

NEITHER THE EXPERTISE NOR THE FIDELITY: THE DETERMINANTS FOR THE SELECTION OF PARLIAMENTARIANS TO THE POSITIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NATIONAL DEFENSE

NEM FIDELIDADE PARTIDÁRIA E NEM ESPECIALIZAÇÃO: AS DETERMINANTES PARA A SELEÇÃO DE PARLAMENTARES AOS CARGOS DA COMISSÃO DE RELAÇÕES EXTERIORES E DE DEFESA NACIONAL

NI FIDELIDAD AL PARTIDO NI ESPECIALIZACIÓN: LAS DETERMINANTES PARA LA ELECCIÓN DE PARLAMENTARIOS A LOS CARGOS DE LA COMISIÓN DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES Y DE DEFENSA NACIONAL

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ABSTRACT

This paper aims to obtain the field of political science, the approach the party strategies adopted for recruiting to occupy positions in the parliamentary Committee on Foreign Relations and National Defense, under the Brazilian democratic regime. The neo-institutionalism was been adopted by most authors who have study with this issue, and therefore, this article promotes a discussion based on these theoretical foundations. Through a descriptive process, a literature review finding evidence that neither the expertise nor the party loyalty was made determine and guide the choices made by party leaders. At the end of this paper search suggestions appear, evidence observed in the field of political science, which may or not be confirmed by quantitative methods for any other student.

Keywords: Commission. Parliament. Defense. Neoinstitutionalism. Party.

RESUMO

O trabalho tem como objetivo coletar, no campo das Ciências Políticas, como são as estratégias partidárias adotadas para o recrutamento de parlamentares que ocuparão cargos na Comissão de Relações Exteriores e Defesa Nacional. O neoinstitucionalismo, como teoria de análise, tem sido amplamente empregado pela maioria dos autores que desenvolveram trabalhos sobre esse assunto e, portanto, busca-se promover uma discussão com base nesses fundamentos. Por meio de um processo descritivo, foi feita uma revisão bibliográfica encontrando indícios que nem a especialização e nem a fidelidade partidária determinam e orientam as escolhas feitas pelas lideranças dos partidos. No final deste artigo são apresentadas sugestões de pesquisa, frutos de indícios levantados neste estudo, que poderão ser confirmadas ou não, por qualquer outro estudante do tema que se estimule em aprofundar o assunto.

Palavras-chave: Comissão. Parlamento. Defesa. Neoinstitucionalismo. Partido.

RESUMEN

El trabajo tiene por objetivo recopilar, en el campo de las Ciencias Políticas, las estrategias dentro de los partidos políticos adoptadas para reclutar parlamentarios que ocuparán cargos en la Comisión de Relaciones Exteriores y Defensa Nacional. El neoinstitucionalismo, como teoría de análisis, ha sido ampliamente empleado por la mayoría de los autores que han desarrollado trabajos al respecto y, por lo tanto, este trabajo promueve una discusión teniendo como base dichos fundamentos. A través de un proceso descriptivo, se llevó a cabo una revisión bibliográfica que mostró no ser la especialización ni la fidelidad al partido las que determinan y orientan las elecciones realizadas por los líderes partidarios. Al final de este trabajo se presentan recomendaciones de investigación, frutos de indicios levantados en este estudio, que podrán ser confirmados o no por cualquier estudioso del tema que tenga interés en profundizarlos.

Palabras clave: Comisión. Parlamento. Defensa. Neoinstitucionalismo. Partido.

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I INTRODUCTION

The objective of this work is to examine the theory that deals with the strategies adopted by the political parties to recruit among members of the House those who will be appointed to a seat on a Permanent Commission of the House of Representatives.

More specifically, this work proposes to investigate how national defense issues are dealt with in the Congress, looking for arguments that justify, or at least, indicate how party leaders work towards selection of Representatives for the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Commission (CREDN).

In a democratic country such as Brazil, where fair and legitimate decisions count on Congress participation, it is important to assess the profile of the Representatives who are members of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Commission in order to understand where the Brazilian defense policy is going and how it is doing.

To Kier (1995), the restrictions imposed by the political decisions are not determinant factors to doctrinaire choices, but the way in which the military organizational culture responds to these limitations, that is, politics limits and military culture interprets, and it is this limitation to organizational culture that will mediate the cause and effect relations between politics and the military doctrine.

