide and rule'. The successive northern-dominated governments in Khartoum practiced this since independence in 1956. [...] Despite many years of common historical development, including fighting together for common nationhood, **many intellectuals now, more than ever before, still identify themselves first as Dinka, Nuer, Moro, Shilluk, Zande, etc., and then South Sudanese**, even when interacting with each other. [...] The political elite who took over the power structure in the South emphasized their tribal attributes [...] (NYABA, 1997, p. 6, text highlights by the author).

Hence, the correlation between the recurrent armed conflict in the current South Sudan and the fight for power between the leading tribes is clearly evidenced, and certainly generates complicating factors for the military operations conducted by the UNMIS peacekeeping force.

Within the context of the current political evolution of South Sudan, the structure of the national army and of the security forces, organized after the independence, reflect the internal contradictions and tribal disputes prevailing in the country. The army has still keeps the SPLA designation, and its most prominent military leaders were raised to the most important offices of the government structure set up after the independence, as they saw themselves as the major contributors to the triumph of the South Sudan liberation

movement (JOHNSON, 2011).

So, the elite of the SPLA ranks was appointed to the most important civil and military government offices and members of the SPLA contingents were selected and appointed to form the military police forces, the environmental police, the military firefighting corps and to man the correctional system as prison guards. Nonetheless, along this process, the tribal component was a key factor in the selection of the individuals that would form the power structures in the country, generating discontent and thwarting the interests of certain groups that today feeds the rebel militias existing in the region.

Today, the Government of South Sudan is based on members of the Dinka and Nuer tribes, and the latter is one of largest in the country. The Murle and Toposa are also quite numerous. All of them share a long history of violent clashes involving land, cattle and even people (women and children) ownership, as Nyaba says about the predominance of the Dinka among SPLA leaders:

These massacres of Dinka recruits by the Anya-nya 2 had provoked SPLA which in turn had serious repercussions on the Nuer civilian population. For instance, the SPLA forces on their way back into the Sudan devastated Lou and Jikany areas as they sought to avenge the death of their kith and kin. Whole villages were razed to the ground, grain destroyed and livestock looted, men and women and children were killed indiscriminately. [...] The cycle of violence triggered off more hostility and ethnic animosity [...] (NYABA, 1997, p. 49).

The history of South Sudan also records a policy implemented by Khartoum, the capital city of Sudan when it was dominant, favoring the Dinka ethnicity for appointment to regional government offices:

Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s there were many Southerners who claimed the region was threatened by 'Dinka domination'. The numbers of Dinka in the regional government, in the administration, and in some branches of security forces appeared to them to be out of proportion[...] (JOHNSON, 2011, p. 51).

A study commissioned by the UN whose purpose was to identify the most important factors for a long lasting political stability in South Sudan after the independence revealed that a continued harmonious and integrated

Figure 2. Areas of the most important tribes of South Sudan.



Source: Figure designed by the author.

relationship between the Dinka and Nuer tribes is critical to the very existence of South Sudan as a country, once if this unity was broken the country would become unfeasible, leading to the chaos of an internal war where these tribes would be supported by neighboring countries of the same ethnicities. For all these reasons, the current president comes from the Dinka group and his vice-president from the Nuer, and there are future plans to alternate these ethnic groups in power.

It is in this environment that the military component of the UNMISS has been acting to fulfill its basic missions, namely: to provide security to the UN teams deployed on the ground, take preventive action to protect civilians, support the SPLA in its organization as a regular force and to keep in place an early conflict warning system. To this end, troops, assets, unit or sub-unit are deployed in all the stated that form South Sudan, and reserve forces are stationed in the capital of the country, Juba (UNITED NATIONS, 2011b).


The UNMISS also counts on a network of teams of military liaison officers stationed in the capital of the Republic, in the capitals of the states and in some of the various counties working to integrate the military actions of the UN peacekeeping forces and those of the SPLA forces, while at the same time seeking to advise the military commanders of the SPLA in structuring their military units to become regular forces. The UNMISS has also available a Japanese engineering company working in the construction and repairs of structures of interest to UN in Juba.

Notwithstanding, since the independence of South Sudan the whole military component of the UNMISS had been concentrating efforts on the prevention and mitigation of the tribal conflicts that involved threats to the civilian population. More specifically, in December of

2012, six months after the independence, the full military structure of the UNMISS was involved in monitoring and civilian protection actions because of an extensive armed conflict between the Nuer and the Murle. The SPLA forces were also involved in this conflict but, in view of their limited logistic and operational capability for emergency deployment, significant involvement of the UN troops was needed.

