

English Edition

ISSN 2316-4891 (Online)

ISSN 2316-4833 (Print)



# Coleção Meira Mattos

revista das ciências militares



Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército  
v. 15 n. 53 May/August 2021

---

#### **EDITORIAL BOARD**

##### **Gen Bda Marcio de Souza Nunes Ribeiro**

Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército  
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.

##### **Cel Carlos Eduardo De Franciscis Ramos**

Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército  
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.

#### **EDITOR**

##### **Prof. Dr. Tássio Franchi**

Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército  
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.

#### **EDITORIAL ADVISER**

Carlos Shigueki Oki  
OKI Serviços de Informação e Imagem

#### **TRANSLATION SERVICES**

Oriente-se Produções

#### **LANGUAGE REVISION**

Maj Mônica da Silva Boia  
Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército  
Rio de Janeiro-RJ, Brasil.

1º Ten Raquel Luciano Gomes

Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército  
Rio de Janeiro-RJ, Brasil.

#### **EDITORIAL SERVICES**

Tikinet Edição

#### **TYPESETTING**

Gabriel Córdova | COMUNICA  
Joaquim Olimpio | COMUNICA

#### **SCIENTIFIC BOARD**

##### **Prof. Dr. Antônio Carlos Moraes Lessa**

Universidade de Brasília  
Brasília, DF, Brasil.

##### **Prof. Dr. Antonio Fonfría Mesa**

Universidad Complutense de Madrid  
Madrid, España.

##### **Prof. Dr. Daniel Zirker**

University of Waikato  
Hamilton, New Zealand.

##### **Prof. Dr. Fernando da Silva Rodrigues**

Universidade Salgado de Oliveira  
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.

##### **Prof. Dr. Francisco Carlos Teixeira da Silva**

Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército  
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.

##### **Prof. Dr. Frank McCann (*in memoriam*)**

University of New Hampshire  
Durham, NH, United States of America.

##### **Profa. Dra. Graciela De Conti Pagliari**

Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina  
Florianópolis, SC, Brasil.

##### **Prof. Dr. Hector Luis Saint Pierre**

Universidade Estadual Paulista Júlio de Mesquita Filho  
Franca, SP, Brasil.

##### **Gen Bda Juraci Ferreira Galdino**

Instituto Militar de Engenharia  
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.

##### **Prof. Dr. Marco Aurélio Chaves Cepik**

Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul  
Porto Alegre, RS, Brasil.

##### **Prof. Dr. Marcos Aurelio Guedes de Oliveira**

Universidade Federal de Pernambuco  
Recife, PE, Brasil.

##### **Prof. Dr. Octavio Amorim Neto**

Fundação Getúlio Vargas  
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.

##### **Prof. Dr. Paulo Gilberto Fagundes Visentini**

Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul  
Porto Alegre, RS, Brasil.

##### **Prof. Dr. Shiguenoli Miyamoto**

Universidade Estadual de Campinas  
Campinas, SP, Brasil.

##### **Prof. Dr. Vinicius Mariano de Carvalho**

King's College London  
London, United Kingdom.

##### **Prof. Dr. Wanderley Messias da Costa**

Universidade de São Paulo  
São Paulo, SP, Brasil.

# Coleção Meira Mattos

revista das ciências militares

---

v. 15 n. 53 May/August 2021  
Rio de Janeiro

English Edition

ISSN 2316-4891 (Online)  
ISSN 2316-4833 (Print)

Coleç. Meira Mattos	Rio de Janeiro	v. 15	n. 53	p. 127-252	May./Aug. 2021
---------------------	----------------	-------	-------	------------	----------------

## ABOUT

The Coleção Meira Mattos is an academic not for profit publication circulated three times a year by the Military Sciences Post-Graduation Program of the Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército (ECEME) based on the policy of free access to information.

## ADDRESS AND CONTACT

Praça General Tibúrcio, 125, Praia Vermelha, Rio de Janeiro/RJ, Brasil.  
CEP: 22290-270.  
Tel: (21) 3873-3868 /Fax: (21) 2275-5895  
e-mail: info.cmm@eceme.eb.mil.br

## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

Except where otherwise stated, the full content of this Journal is licensed under a Creative Commons License of the CC-BY type.

Published texts do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the ECEME or of the Brazilian Army.

## EDITORIAL SERVICES

Tikinet Edição

## PRESS

Triunfal Gráfica e Editora

## COVER GRAPHIC DESIGN

Designed by the Production, Publicity and Cataloging Section, based on art by Harerama Santos da Costa, ECEME Desktop Publishing Section.

## DISPONÍVEL EM PORTUGUÊS / DISPONIBLE EN ESPAÑOL

<<http://ebrevistas.eb.mil.br/index.php/RMM/index>>

## Cataloging in Publication (CIP)

C691 Coleção Meira Mattos : revista das ciências militares. — Vol. 1, n. 24- .  
— Rio de Janeiro : ECEME, 2007-  
v. : il. ; 28 cm.

Quarterly.

Published from no. 1-14 with the title *Padeceme*, and from no. 15-23 with the titles *Padeceme* and *Coleção Meira Mattos*.

*Padeceme* e *Coleção Meira Mattos*.

ISSN 2316-4891 (Online). — ISSN 2316-4833 (Print)

1. DEFENSE. 2. MILITARY SCIENCE. I. Escola de Comando Estado-Maior do Exército (Brasil).

CDD 355

---

# CONTENTS

## EDITORIAL

- The Brazilian military history is in mourning** v  
*Tássio Franchi, Sandro Teixeira Moita*

## ARTICLES

- Public procurement of innovation for obtaining complex defense systems** 127  
*Wankley Lima de Oliveira, Janaina Rodrigues Marcos Dantas de Sousa Oliveira, Jorge Marques de Campos Júnior, Patrícia de Oliveira Matos*
- The Trinitarian role of the Brazilian Army: bases of a "multitasking" force** 147  
*Oscar Medeiros Filho, Marcelo de Jesus Santa Bárbara*
- Proposition of an index for sports diplomacy in the military context** 167  
*Delon Philbert Willis, Angela Nogueira Neves*
- The Relationship between Diplomacy and Military Power in the Grand Strategies of Barão do Rio Branco and Amorim** 185  
*Walter Maurício Costa de Miranda, Alexandre Rocha Violante, Marcelo Mello Valença*
- United States, China and the power transition in the 21st century** 207  
*Eduardo Migowski*
- The theme as a frame: an opportunity of synergy among Intelligence, Social Communication and Psychological Operations** 223  
*Luiz Eduardo Maciel Lopes*

## BOOK REVIEWS

- The fifth domain: defending our country, our companies and ourselves in the age of cyber threats**  
*Rafael Gonçalves Mota* 245



## The Brazilian military history is in mourning

**Tássio Franchi** 

Exército Brasileiro. Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior  
do Exército, Instituto Meira Mattos.  
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.  
editor.cmm@eceme.eb.mil.br

COLEÇÃO MEIRA MATTOS

ISSN on-line 2316-4891 / ISSN print 2316-4833

<http://ebrevistas.eb.mil.br/index.php/RMM/index>



Creative Commons  
Attribution Licence

**Sandro Teixeira Moita** 

Exército Brasileiro.  
Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército.  
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.  
sandrotm@gmail.com

It is with regret that we begin this editorial informing of the death of an illustrious member of the Scientific Council of the Meira Mattos Collection, Dr. Francis (Frank) Daniel McCann Junior (1938-2021), who died on March 2, 2021.

Frank McCann, as he was popularly known in Brazil, was born in Bloomington, Indiana, USA, on December 15, 1938, died on March 2, 2021. He graduated in History from Niagara University (1960), completed his master's degree at Kent University (1962) and a PhD at Indiana University (1967).

In the United States, he taught at the University of Wisconsin, at the University of River Falls and at the United States Military Academy at West Point, before arriving at the University of New Hampshire (UNH), where he stayed from 1972 to 2007, the safe haven from which he wrote several of his best known works. In Brazil, he served as a visiting professor at the University of Brasilia and at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro.

His relationship with the country began in 1965, when he obtained a Fulbright scholarship to study Brazil-United States relations. He came to live in the country with his family (his wife Diane and daughters Teresa Bernadette and Katherine Diane) and returned several times to research and socialize with friends that he made over the decades. Frank McCann formally and informally received several Brazilian researchers in the USA, who assisted him in his research. For his studies, the Foreign Relations Ministry awarded him the title of Commander of the Order of Rio Branco (1987) and the Brazilian Army awarded the Peacemaker Medal (1995).

The 82-year-old Brazilianist left an extensive body of work that includes books, chapters, articles, reviews and other publications. His research dedicated to the study of the Brazilian Armed Forces yielded books such as: *Brazilian American Alliance (The Aliança Brasileira Americana)*, 1937-1945; *Soldiers of the Fatherland: a History of the Brazilian Army, 1889-1937*; and *Brazil and the United States during World War II*. When this last book was released, Dr. McCann held a lecture at ECEME. Taking advantage of this opportunity he also taught a short course on research methods and techniques for civilian and military students of the Posgraduate Program in Military Sciences. Easy demeanor, availability and kindness captivated the students at the time.

The writing of history is done by people with a deep commitment to their themes and research objects. People who dedicate their lives to understanding other individuals, their institutions and dynamics. Frank McCann was one of such people who left a huge legacy that will still be read by generations of American, Brazilian and other scholars. The Meira Mattos Collection recognizes the great researcher that Dr. McCann was, providing relevant contributions to the field of Military Sciences, and is grateful for the privilege of having had him as a member of the Scientific Council of the Collection.



# Public procurement of innovation for obtaining complex defense systems

*Encomiendas tecnológicas de innovación para obtener sistemas complejos de defensa*

**Abstract:** This paper aims to analyze the Public Procurement of Innovation (PPI) model applied to complex defense systems acquisition processes, the opportunities generated by this type of contracting as well as its legal security. The research included literature and document review, considering the literature that addresses the process of obtaining defense products in Brazil, since PPI could benefit the national defense industrial base in the development of technological solutions capable of replacing options provided by the international market, which historically have been subject to restrictions and embargoes by countries that have control over sensitive technologies. The study demonstrated that despite the possibility provided by the legislation, few processes for defense systems acquisition have relied on PPI, until now. The research allowed us to conclude that due to the complexity of a process of complex defense systems acquisitions, the full use of PPI will only be possible through the elaboration of an internal regulation by the Ministry of Defense detailing the process to be followed when contracting a product through a PPI approved by the Audit Institutions.

**Keywords:** Public Procurement of Innovation. PPI. Acquisition. Complex Defense Systems.

**Resumen:** El presente artículo tiene como objetivo analizar el modelo de compras públicas por Encomiendas Tecnológicas (ETEC) aplicadas a la obtención de sistemas complejos de defensa, las oportunidades generadas a partir de este tipo de contratación, así como la seguridad jurídica en emplearlas. La investigación se ha desarrollado por medio de revisión bibliográfica y documental, a la luz de la literatura que aborda el proceso de obtención de productos de defensa en Brasil, ya que las ETEC podrían beneficiar a la base industrial de defensa nacional en el desarrollo de soluciones tecnológicas capaces de sustituir opciones suministradas en el mercado internacional, las cuales, históricamente, son blanco de restricciones y embargos por parte de los países detentores del control de tecnologías sensibles. El estudio demuestra que a pesar de las posibilidades de emplear las ETEC, que dispone la legislación brasileña, pocos procesos para obtener sistemas de defensa se han realizado por medio de ese mecanismo de compras públicas, durante el periodo contemplado por esta investigación. El estudio ha permitido, también, llegar a la conclusión que en función de la complejidad de ese proceso, la plena utilización de las ETEC solo será posible por medio de la elaboración de una reglamentación interna del Ministerio de Defensa, aprobada por los órganos de control y con los debidos detalles que se deben seguir durante la contratación de un producto de defensa (PRODE).

**Palabras-clave:** Encomiendas Tecnológicas. ETEC. Obtención. Sistemas Complejos de Defensa.

**Wankley Lima de Oliveira** 

Força Aérea Brasileira.  
Primeiro Esquadrão do Oitavo Grupo  
de Aviação (1o/8o GAV)  
Natal, RN, Brasil  
wankleylima@gmail.com

**Janaina Rodrigues Marcos Dantas  
de Sousa Oliveira** 

Força Aérea Brasileira.  
Estado-Maior da Aeronáutica.  
Brasília, DF, Brasil.  
contatojanamarcos@gmail.com

**Jorge Marques de Campos Júnior** 

Força Aérea Brasileira. Estado-Maior da  
Aeronáutica.  
Brasília, DF, Brasil.  
marquesjmcj@fab.mil.br

**Patrícia de Oliveira Matos** 

Força Aérea Brasileira. Universidade da  
Força Aérea (UNIFA).  
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.  
pomatos@hotmail.com

**Received: Oct 29, 2020**

**Approved: Dec 18, 2020**

**COLEÇÃO MEIRA MATTOS**

**ISSN on-line 2316-4891 / ISSN print 2316-4833**

<http://ebrevistas.eb.mil.br/index.php/RMM/index>



## 1 Introduction

The acquisition of Defense Products (DEPRO) is a complex activity because it includes cutting-edge technologies, requires significant financial resources and, generally, is undertaken in a context of technological uncertainties, export and technological restrictions and budgetary unpredictability. When procurement is related to Complex Defense Systems, which for the most part includes Strategic Defense Products (SDP)<sup>1</sup>, the decisions become even more complex, since they can impact other expressions of National Power.

The term “system”, according to Blanchard and Blyler (2016), is a complex combination of resources (human, material, equipment, hardware, software, facilities, data, information, services, etc.) integrated in order to meet a specified operational requirement. Also, according to these authors, a system is designed for a specific function, or a series of functions, with the purpose of satisfying an identified need. This concept is based on the concepts defended by Bertalanffy (1977), considered the creator of the General Systems Theory (GST), which describes them as a set of mutually inter-linked units.

Mitchell (2009) clarifies that a complex system is a system with a large number of interacting agents that exhibit non-trivial and self-organized behavior. The author also considers that such systems involve sophisticated processes of information and adaptation via learning or evolution. Complementing this definition, Oliveira (2009) adds that complex systems are products developed in order to meet specific demands and, therefore, require a high capacity for integrating knowledge and skills. (OLIVEIRA, 2009).

A defense system, on the other hand, is considered complex when it has a long production cycle, high unit cost, complex interfaces and intense engineering demand (HOBDA, 1998). Examples of complex defense systems are military aircraft, submarines, armored combat vehicles, missiles, satellites and their subsystems, among others.

The process of procuring defense products according to the Ministry of Defense is the system for acquiring DEPRO, jointly or not, based on military capabilities and its relevance to the national interests (BRASIL, 2018a).

In Brazil, defense products are obtained through the procurement process<sup>2</sup>, the rules of which are defined by the Law 8.666 / 93 and its subsequent amendments. This law seeks to assure fair competition among the bidders in the public sector, impartiality of judgment and the guarantee of selection of the most advantageous proposals for the goods and services demanded by the government agencies. However, some peculiarities of acquiring defense products, such as the lack of solutions in the domestic market, the need

1 Strategic Defense Product is “any DEPRO that, due to technological content, difficulty of acquisition or indispensability, is of strategic interest for national defense” (BRASIL, 2018a, p. 1).

2 Due to the specificity, the hiring of Defense Products may also occur through the waiver of bidding or unenforceability. Among the reasons that justify the waiver of bidding are International Agreements, cases related to National Security (Decree No. 2,225, 1997) and products related to research and development (BRASIL, 1993).

for technological development and the presence of technological risk, demand a more specific approach under the national legislation (Department of Defense Industry, 2011).

In the context of diverse difficulties, not only the defense sector, but all the other public sectors, that deal with the acquisition of high technological content equipment, needed changes in the legislation to enable new ways of procurement, especially those involving research and development of products. It is in this scenario that the Innovation Procurement option appears.

The Procurement of Innovation (PPI) is a type of public procurement under which a public agency or entity may contract a research, development or innovation service to solve specific technical problems (BRASIL, 2018b). This option involves a contractual link that has the characteristic of technological development and risk. The development process can be carried out by an individual company or by a consortium of companies.

The aforementioned public procurement modality represents, therefore, the consolidation of a series of adaptations in the legislation that deals with technology, innovation and tax incentives, making it necessary to analyze its possibilities and the legal apparatus necessary for its effectiveness. In this sense, this article aims to analyze the public procurement model by PPI applied to obtaining complex defense systems, the opportunities generated from this type of contracting, as well as the legal security in their employment.

To make this goal feasible, the methodology employed consisted of exploratory documentary research of the main laws that define the theme, such as the New Legal Regulatory Framework for Science, Technology and Innovation, Decree no. 5.798 / 2006, called the "*Lei do Bem* (Law of Good)", Law 10.973 / 2004, which provides for the use of PPI, the Air Force Command Guidelines, which deal with the Aeronautics Systems and Materials Life Cycle (DCA 400-6), among others. Public documents of the Brazilian Space Agency (AEB) were also raised, such as technical notes and preliminary studies, in order to identify the main practices adopted by the Agency in procurement processes carried out through PPI. In addition to document analysis, a bibliographic review related to technological innovation was carried out to identify the use of PPI in public contracts in the national defense sector, in addition to an approach on complex defense systems, the particularities applicable to acquisitions in the defense sector, and the possible embargoes to which this sector is subjected.

This article is divided into five sections. Following the introduction, the second section reviews the changes in the legislation on technological innovation, with emphasis on the legal aspects and the possibilities provided by PPI. The third section deals with complex defense systems already obtained in Brazil through PPI, as well as the main obstacles to the adoption of this type of contracting by the Singular Forces. The fourth section presents a PPI initiative carried out by the Brazilian Space Agency (AEB), related to the acquisition of a navigation system, the results of which can contribute to learning about the topic, mainly for use in purchasing processes carried out

by Brazilian Armed Forces. Finally, in the last section, the conclusions of the analysis of technological orders within the defense sector are summarized.

## 2 Innovation and public procurement of innovation: legal aspects and opportunities

According to Dosi (1988), innovation refers to the search, discovery, experimentation, development, imitation and adoption of new products, new production processes and new forms of organization. For Longo and Moreira (2013, p. 9), innovation results from a “process that involves interactions between science, technology, research, experimental development, basic industrial technology, engineering and other activities that occur inside, outside and between companies”. According to the authors, the innovation process depends on several factors, such as public policies, formal regulatory framework and usual practices of organizations, suppliers and, in a broader aspect, of society in general.

In the same sense, Freeman (1995) observes that the innovation process is permanent and irreversible, especially in the firm's environment, since the absence of innovation may imply its disappearance. Despite this, the author also highlights the importance of thinking about innovation as part of a *national innovation system*, linked to scientific, technological and industrial policy.

According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), technological innovation is a set of scientific, technological, organizational, financial and commercial measures, including investment in new knowledge, which are intended to lead to the realization of technologically new and or significantly improved products and processes (ORGANIZAÇÃO PARA A COOPERAÇÃO E DESENVOLVIMENTO ECONÔMICO, 2002). In a more restrictive concept, Decree no. 5.798/2006, which regulated the so-called Law of Good, defines technological innovation as:

The conception of a new product or manufacturing process, as well as the addition of new features or characteristics to the product or process that lead to incremental improvements and effective gain in quality or productivity, resulting in greater competitiveness in the market (AGBI, 2020, Our translation).

Therefore, technological innovation is related to the design of a new product or process not yet known, with characteristics different from those existing in a given institution. It is also related to the aggregation of new functionalities, requiring the characteristics of innovative products to be substantially improved or to lead to incremental improvements, and generate advantages and benefits for the institution (AGBI, 2020).

Also, in the Oslo Manual, innovation is defined as the implementation of a new or significantly improved product, process, organizational or business method. The innovation activities would be the scientific, technological, organizational, financial and commercial stages that lead to the increase in these products or processes (ORGANIZAÇÃO PARA A COOPERAÇÃO E DESENVOLVIMENTO ECONÔMICO, 2005).

Despite being an easy concept to understand, the application of the concept to the reality of companies can be more complex. When the sector that produces goods and services for National Defense is considered, this complexity tends to be even greater. Azevedo (2018), who divides innovations between technological and non-technological, defines innovation in the Defense sector as the implementation of a product (good or service), or of a new or significantly improved process, marketing or organizational method, that are capable of altering the organization, preparation and use of military power.

Still regarding innovation in the defense sector, Brazil modified the legislation that deals with the subject, in order to foster national technological development and encourage the Industrial Defense Base (IDB). This participation of Brazil is also due to the need to turn national products, developed through investments in Research, Development and Innovation (RD&I), more competitive in an increasingly fierce market.

In Brazil, the policy of tax incentives was instituted in 1994, with the Industrial Technological Development Program (PTDI)<sup>3</sup>, the objective of which was to stimulate private sector investment in the area of research and innovation, in order to enable the creation of new processes and products or to improve their characteristics, in order to increase the level of competitiveness of Brazilian companies, through tax incentives destined to the technological qualification of the industry (FORMIGONI et al., 2009).

Despite the relevance of the PTDI, the emergence of new market demands required the State to pass other laws in order to improve the incentives that promote national capacities for technological innovations and Research and Development (R&D), as seen in Figure 1.


Despite the importance of the aforementioned legislation, it is worth highlighting the relevance of the New Legal Regulatory Framework for Science, Technology and Innovation<sup>4</sup>. This legislation changes important rules and aims to facilitate the creation of a more dynamic innovation environment in Brazil. This Law seeks to favor the innovation environment by promoting scientific and technological activities, considering them strategic for economic and social development; promoting cooperation and interaction among public entities, among the public and private sectors and among companies themselves; for stimulating innovation activity in companies and in Science and Technology Institutions (STI); and by simplifying procedures for the management of science, technology and innovation projects and adopting control for results in its evaluation (SEBRAE, 2020).

For the defense sector, that works with complex systems which operate on the frontier of existing technology, this New Regulatory Framework may bring advances by including measures to stimulate innovation in companies, such as Innovation Procurement (PPI).

3 The PTDI was instituted by Law 8,661, of June 2, 1993, which provides for tax incentives for the technological training of industry and agriculture, and provides other measures.

4 Law No. 13,243, of 2016, provides for incentives for scientific development, research, scientific and technological training and innovation and was regulated by Decree No. 9,283, of 2018.

Figure 1 - Legislation focused on technological innovation



Source: Adapted from ABGI (2018).

## 2.1 Public procurement of innovation and the legal security of the process

Due to the difficulties related to the access to sensitive technologies, especially those intended for the space and defense sectors, a viable alternative for countries such as Brazil is the autochthonous development of technological solutions<sup>5</sup> through national research, in order to circumvent their current technological dependence (ANDRADE; SANTOS, 2018).

According to Longo and Moreira (2018), sensitive technology is the one that gives rise to sensitive products and/or has dual use, such as space and nuclear technologies. According to the authors, sensitive technologies are controlled by one country, or a group of countries, who consider that "one should not give access to it to other countries, for a certain time, hypothetically for security reasons".

In this scenario, although PPI is a possibility available for the search for solutions to technological problems that involve national interests, some actions must be taken by the contracting public agencies in order to guarantee legal security of the entire process.

One of the major problems faced in processes of defense products acquisition through development is to obey the same rite, defined for other government contracting, established in Law 8.666/93 (Department of Defense of Industry, 2011). This legislation demands, in the initial

<sup>5</sup> Technological solution is the application of a technology or know-how aimed at meeting the needs of creating / modifying / improving a product or process of companies or institutions (ALBUQUERQUE et al., 2015, p. 250).

phase of the process, a sequence of acts that do not contemplate some factors directly related to purchasing defense products, such as technological risk.

In this context, public bodies find it very difficult to both acquire the product appropriate to their needs, and to comply with all the procedures provided for in the legislation in force. These procedures, despite requiring time, human and material resources, are necessary to guarantee legal security of an Innovation Procurement process.

Surrounding this issue, the Public Sector Bidding and Contracts Law requires the contracting entity to describe the technical-operational requirements of the object/item to be acquired so that stakeholders are fully able to identify the nature of the existing technical problem, as well as envisage the product, service or innovative process required. The difficulty of this task is in the description of the technical specifications of the object to be developed, due to the complexity of the research, development and innovation activity or because it involves innovative solutions not available on the market.

In sum, the contracting public body must describe the technical-operational needs in such a way that allows stakeholders to identify the nature of the technical problem. In practice, the more complex the system ordered, the more difficult it becomes to describe the requirements for it and the greater the technological risk involved.

The existence of technological risk is one of the main characteristics of PPI. It is the possibility of failure in the development of a solution, resulting from a process the result of which is uncertain due to the technical-scientific knowledge restricted to the time when the decision to purchase the product was made.

In order to ensure the lawfulness of the procedures, the consultations, the responses of potential contractors and all other documents related to PPI should be attached to the contracting process, except for the cases in which information of an industrial, technological or commercial nature must be kept confidential (BRASIL, 2018b).

Furthermore, in order to maintain legal record, the legislation establishes that the contracting public administration body or entity may create, by decision of its highest authority, a technical committee of specialists to assist the institution in defining the object of the order, in choosing the future contracted party, in monitoring contract implementation and in the other functions provided for in the Decree No. 9283/2018. It is, therefore, a feasibility study to be carried out by a group of specialists of various fields/areas. This study, provided for in a few legal acts<sup>6</sup> on the acquisition of defense products, consists of a thorough examination of the planning carried out so far, checking the consistency of its structure, its coherence with the intended objectives and the reliability of the data obtained (BRASIL, 2007).

Another factor of legal certainty for the process is the determination of the minimum acceptable parameters for receiving the product, service or process related to the order. In short, it is a precise definition of the technical, logistical and industrial requirements for the PPI in question.

<sup>6</sup> The Aeronautics Command Directive (DCA 400-6) deals with the Aeronautics Systems and Materials Life Cycle, which ranges from the product design phase to the disposal phase (BRASIL, 2007).

The conclusion of the PPI contract also requires that the contracting public body must acquire the product with the most advantageous contracting conditions. Legislation requires transparent negotiation, with the relevant documentation attached to the contracting process records, with the exception of any information of an industrial, technological or commercial nature that must be kept confidential. Furthermore, the choice of the contractor considers the highest probability of achieving the result intended by the contractor, and not necessarily the lowest price or cost. In this case, the public administration will be able to use, as factors of choice, technical competence, management capacity, previous experiences, the quality of the project presented and other significant evaluation criteria of the contractor (MONTEIRO, 2020).

An additional factor for the legal guarantee of the process is the need for prior approval of the specific project prepared by the contractor. This project must contain a work plan and financial schedule, compliance with the objectives to be achieved by the PPI, the requirements that allow the application of the methods and means indispensable for verifying the progress of the project at each stage, in addition to other elements established by the contracting party. Prior analysis can be carried out by the technical committee of experts established by the contracting public body.

## 2.2 Opportunities generated by the public procurement of innovation

The main opportunity generated by the PPI is facilitation of the interaction between the purchaser and the supplier, since it offers the possibility to waive public bidding. However, to make this interaction feasible, a contract is required between the parties that establishes the object, the physical-financial schedule and the rules that define intellectual property rights (BRASIL, 2018b).

PPI also allows public administration bodies and entities to directly hire Scientific, Technological and Innovation Institutions (STI), public or private, or even non-profit private entities or companies, either alone or in consortia, focused on research activities, provided that they have recognized technological training in the sector.

PPI's objective is, therefore, to carry out research, development and innovation activities that involve technological risk, to solve a specific technical problem or obtain an innovative product, service or process (BRASIL, 2018b).

In view of the difficulties involved in the development of complex defense systems, the legislation began to consider the existence of technological risk during the process. According to the regulatory decree<sup>7</sup>, technological risks are related to the "possibility of failure to develop a solution, resulting from a process in which the result is uncertain due to insufficient technical and scientific knowledge at the time when the decision to perform the action is made" (BRASIL, 2018b, p. 2).

In the case of contracts where the object involves technological risk, the Public Procurement of Innovation admits that the product obtained by the contract may be different from the one desired, due to the existing technological uncertainty. In addition, this new legal provision allows the contract to be discontinued due to technical or economic infeasibility observed during its development.

<sup>7</sup> Decree No. 9,283, of 2018, requires incentives to encourage innovation and scientific and technological research in the productive environment, with a view to technological training, the achievement of technological autonomy and the development of the national and regional productive system.



Another possibility generated by PPI is the inclusion of the costs of activities that precede the introduction of the solution, product, service or innovative process to the market. Thus, the manufacture of prototypes; gradual delivery, e.g. initial designs as proof of concept, tests and demonstration; and the construction of the first designs on a commercial scale once the interest of the contracting public body in the supply of these items is confirmed, may be a part of the object of the contract.

The New Regulatory Framework under review has a direct impact on the public sector entities that promote research and development activities and execute contracts based on Article 24 of Law 8.666/93, since this new legislation removes the need to carry out a public bidding to contract goods, supplies, services and works in cases where the object of the contract is linked to research projects and duly approved by the Administration, thus offering legal certainty for the actors involved.

In a technical note published by the Brazilian Space Agency (AEB) (AGÊNCIA ESPACIAL BRASILEIRA, 2020c), it is clear that PPI only applies in cases where there are no solutions available on the market, for the problem that the government aims to solve through contracting (AGÊNCIA ESPACIAL BRASILEIRA, 2020a). This consideration is important because PPI becomes an option to be used only in very specific cases. It is, therefore, an exception among the contracting instruments made available by the Brazilian legislation, since it presupposes the assumption of a significant portion of technological risks by the government.

It should be noted that when seeking technological solutions, even though options are available on the market, the possibility of restrictions and embargoes by the countries that own the technology should be considered. In the space and defense sector, as an example, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), of which Brazil is a signatory, affected the development of national satellite launch vehicles (LONGO; MOREIRA, 2018). Such embargoes can mean delays and, in more extreme situations, even the abandonment of related activities (SANTOS, 1996).

However, given the importance of PPI for the acquisitions that involve technological risks, the need for control mechanisms causes difficulties in the application of the legislation in question, which in practice restricts the use of the PPI modality by Brazilian public agencies.

### **3 Complex defense systems acquisition and public procurement of innovation**

The possibility of making public purchases in Brazil through a Public Procurement of Innovation has existed since the enactment of Law No. 10.973/2004<sup>8</sup>. This possibility favors complex defense products acquisition due to several factors, including the option of developing a technological solution not yet available on the market.

8 PPIs are provided for in art. 20 of Law No. 10.973 / 2004, as amended by Law No. 13.243 / 16 and regulation given by Decree No. 9,283 / 2018. According to item XXXI of art. 24 of Law 8.666 / 1993, ETEC are exempted from the bidding process (RAUEN, 2019, p. 7).

However, despite the options made available by the PPI, few processes for obtaining defense products through PPR have been implemented by the Armed Forces (AF) until the present moment. According to Barbosa and Rauen (2019), only on five occasions the AF carried out procurement processes using this legal provision, as seen in Table 1.

**Table 1 – Public procurement of innovation undertaken by the Brazilian Armed Forces**

Date	Contractor	Supplier	Object	Contract value (Current R\$)
12/06/10	Army Technological Center	Orbisat	Specialized technical services for the technological updating of five low-altitude anti-aircraft defense radars (Radio Target Monitoring System Based on Radio Frequency Emission - SABER M60)	2,973,000.00
08/21/14	Brazilian Army Research, Development and Innovation Support Foundation	CPqD	Specialized technical services related to the R&D modeling services of a waveform module for use in the high frequency range (HF)	4,580,000.00
11/04/14	Brazilian Army	Hidromec	Hiring of services for the development of the Integration Platform for the Radio Project Defined by Defense Software (RDS-Defense), vehicular version	2,399,895.00
12/07/18	Brazilian Navy	Instituto de Pesquisas Energéticas e Nucleares	Development of technologies for accelerating laser protons for nuclear applications	14,860,000.00
09/20/19	Brazilian Army	Opto	Thermal imaging monocular R&D service LOOK (OLHAR)	2,879,204.45

Source: Adapted from Barbosa and Rauen (2019).

Analyzing Table 1, we infer that despite the possibilities provided by the PPI, Brazilian AFs made little use of this resource. Barbosa and Rauen (2019) mention that the fact that PPI is underused in the set of national technological development strategies is evident. In this sense, when analyzing the acquisition of complex defense products, the same conclusion can be drawn.

We also observe that there was no participation of the Air Force Command in any process of acquisition through PPI, despite the existence of projects, within the scope of this Command, directly aimed at the development of technological solutions. Despite being signed in 2009, the

KC-390 cargo aircraft development contract (Project KC-X)<sup>9</sup> is an example of defense products that could have been acquired through a PPI.

In complex projects like KC-X, the use of PPI would be a guarantee that possible problems in the development of the contracted solution would not cause conflicts between contracting and contracted entities. In the case of KC-X, as it was a project contracted through a bidding waiver, there was a risk that prototypes would not be produced according to the contractual rules, due to the technological risks existing in a complex activity such as the development of an aircraft.

PPI allows the utilization of variable forms of remuneration in contracting: fixed price, fixed price plus variable incentive remuneration, cost reimbursement without additional remuneration, cost refund plus variable incentive remuneration and cost refund plus fixed incentive remuneration (BRASIL, 2018b). These compensation options allow the existing technological risk to be shared between companies and the public administration, and make it possible to alleviate the difficulty of estimating a price for a solution still in the development stage.

In relation to the KC-X Project, it is important to note that fixed price contracting (or remuneration of the contracted company) was utilized, whereby all risks fall under the responsibility of the contracted company.

Although fixed price contracting seems advantageous to the contracting party, in practice, contracted companies tend to include all the uncertainty of the project in the price defined in the contract, which makes the project more expensive (BARBOSA; RAUEN, 2019). In this sense, the development of the two prototypes of the KC-390 cargo aircraft had an estimated cost of 5.9 billion reais. This cost for the development of the two freighter units is clearly quite high when compared to the value of the 28 aircraft planned for the KC-390 Project, which will cost around R\$ 16.2 billion (BRASIL, 2020).

In addition, according to Barbosa and Rauen (2019), the legal instrument chosen for the development of the KC-X brought considerable risks to the company Embraer, since the non-enforceable bidding contracts do not provide for the existence of technological risks.

It should be noted that, despite the existence of the PPI modality for acquiring complex defense products, limited knowledge and experience of the federal government and the Armed Forces' legal body on the application of the aforementioned legislation (see the limited usage verified in Table 1), as well as the difficulty in defining the object of certain acquisitions under the PPI modality may prevent this option from being fully applied.

The difficulty in defining a defense product under a PPI is a relevant factor in determining whether to use this modality in the acquisition process. In this respect, the uncertainties related to technological risk, as a rule, are not the only relevant factors in the

<sup>9</sup> The KC-X Project was aimed at the development of two prototypes of a military transport aircraft and in-flight refueling to complement and eventually replace the Brazilian Air Force's C / KC-130 aircraft in carrying out the logistical air transport missions, SAR (Search and Rescue) and in-flight refueling, among others. More broadly, the Project also aimed to promote the technological training of Aeronautics and the Brazilian aerospace industry and to increase the operational capacity of the Brazilian Air Force, through the development and subsequent acquisition of the KC-390 aircraft (BRASIL, 2018).

selection of the contracted company. In many cases, problems related to international embargoes, for example, can be of great importance when it comes to complex defense products, due to the strategic importance that these items have for national sovereignty (AGÊNCIA ESPACIAL BRASILEIRA, 2020b).

