

Levinas and the necessity of alterity in military education


Levinas y la necesidad de la alteridad en la formación militar

Abstract: This article aims to examine how Emmanuel Levinas's concept of alterity offers a critical framework for analyzing the discourses and institutional practices that shape military academic education, with particular emphasis on the ethical implications of the standardization of subjectivities and the systematic suppression of difference throughout the formative process. Levinas articulates a profound critique of Western ontology, which, by privileging totality and the identity of the same, structurally marginalizes the other, thereby precluding any genuine ethical relation. In this context, the military educational model—characterized by rigid hierarchical norms and behavioral homogenization—manifests a form of philosophical violence insofar as it nullifies singularity and forecloses the ethical dimension of interpersonal responsibility. The analysis proceeds in four interrelated stages: (1) a conceptual exposition of Levinas's critique of ontological reductionism and its effects on the recognition of otherness; (2) an exploration of the notions of alterity, desire, and the infinite as constitutive of ethical subjectivity; (3) a discussion of the “face” as a phenomenological and ethical locus that calls the self to responsibility for the other; and (4) a critical evaluation of military educational discourse through the lens of Levinasian ethics, underscoring the urgency of reconfiguring pedagogical paradigms that efface alterity in favor of normative conformity.

Keywords: alterity; Emmanuel Levinas; military education; ontology; difference.

Resumen: El objetivo de este artículo es analizar cómo el concepto de alteridad, desarrollado por Emmanuel Levinas, puede contribuir a una reflexión crítica sobre los discursos y las prácticas que estructuran la formación académica militar, prestando especial atención a los efectos éticos derivados de la estandarización de las subjetividades y la negación de la diferencia en el proceso formativo. La propuesta filosófica de Levinas se caracteriza por una crítica a la ontología occidental, la cual, al privilegiar la totalidad y la identidad del ser, margina la alteridad e imposibilita el reconocimiento del otro como otro. Para el autor, el sujeto que escapa a la lógica del “yo” suele quedar atrapado en categorías totalizadoras, en las que la diferencia se anula por la unidad conceptual. En el contexto de la formación militar, se observa una tendencia a la homogeneización de conductas y comportamientos, orientada por discursos que buscan suprimir las singularidades individuales en favor de la eficacia colectiva. Esta supresión, a la luz de la filosofía levinasiana, constituye una forma de violencia filosófica, ya que desconsidera la dimensión ética fundamental de la relación con el otro. La metodología adoptada en este artículo se organiza en cuatro etapas interdependientes: 1) exposición de la crítica de Levinas a la ontología occidental, responsable de la reducción conceptual de los seres y de la propia alteridad; 2) examen de los conceptos de alteridad, deseo e infinito como fundamentos de la subjetividad ética; 3) discusión de la categoría del rostro como expresión de la diferencia e instancia que convoca al sujeto a la responsabilidad por el otro; y 4) análisis crítico de los discursos formativos en el ámbito militar a la luz de la ética levinasiana, con énfasis en la forma en que estos discursos desautorizan la alteridad e inhiben el reconocimiento de la responsabilidad hacia el otro.

Palabras clave: alteridad; Emmanuel Levinas; formación militar; ontología; diferencia.

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1 INTRODUCTION

Military training is based on the values of hierarchy and discipline. According to Article 28 of the Military Statute (Brasil, 1980, our translation), “the sense of duty, military attitude, and the decorum of the class impose an irreproachable moral and professional conduct on each member of the Armed Forces.” Thus, the debate on ethics becomes indispensable in military training schools since the military requires irreproachable conduct.

The founding aspects of military training show its excessive attachment to education and traditional teaching methods. In view of the technological advances of the last decades and the social changes due to the spread of information, science, and knowledge in general, only basing human behavior on normative and prescriptive ethics can generate an ethical vacuum in the military.

To contribute to military education and training, this research investigates Emmanuel Levinas’ thought when he defends alterity as the foundation of ethics. The philosopher deems that ethics should be considered as the primary philosophy. Levinas retrieves the concept of alterity in the philosophical tradition, that is, an ethics that can lead us to meet the other, an indispensable condition for us to be able to realize ourselves as beings.

According to Levinas (2000), Western thought has sought to reduce the entities of the world to concepts throughout its history. Ontologically reducing beings to concepts reduces them to a totality; normalizing and molding individuals’ differences and singularities according to the structures of knowledge. Such behavior uniformization and standardization creates useful subjects and docile bodies, as Foucault (2009) illustrates in *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*.