However, right now our intent is not to study the military organizational culture, but to understand how civil control may affect the military doctrine.

Hence, it is not too early to say that the constraints created at the highest national political levels are not merely relevant, but necessary, to the development of research on military sciences, and this is why this article intends to introduce the research on the profile of a member of a congressman with a seat on the CREDN.

The text is broken down into three sections. The first one presents the leading authors who discussed the formation of parliamentary commissions, using neoinstitutionalism as their analysis tool. In this section of the text, the Pereira and Mueller (2000) theory of executive power preponderance was included to encourage a critical dialogue with the already mentioned organizational approach.

The second section discusses the most probable profile to be presented by party leaders for selection by House Representatives for appointment to these commissions. The third and last part of the work presents future empirical researches that may contribute to the development of the embryonic Defense studies in the Brazilian academic community.

2 DIMENSIONS OF NEOINSTITUTIONALISM IN THE FORMATION OF PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSIONS

Neoinstitutionalism deals with the study of

organizations, in an area where a set of formal and informal rules are assessed and serve to guide the operation of institutions, aiming at maintaining and preserving the existence of the organization.

In order to understand how parliamentary commissions work, the international academic literature has basically produced three lines of interpretation, namely the distributist, the informal and the party lines of thought. Subsequently, Carlos Pereira and Bernardo Mueller (2000) advanced the theory of executive power preponderance in the Brazilian Legislative system. Additionally, Müller (2009) argued that the system of commissions leads the parties to select congressmen with stronger political loyalty for appointment to strategic commissions.

In the Brazilian democratic regime, the political system works under the conceptual dilemma of Sérgio Abranches (1988) of the coalition presidentialism, that is, of peaceful Executive and Legislative coexistence, through a kind of system of exchanges between the powers, maybe, with the purpose of preventing a supposed decision making standstill.

To refute the more or less loyal rationale for selection of the ideal Congressman to represent the party, Fabiano Santos (2002) introduced a restriction that refers to the specialization of candidates for commission membership.

The weight assigned to the institutional structure in the strategies enforced by Congressmen is the similarity found in the theories, that is, the party still has significant influence on political decisions, the difference lying on the level of autonomy these members will have to act on the commissions (MÜLLER, 2009). To speak frankly, we would argue for a limited autonomy.

2.1 The Distributist Dimension

Limongi (1994) argues that the distributist current of thought seeks to explain the behavior of the House based on the interest each congressman has in obtaining electoral dividends. This is a pessimistic view of how the House operates, which is ratified by Ames, Pereira and Rennó (2011) with emphasis on pork barrel type political offerings to increase the chances of congressman reelection.

The term pork barrel was used for the first time by Edward Everett Hale, in 1863, in his article "The Children of the Public", where the term is used as a metaphor for any form of government expenditure with citizens. Yet, the expression has now been borrowed to represent the resources, works or government jobs politicians use as clientelism tools, focusing rather on political advantages than on public interest.

Pork barrel type politics is the strategic key to parliamentary elections, keeping a certain cause relation with the aspirations of constituents. Identification with the Party, in these cases, is not so critical to congressmen who are hooked by local distributions, where, obviously, they

find their constituency bases (AMES; PEREIRA; RENNÓ, 2011).

The views on pork barrel tend to be shared by left and right wing politicians, but are stronger among the latter. In other words, apparently, there is a match of declared preferences between voters and their representatives, mostly tinted by affinity with parties. However, when the resource allocation strategies are investigated, both left and right wing politicians are engaged in this practice by allocating resources to their municipalities. In the practice of allocation of bill amendments, actually, the social-economic features of the municipalities and the political competition seem to be more relevant, instead of affinity with the party (AMES; PEREIRA; RENNÓ, 2011).

As formulated by Shepsle and Weingast (1987) the distributist dimension is not directly applicable to the Brazilian Congress in view of the inability evidenced by the commissions to enforce their preferences. The limited institutional power of the Congress can be mostly explained by the predominance of the Executive over the Legislative (PEREIRA; MUELLER, 2000).