Another aspect to be highlighted is that the use of the SPLA, the national army, to contain tribal conflicts has evidenced to be highly sensitive, once many of the officers in this force belong to the involved ethnic groups, thus endangering the result of the actions.

Figure 3. Main areas of tribal conflicts in South Sudan




Source: Figure designed by the author.

Within the context of the UNMISS, logistics operations are subject to significant hindrances because South Sudan has no ports and the inland connecting roads are precarious. All the logistic flow is carried out by air or ground, and ground transportation must be coordinated from the port of Mombasa, in Kenya, to Kampala, in Uganda, to ultimately reach Juba, the capital of South Sudan. This whole process requires special security procedures in view of the type of materials being carried: material for military use.

This requires diplomatic involvement by the country of origin in order to see to the coordination and clearances need before the security and control agencies of each country on the route. An example is the Japanese engineering company that was asked to organize a large logistics operation to concentrate the heavy equipment in Juba, as shown in the Figure 4.

Inland roads in South Sudan are of a very poor quality, with the exception of the road that connects the Ugandan border, close to the town of Nimule, to Juba, which was built and paved by international initiative. All other roads in the country are unpaved and highly susceptible to the rainy season when these roads are unusable. This reality has been hindering the flows of supplies to the interior areas of the country, imposing full reliance on airborne transportation in order to carry supplies to the UNMISS troops deployed on the ground, which also renders all troops reinforcement actions more complex during periods of crises.

Figure 4. Logistic maneuvers of the Japanese troops.



Source: Figure designed by the author.

Therefore, it can be concluded that in the UNMISS the peacekeeping forces used in, sometimes questionable, military operations to enforce the UN policy of protection to civilians, even when there are no civilian to be protected, as in Africa the population is frequently seen abandoning the cities and small villages when faced of a threatened conflict and migrating to a safer place. This move to show "the presence of the UN", even where it is not necessary, has been placing the peacekeeping troops in unnecessary risk situations, with the sole purpose of demonstrating the political engagement of UN in the stability of security in the country. In the field of logistics, for the troops involved in the UNMISS, the process needed to concentrate and keep a compatible flow of supply has evidenced to be a challenge, particularly in moments of crisis.

Figure 5. Inland Roads in South Sudan



Source: Author.

2.2.4 Field survey

As previously mentioned in the section where the method was discussed, a field survey was conducted among officers of the armed forces who took or are taking part in the United Nations peacekeeping missions, and almost this whole universe comprised members of peace operations in the African continent or in Haiti.

Hence, the survey has fully consolidated (100% of the universe) the idea that the poor conditions of grou-

nd connecting roads in the African continent, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, generates serious impacts on the logistics and operational activities to be developed aiming at the use of Brazilian troops in peacekeeping operations in Africa. Such impacts are particularly stronger on emergency reinforcement, troop deployment and evacuation actions.

As a solution in an attempt to minimize the weakness represented by the quality of ground connection roads, the usefulness of having organic engineering resources in the Brazilian peacekeeping force to be used was investigated. This, the absolute majority of the surveyed universe (80%) said could be an effective solution that should be adopted in case of Brazilian participation in a UN peacekeeping force in Africa. It was also said that, besides providing support to maintenance of ground routes, the engineering resources could be employed to improve the social conditions of the general population, for example, construction of artesian wells and small water treatment facilities, earthworks and area clearing. Such actions gain significant visibility and have been proving to be a highly positive factor for the Brazilian troops in the MINUSTAH.

In the survey, tribal culture was seen by 100% of the universe as an element responsible for a significant increase in the risk of conflict between adversary troops and the peacekeeping forces, as well as in the level of complexity required to plan the peacekeeping operation.

The universe of specialists included in the survey pointed at Psychological/Social Communication Operations (42%) and Citizenship-Social Actions (ACISO) (38%) as the main tools to mitigate the effects of this tribal culture.

About the use of civil aviation in military actions of the peacekeeping mission, is a common practice in the African continent, with all of the security limitations deriving from this use, particularly in moments of crisis, 90% of the universe of specialists included in the survey agreed that as this generates significant risk to the troops used or deployed on the ground, since they may come to depend on limited air support during crises. Consistently with these results, the same number of specialists reported that, in the event Brazilian troops were to be used in Africa as a peacekeeping force, an important recommendation was to equip these troops with its own military aviation, specifically helicopters, in order to reduce the dependence on civil aviation resources for military actions.