However, the Armed Forces must awaken a sense of collectivity and unity in the military since these institutions aim to defend their countries. However, these subjects, coming from different regions and even from other countries, have varying beliefs, wills, and habits. The barracks constitute the place in which these subjectivities meet and challenge the training process as they need to build a space of plurality and respect for differences.

These considerations elicit the following problem: how to train military personnel without nullifying the differences and subjectivity of those who make up the Armed Forces? Based on this guiding question, we propose to analyze how Emmanuel Levinas’ concept of alterity can subsidize a critical reflection on the discourses and practices that structure military training, paying special attention to the ethical effects resulting from the standardization of subjectivities and the denial of difference in the training process.

Rather than intending to give ready and definitive answers to this question, this study proposes an academic and theoretical discussion on the difficulties with which military training must concern itself given the new technological and social dimensions that shape the existence of the military. Thus, this research has a merely bibliographic character. We will qualitatively analyze and discuss some points of Levinas’ work that will help us to think about the challenges of this new ethics and reflect on the commentators on the subject.

Our methodological path will be structured as follows: we will first analyze Levinas’ critique of traditional ontology, discuss the concepts of totality and the ontological reduction

of the other based on his phenomenology, and show how the concept of alterity is based on an ethical imperative. Then, we will analyze how responsibility and the face ground and challenge the subject to ethical care. Finally, we will discuss how the training practices of military training require the insertion of alterity given its logic of standardization and homogenization of individuals.

2 ONTOLOGY AS THE REDUCTION OF THE OTHER: LEVINAS' CRITIQUE

World War II strongly influenced Levinas, a contemporary philosopher. As many Jewish philosophers, Levinas' works sought to understand the phenomenon of war in the 20th century and what led humanity to accept the barbarities of the Holocaust.

Throughout his works, ethics emerges in the author's thought as the foremost philosophy. According to him, ethics takes primacy over ontology:

[...] This primacy results from a whole process in which the empire of the being-essence commonly understood in the Western tradition is put in check. A better relationship with alterity (unobtainable by intentionality and yet unavoidable by the self) is established in the open gaps of the rupture of being. Here, alterity must be understood as a face, it is the other present and their vestige, which refers to a past that is forever irretrievable (Pivatto, 1992, p. 328, our translation).

The main characteristic of the Western philosophical tradition was to reduce all world entities to concepts. Ontology imprisoned the being in knowledge by privileging the process of knowledge based on the subject-object relationship, causing it to lose its authenticity and constituent identity of agent. To completely understand the being, ontology had to neutralize it to know it; during this reduction, the being came to be understood within a totalizing category.

This type of ontological reduction philosophy proposed targeted alterity, narrowing it into a totality, normalizing differences and singularities within concepts and behaviors. According to Nodari (2002, p. 195, emphasis in the original, our translation), "ontology thus caused a struggle between the assimilating powers the rules of the game of which consist of reducing the identity of the *other* to the identity of the *self*." The ontological reduction of the other enables an understanding and intelligibility based on the self. However, this assimilation of the other by the self provokes a philosophical injustice against the individual.

The Same, in Western philosophy, has always reduced the other to a concept, that is, we never look at the other as they are, in themselves. "The relation with Being that is enacted as ontology consists in neutralizing the existent in order to comprehend or grasp it. It is hence not a relation with the other as such but the reduction of the other to the same." (Levinas, 2000, p. 33). Conditioning the other to a concept eliminates alterity by nullifying any possibility of difference and singularity. Alterity precisely consists of maintaining difference and singularity.

“The objectification of the other in categories and systems of thought exposes them with total vulnerability to the normative intervention of modern technologies. The modern principle of domination is to normalize alterity by assimilating difference into a form of totality” (Ruiz, 2011, p. 228, our translation).

The intelligibility of the “self acquired a hegemonic role, making philosophy express itself primarily in the first person” Dias (2019, p. 561, our translation); that is, the other strips themselves of their uniqueness to be formatted in the categories of the self, which erases their existence.

According to Levinas, Socrates began the primacy of the self by stating that nothing existed outside it. However, Modernity caused a more pronounced ontological reduction of the other, which manifests the desires and interests of the self. Bacon’s formula, “knowledge is power,” praises the pretension of reducing human beings to logical categories. Levinas escapes from these conceptions and proposes a metaphysical condition of alterity that has no room for any form of universalization of individuals and that privileges difference. According to the author, “The metaphysical other is other with an alterity that is not formal, is not the simple reverse of identity, and is not formed out of resistance to the same, but is prior to every initiative, to all imperialism of the same.” (Levinas, 2000, p. 26).