Regarding this type of impasse, the Ministry of Health, which is currently one of the main users of the PPI modality, realized the need to work together with other institutions<sup>10</sup> to resolve possible difficulties in understanding and applying PPI in solving problems related to the Ministries (BRASIL, 2017). In this sense, the promulgation of Decree No. 9.245<sup>11</sup>, of December 20, 2017, was an important step in dealing with complex issues aimed at obtaining indispensable solutions in the area of Health.

If a parallel is made between the Ministry of Health and the solutions sought by the Armed Forces, it can be observed that the defense area needs to evolve in order to define procedures and establish more precise and standardized processes on the subject, in order to facilitate the work of professionals directly involved in the activities of acquiring complex defense systems.

According to Rauen (2014), central coordination allows not only efficiency and legal certainty, but also facilitates the analysis of processes related to public procurement of innovation. Thus, the drafting of internal regulations by the Ministry of Defense (MD), aimed at standardizing some procedures related to the PPI modality, could facilitate the acquisition of certain defense products using this modality. These new regulations may speed up the process and provide greater legal certainty for the bodies involved in the acquisition processes.

Furthermore, the creation of a more integrated and robust defense product procurement system, under the coordination of the MD, as stated by Longo and Moreira (2013), can be a fundamental option for the efficient and effective use of available financial resources, through consistent and feasible public procurement of innovation.

However, just as an example that corroborates the legal security of defense systems acquisition processes, it should be noted that the Air Force Command (COMAER) has already created, on other occasions, specific rules aimed at facilitating the understanding of legislation on public purchasing. One of these cases was the Ordinance No. 921/GC3<sup>12</sup>, of September 2, 2004, which attributes competence and defines procedures for internal COMAER commissions to issue technical opinions aimed at justifying the waiver of bidding in the purchase of materials and equipment motivated by the need to maintain the standardization required by the logistical support structure of air and land resources.

---

10 Bodies that make up the so-called Executive Group of the Industrial Health Complex (GECIS), such as Casa Civil, MRE, Ministry of Finance, among others.

11 Decree No. 9,245, of 2017, institutes the National Policy for Technological Innovation in Health, regulating the use of the State purchasing power in contracts and acquisitions that involve strategic products and services for the Unified Health System within the scope of the Industrial Health Complex and provides for the Executive Group of the Industrial Health Complex and the Permanent Forum for Articulation with Civil Society.

12 Ordinance No. 921 / GC3, 2004, provides for an Internal Commission with the competence to examine and issue an opinion on the waiver of bidding for the purchase of materials and equipment used by the Air Force Command, except for materials for personal and administrative use, motivated by the need to maintain the standardization required by the logistical support structure of air and land resources.

#### 4 The case of the public procurement of innovation undertaken by AEB

The Brazilian Space Agency (AEB) started an unprecedented project to acquire a technological solution based on a PPI. This project focused on contracting the development of an Inertial Navigation System (INS). The unprecedented nature of this AEB initiative is mainly due to the partnership with the Federal Audit Court (TCU) and representatives of the Federal Attorney General (AGU), the Federal Comptroller General (CGU), the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MCT) and the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA).

According to AEB, the difficulty of inertial navigation systems acquisition has usually been an obstacle to Brazilian research and development activities. This is due to the embargoes imposed by international suppliers on products related to space and defense applications. Among these embargoes are the control regimes for the transfer of sensitive goods and technologies established by the countries that master this knowledge, such as the aforementioned *Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)*<sup>13</sup> led by G7 members.

In addition to the embargoes, other risks inherent to this activity are also common, among them, the restriction of the number of items supplied, the sale of technologically obsolete equipment, insufficient functional specifications for the desired mission, supply of items not customized to the intended application, among others (BRASIL, 2020).

In view of the presented scenario, AEB identified PPI as an instrument that has the potential to be used in contracting solutions for the space sector (BRASIL, 2020). Also according to this Agency, because of the unprecedented nature of the initiative and the lack of practical experiences in the space sector, there was a need for the participation of the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU) to accompany the process of public procurement of innovation in order to map and mitigate the risks encountered, to guarantee the correct application of the legislation and guarantee the compliance of the process. It should be noted that, as it is a new activity, the paradigm shift is relevant for both contracting agencies and control bodies (AGÊNCIA ESPACIAL BRASILEIRA, 2020a).

As previously mentioned, AEB chose a navigation subsystem as the object of the first PPI. According to the Agency, this type of navigation subsystem is usually represented by an Inertial System (INS)<sup>14</sup> operating in parallel with a positioning component by GNSS (*Global Navigation Satellite System*), as seen in Table 2. The complexity of the system is related to the fact that INS systems can have their position processing influenced by the inherent error of sensors, among others. Therefore, some problems may arise; for example, integration over time can propagate a positioning error during its trajectory.

13 The MTCR is a regime that works informally and member countries commit to develop an export system that inhibits, or even eliminates, the possibility of transferring sensitive items to countries that intend to develop missiles (SANTOS, 1995).

14 INS composes a navigation technique in which three-dimensional measurements of linear and angular acceleration are used to follow the position, orientation and speed of an object relative to a starting point. An INS detects changes in geographical position, in its speed (direction and magnitude), and in its orientation (rotation around an axis), from linear acceleration and angular speed applied to the vehicle. Thus, it is immune to external influences because it does not require external references after its initialization (AEB, 2020).

**Table 2 – Basic components and parameters of the inertial system**

<b>Internal Components</b>	<i>Interface Parameters</i>
An on-board computer (OBC1) and its software for processing signals emitted by inertial sensors	Total mass less than 5 kg
An on-board computer (OBC2) and respective software for positioning and integration data processing for trajectory definition, corrected by GNSS	Dimensions required to board as a payload on the VSB-30 rocket and modified versions, or on FTB and FTI training rockets
GNSS receiver	Own telemetry
A Mobile Measuring Unit (MMI) composed of inertial sensors (accelerometers and gyroscopes)	Energy source and own electrical network
Telemetry adapted to a ground reception system	-

Source: Adapted from Agência Espacial Brasileira (2020a).

The importance of PPI arises from the fact that this acquisition involves considerable risks, since the object of the contract is a product that is on the cutting edge of existing technology. Thus, according to AEB, to minimize the occurrence of problems during the ordering phases, all technical specifications and operating parameters will be reviewed and detailed by a technical committee of specialists.

Although space projects use the minimum Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 2 as a technological development metric, as occurred with the SISNAV<sup>15</sup> project, the Inertial Navigation System acquired through the public procurement of innovation modality will have its deliverable products divided into five phases. The first phase will start with a technology maturity index level 3, as shown in Table 3.

**Table 3 – Inertial Navigation System phases.**

<b>Phase</b>	<b>Technology Readiness Level (TRL)</b>	<b>Deliverable Product</b>
Phase 1	TRL 3	Engineering Project
Phase 2	TRL 4	Laboratory testing of components and interfaces
Phase 2	TRL 5	Integration and validation in relevant environment
Phase 4	TRL 6 e 7	Verification and integrated prototype demonstration
Phase 5	TRL 8 e 9	Complete prototype for flight qualification

Source: Adapted from AEB (2020a).

<sup>15</sup> SISNAV is an inertial navigation system developed by the Aeronautics and Space Institute (IAE) for launch and suborbital vehicles (BRASIL, 2020).

The adoption of TRL 3 for the first phase of PPI undertaken by the AEB is a mitigating measure to increase the chances of success, considering that TRL 3 consists of obtaining documented analytical/ experimental results in order to validate the proof of concept (MANKINS, 1995).

The PPI undertaken by the AEB shows similarities to the R&D projects carried out within the scope of the Brazilian Armed Forces in relation to the object of the contracts, as is the case with the development of the KC-390 aircraft (Project KC-X), among other projects aimed at the acquisition of complex defense products. However, in the case of the KC-390, due to several factors, including the lack of specific legislation by the COMAER for the implementation of public procurement of innovation modality, at the time of conception of the project in question, the Air Force Command relied on two legal provisions, namely waiver and unenforceable bidding<sup>16</sup> (RIBEIRO, 2017).

## 5 Final considerations

This article analyzes the Public Procurement of Innovation (PPI) model applied to acquire complex defense systems, the opportunities generated by this type of contracting, as well as legal security in its use.

It is observed that despite the time elapsed between the publication of the New Legal Framework for Science, Technology and Innovation and its regulation, Brazilian public bodies have not yet shown significant adherence to the aforementioned legislation for defense systems acquisitions. This lack of adherence is possibly related to the limited knowledge on the details of the legislation and the fear of making mistakes in the interpretation of the current rules, which could imply the loss of public resources and its legal implications for the public servants.

Thus, for public bodies to make use of all the possibilities offered by the existing legislation, it is necessary to adopt measures that help public servants understand the rules in force in order to provide greater legal security to complex defense systems acquisition processes.

It should be noted that this type of acquisitions stand out due to their high costs, the importance of defense systems to the country, the complexity of the processes and the uncertainty in the success of the activity, especially when procurement involves the development of defense products. Due to these particularities, the processes of contracting complex defense systems require specific approaches that offer viable options for the public administration and enable the fulfillment of society's demands more efficiently.

The cases discussed in this paper include two processes for complex systems acquisition that followed different paths: the KC-390 Project and the Inertial Navigation System (INS). Although they are considered systems of outstanding importance for national sovereignty, and are successful R&D projects, it appears that the legal method used as the basis for the process of obtaining the INS, the Public Procurement

<sup>16</sup> Public bidding waiver (Art. 24) and Bidding unenforceability (Art. 25), both of Law No. 8.666 / 1993.

of Innovation, is more suitable for contracts when object involves technological risks, mainly due to the existing uncertainties and the legal security provided to the managers involved.

The instrument used by the AEB shows that it is possible to overcome the difficulty in using PPI as an instrument for contracting technological solutions in order to meet public sector needs, while the legislation is not yet fully consolidated. It was also possible to identify that the lack of experience in AEB raised the need for the participation of a control body (TCU) as well as other organs of public administration, such as AGU, MCTI and IPEA, in all phases of the process in order to build the knowledge necessary for the appropriate use of the PPI and with the necessary legal certainty.

Following the example of the AEB, we suggest that the Ministry of Defense draw up internal regulations aimed at standardizing procedures related to PPI and including certain defense products in this type of contracting modality. This new regulation may speed up the process and provide greater legal certainty for the government bodies involved in the acquisition processes. Furthermore, a central coordination will possibly allow not only greater efficiency, but also facilitate the analysis of processes related to public procurement of innovation.



## References

ABGI. **Lei do Bem**: os incentivos fiscais à inovação tecnológica. [S.l.], 2020. Available at: <https://brasil.abgi-group.com/lei-do-bem>. Accessed on: 23 Dec. 2020.

AGÊNCIA ESPACIAL BRASILEIRA. **Encomenda Tecnológica (ETEC)**. Brasília, 2020b. Available at: <http://www.aeb.gov.br/pt-br/programa-espacial-brasileiro/encomenda-tecnologica-etec>. Accessed on: 23 Dec. 2020.

AGÊNCIA ESPACIAL BRASILEIRA. Estudos Preliminares. **Processo nº 01350.000025/2020-58**. Brasília, 2020c. Available at: <http://www.aeb.gov.br/pt-br/programa-espacial-brasileiro/encomenda-tecnologica-etec/documentos>. Accessed on: 23 Nov. 2020.

AGÊNCIA ESPACIAL BRASILEIRA. Nota Técnica. **Processo nº 01350.000025/2020-58. Encomenda Tecnológica sobre sistema de navegação inercial**. Brasília, 2020d. Available at: <http://www.aeb.gov.br/programa-espacial-brasileiro/encomenda-tecnologica-etec/documentos>. Accessed on: 23 Dec. 2020.

ALBUQUERQUE, B. et al. Novas práticas para o fomento da inovação na economia brasileira: o BNDES Soluções Tecnológicas. In: ABDE/BID (orgs.). **Prêmio Associação Brasileira de Desenvolvimento (ABDE-BID)** - Coletânea de Trabalhos. Rio de Janeiro: ABDE Editorial, p. 241-262, 2015. Available at: [https://abde.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/PREMIO-ABDE-BID-2015\\_PDF-COMPLETO.pdf](https://abde.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/PREMIO-ABDE-BID-2015_PDF-COMPLETO.pdf). Accessed on: 01 Jan. 2021.

ANDRADE, A. D. P.; SANTOS, C. S. A. **Políticas públicas de defesa: uma análise sobre a Lei nº 12.598/2012 e as empresas estratégicas de defesa**. [S.l.], 2018. Available at: [https://www.enabed2018.abedef.org/resources/anais/8/1535683049\\_ARQUIVO\\_artigoppallaneclarice.pdf](https://www.enabed2018.abedef.org/resources/anais/8/1535683049_ARQUIVO_artigoppallaneclarice.pdf). Accessed on: 23 Dec. 2020.

AZEVEDO, C. E. The elements of analysis of the culture of innovation in the Defense sector and its three-dimensional model. **Coleção Meira Mattos: Revista das Ciências Militares**, [S.l.], v. 12, n. 45, p. 145-167, 2018.

BARBOSA, C. M. M.; RAUEN, A. T. **Encomendas Tecnológicas no Brasil: Guia Geral de Boas Práticas**. Ipea: Brasília, 2019.

BERTALANFFY, L. **Teoria Geral dos Sistemas**. 3. ed. Petrópolis: Vozes, 1977.

BLANCHARD, B. S.; BLYLER, J. E. **System Engineering Management**. 5. ed. New Jersey: Wiley, 2016.

BRASIL. Casa Civil. **Lei nº 8.666**, de 21 de junho de 1993. Diário Oficial da União. República Federativa do Brasil, Brasília, DF, 22 jun. 1993. Available at: [http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil\\_03/leis/l8666const.htm](http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/l8666const.htm). Accessed on: 23 Dec. 2020.

BRASIL. Comando da Aeronáutica. **Portaria nº 129/GC4**, of March 5, 2007. Boletim do Comando da Aeronáutica, Brasília, n. 47, 9 Mar. 2007.

BRASIL. Comando da Aeronáutica. **Sistema de Navegação e Controle**. Brasília, 2020a. Available at: <http://www.iae.cta.br/index.php/todos-os-projetos/projetos-aeronautica/sistema-de-navegacao-e-controle>. Accessed on: 23 Dec. 2020.

BRASIL. Ministério da Defesa. **Portaria Normativa nº 15/MD**, de 4 de abril de 2018. Diário Oficial da União. República Federativa do Brasil, Brasília, n. 65, 5 Apr. 2018a.

BRASIL. Presidência da República. **Decreto nº 9.283**, de 7 de fevereiro de 2018. Diário Oficial da União. República Federativa do Brasil, Brasília, 7 Feb. 2018b.

BRASIL. Presidência da República. **Lei nº 13.243**, de 11 de janeiro de 2016. Diário Oficial da União. República Federativa do Brasil, Brasília, 12 Jan. 2016.

Departamento de Indústria de Defesa. **Análise COMDEFESA: por uma Política de Aquisição de Material de Defesa**. São Paulo, 2011. Available at: <http://www.defesanet.com.br/defesa/noticia/2629/ANALISE-COMDEFESA---Por-uma-Politica-de-Aquisicao-de-Material-de-Defesa>. Accessed on: 23 Dec. 2020.

DOSI, G. The nature of the innovative process. In: DOSI, G. et al (orgs). **Technical change and economic theory**. London: Pinter Publishers, 1988.

FORMIGONI, H. et al. **A influência do PDTI e da Lei do Bem na geração de riqueza das companhias abertas brasileiras não financeiras**. [S.l.], 2009. Available at: <https://anaiscbc.emnuvens.com.br/anais/article/view/1053>. Accessed on: 23 Dec. 2020.

FREEMAN, C. The national system of innovation in historical perspective. **Journal of Economics**, Cambridge, v. 19, n. 1, p. 5-24, 1995.

HOBDAY, M. Product complexity, innovation and industrial organization. **CoPS Publication**, Falmer, n. 52, 1998.

LONGO, W. P.; MOREIRA, W.S. Tecnologia e inovação no setor de defesa: uma perspectiva sistêmica. **Revista da Escola de Guerra Naval**, Rio de Janeiro, v. 19, n. 2, p. 277-304, Jul./Dec. 2013.

LONGO, W P.; MOREIRA, W.S. O acesso a tecnologias sensíveis. **Tensões Mundiais**, [S.l.], v. 5, n. 9, p. 73-122, 2018. Available at: <https://revistas.uece.br/index.php/tensoesmundiais/article/view/669>. Accessed on: 23 Dec. 2020.

MANKINS, J. C. **Technology Readiness Levels: a white paper**. Office of Space Access and Technology: NASA, [S.l.], 1995. Available at: [https://aiaa.kavi.com/apps/group\\_public/download.php/2212/TRLs\\_MankinsPaper\\_1995.pdf](https://aiaa.kavi.com/apps/group_public/download.php/2212/TRLs_MankinsPaper_1995.pdf). Accessed on: 23 Dec. 2020.

MITCHELL, M. **Complexity: a guided tour**. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

MONTEIRO, V. **O que aprendi lendo a legislação sobre contrato de encomenda tecnológica**. [S.l.], 2020. Available at: <http://ga.basegroup.com.br/o-que-aprendi-lendo-a-legislacao-sobre-contrato-de-encomenda-tecnologica>. Accessed on: 23 Dec. 2020.

OCDE. Organização para a Cooperação e Desenvolvimento Econômico. **Manual de Frascati: metodologia proposta para definição da pesquisa e desenvolvimento experimental**. [S.l.], 2002. Available at: [http://www.ipdeletron.org.br/wwwroot/pdf-publicacoes/14/Manual\\_de\\_Frascati.pdf](http://www.ipdeletron.org.br/wwwroot/pdf-publicacoes/14/Manual_de_Frascati.pdf). Accessed on: 23 Dec. 2020.

OCDE. Organização para a Cooperação e Desenvolvimento Econômico. **Manual de Oslo: diretrizes para coleta e interpretação de dados sobre inovação**. [S.l.], 3. ed., 2005. Available at: <https://www.finep.gov.br/images/apoio-e-financiamento/manualoslo.pdf>. Accessed on: 23 Dec. 2020.

OLIVEIRA, L. G. O desenvolvimento de projetos de sistemas complexos na indústria aeronáutica: o caso de gestão integrada aplicada ao programa Embraer 170. **Cadernos EBAPE**, Rio de Janeiro, v. 7, n. 1, p.19-33, mar. 2009. Available at: [http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=S1679-39512009000100003&script=sci\\_abstract&tlng=pt](http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=S1679-39512009000100003&script=sci_abstract&tlng=pt). Accessed on: 23 Dec. 2020.

RAUEN, A. T. Encomendas tecnológicas nos Estados Unidos: possibilidades do regulamento federal de aquisições. **Radar**, [S.l.], n. 36, 2014. Available at: <https://www.ipea.gov.br/radar/temas/regulacao/450-radar-n-36-encomendas-tecnologicas-nos-estados-unidos-possibilidades-do-regulamento-federal-de-aquisicoes>. Accessed on: 23 Dec. 2020.

RIBEIRO, C. G. Desenvolvimento tecnológico nacional: o caso KC-390. In: RAUEN, A. T. (org.). **Políticas de inovação pelo lado da demanda no Brasil**. Brasília: Ipea, 2017, p. 236-288. Available at: <http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/handle/11058/8953>. Accessed on: 23 Dec. 2020.

SANTOS, R. Desenvolvimento de tecnologia de ponta: embargos tecnológicos. **Revista da Escola Superior de Guerra**, [S.l.], n. 32, p. 115-126, dez. 1996. Available at: <https://revista.esg.br/index.php/revistadaesg/article/view/729>. Accessed on 23: Dec. 2020.

SEBRAE. **O Novo Marco Legal de Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação**. [S.l.], 2020. Available at: <https://www.sebrae.com.br/sites/PortalSebrae/artigos/o-novo-marco-legal-de-ciencia-tecnologia-e-inovacao,8603f03e7f484610VgnVCM1000004c00210aRCRD>. Accessed on 23: Dec. 2020.



# The Trinitarian role of the Brazilian Army: bases of a “multitasking” force

*El papel trinitario del Ejército Brasileiro: bases de una fuerza “multitarea”*

**Abstract:** In Brazil, the Army has been recurrently employed by the Federal Government to carry out activities that, by its nature, would have traditionally been carried out by other State agencies. However, even though this is admittedly a national problem, there are no signs of change. For this reason, the article aimed to discuss the peculiarities of the Army’s activities in Brazil, highlighting how the functions traditionally performed by the military go far beyond preparing for war. From a methodological perspective, a perspective was adopted based on the concept of strategic culture and the geopolitical conditions of the Brazilian territory, a bibliographic review and consultation of defense documents and military manuals were carried out, which helped to understand the process of building the multitasking profile. As a result, a Trinitarian model of EB performance is proposed, representing a strategic Brazilian culture, which relates the participation of the Army to the process of building the national state.

**Keywords:** Brazilian Army. Defense. Territorial security. Subsidiary actions.

**Resumen:** En Brasil, el Ejército ha sido empleado repetidamente por el Gobierno Federal para llevar a cabo actividades que, por su naturaleza, tradicionalmente serían realizadas por otros organismos estatales. Sin embargo, aunque es cierto que esto es un problema, no hay señales de cambio cuando la fuerza se desvía de sus funciones anteriores. Por lo tanto, el artículo tuvo como objetivo discutir las peculiaridades del Ejército Brasileño (EB), destacando cómo las funciones tradicionalmente desempeñadas por los militares van mucho más allá de la preparación para la guerra. Desde el punto de vista metodológico, se adoptó una perspectiva teórica basada en el concepto de cultura estratégica, se realizó una revisión de la literatura y se realizó la consulta de documentos de defensa y manuales militares que ayudaron a comprender el proceso de construcción del perfil multitarea. Como resultado, proponemos un modelo trinitario de desempeño del EB representativo de una cultura estratégica propia brasileña, que relaciona la participación del Ejército con el proceso de construcción del Estado nacional.

**Palabras Clave:** Ejército 10 / 5000 Resultados de tradução Brasileño. Defensa. Seguridad territorial. Acciones subsidiarias.

**Oscar Medeiros Filho** 

Exército Brasileiro. Estado-Maior do Exército.  
Brasília, DF, Brasil.  
oscarfilho.medeiros@eb.mil.br

**Marcelo de Jesus Santa Bárbara** 

Exército Brasileiro. Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército.  
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.  
marcelojsb@id.uff.br

**Received: Oct 29, 2020**

**Approved: Dec 18, 2020**

COLEÇÃO MEIRA MATTOS

ISSN on-line 2316-4891 / ISSN print 2316-4833

<http://ebrevistas.eb.mil.br/index.php/RMM/index>



Creative Commons  
Attribution Licence

## 1 Introduction

The goal of this article is to discuss the peculiarities of the Army's activities in Brazil, highlighting how the functions traditionally performed by the Brazilian military go far beyond the preparation for war.

To this end, the authors propose a Trinitarian model of EB's performance considering: a) its primary purpose (to prepare for war); b) its territorial security function (acting as a security force, especially at the borders); and c) its historical participation as a kind of "stronghold of nationality" and "civism school".

The central point that guides the article is the following: why, in Brazil, the Army has been recurrently employed by the Federal Government to carry out activities that, by its nature, would have traditionally been executed by other agencies of the State? Why, even though this is admittedly a problem in diverting the Force from its core functions, are there no signs of change?

Under an approach that integrates ideational factors (strategic culture) and materials (geopolitical constraints), the article is divided into three sections, in addition to the introduction and final considerations. The first will discuss the existence of a strategic Brazilian culture, which relates to the participation of EB in the process of building the national state, as well as the influences of material factors in the geopolitical formulations developed by military personnel in the Army; as a result, the second section will present elements of the formation of the Army's military ethos, giving some outlines to the presence strategy. In the third section we will discuss the central theme of this article: the Trinitarian role of EB.

## 2 Elements of the Brazilian strategic culture and geopolitical conditions of the territory

The roots of the strategic culture go back to the 1970's<sup>1</sup> in works that seek to understand international security issues from a culturalist approach (REIS, 2013), that is, which consider it relevant to understand ideational aspects in addition to the purely rational choice in the use of military force. Johnston (1995) refers to strategic culture as an integrated system of symbols (arguments, metaphors, etc.) that act in order to establish lasting strategic preferences through the formulation of the effective use of the armed forces in the international scenario.

The strategic culture would be constituted by long-lasting ideational elements - but not immutable - such as tradition, perceptions and preferences. In this sense, a country's geography and history are the most important factors in its strategic culture shaping (DOESER, 2016). It is possible to define strategic culture as the ideational environment that conditions the behavior of the actors when making decisions about the strategic options considered most appropriate and effective (DOESER, 2016; LANTIS, 2002).

---

1 The concept of "strategic culture" was first coined in 1977, by Jack L. Snyder, in "The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options". In this work, Snyder defines the concept as a "sum total of ideals, conditional emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of the national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy" (JOHNSTON, 1995, p. 36).

This environment would represent a system of ideas and objects, a mindset available to public policy makers. In this case, the traditions, values and beliefs that are interpreted as the "national will" by the decision-making elite in power stand out. In this way, geographical and historical conditions offer the possibilities for decision-making elites to build a particular political agenda, which ends up bringing forth a "national style".

In this way, the concept of strategic culture would serve as a basis for understanding how domestic political conditions and external constraints can influence both the diplomatic, military and economic behavior of States in the international system, as well as the way in which they organize the occupation of national space, establishing points of contact between the security, defense and development agendas.


This means that there is always a cultural context that conditions the basic perceptions and preferences that inevitably influence previously the strategic options (REIS, 2013), impacting decision making and "the military doing".

Therefore, recognizing that this culture is not something given, solidified, but is in fact a permanent process of construction and reconstruction, it seems appropriate to discuss how the military in Brazil – state actors with a considerable degree of autonomy – shaped and were shaped by a genuinely national strategic culture.

In search of the elements that would compose a strategic Brazilian culture, it is necessary, initially, to situate Brazil in its geopolitical context.

Brazil is a country of continental dimensions, with approximately seventeen thousand kilometers of borderland with nine South American countries and a French overseas department. Added to this is a coastline of approximately seven thousand kilometers where, within a radius of up to two hundred kilometers away from the coast, approximately 50% of the entire national population is concentrated. It should also be noted that 40% of the entire national territory is more than a thousand kilometers from the coast (figure 1), which, in itself, constitutes an obstacle to the very occupation of the central space, despite all the national effort for the occupation of the "West".

**Figure 1 – Brazilian demographic concentration**



Source: Adapted by the authors from the "Population Count" Map (IBGE, 2007).

Indeed, the geopolitical thinking of authors such as Travassos, Golbery, Meira Mattos already emphasized the importance of establishing economic links between the coast, the interior areas and the border areas of Brazil with its surroundings. The issue of development, therefore, should be associated with an agenda for cooperation with bordering countries in both the Amazon Basin and the Southern Cone.

Thus, the military's geopolitical formulations traditionally deal with the need for the State to be present in the geographic space of continental dimensions. It is this condition that has been fundamental to understand the Army's strategic stance in the Brazilian context. It should be noted that this condition, in the perspective presented here, can be focused on as Brazil is understood as an inseparable part of a South America also formed by developing countries.

In this sense, there is no way to disregard the characteristics that surround our strategic environment. Brazil is inserted in a region with a low incidence of interstate wars<sup>2</sup>, historical-military factors and the challenges faced by developing countries, contributed, from the point of view of the strategic culture, to the construction of an "look inside". From this perspective, a privileged internal plan and, consequently, a military job associated with public policies such as those of security and development.

Thus, the geopolitical reflection produced in Brazil throughout the 20th century is a typical example of this situation: on the one hand, it was conceived especially by Army officers; on the other hand, the most relevant aspects concern issues such as: occupation of immense empty spaces, project for the integration and development of the country and a project for the construction and consolidation of a cohesive national identity. In short, it deals with integration, development and security, having a privileged space in the debate about internal challenges. An interesting example of this concerns the presence of the Brazilian Army on the border as part of the process of consolidating the limits of the national state. In this sense, it is worth mentioning the creation of military colonies, in the middle of the 19th century, whose purpose was to populate (vivify) the borders, in the hope that they would become population centers until they reached the point of emancipation (BRAZIL, 1959). Due to its geopolitical characteristics and continental dimensions, the idea of defense in Brazil was born intertwined with the notion of development. In this sense, livening the borders expressed, in the words of General Meira Mattos, the mixture between "the weapon of defense and the hoe of the economic fixation of man to the land" (MATTOS, 2011)<sup>3</sup>.

Consequently, these brief considerations on the military geopolitical conception can be associated with the literature on international security, opening space for a debate that lacks even more depth in strategic studies on the peculiarities of defense in developing coun-

---

2 For Medeiros Filho (2014), five factors can be pointed out as possible causes of the anomalous pattern of South America in the international system over the last century. The first concerns the peripheral location of the region in relation to major world conflicts. The second factor, derived from the first, refers to the relatively small military power of the countries in the region. The third factor corresponds to the hegemonic presence of the United States as an element of regional stability. The fourth factor refers to the priority given to domestic problems - (internal enemy) to the detriment of external interests. Finally, from a liberal perspective, the role of norms in international relations can be highlighted.

3 Even today, the Army has 24 Special Border Platoons (PEF) in the Military Command of the Amazon alone. Under the motto "Life, Combat and Work", the PEF carry out military activities, such as training, surveillance of points and recognition of areas, in addition to numerous specific tasks in the border areas, such as: support to public agencies, health assistance to women, native populations, among others. In line with the platoons' motto, the soldiers who will serve there are encouraged to take their families, staying there for up to two years.



tries such as Brazil. For example, Mohamed Ayoob (1995) considers that, in addition to the issues of defense *stricto sensu*, developing countries include in their security agenda a set of challenges related to the formation process of these states (state building).

According to Ayoob (1995), unlike the classic model of international security, security/insecurity issues in developing countries are defined regarding the vulnerabilities that threaten or have the potential to threaten the very structures of the State. Thus, it is added that the realistic and conservative view of the military is integrated with the main concerns of the ruling elites and concerns issues related to the structures of the State and the government regime, involving challenges related to the legitimacy of institutions and regimes and the need for social cohesion (AYOOB, 1995).

By assuming elements here from a post-colonialist perspective, generally focused on the challenges of underdeveloped and developing countries, it is not intended to assume, under any circumstances, which countries in the region would fit in the definition of failed states, such as those that they have reached the critical level of degradation of state control over the territory, but they face challenges that have been somewhat outgrown in developed countries stemming from a process that we can call “national state building”. Thus, it can be said that the state weaknesses observed in countries in the region are related to the development model itself, marked by socioeconomic and institutional needs, and that generate challenges such as maintaining order and applying the rule of law in portions of their own territories. Our hypothesis would be that such challenges would eventually lead to its Armed Forces playing unorthodox roles in the region.

In this sense, the words of Army General Eduardo Dias da Costa Villas Bôas, Commander of the Brazilian Army, are worth mentioning during the Public Hearing held by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee of the Chamber of Deputies on 07/05/2017. According to him,

“[...] at the same time that we have to be an Army with those characteristics that I referred to, a modern Army, with the capacity for external projection, we have to remain a colonization Army. This is the reality” (BRASIL, 2017, n.p.).

In summary, the perception that seems to have been consolidated among the Brazilian military is that Brazil would be a state still in the process of formation and that the involvement of the military in activities to support national development would be a necessary security factor. From the point of view of the idea of this condition, development, security and integration of the territory would be elements seen as inseparable, as will be exposed in the next section on the elements of the national strategic culture.

### **3 National vulnerabilities, military *ethos* and presence strategy**

The demands for territorial control arising from the historical condition of former colonies and the shared perception of States still in the process of formation seem to have a relevant impact on the Brazilian strategic culture. This “geohistorical” condition is a fundamental factor that ends up giving relevance to internal dimensions, such as the presence strategy,

the control of peripheral regions and the surveillance of borders. Marques (2007), for example, highlights as one of the main traits of the strategic culture of the Brazilian military the importance given to the presence strategy, understood as a fundamental factor for the national integration and territorial integrity of Brazil.

Indeed, in the face of such challenges, the military find themselves imbued with the "republican" mission of contributing to national development that involves the consolidation of internal sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the State. It is an ideational element organic to its institutional culture and which is based on the feeling of incompleteness of the National State - still in process of consolidation (MEDEIROS FILHO, 2020)

In this context, over the last century, EB sought to present itself to society as a kind of "active synthesis of modernization", always ready to lend its degree of professionalism as a support to face the weaknesses observed in the public sphere. As such, the military tend, to make their institution the model of political organization, of their "ethos", the way of thinking seen as more appropriate to national development (FERREIRA, 2004).

Therefore, from that point on, it is necessary to discuss some elements that make up the EB *ethos*. To this end, it is important to highlight the way in which European military professionalism was emulated in South America, especially between 1890 and 1940, which played a fundamental role in the formation of the Army's military ethos, synthesized in the German and French influences (NUNN, 1983). The "tropicalization" of European doctrines based on the roots, values and traditions of the Force provided traces for the formation of the cultural identity of an Army dedicated to acting in the internal space, standing out for establishing a model that aims to make contributions to civic-social issues in the country.

This perception of Brazil as a "limping" state and of "national incompleteness" appears recurrently throughout the process of republican construction, not being exclusive to the military. Gilberto Freyre, for example, suggested, during the "Nation and Army" conference, held at the Army Command and Staff School, in 1948, that: "[...] the truth, however, is that the country where the Army is the only, or almost the only, organized force, it needs urgent organization or reorganization of the set of social and cultural activities to be truly a nation. A disorganized nation is not a nation: it is only a landscape" (FREYRE, 2019, p. 28).

Freyre reveals a dangerous reality, of a society that, realizing in its incipient state the lack of truly national institutions, relies - by collusion - in the Army to fulfill clearly civil responsibilities and obligations. In the following excerpt, Freyre illustrates, in an ironic way, this reality:

Why doesn't the Army solve the meat shortage problem? Or the lack of milk? Or the exploitation of fish and vegetables? Or that of the many suicides? Or that of the many murders? Or the traffic in Rio de Janeiro [...] A brief question will be asked: why doesn't the Army make masses in our churches more popular? [...] If this trend continues, the priests in Brazil will cross their arms for the military to teach the boys the sign of the cross. Teachers will fold their arms so that the military can teach boys geography of Brazil, history of Brazil; chorography of Brazil; for the military to take charge of the moral and civic instruction of the little ones (FREYRE, 2019, p. 26).

In that context, as modernization became a project not actually carried out by national society, fragile and politically disorganized (CARVALHO, 2006; FAORO, 2007), EB seemed to be an “organized force in the midst of a lot of disorganization that disturbs us and afflicts” (FREYRE, 2019, p. 27). According to Faoro, the constant guardianship of the Armed Forces, especially the Army, in an “unfinished Republic” represents a state in the process of modernization that brought with it the tensions and contradictions of institutional formations not yet consolidated.

Notably, these historical challenges are not exclusive to Brazil, but it reflects a political perception present in countries in the region throughout the 20th century according to which national armies would constitute a kind of “bulwark of the Republic”, without which countries would be condemned to instability. The following excerpt, extracted from the work of Argentine general Benjamin Rattenbach in the early 1970s, seems to summarize the form of this perception well: “In Latin American countries, political instability is not due to the frequent intervention of the military, but on the contrary, they interfere in domestic politics precisely because of this instability” (RATTENBACH, 1972, p. 117, our translation)<sup>4</sup>.

