

South American Defence Council: failure or first step?

Consejo de Defensa Sudamericano: ¿fracaso o primer paso?

Abstract: The Organization of American States (OEA) and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR), existing defense organizations until the creation of the CDS, have not evolved enough and lack legitimacy, since they are under clear american influence. There were several contributions from the new Council and some possibilities were glimpsed, some of which are very relevant, even if they still need more attention. This paper will analyze this topic, studying the meaning and results of the CDS until now, trying to build a perspective for its future, taking into account the current circumstances in South America (SA).

Keywords: South American Integration. South American Defense Council. UNASUL. Perspectives and results.

Resumen: La Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA) y el Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Recíproca (TIAR), organizaciones de defensa que existieron hasta la creación del CDS, no han evolucionado lo suficiente y carecen de legitimidad, ya que están bajo clara influencia estadounidense. Hubo varias contribuciones del nuevo Consejo y se vislumbraron posibilidades, algunas de las cuales son muy relevantes, aunque todavía necesitan más atención. Este artículo analizará este tópico, estudiando el significado y los resultados del CDS hasta el momento y intentando construir una perspectiva para su futuro, llevando en cuenta las circunstancias actuales en América del Sur (AS).

Palabras-clave: Integración Sudamericana. Consejo de Defensa Sudamericano. UNASUR. Perspectivas y resultados.

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1 Introduction

The new century brought with it some novel aspects, after the dramatic changes in the global scenario. The end of the Cold War, the fall of the Berlin Wall, globalization, the existence of a hegemonic nation and terrorism, among other acts and events, were fundamental in the strategy of the great nations and regional blocs.

The economic approach began to overcome the ideological. The world is reorganized fundamentally in blocks with emphasis on political and economic aspects. This tendency to block formation is being led by the great powers in the different continents. The most prominent emerging peripheral nations, by many called BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), continue to seek to define their areas of influence and regional power.

In 2008, the creation of UNASUL (Union of South American Nations) represented another contemporary South American attempt to expand integration in South America (SA)¹, under the Brazilian initiative. In this sense, in the same year, the South American Defense Council (CDS) was created, whose diffusion could allow the expansion of regional cooperation in military and scientific-technological matters. It is worth to observe the ideological and political alignment that was on the occasion of the creation of the CDS (LUIGI JÚNIOR, 2017). Brazil has led a bloc whose main Heads of State were left wing (Argentina, Paraguay, Peru, Ecuador, Chile, Bolivia, Venezuela and Brazil). In addition, the economy of these countries grew at a strong pace, due to the international value of commodities (MURRAY, 2012).

The CDS came after several attempts towards South American integration, marked by a recognized goodwill, by rhetoric and by little practical content. On the other hand, the lack of an adequate and shared policy for the subcontinent, which for almost the entire 20th century lived in the desert of the convergence of the interests of the great powers, raises doubts about the maturity of their relations for the adoption of an effective convergence of community efforts and objectives.

Nowadays, the scenario has changed economically and politically. The economies of the bloc countries are still recovering from the economic crisis of 2008 (GASPAR; SPINA, 2018), while protectionism has grown, in the midst of ideological divergences, mainly between Venezuela and the countries that have changed their government, since 2015, ideologically more right (QUIRÓS, 2017). Thus, just over a year ago, UNASUL, by changing its president, has frozen its activities, due to the lack of consensus in the election of the new General Secretary. In the same way, the CDS, as an organ of the UNASUL, is paralyzed at this moment.

The objective of this article is to generate holistic and integrating thinking about the future prospects of the CDS, taking into account its results, its future possibilities and leading with the new South American political and economic scenario.

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2 The road to the cds

To contextualize the geopolitical environment, it is worth remembering the characteristics of Spanish colonialism, which, due to its centralizing nature, have made it difficult to integrate its former colonies. The liberator Simón Bolívar led the pioneering integrationist attempt, in 1815, who had conceived a Gran Colombia (FEDOZZI, 2005, p.161) from the union of the viceroalties of Peru and New Granada (it included the territories of Venezuela, Ecuador, Colombia and Panama).

During the nineteenth century, the integration of SA was mitigated, in large part, by geopolitical disputes and territorial demarcation, being strongly influenced by European and American interests. In 1889, Pan-Americanism emerges with the First International American Conference, held in Washington. These first steps around the unit revolved around the US, an emerging power that proposed protecting the entire continent (CERVO; BUENO, 2008).

At the beginning of the 20th century, there was still influence of the European defense industries in SA. The existing antagonisms, once again, were aggravated. In 1915, the ABC Treaty (Argentina, Brazil and Chile) was the first South American international instrument. It was motivated by the perception that the countries of SA, through the minimization of regional rivalries, could live in a situation of collaboration, rather than submit to the world powers. Since then, regional integration initiatives (CERVO; BUENO, 2008) adopted in SA, up to 1980, have been carried out in accordance with American interest, in the search for Pan-Americanism.