Heidegger (2015), in contemporary times, proposed the rescue of the being in its ontology to the detriment of the entities in the world, completing the philosophical movement of forgetting the other. We can also direct this criticism to Husserl since, according to Sales (2005, p. 109, our translation), “Levinas sees that Husserl, in prioritizing consciousness, subordinates everything to the self as a subject of knowledge and to alterity as an object, thus reducing the intersubjective relationship self-other into a knowing, and thus neutralizing, egological, and dominating relationship.”

We seek to show some indications of how ontology has denied ethics by always seeing the other as a concept or a theory. The moment we ontologically reduce alterity to a totality, that is, to a concept, we practice a kind of philosophical violence. Even physical violence happens when the other is reduced to a concept, that is, treated as an object, as an objectification. Philosophical violence is named as such because it denies the alterity of the other and it reduces the latter to the interests of the self, excluding any possibility of singularity (which requires a grounded ethics that can recognize the difference of the other). The dimension of responsibility will emerge as a principle that can reduce the interests of the self the moment we recognize the other via alterity.

3 ALTERITY AS AN ETHICAL FOUNDATION: DESIRE AND INFINITY

Western philosophy, in turning its analysis and understanding to the being becomes selfish, that is, it begins to reflect the individuality that is so present in the contemporary world. Levinas’ philosophy seeks to break with the totalizing objectivity of Western philosophy and establish an ethics that deviates from ontology, placing in a prominent place (that is, as the foremost philosophy) so that the other is “the functional aspect of the ethical relationship, making it transcend” (Sales, 2005, p. 108, our translation).

By breaking with the philosophical tradition, Levinas states that philosophy should seek meaning for things based on the other with whom I relate. In other words, Levinas, breaking with the subjectivity centered on the being, points to alterity as a path to overcome human beings' contemporary selfishness and individuality.

The ontological and epistemological rupture caused by contemporary technoscience has placed individuals as beings distant from nature. The Levinasian proposal seeks to rediscover the other, that is, to build a being open to the exteriority, the infinite, and the transcendence of the other.

The concept of alterity in Levinas' philosophy avoids founding a new formal theoretical framework of thought as this would construct a new ontology. The author proposes to inaugurate a new principle in philosophy: difference. Rather than only a methodological inversion of the identity of the being and its substitution for the other; difference elevates alterity to transcendence, overcoming the imperialism of the self. In other words, Levinas escapes the idea of classifying the subject into universal categories and establishes his metaphysics in the singularity of the subject.

Alterity should subject itself to no ontology or metaphysics because, as we have seen, this reduction nullifies the subject, reducing it to totalizing categories and denying this living being's existence. This denial provokes philosophical violence, which can quickly become physical violence because the assimilation of the other by the self can instrumentalize and objectify the former. According to Ruiz (2011), Western civilization has recently become violent because it has denied the ethical singularity of those who are different. Furthermore, "Levinas claims the ethical condition of alterity as the primary dimension of human existence" (Ruiz, 2011, p. 227, our translation). Thus, recognizing difference in its new ethical dimension can nullify Western ontological violence.

Alterity can be neither confused with empathy nor inscribed in the dictates of subjectivity; it involves the necessary condition of being so that the human being would not be human without it. In an anthropological perspective, alterity differentiates us from other living beings. For Levinas, we become human as we open ourselves to the encounter with the other and relate to them. Thus, we can state that the constitution of the subject involves the understanding and the ability they have to relate to others. For the author, "The relation with Others challenges me, empties me of myself and keeps on emptying me by showing me ever new resources. I did not know I was so rich, but I don't have the right to keep anything anymore." (Levinas, 1993, p. 56).

Knowing the other reveals the being within me. However, this process of discovery of the being via alterity is not born out of a will of the subject. Alterity precedes the individual since it constitutes a necessary condition of being. Thus, since it is metaphysical in nature, alterity preserves difference and respects the uniqueness of the other.

This new dimension of ethics as a primary philosophy breaks with the normativity of traditional ethics by showing that action must consider subjects' particularities. For Levinas, the modern subject lacks meaning from the moment it denies the existence of the other. For the author, we only think of the self based on the relationship with the other.