Therefore, against the background of the image of a State still in the process of consolidation, the idea of development and national defense would be inseparable elements, and the military involvement in non-war activities and in support of national development would be a fundamental factor of the very institution’s identity.

In addition to the “strong arm” of the war, the military dedicates a great deal of effort, in subsidiary actions to support the state, called by the military itself a “helping hand”. These are actions related to the process of building and consolidating the State and overcoming national instabilities, for which EB has sought to lend its model of permanent and stable organization that, in most cases, escape the scope of the war, as we’ll see next.

#### **4 One army, many functions**

The central issue discussed here and which is in the title of this article concerns the “multitasking” character played by EB. In other words, it seeks to understand how the historical trajectory and the conditions that made up the regional scenario and the domestic context, end up contributing to the permanence of the peculiarity of the Armed Forces model adopted in Brazil. This issue becomes even more interesting when one realizes that the Army itself has been conducting a process of self-transformation<sup>5</sup>. In other words, in the institution’s decision-making bodies there is a perception of the need to adapt the force model to the new demands imposed at the beginning of the 21st century.

4 Original: [...] En los países latinoamericanos, la inestabilidad política no se debe a la intervención frecuente de los militares, sino al revés, estos interfieren en la política interna precisamente a causa de esa inestabilidad [...].

5 The Army Transformation Conception document, approved through Ordinance No. 1,253, of December 5, 2013, considered “that the desired transformation would be “the result of a set of innovations [...] causing a new concept of organization, articulation, preparation and employment”. And he concluded: “[...] the intention is, with the transformation process, to lead the Army to the level of armed force of a developed country and a global actor, capable of being present, with the necessary promptness, in any area of interest. Brazil’s strategic plan”.


The great challenge that is presented is to meet the desirable demands in a process of military transformation that, in theory, would require leaner forces, centralized, modular and equipped with systems with high technological level, and, at the same time, maintain the necessary presence to the fulfillment of the various missions imposed by the nation, reinforcing the bonds of loyalty between the citizen and the State.

One of these missions concerns the annual training of new recruits who, in addition to preparing for war, contribute to the construction, within society, of a defense mentality, as according to the idea of republican leveling that appears recently prepared: “[...] the Mandatory Military Service is the guarantee of citizen participation as an instrument of mobilization to affirm national unity and contribute to the development of the defense mentality within Brazilian society” (BRASIL, 2020, np).

In developing countries, national vulnerabilities associated with state weaknesses demand greater participation by the Armed Forces in the various national problems that, due to their organizational and logistical capacity, end up imposing themselves as an “adequate” instrument for the fulfillment of tasks of this nature in border areas, or distant from large urban centers. In the specific case of Brazil, the most varied demands, especially linked to civil defense and public security, giving rise to the greater participation of the Armed Forces due to their logistical capacity and capillarity in the territory.

We will now discuss the central issue of our article: the Trinitarian role of the Brazilian Army. Unlike models of force in developed countries, EB has (even if this is not explicitly categorized in defense documents) two other “state” functions in addition to *stricto sensu* defense (preparing for war): a) **territorial security** (due to the inability of our police to meet intermediate and national and international demands, such as border control); and b) **strength of presence** (stronghold of nationality and civism school), according to the scheme proposed below in figure 2.

Figure 2 – Trinitarian model of EB performance



Source: Authors (2020).

Indeed, it would be up to the Army to prepare the Land Force (F Ter) to fulfill its constitutional mission of defending the country and guaranteeing constitutional powers, law and order. In addition, the Land Force must fulfill the general subsidiary attributions provided for in the complementary legislation, which are: to cooperate with national development and Civil defense, as well as support the country's foreign policy and participate in international peace and humanitarian aid operations. It is noteworthy that the Ground Military Doctrine Fundamentals manual (EB20-MF-10.102) indicates that Ground Force elements can carry out three basic operations: offensive, defensive and cooperation and coordination with agencies.

So, the State requires the EB to have private subsidiary attributions to act, through preventive and repressive actions in the borderland border strip, against cross-border and environmental crimes, alone or in coordination with other organs of the Executive Branch, carrying out, among others, patrolling actions; search of people, land vehicles, boats and aircraft and prisons in *flagrante delicto*. At the same time, cooperate with federal agencies, when necessary, in the repression of crimes, in the national territory, with logistical, intelligence, communications and instruction support; and to cooperate with federal, state and municipal public agencies in the execution of engineering works and services.

Next, we will describe each of the roles that make up the Brazilian Army's trinity of activities. We will start with what constitutes the main function of any armed force: the preparation for war, that is, the possibility of employment against external threats in a situation of armed conflict.

#### 4.1 The Army as a “*stricto sensu* armed force”: deterrence and military transformation

At the end of the first decade of this century, most of the national armies underwent processes of military transformation. It is a fact that seeks, at the same time, transformation and rationalization, in a world in which war is progressively more complex and in which technology plays an increasingly important role. As a consequence, structural changes have been observed in the organization and employment of the Armed Forces.

Roughly speaking, the idea of military modernization originated in the 1970s, from the discussion on Evolution in Military Affairs (EAM) and Revolution in Military Affairs (RAM). In South America, a basic document of this process was the publication, in 2007, of the article “Three Pillars of a Military Transformation” by Chilean brigadier Jaime Covarrubias. The author sought to understand military changes from three levels, which differ by the depth with which these changes are made: adaptation, modernization and transformation.

For Covarrubias (2007), the transformation does not refer only to obtaining new technologies (which would be modernization), but involves deep reforms and changes in orientation in the doctrine and structure of forces. To transform, in synthesis, would mean changing the conceptions of the Force, projecting it into the future. In this way, the Army's transformation process is part of a historic milestone related to the evolution of security and defense thinking in Brazil. In 2009, the Army Commander handed over the “Strong Arm” strategy to the Ministry of Defense (MD), based on four major programs: Protected Amazon, Sentinel of the Fatherland, Strategic Mobility and Brazilian Combatant of the Future.

In the case of Brazil, this process gained momentum after the publication of the National Defense Strategy (END) of 2008. It is necessary to understand the geopolitical context in which this happened. On the one hand, after almost two decades after the end of the Cold War, the world was beginning to experience signs of the return of classical geopolitics, which began after the attacks on the "twin towers" in 2001 and the international financial crisis in 2007. On the other hand, Brazil was rehearsing its first steps towards regional leadership and more protonic actions at the global level. In the Defense realm, Brazil's need to constitute a force consistent with its geopolitical stature was discussed, creating a necessary rearguard to face reactions to Brazilian protagonism.

As presented in the second section of this article, the fact that the country has continental dimensions and borders ten countries imposes the need for it to have structured, equipped and trained Armed Forces, with firepower, reach and lethality that enable it to support the sovereign decisions in international forums. That was the fundamental message contained in END 2008.

Thus, Lima and Medeiros Filho (2019), state that the END was the main driver of some inflections, guiding the Army to organize itself by two fundamental principles: flexibility and elasticity. The first indicates the ability to use force with the minimum of pre-established stiffness, while the second indicates the ability to rapidly expand the dimensioning of forces when circumstances demand it. The authors note that, more recently, three other concepts have been incorporated into defense policies, namely: adaptability, modularity and sustainability (LIMA; MEDEIROS FILHO, 2019).

In 2012, EB instituted the "Brazilian Army Strength Project" (PROFORÇA), with the task of establishing, in an integrated manner, the bases for the Transformation of the Brazilian Army, considering three time frames: 2015, 2022 and 2030. Based on called "Transformation Vectors" (Science & Technology, Doctrine, Education & Culture, Engineering, Management, Logistics, Budget & Finance, Preparation & Employment and Human Resources). The Proforça resulted in the "Conception of Transformation of the Army 2013-2022".

In operational terms, what was sought was to restructure the force, adapting it to the context of the 21st century and contributing to generate a credible deterrence capacity. To this end, several projects were designed, among which we highlight, for the meaning they represent for the war of the future, Astros 2020, Cyber Defense and the Integrated Border Monitoring System (SISFRON).

The ASTROS 2020 Strategic Project aims to provide F Ter with means capable of providing long-range fire support, with high precision and lethality. The Project involves the development of two new armaments: the guided rocket, using the design of the current SS-40 rocket, of the rocket family of the ASTROS II system, in use by the Brazilian Army, and the tactical cruise missile with a 300 km range; in addition to specialized units in the Guarnição de Formosa (GO).

Cyber Defense aims to enable EB to fight in a new dimension of war: cyberspace. It should be noted that it was from the 2008 National Defense Strategy (END), which was revised in 2012, that there was a division of responsibilities between the three Brazilian Armed Forces, each of which has a strategic Defense sector, namely: nuclear (Navy), space (Air Force) and cyber (EB). Henceforth, cybernetics was part of an important movement of technologi-

cal innovation in the Army. It should be noted that, in that context, the transformation process came to understand that the current military doctrine was based on outdated conceptions of an army from the industrial era. Thus, the Army needed to be transformed into an institution of the “Information Age”, which should be based on information technology (IT) tools.

Therefore, in 2010, the Cyber Defense Center (CDCiber) was created. Despite operating within the Army Headquarters, CDCiber had military personnel from different forces. In 2014, CDCiber became part of the structure of the Cyber Defense Command (ComDCiber), which, in 2018, began operating at the facilities of Fort Rondon, where the Army’s Communications and Electronic Warfare Command already operates.

Thus, the Integrated Border Monitoring System (Sisfron) is composed of an integrated set of technological resources, such as surveillance and monitoring systems, information technology, electronic warfare and intelligence that, allied with infrastructure projects, will reduce vulnerabilities in the borderland. In this way, Sisfron intends to strengthen EB’s capacity for action in the border strip, an area of 16,886 kilometers in length, allowing the monitoring, mobility and presence capabilities present in the National Defense Strategy to be met.

Regarding this last program, despite being located here in the field of “Deterrence force”, it is observed, due to the nature of the threat faced, that the surveillance system has proved to be another tool to face security threats (problems “in ”Frontier) than geopolitical threats “ frontier ”problems. Alsina Junior (2018), for example, suggests that the concern with aspects related to transnational crime and the porosity of frontiers in the face of drug trafficking is the main reason that would have led EB to conceive Sisfron, so that it would be more subordinate to the dimension of security than the defense of strict sense.

It should be noted that the debate on the transformation of EB originates in a context of international projection in Brazil that suggested new military capabilities that would raise the Brazilian deterrent to another level, from the regional to the extra-regional. Such a process constituted a unique opportunity to advance in the discussion of the main mission of the armed forces, that is, the preparation for war. The moment is important to resume the discussion about tensions generated between the internal vocation.

#### **4.2 The Army as a territorial security force: playing the role of a middleman force**

The Army reaches the 21st century and the presence strategy, in its internal formulations, still prevails in a continental country. It was in this way that the capacities necessary for the EB of 2030 were listed in the document “Process of Transformation of the Army” presented by the General Staff of the Army (EME). It is worth noting that, despite the intention to transform, a key cultural perception in the Force still remained: “helping to conclude the occupation and integration into the Brazilian nation of practically half of the national territory corresponding to the Amazon” (BRASIL, 2010, p. 26).

The EME document verbatim signals three historical tasks for the Army, all geopolitical. First, the aforementioned need to occupy “empty spaces” in the Amazon. The second, related to the South American environment and the condition of having seventeen thousand kilometers of border with ten countries of the region. Finally, the need to project power internationally with

consistency capable of ensuring national interests, including being able to pacification and stabilization of South American neighbors in crisis.

However, it is the domestic plan and its implications for the articulation of public policies, the function that most involves and absorbs the Army. The Army's geopolitical formulators indicate, as noted in the first section, that the military has historically worked in the occupation of "empty spaces" that may exist in the national territory and in its extensions in order to fulfill its constitutional destination and subsidiary actions and, therefore, in the containment of eventual urban crises and the like in the dense problem of public security in Brazil.

According to Lima and Medeiros Filho (2018), between 1992 and 2017 there were 132 GLO operations in different situations that involved major events, international conferences, police and trucker strikes, among others, with approximately 60 in the area of security. public. It is noteworthy that this participation represented an average of 15 operations per presidential cycle between the years 1995 and 2017 (LIMA; MEDEIROS FILHO, 2018).

It should be noted that Brazil is the only South American country that does not have a permanent middleman force (Gendarmeria, Carabineros, National Guard, National Police, etc.). This fact turns out to be a vulnerability to the national security model insofar as the country does not have a force specifically dedicated to combating intermediary threats, which cross national borders, easily connecting the external to the internal environment. Ideally, the scenario would raise a debate about the creation of a national intermediary force in the face of a shortage of human resources or the inability of the federal, highway, military police or even due to the ad hoc (episodic) nature of the National Security Force or "National guard". Such conditions contribute for the Army to remain acting as a territorial security force, especially at the borders.

Alsina Júnior (2018) states that the central question is to know how much the Armed Forces can be prepared for constabular functions without risking their primary function.

"The weakness of the State has a double effect: it allows the proliferation of domestic dissensions while making the accumulation of warlike and organizational means more complex to conduct military campaigns against external enemies more complex" (ALSINA JUNIOR, 2018, p. 156).

The missions related to the sphere of security in the face of transnational crime and border porosity are related to aspects such as, for example, the modernization of the troops' equipment, new command and control measures and the acquisition of VBTP Guarani (ALSINA JUNIOR, 2018).

The fact is that this condition places the debate on military planning in Brazil facing a dilemma: to maintain the role of the Army as a territorial guard, assuming "ad hoc" functions of a police nature or would it be more effective to invest in the permanent "National Security Force" that had budgetary, human and material resources and capillarity throughout the national territory?

#### **4.3 Army as a force of presence and national development (bastion of nationality and school of civism)**

The third and most controversial of the EB's functions concerns the involvement of the Force in activities to support national development, as well as its belief in the status of a stronghold



of nationality. As seen in the first section, this is an issue that has its origin in the Brazilian military strategic culture, which constitutes linking security, territorial integration and development.

The presence of the Army throughout the national territory is a process that sought to legitimize itself along with the ordering territoriality of the State throughout history. For EB, actions such as Luiz Alves de Lima e Silva (Duque de Caxias) in the pacification of rebellions that occurred during the Regency Period and at the beginning of the Second Reign, would support the role of the military as agglutinators in the Brazilian territory (GONZALES, 2008)

Thus, the condition of a stronghold of nationality remains latent in the Institution and in society, if not as hegemonic thinking, certainly permeating subtle sectors and mentalities. Gonzales (2008) stresses that, to prove this observation, it is enough to follow the justifications and the so-called “ideas-force” on the official page or in internal publications for dissemination of the Earth Force. In this sense, the author highlights the excerpt from the periodical “Noticiário do Exército”, published in April 2006:

**Today's Army is a synthesis of its historical trajectory: the same people in arms committed to national integration and progress.** The “Strong Arm” that guarantees sovereignty, law and order. The “Friendly Hand” in which the Nation finds support in difficult moments [...] Brazilian Army: yesterday, today and always, the same mission (EXÉRCITO BRASILEIRO, 2006 apud GONZALES, 2008, p. 57, author's highlighting). (own translation)

In addition to an excerpt from the institutional article “The origins of the Brazilian Army”, published on EB's own website:

After Independence, in 1822, the performance of the Brazilian Army, internally, was decisive in **defeating all attempts at territorial and social fragmentation** in the country. The **maintenance of national unity**, painfully bequeathed by our ancestors, is due to their actions, in particular, from the performance of **Duque de Caxias**. Thus, **yesterday, as today, the need for national security and integration prevailed**, reflecting the sovereign will of the people, expressed, as an intangible ideal, in the Brazilian Constitutions of all times. (EXÉRCITO BRASILEIRO, 2007 apud GONZALES, 2008, p. 57, author's highlighting). (own translation)

The idea of integration between security and development of the territory, in the two quotations above, would appear as a strong point of the Army's performance throughout the history of the Empire and the Republic. A revealing aspect of this stance would be the fact that Duque de Caxias, “the great articulator of national unity”, was elevated to patron of the Institution.

Thus, the arguments of the Armed Forces are that in some regions they would represent the only meaning of *Brazilianness* and the presence of the State, acting as the main vector of national cohesion and unity and that the feeling of exclusivity, of being present, would translate an idea of “omnipresence”, of “power over the State” (GONZALES, 2008).

This would be an explanation for the fact that the Army, in certain contexts, takes on roles that would belong to other sectors of national life, causing, “on the one hand, an accom-

modation of political power, represented by the convenience and connivance of the State with this type of action and, on the other hand, a distortion in the role of each power and its respective responsibility for the conduct of public policies in the country" (GONZALES, 2008).

Another relevant aspect of the strategic military culture that supports and justifies, over time, the national presence of the Army and its status as a stronghold of nationality, is what we call here the "Civism School".

Gonzales (2008) suggests that the concern with the citizen's moral and civic formation is a marked feature in the institution. To this end, it refers to the so-called Military Instruction Schools - created in 1998 with the aim of being an alternative to the provision of mandatory military service - highlighting text available on the official website of EB and which guides the functioning of these schools:

[Military Instruction Schools] should constitute centers for the dissemination of civism, citizenship and patriotism [...]. Moral and civic education will be an object of constant concern in the training of personnel in order to develop the spiritual and moral values of nationality, the feeling of obligations towards the Homeland and understanding of basic institutions that govern society, such as family, government, church and the Armed Forces (EXÉRCITO BRASILEIRO apud GONZALES, 2008, p. 119-120, author's highlighting).

The feeling of responsibility in solving Brazilian problems is something that has been gradually built up in school benches during military life. It should be noted, for example, that the military study of Geography and Geopolitics<sup>6</sup> seeks to offer the officer a Cartesian method<sup>7</sup> that is capable of assessing the National Power or the Power of a given region, through the articulation of physiographic, economic, psychosocial, political and scientific-technological issues that impact national development. Therefore, from training at the Military Academy of Agulhas Negras (AMAN), passing through the School for the Improvement of Officers (EsAO) and arriving at the High Military Studies Courses, given at the Army Command and Staff School (ECEME), "the method" is a lens - a particular (mindset) - from which the military interacts with reality and seeks answers to complex national problems.

Therefore, the educational process is a conceptual key to understanding the relationship of responsibility / instrumentality of the military with the development of Brazil. Such a relationship takes place from a perspective where the officer is trained nurturing the belief that he is not only an arms professional, but also part of the nation's managerial-decision-making vanguard. In this way, the idea of a "military power" in Brazil is maintained, according to the constant perspective of the work "Fundamentals of National Power" of the *Escola Superior de Guerra* (2019), as part of a complex synthesis that is inserted in several dimensions - "expressions of power" - and that contribute to national security and development.

6 The discipline of Geography was removed from the AMAN curriculum in 2013, being replaced by the discipline of Geopolitics that started to be taught in 2016.

7 The method of the Geographic Area Survey (LGA) is taught to Cadet and becomes a *modus operandi* approach throughout a military career. It is worth noting that the selection process for the Army Command and General Staff School (ECEME) is composed exclusively of issues of History and Geography and has the "method" as its key element. For the military, the method gives a particular look at reality, a "mindset".

To this end, the "arms professional" seeks to deal not only with pragmatic and, say, "tougher" issues of power, but also be able to apply his more persuasive or "soft" character. For the military, the involvement of the Force in "non-war" activities, which touch on the expressions of national power mentioned above, would bring them closer to public opinion, a condition considered fundamental for the increase in the stock of confidence that society places in the Armed Forces. In this sense, the EB has devoted, in recent decades, special attention to themes that concern the "image of the Force", and its relationship with society, in general, and with the media, in particular.

Indeed, there are several examples of the EB involvement in activities that do not concern military issues. There are several situations that the military doctrine of the Army starts to accommodate. In the military perspective, such activities constitute opportunities to associate the image of the Army and its quality standard, with that discussed notion of a stronghold of nationality and a school of civism. In this sense, there has been a movement towards greater integration of the Armed Forces in interagency operations with public security bodies, Civil Defense, Health Surveillance, non-governmental organizations, the Federal Police, among others. It can be exemplified with some recent situations such as *Operação Acolhida*, which seeks to act facing the humanitarian crisis in the context of the Venezuelan migration to Roraima.

## 5 Final considerations

The condition of a developing country-continent is essential in answering the question proposed in the article. Thus, future debates can also assess the extent to which the combination of material (geopolitical) and ideational (strategic culture) factors would "condemn" EB to remain attached to the tripod presented in the text.

Be that as it may, two aspects call attention to the response to the problem proposed in the introduction. On the one hand a) the middleman force function, used especially in the most peripheral and border regions; and, on the other hand, b) the political significance of EB as a "stronghold of nationality".

In relation to the first, due to the inability of the security forces to meet intermediary demands of a national and international nature, such as border control, the EB has exercised the function of territorial security force, which is generally carried out in other countries by middleman forces. In this case, in addition to historical and institutional aspects, it is necessary to highlight the geographical characteristics of a country of continental dimensions that require a herculean effort to maintain its internal and international security. The historical presence of Army units in the border region, especially through the Special Border Platoons (PEF), ends up representing an element of employment economics (capillarity, logistics).

Regarding the second aspect, it is a long historical process in which the Army has been called upon to participate in the process of building the National State itself, which often involves the institution's participation as an instrument of stabilization.

The Army reaches the 21st century and the strategy of the national presence and conflict pacification remains symbiotically related to national development and the role of a civic school. The "territorial precariousness" of the material and human resources available to the State, in the inte-

rior and border exchange areas, keeps the Army's role in the dissemination of civic values active through conscription, the Tiros de Guerra, NPORs and CPORs.

The fact is that we have a unique challenge for the Armed Forces in Brazil. The big question that arises is: what to make of the Army of the future: focused exclusively on what is its primary function (war) or continue to meet the demands arising from our state weaknesses? The answer is not as obvious as it seems, according to the elements discussed in the text. If not: who would actually take care of the other two bases of the tripod if the Armed Forces started to dedicate themselves solely and exclusively to their core function: the preparation for war?

## References

ALSINA JÚNIOR, J. P. S. **Ensaio de grande estratégia brasileira**. Rio de Janeiro: FGV Editora, 2018.

AYOOB, M. **The third world security predicament: state-making, regional conflict, and the international system**. London: Lynne Rienner, 1995.

BRASIL. Congresso Nacional. Câmara do Deputados. Comissão de Relações Exteriores e de Defesa Nacional. **Audiência pública ordinária - 05/07/2017**. Brasília, DF: Câmara dos Deputados, 5 jul. 2017. Tema: Debater sobre a situação dos projetos estratégicos das Forças Armadas, os programas de cooperação internacional do Brasil na área da defesa e os planos do Exército para o desenvolvimento tecnológico. Convidado: General do Exército Eduardo Dias da Costa Villas Bôas. Available in: <https://www.camara.leg.br/internet/sitaqweb/TextoHTML.asp?etapa=11&nuSessao=0868/17>. Accessed in: 20 mar. 2021.

BRASIL. Exército. **Doutrina militar terrestre: manual de fundamentos**. Brasília, DF: Exército, 2014. Available in: <https://bdex.eb.mil.br/jspui/bitstream/123456789/93/5/REVOGADO-EB20-MF-10.102.pdf>. Accessed in: 18 mar. 2021.

BRASIL. Ministério da Defesa. **Projeto de Força do Exército Brasileiro (Proforça)**. Brasília: EB, 2012. Available in: [https://www.eb.mil.br/c/document\\_library/get\\_file?uuid=b8fd062b-d6c0-431f-a931-1d7ad6facccc&groupId=1094704](https://www.eb.mil.br/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=b8fd062b-d6c0-431f-a931-1d7ad6facccc&groupId=1094704) Accessed in: 21 mar 2021.

BRASIL. Presidência da República. **Decreto nº 45.479, de 26 de fevereiro de 1959**. Aprova o Regulamento das Colônias militares de Fronteiras na Amazônia. Brasília, DF: Presidência da República, 1959. Available in: <http://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/decret/1950-1959/decreto-45479-26-fevereiro-1959-384603-publicacaooriginal-1-pe.html>. Accessed in: 18 mar. 2021.

BRASIL. Exército. **O Processo de Transformação do Exército**. 2. ed. Brasília: Estado-Maior do Exército, 2010.

BRASIL. Ministério da Defesa. **Política Nacional de Defesa [e] Estratégia Nacional de Defesa**. Brasília, DF: Ministério da Defesa, 2020. Available in: [https://www.gov.br/defesa/pt-br/assuntos/copy\\_of\\_estado-e-defesa/estrategia-nacional-de-defesa](https://www.gov.br/defesa/pt-br/assuntos/copy_of_estado-e-defesa/estrategia-nacional-de-defesa). Accessed in: 19 mar. 2021.

CARVALHO, J. M. de. **Forças armadas e política no Brasil**. 2. ed. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2006.

COVARRUBIAS, J. G. Os três pilares de uma transformação militar. **Military Review (Edição Brasileira)**, Fort Leavenworth, p. 16-24, nov./dez. 2007.

DOESER, F. Finland, Sweden and Operation Unified Protector: the impact of strategic culture. **Comparative Strategy**, [London], v. 35, n. 4, p. 284-297, Nov 2016. Available in: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01495933.2016.1222842>. Accessed in: 19 mar. 2021.

FAORO, R. **A república inacabada**. São Paulo: Globo, 2007.

FERREIRA, O. S. **Forças armadas para quê?**. Rio de Janeiro: Edições GRD, 2004.

FREYRE, G. **Nação e exército**. Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 2019.

ESCOLA SUPERIOR DE GUERRA (Brasil). **Fundamentos do poder nacional**. Rio de Janeiro: ESG, 2019. Available in: <https://www.esg.br/publi/FundamentosdoPoderNacional2019FINALFINAL.pdf>. Accessed in: 19 mar. 2021.

GONZALES, S. L. de M. **A territorialidade militar terrestre no Brasil: os tiros de guerra e a estratégia da presença**. 2008. Tese (Doutorado em Geografia) – Departamento de Geografia, Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas, Universidade de São Paulo, 2008. Available in: <https://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8136/tde-31032009-143246/pt-br.php>. Accessed in: 19 mar. 2020.

IBGE. **Contagem da População 2007**. [S. l.]: IBGE, 2007. Available in: <http://censos2007.ibge.gov.br/> Accessed in: 21 mar 2021.

JOHNSTON, A. I. Thinking about Strategic Culture. **International Security**, [S. l.]. v. 19, n. 4, p. 32-64, 1995.

LANTIS, J. S. **Strategic culture and national security**. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2002.

LIMA, R. C.; MEDEIROS FILHO, O. O papel do exército brasileiro no setor de segurança: implicações para a defesa e o emprego das forças armadas. In: ANDRADE, I. de O. et al. (org.). **Desafios contemporâneos para o exército brasileiro**. Brasília, DF: Ipea, 2019. p. 95-132. Available in: [https://www.ipea.gov.br/portal/images/stories/PDFs/livros/livros/180826\\_desafios\\_contemporaneos\\_para\\_o\\_exercito\\_brasileiro.pdf](https://www.ipea.gov.br/portal/images/stories/PDFs/livros/livros/180826_desafios_contemporaneos_para_o_exercito_brasileiro.pdf). Accessed in: 20 mar. 2021.

LIMA, R. C.; MEDEIROS FILHO, O. Segurança, defesa e o emprego da força no Brasil: trajetórias e desafios políticos. ENCONTRO NACIONAL DA ASSOCIAÇÃO BRASILEIRA DE ESTUDOS DE DEFESA, 10., 2018, São Paulo. **Anais [...]**. São Paulo: ABED, 2018. Available in: [https://www.enabed2018.abedef.org/resources/anais/8/1535663680\\_ARQUIVO\\_Lima,R.C.eMedeirosFilho,O.\(2018\).TrabalhoENABED.pdf](https://www.enabed2018.abedef.org/resources/anais/8/1535663680_ARQUIVO_Lima,R.C.eMedeirosFilho,O.(2018).TrabalhoENABED.pdf). Accessed in: 20 mar. 2021.

MARQUES, A. A. **Amazônia: pensamento e presença militar**. 2007. Tese (Doutorado em Ciência Política) – Departamento de ciência Política, Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas, Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo, 2007. Available in: [https://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8131/tde-30112007-153256/publico/TESE\\_ADRIANA\\_APARECIDA\\_MARQUES.pdf](https://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8131/tde-30112007-153256/publico/TESE_ADRIANA_APARECIDA_MARQUES.pdf). Accessed in: 20 mar. 2021.

MATTOS, C. de M. Uma geopolítica Pan-Amazônica. In: MATTOS, C. de M. **Geopolítica**. Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2011. p. 13-205. v. 2.

MEDEIROS FILHO, O. Breve panorama de segurança na América do Sul. In: NASSER, R. M.; MORAES, R. F. de (org.). **O Brasil e a segurança no seu entorno estratégico**: América do Sul e o Atlântico Sul. Brasília, DF: Ipea, 2014. p. 21-42. Available in: [https://www.ipea.gov.br/portal/images/stories/PDFs/livros/livros/livro\\_brasil\\_seguranca.pdf](https://www.ipea.gov.br/portal/images/stories/PDFs/livros/livros/livro_brasil_seguranca.pdf). Accessed in: 20 mar. 2020.

MEDEIROS FILHO, O. Desafios do exército brasileiro nas fronteiras amazônicas: entre a border e a frontier. **Coleção Meira Mattos**: revista das ciências militares, Rio de Janeiro, v. 14, n. 49, p. 77-97, jan./abr. 2020. Available in: <http://ebrevistas.eb.mil.br/RMM/article/view/2965/2681>. Accessed in: 20 mar. 2021.

NUNN, F. **Yesterday soldiers**: european military professionalism in South America, 1890-1940. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983.

RATTENBACH, B. **El sistema social-militar en la sociedad moderna**. Buenos Aires: Editorial Pleamar, 1972.

REIS, B. C. Ensaio em torno de uma cultura estratégica portuguesa. **Revista Nação e Defesa**, [Porto], n. 136, p. 9-33, 2013.





# Proposition of an index for sports diplomacy in the military context

*Propuesta de un index para la diplomacia deportiva en el contexto militar*

**Abstract:** Sports diplomacy uses sportsmen and sporting events to build a favorable image between audiences and foreign institutions. The aim of the research was to propose an index of sports diplomacy in the context of military sport. An analytical literature review was conducted to list the tools and indicators of sports diplomacy. Five experts judged the importance and potential impact of the tools in the military sports context. Multidimensional scaling was performed to define tool retention. Finally, it was identified in the International Military Sports Council yearbooks the frequency of use of these tools in the last three editions of the Military World Games and the confirmatory factorial analysis with partial least squares for formative models was employed to generate the index algorithm. The results indicated that six tools were relevant and the factor analysis indicated that the index met the required quality criteria, being possible to generate the algorithm from its weighted factor weights, generating a model for analysis of sports diplomacy in the military context.

**Keywords:** Diplomacy. Sports. Military.

**Resumen:** La diplomacia deportiva utiliza deportistas y eventos deportivos para construir una imagen favorable entre el público y las instituciones extranjeras. La investigación tuvo como objetivo proponer un *index* de diplomacia deportiva en el contexto del deporte militar. Se llevó a cabo un examen de la bibliografía analítica para enumerar los instrumentos e indicadores de la diplomacia deportiva. Cinco *experts* juzgaron la importancia y el potencial de impacto de las herramientas en el contexto del deporte militar. El escalado multidimensional se realizó para definir la retención de herramientas. Finalmente, se identificó en los *yearbooks* del *International Military Sports Council* la frecuencia de uso de estas herramientas en las últimas tres ediciones de los Juegos Mundiales Militares y se empleó el análisis factorial confirmatorio de mínimos cuadrados parciales para modelos formativos a generación del algoritmo de *index*. Los resultados indican que seis herramientas eran relevantes y el análisis factorial indicó que el *index* cumplía los criterios de calidad requeridos, siendo posible generar el algoritmo a partir de sus pesos factoriales ponderados, generando un modelo para el análisis de la diplomacia deportiva en el contexto militar.

**Palabras Clave:** Diplomacia. Deportes. Militar.

**Delon Philbert Willis** 

Guiana Defense Force.  
Georgetown, Guyana.  
delon\_looney@hotmail.com

**Angela Nogueira Neves** 

Exército Brasileiro.  
Escola Educação Física do Exército.  
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.  
angelanneves@yahoo.com.br

**Received: Nov. 11, 2020.**

**Approved: Jan. 21, 2021.**

COLEÇÃO MEIRA MATTOS

ISSN on-line 2316-4891 / ISSN print 2316-4833

<http://ebrevistas.eb.mil.br/index.php/RMM/index>



Creative Commons  
Attribution Licence

## 1 Introduction

Since indefinite times, "man has lived in bands or villages" but not until perhaps 5000 BC the villages began to come together in larger political units. As a consequence, the aggregation process continued at a progressively faster pace and led to the formation of the first state in history (SPRUYT, 2002). Since then, the State has configured itself as the legitimate holder of the use of force (WEBER, 2015) and the expansion of States creates a society of relations between them, in which both hard power (military and economic) and soft power are employed in a single or combined way in order to balance relations between States (NYE, 2004).

While the world great powers can use both types of power in international politics to tip the balance of power (smart power), peripheral nations has soft power as their main option, that is, the ability to make others do what they want through attraction, and not through coercion or payment (NYE; WELCH, 2013). Diplomacy, economic assistance, peace operations and communication are tools for soft power (MARKS; FREEMAN, 2020).

The term diplomacy has its origins in both Old French (*diplomatie*) and Greek (*diplōma, matos*) and Latin (*diploma*), having come into use not before the last decade of the 18th century (LEIRA, 2016; MARKS; FREEMAN, 2020). Diplomacy is generally defined as an art that is practiced in conducting negotiations between nations in order to implement policies and pursue interests (LEIRA, 2016; MARKS, 2015).

In the discipline of international relations, it is argued that there are eight forms of modern diplomacy: (1) pacification policy, (2) gunboat diplomacy, (3) dollar diplomacy, (4) public diplomacy, (5) people's diplomacy, (6) intermediary diplomacy, (7) economic diplomacy and (8) digital or electronic diplomacy (REDEKER, 2008). Although all forms of diplomacy are important, this article is restricted to sports diplomacy, which is configured as a type of public diplomacy.

Sports diplomacy involves representation and diplomatic activities carried out by sportspeople and / or sports confederations on behalf of and in conjunction with their governments (ALLISON; MONNINGTON, 2002). Sports diplomacy uses athletes, sport-related people – coaches, managers – and sporting events to inform, engage and build a favorable image among foreign audiences and institutions, which often shape perceptions in a way more favorable to the government's foreign policy objectives. (MURRAY, 2018). It is an expression of soft power (DUBINSKY, 2019; NYE, 2008).

There is an attitude of explicitly denying or, at least, moving away from any association of institutions and sporting events with politics. It is stated that "sport, like music and art, transcends politics, [so] we are concerned with sport, and not with politics or business" (BROUNDAGE, 1968, p. 10). However, what is seen in contemporary times is the use of sport by governments for political purposes: the Berlin Olympics in 1936 (GRIX; HOULIHAN, 2014), the ping pong table between the United States and China (GRIFFIN, 2014), the Seoul Olympics in 1988(CHO, 2012), Socchi's winter Olympics (KOBIERECKI, 2019), Germany's World Cup (GRIX; HOULIHAN, 2014), and PyeongChang's winter Olympics (LEE, 2019) are recent examples of success of these practices. Furthermore, in

recent years, there has been a more explicit recognition of the role of sport as an international diplomatic tool. This is illustrated, for example, in the development of a close relationship between the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the United Nations (UN) in the use of sport for development and peace, and the subsequent provision of "observer status" To the IOC at the UN (HONG, 2010).