2.1 Economic and political integration

Thus, focused on the economic, there were some initiatives worthy of reference, as in 1948, when the Economic Commission for Latin America (CELAC) was established in Chile. One begins to think about a free trade area in Latin America and, shortly after, in 1960, in Montevideo, Uruguay, six South American countries, plus Mexico, joined the Treaty of the Latin American Free Trade Association (ALALC). Its objective was the increase of trade (CONSIDERA, 2006).

More specifically, the Andean Pact (Chile, Bolivia, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, and Ecuador) emerged in 1967, which evolved for the Andean Community in 1997 (without Chile). The Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO) was also created in 1995. International trade in Latin America, during the 1970s, grew an average of 20.8%, while between 1950 and 1970, only it was 5.4%, demonstrating the validity of the integration initiatives (UNCTAD, 1994).

The Treaty of Montevideo, signed in 1980, created the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), replacing the ALALC, with the participation of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.


Thus, in 1991, the Presidents of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay created MERCOSUL with a zone of free trade and partial customs union and, since 1995, with a Common External Tariff, serving as a basis for projects that included all SA. Beyond the commercial aspect, it played an important role in the consolidation of democracy (Democratic Clause), contributing to the continuity of political stability (FREIRE, 2016).

It is worth noting that the first meeting of the Heads of State of SA occurred in 2000, in Brasilia. From this meeting emerged the Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA), representing the important commitment of the twelve countries to develop, through physical integration, transport, energy and communications infrastructures.

On May 23, 2008, in Brasilia, the result of the evolution presented, the UNASUL emerged. Finally, SA came to have an international legal personality, at the beginning of its political, economic and social coordination. In this forum, in December 2008, the CDS was created, expanding defense cooperation.

This economic and political integration is fully backed by the population of SA. An expressive number of Latin-Americans, 77%, will support the economic integration. In Brazil, there are a high number, with 66% in accordance with this. In the region, the support for political integration initiatives, such as UNASUL, although still loud, is a bit smaller: 60% (CUÉ, 2016).

Figure 1- Percentage of population in favor of political integration



Source: Latinobarômetro, 2016 apud Beliz and Chelala, 2016, p. 22.

2.2 Integration of the military field

Trying to integrate into the defense area, the pioneer step was in 1890, when the First International American Conference launched the principle of "hemispheric collective security", which was consecrated, in 1942, at the Rio de Janeiro Conference, with the Inter-American Defense Board (IID). Established during the Second World War, it defined that: "[...] an attack

by a non-American State against an American State will be considered an attack against all the signatory countries." This led to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) and the Organization of American States (OEA), in 1948.

The OEA has absorbed the JID, TIAR and also the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The Rio Treaty demonstrated its ineffectiveness during the Falklands War between Argentina and Britain in 1982, as the USA, before a standoff between allied members of the Organization of the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) and the Rio Treaty, defined their most favorable position to the United Kingdom (SCHNEIDER, 2003).

The American Armies created, in 1960, the Conference of American Armies (CEA), for the exchange between the Armies of the Americas. In 1995, under the leadership of the USA, the Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas (CMDAs) was created.

MERCOSUL has allowed a relaxation in the area of security and defense in SA. The Mutual Trust Promotion Measures (MFCM), without excluding the USA, have been an instrument that brought the subcontinent closer, as well as the use of its Armies in peacekeeping missions (FREIRE, 2016). With the advent of UNASUL, military integration expands its list of activities, involving the entire subcontinent. With the CDS, in 2008, defense cooperation, previously focused on the level of the Armed Forces, was raised to the political level.

3 The time and the opportunity for the creation of the cds.

SA has been the last region in the world to organize politically around a common project, in contrast to the European Union (EU), the African Union, the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and other regional blocs. In all of history, until the creation of UNASUL, the Heads of State of AS met only six times, all after the year 2000, when there was the first meeting (GARCIA, 2010).

A first explanation will probably be in the strong power of magnetization of the relations that historically all the countries of the region maintained with the North. That was, until recently, the central and practically exclusive axis of the external relations of the South American countries (GARCIA, 2010). In this context, it is necessary to deepen the analysis on some points that show the opportunity of the creation of the CDS.

Since the end of the last century, we can observe the recent effort of the nations of the subcontinent to seek an alignment of their positions in international bodies and forums, such as the G-20 (fruit of the Brazilian initiative) and in the negotiations of the Doha Round. It is worth remembering the decision of the Summit of the Unit of the Latin American and the Caribbean, held in February 2010, to affirm its support for Argentina in the question of the Malvinas (COSTAS, 2010).

In 2008, when the creation of UNASUL and CDS, most of the Presidents (Luis Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil; Evo Morales in Bolivia; Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Fernando Lugo in Paraguay, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela; and Couple Kirchner in Argentina) were on the left wing and shared similar ideologies, with the exception perhaps of Colombia (Álvaro Uribe). At its gesta-

tion, 2008-2011, the scenario of ideological congruence coincides, exactly with the most effective years of that institution, from 2011 to 2014 (LUIGI JÚNIOR, 2017).