Specifically in this scenario, the field survey revealed that respondents valued the experience in the use of organic military aviation by the Argentinean contingent (unilaterally) in Haiti, in the first contingent of the MINUSTAH. The respondents also agreed that the use of own and independent military aviation by Brazilian contingent in Africa would constitute an excellent solution. Simultaneously, however, questions were raised about the logistic feasibility of this course of action, in view of the difficulty in maintaining this capacity (organic military aviation), wit-

nessed in the Indian and Ukrainian contingents during the UN peacekeeping mission in Sudan.

When the inadequate level of trust in the relationship between troops and command (Force Commander and Joint Chiefs of Staff) and their causes were surveyed, the leading causes found were the political interference in military actions and lack of professional qualification of the Force Commander. Considering that the Force Commander is the most important interlocutor in the dialogue between the military component and the civil leadership of the peacekeeping mission, all the specialists included in the survey agreed that a highly skilled Force Commander represents an important trust and security factor to the troops deployed, with highly positive reflexes on the success of the operations.

Taking the survey further into the issue related to Force Commander professional performance, the universe of specialists reported that training of African military differs from the one provided to Brazilian military, and this ultimately hinders the implementation of joint actions. In view of this finding, and considering the current United Nations policy to look among the members of the African armed forces for a Force Commander for the peacekeeping mission in the African continent, 90% of the specialists included in the survey stated that in case Brazil decides to send a peacekeeping force to Africa, chances are high that Brazilian troops would be subordinated to an African Force Commander, and this could compound the risks for the Brazilian troops.

In the course of the survey, a relatively large portion of the surveyed universe (37%) has witnessed situations where there no alignment existed between the civil and military components when the time came to make decisions pertaining to the launching of the military operations, hence exposing the troops deployed on the ground to unnecessary risk. In line with this scenario, 96% of the surveyed specialists find that this information makes the appropriate selection of a highly skilled Force Commander even more important.

On the core aspects of this work, where tribal culture and the poor conditions of the connecting roads are presented as intrinsic aspects of Africa, and must be faced as complicating factors for any military operation in that continent, 96% of the specialists share this view.

In the light of the data collected from the previous questions, and seeking to establish a correlation between the use of troops in a peacekeeping mission in Africa and today's use of Brazilian troops in Haiti (MINUSTAH), 86% of the respondents said that the characteristics and the risks involved in the use of Brazilian troops in Africa will be completely different from those found in Haiti.

Going forward in this analytical process of correlating the use of troops in African and in Haiti, five key factors contributed to the success achieved by Brazilians in conducting the MINUSTAH: 1) the quality of the professional performance of the Brazilian military; 2) the fact

that mission Force Commander is a Brazilian officer; 3) the majority of the military personnel in the mission is Brazilian; 4) the adverse forces in Haiti do not count on external support; and 5) the low level of organization/centralization of these adverse forces.

Nonetheless, in the event Brazilian troops are used in a peacekeeping mission in Africa, just the success factor "professional quality of the Brazilian military" will exist which, to 96% of the surveyed specialist, gave added strength to the idea that the use of Brazilian troops in a peacekeeping mission in Africa, will be completely different from their use in Haiti, with compounded risks, planning and implementation.

Although the research confirms this radical difference between the scenarios faced by the use of troops in the African continent and in Haiti, it also reveals that the experiences acquired in Haiti will be used as inputs to adjust the operational, tactical and logistics procedures required by the African reality, once ignoring the experiences acquired in Haiti would be to assume an even greater risk.

Other important issues assessed during the survey as capable of mitigating the risks involved in the use of Brazilian troops in the African continent are the intensive use of combat intelligence in the context of the peacekeeping operation, although the use of this tool is not taken kindly by the United Nations or the political actions necessary to increase the number of Brazilian officers assigned to relevant posts among the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the peace mission and, even, in the military command of the mission (Force Commander).

2.3 Discussion

As discussed in the along the research, Brazil has an extended and traditional record of participation in the UN peacekeeping missions, with participations with troops gaining the highest visibility and, therefore, such mission are those that earn highest political dividends in the international scenario. The MINUSTAH, the peacekeeping mission headed by Brazil, will soon reach its tenth year, and is starts its phase down operating stage upon demobilization of a significant portion of its effectives and the beginning of the first studies about the reestablishment of a strategy for withdrawal to take the mission to its end.