Despite the relationship between international sports and diplomacy being a familiar area, it is relatively little explored when compared to other types of diplomacy, and more studies are needed in this area (MURRAY, 2018). Theoretically, it is recognized that there are two distinct categories of sports diplomacy. One, more versed in traditional diplomacy – the dialogue between States – international sport is intentionally employed by the government official as an instrument of diplomacy, being the most familiar form of sports diplomacy. Here, sports diplomacy is often associated with governments that employ sportsmen to convey a diplomatic message, or with states that use sporting events – promoting or participating in them – to cool tensions in diplomatic relations or simply test the ground for a possible change in politics (ESHERICK et al., 2017; MURRAY, 2012, 2013; MURRAY, PIGMAN, 2014; ROFE, 2018).

Otherwise, the second category postulates that international sport-as-diplomacy concerns diplomatic representation, communication and negotiation between non-state actors that occur as a result of the ongoing international sports competition – more versed in public diplomacy (MURRAY; PIGMAN, 2014). It includes diplomatic activities that take place to make international sports competition possible. In the modern and plural diplomatic environment, non-state actors such as the IOC and the International Football Federation (FIFA), can practice this distinct type of diplomacy. It is these organizations that negotiate with governments, with regional and national sports organizing bodies, with large global companies, the global media and global civil society organizations that sponsor, transmit and validate the competition (MURRAY, 2018; MURRAY, PIGMAN, 2014).

Military sporting events can be an opportunity for convergence between military diplomacy and sports diplomacy. Military diplomacy uses tangible and intangible military resources to exert influence in a non-coercive manner, in various activities – appointment of attachés, educational and training exchanges, support for humanitarian aid – as a form of expression of the nation's soft power (SILVA, 2015). This possibility of convergence is due to the existence of the World Military Games promoted by the International Military Sports Council (CISM), with the participation of the Armed Forces (FFAA) from countries in America, Europe, Asia and Africa every four years. CISM itself promotes this double vision – sports and military diplomacy – based on the reasons it presented for the support of nations to their mission (INTERNACIONAL MILITARY SPORTS COUNCIL, 2020).

Sports diplomacy has four basic objectives: to build peace, to unite nations, to establish a platform for dialogue and to build trust and consensus of interests between nations (ÖZSARI et al., 2018). These goals can be achieved through the tools of sports diplomacy. To date, there is no consensus in the literature, on which tools are effectively constituents of sports diplomacy – national brand, sports media, victories, organization of events, lobbying are some examples – and what weight each has in practice sports diplomacy in order to meet

the objectives it serves (MURRAY, 2017). This research focuses on the identification of tools and their use in the context of military sport.

The aim of this research is to propose an index for sports diplomacy in the military context, based on the frequency of their use. Its constitution is based on analytical literature review, expert evaluation and analysis of the last three editions of the Military World Games. We conclude with the proposition of an algorithm for calculating an index score, in order to make it possible to determine the weight of each tool and to categorize countries based on the frequency of use of sports diplomacy tools in the military context.

## **2 Methods**

This is a methodological research, focused on developing a tool, a measure (diplomacy index) (MAUCH; BIRCH, 1998). It follows the methodological proposal of index construction in which the steps of searching for evidence in the literature, proposing and confirming the items and validating the index using multivariate methods are described as essential (ABEYASEKERA, 2005).

### **2.1 Identification of tools related to sports diplomacy**

Initially, sources were searched in the Google Scholar database. Due to its scope, this public database provides relevant evidence for the topic, not only centered on scientific articles, but also on reports, of the topic under investigation. The following string was used: "sports diplomacy" "dimension" "tools" "indicators".

The search period included materials published since 2002, to consider the scenario of international relations after the events of September 11, 2001, which caused profound changes in the form of expression of hard and soft power in the dynamics of relations international standards. There was no attempt to exhaust the literature, only to gather relevant evidence for the proposition of the index.

### **2.2 Selection criteria**

Theoretical essays, books, book chapters, theses and dissertations, newspaper news, reports and policy papers regarding sports diplomacy were considered documents to be included. Cases of particular analysis of an event were excluded, as were texts that discussed sports diplomacy conceptually, and not its application. Articles wrote in Portuguese and English were read.

### **2.3 Tools identification**

The selected material was systematically read to identify used or theoretically proposed sports diplomacy tools. From this reading, the tools were listed and their indicators were generated, in order to define the constituent actions of each tool. The list


of tools / definition of indicators was finalized when no other tool / indicator other than those already described was identified in the selected material, that is, by the saturation criterion.

## 2.4 Index dimensions

Subsequently, the list was submitted to analysis by five professionals considered experts on the topic – military personnel from the General Staff (QEMA) and General officers with military sports experience. Together with the indicators, these professionals were offered the definition of diplomacy adopted in this work for the theoretical guidance of the judgment. The judges assigned a score from 1 to 10 to verify the importance (1 = not very important; 10 = very important) and the potential impact of the tools (1 being low potential and 10 = high potential).

Based on the judges' scores, attributed to the importance and potential impact of each tool, a multidimensional scaling (ALSCAL) was carried out in order to determine their dissimilarities on a perceptual map. A model with determination coefficient (RSQ) greater than 0.60 and stress less than 2.5 is acceptable (HAIR et al., 2009). A perception of value was attributed to each tool, varying according to its dimensional position on the perceptual map (Figure 1). Low value tools have been eliminated.

Figure 1 – Interpretation of the perceptual map for decision



Source: Adapted from Abeyasekera (2005).

## 2.5 Index algorithm (score)

To create an index score based on the reality of military sport, data from the last three editions of the Military World Games promoted by CISM were analyzed. Yearbooks from the years 2011, 2015 and 2019 (years of the Summer Military World Games) were used. From these sources, information was collected on the use of each tool remaining in the index, after the previous analysis.

The yearbooks were systematically read, having as reading guide material the list of all countries associated with CISM and the indicators of diplomacy tools in the military context. To identify the frequency of use of each tool, a specific reading of each yearbooks was carried out, in order to avoid loss of information and / or confusion between the indicators. Analyzing the content of the yearbooks, actions were identified that reflected the use of the tools – through similarity with the indicators that define them. For each identified action, one frequency point was assigned.

The diplomacy index, in statistical terms, constitutes a formative model, in which each tool collaborates to form a general concept. For this characteristic, a confirmatory factor analysis with partial least squares was conducted. As it is a formative model, outer weights ( $\omega$ ) are the indicators of the tool's "contribution" to the index. To be important, outer weights must be significant and, preferably but not necessarily,  $\omega > 0.50$  (HAIR et al., 2009). The multi-collinearity of the tools was investigated, measured by the variance inflation factor (VIF) as a retention criterion in the model, considering an acceptable VIF  $< 10$  (HAIR et al., 2009). To assess the fit of the model (and ultimately, the relevance of the tools), the Cohen indicator ( $F^2$ ; values of 0.02, 0.15 and 0.35 are considered small, medium and large) (COHEN, 1988) to assess how each tool is "useful" for adjusting the index. The Stone-Geisser indicator ( $Q^2 > 0$ ; values of 0.02, 0.15 and 0.35 are considered small, medium and large) evaluated the precision of the adjusted model (index) (COHEN, 1988).

From data, the algorithm was created, which may be used to classify the frequency of the tools used for sports diplomacy in the military context. The algorithm was written using the tools' weighted outer weights ( $\omega$ ), following the common practice (MARÔCO, 2014)

$$\text{Sports diplomacy Index}_{country} = \omega_{\text{weighted}_1} * (\text{frequency of tool}_1 \text{ usage}) + \omega_{\text{weighted}_2} * (\text{frequency of tool}_2 \text{ usage}) + \dots + \omega_{\text{weighted}_n} * (\text{frequency of tool}_n \text{ usage})$$

Weighting is done by the following formula:  $\omega_{\text{weighted}} = \omega_n / \sum \omega$

For all inferential tests, a significance level of 5% was adopted, and the software SPSS 22 and PLS-PM 3.2.2 were used in the analyzes.

## 3 Results

### 3.1 Tools identification

From the works collected in our analytical review of the literature, it was possible to identify fourteen reference sources (BLACK, PEACOCK, 2013; GRIX, 2018; GRIX, HOULIHAN,

2014; EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2018; GRASSROOTS ..., 2018a; HAUT et al., 2018; HEERE et al., 2012; MURRAY, 2013; 2018; NYGÅRD, GATES, 2013; ÖZSARI et al., 2018; TRUNKOS, HEERE, 2017; USHKOVSKA, PETRUSHEVSKA, 2015; ZINTZ, PARRISH, 2019) relevant for this research, which directly described, or indicated, or defined tools to be used in sports diplomacy. We were able to recognize and define eight tools from the reading of these works: (1) Being an active nation in large sporting events; (2) Promote a National Brand; (3) Use of Media and Technology; (4) Appointment of Sports Ambassador; (5) Lobby; (6) Establishment of International Technical Cooperation; (7) Establishment of Non-Governmental Partnerships; (8) Creation and / or Participation in Multisectoral Networks. The description of the indicators of these tools can be seen in Table 1.

**Table 1 – Sports diplomacy tools and indicators**


<b>Tools</b>	<b>Indicators</b>
Being an active nation in relevant sporting events	<p>a. Be a hostess of mega events (Olympic Games or FIFA World Cup) to increase international prestige and project soft power.</p> <p>b. Project the image of the country with the publication of records and medals (both for isolated sports and for the medal table), being of special importance for countries that are not promoting the event.</p> <p>c. States can combine the two methods mentioned above.</p>
Promote a National Brand	<p>a. Sport may be used as an instrument to promote international recognition or the country's good reputation and image. Not only are victories part of this, but also sports promotion programs, technology development and used materials.</p>
Use of Media and Technology	<p>a. Use of media tools to promote countries' cultural and social values in the international arena.</p> <p>b. Promotes prominence to commercial institutions and state institutions and international media organizations.</p> <p>c. Promotes country identification with some sporting areas in which they are successful.</p>
Appointment of Sports Ambassador	<p>a. Serves as a model for global youth.</p> <p>b. Seen as a representative of public diplomacy in his country.</p> <p>c. Acts as a mediator in the development of mutual understanding through a variety of joint programs between countries.</p>
<i>Lobbying</i>	<p>a. Influence people who are active in decision-making, with the purpose of making a significant contribution to interstate relations.</p> <p>b. The most common lobbying activities in the sports context are: influencing which countries, cities and even places where relevant sports games will take place.</p>
Establishment of Non-Governmental Partnerships	<p>a. Transfer or sharing successful practices through non-governmental partnerships.</p>

Tools	Indicators
Establishment of International Technical Cooperation	a. Transfer or sharing of successful practices through international Technical Cooperation.
Creation and/or Participation in Multisectoral Networks	a. The exchange of successful practices and/or advocacy

Source: The authors (2020).

In order to verify the relevance of sports diplomacy instruments, the list of indicators was submitted to the five experts, the same being: former commander of the Centro de Capacitação Física do Exército; three (03) QEMA officers, undergraduated in Physical Education at Physical Education School of Brazilian Army and representatives of Brazil at CISM; and the president of CISM in English Guiana.

**Figure 2 – Mean of the sports diplomacy tools evaluation, regarding their potential impact and importance in military sport**



Source: The authors (2020).

In Figure 2, the mean of the scores and the standard deviation of each tool can be observed, both for the evaluation of its importance in the military sports context and for the potential for impact.

In order to determine the dimensions of the index, multidimensional scaling analysis (ALSCAL) was performed. The best fit of the model (Stress = 0.03; RSQ = 0.99) was obtained



from the calculation of squared Euclidean distances between variables, for ordinal measurement level, with Euclidean distance model, without normalizing the variables (Table 1).

**Table 1 – Adjustments of the different models**


Interval	Standardization	Stress	RSQ
Squared Euclidean	No standardization	0,03	0,99
Squared Euclidean	Z score	0,04	0,99
Chebychev	No standardization	0,07	0,96
Chebychev	Z score	0,10	0,93
Block	No standardization	0,04	0,98
Block	Z score	0,05	0,98

Source: The authors (2020).

Note: RSQ = coefficient of determination.

The perceptual map indicates that promoting a national brand through sport and promoting/participating in large events tend to be the most relevant and important tools (Figure 3).

**Figure 3 – Perceptual map of sports diplomacy tools in the military context**



Source: The authors (2020).

On the other hand, the appointment of a sports ambassador in the context of military sport and establishing non-governmental partnerships were considered to be tools of low relevance and low importance. According to the interpretation guideline adopted for the perceptual map (ABEYASEKERA, 2005), these tools must then be eliminated from the index.

### 3.2 Index algorithm

The raw data regarding the use of tools by each nation can be obtained from the authors in full. As a highlight, only Brazil, Belgium and France were the countries that used all the tools listed in the 3 Military World Games analyzed.

#### Measurement model

Initially, it was tested whether the tools that could make up the index were not multicollinear. All tools were below the acceptable value ( $VIF < 10$ ) (HAIR et al., 2009), allowing the index to be constituted by the six remaining tools from the previous analysis. The factor weights were then calculated for each tool (Table 2).

Table 2 – Factorial weights and collinearity for each index tool

Tool	$\omega$	p	VIF
(1) Being an active nation in major sporting events	0.52	<0.001	1.85
(2) Promotion of a National Brand	0.22	<0.001	2.85
(3) Lobbying	0.25	<0.001	4.13
(4) Use of Media and Technology	0.26	<0.001	9.17
(5) Establishment of International Technical Cooperation	0.24	<0.001	5.37
(6) Creation and / or Participation in Multisectoral Networks	0.13	<0.001	1.33

Source: The Authors (2020).

Note:  $\omega$  = outer weights; p = significance; VIF = variance inflation factor.

The outer weights were relatively low, but still, all significant, which is the most relevant for their retention in the model.

#### Structural Model

In order to confirm the quality of the proposed index, the adequacy of two general indicators was verified: Cohen ( $f^2$ ) and Stone-Geisser ( $Q^2$ ) (COHEN, 1988). After performing the blindfolding analysis, it was found that the index has significant ( $Q^2 = 0.59$ ) and high ( $f^2 = 0.49$ ) predictive relevance, as well as the index tools, which varied in terms of intensity of relevance – medium to high (Table 3).

**Table 3 – General indicators of adjustment and quality of the index and its tools**

Tool	Q2	f2
(1) Being an active nation in major sporting events	0,29	0,20
(2) Promotion of a National Brand	0,63	0,49
(3) Lobbying	0,80	0,69
(4) Use of Media and Technology	0,86	0,79
(5) Establishment of International Technical Cooperation	0,73	0,64
(6) Creation and / or Participation in Multisectoral Networks	0,21	0,15
<b>Sports Diplomacy Index</b>	0,59	0,49

Source: The Authors (2020).

Note: Q2 = Stone-Geisser indicator; f2 = Cohen indicator.

In view of these results, we were able to show that the selected tools are relevant and that the index formed by them has evidence of quality. After weighting the outer weights (MARÔCO, 2014), it was then possible to propose the algorithm for calculating the frequency of use of sports diplomacy tools in the context of military sport:

$$\text{Sports Diplomacy Index}_{country} = 0,32 * (\text{frequency of tool}_1 \text{ usage}) + 0,14 * (\text{frequency of tool}_2 \text{ usage}) + 0,15 * (\text{frequency of tool}_3 \text{ usage}) + 0,16 * (\text{frequency of tool}_4 \text{ usage}) + 0,15 * (\text{frequency of tool}_5 \text{ usage}) + 0,08 * (\text{frequency of tool}_6 \text{ usage})$$

Table 4 shows the 10 highest scores in the Sports Diplomacy Index in the military context.

**Table 4 – Countries classified according to the proposed Index**

No	Country	Index score
1	Brazil (BRA)	3.32
2	China (CHN) e South Korea (KOR)	3.08
3	Kuwait (KUW)	3.03
4	Belgium (BEL) e France (FRA)	3.00
5	United States (USA) e Russia (RUS)	2.84
6	Ecuador (ECU), Germany (GER), Austria (AUT), Spain (ESP)	2.76
7	Oman (OMA) e Finland (FIN)	2.61
8	Algeria (ALG)	2.47
9	Lebanon (LBN) e Portugal (POR)	2.46
10	Indonesia (INA)	2.45

Source: The authors (2020).

#### 4 Discussion

The aim of this research was to propose an index for sports diplomacy in the military context, generating an algorithm that makes it possible to classify countries based on the frequency of use of sports diplomacy tools in the Military World Games.

A reflection on the need to think about sports diplomacy in the military context should be done in view of the *signifié* of sport in the military environment. There is the saying that is repeatedly recalled: “in times of peace, sport is what most resembles combat” – a sentence whose authorship is unknown. George Orwell (1945), for his part, stated in the 1940s that sport is war without guns. Sport is often imbued with notions of national identity and war, and is a significant symbol of nationality in international disputes (GLEAVES; LLEWELLYN, 2014).

For this reason, although there is Defense diplomacy – defined as the cooperative use of the Armed Forces and related infrastructure (military and civilian) as a tool of foreign and security policy (SILVA, 2015) – and military diplomacy – defined as an instrument that “aims to promote exchanges and cooperation, building relationships of mutual trust, with the purpose of collaborating with the training of personnel, security, development, stability and peace” (BRASIL, 2016, p. 19) – sports diplomacy must have its place in the military context, in order to better understand the contribution that sport can make to diplomacy, conflict resolution and cultural understanding.

As diplomacy is an expression of soft power (DUBINSKY, 2019; NYE, 2004) – measuring it, in some way, is a strategic necessity in the international anarchic system. To name a few of these, we highlight the Lowy Global Diplomacy Index (LOWY INSTITUTE, 2019) – which is based on the number of diplomatic representations – and the Digital Diplomacy Index (REPUTATION SQUAD, 2020) – which is based on the frequency of nine Twitter indicators to assess G20 countries. In this context, the proposal for the present sports diplomacy index in the military context is coherent, not only because of its importance, but because of the way in which the indicators are addressed – frequency of use.

The model proposed here was developed from a literature review and was able to identify specific indicators for the sport. To select them for military sport, experts with a notorious ability to exercise this function judged them, and it was possible to identify the six indicators that actually made up the index. With a robust statistical analysis, it was possible to highlight the relevance and usefulness of the index, also generating an algorithm that makes it possible to update the data year by year – if the query is maintained in the CISM yearbook – or at least every four years, for advent of the Military World Games.

Despite these positive results, it is recognized that there is a possibility of future improvement to the index, or at least, in the countries' assessment sources. Yearbooks aggregate public data, being a communication to the public of the actions promoted within the scope of CISM. Perhaps, internal data, of the meetings and actions of the countries within the organization and behind the scenes of the events could allow to recognize more accurately how the countries use the tools of sports diplomacy. On the other hand, what has been made public is the action that really caused some impact – notorious for being remembered – and for that reason keeping this consultation with public material can be interesting. Add, do not exchange for internal data.

What is presented here is an initial proposal, which allows classifying countries in relation to the frequency of use of sports diplomacy tools in the context of military sport. The tool does not allow the evaluation of outcomes – the results of the action in the short, medium and long term; just the inputs – what has been done. But measuring this construct using quantifiable indicators is an improvement (PAHLAVI, 2007). The continuity of the research and the improvement of the measure is necessary, including following the developments of the actions taken by the countries.

The classification of Brazil as first in the ranking is consistent with its actions in the analyzed period: it hosted an event, participated in all the others and, alongside France and Belgium, used all the tools identified in the three editions of the analyzed Games. In the same way that it is consistent to be followed by the other two hosts of the Games of 2015 and 2019, South Korea and China, respectively. It is up to Brazil to maintain the use of this soft power, seeking to use it in favor of its international policy, leaving the athletes of the Brazilian FFAA the role of representatives of their country in this space, also political, of sweat and peace.

## 5 Conclusion

The present work achieved its objective, making a coherent proposal relevant to the military context to evaluate the frequency of sports diplomacy actions. Future research can improve the measure and its recurrent use can help the FFAA to position itself in the use of this soft power instrument.

**Acknowledgments:** The authors would like to thank Comd. Vermon Burnette; Brigadier General André Luiz Ribeiro Campos Allão; Colonel Luiz Fernando Medeiros Nóbrega; Colonel Rafael Soares Pinheiro da Cunha and Lieutenant-Colonel Edson Aita for their help in carrying out this research.

## References

ABEYASEKERA, S. Multivariate methods for index construction. *In: UNITED NATIONS (org.). Household sample surveys in developing and transitions countries*. Nova Iorque: Nações Unidas, 2005. p. 377-378.

ALLISON, L.; MONNINGTON, T. Sport, prestige and international relations. **Government and Opposition**, v. 37, n. 1, p. 106-134, 2002.

BLACK, D.; PEACOCK, B. Sports and diplomacy. *In: COOPER, A.; HEINE, J.; THAKUR, R. (ed.). The Oxford handbook of modern diplomacy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. p. 535-547.

BRASIL. Exército. Portaria nº 184, de 2 de março de 2016. Aprova a diretriz para as atividades do Exército Brasileiro na Área Internacional - DAEBAI (EB-D-01.006) e dá outras providências. **Boletim do Exército**, Brasília, DF, n. 10, p.15-27, 11 mar. 2016. Available in: <https://bdex.eb.mil.br/jspui/bitstream/1/1456/1/be10-16.pdf>. Accessed in: 25 Jan. 2021.

BROUNDAGE, A. **The Speeches of President Avery Brundage 1952 to 1968**. Comitê olímpico internacional: Bruxelas, 1968.

CHO, H. **International sporting events, nationalism and sport diplomacy: the evolving relationships between North and South Korea from 1978 to 2007**. 2012. Tese (Doutorado em Esporte, Exercício e Ciências da Saúde). School of Sport, Exercise and Health Sciences, Loughborough University, Loughborough, UK, p. 335. 2012.

COHEN, J. **Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences**. 2nd ed. Nova York: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, 1988.

DUBINSKY, Y. From soft power to sports diplomacy: a theoretical and conceptual discussion. **Place Branding and Public Diplomacy**, v. 15, n. 3, p. 156-164, 2019.

ESHERICK, G. *et al.* **Case studies in sport diplomacy**. Morgentown: FIT Publishers, 2017.

EUROPEAN COMISSION. **Sport diplomacy: identifying good practices: a final report to the European Commission**. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2018. Available in: <https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/0efc09a6-025e-11e8-b8f5-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-65111809>. Accessed in: 20 ago. 2020.

European Comission. **“Grassroots Diplomacy. Overview, Mapping and Definitions**, 2018a. Available in: [http://isca-web.org/files/Grassroots\\_Sport\\_Diplomacy/Grassroots\\_Sport\\_Diplomacy\\_-\\_Overview\\_mapping\\_definitions\[1\].pdf](http://isca-web.org/files/Grassroots_Sport_Diplomacy/Grassroots_Sport_Diplomacy_-_Overview_mapping_definitions[1].pdf) Accessed in: 20 ago. 2020.

GLEAVES, J.; LLEWELLYN, M. Ethics, nationalism, and the imagined community: the case against inter-national sport. **Journal of the Philosophy of Sport**, v. 41, n. 1, p. 1-19, 2014.

GRIFFIN, N. **Ping-pong diplomacy**: the secret history behind the game that changed the world. Nova Iorque: Simon and Schuster, 2014.

GRIX, J. The mixed record of sports diplomacy. Interviewee: Eleanor Albert. **Council on Foreign Relations**. Available in: <https://www.cfr.org/interview/mixed-record-sports-diplomacy>. Accessed in: 22 ago. 2020

GRIX, J.; HOULIHAN, B. Sports mega-events as part of a nation's soft power strategy: the cases of Germany (2006) and the UK (2012). **The British Journal of Politics and International Relations**, v. 16, n. 4, p. 572-596, 2014

HAIR, J. F. *et al.* **Multivariate data analysis**. London: Pearson, 2009.

HAUT, J. *et al.* International prestige through 'sporting success': an evaluation of the evidence. **European journal for sport and society**, v. 14, n. 4, p. 311-326, 2018.

HEERE, B. *et al.* The impact of World Cup 2002 on the bilateral relationship between South Korea and Japan. **Journal of Sport Management**, v. 26, n. 2, p. 127-142, 2012.

HONG, Eunah. **An Analysis of the Sport Policy Process in the Republic of Korea: The Cases of Elite Sport Development and Sport for All**. Tese (Doutorado em Esporte, Exercício e Ciências da Saúde). Loughborough University, Leicester, p. 409. 2010.

INTERNACIONAL MILITARY SPORTS COUNCIL. **Vision and mission**. Bruxelles: CISM, [2020]. Available in: <https://www.milспорт.one/cism/vision-and-mission>. Accessed in: 05 jun. 2020.

KOBIERECKI, M. M. The domestic dimension of sports diplomacy. **Review of Nationalities**, v. 9, n. 1, p. 17-28, 2019.

LEE, J. W. Olympic Ceremony and Diplomacy: South Korean, North Korean, and British Media Coverage of the 2018 Olympic Winter Games' Opening and Closing Ceremonies. **Communication & Sport**, on line first, 2019.

LEIRA, H. A conceptual history of diplomacy. *In*: CONSTANTINOU, C. M.; KERR, P.; SHARP, P. (ed.). **The SAGE handbook of diplomacy**. London: Sage, 2016. p. 28-38.

LOWYINSTITUTE. **Global diplomacy index**, 2019. Available in: <https://globaldiplomacyindex.lowyinstitute.org/>. Accessed in: 03 nov. 2020

MARKS, Eduard: Defining Diplomacy. **Center for Interagency Cooperation**, 2015. Available in: <https://thesimonscenter.org/featured-article-defining-diplomacy/> . Accessed in: 22 abr. 2020.

MARKS, S; FREEMAN, C. W. Diplomacy. Diplomacy. **Encyclopedia Britannica**, 2015. Available in: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/diplomacy>. Accessed in: 22 abr. 2020.

MARÔCO, J. **Análise de equações estruturais: fundamentos teóricos, software & aplicações**. Pêro Pinheiro: Report Number, 2014.

MAUCH, J. E.; BIRCH, J. W. Guide to the successful thesis and dissertation: a handbook for students and faculty. Nova Iorque: Marcel Dekker, 1998.

MURRAY, S. The two halves of sports-diplomacy. **Diplomacy & statecraft**, v. 23, n. 3, p. 576-592, 2012.

MURRAY, S. Moving beyond the ping-pong table: sports diplomacy in the modern diplomatic environment. **Public Diplomacy Magazine**, v. 9, p. 11-16, 2013.

MURRAY, S. Sports diplomacy in the Australian context: theory into strategy. **Politics & Policy**, v. 45, n. 5, p. 841-861, 2017.

MURRAY, S. **Sports diplomacy: Origins, theory and practice**. Nova Iorque: Routledge, 2018

MURRAY, S.; PIGMAN, G. A. Mapping the relationship between international sport and diplomacy. **Sport in Society**, v. 17, n. 9, p. 1098-1118, 2014

NYE JR, Joseph S. **Soft power: The means to success in world politics**. Nova Iorque: Public Affairs, 2004.

NYE JR, Joseph S. Public diplomacy and soft power. **The annals of the American academy of political and social science**, v. 616, n. 1, p. 94-109, 2008.

NYE, J. S.; WELCH, D. A. **Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory and History** Londres: Pearson, 2013.

NYGÅRD, H. M.; GATES, S. Soft power at home and abroad: sport diplomacy, politics and peace-building. **International Area Studies Review**, v. 16, n. 3, p. 235-243, 2013.

ORWELL, George. The sporting spirit. **Tribune**, v. 468, n. 14, p. 10-11, 1945.

ÖZSARI, A. et al. Sport Diplomacy as Public Diplomacy Element. **International Journal of Sport Culture and Science**, v. 6, n. 3, p. 339-349, 2018.



PAHLAVI, P. Evaluating public diplomacy programmes. **The Hague Journal of Diplomacy**, v. 2, n. 3, p. 255-281, 2007.

REDEKER, R. Sport as an opiate of international relations: the myth and illusion of sport as a tool of foreign diplomacy. **Sport in Society**, v. 11, n. 4, p. 494-500, 2008.

REPUTATION SQUAD. **Digital diplomacy index**, 2020. Available in: <https://digital-diplomacy-index.com/>. Accessed in: 03 nov. 2020

ROFE, J. S. . **Sport and diplomacy: game within games**. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2018.

SILVA, A. R. de A. A diplomacia de defesa na política internacional. **Revista da Escola de Guerra Naval**, v. 21, n. 2, p. 179, 2015.

SPRUYT, H. The origins, development, and possible decline of the modern state. **Annual Review of Political Science**, v. 5, n. 1, p. 127-149, 2002.

TRUNKOS, J.; HEERE, B. Sport diplomacy: a review of how sports can be used to improve international relationships. *In*: ESHERICK, C. *et al.* (ed.). **Case studies in sport diplomacy**. Morgantown, WV: FiT Publishing, 2017. p. 1-18.

USHKOVSKA, M.; PETRUSHEVSKA, T. Sports diplomacy: development and practice. **Research in Kinesiology**, v. 43, n. 1, p. 89-93, 2015.

WEBER, M. **Ciência e política: duas vocações**. São Paulo: Editora Martin Claret, 2015.

ZINTZ, T.; PARRISH, R. **Promoting a strategic approach to EU sports diplomacy**. 2019. Available in: <https://www.edgehill.ac.uk/law/files/2019/05/Sports-Diplomacy-Background-Paper-v2.pdf>. Accessed in: 23 ago. 2020.



# The Relationship between Diplomacy and Military Power in the Grand Strategies of Barão do Rio Branco and Amorim

*La articulación entre diplomacia y poder militar en las grandes estrategias del Barão do Rio Branco y Amorim*

**Abstract:** A Great Strategy involves the coordination and direction of all the resources of a nation to achieve political goals, or at greater bias use of military power, the theory and practice of use and threatened use of organized force for political purposes. Favoring the latter bias, the “Grand Strategy of Baron”, implemented in the period in which he headed the Foreign Ministry, used sometimes military power of coercive and deterrent manner. The “Great Strategy of the Baron” is distinct from the “Great Strategy of Amorim”, mainly in the form of articulating diplomacy with the Military Power. The differences in these articulations, as well as the concrete gains resulting from each one, are perceived, initially by the realistic bias – Baron - and by the combination of several internationalist theories – Amorim. The “Great Strategy of Baron” was based on the increase of military hard power, which resulted in the Acre issue. The “Great Strategy of Amorim” was guided more in Brazil’s international insertion by increasing its “soft power”, but which did not achieve a perfect synthesis between diplomacy and defense. Therefore, this research has the objective to highlight the “different forms of articulation” between diplomacy and defense.

**Keywords:** Great Strategy. Diplomacy. Military Power. Rio Branco. Amorim.

**Resumen:** Una gran estrategia implica la coordinación y dirección de todos los recursos de una nación para lograr objetivos políticos, o el uso del poder militar, la teoría y la práctica del uso y la amenaza del uso de la fuerza organizada con fines políticos. Favoreciendo este último sesgo, la “Gran estrategia del Barão do Rio Branco”, puesta en práctica en el período en el que estuvo a la cabeza de Itamaraty, utilizó con frecuencia el poder militar de manera coercitiva y disuasoria. La Gran Estrategia del Barão es distinta de la Gran Estrategia de Amorim, principalmente en la forma de articular la diplomacia con el Poder Militar. Las diferencias en estas articulaciones, así como las ganancias concretas de cada una, son percibidas, inicialmente por el sesgo más realista – del Barão – y por la conjugación de varias teorías internacionalistas – de Amorim. La “Gran Estrategia del Barão” fue guiada por el aumento del hard power, lo que resultó en ganancias concretas, como en la cuestión de Acre, la “Gran Estrategia” de Amorim fue guiada más por el aumento de su “soft power”, pero que no logró una síntesis perfecta entre diplomacia y defensa. Así, este trabajo propone evidenciar las “diferentes formas de articulación” entre diplomacia y defensa.

**Palabras Clave:** Gran Estrategia. Diplomacia. Poder Militar. Barão do Rio Branco Amorim.

**Walter Maurício Costa de Miranda** 

Universidade Federal Fluminense.  
Programa de Pós-Graduação  
em Estudos Estratégicos.  
Niterói, RJ, Brasil.  
waltermauricio@yahoo.com.br

**Alexandre Rocha Violante** 

Universidade Federal Fluminense.  
Programa de Pós-Graduação  
em Estudos Estratégicos.  
Niterói, RJ, Brasil.  
alexandreviolante@id.uff.br

**Marcelo Mello Valença** 

Marinha do Brasil.  
Escola de Guerra Naval.  
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.  
marcelo.valenca@marinha.mil.br

**Received: 31 ago. 2020**

**Approved: 02 mar. 2021**

**COLEÇÃO MEIRA MATTOS**

**ISSN on-line 2316-4891 / ISSN print 2316-4833**

<http://ebrevistas.eb.mil.br/index.php/RMM/index>



## 1 Introduction

In a general and conceptual sense, strategy can be defined as a way of thinking about the future, integrated in the decision-making process, based on a formalized and results-articulating procedure. As the concept of strategy comes from the military field, a closer definition of this field is the art of coordinating the action of the military, political, economic and moral forces involved in the conduct of a conflict or in the preparation of the defense of a nation or community of nations to achieve future goals.

A grand strategy, on the other hand, involves coordinating and directing all the resources of a nation to achieve political goals, or under a more militaristic bias, the theory and practice of using and the threat of using organized force for political purposes (LIDDELL HART, 1967).

Thus, the strategy at its national level deals with decisive political and institutional issues for the defense of the country, such as the objectives of its Grand Strategy, also addressing properly military problems, derived from the influence of this Grand Strategy in the orientation and operational practices of the three Forces (BRASIL, 2008).

We understand that developing the postulates of a “Great Strategy” is essential, therefore, for Brazil to reach its aspirations as a global player. Throughout the republican history of Brazil, different strategies for international insertion were adopted, articulating and combining national foreign policy with military power.

Although according to Freedman (2013) the meaning of strategy allows a series of definitions, one of the parameters of evaluation of its impact is the comparison between the result before its adoption, with reference to the balance of power, and the real result that prevailed after the implementation of the strategy.

We chose in this article to work with two of these strategies, which represent different worldviews. The first, called the “Great Strategy of the Barão do Rio Branco”, refers to the beginning of the 20th century and was promoted during the period when José Maria da Silva Paranhos Jr., was the head of the Itamaraty. He sought international insertion through a “pragmatic Americanism”, a pragmatic bandwagoning<sup>1</sup> on the United States of America at the hemispheric and global level (VALENÇA; CARVALHO, 2014, p. 70), while internally articulating foreign policy with the use of military hard power, in a coercive and negative deterrent manner. The second strategy is the “Grande Amorim Strategy”. In it, peace is the premise underlying Brazil’s international insertion (AMORIM, 2016, p. 175), articulating foreign policy and defense policy through the strengthening of soft power and the relative reinforcement of military hard power, in intensity smaller than that proclaimed by the Barão do Rio Branco. It can be said that this articulation was based more on a combination of internationalist theories, while the Barão do Rio Branco presents more realistic elements in his Grand Strategy.