Also in the economic area, the timing was very appropriate. The countries of the region expanded their GDP at considerable rates (FIORI, 2013). Brazil was a reference and tried to expand its influence in the region:

At the end of the first decade of the 21st century, Brazil concentrated half of the South American population and was the main player within the continental geopolitical and economic board [...] in 2001, the Brazilian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was around 550 billion and was lower than the sum of the output of the other South American countries, which was around US \$ 640 billion [...] ten years later, the relationship changed radically: Brazilian GDP grew to reach approximately 2.5 trillion dollars in 2011, while the gross product value of the rest of South America was about 1.6 trillion dollars (FIORI, 2013, p. 36, our translation).

Such ideological alignment and the valorization of natural resources in the region were added to the concern with the emergence of the concepts of preventive and unilateral action by the United States since the September 11, 2001 attacks. The fact that the displacement of NATO troops to Afghanistan was the first case of action outside the traditional area of concern of the Alliance, much in addition to its geographical environment (AMORIM, 2009).

In the same way, South American leaders have shown their concern with the reactivation of the 4th US Squadron, designed to operate in the South Atlantic and the Caribbean (FRAGELLI, 2010, p. 497), even more because, as observed, "it coincides with the oil discoveries announced by Brazil on its continental shelf".

These examples are not a unanimous concern in the subcontinent, but they have served as an argument for many to advocate a greater capacity for deterrence and for the development of a greater synergy of the South American countries to ensure the defense of their natural resources and sovereignty. The CDS, in this context, was presented as a very appropriate tool.

This greater South American identity has been facilitated mainly by the approach of Argentina and Brazil. The Brazil - Argentina alliance is for UNASUL what the United Kingdom - France alliance was for the European Union. For many, the analysis made by the Wall Street Journal and published by the Argentine newspaper *El Clarín* (MOFFETT, 2010) would be unimaginable. The article showed that some Argentines are beginning to accept a Brazilian preeminence more naturally on the regional stage, due to the possible positive reflections for Argentina of Brazilian protagonism.

Another point that contributes to the expansion of military integration was the similarity and congruity of the defense policies of the AS countries, which are very similar in their aims and strategies, as the *Comparative Atlas of Defense in Latin America / 2012* points out. Also in relation to internal security, there are great similarities in terms of constitutional precepts and limits (SOUSA FILHO, 2012).

Thus, it is possible to observe that, in 2008, there were many political, economic, ideological and military elements that showed cooperative intentions and aptitudes. In addition, the existing legal base contributes to the creation and operation of the CDS, expanding the integration of AS in the defense area.

4 The results and the effectiveness of the CDS

Deepening the analysis of the CDS, it's possible to observe that its structure provides that the Ministers of Defense of the countries in UNASUL work directly with the representatives of the highest level of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs (MRE), allowing a greater inter-ministerial integration in the issues inherent in defense. Thus, the defense issues start to be treated at the political level of the international scene.

The presidency of the council is rotating, corresponding to the same country that holds the presidency, pro tempore, of UNASUL. In accordance with what was established in the normative body, the CDS annually develops its institutional activities through the so-called "Action Plan", which is elaborated by the Executive Instance of the Council (the Deputy Ministers) and is set forth for the consideration of Ministers of Defense for its proper approval. Since its creation, the South American Defense Council has developed a set of activities under four thematic axes, namely: Axis 1 – Defense Policies; Axis 2 – Military Cooperation, Humanitarian Action and Peace Operations; Axis 3 - Defense Industry and Technology; and Axis 4 – Education and Training.

Thus, the CDS carried out, between 2009 and 2018, a series of meetings in its executive format (Vice Ministers of Defense) and Ministers of Defense. Interactions of representations of foreign relations and defense occurred, resulting in the various "action plans" and a distribution of tasks for the member countries. It is worth remembering some important initiatives of the CDS, as a result of the discussions and decisions that occurred in some of its meetings².

In March 2009, in Chile, the First Ordinary Meeting was held with the Ministers of Defense. The Declaration of Santiago de Chile established the objectives of: a) Consolidate AS as a zone of peace; b) Build a South American identity defense; and c) Generate consensus for regional cooperation in defense. In addition, the South American Center for Strategic Defense Studies (CSEED) was created in Buenos Aires. Even in this Meeting, the crisis between Ecuador and Colombia was successfully confronted, involving Venezuela (ARAVENA, 2012), which has resulted in a Colombian intervention in Ecuadorian territory to combat the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Colombia accused the other two governments of supporting the FARC.

The Extraordinary Meeting of the CDS of Quito, Ecuador, in November 2009, was the result of the Extraordinary Dome of the UNASUL of Bariloche, in August 2009, held to discuss the American bases in Colombia (Endnote 263, of 27/11/2009, from the MRE of Brazil).