For Levinas, we are desiring beings, becoming open beings via alterity. This desire for the other shows the incompleteness of the subject, making them permanently seek their fullness when coexisting with the other. In other words, desire moves the being for Levinas, it shows that we are open beings who constantly seek the completeness of being via subjectivity. “It is a desire that is not satisfied with possession and fluidity, as occurs with needs and instinctive drives that are extinguished once they possess or enjoy the desired object” (Ruiz, 2011, p. 233, our translation).

Hans Jonas’ (2004) *The phenomenon of life: toward a philosophical biology* states that living is being essentially related to life. Levinas’ philosophy shows that this relationship with life has meaning from the moment we see desire as a metaphysical condition that projects us to meet the other. However, this desire-motivated search for completeness becomes infinite.

The subject is a desiring being. Desiring for being, desiring a plenitude never attained and unattainable, desiring a harmony never achieved and unattainable. This insatiable desire that runs through the being of subjectivity and opens it to alterity is, ultimately, a desire for the Infinite (Ruiz, 2011, p. 234, our translation).

Thus, desire shows the impossibility and imprecision of the totalizing theories of the human being by evincing this search for the infinite and showing that we are constantly open beings. But how can we know the other? For Levinas, the other manifests themselves via revelation, an epistemological category that offers access to the other.

Unlike scientific objectivity, revelation enables the other’s alterity to authentically manifest itself, welcoming difference and respecting the being as it manifests itself. This shows us that this epistemological category of revelation also constitutes an ethical dimension.

Revelation offers partial knowledge about the other, never reducing them to totalizing concepts. This partial knowledge stems from the fact that we must understand the other as an individual in constant change, rendering our knowledge of them as ever incomplete given the transmutability of their being. In this process of unveiling the other, the self must adopt the posture of welcoming since it will only know what is revealed.

4 THE FACE AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE LEVINASIAN ETHICAL INTERPELLATION

Levinas’ (2000, p. 190) *Totality and infinity* states that the face is the place of discovery of the other or “the epiphany of the face qua face opens humanity.” Thus, rather than seeing the other as an abstract concept, we find that they reveal themselves by their face. Thus, we can understand them as we welcome them.

This discovery of the other via the face places them as my neighbor. Rather than simply a matter of empirically seeing the face of the other, such acceptance of the face constitutes an ethical attitude that preserves difference. “The face in its nakedness as a face presents to me the destitution of the poor one and the stranger; but this poverty and exile which appeal to my powers, address

me, do not deliver themselves over to these powers as givens, remain the expression of the face.” (Levinas, 2000, p. 190).

The approximation the face provides for the unveiling of the other shows them as a unique being who renders reduction impossible. “The other is a unique and unrepeatable subjectivity that reveals itself to me as someone different” (Ruiz, 2011, p. 240, our translation), as is proper to the being that manifests itself freely.

Alterity, by interpreting the subject based on recognizing the other, sets the two beings in contact. The face of the other forces the subject to maintain a constant relationship to boost freedom. This questioning enriches the subject to the extent that it provokes them and invites them to responsibility. For Levinas, freedom is effective in the freedom of the other.

Responsibility in Levinas’ philosophy is a constituent dimension of the subject that challenges me. The face of the other who suffers invites me to consider their way of being and living. As someone close to me who is in a constant relationship, the other, questioning me, summons the subject to responsibility.

The other, therefore, provokes in me the moral question and carries me beyond my will and conscience. The other awakens me to responsibility, which becomes possible only based on the moral shame produced before the other in the contrast between my naïve sovereignty and my spontaneity and arbitrary and potentially murderous freedom, on the one hand, and the excellence, humility, and offer of peace from the other who visits me (Nodari, 2002, p. 204, our translation).

Thus, the discovery of the other makes me vulnerable to awaken a need to understand the entities in this relationship as subjects. Levinas, from the face of the other, breaks with the normativity of traditional ethics by showing that we are fully responsible for the other, and not only under the imputability of acts.

We can only think about the responsibility the other awakens in us from the concept of closeness. For Levinas (2000), talking about proximity fails to simply presuppose a physical approximation between subjects; it configures a non-reciprocal relationship that expects nothing. Thus, to be near the other is to bear the existence of the other, to carry the weight of one’s existence, to “suffer for the other” (Nodari, 2002, p. 207, our translation).