We investigated these great strategies from the internal and external conjunctures regarding the power at the time, as well as from the worldview perceived by its articulators. For

---

<sup>1</sup> *Bandwagoning* is the union of weaker states around a strong leader state so that, through this alignment, greater relative gains can be obtained in the international system. Rio Branco aimed to contribute to the transformation of Brazil into a regional power and later world power. This bandwagoning strategy could be changed, with the greater acquisition of relative power.

that, we explored, through an ideographic methodology (LEVY, 2008, p. 4) historical episodes and fragments of discourses that illustrate these structures. Such a method allows to work each event as a separate ideographic case, in order to understand its importance for the argument now constructed without, however, generalizing or formulating broad universally applicable hypotheses. Considering the very different historical and political scenarios faced by Barão do Rio Branco and Amorim, mainly within the ethical limits of the use of armed force for political purposes, the adoption of such a method is relevant. Thus, we do not seek to compare these two great strategies, but to highlight the different forms of articulation between diplomacy and power, especially the military.

Our argument is developed in three stages, in addition to this introduction and a brief conclusion. In the first section, we address the meaning of the Great Strategy and its relationship with Power in International Relations. Then we present the Great Strategy of the Barão do Rio Branco, its characteristics, actions and directions followed. In the third section, we address the Great Strategy of Amorim, exploring the same elements previously discussed in the Great Strategy Barão do Rio Branco also addressing these parameters.

## 2 What is Grand Strategy? Power in International Relations

There are many classic definitions of what Strategy is. Moreira (2010, p. 2) presents some:

The use of engagements to achieve the objectives of war (Carl Von Clausewitz); the art of distributing and applying military means to achieve policy objectives (Liddell Hart); the art of the dialectic of force or, more precisely, the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills, using force to resolve their disputes (André Beaufre); general plan to use the capacity of armed coercion – in combination with economic, diplomatic, psychological instruments, to effectively support foreign policy, by ostentatious, hidden and tacit means (OSGOOD and TUCKER, 1967); the use that is made of force or its threat of employment for the purposes of politics (Collin S. Gray); art of preparing and applying power to conquer and preserve objectives, overcoming obstacles of all kinds (BRASIL, 2007, our translation).

Moreira (2010) points out that these definitions deal with the relationship between available means (power, strength) and ends (politics), which guide various aspects of the binomial security and defense of the State.

The study and practice of the Strategy had a great impetus in the 1950s, after the 2nd GM, mainly in European and American affairs. Formerly closely linked to the military establishment, it became the object of study by civilians. The researches and studies carried out that had the security, the defense and the use of force against the political objectives were conventionally called Strategic Studies.

Figueiredo (2015) explains that, since politics is the epistemological essence of Strategic Studies, these, in a strict sense, are concerned with the use of force by political

communities in their relations, thus approaching the Clausewitzian concept that politics is the guiding intelligence and war is only an instrument. There is, according to Paret (2001), no other possibility than to subordinate the military point of view to the political one. This means the prevalence of reason<sup>2</sup> on the surprising Clausewitzian trinity. Therefore, it would not be possible to separate strategy and politics, since the former functions as a bridge between military means and political objectives, which requires specialists in Strategic Studies to know both political issues and military operations.

The Grand Strategy can be understood as a path from the present to the future, which combines and articulates foreign policy and defense policy, in the Grand Policy, for the pursuit of national interests (FIGUEIREDO, 2015). Therefore, this should include efforts that must be combined to guarantee national sovereignty, security, defense and development, providing the use of the various facets of Power in the international system.

In this interrelation of concepts, “power” is dear for theoretical and political debates in the field of International Relations, especially for those with a realistic orientation. Understood from different perspectives and references, its concept is not a consensus among academics and policymakers.

Its definition is the result of several theoretical and political debates, with different orientations. Considering the worldviews proposed in the major strategies worked on in the next section, and seeking to maintain analytical coherence, we maintain the conceptual debate about power restricted to realistic and liberal approaches. In this dispute of interests between nations, “power” is a central variable. Hans Morgenthau (1962) understands that power implies man’s control over the minds and actions of other men. This idea would be reflected at all levels of social relations, from individuals to states - politics, therefore, would be a form of power struggle. In this way, power takes on a central role in theory and everything would derive from it, including obtaining and operationalizing non-material elements, such as prestige. Power is thus a reflection of politics.

The same view of the political character of power is shared by Raymond Aron. According to Aron (2002), power would combine material issues, such as territories and population, and non-material issues, such as prestige and glory, and underpin the international aspirations of States: the greater the power of a State, the greater its ambitions. This notion returns to Morgenthau’s second principle, that the concept of interest is defined in terms of power, reverberating its centrality, in its different manifestations and forms, in the decision-making process of States.

Aron (2002, p. 24) also discusses the “capacity of a political entity to impose its will on others”, and Weber (1964, p. 175) prescribes that power, in a generic way, can be understood as “The probability that one person or several will impose their own will in a social action, even against the opposition of other participants in it”.

Martin Wight assumes a different position, discarding the non-material dimension of power in the constitution of powers, arguing that international politics is not concerned

---

2 The reason is probably the most important component of the surprising trinity. Just as victory has its political consequences, so it has defeat. A defeat in the war is, in the first place, a defeat of politics, because the policy that caused the defeats was wrong: it had made a judgment against the real war against the nature of the latter. (ARON, 1976, p. 165).

with influence: power is not influence. Power is a material, concrete element that resolves major issues of international politics. Furthermore, non-material elements could not be considered as constituting power, as they would not help the State to become a great power (WIGHT, 2002).

Corroborating Wight's writings, John Mearsheimer (2007), understands that power is formed by material components and would reduce the levels of insecurity in the State. Faced with a state of permanent competition at the international level, power would not be objective in itself, but would lead to the survival of the State. Among the different objectives of the States, the biggest one would be to achieve hegemony<sup>3</sup>, essentially a material desire, so as not to be threatened by peers. Other objectives could be pursued through a combination of power and diplomacy, according to their convenience - which would reflect the influence of classical realists.

It is unlikely to associate Mearsheimer with a liberal perspective, but the possibility of combining power with other policy tools opens space for the debate of liberal perspectives on power. Liberally inclined authors suggest that the policy of power can be replaced by cooperation and greater interdependence between states. This would lead to international stability through international organizations and other forms of inter-state relations in the pursuit of national goals.

This reinforces Kalevi Holsti's perception that power has a relational character. Power consists of a relational position that characterizes the interaction between two parts, so that one of them would have the ability to constrain the other to do something that, otherwise, it would not do (HOLSTI, 1964). Although he denies the centrality of the concept of power in International Relations, he adds that power would better explain the processes of relationship between the actors, not the focus of their actions. Therefore, the act of influencing becomes central to the study of international politics and it is from this that a definition of power is best deduced.

Similarly, Schuessler & Baldwin (SCHUESSLER, 2017) point out that any definition of power as control will only have meaning when the scope and domain of power can be presented. In order to understand the impact of power on social relations, it is necessary to identify that the influence of one actor on another is related to specific themes, with results derived from this relationship.

This brings Barry Buzan's criticism closer to the concept of power and its centrality in international relations. Buzan (1991) points out that the greatest quality of the concept of power is also its greatest weakness. The concept focuses on the reality of anarchy through the observation of the capacities of the units that make up the system. Such thinking would identify not only the main functionality of anarchy, but also the motivation of state units, so that policy-makers define the means and ends for their actions. The strategies and ways in which power is operationalized, therefore, reflect the preferences and opportunities of States in their

---

3 Hegemonic state, according to Belligni (2008), refers to the Nation-State, a power that exerts a preeminence not only military, but economic and cultural, conditioning the options to be followed, due to its high intimidating and coercive potential. Keohane (1984, p. 34) reiterates that the hegemonic state "is powerful enough to be able to maintain the essential rules that govern relations between states, and that it has the determination to maintain them".

social relations, not just a crude manifestation of their military capacity to the detriment of their opponents.

From these readings and considering an operational definition to be applied to our argument, we understand as power the way in which one State influences the behavior of another within its own interests. It consists of material components, such as military power, and non-material components, such as reputation, that affect trust between the state and its peers. Thus, it is possible to read military power and diplomacy as tools at the disposal of decision-makers to proceed with their foreign policy strategies.

The operational concept of power that we use allows the debate of its scope based on views that derive from hard and soft power. In order to understand the two great strategies analyzed in this article, such flexibility becomes important. Therefore, it is important to briefly explain what we understand as military power and diplomacy.

According to Nye (2002), military power is able to offer bases for the promotion of governmental policies inasmuch as it offers foreign policy strategies, adding to Foreign Policy instruments that allow the exercise of coercive diplomacy so that the State reaches its goals. interests.

Consequently, military power is liable to be employed either directly in the form of physical violence to impose the will of one state on the other, or to be employed indirectly, using its credibility and potential to intimidate or deter the opponent.

In this version of indirect use, military power needs a material and credible base, in which armaments stand out, in order to enable a political discourse that will affect the persuasion, coercion or coercion of the opponent. Thus, military power is an inseparable element of state power, although there are other forms of power that make up national power, such as political, economic and psychosocial.

Regardless of the definition of power and its use, the thread that connects them is their relational character, in which the agent with the least capacity for power will have the option of resisting the one that imposes it. This will result, in most cases, in a negotiation between the parties, since the “weakest” agent can reach an agreement that makes him yield less. In this sense, this assignment of rights takes place directly proportional to this difference in power for the stronger.

The tension between hard and soft power appears frequently in contemporary International Relations literature. The distinction promoted by Nye (2012) is repeatedly mentioned to distinguish two different forms of manifestation of power. According to him, while hard power is characterized by being a coercive power involving economic and military power, soft power is conceptualized as a notion of “behavioral power” and is based on the cultural aspects manifested by the States. A correct strategy of power that achieves a successful policy, called smart power, depends on a correct combination of hard and soft resources (NYE, 2012).

Although the distinction between soft and hard power is attractive, becoming a popular jargon among analysts and field theorists, this separation is merely pedagogical, being perceived among more traditional theorists with a realistic and liberal inclination. In this way, diplomacy and military power go hand in hand with a dispute of States' interests in the international system, diplomacy being understood as the art of convincing (*convaincre*) without the use of force, and



the strategy for the implementation of military power, the art of winning (*vaincre*) at the lowest cost. Therefore, according to Aron (2002, p. 24), “complementary aspects of the unique art of politics - the art of conducting relations with other States to achieve national interest”.

Therefore, in terms of the argument developed in this article, cooperation and deterrence are discussed as a result of the application of power and diplomacy, which involve the most diverse relational aspects of the elements of hard and soft power.

In this understanding, the cooperation-deterrence binomial, when associated with these two types of power, would mean the integration of networks of diplomacy, defense, development and tools of soft and hard power in a winning strategy, called, by Nye, smart power. This could be seen in the application of the Great Strategies of Barão do Rio Branco and Amorim. Thus, by combining diplomacy and military power, albeit at different scales and priorities, such binomial was applied in favor of greater international insertion that reflected nuances in Brazilian foreign policy in these two historical moments.

It is what we tried to analyze in the next sections, that is, how the Great Strategies of Barão do Rio Branco and Amorim presented themselves, representing the political will of the conjugation of the National Power in all its spheres and instrumentalizations.

### 3 Barão do Rio Branco's Grand Strategy

José Maria da Silva Paranhos Jr., the Barão do Rio Branco (1845-1912), became known for the way that a nation should conduct its foreign policy, according to its grandeur and ambition on the international stage. In his words: “It is possible that, renouncing equal treatment ... some will resign themselves to signing conventions, in which third, fourth or fifth order nations are declared and confessed. Brazil cannot be of that sort” (BARÃO DO RIO BRANCO apud RICUPERO, 2000, p. 27).

Such fame was constituted through the operationalization of a foreign policy motivated, mainly, by the belief that a nation should conduct its foreign policy according to its greatness and ambition in the international scenario.

The affinity of the Barão do Rio Branco with the military field associated with the 19th century zeitgeist, marked by philosophical, scientific and artistic currents that lent legitimacy to the war, opened space for the use of military power as a way of resolving disputes and making the interest stand out Brazilian national. These are the premises that support its Grand Strategy, reflecting the gains that Brazil had at the beginning of its republican period. Its foreign policy represented the articulation between diplomacy and power, allowing Brazil to achieve regional prominence. Thus, its Grand Strategy involved the instrumental use of military power as a propellant of strategies to achieve the objectives of national interest.

The Barão do Rio Branco's relationship with military power has professional, academic and family bases (ALSINA JÚNIOR, 2015). His father, Visconde do Rio Branco, was Minister of the Navy in the Marquês do Paraná's conciliation cabinet (1853-1856), also leading the 21st Empire cabinet (1871-1875), formed by the Conservative Party. Between 1893 and 1898, he was plenipotentiary minister on a special mission in the United States

of America (USA), from 1898 to 1900, plenipotentiary minister on a special mission in Switzerland and from 1900 to 1902, plenipotentiary minister in the German Empire - a time when Germany was fighting naval race against the United Kingdom, highlighting the impacts of Maritime Power on the aspirations of a great nation. In addition, the first work produced by Rio Branco was about the life of Barroso Pereira, commander of the frigate Imperatriz. His vein as a military researcher would remain evident in other works, such as "Episodes of the Silver War" and the biography of Barão do Sêrro Largo. Finally, several close relatives were members of the armed forces, which provided close contact in their social circle with the military and their families, including Luiz Alves de Lima e Silva, Duque de Caxias.

Rio Branco's performance at the forefront of Brazil's foreign policy was permeated by episodes that explain his Grand Strategy of seeking greater international insertion and the construction of Brazil as a regional power. The refusal to assume the role of a marginal nation in international politics ended up influencing the very dynamics of Brazilian foreign policy, directly impacting on the long-term objectives sought by the country, autonomy and relevance (SANTOS, 2018). Cooperation and deterrence operated as legitimate political tools to sustain Brazilian international operations. The option for cooperation should be seen as a political action, in the search for the expansion of the country's power, prestige and economic gains in the international system (MORGENTHAU, 1962). Similarly, deterrence operated complementarily to the achievement of the objectives set, serving as a guarantor that threats and promises would be carried out (ARON, 2002, p. 519). The following are some episodes that illustrate these assertions.

The issue of Acre is a central event for the understanding of the Baron's Great Strategy. According to Bandeira (2000), the concession of Acre to the Bolivian Syndicate aroused reactions in Brazil and in the South American community. It delivered a significant area to American companies, which could be considered a US meddling and its big stick policy<sup>4</sup> in the region. The presence of foreign power in South American territory was also perceived by civil society, starting, for example, from the cartoons on *Jornal do Brasil*. In them, "Uncle Sam" represented in the figure of a teacher who raised the paddle against Bolivia and asked: "Whose Acre is it, girl? Say it out loud to be heard even in Brazil". Bolivia, represented by a student, replied with terror: "But I am tired of saying ... Acre is Your Lordship's, Mr. Master" (BANDEIRA, 2000).

According to Alsina Júnior (2015), the Barão do Rio Branco implemented the strategy of negotiating directly with Bolivia, avoiding involving other actors - and interests - such as Peru, which claimed part of the contentious territory for itself, and the United States, which claimed concern with the investments of its nationals. As part of this strategy, aware of the threat that constituted a possible direct US intervention in the matter, he negotiated compensation from the Anglo-American union. As the issue with the Bolivian Syndicate was under control, the tension peaked when the Bolivian president, General Pando Solares (1899-1904), determined military action. In return, Barão do Rio Branco requested the sending of troops to the region to President Rodrigues Alves (1902-1906), rejecting the threat. The successful use of

<sup>4</sup> This policy was based on the premise, in President Roosevelt's own words, that "with soft speech and a big stick, you will go far". This was the US negotiating style to avoid conflict and show its military might on the American continent.

the combination of military power and diplomacy highlighted the pragmatism of its Grand Strategy, guaranteeing Brazil to annex territory larger than England.

Another episode that illustrates the Great Strategy of the Barão do Rio Branco was the Naval Refitting Program (1904-1910) in the First Republic (ALSINA JÚNIOR, 2015). The Program, at an approximate cost of three times the budget allocated to the Navy at the time, had among the episodes used to justify the need and urgency of the Panther Case. Panther was a German gunboat whose officers and officers, while moored in Itajaí, invaded Brazilian homes going after a deserter, disrespecting national sovereignty. The event provided a telegram from the Baron to Joaquim Nabuco, Brazil's first ambassador to the USA, in the following terms:

Sailors German gunboat Panther led by undercover officers, dawn 27 November disembarked Itajaí forced owner Hotel Comercio to deliver young refractory German Steinhoff military service they took prisoner on board. It is the result of the inquiry. Panther entered Rio Grande yesterday, where it will remain days. Try to provoke energetic monroists against this insult. I will demand delivery of convicted if formal act. If unattended, we will use force to free prisoner or we will sink Panther. Then whatever happens (ALSINA JÚNIOR, 2015, p. 261, our translation).

After the episode, three cruisers were sent to intercept Panther. However, due to the condition of Brazilian ships, they were unable to reach the German ship (ALSINA JÚNIOR, 2015). The need for power projection, especially naval power, to guarantee the country's sovereignty, remained evident, motivating the modernization of the Navy.

Other events followed in the wake of the Panther incident, reflecting the importance of military power as a support for foreign policy. One of them was the crisis in Venezuela (ALSINA JÚNIOR, 2015), in which the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy imposed a naval blockade for the Venezuelan government to make the payment of debts. This type of operation clashed with the Monroe Doctrine. However, the United States was afraid to intervene, as the use of military force to pay debts was politically acceptable at the time.

In order to embarrass the United States, encouraging him to intervene, the Drago Doctrine emerged, proposed by Argentina and named after its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Luis María Drago (1902-1903). According to Souza (2008), the Drago Doctrine condemned coercive debt collection, accusing this instrument of leading the weakest nations to ruin, including the submission of their governments to more powerful nations.

However, the Barão do Rio Branco did not support the Drago Doctrine, aligning itself pragmatically with the USA. He understood that Venezuela, like other South American countries, was a financial debtor to Brazil. The refutation of a collection instrument based on regional solidarity did not interest Brazil, which argued, in the last instance, that military power would decide conflicts of interest between States, above international treaties. His position echoed one of the principles of Morgenthau's political realism - that of autonomy in the political sphere to the detriment of other areas, such as law (MORGENTHAU, 2003, p. 22-23). The

crisis was eased after naval exercises carried out by the American squadron in the Caribbean, when military power acted as a deterrent.

This event and others that occurred as chancellor (1902-1912) evidenced a pragmatic worldview, according to the realistic paradigm. His Grand Strategy laid the foundations for the development of Brazilian power and its projection at the international level, in order to make it a relevant actor at the regional and hemispheric level. In it, Brazil acted selfishly and according to the logic of self-help, placing its national interests ahead of other nations. In this view, it was unacceptable for a state to condemn itself not to be a protagonist. The articulation of foreign policy with credible and robust material components of power was a necessary tool for its success. There was a recognition of morality in political action and a refusal to align with the moral aspirations of another nation, preventing moral excess (MORGENTHAU, 2003). The unfolding in the litigation in Acre and in other disputes necessary for the consolidation of the country's borders showed the success of the strategy adopted by the Barão do Rio Branco. The use of hard power, in its relational aspects, was a central element for the achievement of national interests, at the time.

#### 4 Amorim's Grand Strategy

The conception of Grand Strategy for Celso Luiz Nunes Amorim derives from his intellectual training and professional practice, in different sectors and representations both in the diplomatic field and in the sphere of the federal government. His rhetoric expresses a Kantian bias (CERVO, 2008, p. 28), with a strong predilection for a multilateral, institutionalist and resistance policy related to the option for the use of military power as a coercive element. The emphasis on cooperation and soft power is very noticeable, as will be shown below, in central points of his thoughts throughout the positions of chancellor (2003-2010) and Minister of Defense (2011-2014).

Amorim highlights the promotion of "development, the reduction of inequality and the eradication of poverty as central aspects for the defense and security of the country" (AMORIM, 2016, p. 45-46). Given the absence of border disputes or military threats in the Brazilian surroundings, he believes that the defense policy of a peaceful country, especially in relation to its neighbors, should be strongly based on cooperation. In this understanding,

[a] Conformation, under the aegis of democratic principles and practices, of a **grand strategy**, based on the articulation between the axes of foreign policy aimed at sovereign insertion in the world and the **defense policy that balances cooperation and deterrence**, requires that each one of us get out of your "comfort zone" - your field of study and work - and bring your interest and curiosity closer to our partners and interlocutors at the "other end" (AMORIM, 2012, p. 15, our translation and highlight).

The rupture of precepts traditionally associated with defense, such as the predominance of military power, would not prevent the promotion of the cooperation-deterrence binomial. This

would prove to be active in collective initiatives, appropriate to that time. To this end, he cited the development of multilateral initiatives, such as (i) engagement in cooperation forums such as UNASUR, with its Defense Council (CDS), which would represent a qualitative leap for security and defense cooperation; (ii) the 1st Advanced Defense Course aimed at training civilians and military personnel from the countries of South American nations, promoting the development of South American defense thinking based on the concepts of cooperation and integration; and (iii) the intention to reinvigorate the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS) (AMORIM, 2016).

Multilateralism reflected a prevalent worldview, since the establishment of an independent foreign policy, drafted between 1961 and 1964 and, effectively put into practice, by Azeredo da Silveira (1974-79), during the Geisel government. His strong institutional inclination was also present during his presidency of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)<sup>5</sup>, between 1995 and 1999. At the time, Amorim actively participated as a Brazilian representative in the discussions about the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime nuclear weapons. He served directly on the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which produced a report for the adoption of measures in the area of disarmament and containment of the arms race, acting as a spokesman and main articulator of the Brazilian position in adhering to the Non- Nuclear Proliferation (NPT) (FGV, 2015).

In fact, the institutional design of the UNSC represented the intention of the great powers of the time to continue the acquired status quo, maintaining the logic of the sovereign states together with a transformation project based on progress, reason and the democratization of international relations. This utopian thought was represented by the theory of perpetual peace<sup>6</sup>, subsequently adapted to the theory of democratic peace<sup>7</sup> (HERZ; HOFFMANN, 2004).

In the specific case of the NPT, its signature can be correlated with the institutional-liberal view of the 1990s. The proposed argument suggested that multilateralism in international politics would induce the worldwide ordering of security, consolidating confidence measures of universal scope, resulting in two main changes. The first was Brazil's adherence to almost all acts of disarmament. The second, in the structuring of a military power that acted primarily in cooperative, rather than coercive, support for foreign policy actions (CERVO, 2002; CERVO, BUENO, 2011). This thesis had among its managers the then President Fernando Henrique Cardoso and its chancellors, Luiz Felipe Lampreia and Celso Lafer.

Thus, the change in Brazil's international insertion model, thought by Cardoso and a large part of his state bureaucracy, met the thinking of the elites, who believed in a country destined to have a significant role and recognized by the great systemic powers (SOUZA, A., 2002). The signing of the NPT<sup>8</sup> itself, without the necessary counterparts

---

5 The UNSC is made up of five permanent and ten temporary members. The five permanent members who have veto power in their resolutions are: USA, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom (UK).

6 Perpetual peace is a philosophical project by Kant that, in short, has as its core the faith in the force of reason in front of power. It was based on the creation of a universal organization and constitution, which would guarantee a lasting peace among all.

7 The theory of democratic peace supports the idea that democracies generally do not, and liberal democracies never or almost never go to war with each other.

8 It is important to note that Brazil, even today (2020), has not adhered to the Additional Protocol to the NPT, which establishes strict international control and is subject to international inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the Brazilian Nuclear Program for enriching uranium for peaceful purposes.

for an emerging state, such as Brazil, can be considered as a negative point that made national sovereignty relative.

In the Lula government (2003-2010), Amorim (2016, p. 57) pointed out that regional political dynamics changed over the course of the 20th and 21st centuries and, therefore, the way of relating to neighbors. Elements such as national soft power, based on “the so-called peaceful nature and an ability to understand complex situations experienced by other countries”, and the role of the military in Peace Operations, in Law and Order Guarantee operations, and in the preparation for the fulfillment of their basic tasks, they pointed out that the historical stage of persuasion of the security of the South American countries by extra-regional powers would be surpassed (AMORIM, 2016, p. 94-95). This part highlights the dubiousness of Amorim's thinking - the acceptance of a foreign policy that is more participatory in the great world and regional agreements, but which relativized national sovereignty without major counterparts, as in the nuclear case.

In “A defense policy for the future” (AMORIM, 2016, p. 131), Amorim proposes that the concept of a Grand Strategy refers to the need to use the full range of resources, not just military, at the disposal of the State for the maintaining their security either during a conflict or to guarantee peace on terms that are favorable to them. Roughly speaking, this would be the correspondence between the means and the political ends of a State, both internally and externally (AMORIM, 2016, p. 133). In this speech, Amorim pointed out that the highest priority of Brazilian foreign policy and that it was present in defense policy would be South American integration (AMORIM, 2016, p. 136). As a consequence, the defense policy would combine a strongly cooperative strategy in the regional environment with a global strategy of deterrence of denial (AMORIM, 2016, p. 149).

In the speech “Hardening Brazil's soft power” (AMORIM, 2016, p. 159), Amorim stressed the thesis that the existence of nuclear weapons to guarantee peace and security would be a fallacy. He proposed that Brazil's international insertion be guided by a Grand Strategy that combines soft and hard power, that takes into account not only the national interest, but also that of our partners and allies. This strategy would be guided by “a robust defense policy that is the indispensable support of a peaceful foreign policy” (AMORIM, 2016, p. 179). Based on this reasoning, he argued that Brazil should strengthen all facets of power, but clearly differentiating the different functions, although complementary, from soft power and from robust power. However, he prioritized soft power in resolving disputes.

For Amorim, the premise of Brazil's international insertion is based on peace. Brazil has not had border disputes with its neighbors for more than 100 years, because the national land and sea borders were and have been defined through negotiation (VALENÇA, 2018). The occasions when Brazil participated in wars were preceded by foreign aggression. Thus, “the attention of the Brazilian people would be focused on overcoming great internal challenges: economic development and social justice” (AMORIM, 2016, p. 175). In these terms, he emphasizes that Brazil has inscribed in its own constitution the duty to use nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes and that the design of the Brazilian nuclear submarine is restricted only to its propulsion. Furthermore, Amorim protests the attempt to completely disarm the relatively unarmed and not contemplate the disarmament of the nuclear powers.

As for the request for a permanent seat at the UNSC, Brazil took firm diplomatic actions in international politics, however, more based on soft power, such as: a) Brazilian diplomacy tried to mediate the nuclear agreement between Iran and the western powers, which he ended up being boycotted by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, even after the acceptance given by President Obama; b) the protagonism was sought in the peace negotiations between Israel and the Arab countries; c) was a relevant actor in the creation of the G-4, of IBSA; d) the establishment of UNASUR and its CDS could be seen as embryos of a concept, still dormant, of the Regional Security Complex, in order to lead the South American regional bloc; e) Brazil's greater role in MINUSTAH with the assumption of the position of force commander in 2004; and f) a stronger African policy, which could be seen with the appreciation of the CPLP and African forums, such as the African Union<sup>9</sup> (AU), the Gulf of Guinea Commission, the G-7 best friends from the Gulf of Guinea.

In this way, the Grand Amorim Strategy sought to strengthen the country as a regional leader in the South Atlantic, despite the diversities of the South American continent and the not-so-consolidated commercial and strategic relations with Africa. The institutional strengthening of the various multilateral forums existing in the region, combined with the feeling of belonging of the member states were applied in an attempt to break with the tradition of hemispheric security arrangements led by central powers, such as the USA (VALENÇA, 2016).

Rubens Barbosa (2011) criticizes the main priorities of this foreign policy, mainly regarding the expected results in the reform of the UN, especially in the UNSC; the more assertive policy towards neighbors in the strategic environment, which did not produce the expected results in terms of regional integration; and in more intense bilateral and multilateral South-South relations, which added little commercially and which were slightly above the percentage of 2002 (final year of the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration), which would have left the developed nations in a secondary position.

These assertions can be relativized and understood as “glass half full or half empty”. In fact, bilateral trade relations with the countries of the South and with the countries of the North are very important to the traditional objectives of PEB and have continued to happen.

It is noteworthy, however, that the use of hard power, specifically military force, was not neglected by Amorim. Following current understanding, both in contemporary international politics and in international law, the use of force is ultimately possible, once other solutions have been exhausted.

This position is reinforced, discursively, based on his idea of how the Defense Policy of a peaceful country should be guided in order to seek a peace strategy, but that had a credible deterrent power to be able to say no when national interests are thwarted by other powers.

at sea, on land and in the air, Brazil must be ready to deter threats or aggressions from any quarter of the globe. Hence the importance of the investments we have made in new submarines, patrol ships, armored vehicles, border monitoring

<sup>9</sup> The AU was created on 07/09/2002, succeeding the Organization of African Unity (OAU), founded on 05/25/1963.

systems, transport planes and, now, in fighters, among many others. [...] today we know that a democratic, developing and independent Brazil in the world must have the support of a robust defense, indispensable to a great peace strategy (AMORIM, 2013, p. 2).

Its position, therefore, is compatible with Brazilian international aspirations in the first two decades of the 21st century. For Amorim, securing a prominent place in Brazil in international politics will depend on the democratic and judicious formulation of a “Great Strategy that balances soft power and robust power in appropriate doses” (AMORIM, 2016, p. 182). With this, it is important to emphasize the link of its Grand Strategy with the theory of smart power of Nye (2012). However, it is curious to see that Amorim, in his main speeches, does not mention the term smart power. Possibly, in order not to copy a strategy used by the USA, from the Obama administration, in order to denote greater independence in the choice of its policies (VIOLANTE, 2017).

In his speech “The Grand Strategy in a naval power in a world in flux” (AMORIM, 2016, p. 243), Amorim states that Brazil has a clear interest in world peace and must contribute to preserving it, given its vocation as a “provider of peace” country (AMORIM, 2016, p. 244). To that end, the country must adopt a Grand Strategy that combines foreign policy and defense policy. In this sense, diplomacy would correspond to the first line of defense of national interests. This would include, but would not limit, reflection on the challenges and definitions of national interests. Therefore, external interference that aimed to demarcate the limits of Brazilian action, in favor of its political objectives, would not be accepted.

Amorim (2016, p. 263) also questioned whether “it would be up to Brazil to continue to play a secondary role in the global scenario, submitting itself to the strategy of the dominant power and seeking, at most, to extract advantages from a subordinate association”. He emphasized, in this speech, that cooperation is the main objective of defense policy in the Brazilian strategic environment. With that, he concluded, through ZOPACAS, that the bordering countries of the South Atlantic join efforts to leave the South Atlantic free of nuclear weapons and all kinds of strange rivalries to this environment (AMORIM, 2016).

The defense of multilateralism in international politics, more than being a principle of Brazilian foreign relations, is an important tool to combat the uncertainties of hegemonies that tend to unipolarize in the international system. This is reflected in the assertion that “[...] and, for the rest of the world, the Brazilian stance will be one of deterrence, among the neighbors it should be of cooperation. [...] cooperation is the best deterrent for friendly states” (BRASIL ..., 2014, p. 7).

The cases and events mentioned suggest that, for Amorim, the Great Strategy of Brazil involves the use of all components of power available to the State, not just military resources to maintain its security. This conception would involve both the conflictive dimension of international politics and the peace-building process. It is clear that its strategic conception has been based on the Kantian premise that inserts the country internationally for the defense of peace.



In this position, despite the greater incentive in some strategic projects to increase national military power, which were launched or reactivated with the support of the FFAA's Articulation and Equipment Plan (PAED), after a short period of national geopolitical construction, in the years 1990, the soft power of diplomacy prevailed compared to military power (VIOLANTE, 2017).

This return to major strategic projects in the defense area, including incentives to the national defense industry, showed the relevance of a geopolitics more focused on the South Atlantic. However, Cervo and Lessa (2014) point out discursive contradictions and the results of this strategy, which it declined as to its assertiveness from 2011 to 2014, not releasing itself from the dependence on economic and technological interests of the central powers. Regardless of the greater assertiveness in matters of defense and security, Brazil adopted a policy of non-confrontation, even for its lower hard power, when compared to other emerging powers. Therefore, the desired permanent seat at the UNSC did not occur.

This Grand Strategy implemented by Amorim is justified, in the short term, because Brazil does not have significant traditional / interstate threats to the territory and its maritime sovereignty. However, this scenario can change quickly, given the natural wealth existing in its jurisdictional waters, such as, for example, the recent discoveries of the Brazilian Pre-Salt, which even cross the limits of the national Extended Continental Platform.

Therefore, if the path of parallels was not found, in an imperfect synthesis between foreign and defense policies, in the 1990s, as stated by Alsina Júnior (2003), the articulation between diplomacy and military power was not consistent with its rhetoric. The Grand Strategy, in the period in which he held prominent positions in the Foreign Ministry (1995 to 1999), as chancellor (2003 to 2010) and as Minister of Defense (2011 to 2014) did not turn into more concrete gains.

## 5 Analytical synthesis and final considerations

The Grand Strategy to which the Barão do Rio Branco and Amorim referred can be framed, keeping their idealizations and practices, anachronically, to the concept of Liddell Hart (1967), that is, “in the art of distribution and application of the military means to reach policy objectives”. In fact, what Liddell Hart (1967) proposed again was that the strategy was not only based on the direction of all military resources, but also on the use of all resources, military or not; or even, according to Saint-Pierre (2010), in a broader strategy that would serve to give meaning to the execution of a policy that would have the role of coordinating and directing an entire nation or the resources that it would provide to achieve a political objective, as war, for example.

The “Great Strategies” proposed by Rio Branco and Amorim, although they had the same political objective - to elevate Brazil to the forefront of nations - followed different paths, in several aspects, such as: in the pragmatic alignment with the USA and for the implantation a more diversified foreign policy; in the realistic world view versus a view more conjugated with other theories of international relations; the differentiated belief about which power, hard power or soft power, should be prioritized and strengthened; in placing, on the same plane or on a secondary plane, military power and diplomacy; and, finally, in the concrete gains that can

be identified as a result of the application of these strategies. As highlighted and emphasized throughout this work, the scenarios faced by each one also influenced the way in which the strategies were conducted, especially regarding the ethical limits of the use of armed force to achieve the objectives of the State. The ideographic methodology used here allowed us to explore such differences.

The Grand Strategy of the Barão do Rio Branco was based on a realistic view that the exercise of power is the central element for the pursuit of national interests. Thus, for this strategy, it is unacceptable for a State to “resign itself to signing conventions” that harm its political and strategic interests, as this would condemn it to be a third, fourth or fifth order State, according to the Baron's own words. Amorim's Grand Strategy is based, for the most part, on a participatory worldview and which had, especially during the period in which it held important positions in Brazilian diplomacy, alignment with Brazil's adherence to almost all international agreements, including acts of disarmament, linked to the restriction of the use of nuclear energy and the technology of launching long-range missiles, putting the possibilities and deterrence capabilities into perspective.

While the Grand Strategy of the Barão do Rio Branco showed, for historical examples, the importance of instrumental use and strengthening of hard power, which is in line with its full support to the Naval Refitting Program (1904-1910), the Grand Strategy of Amorim, although he mentioned a balance between soft and hard power, valued the former more, despite important investments in strategic projects such as the construction of conventional submarines and the nuclear powered submarine, of the fighters and freighters, in the FAB, and of the Guarani armored vehicle in the EB.

Amorim's appreciation of soft Power, associated with the persuasive negotiation and propagation of values, which in the Brazilian case was linked to the sympathy of its people, its propagated “peaceful” nature and an ability to understand complex situations experienced by other countries, had no direct connection with the national military, nor with the capacity to deter threats more strictly. This connection occurred in the somewhat late “revival” of strategic projects by the singular forces, and in cooperation in defense with friendly states in the strategic environment, which also reinforced their military hard powers. Its Grand Strategy was justified, in the context of its time, by the absence of interstate threats in the short term to Brazilian territory and jurisdictional waters.