² Taken from the official site of the CDS: www.unasurcds.org.

The CDS emerged, then, as an important forum for the discussion of sensitive issues, receiving from the South American leaders the order to build measures of mutual trust that would support regional peace and cordiality (Endnote 4162, of 08/28/2009, of the MRE from Brazil).

Since then, various meetings of the Ministers and Deputy Ministers of Defense of UNASUL have been held. From the reading of the Action Plans of 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 it is observed that some points were not attended to in their fullness, being, therefore, repeated in the following biennial plan. As of 2012, the Action Plan has been proposed annually and the official CDS website itself presents the evolution and achievement of the goals. The analysis of the 2012, 2013 and 2014 Action Plans confirms that they presented an effective and promising execution. On the other hand, as of 2014, with the change of protagonism in Brazil and the worsening of the economic crisis, the rate has been reduced, mainly, from 2017, with lack of consensus for the replacement of the Secretary General (LUIGI JÚNIOR, 2017).

An important advance obtained by the CDS was that, in the Superior School of War (ESG) of Brazil, the Advanced South American Defense Course (CAD-SUR) is taught to train both civilians and military personnel working in the defense area. The UNASUL countries, based on regional cooperation.

The complementary Institutions of the South American Defense Course are the Center for Strategic Defense Studies (CEED) and the South American Defense School

(ESUDE). The CEED, based in the city of Buenos Aires, Argentina, as of 2009, has carried out works aimed at distinguishing and reporting matters of interest such as: expenses in defense of the member countries of the bloc, inventories of military equipment of the countries, the institutionality of the defense sector, the gender policy in the defense, as well as the information of the military exercises carried out in the region (ARREDONDO, 2017).

The South American Defense School (ESUDE), located at the UNASUL facilities in the city of Quito (Ecuador), was created with the objective of monitoring and articulating the national initiatives of the member states for the training of civilians and military in matters of defense and regional security at strategic political level (ARREDONDO, 2017).

On February 28 2018, took place, through videoconference, the XIV Meeting of the Executive Instance of the South American Defense Council, the VIII Meeting of the Directive Council of the Center for Strategic Defense Studies and the IV Meeting of the Superior Council of the South American Defense School. The meeting was led by the Pro Tempore Secretariat of the CDS, Mr. Horacio Aldo Chighizola, Secretary of Strategy and Military Affairs of the Ministry of Defense of Argentina and involved the participation of delegations from the twelve member States of the Union of South American Nations, the South American Defense School and the Center for Strategic Defense Studies.

Some initiatives have prospered more strongly (ARREDONDO, 2017), acquiring supremacy in relation to others, so that some axes of action are maintained with greater energy and degree of activity, emerging proposals of broad consensus in relation to the topics described then: a) Homologation of Defense Expenses and measures of mutual trust; b) Compilation of data from the Military Inventories; c) Prevention exercises and responses to natural disasters in

the region; d) Common cataloging of the material of the Armed Forces; e) Cyberdefense and cybersecurity; f) Strengthening the concept of humanitarian law in the region; and h) Peace Operations, together with the implementation of UN Resolution No. 1325, for the integration of women in this type of operations.

5 Is there a future for unasul?


It is worth noting that the CDS was created and based on the structure of an organ with little maturity: UNASUL. The success and survival of UNASUL determine, in part, the CDS. Thus, an attempt will be made to build a prospective vision on that organ. Maid has been years, by Brazilian initiative, the UNASUL is paralyzed. The cause was the veto of Venezuela - like support of Bolivia, of Ecuador and Suriname - to the candidacy of Argentine embassy José Octávio Bordón for or position of General Secretary of Organism (OLIVEIRA, 2018).

Brazil and five other countries in the region (Colombia, Peru, Chile, Paraguay and Argentina) officially asked Bolivian Foreign Minister Fernando Huanacuni to find a solution that could end the current state of paralysis of UNASUL. Since January 2017, there have been no more meetings of foreign ministers, no summit of presidents, and there have been only a few thematic meetings. The last secretary general was former president of Colombia Ernesto Samper. He should have left office in mid-2016 but ended up staying until January 2017 (OLIVEIRA, 2018).

The picture is different today from the time of the creation of the CDS: leftist governments are a minority and, with the worsening of the political and economic crisis in Venezuela, the region became more polarized, unable to coordinate consensual policies. Thus, even more, it can be deduced that UNASUR needs to overcome some challenges: lack of tradition in the cession of sovereignty; great asymmetries, geography as an obstacle; low convergence of macro-economic policies; and more political than economic approach of certain countries.


Despite the political and economic paralysis of today, the data on the evolution of trade between the South American countries since the beginning of MERCOSUL, created in 1991, are relevant. As can be seen in the figures below, in 1990, AS was only the fifth most important commercial bloc with Brazil, with a deficit in the trade balance. This same region, ten years later, was already the first block, with a trade surplus of almost 100 billion.