While this scenario is in the making, all the official Brazilian documents that were studied point at the political decision to expand the international projection of the country by means of a more effective participation in the peacekeeping missions of the United Nations. This will certainly mean an involvement, at least, as intense as in Haiti. But, a clear definition is still to be reached about which or where will be this UN mission to be considered for Brazilian participation.

In this scenario, Africa appears as a strong possi-

bility as it hosts half of the ongoing UN peace missions, besides being the continent with the most pressing need of troops prepared and available for this type of operation. On the other hand, the United Nations, dominated by the central powers, the permanent members of its Security Council, has adopted the policy of keeping its troops away from extra-regional conflicts, except when this becomes mandatory in face of the involved interests (BROSIG, 2010). Thus, it falls to peripheral countries, such as the Latin American, Asian, African and Eastern countries, the task of making troops available to the UN implement its peacekeeping policy, particularly the current policy of affording protection to civil populations.

Specifically about the African troops that join the UN peace forces, it is important to bear in mind that in most of the African countries the armed forces, especially the army, are just coming out of a relatively quick process of transformation from guerilla forces into national armies since their independence was conquered, which bears heavily on the limited professional quality of the servicemen enlisted in these forces. This is a fact that also directly impacts the level of professional qualification of a Force Commander of African origin, which, if limited, could impair the management of the relationship with the civil component of the mission and expose the troops to unnecessary risks in flawed military operations.

Therefore, sources of qualified human resources are scarce and there are just a few peripheral countries capable of supplying to the UN appropriately prepared troops for the peace force. Brazil is a highlight among these nations as an emerging country planning to project its power in the international scenario, by means of increased participation in peacekeeping missions looking for the possibility of claiming, in the future, a permanent seat in United Nations Security Council.

From the study of the peacekeeping missions in Africa it can be inferred that the tribal culture existing in the continent, the unsuitable conditions of the connecting roads and dependence on air means of transportation are preponderant and recurrent factors that dictate how the military operations and logistic activities will be conducted in the African continent. It was also evidenced in the study that such factors lead to an exponential increase of the complexity of peacekeeping operation planning and of the logistics to support it, and such factors also increase the risks to which the peacekeeping force will be exposed.

However, as evidenced in the study, Angola and Mozambique, two coastal countries, with ports capable of supporting the concentration of military assets and subsequently maintaining the logistics flow, profited from that in the development of peacekeeping missions in their territories. Even though, difficulties were faced with the operational and logistic aspects. On their turn, the peacekeeping missions in Rwanda and South Sudan that located inland in the continent, faced serious problems related to the concentration of means and management of the logistics flow, notably in moments of crisis, due to the

complexity of access to the territory and the risks existing along the connecting roads.

From the study of the cases of Rwanda and South Sudan, in moments of crisis the UN lacks capacity to respond appropriately, military contingents are used inappropriately and, sometimes, placed in unnecessary risk situations for merely political reasons.

The surveys carried out with specialists in peacekeeping missions also cemented the idea that cultural tribal and inappropriate connecting roads are intrinsic aspects of the African continent, and must be assigned priority for planning. The high value of organic engineering and military aviation to a peacekeeping force for enabling the independence of the UN assets allocated to the mission.

The surveys have also shown the importance of the Force Commander to an appropriate use of the peacekeeping troops, preventing their use as a tool of momentary policies of the UN that are not of interest to the nations that effectively furnish military forces for peacekeeping.

Notwithstanding, the most important result obtained was the perception that, for current use of Brazilian troops as a peace force, the environment in Africa will be totally different from that found in Haiti, where the Brazilian leadership has been achieving significant success. However, as evidenced, among the success factors existing in Haiti, just the professional quality of Brazilian military personnel will be present in a possible use in the African continent, which will require a detailed and specific study to plan the mission.

On the comparison between these environments, that is, Africa and Haiti, Brazilian Army General Carlos Alberto de Santos Cruz, former MINUSTAH commander and current Force Commander of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), in a recent statement to the newspaper *Valor Econômico* when he took command of the Congo peacekeeping mission, made his views perfectly clear by saying:

This is an extremely complex mission in a very large country with over 70 million inhabitants, rich in natural resources and with a history marked by violence. **The context is totally different from what we had in Haiti [...]** (MELLO, 2013, p. 15, text highlights by the author).