The Grand Strategy of the Barão do Rio Branco gave priority to diplomacy, but also, in a very robust way, military power. He adopted a Clausewitzian stance in which war is the continuation of politics by other means, not hesitating, as in the case of Acre, to request the deployment of troops as a form of coercion to make national interests prevail. His phrase, in diplomatic negotiations that took place in 1904, sums up the analytics presented: “It is very good to discuss agreements with a squad behind it with credibility”. In another perspective, Amorim's great strategy, proclaims international insertion, denying, peremptorily, the development of nuclear weapons, affirming, despite established theories such as nuclear deterrence, that the thesis that they are the guarantee of peace and security would be a “great fallacy”.

With regard to concrete results, the gains achieved by the Rio Branco Grand Strategy were evident, such as the success in almost all border disputes and, mainly, in the issue of Acre, which added to Brazil an area larger than England. In turn, the Great Amorim Strategy, although it is lavish on initiatives, which have effected greater cooperation in Defense, as an effort to reinvigorate ZOPACAS, creation of the South American Defense Council and several south-south and north-south partnerships - such as the Brazil-France partnership for the construction of conventional and nuclear powered submarines -, its results were fluid and sparse, as they did not result in an increase in interoperability between the South American Armed Forces, much of it in precarious situations, or of improvement in combat preparation training. This situation was aggravated by the use, increasingly frequent, of the Armed Forces in Law and Order Guarantee operations, focused on the “war on drugs”, which were frequent throughout the Lula and Rousseff governments, and which contradicted their own speech.

In both strategies, **there was an articulation between foreign policy and military power**, although different paths and types of articulation can be identified. In a more evident articulation, presented by the Barão do Rio Branco, when combining in a more proportional way to foreign and defense policies, Amorim's Great Strategy favored the strengthening of soft power, with less emphasis on military hard power. In this articulation, the complementarity of military power with diplomacy was shown more rhetoric.

However, the national objective of aiming for a seat at the UNSC did not materialize or progressed concretely, within the Great Strategy of Amorim. It can be said that one of the main reasons for Brazil's acceptance as a candidate from Latin America in a possible reformulation of the UNSC is more the absence of sufficient military hard power for use when necessary, in the light of the decisions of this council, than an effective disagreement from its neighbors in the South Atlantic (VALENÇA; CARVALHO, 2014).

In conclusion, both strategies were consistent with the insertion of a medium and peripheral power that aims for greater power in the international system, given the internal and external political circumstances of their times.

As a perspective, it is believed that a new national “Grand Strategy” should strengthen the budget for defense investment, in the medium and long term, so that the modernization of the military Power is effective and allows the solidification of an Industrial Defense Base capable of to provide systems with high added value and an increasingly indigenous technological content.

It is worth noting, however, that today's technological innovations are evolving in ever smaller cycles. It is necessary to propose the updating of military power based on the tasks to be carried out: strategic, operational or tactical. The “Grand Strategy” should not be based on structured arguments for the acquisition of platforms that are constantly evolving. This is a trap in which strategy analysts and public policy makers feel constantly affected, especially in an environment of limited resources and, at times, contingent on defense.

## References

ALSINA JÚNIOR, João Paulo Soares. **Rio Branco: grande estratégia e o poder naval**. Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2015.

ALSINA JÚNIOR, João Paulo Soares. A síntese imperfeita: articulação entre política externa e política de defesa na era Cardoso. **Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional**, Brasília, DF, v. 46, n. 2, p. 53-86, jul./dez. 2003. Available in: [https://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci\\_arttext&pid=S0034-73292003000200003](https://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-73292003000200003). Accessed in: 16 mar. 2021.

AMORIM, Celso. **A grande estratégia do Brasil: discursos, artigos e entrevistas da gestão no Ministério da Defesa (2011-2014)**. Brasília, DF: FUNAG; [São Paulo]: UNESP, 2016.

AMORIM, Celso. A política de defesa de um país pacífico. **Revista da Escola de Guerra Naval**, Rio de Janeiro, v. 18, n. 1, p. 7-15, jan./jun. 2012.

AMORIM, Celso. Segurança internacional: novos desafios para o brasil. In: BRASIL. Ministério da Defesa. **Discursos do Ministro da Defesa**. Brasília, DF: Ministério da Defesa, 2013. Aula Magna do Ministro da Defesa, Celso Amorim, no Instituto de Relações Internacionais da Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, 11 de outubro de 2013. 2013. Available in: [https://www.gov.br/defesa/pt-br/arquivos/2013/pronunciamentos/discurso\\_ministro/outubro/seguranaa\\_internacionala\\_novosa\\_desafiosa\\_brasila\\_11102013.pdf](https://www.gov.br/defesa/pt-br/arquivos/2013/pronunciamentos/discurso_ministro/outubro/seguranaa_internacionala_novosa_desafiosa_brasila_11102013.pdf). Accessed in: 17 mar. 2018.

ARON, Raymond. **Pensar a guerra, Clausewitz**. Brasília, DF: UnB, 1976. v. 2.

ARON, Raymond. **Guerra e paz entre as nações**. São Paulo: Imprensa Oficial do Estado de São Paulo; Brasília, DF: UnB, 2002.

BANDEIRA, Luiz Alberto Moniz. O Barão de Rothschild e a questão do Acre. **Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional**, Brasília, DF, v. 43, n. 2, p. 150-169, dez. 2000. Available in: [http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=S0034-73292000000200007&script=sci\\_abstract&tlng=pt](http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=S0034-73292000000200007&script=sci_abstract&tlng=pt). Accessed in: 16 mar. 2021.

BARBOSA, Rubens A. **A política externa de dois governos**. In: FGV. Centro de Estudos no Novo Desenvolvimento. Rio de Janeiro: Arquivo FGV, 2011. Available in: <http://cemacro.fgv.br/sites/cemacro.fgv.br/files/Rubens%20Barbosa%20-%20Pol%C3%ADtica%20externa%20de%20dois%20governos.pdf>. Accessed in: 25 out. 2015.

BELLIGNI, S. Hegemonia. In: BOBBIO, Noberto; MANTEUCCI, Nicola; PASQUINO, Gianfranco. **Dicionário de política**. Tradução de Carmem C. Varriale et al. 13. ed. Brasília, DF: Editora UnB, 2008.

BRASIL. Decreto nº 6.703 de 18 de dezembro de 2008. Aprova a Estratégia Nacional de Defesa, e dá outras providências. **Diário Oficial [da] República Federativa do Brasil**, Brasília, DF, 18 dez. 2008. Available in: [http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil\\_03/\\_ato2007-2010/2008/Decreto/D6703.htm](http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2007-2010/2008/Decreto/D6703.htm). Accessed in: 20 mai. 2018

BRASIL precisa de poderio para se impor, diz Amorim. **Jornal do Senado**, Brasília, DF, ano 20, n. 4055, p. 7, 28 mar. 2014. Available in: <https://www2.senado.leg.br/bdsf/bitstream/handle/id/502688/2014-03-28.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>. Accessed in: 17 mar. 2021.

BUZAN, Barry. New patterns of global security in the twenty-first century. **International affairs**, [Oxford], v. 67, n. 3, p. 431-451, July 1991. Available in: <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/7e80/1a412aec847eb67e464852c0d6319388266e.pdf>. Accessed in: 17 mar. 2020.

CERVO, A. Luiz. **Inserção internacional**: formação dos conceitos. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2008.

CERVO, A. Luiz; BUENO, Clodoaldo. **História da política exterior do Brasil**. 4. ed. rev. e ampl. Brasília, DF: Editora UnB, 2011.

CERVO, A. Luiz. Relações internacionais do Brasil: um balanço da era Cardoso. **Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional**, Brasília, DF, ano 45, n. 2, p. 5-35, 2002. Available in: <https://www.scielo.br/pdf/rbpi/v45n1/a01v45n1.pdf>. Accessed in: 17 mar. 2021.

CERVO, A. Luiz.; LESSA, Antônio C. O declínio: inserção internacional do Brasil (2011-2014). **Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional**, Brasília, DF, v. 57, n. 2, 2014. Available in: <https://www.scielo.br/pdf/rbpi/v57n2/0034-7329-rbpi-57-02-00133.pdf>. Accessed in: 17 mar. 2021.

FGV. Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil. Acervo. Verbetes bibliográfico. **Celso Luís Nunes de Amorim**. Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 2015. 1 registro biográfico. Available in: <http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-biografico/celso-luis-nunes-de-AMORIM>. Accessed in: 16 mar. 2021.

FIGUEIREDO, Eurico de Lima. **Pensamento estratégico brasileiro**: discursos. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Luzes, 2015.

FREEDMAN, Laurence. **Strategy: A History**. USA: Oxford University Press, 2013.

HERZ, Mônica; HOFFMANN, Andrea Ribeiro. **Organizações internacionais**: história e práticas. Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier, 2004.

HOLSTI, Kalevi J. The Concept of Power in the Study of International Relations. **Background**, v. 7, n. 4, p. 179-194, Fevereiro de 1964.

KANT, Immanuel. **Para a paz perpétua**: um projecto filosófico. Beira: Universidade de Beira interior, 1985.

KEOHANE, Robert O. **After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy**. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

LEVY, Jack S. Case studies: types, designs, and logics of inference. **Conflict Management and Peace Science**, [S. l.], v. 25, n. 1, p. 1-18, Mar 2008.

LIDDELL HART, Basil Henry. **Strategy: the indirect approach**. 4th ed. London: Faber & Faber, 1967.

MEARSHEIMER, John J. **A tragédia da política das grandes potências**. Tradução de Thiago Araújo. Lisboa: Gradiva, 2007.

MOREIRA, W. de S. Estudos estratégicos: epistemologia, crítica e novas abordagens. *In*: ENCONTRO NACIONAL DA ASSOCIAÇÃO BRASILEIRA DE ESTUDOS DE DEFESA, 4., 2010, Brasília, DF. **Anais [...]**. Brasília, DF: Universidade de Brasília, 2010. 12 p. Simpósio Temático nº 12. Available in: [https://www.abedef.org/conteudo/view?ID\\_CONTEUDO=71](https://www.abedef.org/conteudo/view?ID_CONTEUDO=71). Accessed in: 16 mar. 2021.

MORGENTHAU, Hans J. A political theory of foreign aid. **The American Political Science Review**, [Cambridge], v. 56, n. 2, p. 301-309, June 1962. Available in: <http://ewclass.lecture.ub.ac.id/files/2019/01/political-theory-of-foreign-aid.pdf>. Accessed in: 16 mar. 2021.

MORGENTHAU, Hans J. **A política entre as nações**. Brasília, DF: Editora UnB; São Paulo: Imprensa Oficial do Estado de São Paulo, 2003. Available in: [http://funag.gov.br/loja/download/0179\\_politica\\_entre\\_as\\_nacoes.pdf](http://funag.gov.br/loja/download/0179_politica_entre_as_nacoes.pdf). Accessed in: 16 mar. 2021.

NYE, Joseph S. **Paradoxo do poder americano**. São Paulo: Editora UNESP, 2002.

NYE, Joseph S. **O Futuro do Poder**. São Paulo: Benvirá, 2012.

OSGOOD, Robert E.; TUCKER, Robert W. **Force, order, and justice**. [Baltimore]: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967.

PARET, Peter. **Construtores da Estratégia Moderna**. Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército (Bibliex), 2001. Tomo 1.

RICUPERO, Rubens. **Rio Branco: o Brasil no mundo**. Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto, 2000.

SAINT-PIERRE, H. L. A defesa na política externa: dos fundamentos a uma análise do caso brasileiro. **Análise de Conjuntura OPSA**, Rio de Janeiro, n. 8, p. 1-17, ago. 2010. Available in: [https://www.academia.edu/6599891/A\\_Defesa\\_na\\_Pol%C3%ADtica\\_Externa\\_dos\\_fundamentos\\_a\\_uma\\_an%C3%A1lise\\_do\\_caso\\_brasileiro\\_An%C3%A1lise\\_de\\_Conjuntura\\_OPSA](https://www.academia.edu/6599891/A_Defesa_na_Pol%C3%ADtica_Externa_dos_fundamentos_a_uma_an%C3%A1lise_do_caso_brasileiro_An%C3%A1lise_de_Conjuntura_OPSA). Accessed in: 18 mar. 2021.

SANTOS, Luís C. V. G. **Juca Paranhos: o Barão do Rio Branco**. São Paulo: Editora Companhia das Letras, 2018.

SCHUESSLER, John. David A. Baldwin: power and international relations: a conceptual approach. **The Review of Politics**, [S.L], v. 79, n. 4, p. 743-745, 2017.

SOUZA, Amaury de. **A Agenda Internacional do Brasil: um estudo sobre a comunidade brasileira de política Externa**. Rio de Janeiro: CEBRI, 2002.

SOUZA, Christiane Laidler de. Doutrina Drago e as relações entre as repúblicas americanas. *In: ENCONTRO INTERNACIONAL DA ANPHLAC*, 8., 2008, Vitória. **Anais eletrônicos** [...]. Vitória: Associação Nacional de Pesquisadores e Professores de História das Américas, 2008. p. 1-14. Available in: [http://antigo.anphlac.org/sites/default/files/christiane\\_laidler.pdf](http://antigo.anphlac.org/sites/default/files/christiane_laidler.pdf). Accessed in: 16 mar. 2021.

VALENÇA, Marcelo M. Contribuições da Prevenção de Conflitos à Política Externa Brasileira: notas e reflexões. *In: LIMA, Sérgio Eduardo Moreira; TEIXEIRA JR, Augusto (orgs.). V Conferência sobre Relações Exteriores: O Brasil e as tendências do cenário internacional*. Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2016a, p. 149-172.

VALENÇA, Marcelo M. Política Externa Brasileira e Multilateralismo: o que esperar do novo governo. **Cadernos Adenauer**, ano XVII, v. 4, p. 45-59, 2016b.

VALENÇA, Marcelo M.; CARVALHO, Gustavo. Soft Power, Hard Aspirations: Brazilian foreign policy strategies and the dilemmas of power projection. **Brazilian Political Science Review**, v. 8, p. 66-94, 2014.

VIOLANTE, Alexandre Rocha. **Política externa, política de defesa e cooperação sul-sul como grande estratégia na África Ocidental: um estudo de caso em Cabo Verde e São Tomé e Príncipe**. 2017. Dissertação (Mestrado em Estudos Estratégicos da Defesa e da Segurança) – Instituto de Estudos Estratégico, Universidade Federal Fluminense, Rio de Janeiro, 2017. Available in: <http://www.ppgest.uff.br/images/Disserta/2017/Disserta%20Alexandre%20Rocha%20Violante.pdf>. Accessed in: 17 ma. 2021.

WEBER, Max. **Economia e sociedade: Fundamentos da sociologia compreensiva**. Brasília, DF: Universidade de Brasília, v.2, 1964.

WIGHT, Martin. **A política do poder**. São Paulo: Imprensa Oficial do Estado de São Paulo; Brasília, DF: Editora UnB, 2002. Available in: [http://funag.gov.br/loja/download/124-Politica\\_do\\_Poder\\_A.pdf](http://funag.gov.br/loja/download/124-Politica_do_Poder_A.pdf). Accessed in: 17 mar. 2021.





# United States, China and the power transition in the 21st century

*Estados Unidos, China y la transición de poder en el siglo XXI*

**Abstract:** The objective of this paper is to understand the upsurge in global conflicts, especially those involving the two main world powers: China and the United States of America. Aiming this, the methodology sought to put in perspective the theories regarding power transition and the geopolitical strategy of the two main (global) powers, China and USA. The objective was that, in this way, the article could indicate which one best fits the current context. The conclusion of the study was, on the other way of what is being defended by a great part of the specialists, the geopolitics of the 21st century is not reediting the bipolar system, lived during the Cold War, but going through a transition crisis, typical of contexts in which there is the dispute between hegemonic and other ascending power, as occurred during the decades before World War I. It remains to be seen how this dynamic is going to be processed in the 21st century.

**Keywords:** China. USA. Geopolitics. History. Power Transition Theory.

**Resumen:** Este artículo busca comprender el resurgimiento de los conflictos internacionales. Para ello, la metodología compara las teorías de la transición de poder y la estrategia geopolítica de las dos superpotencias globales: China y Estados Unidos. El objetivo era señalar qué corriente teórica sería la más adecuada para explicar el contexto actual. La conclusión del estudio fue que, contrariamente a lo que está siendo defendido por buena parte de los expertos, la geopolítica del siglo XXI no está reeditando el sistema bipolar, vivido durante la Guerra Fría, sino atravesando una crisis de transición, típica de contextos en los que existe la disputa entre la potencia hegemónica y otro ascendente, como ocurrió durante las décadas anteriores a la Primera Guerra Mundial. Queda por ver cómo se procesará esa dinámica en el siglo XXI.

**Palabras Clave:** China. Estados Unidos Geopolítica. Historia. Teoría de la Transición de Poder.

**Eduardo Migowski** 

Exército Brasileiro.

Colégio Militar do Recife.

Recife, PE, Brasil.

eduardomigowski@hotmail.com

**Received: Oct. 05, 2020**

**Approved: Mar. 02, 2021**

COLEÇÃO MEIRA MATTOS

ISSN on-line 2316-4891 / ISSN print 2316-4833

<http://ebrevistas.eb.mil.br/index.php/RMM/index>



Creative Commons  
Attribution Licence

## 1 Introduction

In September 2020, Donald Trump took the floor of the United Nations General Assembly and, in an aggressive manner, affirmed the need to fight what the Republican called “Chinese virus”. The expression, in a double sense, referred to both the Coronavirus and the influence of the Asian country around the world, only by that fight, said the president, there would be peace and prosperity (DONALD ..., 2020).

Even after the change of command at the White House, as much as Joe Biden is more restrained with his words, the expectation is that the assertive conduct towards China will be maintained. According to Reuters, in a meeting with senators, the new president would have warned that the United States is Beijing’s most serious opponent and promised those present “to compete and win” the dispute with the Asian rival. “If we don’t start moving, they’ll eat our lunch,” the Democrat is alleged to have said (CHINA ..., 2021, n.p.).

How to interpret the recent escalation of rivalry between the two superpowers? That is the question that many analysts are asking. Political scientist Graham Allison (2020) argues that the international system would be going through a transition crisis, a concept that the professor explained through the expression Thucydides trap. According to Allison, thousands of years ago, Thucydides had already realized the systemic nature of conflicts in times of transition. Writing about the Peloponnesian War, the Greek historian demonstrated two factors that would have made the conflict between Spartans and Athenians inevitable: the rise of the second and the fear it caused in the first.

As much as there is an exaggeration in the idea that something would be inevitable, the metaphor is interesting. Now, if the conflict was inevitable, its outbreak is independent of the will of the respective rulers. If the actors, the century or the geography changed, the war would happen in the same way. That is, Thucydides was not only elucidating a local issue, but proposing an explanatory model that could be perfectly expanded. It was, therefore, to characterize the contexts in which there are similar dynamics, that the political scientist proposed the expression Thucydides trap.

It was, in effect, the Thucydides trap which would initiate the cataclysm of the First World War in the 19th century. In this context, the established order, led by the countries with the oldest industrialization, especially England and France, would be destabilized by the rapid growth of a recently unified Germany. And, in a world that had already been divided during Imperialism, the worldwide projection of the German Empire would invariably clash with hegemonic interests.

The question is whether China and the United States are, in fact, following the roadmap described above. For that, first, it is essential to know the debate about the so-called “power transition” theory and, secondly, the recent history of foreign policy of the two main powers of the 21st century. Only then will it be possible, in the sequence, to understand which of the theories about the transition of power would be the most adequate to explain the current context and, finally, to outline some ideas of how it would be possible to change the outcome of this dangerous plot.

As pessimistic as the above interpretation may seem, it is necessary to be clear that “different choices would have produced different results” (ALLISON, 2020, p. 270). At this point,

therefore, the key is to understand which decisions could increase and which would allow the risk of armed conflict to be removed. Paraphrasing Thucydides, we can say that it is the fear that the rise of Beijing has caused in Washington that has imposed on international relations theorists the urgent need to think about ways out so that the war is avoidable.

## 2 Theoretical considerations

Like the realist tradition, the theory of the transition of power favors the study of power relations. In the second case, however, the focus is on systemic asymmetries. Abramson Organski (1958), a pioneer in the field, for example, proposed a pyramid to characterize international hierarchies. States were classified into four levels: 1) dominant state, 2) great powers, 3) regional powers, 4) secondary powers. The argument is that the position that each actor occupies in the international hierarchy would be fundamental for the understanding of the factors that lead to cooperation or competition between States.

Also, according to Organski, the dominant powers would be composed of a small group of countries that disproportionately concentrate the available power resources. For this reason, these States would be interested in maintaining the status quo that privileges them. What is expected under normal conditions is that the superpower will seek to stabilize the system. In other words, unlike classical realism, peace does not come from the balance of power, but it would be imperial.

The problem is that the hierarchical pyramid is not static. The correlation of forces is always being modified, and when a power emerges capable of rivaling the established powers, the likelihood of an armed conflict would escalate considerably. In this case, systemic stability can be seen as detrimental to the interests of the dominant state, which would eventually impose a different dynamic. This is the context that can be classified as a transition of power. The question is whether the rivalry between the USA and China is following the script described by transition theorists.

Graham Allison, as said, was adamant in saying yes. John Mearsheimer (2001) also does not appear to be very optimistic about the current scenario. The offensive realism, proposed by Mearsheimer, argues that international security comes from the concentration of resources and not from the balance of power. Such a perspective significantly alters the expected behavior of the actors on the world geopolitical board. “The great powers would always be revisionist forces in the eternal search for the maximization of their power [...]. Only with greater sums of power resources would threats be overcome and security, in fact, achieved” (BARCELLOS; MÈRCHER, 2020, p. 389).

The transition periods, therefore, would configure scenarios of uncertainty and mutual distrust, which could induce the formation of a new security dilemma. The conclusion is that, in these contexts, there would be a high probability that competition between rival poles of power would escalate in the direction of a war conflict. “In short, China’s rise is unlikely to be tranquil” (MEARSHEIMER, 2014)

If such interpretations are correct, the increase in international friction would have a structural character and, in the coming years, the tendency would be to worsen it. However,

there are other interpretative proposals. Liberals, for example, are less pessimistic. According to this current, globalization would prefigure a complex interdependence framework, characterized by mutual dependence between the actors. In a scenario in which global markets are integrated, according to authors like Joseph Nye (2002), the emergence of a new global player would leverage the world economy and bring benefits to the international community as a whole. Therefore, as long as there are defined rules and multilateral institutions capable of mediating conflicts, the transition of power would occur without major upheavals.

Chinese geopolitical thinking also proposes another interpretive key for the current scenario. Professor Yan Xuetong, exponent of the so-called moral realism, understands that the conduct of States must be guided by ethical criteria and always seek the preservation of peace (RIBEIRO, 2020). For the transition to take place peacefully, Beijing should take advantage of the decay of American soft power and enlist followers in the international community through moral conduct. “Even if China overcomes the United States in general power, it cannot exercise international leadership unless it can attract followers, which requires articulating and defending an ideology that appeals to other cultures” (LARSON, 2020, p. 164 apud RIBEIRO, 2020, p. 632).

This is what Eastern intellectuals call the real path. The example used to support moral realism comes from Eastern history, from the Warring States period, when the decay of the Zhou State and the rise of the Qin dynasty occurred. In the case of the Warring States, unlike what happened in Ancient Greece, hegemonic balance would have occurred, not mutual destruction. The proposal is that, in the name of a balanced and peaceful environment, global governance should favor the “distribution of international responsibility to reduce threats common to all countries” (XUETONG, 2019, p. 7 apud RIBEIRO, 2020, p. 630).

Well, in the face of such a multifaceted debate, the basic question is: who would be right? At this point, the only certainty is that a new geopolitical cycle is being initiated. And, in the midst of so many doubts, it remains to put the hypotheses of the theorists to the test. Where are we going? The answer to this distressing question must be sought, first, in the reevaluation of recent history.

### **3 The competitive coexistence of the 1990s**

Professors Li Xing and Timothy Shaw (2018) used the expression “sleeping in the same bed with different dreams” to characterize changes in world geopolitics. The pillars of the bilateral China / USA relationship were founded on an unstable basis because they had the objective of isolating a common enemy: the USSR. It was a “marriage” of convenience and, as such, should be revised after the collapse of the Bolshevik experience.

What would follow? The North American interpretation was that a policy of direct confrontation could isolate Westerners on the Asian continent (KISSINGER, 2012). For this reason, the redefinition of diplomatic guidelines would be done with great caution. Henceforth, according to Henry Kissinger (2011), both (China and the USA) would merge their strategies in a pattern of cooperative coexistence. “The United States and China realized that they needed each

other because both were too big to be dominated, too special to be transformed and too necessary for each other to allow the luxury of isolation” (KISSINGER, 2011, p. 469).

Cooperative coexistence should favor areas where there would be complementarity. The observed pattern, however, would be different. In the North American perspective, cooperation should be carried out through a clear hierarchy. China would become a partner of the US-led order. The Chinese, in turn, wanted to ride the tiger (XING; SHAW, 2018), an image that represents the dialectical tension between the opportunities and the dangers inherent in strategic cooperation with the main world power.

Gradually, emerging rivalries would bury the hope that the pattern of cooperative coexistence would be established. In practice, what happened was a competitive coexistence and, in this model, China was clearly taking advantage.

The USA, seeing the dangerous growth of a rival pole in Asia, would begin to reevaluate the strategy that was being adopted. Conforming what some scholars have defined as China's syndrome, characterized by “a mixture of psychological anxiety, emotional hysteria and empathic demonization” (XING; SHAW, 2018, p. 55). The reason for such anguish is the recognition that the balance of power is swinging towards the east and that, therefore, time would be detrimental to American interests. In the 21st century, the bed has become too small to accommodate two giants.

#### **4 The American strategy**

The correction of directions in US foreign policy had been initiated during the Obama administration. In 2011, shortly after China overtook Japan and became the second largest economy in the world, the Democrat would start the strategy known as Pivot/Rebalance to Asia. The idea was to counteract the Chinese influence by approaching the nations of the Pacific Basin and Southeast Asia. The strategic objective was the political, economic and military strangulation of the Asian rival (PECEQUILO, 2013).

In 2015, after seven years of negotiations, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was signed, a free trade agreement involving twelve countries bordering the Pacific Ocean. The TPP should strengthen the North American position through commercial cooptation (PECEQUILO, 2013). In December 2017, the Trump administration published the new National Security Strategy report, which openly pointed to China as a strategic competitor and main threat to the country's global interests (RIBEIRO, 2020). The turn in American politics was complete.

According to Ambassador Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, the American foreign policy would henceforth pursue the following objectives: 1) eliminate the trade deficit, 2) prevent the transfer of advanced technology, 3) reduce the presence of Chinese students in the USA, 4) prevent the adoption of Huawei's 5G technology, 5) promote the return of industrial production to the USA, 6) expand the country's budget and military presence, 7) align European countries with the USA against China (GUIMARÃES, 2020).


According to the influential political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski (2012), in a conflict environment, the stability of the Asian continent will depend on what Jimmy Carter's former Counselor called “two overlapping regional triangles, nucleated in China. The first refers to

China, India and Pakistan. The second to China, Japan and Korea with the states of Southeast Asia playing a supporting role” (BRZEZINSKI, 2012, p. 162 apud PECEQUILO, 2013, p. 3697).

In the case of the first, which involves problem areas, such as Tibet and the autonomous region of Xinjiang, the central issue would be that of human rights. The problem is that both Xinjiang and Tibet are strategic territories for the geopolitical ambitions of the PRC. Xinjiang allows direct access to Pakistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, Russia, Mongolia and India, a key area for the most daring project in recent decades, the new Silk Road. The autonomous region also acts as a “bumper” for the central area of the country, in addition to housing natural resources and being the main area for testing nuclear weapons.

In Tibet important military bases are installed, mainly of the Air Force, due to its altitude. The Himalayas, which cross the entire border with India, form an artificial protective wall, offering an important strategic advantage to the power that controls the mountain range. It is also in Tibet that are the source of the main rivers that cross the Asian continent and, from a geopolitical perspective, dominating water sources means exercising power in the water supply of several countries.

Figure 1 - Strategic position of Xinjiang and Tibet




Source: Shankar (2020).

In the second triangle, the United States intends to intensify conflicts in Asia and the Pacific in order to consolidate the strategic-military encirclement of the Asian rival. The points of vulnerability are many. The dispute with Japan over the East Sea islands has been going on for years and expo-

ses the historic unhealed wounds between the two main Asian powers. But it is in the South China Sea that tensions have reached dangerous levels. The Communist Party claims the right over the so-called nine-lane islands, or ten, if Taiwan is included, which would give sovereignty to the Chinese from the sea, which has been called the Asian Mediterranean, such is its strategic importance, and which has also recently been compared to the Persian Gulf, due to oil and natural gas reserves.

In 1992, China passed controversial legislation that puts the South China Sea under the country's sovereignty, a document that is not recognized by any of the governments in the regional surroundings. This fact causes friction with Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei and the Philippines. Indeed, in 2016, the Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration recognized the Philippines' right to economically explore the South China Sea. Researchers Diego Pautasso and Gaio Dória (2017) highlight the existence of strong indications that the USA would have influenced the lawsuit of these countries in the International Court (especially that of the Philippines). Washington's goal, by fomenting the litigation, would be to balance Beijing's weight in the region. In any case, in the end, the Resolution would be ignored.

Figure 2 - Importance of the South Sea for China's military and commercial security.



Source: Gnanasagaran (2018).

Taiwan and Hong Kong are also points of instability. If a power wants to dominate the mainland, it will first have to enter the island of Taiwan. The strait leaves the main financial centers vulnerable: Shanghai, Beijing and Hong Kong are cities located near the east coast. Taiwan is also in a strategic position for the CCP's ambitions to control trade routes

across the South China Sea. In recent history, therefore, Taiwan was (and remains) a space of tension, the epicenter of the shock caused by contact between the West and the East.

Hong Kong, on the other hand, with a political system similar to that of Western democracies, has been noted in recent years as a nucleus of resistance to political centralization promoted by the Communist Party. The island is also the main channel of influence for Western propaganda in the country. This puts Beijing in the face of a complex dilemma. If, on the one hand, Hong Kong's autonomy can be used as a form of internal destabilization; on the other hand, the repression of popular movements can strengthen the Western narrative regarding the "totalitarian danger", in addition to hindering the strategy of approaching the government of Taipei (Taiwan's capital).

It is in this context that the recent return to anti-communist discourse must be interpreted. Not as an explanation of reality, but as part of the containment of Chinese geopolitical power. The notion of a new Cold War is an attempt to stop the Chinese strategy of co-opting partners by example. An idea that, as seen, is at the basis of moral realism. Now, by reducing geopolitics to the confrontation between good and evil, it would become the obligation of the so-called "free and democratic nations" to engage in the fight against the common enemy, which, in practice, would place them under the tutelage of the United States. Therefore, according to this narrative, China should be seen as a threat to freedom and could never serve as an example to other actors in the international community.

In sum, the Chinese expansion is producing imbalances in the balance of power, a fact that allows for more assertive action on the part of the United States. Apparently, Washington will act in two directions: 1) indirectly, seeking to intensify the rival's points of vulnerability and 2) directly, resorting to the notion of a new Cold War, in order to rescue the values that confer legitimacy to the containment policy and which will be used to block Chinese influence in areas where the Western power is unable to compete under advantageous conditions.

## 5 The Chinese strategy

The Chinese dream "captures the strong desire of a billion Chinese: to be rich, powerful and respected" (ALLISON, 2020, p. 136). Now, considering that the country has grown close to double digits in the last four decades, it is possible to say that the model followed has shown success. The Chinese strategy, therefore, is to maintain the pace of modernization of previous years. In other words, if the American leadership wants to intensify the rival's points of vulnerability, the Eastern planners intend to annul them. It is, within this perspective, that the oriental narrative of peaceful ascension must be understood.

In practical terms, the country's foreign policy would be aiming at four objectives: 1) to return the leadership in the Asian continent. 2) re-establish the territory of Greater China, which includes the separatist regions of Tibet and Xinjiang. 3) to recover the sphere of influence and to prevent the action of Americans in their strategic surroundings, 4) to take a leading role in the relevant issues of the world diplomatic debate (ALLISON, 2020). In addition to those mentioned, we can include the dispute for the vanguard in cutting-edge technological production and the control of part of the sources of raw materials, food production and global energy.


To this end, Beijing operates on two fronts. In the western part, the CCP seeks projection in the area that Western geopolitics defined as Heartland. First introduced in 2013, the New Silk



Road (OBOR), the most ambitious economic initiative undertaken by the Asian country so far, would begin to revitalize the logistics infrastructure to stimulate China's trade with Africa and Eurasia. Configuring itself as an important strategic corridor for political and economic projection in the region.

Researchers Leonardo Mècher and Bruna Barcellos, point out that, since 1999, the country's strategic objective has been to boost investments by its multinational companies around the world and ensure access to the fundamental resources for maintaining the rapid expansion of economic activity. In addition to allowing the acquisition of new technologies (BARCELLOS; MÉRCHER, 2020).

Gráfico 1 – External flow of Chinese FDI.



Source: Unctad (2013 apud Ma; Overbeek, 2018, p. 75).

In 2020, under the leadership of Beijing, the largest free trade agreement in the world (RCEP) would be created, involving countries in Asia and the Pacific, without the participation of the United States. The RCEP is being called by the Western media as Chinese globalization. As much as it may sound like an exaggeration, the term is interesting. China was the main beneficiary of the global financial deregulation of the previous decades and, increasingly, it needs international trade to maintain its growth pace. The problem is that, apparently, such rules are being revised. In response, it would be occurring the conformation of a synocentric system (PAUTASSO; UNGARETTI, 2017). In other words, "Chinese globalization" would serve as an antidote to the retreat of "American" globalization".

Figure 3 – International Economic Corridors



Source: Alves (2017).

In the east, the goal is to test American naval supremacy in the Pacific and thereby reconfigure maritime space. Washington's assertive attitude produces psychological effects that cannot be overlooked. It is common to hear from the Chinese authorities references to the so-called century of humiliation, between the first Opium War (1839) and the Communist Revolution (1949), in which the country was subject to successive foreign occupations. "For many Chinese, pursuing national interests is not only important to move China towards national rejuvenation, but because it actively protects China from another period of oppression" (TISCHLER, 2020, n.p.).

The argument is that such humiliations were only possible due to the internal weakening of the Qing dynasty, which allowed foreign interference in Chinese domestic affairs. At this point, there is a clear parallel between national history and the current separatist conflicts, which are being stimulated by the Americans. As Mark Tischler, an expert in Asian geopolitics, demonstrated:

Understanding this narrative is essential for the understanding of Beijing's domestic, foreign, and defense policy. While for American decision-makers losing control of the South China Sea might be a significant blow to Washington's strategic standing, for their Chinese counterparts losing control of the region may signal the first steps of another occupation. This might sound like hyperbole, but the haunting memories of this dark past play an immensely strong force in Beijing's contemporary policies (TISCHLER, 2020.)

This mentality has been instrumental in driving the recent expansion of the Asian country's military power. The naval strategy, first, must guarantee the supremacy of the seas that surround its territory - which involves Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines and the southern China Sea - and, subsequently, be able to project power globally (VIOLANTE; MARRONI; MAIA, 2020).