Figure 2 – South Sudan Map.



Source: Geographic Guide, 2017.

Figure 3 – South Sudan Map.



Source: Geographic Guide, 2017.

Since its launch, there have been doubts regarding the performance of UNASUL due to the excess of bureaucracy, the overlap of regional bodies, the scarcity of financial resources and the difficulty, in the face of the cult of sovereignty and political vanities, of executing projects of infrastructure and energy integration. In order not to slow down or slow down, UNASUL needs to move urgently towards levels of supranational institutionality (BASPINEIRO, 2017).

Perhaps the example of the Pacific Alliance is a reference for pragmatism and real openness and increase of commercial relations (GUIMARAES, 2014). This Block has been more attractive than the UNASUL. The new President of Colombia, in his pose, has already admitted leaving the UNASUL, due to the results and little effectiveness against the crisis in Venezuela.

In addition to the IIRSA, the COSIPLAN (Council OF Infrastructure and Planning), is another UNASUL initiative (PADULA, 2014). It intends to attribute a strategic character and a political control to two projects of infrastructure integration, promoting energy integra-

tion, still has not presented effective results and capacity to create financing formulas for the projects. Without these advances, UNASUL will continue with limiting factors to its full operation and development.

Therefore, the region must discuss how to relaunch UNASUL, independent of the name. Right now, in the Venezuelan refugee crisis, Brazil and its neighbors have to decide how to act jointly and co-ordinately, or assist other nations and international organizations to act on their behalf. Brazil, after the presidential elections of 2018, has an important role in this fundamental project of integration. UNASUL already had this role before.

In June 2012, for example, the region has witnessed the dismissal of Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo for a summary proceeding. The fact was condemned by UNASUL that suspended Paraguay from the bloc. On the one hand, it demonstrates an internal crisis; on the other, it represents a coordinated action of the subcontinent in defense of democracy (FLECK, 2013).

In the same way, in 2008, in Bolivia, a separatist action has been revived in the Media Luna region (ZABOLOTSKY, 2018), with the attempt of emancipation and autonomy of four states in the most developed area of the country. Also in Ecuador, in September 2010, a state of emergency was decreed due to the serious crisis involving the police. Another example that makes explicit the need for a forum to discuss and avoid major crises is a possible friction between Bolivia and Chile, when the International Court of The Haia³ expresses your opinion about the Bolivian claim to obtain an exit to the sea via Chilean territory (OLIVEIRA, 2018). In all this cases, UNASUL was in the past, and could be in the future, an important forum to discuss these crises.

UNASUL is, at times, a reflection of the functioning of strictly intergovernmental schemes, in which the absorption of national policies ringed with differentiated and polarized positions among States ends up diminishing the dynamism of convergent wills. The lack of definition in processes where everything is decided by consensus paralyze the integrationist structures and purposes, as has been the case for many long months without the election of a General Secretary (BASPINEIRO, 2017).

6 Possibilities and contributions of the cds: advantages that can be obtained

The CDS is an organ of recent creation and, throughout its brief existence, has been presenting new forms of action that increase its relevance and its area of influence. Next, a series of possibilities will be analyzed, some of them not yet developed officially by the new Council, but which are of special interest for the south american nations.

An important possibility of the CDS is the **increase of the South American defense industries**. The fragility of the industrial sector and the consequent external dependence on defense products constitute a great strategic vulnerability for the region. Investments in technology bring relevant returns. History confirms the importance of this capacity in times of crisis, when the acquisition of MEM suffers political inferences (AGUIAR, 2013). According to the

3 The International Court of Justice, better known as the Hague Court, marked for October 1 the verdict over Bolivia's claim to compel Chile to negotiate a "sovereign exit" to the Pacific Ocean.

statistics of 2012, of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), purchases of weapons by SA grew by 150% in the last five years compared to the period between 2000 and 2004, while in the world the increase was of 22%. In the various CDS action plans, the development of the regional defense industry and technological capacity are essential points. This development necessarily depends on the success of the sector in Brazil⁴.

Examples of projects that can bring together collective efforts in the region are the Brazilian nuclear propulsion submarine, which has a contract with France for the development of a Brazilian prototype, with integral technological transfer (VILLELA, 2013) and the ambitious project of the freighter KC - 390. Confirming the idea of the CDS to increase the synergy of the efforts in MEM projects in AS, the KC - 390 has already attracted the interest of other nations in its chain of production and acquisition, such as Chile and Colombia. Argentina has already shown its willingness to participate, having entrusted five units, after having set up its Aircraft Factory in Córdoba (FADEA), proposing to participate as a supplier of parts of the KC-390.