Via the face, we expose the vulnerability of the other. According to Levinas:

The skin of the face is the one that remains the most naked, the most undressed. The most naked, although of a decent nudity. The most undressed too: there is an essential poverty on the face; the proof of this is that they try to mask such poverty by assuming attitudes, disguising them. The face is exposed, threatened, as if inviting us to an act of violence. At the same time, the face is what prohibits us from killing (Levinas, 1986 *apud* Sales, 2005, p. 120, our translation).

Levinasian ethics, rather than a phenomenology of the face in the sense that the face would make the vulnerability of the other appear, refers to a transcendence since even the silence of the face questions and challenges me. That is why we relate to others via the face.

The face enables us to perceive the pain and suffering of the other so that, once this relationship is established with another, who by the interpellation of responsibility becomes my neighbor, impedes the subject to treat them with indifference. Thus, we are free to decide how we will be responsible for the other but not to reject the other. For Levinas (2000, p. 71), “it is the welcoming of the Other, the commencement of moral consciousness, which calls in question my freedom.”

The discovery of the other, rather than a mere apparition of the sensible order, involves a metaphysical discovery that offers a mystery to be unraveled. However, the scientific discourse of modernity is unable to discover this revelation (illumination). This language of the infinite stands far from the Western totalizing categories.

5 MILITARY TRAINING AND THE SUPPRESSION OF ALTERITY

Hierarchy and discipline configure the institutional pillars of military training that aim to ensure the continuity and strengthening of the Armed Forces. However, in the teaching-learning process, rigidity and blind obedience to rules and determinations can hinder the military’s decision-making throughout their career.

The standardization and homogenization of the behavior of military personnel during their training in the barracks clearly deny alterity; that is, it encourages the subtraction of the individuality and uniqueness of each subject in the name of the collectivity and *esprit de corps*. This gives rise to the often-ignored greatest difficulty for these leaders’ trainers: dealing with the individualities, principles, values, and cultural aspects of each military officer, who come from different parts of Brazil and must often live with cultures from other parts of the world.

Levinas’ critique of the Western ontological tradition offers an important philosophical reflection that must be addressed in militarism. The usual solution to this question is to ignore the subjectivity of students in training and promote a discourse of the need to homogenize the educational body to correct the ethical “problems” and “imperfections” generated by society. However, would that suffice to train “good” individuals? Notoriously, military training totalizes entities and reduces the other to the “self.”

However, the reflection in this study ignores the training of military doctrine or, rather, what is conventionally called military *ethos*; specifically concerning itself with the intellectual training of the soldiers in the barracks and officers, which can be helped by Levinas’ criticism and philosophical response based on a new conception of ethics.

Since its origins, the teaching-learning process reflects a totalizing reduction of the other. Seeking to discover the conditions for the possibility of reliable and safe knowledge, the learning process credits primacy sometimes to the subject, sometimes to the object. The educational point of view establishes a subject who holds knowledge and an object who wants to know things. In this dichotomous relationship of education, the subject takes primacy of being over the other they want to know. “The form of bipolar relationship subject-object does not consider human

existence and inter-human relationships (and their impactful densities) in practical and ethical terms” (Souza, 2013, p. 237, our translation).

In the learning process, the subject must maintain an open relationship of proximity with the other that challenges and unveils the other’s being, neither nullifying their singularity nor reducing them to a constituent element of the self. This results in seeing the other as a being who has meaning in themselves. “Knowledge or theory designates first a relation with being such that the knowing being lets the known being manifest itself while respecting its alterity and without marking it in any way whatever by this cognitive relation” (Levinas, 2000, p. 29). Levinas proposed an ethical pedagogy, that is, the teaching-learning process starts from the recognition of alterity and contact with the other rather than imposing itself on the subject, who learns no knowable determination of prior intelligibility of the being.

The teaching-learning process of the military domesticates the other’s impulses and standardizes their subjectivity, reducing the other’s alterity, freedom, and autonomy to a uniformity arising from the military *ethos*.

Traditional education has always given an ontological status to the subject who holds knowledge, deeming the educational process as a necessity.

In the pedagogy of the Same, the Self subsumes and consumes the Other by the intentional activity of thought that is motivated and awakened by a *connatus* (force, appetite), that is, by a need that tends to satisfy and fulfill itself. The knowledge from this type of relationship presents itself as a form of enjoyment, satisfaction, and potentiation of subjectivity as an identity that is discovered and known as power and freedom. The cognitive process, from which modern philosophy frames itself and expresses itself in its search for truth, gives proof of this theoretical *jouissance* and narcissism (Alves; Ghiggi, 2012, p. 583-584, our translation).