It is an ambition that, it must be said, is becoming more and more plausible: "thanks to the continuous regaining of power of influence in East Asia, for China the American position in the western Pacific is in decline. Chinese actions in the region have managed to accelerate this retreat, most noticeably in the South China Sea". (ALLISON, 2020, p. 180).

The geopolitics of contemporary China, therefore, operates in a multidimensional way. The hegemonic transition, however, needs more than economic weight and military strength. As the Chinese themselves pointed out, it takes legitimacy to lead. The strategy, in this case, has been to bet on the growing contradictions of the post-Cold War international order, shaped by American values, and which delivered very little of what it had promised.

The globalization of the last decades has produced imbalances and strengthened asymmetries, concentrated power in a few States, at the same time that it has made possible the rise of new regional centers. Here, there is a strong contradiction. Now, the capital of China, Beijing, as said, was the main beneficiary of financial deregulation and, therefore, depends on the maintenance of the system it criticizes. The justification is that "Chinese globalization" would be guided by different rules. The promise is that it will be able to provide an inclusive integration model, which would allow to overcome the asymmetries between developed and developing countries (PAUTASSO; UNGARETTI, 2017).

For this, Beijing seeks moral strength in the narrative that, like a good part of the emerging countries, China was subjugated by the imperial project of the western powers. However, having overcome the peripheral condition, the country would be in a position to modify the imposed system in order to perpetuate the submission of peripheral peoples. It is in this way that the principle of moral realism of enlisting followers by example is being put into practice in the 21st century.

## **6 21st century geopolitics and power transition theorists**

After presenting the main theories of the power transition, and the strategic insertion of the two main global superpowers, the time has come to answer the last question proposed: which of the explanatory currents would be the most appropriate to interpret the current context? This issue will be addressed below.

The liberal proposal is certainly the most fragile. The reason is a contradiction between the "ought" and the "is" of the international system. The New World Order was an American creation and, as such, should be sustained by the country's global hegemony. Washington's supremacy would be a key element in the governance of the system. Thus, at the moment when a defiant power arose, it could be understood as a threat to the reproduction of the liberal order itself.

Ultimately, therefore, what would be at risk would be the values that, according to liberalism, should ensure that the transition takes place in a peaceful manner. This is the logic underlying the rescue of the new Cold War concept in recent years; what would be in dispute would be freedom from

the totalitarian threat. In the end, this interpretation would make it impossible for the hegemonic dispute to be managed by multilateral institutions.

Moral realism also has limitations. How would it be possible to form a hegemonic balance in a context in which the challenging power grows at a rate three times greater than the established power? There are also countless historical examples - such as the Third Vietnam War (1978), support for UNITA in the civil war in Angola and the treatment reserved for separatists in Xinjiang and Tibet - which, contrary to what is alleged, demonstrate that the country Asia is far from privileging moral values in its internal and external conduct.

In addition, Beijing's stance in Asia does not indicate a willingness to share responsibility with other actors. The country's rise is also not without conflict; the surrounding countries - such as India, Japan, Vietnam, Australia, Malaysia, the Philippines, among others - often perceive the new regional power as a threat to the sovereignty of these states and not as an alternative to American hegemony. Chinese performance in Asia, therefore, is far from the proposal expressed by the concept of the real path. Furthermore, from the North American point of view, the proposed division of responsibility sounds like a strategy to recognize the global power of the Asian rival; that is, it would be just another step towards the transition of power.

What is being verified in 21st century geopolitics, therefore, is closer to Graham's Thucydides trap metaphor and Mearsheimer's offensive realism. In 2014, John Mearsheimer already argued that if China maintained the pace of growth of previous decades (which is happening), sooner or later, Beijing would need to project power in its strategic environment. The United States, in reaction, would seek approximation with the other countries in the region, in order to block the growth of the challenging power. It is precisely what has been happening in recent years. "As much as China rejects in its speech the idea of hegemony (...), and is not even in a hegemonic position over the other powers, it maintains concrete data on Mearsheimer's maximum power" (BARCELOS; MÈRCHER, 2020, p 379, our translation).

## 7 Final Considerations

The history of the 21st century will be told according to the way in which China will be inserted as a power in the international system. It is necessary to be clear that this movement is never smooth, however, the turbulences produced can vary greatly in intensity.

Apparently, international rivalry is following the same path that led Ancient Greece to ruin after the Peloponnesian War, and which, millennia later, would sink Europe into the cataclysm of the two world wars. It would be a mistake, however, to understand Thucydides' trap in a fatalistic way. As much as the Greek historian said that the Peloponnesian War was inevitable, it must be recognized that practically everything can be avoided. In human history, there is no inexorable fate.

If the cause of Hegemonic War between the established power and the defying power is structural, the form with which it will be conducted will depend decisively on the choices of the two main protagonists. In other words, the war does not have to be military. To this end, the United States must accept that Beijing's growing geopolitical weight is an unavoidable reality, to separate its vital interests from those transitory, in order to put the latter on the diplomatic negotiating table, in a joint effort of understanding.

Asia's geopolitics, for example, while vital to the Chinese, does not threaten the security of any nation on the American continent. In that case, it is obvious who should be inclined to give in. Rather than sending aircraft carriers to the South China Sea, it might be more productive to mediate dialogue between the parties involved, in order to also mitigate the military pressure that Beijing is clearly exerting on its neighbors. Such an act would even help the United States to recover the moral strength of its foreign policy, which, in recent years, has entered an accelerated process of wear and tear. In addition to decisively affecting the Chinese ambition to lead by example.

There is no way to prevent the expansion of power in the international system from an act that grows at the pace that China has been presenting. Any form of containment policy, therefore, in addition to being highly risky in the medium and long term, will be doomed to failure. The maintenance of North American hegemony needs more internal reforms, which allow the resumption of dynamism, especially with regard to the production of new technologies, which reconfigures the country's external insertion. American authorities need to be clear about this reality.

In short, the inevitable rivalry between two superpowers must be conducted within the limits imposed by the higher need for peacekeeping. For this, it must be borne in mind that Thucydides' trap ended up ruining both Sparta and Athens and, in the 19th century, it would also devastate the European continent. Not to mention that, in the atomic era, if set in motion, the military machine of doomsday (KISSINGER, 2012) may lose its metaphorical content.

The lesson we can learn from the past, therefore, is that war has never been a solution, be it hot or cold. If it is not possible for two giants to sleep in the same bed, they will need to moderate their dreams for humanity to continue dreaming.

## References

ALLISON, Graham. **A caminho da guerra: os Estados Unidos e a China conseguirão escapar da Armadilha de Thucydides?**. Rio de Janeiro: Intrínseca, 2020.

ALVES, José Eustáquio Diniz. RIC (Rússia, Índia e China): o triângulo estratégico que pode mudar a governança mundial. **Eco Debate**, [Rio de Janeiro], 26 mar. 2017. Available in: <https://www.ecodebate.com.br/2017/04/26/ric-russia-india-e-china-o-triangulo-estrategico-que-pode-mudar-governanca-mundial-artigo-de-jose-eustaquio-diniz-alves/>. Accessed in: 28 mar. 2021.

BARCELLOS, Bruna; MÈRCHER, Leonardo. Nova Rota da Seda: China e sua maximização econômica por recursos de poder. **Geosul**, Florianópolis, v. 35, n. 77, p. 621-644, dez. 2020. Available in: <https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/geosul/article/view/76685/44698>. Accessed in: 21 mar. 2021.

BRZEZINSKI, Zbigniew. **Strategic vision**. New York: Basic Books, 2012.

CHINA vai “comer nosso almoço”, alerta Biden após conversa com Xi Jinping. **InfoMoney**, [São Paulo], 11 fev. 2021. Available in: <https://www.infomoney.com.br/economia/china-vai-comer-nosso-almoco-alerta-biden-apos-conversa-com-xi-jinping/>. Accessed in: 22 mar. 2021.

DONALD Trump discursa na Assembleia Geral da ONU. Rio de Janeiro: GloboNews, 22 set. 2020. 1 vídeo (7 min). Available in: <https://g1.globo.com/globonews/jornal-globonews-edicao-das-10/video/confira-o-discurso-completo-de-donald-trump-na-assembleia-geral-da-onu-8876196.ghtml>. Accessed in: 22 mar. 2021.

GNANASAGARAN, Asean. Is joint exploration the answer to the South China Sea dispute? **The Asian Post**, Kuala Lumpur, 25 Mar. 2018. Available in: <https://theaseanpost.com/article/joint-exploration-answer-south-china-sea-dispute>. Accessed in: 01 abr. 2021.

GUIMARÃES, Samuel Pinheiro. A hegemonia dos EUA e a ascensão da China. **Brasil de Fato**, São Paulo, 17 jun. 2020. Available in: <https://www.brasildefato.com.br/2020/06/17/artigo-o-sistema-internacional-e-o-imperio-hegemonia-dos-eua-e-ascensao-da-china>. Accessed in: 21 mar. 2021.

KISSINGER, Henry. **Sobre a China**. Rio de Janeiro: Objetiva, 2011.

KISSINGER, Henry. **Diplomacia**. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2012.

MA, Yuan.; OVERBEEK, H. Investimento externo direito chinês na União Europeia. In VADELL, Javier. (org.). **A expansão econômica e geopolítica da China no século XXI**. Belo Horizonte: Editora PUC Minas, 2018. p. 75.

MEARSHEIMER, John. J. **The tragedy of great power politics**. Nova York: Norton, 2001.

MEARSHEIMER, John. J. Can China rise peacefully?. **The National Interest**, [Washington, DC], 25 Out 2014. Available in: <https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204>. Accessed in: 21 mar. 2021.

NYE, Joseph S. **O paradoxo do poder americano**. São Paulo: Editora Unesp, 2002.

ORGANSKI, Abramo F. K. **World politics**. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958.

PAUTASSO, Diego; DORIA, Gaio. A China e as disputas no Mar do Sul: entrelaçamento entre as dimensões regional e global. **Revista de Estudos Internacionais**, João Pessoa, v. 8, p. 18-32, 2017.

PAUTASSO, Diego; UNGARETTI, Carlos Renato. A nova Rota da Seda e a recriação do sistema sinocêntrico. **Estudos Internacionais: Revista de Relações Internacionais**, Belo Horizonte, v. 4, n. 3, p. 25-44, 2016. Available in: <http://periodicos.pucminas.br/index.php/estudosinternacionais/article/view/P.2317-773X.2016v4n3p25/11369>. Acesso: 21 mar. 2021.

PECEQUILO, Cristina Soreanu. **Os Estados Unidos e o século XXI**. Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier, 2013. 1 E-book.

RIBEIRO, Filipe G. D. B. Geopolítica do Século XXI: a perspectiva chinesa geopolítica do sistema internacional. **Geosul**, Florianópolis, v. 35, n. 77, p. 621-644, dez. 2020. Available in: <https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/geosul/article/view/75746/44759>. Accessed in: 21 mar. 2021.

SHANKAR, Lt Gen Pr. India, Tibet and China: the way forward. **The Daily Guardian**, [Iloilo], 28 Dec 2020. Available in: <https://theguardian.com/india-tibet-and-china-the-way-forward/>. Accessed in: 28 mar. 2021

THUCYDIDES. **História da guerra do Peloponeso**: livro I. 3. Ed. São Paulo: WMF Martins Fontes, 2013.

TISCHLER, Mark. China's 'never again' mentality. **The Diplomat**, Washington, DC, 18 Aug 2020. Available in: <https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/chinas-never-again-mentality> Accessed in: 21 mar. 2021.

VIOLANTE, Alexandre Rocha; MARRONI, Etienne Villela; MAIA, André Valente. Reflexões sobre a guerra hegemônica na atualidade: China e Estados Unidos. **Geosul**, Florianópolis, v. 35, n. 77, p. 531-552, dez. 2020. Available in: <https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/geosul/article/view/73966>. Accessed in: 21 mar. 2021.

XING, Li.; SHAW, Timothy. O sonho chinês versus o sonho americano no reordenamento mundial: mesma chama? sonhos distintos?. In VADELL, Javier. (org.). **A expansão econômica e geopolítica da China no século XXI**. Belo Horizonte: Editora PUC Minas, 2018. p. 43/72.





# The theme as a frame: an opportunity of synergy among Intelligence, Social Communication and Psychological Operations

*El tema como marco: una oportunidad para la sinergia entre Inteligencia, Comunicación Social y Operaciones Psicológicas*

**Abstract:** This research starts with an approximation of the idea of framing, as an activity developed by the soviet misinformation system over western societies, with the concept of framing as developed by ERWIN GOFFMAN (2012), to map how each one of the Information Related Capabilities (IRC) – Intelligence, Social Communication and Psychological Operations – relates with the frames of the Frame Analysis. It was observed that there are convergences between the Intelligence activity and the schemata of interpretation, the Social Communication and the keys, and the Psychological Operations and the fabrications. Lastly, it was proposed that the Theme, a concept from the Synchronized Communication of the United States Armed Forces, would be used as a Frame, to make easier to get the synergy of the capabilities (IRC).

**Keywords:** Framing. Misinformation. Intelligence. Social Communication. Psychological Operations.

**Resumen:** El presente estudio parte de la aproximación de la idea de marco, como actividad componente de la desinformación soviética sobre las sociedades occidentales, con el concepto de marco definido por ERWIN GOFFMAN (2012), para delinear cómo cada una de las Capacidades Relacionadas con la Información (CRI) productoras de discurso – Inteligencia, Comunicación Social y Operaciones Psicológicas – se relaciona con los marcos de la experiencia social. Observamos, pues, convergencias entre inteligencia y esquemas primarios, Comunicación Social y las tonalidades y Operaciones Psicológicas y las maquinaciones. Por último, se utiliza el concepto de Comunicación Sincronizada de las Fuerzas Armadas de los Estados Unidos para proponer que el tema sea considerado un Marco, que permitirá el logro de sinergias entre las CRI.

**Palabras Clave:** Marco. Desinformación. Inteligencia. Comunicación Social. Operaciones Psicológicas.

**Luiz Eduardo Maciel Lopes** 

Exército Brasileiro.

Porto Alegre, RS, Brasil.

macielopes1@yahoo.com.br

Received: 11 Nov, 2020

Approved: 21 Jan, 2021

COLEÇÃO MEIRA MATTOS

ISSN on-line 2316-4891 / ISSN print 2316-4833

<http://ebrevistas.eb.mil.br/index.php/RMM/index>



Creative Commons  
Attribution Licence

## 1 Introduction<sup>1</sup>

To think about the synergy between Intelligence, Social Communication and Psychological Operations within the Brazilian Armed Forces, it is necessary to define the concepts based on the ethos of these components, specific to the Brazilian Army, where Intelligence is defined as one of the six combat functions, because: "Its scope reaches the other combat functions, which are directly affected or are related to the products of Intelligence" (BRASIL, 2015a, p. 2-1). The Intelligence combat function is directly related to generating information, the latter taken in its broadest sense, since it comprises "the set of activities, tasks and interrelated systems employed to ensure understanding of the operational environment, threats (current and potential), opponents, terrain and civilian factors" (BRASIL, 2015a, p. 2-1).

Another combat support activity that also deals with Information is Social Communication. The manual defines it as "the process by which one seeks to improve the relationship between human beings, as individuals, or as members of a social group". It can also be understood as "a series of actions according to which ideas, feelings and information can be expressed aiming to establish relationships and pool experiences" (BRASIL, 2019a, p. 4-2).

Psychological Operations (PsyOps) are defined as:

Technical-specialized procedures, operated in a systematic manner to support the achievement of political or military objectives and undertaken before, during and after the use of force, aiming to motivate friendly, neutral or hostile target audiences to achieve desirable behaviors. (BRASIL, 2015b, p. 196/288).

Although, by themselves, they follow very different concepts, the three activities are among those identified as Information-Related Capabilities (CRI), among which one must seek opportunities for synergy, as well as, establish clearly defined limits, that help prevent "informational fratricide". All of this under the coordination of Information Operations, which consist of the:

integrated use of information-related capabilities (IRC) and other information-related resources, within the scope of the informational dimension, to influence, interrupt, corrupt or usurp the decision-making process of opponents and potential adversaries, while protecting our own (BRASIL, 2019a, p. 3-1, 3-2).

However Military Terrestrial Doctrine (MTD) defends the use of modular capacity development to generate combat power:

---

1 Framing is a concept that refers to the principles of organization, observable by an individual, that govern events - at least social ones - and the subjective involvement in them, which allow the definition of situations. In short, the frame is a socially constructed system of perception that allows the individual, whenever faced with a new situation, to answer: what is happening here? (GOFFMAN, 2012).

[...] the Ground Force (GFor) seeks the development of capabilities, prioritizing the generation of sustainable modules with complete capabilities (doctrine, organization, training, material, education, personnel and infrastructure - DOAMEPI), with full combat capabilities, and in accordance with the demands of strategic areas and national interests (BRASIL, 2019b, p. 4-1).

Given this assumption, the development of the three IRC under study occurs independently. However, the same MTD indicates the need to pool capabilities under a single command:

For the generation of power, [...] the capacities required to counter the perceived threats must be taken into account. Its constitution must follow the following criteria:

- a) be based on pre-existing organizational structures;
- b) have a modular composition, according to the necessary operational capacities;
- c) have flexibility to adapt easily and economically to changes in mission and situation; and
- d) have a command unit, so that the responsibility for carrying out the mission rests with a single authority (BRASIL, 2019b, p. 4-3).

Thus, it is assumed that the IRC, Intelligence, Social Communication and Psychological Operations, can (and should) constitute modules to be assembled under a single command, if the situation analysis indicates such need so that the Force can counter the identified threats.

The development, however, of the IRC in a watertight manner means that each one is very focused on its own way of approaching military problems, on its particular information processing structure and on the specific solutions that they can provide separately.

Intelligence (Intel) organizes data to “ensure understanding of the operational environment, threats (current and potential), opponents, terrain and civilian considerations<sup>2</sup>” (BRASIL, 2015a, p. 2-1). The Social Communication (SocCom) organizes data to produce a discourse that preserves and strengthens the Army’s image within the national and international communities (BRASIL, 2017). And Psychological Operations (PsyOps) organize data to produce narratives (and here the emphasis is on the plural) with “the objective of motivating friendly, neutral or hostile audiences to manifest desirable behaviors, with the final intention of supporting the achievement of established goals” (BRASIL, 2015b, p. 196/288).

The question, finally, that is presented to the General Staff that receives Intel, PsyOps and SocCom modules is: how to produce a common discourse among the three activities that produce narratives?

Given this question, the problem is formulated as follows: is there a sociological theory whose concepts allow the establishment of a logic within which one can think about the integrated use of Information-Related Capacities: Intelligence, Social Communication and Psychological Operations?

2 “[...] the influence of civilian institutions, the attitudes and activities of civilian leaders, the population, public opinion, the environment, man-made infrastructure, national and international agencies, whether governmental or non-governmental, with the capacity to influence and form opinions among nationals or internationals, in the battle space.” (BRASIL, 2015a, p. [44]).

The present study aimed, therefore, to identify a sociological theory whose concepts facilitated the synergistic use of Information-Related Capacities (IRC) Intelligence, Social Communication and Psychological Operations. In order to achieve the general purpose of the study, the following specific objectives were outlined:

- a) To explain how the sociological theory of “social experience frameworks” can be related to the use of Soviet disinformation during the Cold War period;
- b) describe how each of the Capacities Related to Information: Intelligence, Psychological Operations and Social Communication can be related to the concepts of frame analysis;
- c) explain how the sociological theory concepts of “social experience frameworks” can contribute to a coordinated production of narratives that characterize a synergistic use of IRC.

There are undoubtedly risks in the concomitant use of Information-Related Capabilities: Intelligence, Psychological Operations and Social Communication, without coordinated planning. For example, there is the possibility of the disclosure of information that compromises counterintelligence on the part of the Social Communication, since it “competes to prevent the opposing force from having access to sensitive data and knowledge” (BRASIL, 2015a, p. 3 -3). Another example of risk to be raised is the possibility of obtaining, through the means of searching for Intelligence, information contaminated by the reverberation of campaigns developed by Social Communication or Psychological Operations.

The lack of an institutionalized channel to achieve synergy between Information-Related Capacities increases risks and reduces opportunities for synergy with individual initiatives, as can be seen from the quote below, that reports on the structures that encompass the concomitant use of Social Communication and Psychological Operations in Federal Intervention in the State of Rio de Janeiro, in 2018:

There was a structure of PsyOps working supporting the operations, however the PsyOps were not directly subordinated to the Joint Command, as the SocCom section was, but to the Integrated Tactical Coordination Center (CCTI). That is, although the operations had both activities, they were not coordinated under the same command or rank. [...] The IRC worked in isolation for a good part of the time, except for some personal integration initiatives (PONTES, 2019, p. 28).

At the opposite end of this segmented performance of the IRC in the Brazilian Army, there is the activity of Disinformation, which was first used in a systematic manner in post-communist Russia in 1917, with the institution of the Cheka Disinformation Sector (secret police in Soviet Russia, during the 1917-1922 years), by Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky (1877-1926). Disinformation emerged as a Psychological Operation, a fact that exemplified by the Operation Trust, launched between 1921 and 1926, whose aim was to

obtain two changes in the behavior of White Russians, opponents of the Bolshevik regime, who had emigrated from Russia during the revolution: neutralize their counterrevolutionary activities and capture or eliminate several of its leaders. In this case, Disinformation consisted of infiltrating the leadership of the emigrants with agents promoting the narrative of a fragile Soviet regime. This fact undermined the attempts to organize external pressures against the regime and ended up causing the return of these leaders to Russia and their subsequent arrests and executions (HARRIS, 1985).

Since its creation, the Disinformation Sector has been restructured as the Soviet Secret Service evolved to the NKVD (Popular Commissariat for Internal Affairs, from 1934 to 1953) and, subsequently, to the KGB (State Security Committee, which functioned between 1953 and 1991) during the Cold War (GONÇALVES, 2008, p. 73-74). Disinformation activity itself has evolved, reaching the definition shared by Lieutenant General Ion Mihai Pacepa of the Romanian Intelligence Service who defected on July 27, 1978: “Disinformation (ie dezinformatsiya) is a secret tool for Intelligence, aiming to obtain a western, non-governmental, seal of approval for the lies of the Soviet government”(PACEPA; RYCHLAK, 2015, p. 69). An example of what disinformation would be today, we can mention the following scenario:

Imagine that the FSB (the new KGB) manufactured some documents as alleged evidence that American military forces were following specific orders to target Muslim prayer houses in their bomb attacks on Libya in 2011. If a report on these documents were to be published on a Russian news channel, it would be bad information, and people in the West could rightly take it with a grain of salt and simply not give a damn, seeing it as routine Moscow propaganda. If, on the other hand, this material were made public in the Western media, it would be misinformation and the credibility of the news item significantly greater (PACEPA; RYCHLAK, 2015, p. 69).

The same general officer firmly states that:

There is a widespread belief that the worst damage done by Russian / Soviet intelligence operations against the West was the theft of highly sensitive secrets, such as atomic bomb technology. It is not quite like that. The absolutely harmful and often irreparable damage inflicted on the Free World was caused by the Kremlin's disinformation operations, which were intended to modify the past (PACEPA; RYCHLAK, 2015, p. 79).

The KGB is internationally known as the Intelligence Agency, but very little is said about its role as executor of disinformation activities. Integrated IRC performance, as understood by the Brazilian Army, can be inferred as the KGB work of building or destroying reputations: “it is easy to see that all this was the product of sophisticated dezinformatsiya and public relations specialist teams, that employed all its safe and deceptive framing techniques”(PACEPA; RYCHLAK, 2015, p. 50). Are specialists in dezinformatsiya the same as specialists

in Psychological Operations? And would Public Relations teams be the equivalent of Social Communication? Joining these two capacities, with the already known characteristic of the KGB of intelligence knowledge production, it can be inferred that the Soviet Union had, in its own way, a single Organ that coordinated and integrated what in the Ground Force are called Information Related Capacities.

It should be noted that disinformation and Information Operations have different objectives. Disinformation aims to destabilize, create and foster friction within target societies, Information Operations seek the opposite, to shape the operational environment to reduce friction in the combat and accelerate the stabilization of conflicted environments.

In accordance with the Military Terrestrial Doctrine, this paper does not advocate the creation of a single body to undertake Information Operations, but rather building synergy opportunities to guide the work of Information Operations units, when the modular structures of Intelligence, Social Communication and Psychological Operations capabilities are brought together to solve military problems.

The present study is limited to the theoretical foundation related to Information Operations, seeking the practical use of the frame concepts in order to achieve synergy between Intelligence, Social Communication and Psychological Operations, without sticking to specific cases of deployment of Information Operations modules, both in the Brazilian Army and abroad.

The relationships established between the IRC with the types of frames described in the “Frames of Social Experience” (GOFFMAN, 2012) were designed with the aim of finding a logic that would offer opportunities for synergy between them.

The other Information-Related Capacities (IRC) established in the doctrine were approached only by way of illustration or to extrapolate the conclusions obtained.

The bibliographic review was used to understand the concepts of framing, as well as its relationship with the activities of the Information-Related Capacities: Intelligence, Psychological Operations and Social Communication. Subsequently, we observed how the studied concept can contribute to establish a logic based on which one can think about the integrated use of the Information-Related Capacities mentioned. The research is, therefore, bibliographic and explanatory (VERGARA, 2008). Explanatory because it aims to clarify the relationships established between the subjects covered and the bibliography as its theoretical-methodological basis stems from the investigation of the subjects available in books, manuals, reports and articles open to the general public.

## **2 Theoretical foundation**

### **2.1 Sociological Frame Concept and its Relationship with the KGB Disinformation Activities**

The Frame can be understood as a common perception of the various individuals of a given social group. It is a way of interpreting social situations, shared by a culture, which

allows individuals who are components of that culture, to position themselves and react (GOFFMAN, 2012).

In the social construction of the frames, they are ordered according to their proximity to the Reality, taken as an original scene, devoid of meaning. Thus, the primary frameworks are those that convert the Real, meaningless, into something meaningful. The application of the primary framework is seen by those who apply it as not dependent on any previous interpretation. The primary framework works as a translation of the reality experienced (GOFFMAN, 2012).

Keing, in contrast, is a process based on a set of conventions, whereby an already significant event within a primary framework, is transformed into something that refers to the event, but is seen by the participants in the social interaction as very different from the event itself. The key is to apply this process of transformation of a fact previously interpreted by a primary framework or by a previous key, to a new frame accepted as something different from the previous frames. Each addition made by keying is called a layer or lamination (GOFFMAN, 2012).

Machination is a type of framing that represents an intentional effort by one or more individuals to modify the perception about a fact or an activity, so that one or more people are induced to have a false conviction about what is happening (GOFFMAN, 2012).

From the sociological concept of framing, one can understand the meaning of the “framings” attributed to KGB agents:

So what did Romanian and Soviet spies spend their time on in the Cold War years? Gen. Pacepa would say that “framing”, that is, rewriting history and manipulating records, documents etc., in order to cause events (WOOSLEY, 2015, p. 17).

It can be seen that Disinformation, originally aimed at changing behavior (which would serve to classify it, according to the Brazilian Army doctrine, as Psychological Operation) has evolved during the KGB years into a search, by various means, for a change in cultural perception of prominent figures, both from the West and from behind the Iron Curtain. This type of framing, considered in the light of the concepts just discussed, could be classified as a machination. This is even more clear in the following statement:

The Kremlin frameworks can be negative, to generate disrepute, or positive, to generate prestige; whether one way or another, they can directly affect the course of world history. Admirable people from the West were defamed or “framed” as criminals, while criminally unworthy characters belonging to the Soviet / Russian sphere of influence were portrayed or “framed” as saints (PACEPA; RYCHLAK, 2015, p. 80).

The frames built by the KGB had, in their elaboration, a condition that the news should always be built around a “core of truth” that would lend credibility to it (PACEPA; RYCHLAK, 2015, p. 73). This denotes knowledge, at least empirical, of the functioning of socially shared frames, because the effect obtained by the addition of significant “framing” layers is the existence of an internal layer, relative to what the fact means in a primary correspondence scheme, and an external edge, relative to the significant concessions provided by the situation or by the medium in which the fact was conveyed (GOFFMAN, 2012). In other words, the “core of truth” around which the KGB built its frameworks is nothing more than the inner layer, relative to what the fact means in a primary correspondence scheme. For example:

Thus, Shalepin and Kirichenko decided that Pius XII framework should be based on a fictional scenario supported by genuine, slightly modified documents from the Vatican (specifically related or not to Pius XII), the originals of which would never be released to the public. [...] The KGB knew what it had to do. It only needed a few Vatican documents to add an aura of authenticity to the operation - “a real heart” (PACEPA; RYCHLAK, 2015, p. 163-164).

In addition to the applicability of the concept of framing, as defined by sociology, it can be seen, in the disinformation activity developed by the KGB, what the Information Operations doctrine, today, advocates as effects-based planning (BRASIL, 2019a, p. 3-4): “then the goal was to manipulate the future, not just learn about the past. In particular, the idea is to fabricate a new past [...] in order to change the way the world perceives them ”(PACEPA; RYCHLAK, 2015, p. 33). It is emphasized here that the effects sought are given in terms of perception, and not in terms of behavior change, which makes the activity of Disinformation something more complex and permanent than a Psychological Operation. However, the effort directed towards the machining of the past is directly related to the “manipulation of the future”.

### **3 DEVELOPMENT**

#### **3.1 The Intelligence Combat Function and the Primary Framework**

Military Intelligence, at any level of activity, has as its common denominator the “permanent identification of threats, minimizing uncertainties and seeking opportunities for the success of operations” (BRASIL, 2015a, p. 1-1) For this, analysis and integration of data obtained by the various sensors are fundamental. “The identification of threats and opportunities is the first of the results that Military Intelligence must provide to commanders” (BRASIL, 2015a, p. 1-2).



The conclusions on threats or opportunities are elaborated through a systematic process that allows a fusion of data in significant fractions, which, in turn, will be organized into knowledge. Thus,

knowledge is the data that has been processed, analyzed and deemed relevant. It must contribute to the understanding of the enemy's terrain, devices and intentions (opposing, hostile or adversary forces), weather conditions and civilian considerations (BRASIL, 2015a, p. 2-1).

The control of the situation in an Operational Environment and in the Battle Space can only be achieved based on situational awareness, a mental state reached by the decision maker that brings the perceived situation closer to the real situation. It is achieved through the “availability of knowledge and the ability to deal with information that, associated with an individual's professional experience, beliefs and values, puts them in an operational advantage in relation to their opponent” (BRASIL, 2015a, p. 2 -2).

This constant search for the approximation of the perceived situation with the real situation allows us to place the Intelligence search effort as the type of framework closest to the Real. In other words, it is fair to say that the Intelligence Combat Function is permanently working to provide primary frames, that is, the first frameworks that make it possible to transform something that would otherwise be meaningless into something meaningful.

The Intelligence work of Colonel Walter Nicolai starting in 1905, and more specifically in the structuring of the German Intelligence System starting in 1913 when he was appointed as Head of the Intelligence Service of the High Command as well as during the First World War (1914-1918) is an example of the effort to search for the first frameworks that explain the reality and, more than that, allow to prospect the decisions of the possible enemies. The scaling up of search methods with deeply infiltrated agents and the assessment of knowledge produced by the various sources, identifying the least reliable ones, allowed the concatenation of the data obtained in a significant whole, which enabled the prospecting of the lines of action of the Triple Entente (United Kingdom, France and Russia - enemies of Germany in the First World War) (CAMPBELL, 2009).

There was an enormous contrast between the result of this structure and the 1908 German manuals, which still maintained that Intelligence could be efficiently obtained through the observation of the battlefield, while the reconnaissance could be left entirely in the hands of the 10 (ten) cavalry divisions of the German Army (JOERGENSEN, 2004 apud CAMPBELL, 2009).

The discrepancy between the form of intelligence production by Colonel Walter Nicolai and the recommendations of the 1908 manuals, resides fundamentally in the priority given to planning the search effort and processing Intelligence to the detriment of simple data retrieval. This is because an in-depth data obtained at high levels of the enemy Armed Forces, most of the time, still takes time to impact the troops in contact, which

gives a fundamental time to carry it and make knowledge available to the decision makers in a timely fashion.

In this manner, it could be said that the data without processing does not yet make up the primary framework, but rather the isolated parts of it, whose significance has not yet been established. Thus, through the production of intelligence knowledge, there is a fusion of data into a significant whole, in which the data are processed, analyzed and those deemed relevant are selected in the search for the composition of the primary framework.

When there is a difficulty in obtaining Intelligence knowledge, the impossibility of answering the question “what is happening here?” established as a paradigm for the composition of the frame becomes evident. The failure stems precisely from the activity responsible for the establishment of the primary framework, as shown in the quote of an English general Rupert Smith below:

At the time, I was already working in London, at the Ministry of Defense, where news about these events came from four different sources. There were reports from the British contingent of UNPROFOR, drawn up on the basis of reports of their deployment in the Srebrenica area. They were timely and factual, but they suffered from the relatively narrow perspective of a small unit involved in major events. As troop providers, we had UNPROFOR HQ reports, but these were often less up-to-date than those of normal diplomatic channels, because they were drawn up more slowly and because UN communications were based on the civilian network and they were deficient compared to those provided by our military contingent. We received reports from various British embassies and missions, particularly those existing at the UN and NATO, and finally, we had the media, whose coverage, I came to consider essential: in addition to being sources of information, they offered me a context in which I acquired some understanding of how other people would interpret what was happening, hence the value of the other reports, most of which focused on completely different aspects of the same events (SMITH, 2008, p. 391).

Even so, the approximation established in the mind of the decision maker between the Intelligence reports and the reality of the facts, as opposed to the media narratives, is clear. When comparing the discursive constructions, the author takes Intelligence reports as a primary frame and uses the “media” narrative to understand how other people would interpret what was happening - a key?

### 3.2 Social Communication and keying

Social Communication, in the Brazilian Army, adopts the following communications model:

The communication between a sending source and a receiving recipient is established by a vehicle, channel or transmitting medium, subject to noise or interference, and continuous feedback. This flow of information is called the communications process (BRASIL, 2017b, p. 2-1).

The term Social Communication, in addition to referring to the instrument that enables and determines social interaction, also refers to an activity performed by one of the sections of the General Staff of Military Organizations, responsible for three aspects of the Institution's relationship with its various groups of interest: the Press Office, Institutional Communication and Public Relations (BRASIL, 2017b).

SocCom's, as an Information-Related Capacity, mission is to preserve and strengthen the Army's image within the national and international communities. To fulfill its mission, SocCom (of the Brazilian Army) bases its actions on some precepts, including: "to provide adequate and opportune answers to the questions of society, related to the Institution" (BRASIL, 2017b, p. 2-2 ). One of the principles of Social Communication (as an IRC) is the principle of truth, considered the "essence of SocCom's activity, since the reliability of the facts ensures coherence, credibility and trust" (BRASIL, 2017b, p. 2-4) .

The idea of providing answers comes close to the concept of "key", because an answer is information processed through a set of conventions by which the activity that originated the questioning, which "was already significant in terms of some primary frame, is transformed into something based on this activity, but seen by the participants as something very different "(GOFFMAN, 2012, p. 71).