To Pereira and Mueller (2000), appointments to certain commissions are manipulated by the Executive, aiming at a strategic allocation of congressmen who are faithful to Executive interests. Additionally, the leaders of the political parties are entitled to appoint and remove commission members, at any given time, thus breaching the distributive argument of congressman self-selection according to his own interest in the above mentioned commissions.

Independent from one's view of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Commission, it can be inferred that the distributist dimension lacks reach to explain the selection of Commission members, or even, to justify how the legislative behaves. In this commission there are no congressmen planning to articulate pork barrel type politics, most of all when the fact that the commission deals with subjects widely removed from those discussed in the electoral arena is considered. If voters are not interested in defense-related subjects, competition for a commission seat will lose its drive.

Another important aspect for analysis is the budget status of the Ministry of Defense. Close to 80% of Ministry resources are committed to payment of personnel, and Ministry payroll includes about one million people, with just 300 thousand on active duty. Besides, the residual grant is routinely withheld by the National Treasury and used for federal public debt service.

Obviously, there is not much left for Defense to distribute, which could represent a significant drive to make congressmen behavior extremely dependent on the loyalty to their respective parties, strengthening such parties in the National Congress. Gains are, therefore, minimum, both for the party and the congressman, and this discourages participation in this type of political agenda.

Notwithstanding, it is conceivable that certain members of the Executive Power will present suggestions related to the appointment of congressmen to this

commission. Yet, we still have not collected sufficient arguments to affirm with certainty, which profile, either party loyalty or specialization, would be pointed at by this pessimistic stand to analyze the behavior of political party leaders.

2.2 The Informational Dimension

The informational and the distributist lines of thought cannot be distinguished from each other in terms of the autonomy of the individual choices related to selection for appointment to the commissions. Based on the arguments advanced by Pereira and Mueller (2000) this view can be questioned with respect to the interference of party leaders and the Executive in the selection or nominations of candidates for a seat on the commission.

But the informational line, according to Krehbiel (1991), works with the idea of reducing the lack of symmetry of the information exchanged by the House and the commissions. This is the feature that appears as the key difference from the previously discussed dimension; that is, the perspective of the electoral primacy exits the stage to make room for the technical perspective of the specialist.

By means of previous familiarity, a commission specialist reduces the need congressmen have for in depth information related to the specific subjects of the commissions. A specialist also conveys the already established knowledge to political party leaders, thus enabling shorter terms for analysis of the different issues by the different political parties.

Notwithstanding, the continued and consecutive participation by some congressmen in certain commissions could foster an increased level of congressman specialization, thus creating a natural barrier against possible replacements.

However, the large number of subjects and projects are constantly requiring analysis overburdens congressmen with tasks and, for this reason, besides the procedure-related advantages, the commissions provide for lower costs of information. Lemos and Ricci (2011) affirm that information cost cuts maximize the time and the energy directed to the development of activities focused on the constituency. This would not be something to be carried out by a congressman appointed to the commission, but rather by another party member who, in a timely manner, would put the knowledge resulting from commission efforts to good use.

It can be inferred that congressmen benefit from formal standards to obtain information gains, however, specialization costs for the plenary are involved. This offers encouragement to the commissions in the form of power to veto and to amend the propositions as costs of information asymmetry, consequently, promoting a decrease in the level of floor uncertainty with regard to submitted bills or projects. (PEREIRA; MUELLER, 2000).

Nonetheless, Pereira and Mueller (2000) evaluate the Executive Power influence on the informational line. Both the Plenary and the Executive are entitled to ask for urgency for proposition evaluation. Commissions are hardly able to examine and take a stand relatively to a proposition subject to a request for urgency, in other words, this is a strategic weapon employed to weaken the power of the commissions, with resulting losses to the decrease of uncertainties.

It is important to take into consideration that the high rate of congressmen turnover, independent from personal wishes, is not just unfavorable to the distributist current but also impacts the informational one, bearing in mind that commission members need time and opportunity to specialize (PEREIRA; MÜLLER, 2000).

It should be noted that the informational dimension can partially justify the way in which the Foreign Affairs and Defense Commission is formed, considering that the subjects to be dealt with are specific and, therefore, may require a membership that, possibly, would be familiar with submitted propositions and, who, on their turn, would be appointed by party leaders according to the individual expertise.