Although small if compared to North America, Europe and Asia, the defense market in SA is presented as an option for the expansion of regional exports of defense products. In the period from 2000-2010, the countries of the region absorbed 56% of the Brazilian exports of MEM, compared to 25% in the 1980-1989 period and 11% in the 1990/99 period⁵. Defense cooperation contributes to share costs in research and development, increasing the volume of production and demand. Therefore, Brazil can coordinate the creation of a "technological park" for its war industry and create a regional "cluster" capable of meeting the interests of its neighbors (ODEBRECHT, 2010, p. 376).

Another possibility is that the **CDS can provide the subcontinent with increased bargaining power and regional deterrence**. The CDS, within a realistic vision of international relations, can increase its joint capacity to defend the common interests of SA in international forums. Despite not contemplating a classical military alliance, it allows joint positions to be adopted in the face of relevant situations, aligning the speeches and positions of its members in the discussions and agreements with other countries and blocs on the defense issue.

SA has availed much, worldwide, of multilateralism. Proof of this is their increasing participation in various issues of global impact, acting as a block. Following this reasoning, the CDS approaches its members in the discussion of defense issues, giving the feeling of unity to the other blocks. The economic blocs, invariably, end up dealing with security issues (GUERREIRO, 2009).

The CDS could add the weight of the collective that owns a block. With the increase in regional defense cooperation, some issues may be addressed in a coordinated manner by the

4 It is enough to observe the data of the document "The military balance of South America", 2008, of the CENM (New Majority Studies Center), which points out that Brazilian defense resources account for 53% of the regional total allocated to SA.

5 Data of the Department of Defense Industry of the Federation of Industries of São Paulo (FIESP) in the document "South American Integration in Defense: Perspectives and Challenges", 01/02/2012.

CDS and UNASUL. The definition of the limits of the maritime waters of exclusive exploration is an example of the variety of subjects in which the Council could conform the interests. It could converge on issues such as nuclear and exploitation rights over Antarctica, points that, even today, motivate discussions on the international stage (LA ARGENTINA..., 2009).

We could also imagine the **creation of a regional forum for the consolidation of peace and for relevant discussions without exogenous interference**. South America, despite being one of the least bellicose areas in the world, without major conflicts between its countries, still presents certain areas of friction that, at times, threaten to destabilize the region. In addition to this scenario, existing bodies, such as the OEA, for example, under the leadership of the United States, have not been efficient and supported. In this context, the CDS continues to gain prestige.

Another possibility of action for the new Council would be the **coordinated action against transnational crimes and the fight against drug trafficking**, without the influence of the United States. Many Armed Forces act to combat organized crime, including Brazil and, recently, Argentina (SPEKTOR, 2018). The South American nations already present some agreements and treaties to act jointly in the repression of transnational crimes.

It is worth mentioning some initiatives: the joint use of radars by Argentina and Bolivia on the border to detect drug trafficking; the reinforcement of the combined presence of the Armed Forces of Colombia and Brazil, in the border area (MONTEIRO, 2010, p. 192-195); and the "Abate Law", which allows in Brazil and Venezuela, the interception of aircraft that overfly, illegally, the airspace between both countries. In addition, the CDS can be the inducer of new coordination and treaties that allow a synergic action among its members.

SA has witnessed the emergence of new sources of tension, the result of the extrapolation of internal and migratory problems, generating delicate situations. The CDS could be **an instrument for the solution of crisis**. The refugees and displaced Venezuelans are examples of this. There are other sources that can generate tensions. Brazil and Paraguay still having problems in relation to about five hundred thousand Brazilians who own land on the Paraguayan side, known as "*brasiguaios*". Since 2006, the Bolivian government of Evo Morales has announced the departure of Brazilians from an area of 50 kilometers adjacent to the border with Brazil (PERIÓDICO DO SENADO, 2011). It is estimated that five thousand people live in the region.

The adoption of aspects of the European defense model and the creation of a South American peace force are advantages that can be seen in the CSD, which may have as a mirror other institutions of greater longevity, expanding its range of action and adopting successful policies, such as the synergistic actions on defense and foreign policy adopted by Europe.

The South American military integration policy would have two points in common with the European one. The first point would be the political and military convergence of two former rivals (United Kingdom and France in the case of EU would be Brazil and Argentina in AS). The second it was the strong influence suffered by the USA (LAMAZIÈRE, 2001).

The difficulties that the EU has to acquire a Common Foreign Policy or its own defense and security policy are well known. An important step for the EU, but one that has not yet had the desired effect, was the **indication of a foreign relations representative for the bloc**. The

CDS already brings together the Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs of the countries in their deliberations, and may, in the future, have a foreign relations representative to negotiate on behalf of the region.

One of the aspects of NATO is about **Civic Military Cooperation (CIMIC)**. Recently, Brazil and other South American nations have supported countries in catastrophes, such as the 2010 earthquake in Chile and the floods in Bolivia in 2012, with numerous practical demonstrations of regional solidarity.