A characteristic example of the functioning of the Army Social Communication as a supplier of toned information is the production of Press Releases. The Press Release is not the primary frame in itself, but the appropriation of already significant information about a fact, organized through a "conventional" process, to provide the media with the official word of the Force. Although it is based on the principle of truth, the recipients of the press release do not consider the fact itself, but something based on the fact, which is very different.

It is this requirement of reliability of the facts that allows to understand the mechanisms of the production of narratives by the IRC SocCom as a documentary key, in the sense that it seeks to use records that reproduce the events, with the purpose of demonstrating the occurrence of a fact, characterizing it as something that happened in the past. SocCom uses this form of frame production, because this is also, in general, the news composition process used by the media. The documentation (or the documentary key) uses real traces of something that previously appeared in the real world (in the sense of less transformed) (GOFFMAN, 2012). The pressing need for these real traces indicates the point of contact between IRC Social Communication and Combat Intelligence functions.

It is then necessary to observe the environment of Social Communication in order to understand the vicissitudes to which the IRC keying activity is subject. It could be said that IRC SocCom is directly involved with the Battle of Narrative, the latter defined as: the conflict between competing narratives, produced by the various actors involved. According to an American manual: "The goal of the battle of the narrative is to gain superiority over the adversary's narrative, to diminish its appeal and followership, and, when possible, to supplant it or make it irrelevant." (UNITED STATES, 2013, p. III-9).

In turn, the media promote agenda-setting, in which news from the press, even if they do not necessarily end up fostering people's thinking about a particular subject, at least make the public focus on a subject in detriment to others (HOLFELDT, 1997, p. 42-51). The press vehicles, then, seek the protagonism of the news, to guarantee priority in scheduling, which reflects their market characteristic. The holder of knowledge about the extraordinary event that will be the next "scoop" has a greater chance of obtaining a larger audience while his/her transmission lasts, because "only extraordinary events are news" (GOFFMAN, 2012, p. 38).

The routine acceleration of newsrooms, in the search for first information, opens loopholes for failures that can be exploited by experts in disinformation:

We were also very successful in filling the Western media with the image of Ceausescu (Romanian dictator). The truth is that Western media were very easily manipulated, as they often built their news from press releases and tended, in general, to be careless about the nature and reliability of their sources. Our information fell very well in the general climate of acceptance of Ceausescu by the West, as a Westernized communist. To Westerners, his position generally seemed as a historic and plausible breach in the Iron Curtain, and almost no one went out into the streets to check the facts and contradict us. (PACEPA; RYCHLAK, 2015, p. 46).

While under constant pressure the media has become the stage for contemporary public debate. However and precisely for this reason, a subject exposed on this stage is not necessarily of public interest. It may have been thought of by marketers who intend to shape the taste of the public, while scheduling their debates (PENA, 2015). This is because "the power that the documentary key has to inhibit the original meanings is impressive" (GOFFMAN, 2012, p. 101). By using, in order to construct their narratives, the documentary key, using traces of real facts, the media gives their narrative construction sufficient credibility to overcome the original meanings of events, which allows the engagement of these marketing professionals, architecting the frameworks.

It should be noted that the framing carried out by a media outlet on the facts to be reported is the result of choices made within a systematized productive process. The news is prepared according to the format, and there is always a (re-)contextualization of its focus during the edition (TUCHMAN, 1978 apud PENA, 2015). In this sense, “to produce a framework is to select some aspects of the perceived reality and give them a greater prominence in the communicative text” (COLLING, 2001 apud CUNHA, 2005, p. 33).

It is possible, then, to identify at least three vectors that pressure the organized narrative of a communication vehicle and affect the news production process: the marketing intention of the vehicle itself; the interest of the public, taken as a concept prior to the discourse itself and shaped by earlier agendas; and the facts to be selected, organized, and converted into news.

If there is an ideological bias to be attributed to the media, it can permeate the entire process, either in the establishment of marketing objectives, in the definition of what is of interest to the public, or in the organization of facts in news, but, primarily, as a key, not as machination, due to the very characteristic of the structure of the construction of the narratives of these vehicles.

Thus, the problem that arises for the production of narratives of IRC Social Communication is how to produce keys, primarily adhering to the principle of truth, that is, relying on facts, and disseminating them to audiences, often through communication vehicles that have their marketing intentions, in an environment of constant search for the protagonism of the news, also considering the interest of the public, in order to obtain superiority over the opponent's narrative.

### 3.3 Psychological Operations and Machination

The main objective of Psychological Operations, as defined in the introduction to this article, is to change the behavior of certain target audiences. The focus on behavior inevitably leads to an approximation with the behavioral psychology, in which the stimulus, interacting with the organism will cause a global reaction manifested by a behavior (COUTINHO, 1997).

However, it should be noted that:

PsyOps focus on the cognitive perspective of the informational dimension of the operational environment, influencing the emotions, reasoning, motivations, objectives and behavior of Target Audiences (TA) [...] (BRASIL, 2019a, p. 4-3)

The stimuli will then be provided to influence the cognition of the individuals who make up a given audience. The tool, described in the Armed Forces Glossary for the “dissemination of any information, idea, doctrine or special appeal, aiming to influence opinions, generate emotions, provoke attitudes or direct the behavior of individuals or social

groups” is propaganda (BRASIL, 2015b, p. 226/288). Therefore, cognitive stimuli can be produced through advertising techniques.

In this case, although the objective is behavior, the structuring of IRC’s Psychological Operations narratives in propaganda pieces, aimed at the cognitive perspective, generates a discursive drag, in which the frames are distorted so that the cognition, as a result of them, generates the desired behavior.

In this sense, the established method of marketing, known as AIDA (Attention, Interest, Desire and Action) is used. Edward Strong Jr was attributed the authorship of this model to St Elmo Lewis, due to his work leading several advertising agencies in the United States, from 1899 to 1909 (STRONG JUNIOR, 1925, p. 349). It aims to lead the consumer to make the purchase of a product, and represents, in summary, four phases or stages that the consumer needs to go through (not necessarily, but generally), progressively, to decide to carry out the acquisition. By substituting the consumer for the members of the Target Audience and considering the acquisition of a product as a change in behavior, it is possible to visualize the operation of the method as a way of using advertising in favor of the objectives of Psychological Operations.

The discursive construction of advertising would then act strongly in the first three stages, creating frames of interpretation capable of fostering attention, interest and arousing the desire for a particular action. When a situation fits into the framework constructed by advertising, the desire for action will become the behavior intended by the propagandist. Therefore, there is no responsibility for reality, since the stimulus to cognition aims exclusively at the intended behavior, although the appeal to reality is necessary for advertising to be credible. A characteristic example of this structure is the initiative of the Volkswagen company known as the “theory of fun”, which transformed a staircase, next to the escalator, into a piano, in the Stockholm subway, in 2009. The intentional modification of the painting (staircase- piano) was responsible for, at the same time, attracting attention, arousing interest and provoking desire. The video demonstrating the change in behavior of people, who started using the ladder instead of the escalator, is available on YouTube<sup>3</sup>.

Thus, the discursive drag caused by the use of advertising can be considered an effect that is close to the concept of machination, since machination is an intentional effort by one or more individuals, to modify the perception about a certain fact so that one or more people are induced to create a distorted conviction about what is really going on. Not for nothing, those who “plan a mistake can be called operators” (GOFFMAN, 2012, p. 118). Distorted conviction (which can be momentary or permanent) is the trigger for changing behavior, as in the example of Volkswagen: is it a ladder or a piano?

Machinations, as well as keying, require the use of a model, the use of something already significant in terms of primary framework - the appeal to reality, which also gives

<sup>3</sup> Video available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SByymar3bds&t=13s>. Accessed on March 10, 2021.

credibility to advertising (GOFFMAN, 2012). The example of the machination of theater plays by Soviet misinformation is illuminating:

We, as revolutionary Marxists, cannot consider our task as fulfilled if we produce an uncritical copy of reality, perceiving the theater as a mirror of the times ... The work of revolutionary theater is to take reality as a starting point and widen the social discrepancy, making it an element of our accusation, our revolt, our new order (PISCATOR, 1929 apud PACEPA; RYCHLAK, 2015, p. 173).

There is, however, a fundamental difference between the activity of Psychological Operations (according to what the Brazilian Army manuals prescribe) and Disinformation, as defined by Lieutenant-General Ion Mihai Pacepa. Disinformation, although it appeared in Operation Trust, as a Psychological Operation, has evolved to become a strategic tool for changing perceptions, therefore, directly involved in machination stratagems. Psychological Operations, on the other hand, are geared towards changing behavior that through advertising can cause machinations to arise. Even so, its relationship with the frames of social experience, based on machinations, must be considered when it comes to seeking synergy with the Social Communication capacity and with the Intelligence Combat Function.

### 3.4 Synchronized Communication and the Theme as a Framework

The synchronization of communication, for the US Armed Forces, starts from the idea that each lethal or non-lethal action represents a part of the narrative that one wants to build superior to the opponent, representing an approach to military operations from a communications perspective. Thus, the IRC Social Communication participates, together with the use of lethal capabilities, such as troops and weapons, and other non-lethal means in synchronized communication (UNITED STATES, 2013).

For that, some key subordinate concepts were established, allowing to structure a communication that starts from a central idea and is disseminated to the diverse troops in operations, providing a unique meaning for the communications carried out. Are they:

**narrative** — Overarching expression of the context and desired results.

**theme** — Unifying idea(s) or intention(s) that supports the narrative and is/are designed to provide guidance and continuity for messaging and related products.

**message** — A tailored communication directed at a specific public, aligned with a specific theme, in support of a specific objective. (UNITED STATES, 2013, p. III-9)

The narrative can be constructed to portray a Military Operation as a whole, or it can be designed to correspond to each phase of the Operation, in order to more accurately encompass the movements of troops in the Human Terrain, defined as “an aggregate of sociocultural characteristics existing in a determined point in time and geographic space” (BRASIL, 2019a, p. 2-2).

The themes are aligned with the narrative and can even be part of it. They, at the same time, promote and limit the production of messages by lethal and non-lethal capacities involved in synchronized communication. The idea is to allow each commander or chief to address their audiences, on the specific themes of a particular operation or phase of it, addressing only matters relating to their level or activity. Therefore: “the themes at each level should be nested underneath the themes of the next higher level and support the strategic themes. Messages are subordinate to themes and deliver precise information to a specific public to create desired effects while supporting a specific theme. Themes are more enduring and should be synchronized up and down the chain of command.” (UNITED STATES, 2013, p. III-11). As they allow communication with audiences and, at the same time, delimit them, the narrative and themes must be elaborated with the active participation of counterintelligence professionals, capable of advising on possible security breaches and damaging repercussions to the Institution.

The messages are, in the framework of synchronized communication, what is emitted by the capacities and represent the use of freedom of action in the informational dimension obtained by the delimitation implemented by the themes. Thus,

Messages are subordinate to themes and deliver precise information to a specific public to create desired effects [...] Messages are tailored for a specific time, place, delivery mechanism, and public. [...] However, the more dynamic nature and leeway inherent in messages provide joint force communicators and planners the maneuver space in the cognitive dimension of the information environment to create more nuanced effects (UNITED STATES, 2013, p. III-12).

The construction of the arguments, themes and messages, is rooted in the reasons for the actions of the troops and in the direction to the desired results / outcomes of the conflict in terms understandable to the relevant public. Such reasons and results must be based on the reality of the situation (UNITED STATES, 2013).

From what was described in this article, it is clear that each of the non-lethal abilities mentioned (Intelligence, Social Communication and Psychological Operations) constructs narratives, and, consequently, perception frames in a very particular way. However, all three necessarily go through the framing as a structuring process for their messages. Based on the escalation of synchronized communication proposed by the United States Armed Forces and the assertion that the themes are more lasting and should be synchronized up and down the chain of command (UNITED STATES, 2013), it can be proposed that the themes of Synchronized Communication are considered frameworks, from which, the IRC will build their messages.



Thus, in order to synchronize the work of IRC, in the context of Information Operations, Intelligence would receive demands to direct its effort to search for data that would indicate the confirmation of certain themes of Synchronized Communication. These themes would be the primary frame of what is intended to achieve, a situational awareness. Synchronized communication must be planned to encompass the success indicators foreseen for the Military Operation itself. If Intelligence will seek the achievement of these indicators, it will end up seeking confirmation of the issues.

Moreover, Social Communication, following its principle of truth, will use the themes to guide the keying of the information obtained, in order to construct narratives. To exemplify, it can be said that the spokespersons will be able to comment only on the subjects covered by the themes foreseen for a given phase (and not on later phases) of the operation, at their level. This is very useful, when thinking about the technique “idea-force transition idea-force”, used for answers to interviews, in situations of image crisis management (BRASIL, 2013). The narrative for the operation phase and, more specifically, the themes that make up the respective narrative, for the media, start to function, at the same time, as a repository and limiter, from which the force-ideas and connections between them must be extracted, synchronizing the narratives at different levels and avoiding informational fratricide.

Finally, Psychological Operations can devise the frameworks, in their advertising, directing the Attention, Interest and Desire of the target audiences to the themes of synchronized communication. For example, let's say that in a Military Operation, a given area is already under the control of troops supported by Psychological Operations and is already receiving an influx of coordinated humanitarian actions between the troops and civilian agencies. In this same Operation, the themes of the synchronized communication for this phase are: the implementation of adequate security conditions and the humanitarian assistance provided. The Psychological Operations, then, can spread, for the areas not yet occupied by the troops, propaganda about the humanitarian assistance that is already being provided in the controlled territories, in order to cause the desire to receive this assistance, suggesting that for that to happen the Occupying Force needs to extend its actions over areas not yet occupied. The intended behavioral solution is to collaborate with the troops to implement adequate security conditions that will allow humanitarian assistance to be provided.

In this sense, the themes recommended in synchronized communication are the drivers of the desire of the members of the target audience, so that the behaviors obtained corroborate the success of Military Operations. In short, the framework proposed by the propaganda would be devised based on the theme with the latter extracted from the narrative elaborated for that particular phase of the Military Operation. As synchronized communication aims to portray the movement of troops in the Human Terrain, naturally, the behavioral changes intended by Psychological Operations will be consistent with the narrative and themes of this communication.

It is worth mentioning that each of the Information-Related Capacities covered by this paper has its own peculiar activities external to Information Operations, as, in fact, the differences between its definitions show. The idea of bringing together the themes of

synchronized communication with the way each of the IRCs produces their frameworks is only one of possibilities of creating synergies between them, in the context of the execution of Information Operations.

It should be noted that Synchronized Communication, in the US Armed Forces, is prepared by a specialized unit, composed of several military and civilian specialists (UNITED STATES, 2013). In the Brazilian Army, with leaner General Staff structures, we recommend that the responsibility for Synchronized Communication, in the planning phase, should be attributed to the Social Communication unit, in coordination with the Information Operations unit. We also suggest that the implementation of Synchronized Communication during the execution phase of the operation, disseminating messages throughout the Human Terrain, through the various channels of access to audiences - mapped by the other Capacities (Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, Cybernetics, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs), with the exception of the media, should be the responsibility of the Information Operations unit, in coordination with SocCom, which would have the mission of conducting the Battle of the Narrative through the Press Releases, Institutional Communication and Public Relations (BRASIL, 2017, p. 1-2).

#### **4 Conclusion**

Although it was not brought up in this paper, there concept close to the Frames of Social Experience, that of Overton Window can not be omitted due to the questions that it raises. Known as a window of discourse, the concept was proposed by Joseph P. Overton “(1960– 2003), a former president of the Mackinac Center for Public Policy, a think tank” (AVILLEZ, 2014, p. 40). According to him, “public opinions can be gradually shaped, from intolerable to consecration in public policies, using a classification in six degrees of acceptance” (AVILLEZ, 2014, p. 40): impossible, radical, acceptable, sensible, popular and needed. Thus, the political viability of an idea depends mainly on where it falls within the window, between acceptable and necessary. This ability to transform what is admitted by a society, according to a gradation, is part of the controversial discussion on the acceptance of this concept (AVILLEZ, 2014, p. 40).

Regardless of the moral discussion that a possible practical application of this idea raises, the Overton Window, taken as a point of observation, would allow us to see, for example, which positions are considered acceptable in a given society at a given time. It could be said that the Overton Window is a type of frame or a condensation (by overlapping framing layers) of pictures, if it allows public policy makers, or even other discourse agents to position themselves vis-a-vis “of what is happening here” (GOFFMAN, 2012) in the society to which they belong.

Thus, when it becomes clear that the Overton Window has shifted its focus on figures whose re-framing was attributed by Lieutenant General Ion Mihai Pacepa to the KGB, we can argue that the Soviet misinformation on Western societies was successful. Examples abound: Che Guevara (who became an icon for student movements) and Pope

Pius XII (who, as protector of Jews during the war, became Hitler's Pope), among others (PACEPA; RYCHLAK, 2015).

Information operations are, without a doubt, not the same as Soviet misinformation. Disinformation aims to destabilize, create and foster friction within target societies, while Information Operations seek the opposite, to shape the operational environment to reduce friction in the combat and accelerate the stabilization of conflicted environments. However, the integrated action of IRC focused on achieving defined objectives can use the Soviet disinformation as an example of achieving the intended effects. The implementation of Information Operations itself can help combat these effects of disinformation in the Human and Informational Dimensions.

Responding to the questions posed in the introduction to this article, Synchronized Communication, as understood by the United States Armed Forces, encourages the convergence of the Information-Related Capabilities: Intelligence, Social Communication and Psychological Operations in developing narratives. However, the proposal here is not to purely and simply import an exogenous doctrine, but to apply it through the logic that can be deduced from the sociological theory of frame analysis (GOFFMAN, 2012), which makes it easier to think about the integrated use of the Capabilities in question.

Thus, the proposal to consider the Theme of Synchronized Communication, as a Framework corroborates an intentional overlapping of the frameworks, in order to allow a greater discursive density. In summary, Intelligence would look for data that would confirm or refute the occurrence of the Theme, taken as a primary frame. SocCom would key the information received in a way that converges with the Theme and disseminate it in the Battle of the Narrative, while the PsyOps would machinate propaganda that would direct the behavioral outcomes towards the proposed Themes and Narrative. The points of contact between the Capabilities, obviously, do not occur automatically. The situational awareness generated by the Intelligence, by the monitoring of the Military Operation in progress and by the deployment of the IRC must be processed by an integrated unit within the General Staff responsible for finding opportunities for synergy between the IRC, the unit of Information Operations.

Perhaps the greatest risk in not using IRC in a coordinated manner, in addition to those already mentioned in the introduction to this article and beyond the possible "informational fratricide", is the loss of opportunities. Considering the Overton Window as a condensation of frames circulating in a society at a certain moment, can Armed Forces in Operations, with all the risks and effort that involve them, afford to lose the possibility of acting forcefully with a powerful dense discourse on Human and Informational Dimensions? Not coordinating the IRC is roughly equivalent to a charge of hypomobile cavalry against armored formations in the Physical Dimension. Overkill? On the other side, is the disinformation.

## References

AVILLEZ, Gerson Machado de. **Ars Ad Speculum**: discursos sobre realidades. Joinville: Clube de Autores, 2014.

BRASIL. Exército. Comando de Operações Terrestres. **EB20-MC-10.213**: operações de informação. 2 ed. Brasília, DF, 2019a. Available at: <https://bdex.eb.mil.br/jspui/bitstream/123456789/5286/1/EB70-MC-10.213.pdf>. Accessed on: 10 mar. 2021.

BRASIL. Exército. Comando do Exército. **Falando com a imprensa**. Brasília: Centro de Comunicação Social do Exército, 2013.

BRASIL. Exército. Estado Maior. **EB20-MC-10.207**: inteligência. 1 ed. Brasília, DF, 2015a. Available at: <https://bdex.eb.mil.br/jspui/bitstream/1/2595/1/EB20-MC-10.207.pdf>. Accessed on: 10 fev. 2021.

BRASIL. Exército. Estado Maior. **EB20-MF-03.103**: comunicação social. 2. ed. Brasília, DF, 2017. Available at: <https://bdex.eb.mil.br/jspui/bitstream/1/1168/1/EB20-MF-03.103.pdf>. Accessed on: 10 fev. 2021.

BRASIL. Exército. Estado Maior. **EB20-MF-10.102**: doutrina militar terrestre. 2. ed. Brasília, DF, 2019b. Available at: <https://bdex.eb.mil.br/jspui/bitstream/123456789/4760/1/EB20-MF-10.102.pdf>. Accessed on: 10 fev. 2021.

BRASIL. Ministério da Defesa. Estado Maior Conjunto das Forças Armadas. **MD35-G-01**: Glossário das Forças Armadas. 5. ed. Brasília, DF, 2015b. Available at: [https://bdex.eb.mil.br/jspui/bitstream/123456789/141/1/MD35\\_G01.pdf](https://bdex.eb.mil.br/jspui/bitstream/123456789/141/1/MD35_G01.pdf). Accessed on: 10 fev. 2021.

CAMPBELL, Kenneth J. Colonel Walter Nicolai: a mysterious but effective spy. **American Intelligence Journal**, [S. l.], v. 27, n. 1, p. 83-89, Fall 2009. Intelligence Support to the Warfighter. Available at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44327117>. Accessed on: 10 mar. 2021.

COUTINHO, Sérgio Augusto de Avellar. **Exercício do comando: a chefia e a liderança militares**, Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1997.

CUNHA, Karenine Miracelly Rocha da. **Agora é Lula**: enquadramentos do governo do PT pelo Jornal Nacional. 2005. 198 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Comunicação Midiática) –Faculdade de Arquitetura, Artes e Comunicação, Universidade Estadual Paulista, Bauru, SP, 2005. Available at: <https://repositorio.unesp.br/handle/11449/89396>. Accessed on: 10 mar. 2021.

GOFFMAN, Erving. **Os quadros da experiência social**: uma perspectiva de análise. Tradução de Gentil A. Titton. Petrópolis: Vozes, 2012.

HARRIS, Stephen A. **The trust**: the classic example of soviet manipulation. 1985. 67f. Master's Thesis (Master of Arts in National Security Affairs) – Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 1985. Available at: <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA161389.pdf>. Accessed on: 10 mar. 2021.

HOLFELDT, Antonio. Os estudos sobre a hipótese de agendamento. Porto Alegre. **Revista FAMECOS**, Porto Alegre, v 4, n. 7, p. 42-51, nov. 1997. Available at: <https://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br/ojs/index.php/revistafamecos/article/view/2983/2265>. Accessed on: 10 mar. 2021.

PACEPA, Ion Mihai; RYCHLAK, Ronald J. **Desinformação**: ex-chefe de espionagem revela estratégias secretas para solapar a liberdade, atacar a religião e promover o terrorismo. Tradução de Ronald Robson. Campinas: VIDE Editorial, 2015.

PENA, Felipe. **Teoria do jornalismo**. 3. ed. São Paulo: Contexto, 2015.

PONTES, Fausto Augusto de Sousa. **A integração entre as seções de Comunicação Social e Operações Psicológicas no estado-maior de uma força terrestre componente em operações**. 33 f. Trabalho de Conclusão de Curso (Curso Avançado de Operações Psicológicas) – Centro de Estudos de Pessoal e Forte Duque de Caxias, Rio de Janeiro, 2019.

SMITH, Rupert. **A utilidade da força**: a arte da guerra no mundo moderno. Tradução de Miguel Mata. Coimbra: Edições 70, 2008.

STRONG JUNIOR, Edward. **The psychology of selling and advertising**. New York: McGraw-Hill-Book Company, 1925.

THE FUN theory 1: piano staircase initiative: Volkswagen. [S. l.]: Volkswagen Publicado pelo canal Volkswagen. 2010. 1 vídeo (1 min. e 47 s.) Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SBBymar3bds&t=13s>. Accessed on: 04 jan. 21

UNITED STATES. Joint Chiefs Of Staff. **Commander's Communication Synchronization**. Joint Doctrine Note 2-13. 16 December 2013. Available at: [https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/jdn\\_jg/jdn2\\_13.pdf](https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/jdn_jg/jdn2_13.pdf). Accessed on: 10 mar. 2021.

VERGARA, Sylvia Constant. **Métodos de pesquisa em administração**. 3. ed. São Paulo: Atlas, 2008.

WOOLSEY, R. James. Introdução. *In*: PACEPA, Ion Mihai; RYCHLAK, Ronald J. **Desinformação**: ex-chefe de espionagem revela estratégias secretas para solapar a liberdade, atacar a religião e promover o terrorismo. Tradução de Ronald Robson. Campinas: VIDE Editorial, 2015. p. 17-19.



## REVIEW: The fifth domain: defending our country, our companies and ourselves in the age of cyber threats.

CLARKE, Richard A.; KNAKE, Robert K. **The fifth domain: defending our country, our companies and ourselves in the age of cyber threats.** [S. l.]: Penguin Press, 2020. ISBN - 978- 0525561989.

**Abstract:** The book faces an essential contemporary issue: the definition of the limits of action, protection and use of cyberspace as a fifth operational domain, as well as in the measures to be taken to make this environment more secure. Using the term adopted by the US Department of Defense, the authors use practical experience to indicate an agenda that aims to create means to improve the defense of areas such as state security, economics, democracy and privacy.

**Keywords:** Cyber Threats. Cyberspace. Cybersecurity. Defense.

**Resumen:** El libro trae una cuestión contemporánea esencial: la definición de los límites de acción, protección y uso del ciberespacio como un quinto dominio operativo, así como las medidas a se adoptar para hacer que este ambiente sea más seguro. Utilizando el término adoptado por el Departamento de Defensa de los Estados Unidos, los autores utilizan la experiencia práctica para indicar una agenda que busca la creación de medios para mejorar la defensa de áreas como la seguridad del Estado, la economía, la democracia y la privacidad.

**Palabras Clave:** Ciberamenazas Ciberespacio. Ciberseguridad. Defensa.

**Rafael Gonçalves Mota** 

Universidade de Fortaleza.

Faculdade Ari de Sá.

Tribunal de Justiça do Estado do Ceará.

Fortaleza, CE, Brasil.

rafaelgmota@yahoo.com.br

Received: 23 april 2021

Approved: 28 april 2021

COLEÇÃO MEIRA MATTOS

ISSN on-line 2316-4891 / ISSN print 2316-4833

<http://ebrevistas.eb.mil.br/index.php/RMM/index>



Creative Commons  
Attribution Licence

The book faces an essential contemporary issue: the definition of the limits of action, protection and use of cyberspace as a fifth operational domain, as well as in the measures to be taken to make this environment more secure. Using the term adopted by the US Department of Defense, the authors use practical experience to indicate an agenda that aims to create means to improve the defense of areas such as state security, economics, democracy and privacy.

The work is fundamental not only for those who study and work with cyber security, but for all those responsible for thinking about issues related to national sovereignty, high strategy and national defense policies. Understanding the scope of the concrete threats that exist in cyberspace, especially in view of the immense speed at which the cyber scenario operates, is essential to guide decision makers in the near future.

The basic perspective of the book holds that the panorama of cyberspace is very different from what it was years ago. According to the authors, the main advantage is that the current technologies allow the reduction of the risks represented by offensive actions of a cybernetic nature. That is, as the development of new technologies holds the potential to create new threats, it also provides National States with new and efficient virtual tools to defend their interests and rights.

Initially, the authors point out that cyberspace has a differentiating characteristic from other operational domains (sea, land, air and space), since it is the only one created by man. This fact, by itself, already makes the virtual environment have different characterizing elements, being necessary to adapt and understand the nature of such threats.

In diagnosing risks, not only aggressive actions taken by state and non-state agents should be considered. Defects, flaws and imperfections in nationally developed software and systems - intentional or not - open a gap for malicious activities to occur more easily and potentially more damaging. With that, Clarke and Knake signal that the creation of a cybersecurity policy must take into account such variables.

Still addressing the potential vulnerabilities arising from the characteristics of cyberspace, the authors comment on the decision of the US government to expand the participation of the private sector in the provision of cyber means, especially physical ones. In 2015, the primary internet servers, hitherto managed through a contract with the Department of Commerce, were transferred to private management.

Given this, there is a sharing of responsibility between the public and private sectors, moving beyond the use of means such as "public-private partnerships" and establishing clear spheres of performance sharing. Although the state field is directly responsible for areas such as military action, cyber-criminal investigation and intelligence collection, data protection and private cyber networks are not state responsibility, and there may only be government collaboration in extreme situations or when private action fail.

Recognizing the impossibility for the State to guarantee, by its own and direct means, the security of cyberspace, as well as the impropriety of the private initiative to safeguard the cyber environment, the authors indicate that there is no easy way or decision. The most certain thing would be to find the least bad solution, not necessarily the best one, since none is completely effective or fully adequate.



Since the Barack Obama administration, the United States has devoted itself to building a strategic cybersecurity policy, aiming to endow not only state agents, but also private entities, with a more concrete and effective degree of protection to guarantee action in cyberspace. An example of this is the creation of the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC). The idea is to provide the virtual environment with safer means of identification, and, consequently, the attribution of the acts performed there.

One of the problems identified by the authors in dealing with the cyber issue is a greater difficulty in imposing a unified security culture in the private environment since, unlike state entities, individuals and companies have more dispersed actions, within their own dimensions of action.

Regarding the military issue, the authors point out that the Pentagon's objective in relation to an operational domain so peculiar to cyberspace is to seek complete control of the virtual system. This objective is even expressly stated in a document dated 2018, which defines the Department of Defense's cyber strategy.

Continuing in the analysis of military action in cyberspace, the authors raise a central question: can an organization directed to war act to reduce tensions and reduce the likelihood of conflicts? Clarke and Knake say the military contribution is critical to reducing tensions and cyber risks. However, this should occur alongside diplomatic action that creates an architecture of international relations and favors the establishment of an environment with less potential and concrete conflicts.

The direction pointed by the authors for the sphere of international relations is the creation of a cyber space built following the example of the "Schengen Area". When considering the hypothetical situation of an international agreement along these lines, it is possible to build common rules for administration and data protection. In this way, the standardization of control and management rules for cyberspace would produce an even safer environment for companies and companies, which will be able to compete according to common rules.

Advancing the analysis, the authors address the need to build efficient mechanisms for the protection of democracies in the virtual domain. They highlight the growing importance of cyberspace in electoral processes, both due to the communication capacity and the evolution of the virtualization technology of the elections.

The authors also emphasize that the development and improvement of artificial intelligence, notably in the field of machine learning, will undergo a significant increase in the next five years, generating more efficient skills for the promotion of means of defense, except that there has also been an improvement in aggressive acts.

The conclusion of the work is that the strategies, tools and policies of administration and use of cyberspace are already known and the effort must now be channeled by the countries to seize the opportunities and, mainly, to make rational choices to outline the next era of cyberspace.



## AUTHOR GUIDELINES AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The entire submission process should be performed through our editorial management system, available at:

<http://ebrevistas.eb.mil.br/index.php/RMM/index> (Short URL: [bit.ly/cmabbr](http://bit.ly/cmabbr))

In case of doubts or technical difficulties, please contact us by email: [info.cmm@eceme.eb.mil.br](mailto:info.cmm@eceme.eb.mil.br)

The manuscript:

- 1) It must be original and unpublished;
- 2) It must not have been published or be in assessment process by another journal, and an eventual submission to another journal will only occur after the assessment return;
- 3) A substantially similar version must not have been published in annals of events.

### Guidelines for Authors

The following guidelines are essential to good editorial flow. Please, read the instructions carefully to be sure that your article meets all requirements. Complete regulatory requirements must be accessed directly in our system.

Article submissions are open in a continuous flow. Other publications such as interviews or technical reports will be selected directly by the editorial team.

### Focus and Scope

The *Coleção Meira Mattos* is an interdisciplinary journal that publishes scientific articles related to Security, Defense and Military Sciences, promoting a dialogue between academics and professionals and integrating questions about Armed Forces and Society. It publishes peer-reviewed articles and, occasionally, interviews and selected technical reports on current issues of interest to the area.

### Formatting

The papers should be submitted in Word or RTF format.

### Structure

Language: articles may be submitted in Portuguese, English or Spanish.

Title: The title should be brief, limited to 22 words (including, if any, the subtitle).

Abstract: with a maximum of 150 words in the language of the text and in English (when submitted in Portuguese or Spanish). It must describe the objectives, methodology and results.

Keywords: at least three and at most five.

Tables, graphics and images: Use editable formats whenever possible so that translations can occur directly in the image. The quality of the images should be 300dpi when they are not from Word/Excel (tables and graphics). The graphic content should be included only if they provide indispensable information for the article's understanding.

Word limit: The article should have between 6000 and 8000 words, including pre-text and references. However, major or minor articles may be published as long as justified by the content of the contribution.

Footnotes: Notes should be included as little as possible and only for essential information. They should be included on the same page as the note, do not use endnote. Avoid using notes to reference, privilege the use of author-date citations directly in the text. For notes of informative texts available on the Internet that are of interest to the reader and which are not direct or indirect citations, such as news, institutional or corporate websites, electronic documents, tables or statistical data, the link and access date must be indicated, as following example:

[Explanatory text]. Available at: [website]. Access on: [month abbr. Day, year].

More information available on the Brazilian Army website. Available at: [www.eb.mil.br](http://www.eb.mil.br). Access on: Jul. 2, 2019.

### **Other Recommendations**

Indication of financing: it should be indicated as a footnote of the title if the research is financed and who financed it. Also indicate, when available, the process number. According to the following structure:

Study/Research project financed by the [funding body], through [project/program], [notice/process].

Example:

Study funded by the Brazilian Ministry of Defense and the *Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior* (CAPES), through the Program of Support for Teaching and Scientific and Technological Research in National Defense (*Pró-Defesa*), notice 27/2018.

Data about the author(s): they must be informed only in the metadata filled in the system when submitting the article. Only the full name, institutional association and e-mail address will be published.

Example:

Tássio Franchi

Exército Brasileiro, Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército, Instituto Meira Mattos. Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.

editor.cmm@eceme.eb.mil.br

We will not accept articles with more than 4 (four) authors/co-authors.

The authors should have at least a masters or similar degree and, preferably, one of them should have a doctorate degree.

Additional documents: Other documents may be inserted during submission to assist reviewers in the article assessment process. However, only the article will be published and made available in the journal.

### **Citations and References**

CMM adopts the Brazilian standards for references and citations, respectively ABNT 6023:2018 and 10520:2002.

For authors not familiar with the ABNT standard, we ask that you adapt your citations and references as much as possible according to the following examples. All references and citations will be reviewed by experts, ensuring their uniformity. However, articles standardized in other presentation standards will not be accepted.

See the full standard requirements and examples of references and citations on our website.

### **Copyright Statement**

The *Coleção Meira Mattos* (CMM) is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)

Under this license, CMM allows to:

Share — copy and redistribute the material in any support or format

Adapt — remix, transform, and create from material to any purpose, even if commercial.

Note

For any reuse or distribution, you must make clear to third parties the terms of the license to which this work is submitted.

## Acknowledgements

Our acknowledgment for the the financial and administrative support from the following institutions and their related agencies. As well as all staff who get involved directly and indirectly with the Coleção Meira Mattos.

---

Ministério da Defesa



Departamento de Ensino



Divisão de Cooperação  
Acadêmica



---

Departamento de Educação e  
Cultura do Exército



Diretoria de Educação  
Superior Militar



Dir. do Patrimônio Histórico  
e Cultural do Exército



Escola de Comando e  
Estado-Maior do Exército



Coordenadoria de Avaliação e  
Desenvolvimento da Educação  
Superior Militar no Exército



EB Conhecer





# Coleção Meira Mattos

revista das ciências militares

---

---

Publication



Edition