On the other hand, for the already mentioned reasons, as not much interest is evidenced in the subjects dealt with by this commission, it should be noted that the leadership of the political parties will appoint to a seat a congressman with lower levels of party loyalty, so as to keep their most faithful congressmen in the commissions that are more advantageous to the parties. Here we can see the distributist perspective influencing the informational view.

Even if in Brazil nowadays the subjects that are dealt with by the Foreign Affairs and Defense Commission do not awaken the interest of congressmen and, least of all, that of party leaders as this discussion lies outside national debates, it is lamentable that, consequently, the Executive actually ends up with exclusive control over this subject matter, in a flagrant lack of civil responsibility on the part of the freely elected representatives of society. Obviously, the objective of this work is not to collect cues about party leaders minimizing the importance of this commission, but rather to evidence that congressmen fail to recognize and do not value participation in or full contribution to the commission and thereby weakening the principles that distinguish the democratic regime from other forms of government.

And, consideration must also be given to the Defense budget.

Hence, it should not come as a surprise that the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Commission lacks prestige, once it does not ensure congressmen access to resources for local distribution. Moreover, once its main issues are out of the electoral debate, this is yet another reason why this commission is not attractive to congressmen who are patently loyal to their parties.

Yet, even if the intent is to nominate members with expertise in defense-related matters, certainly

the commission will not have more than 20% defense specialists, bearing in mind that, rarely, this percentage is reached because of the small number in Congress of specialists in defense matters, and also in view of the elevated rate of congressmen turnover in this commission.

2.3 The Political Party Dimension

The political party dimension developed by Cox and McCubbins (1993) considers political party participation in conflict solving, and goes against the two previously discussed dimensions. Adopting an optimistic perspective, these authors introduced the idea of supremacy of the rules of procedure over congressman autonomy and individual choices. They highlight the power of the agenda as a tool whereby party leaders ensure control over party members, preventing congressmen from adopting an individualist behavior.

This dimension of the theory refers to the rationale of party behavior, and two lines of thought appeared in this dimension. The first one considers that there is no discipline in the parties and, as a result, the behavior of the House of Representatives cannot be predicted, and it is argued that congressmen would always be looking for electoral benefits and, consequently, would adopt a parochial-type of behavior. This view is shared by Ames (1995), Amorim Neto (1998), Lamounier (1991) and other authors.

The second point of view argues for political party discipline and the previsibility of their members on the basis of the powers granted to the leaders of political parties, which would serve to deter any individualist behavior. This view can be found in Figueiredo and Limongi (1999) and Lemos and Ricci (2011).

It would be reasonable to take into consideration the particularism that marks the interest of Brazilian congressmen and, more than anywhere else, in the electoral arena. Also, the idea of political party centralization after the 1988 Constitution was enacted should not be simply set aside.

Notwithstanding, congressmen particularism results from the feeling that the party is not of utmost importance for success in the elections. The percentage of congressmen who report to have been elected as a result of personal efforts may reach 80% or more, except in the PT Party where this percentage is lower. Close to 50% of the congressmen elected by the PT state to believe to have been elected as a result of party relevance (LEMONS; RICCI, 2011).

Actually, an estimate that more than half of the Congress feels that the party is not relevant for electoral success, weakens the arguments in favor of this theoretical perspective in Brazil, and this can easily explain the pessimistic views of Ames (1995), Amorim Neto (1998), Lamounier (1991) and other authors, who argue that political party centralization is unfeasible.

This perception of congressmen who credit their success in the elections to themselves, certainly comes

close to a parochial behavior that varies according to the socio-economic conditions of their constituency base and the local political competition each member faces (AMES; PEREIRA; RENNÓ, 2011).

But, paradoxically, in the legislative arena, in many instances, the decision making process impacts the individual preferences of congressmen, who feel bound to vote according to party guidance in order to comply with set rules. The internal rules of the House foster internal party cohesion and, additionally, there is no normative rule mandating the Executive Power to distribute positions in the commissions according to congressmen preferences (AMES; PEREIRA; RENNÓ, 2011).