The pedagogy of the Same emerges in the principles of military education as it tries to reproduce the interests of the self without considering the teaching-learning process that leads those individuals to critical reflection.

The need to discover the other during the teaching-learning process shows that learning stems from the other rather than from the satisfaction and need of the self. Thus, the process of intellectual training should begin with a dialogue between teaching participants. Knowing and knowable beings must enable knowledge to flow in alterity and transcendence.

Thus, a plastered, static, and technicist teaching-learning process transforms subjects into docile and useful bodies rather than into critical individuals (cf. Foucault, 2009), producing a neutralizing, reductionist, and possessive education.

Education must be challenging, the result of constant confrontations with the supremacy of the technicist and pragmatic self. An authentic education, envisioned by an ethics of alterity, must awaken what is most human in the other. Education must be seen as

something that must transcend the concrete reality of things rather than as a closed process of knowledge. For this reason, Levinas' pedagogy and ethics constitute a process of learning toward the Infinite as its constant and continuous openness always challenges the rigidity of Western ontology.

Teaching, as restlessness, causes an emptying that structures itself from a permanent criticism of the egonomic, free, and spontaneous consciousness. Thus, Metaphysical Teaching demands the movement of the Same toward the Other and never returns to the Same. In other words, it requires a radical generosity and a transcendence that becomes into acceptance and responsibility for the irreducible Other (Alves; Ghiggi, 2012, p. 588, our translation).

Together with acceptance and responsibility, the training process must awaken with the discovery of the other; education triggers the feeling of care. The educational environment fixed on alterity enables social welcoming interactions between the participants in the teaching-learning process. In military training, such welcome (which dialogue can awaken) tends to help conflict resolution, strengthening commitment and solidarity.

Education based on alterity must consider the singularities and sociocultural aspects of the teaching agents. This type of education should "provide conditions for interaction and learning that respect the variety of individual needs and rhythms. It is necessary to value the being and knowledge each student brings to the learning group, each with a special contribution to be socialized" (Guedes, 2023, p. 51, our translation).

Military education would need to face a difficulty if it were based on an education focused on alterity: by standardizing a rigorous and closed education that opens no way to the discovery of knowledge by assimilating the other, military education prohibits the emergence of the singularity and diversity of the individuals who make up the student body in the barracks. The current belief in military education states that creating a strong and united collective requires subsuming these singularities.

Finally, ethical education must break with the domestication and indoctrination of bodies in the teaching-learning process. Thus, its basis stands on responsibility, which transforms the different and opens the possibility of understanding the unknown.

6 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

Military education, as historically structured, follows an educational paradigm that privileges the standardization of bodies and subjectivities in the name of efficiency and institutional cohesion. This pedagogical model, anchored in discipline, hierarchy, and the standardization of bodies, tends to reduce the other to a single concept, erasing the uniqueness of the military and neutralizing difference. For Levinas, this movement configures a philosophical violence since the other is denied the right to emerge as a being.

Thus, the Levinasian critique of Western ontology emerges a powerful interpretative key for rethinking the ethical foundations of military education. By proposing an ethics based on an unconditional responsibility for the other and on the interpellation of the face, Levinas challenges us to break with authoritarian and unilateral pedagogical models that transform teaching into indoctrination and domesticate alterity under the imperative of order.

Thus, military education must open itself to alterity in the sense as recognition of the vulnerability, responsibility, and irreducibility of each subject rather than as passive tolerance of difference. The ethical training of the military must displace the sovereign self to the other that silently but radically calls for responsibility.

If education should be, as Levinas proposes, a continuous process of openness to the infinite rather than a reproduction of contents or norms, military training requires critical rethinking so it stops suppressing alterity and starts to cultivate it as an ethical and existential value. This does not imply abandoning the institutional cohesion necessary for the Armed Forces, requiring that it avoids silencing subjectivities.

Thus, to highlight this alignment of the ethics of alterity in military training, we can elaborate actions that involve rethinking curricula that focus on effectively developing listening and dialogue rather than only on protocol actions, training teachers and instructors under an adequate philosophical and ethical training, and adopting methodologies that respect the plurality of experiences in the Armed Forces.

Such proposal for an ethical education acknowledges the other as a starting point rather than an obstacle, going beyond the logic of domestication and promoting a military *ethos* more sensitive to plurality, listening, and justice.

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