The Armed Forces of CDS members are invariably called to help their nations in times of catastrophes. Thus, bringing together the defense portfolios of the various countries, the CDS could coordinate actions in this regard, equipping itself with the necessary instruments to carry out this task. Line (h) of Article 14 of the creation note of the CDS says: "Share experiences and support humanitarian actions, such as minefield retreat, prevention and mitigation of natural disasters and assistance to victims [...]".

Another aspect that should be discussed, within the scope of the CDS, is the incentive policies for the defense industry, which could be modeled on European policy. When analyzing the conclusion⁶ to which the European Commission has come, in 2006, when the juncture of its defense industry was studied, some problems in common with AS can be diagnosed and similar solutions can be glimpsed. Among the problems identified, there has been a need to improve financing conditions, market fragmentation and the opening of new consumer markets.

Another point that could be coordinated by the CDS would be the idea that nations concentrate on fewer activities than they do today. Thus, and seeking complementarity and synergy, they would **devote their attention to centers of excellence** that should be a consequence of a process essentially oriented to the market and to the peculiarities and capacities of the members of the CDS.

The CDS has as one of the main axes of its action plans the training and training of the South American military. In this sense, reference can be made to the efforts of various EU countries to adapt to the Bologna Process⁷ which seeks to homogenize degrees and studies, in general (not military). It is not a question of copying this process but of creating something similar for military teaching in AS, led by the CDS to facilitate the exchange and the creation of common study centers that serve the various Armed Forces of the CDS.

If on the one hand Brazil is not interested in the creation of a combined rapid-action regional military force, the proposal, of 2010, of the then president of Peru Alan Garcia, regarding the creation of a **South American Peace Force** should be analyzed. This proposal has received the initial support of Brazil and Chile. It is therefore necessary to study the recent history of the actions of the South American troops in peace missions. It is worth noting that in

6 Which seeks to homogenize degrees and studies, in general (not military). It is not a question of copying this process but of creating something similar for military teaching in AS, led by the CDS to facilitate the exchange and the creation of common study centers that serve the various Armed Forces of the CDS.

7 Process of Bologna is an agreement that in 1999 signed the ministers of Education of different countries of Europe, in Bologna. It is a joint declaration (the EU does not have competences in the field of education) that started a convergence process that aimed to facilitate the exchange of graduates and adapt the content of university studies to social demands, improving their quality and competitiveness.

the UN Charter, Article 52, does not prevent the formation of regional organizations for matters related to the maintenance of international peace and security.

The analysis of the use of the armies of the South American countries in peacekeeping missions is an instrument to confirm the degree of cooperation existing in the military area. In 2011, Brazil assumed command of the UN Naval Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), demonstrating that South America is increasingly being requested in this type of mission.

The United Nations Mission for the Stabilization of Haiti (MINUSTAH), led by Brazil, has the participation of several members of the CDS, stimulating the political convergence of these countries in forums such as the Latin American Association of Peace Operations (ALCOPAZ) and in the CDS. That MINUSTAH be the first mission of peace without the leading role of the main powers, urges the countries of the region to assume a greater commitment to regional and global security. The Binational Combined Peace Force Cruz del Sur (Chile - Argentina), already made available to the UN since 2010 to fulfill peace missions, is an example in this direction (BARRIOS, 2011).

Thus, it is possible to conclude that the European model presents some points that could serve as a model for the CDS. It is not a matter of forming a military alliance in the South Atlantic, but of having as a reference some policies and structures. The idea of a South American peace force under the coordination of the CDS also seems to be a very useful possibility, since a pre-existing and modular peace force would develop the doctrine and structures necessary to execute its work more efficiently, enhancing its performance.

Brazil, a true continent, with more than 200 million inhabitants (55% of the population of AS), more than 47% of the territory of the subcontinent (8.5 million square kilometers), and a GDP of more than 1.31 trillions of dollars (56% of the regional economy), stands out on the scene of the former Luso-Hispanic colonies. Analyzing the other regional blocs, throughout the world, it is necessary an agglutinative pole around which the other nations are associated (WEISE, 2010). Thus, probably, the CDS and UNASUL could **help the consolidation of the brazilian leadership and increase of Mutual Confidence Measures (MCM)**.

In addition to economic power, Brazil is looking for its space on the global board. Since the 1980s, it had been leading the Third World in the responses to asymmetries, notably the Group of 77 Meeting (Rio de Janeiro, 1983) and the rejection of the US proposal in the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), in 1986. Similarly, the SA - Africa (ASA) and SA - Arab Countries (ASPA) forums were created, as well as the IBAS (India, Brazil and South Africa). Between 2008 and 2010, it has opened 66 new Brazilian embassies and has diplomatic relations with all members of the UN (SOUSA FILHO, 2012).

According to traditional geopolitical views, the peripheral position of SA is clear. During the last hundred years, three geopolitical theories dominated international politics: the first is MACKINDER's "Heart Land", the second is SPYKMAN's "Rimland," and finally the theory of "Maritime Power", of MAHAN, in none of them has more significance or importance relative to global power (MATTOS, 1992).