Political party centralization that restricts the autonomous actions of politicians and channels bills to be submitted based on leadership control, can also be understood as a factor that facilitates the legislative work. If on the one hand, certain advantages are generated by centralization, on the other it reduces the cost of information when the time comes to appreciate the merit of the propositions, about which, in many instances, legislators have no idea of what they are actually dealing with (LEMOS; RICCI, 2011).

Another detail that deserves to be mentioned has to do with political party position towards the government. A party that is not aligned to the current administration will certainly propose and vote according to party interests and, thus, the choice to be made by a congressman could be related both to his commitment to the party and to his specialization.

The party dimension may present the relevant fundamentals capable of explaining the nomination of candidates to compose the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Commission. Even considering the downside of Legislative position in face of the Executive, when added to the informational dimension, this dimension may offer a consistent explanation to the choices made by political party leaders.

First of all, when the behavior the parties allied to the government is considered, we may find evidence of choice of the ideal congressman with a certain level of party loyalty to seat on the commission, as a party strategy to benefit the Executive when the time comes to approve policies that interest it.

Secondly, if the issue involves the opposition parties, then specialization combined to party loyalty is to be desired for selection of possible candidates for commission membership. The opposition parties would consider enabling a decrease of the information asymmetries based on the need to defend their interests in congress.

The parties allied to the federal administration would tend to nominate loyal members, while the opposition parties would chose faithful and specialized members for the relevant commissions. It should be noted that in the specific case of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Commission, the object of this analysis, viewed from the perspective of the political dimension,

any congressmen selected, whether among federal administration allies or from the opposition, will tend to work in accordance with party guidance, independent from his level of loyalty, once the subject matters dealt with lie outside the leading national debates and, for this reason, party loyalty would not be as relevant as specialization to reduce the operational costs for the other congressmen.

3 PARTY LOYALTY AND SPECIALIZATION AS CONDITIONS FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSIONS

Some ideas on party loyalty were presented in the previous sections, and it was said that, essentially, there are two main currents of thought: the first would be the absence of the premise that the congress is actually unpredictable; conflicting with the first one, the second argues that a disciplinary centralization actually exists in the legislative arena.

Obviously, the coalition mode of presidentialism has been impacting the strategy adopted by political parties to appoint members to the commissions. The choices are centralized by the Governing Board, that is, appointments to the commissions are tasks assigned to party leaders and, probably, the choices made by the leaders will be consistent with party situation.

Party loyalty and specialization are features party leaders look for in the members who will seat on the various commissions. About party loyalty, it is said about the degree of congressman commitment that "the more often a congressman votes with the majority of his party, the deeper is his commitment to the majority faction of his party, and higher, therefore, will be the political trust this congressman awakens in the party leader" (SANTOS, 2002, p. 252). On the other hand, specialization has to do with previous contact a given congressman had with other commissions, offices and experience in the subject matters dealt with by with the commission he feels to be an expert in. Additionally, specialization may also depend on congressman origins being linked to the subjects the commissions will be discussing. In the specific case of the Education, Culture and Sport Commission, Congress has on the floor a good number of specialized congressmen. Yet, in the case of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Commission finding a specialist is not a simple task.

In Brazil the demand for best practices aimed at an improvement of public governance, has contributed to the idea that prior specialization is a determining factor for the selection of a commission member, and this feature may or not restrict access to any commission (SANTOS, 2002). However, for the specific case discussed in this work, in any situation, the political leaders of Congress will always have to find a way to establish a commission of 19 members and 19 substitutes, independent from their specialization.

Notwithstanding, to Müller (2005), the rationale behind party loyalty continues to justify the selection of candidates for the commissions. In his research, the block formed by the small right wing parties sought to appoint their most reliable congressmen to the previous National Defense Commission. Furthermore, parties tending more to the left, such as PSB, PDT, PT and PC do B, stood out by showing the highest levels of party unity and loyalty in the Foreign Affairs Commission.

Just like when planning for a battle, before combat itself, the positions are taken according to certain logistics, the initial recruiting for the commissions was seen as actual planning. In this initial logistics planning, the parties pinpoint the areas that are strategic to the achievement of their targets and, to this end, they send in their best "soldiers". And thus, the system of Permanent Commissions leads parties to select congressmen with the highest level of political loyalty (MÜLLER, 2005, p. 390).