We can, therefore, say that for all the issues discussed up to this point, the use of Brazilian troops as a peacekeeping force in the African continent will require a much greater involvement of all the structures of the Brazilian State, in order to mobilize and to provide all the support these troops will need, so that they will have available all the capabilities required to accomplish their mission, and also the skills needed for an effective and timely response to their risks they will be facing.

The Brazilian Army, one of the most important

structures involved in this action by the State, should develop a detailed and specific preparation in order to be ready to face the threat and the challenges that will be faced in the African continent. Fundamentally, such planning should warn the State about the mandatory mobilization of the military resources needed for safe accomplishment of the mission and, as much as possible, without depending on the UN resources deployed in the peacekeeping missions. This is why it is important to mobilize engineering and military aviation resources to join this peacekeeping force and, likewise, to establish a robust logistics flow to meet the continuous needs of this force.

It is to the Brazilian Army that will fall the important tasks of showing the Brazilian Government that, when choosing to enforce the foreign policy of sending Brazilian troops to Africa, the central government must commit the resources and bear the financial costs to be incurred for safe use of the forces, independent from the specific wishes of the United Nations, so that this use will effectively generate the political dividends expected by the Nation.

3 CONCLUSIONS

The Brazilian foreign policy is moving forward in the international environment seeking to improve Brazil's participation in the UN peacekeeping missions. As a result of the success of the MINUSTAH, in Haiti, and the imminent demobilization of this mission, the Brazilian Government appears to be sensitive to the consultations by the United Nations as to the possibility of having Brazilian troops taking part in other peacekeeping missions.

In the same scenario, Africa appears as a feasible and more probable option for the expansion of this Brazilian foreign policy. Notwithstanding, as discussed in this article, aspects that are intrinsic of this continent, like the tribal conflicts and inappropriate connecting roads, give rise to significant risks to the implementation and increase the complexity of planning for a peacekeeping mission, which will require much greater and robust governmental involvement than in the case of Haiti.

There is no question that the experiences acquired by the Brazilian forces in Haiti will be immensely valuable for a future use in Africa. However, the African scenario is much more complex and involves much higher risks and thus requires a more detailed and specific planning, in order to be able to deal with the intrinsic cultural and infrastructure aspects of the region, as well as to minimize the possibility of casualties in the military contingent.

Also based on experience it can be said that if used in Africa, the Brazilian forces, will succeed in their mission given the professional quality of Brazilian military personnel, which has already been evidenced in previous peacekeeping missions. Notwithstanding, the core issue to be considered is what price the Brazilian State is willing to pay to achieve this success in its international policy or,

in other words, how many Brazilian casualties is the Nation willing to accept towards the success of the Brazilian troops used in a peacekeeping mission.

Currently, when the Brazilian government is asked by the UN about the possibility of furnishing troops for peacekeeping missions in Syria, Lebanon, Mali and Congo, preponderantly the Brazilian Army must offer advice to the governmental agencies and political decision makers as to the feasibility and risks involved in the action and, more importantly, how and with means must this military action be carried out in face of the challenges that will be faced when the time comes to use the military expression of the National Power in the African continent. This minimum design of acceptable force for the organization of a peacekeeping force must be a priority for the Brazilian State, and should be presented to the UN as a mandatory condition for Brazilian participation.

Simultaneously to this process of negotiation with the UN aimed at the participation of Brazilian troops in a new peacekeeping mission, it is opportune for us to develop the political, internal and external actions required to mobilize and designate a reasonable contingent of Brazilian military personnel to join the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the military component of the selected peacekeeping mission, with the purpose of providing professional and quality advisory services to the Force Commander in conducting all the decision making processes related to the operation.

Participation in peacekeeping missions of the United Nations will remain as an important instrument for the implementation of the Brazilian policy, however, more importantly, this instrument must be applied, more than anything else, towards the achievement of Brazilian political objectives, and not as a tool to meet the political objectives currently pursued by the United Nations, which are first and foremost focused on maintaining the image of the UN as an effective institution for world peace and aligned to the political objectives of the developed countries, the major financial backers of the United Nations, and, normally, in these circumstances, any considerations about the risks to which the military component may be exposed is not a priority.

Undoubtedly, the priority UN policy of civil population protection is justified and critical to the success of the peacekeeping operations. However, the military operations developed to promote this protection must comply with the decision making process that is common to the Armed Forces, in order to use the peace troops in the design and in the form needed for the operation to succeed, avoiding unnecessary risks and ineffective actions.

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