Brazil sees scenarios favorable to increasing its influence at the regional and global levels. HUNTINGTON, in his book "The Clash of Civilizations and the New World Order", 1996, presents

LA in the same bloc, but without clear leadership. MAFRA, a Brazilian geopolitical thinker, presents the "Theory of the Cuaterno", advocating that, from the first quarter of the twenty-first century, the world would be divided into four blocks: North American, European, Asian and South American. The latter was initially composed of the South American countries and, subsequently, increased by the countries of Central America, the Caribbean and Mexico (MAFRA, 2006).

In this sense, Brazil could prove its ability to contribute to stability in its strategic environment, acting more directly in the resolution of regional crises. The proposal for the creation of the CDS was Brazilian, approving it in record time (about 10 months), after a series of visits developed by the then Minister of Defense Nelson Jobim. The breadth and diversity of relations built by Brazil in the last ten years prioritize SA, without abandoning traditional partners such as the US and EU, as well as being extended to new actors in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, not only in economic, but also in Defense (SOUSA FILHO, 2012, p. 119).

The international recognition of SA and its sovereign and independent policy, in synergy with the Brazilian efforts, opens spaces and opportunities in the complex world order. The CDS is more an instrument that reinforces this vision.

A natural contribution of the CDS, which is the result of all other contributions, is the **increase in Mutual Trust Measures (MCAs)** as transparency of defense expenditures increases and military cooperation is improved, reducing mistrust between its members. Joint action in peace and humanitarian actions, synergistic investments in the defense industry, discussion of crises at the regional level and integrated training of human resources are actions that generate growing ties of friendship in SA.

7 Final considerations

Initially, it was possible to note that the CDS resulted from a process of regional integration, which matured throughout the twentieth century and intensified greatly in the 21st century. South America was one of the last regions in the world to deepen political and economic cooperation with a broader coverage of the subcontinent. Defense integration has evolved and passed the phase of geopolitical rivalry and mutual distrust. In addition, before the CDS, it occurred at a level below strategic and policy decisions. The CDS allowed for greater cooperation in defense, raising the level of the discussions, with the participation of the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs.

The role of Brazil in this whole process was decisive and has brought, from MERCOSUL, a more independent and sovereign vision for regional integration. UNASUL represented a new scope for cooperation in SA, more ambitious and encompassing the area of defense, materialized by the CDS.

Both UNASUL and the South American Defense Council emerged at a time of political alignment between leftist governments with similar ideological bias. Likewise, the economic situation was highly appropriate, creating conditions to expand trade relations and investments

in the infrastructure of connection between nations, as well as allowing planning beyond the sovereign borders of the South American nations.

At the same time, UNASUR and CDS have shown timeliness in relation to a series of factors, among which the following are the approach of Brazil and Argentina and the sustainable growth of the economy and the international projection of Brazil. Besides this, we could observe the regional perception of exogenous threats to its natural resources; the search for a new space for congruence and the alignment of opinions in SA; and the maturity of relations and commercial exchange among the members of UNASUL.

Therefore, these favorable conditions, in the political and economic field, have changed radically since 2014, causing a weakening of the initiatives, which were still consolidated and tested in their first challenges for the solution of crises. Thus, from the Venezuelan crisis, the changes in the ideological visions of the South American governments and the low economic growth, UNASUL was paralyzed and runs the risk of extinction.

Regarding the effectiveness and results obtained by the CDS, it was verified that until 2014, the goals proposed in its action plans have been satisfactorily achieved. Then, the regional scenario and the perspectives of UNASUR have generated paralysis. Defense integration has increased, while some crises and frictions have been successfully addressed in this forum and UNASUL. Likewise, it has been able to implement important measures for the deepening of mutual confidence measures.

In addition, the CDS can make important contributions to regional integration, from its maturation, such as: increasing regional deterrence capacity; the increase of the South American defense industry; the increase and synergy in the fight against transnational crimes. It is important to remake other possibilities: create a regional forum for the discussion of relevant aspects and for the consolidation of peace; the adoption of some practices, duly adapted to South American reality, used by NATO and the EU; and the consolidation of Brazilian leadership.

In other hands, as an organ of UNASUL, CDS depends on the survival of this to proceed with your performance. The future of UNASUR is very foggy today, included some points that need a course correction. In this sense Brazil has a crucial role. South America has the challenge of building, by its own ideas and with the establishment of a particular geopolitical and defense thinking, a more integrated and prosperous subcontinent. This task is not performed overnight. It is the result of the maturity of the institutions and instruments of integration of the subcontinent that, despite the obstacles and difficulties, suggest that it is worth making this bet for the future.

The success of the CDS is a fundamental step in that direction for all that it contributes for the cooperation in the matter of defense and for the regional stability. UNASUL, in turn was more a step forward, as the organizations that will precede it. Therefore, with the necessary adjustments, this breadth of integration, across the subcontinent and encompassing defense, is a matter of time.

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