Yet, as already mentioned above, it is believed that the parties will not "recruit their best soldiers" for this commission, but they will preferably be appointed to other commissions capable of generating political dividends for the congressmen themselves and their parties.

In his work, Müller (2005) argues that left wing parties are interested in foreign policy matters. On the other hand, the small right wing parties are interested in the national defense policy. Consequently, it can be assumed that the merger of the two commissions that existed before 1996 to form the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Commission was beneficial to the National Defense Policy. Bearing in mind that the national defense issue entered the debates of the majority of the leftwing parties, the limited participation existing before 1996 was incremented.

4 DISCUSSION

Along this article an attempt was made to succinctly approach all the factors that determine the selection of congressmen for the commissions, using rational choice neoinstitutionalism as the selected analysis tool to look for explanations to the composition of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Commission.

The commission is assigned the responsibility of directing the debates about National Defense and to demystify them to the national congress, that is, this is where the constraints that will impact the military doctrine arise, and this is why knowing it better is so important.

Initially, it can be inferred that as of 1996 the matters related to the National Defense gained relevance from the merger with Foreign Policy issues. For the very nature of the commission, it can be assumed that congressmen less experienced in defense subjects and with higher specialization in international relations are members of this commission, even because it is practically

impossible to political party leaders to have the whole commission composed of congressmen specialized in defense.

The discussion led to the rationale behind political party choices and preferences, strategically adopted aimed at obtaining political dividends, in other words, definitely, the distributist dimension influences the commissions. Therefore, we can also assume that in such a commission party loyalty is not a feature to be found in the congressman appointed to a seat, as it is assumed that the parties will not deploy its more faithful congressmen in a commission that will not generate significant political gains.

Another interesting detail assessed by this research has to do with the impossibility a congressman faces to implement his parochial politics and, in this type of commission, the chances of obtaining resources for his electoral stronghold are minimal. Considering that strong cause-effect relationship exists between pork barrel-type politics and reelection opportunities. Probably, whenever possible, the candidate for a seat on the CREDN will avoid this type of debate or commission.

This pessimistic view that envisages the impossibility of promoting pork barrel politics by commission members gives us signs of the alleged lack of interest from congressmen in this debate, which is added to the difficulty in appointing a specialized member to this commission.

Thus, the possibility of a congressman with active legislative action and true concern with national causes is now envisaged for a seat on this commission.

On the other hand, in his work Müller (2005) contributed to point out that, as they are more interested in subjects related to foreign policy, as they are in the same commission now, the left wing parties start also to deal more intimately with defense matters. The behavior of the small right wing parties is precisely the opposite, once they already are interested in National Defense issues.

Thus, in order to provide inputs to future research, some hypotheses capable of corroborating the arguments presented up to this point can be formulated:

H1 – A congressman selected for a seat on the CREDN is not bound by party loyalty.

H2 - A left wing party congressman selected for a seat on the CREDN has no specialization in defense matters.

H3 – A congressman selected for a seat on the CREDN is aligned to political activism.

H4 – A small right wing party congressman selected for a seat on the CREDN is, as much as possible, specialized in defense matters.

This is an initial research, with a descriptive approach and it represents an invitation to students of military sciences to prove or refute the hypothesis presented above, in order to, in a following stage, identify the profile of candidates for the CREDN, that is, this or that congressman who probably shows marked political activism and is tuned to the national causes. Furthermore,

we wish to suggest an investigation of the variables that contribute to mediate the constraints to the Brazilian military doctrine, in other works, that is, we are referring to the military organizational culture.

Hence, it would be important to prove the clues that suggest that party loyalty and specialization are not determining factors for the appointment of a member to offices in the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Commission, which can be explained by the lack of interest of congressmen in the discussions about national defense, and by the obstacles faced to nominate a specialized member for this commission.

It is also necessary to bear in mind that it has been demonstrated that neoinstitutionalism lacks sufficient reach to explain the profile of a congressman a member of the CREDN and, maybe, it would be necessary to combine it to other organizational theories.

Last, the next challenge to be faced will be to find data or empirical facts corroborating the profile of the congressmen who sat on the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Commission in the last 17 years, with the purpose or proving or refuting the arguments we have presented in this research despite its introductory nature, but which already evidences that nor party loyalty or specialization are characteristics of congressmen members of the CREDN.

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