English Edition

ISSN 2316-4891 (Online)
ISSN 2316-4833 (Print)

Coleção Meira Mattos

revista das ciências militares

Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército
v. 15 n. especial december 2021

Coleção Meira Mattos

revista das ciências militares

v. 15 n. special December 2021
Rio de Janeiro

English Edition

ISSN 2316-4891 (Online)
ISSN 2316-4833 (Print)

ABOUT
The Coleção Meira Mattos is an academic not for profit publication circulated three times a year by the Military Sciences Post-Graduation Program of the Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército (ECEME) based on the policy of free access to information.

ADRESS AND CONTACT
Praça General Tibúrcio, 125, Praia Vermelha, Rio de Janeiro/RJ, Brasil.
CEP: 22290-270.
Tel: (21) 3873-3868 /Fax: (21) 2275-5895
e-mail: info.cmm@eceme.eb.mil.br

EDITORIAL SERVICES
Tikinet Edição

PRESS
Triunfal Gráfica e Editora

COVER GRAPHIC DESIGN
Designed by the Production, Publicity and Cataloging Section, based on art by Harerama Santos da Costa, ECEME Desktop Publishing Section.

DISPONÍVEL EM PORTUGUÊS / DISPONIBLE EN ESPAÑOL
<http://ebrevistas.eb.mil.br/index.php/RMM/index>

Cataloging in Publication (CIP)

C691 Coleção Meira Mattos : revista das ciências militares. — Vol. 1, n. 24- .
— Rio de Janeiro : ECEME, 2007-
v. : il. ; 28 cm.

Quarterly.
Published from no. 1-14 with the title Padeceme, and from no. 15-23 with the titles Padeceme and Coleção Meira Mattos.
Padeceme e Coleção Meira Mattos.
ISSN 2316-4891 (Online). — ISSN 2316-4833 (Print)

1. DEFENSE. 2. MILITARY SCIENCE. I. Escola de Comando Estado-Maior do Exército (Brasil).

CDD 355

CONTENTS

ECEME

DOI 10.52781/cmm.e019

Meira Mattos Institute: 10 years training human resources and producing knowledge for the benefit of the Army and National Defense

Alexandre Santana Moreira
Exército Brasileiro. Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército.
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.
alex_smor@yahoo.com.br

Carlos Eduardo De Franciscis Ramos
Exército Brasileiro. Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército.
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.
defranciscis@hotmail.com

COLEÇÃO MEIRA MATTOS
ISSN on-line 2316-4891 / ISSN print 2316-4833
http://ebrevistas.eb.mil.br/index.php/RMM/index

Driven on by the publication of the first edition of the National Defense Strategy (END) in 2008, the creation of the Meira Mattos Institute (IMM), through Order of the Commander (Cmt) Army No. 724, September 6th, 2012, reinforces the transformation initiatives unleashed at the dawn of the 2010s, materialized in the Army Cmt Directive itself, with the aim of further strengthening ties with society, especially with the academic community dedicated to the studies of Defense subjects.

On the other hand, at the Army's internal level, it reinforces the initiatives in the areas of Post-Graduation and Research, already evolving at the Army Command and General Staff School (ECEME) since the 1960s, and, more systematically, since 2001 with its Graduate Program, under the provisions of the Army Education Law, Law No. 9.786 of 1999 and in line with the Law of Guidelines and Bases, Law No. 9,394 of 1996. Thus, as stated by Richard Nunes (2012), by increasing research and postgraduate activities, the IMM expands the level of debates and studies to the internal public of the School, which conducts courses of the highest hierarchical level and with consequences for the entire Army. Additionally, fulfilling an original role of the Center for Strategic Studies, extinguished with its creation, the IMM is also responsible for monitoring the national and international situation, the relationship with similar structures both in the academic and strategic studies areas, in addition to the management of scientific knowledge produced by the School.

Despite the publication of its creation ordinance taking place in September 2012, effectively, the IMM was already working on an experimental basis within the scope of ECEME, since mid-2011, which allows us to start some reflections on these ten years of trajectory. successful and full of challenges and learning. Thus, in order to illustrate this approach, three distinct phases of this evolutionary process are identified: the creation, development and consolidation of its activities, which will be briefly explored below.

The first phase begins in 2011, motivated by the challenge faced in conducting research and graduate studies within the scope of ECEME resulting from the end of an institutional development project, which included the participation of civilian and military researchers in Military Sciences in this process. On the other hand, it was latent that the model adopted for the Center for Strategic Studies at ECEME was already impacted by competing structures within the Army and Defense itself, indicating the need for innovative initiatives to expand the studies, debate and knowledge produced. on Red Beach. Thus, by bringing together and transforming existing internal structures at ECEME, the organization of the IMM privileged administrative rationality, innovating by bringing the research activity closer to strategic studies, with the training of human resources as the center of gravity and the improvement of knowledge management as premise.

Three actions indelibly marked this initial trajectory. The first was the elaboration of the organizational architecture and proposal of the IMM, promoting extensive work of convincing and approval in all instances of the Military Education System, which allowed the insertion of several improvements, in addition to the detailed clarification of points of the proposal and its consequent forwarding and approval by the Army Commander. The second involves the beginning of the formation of a faculty composed of civil and military doctoral professors, with the necessary qualifications to conduct an Academic Master's Degree in Military Sciences along the lines of the National Postgraduate System. The third and last was the creation of a working group for the elaboration and submission of the proposal of the Academic Master's course in Military Sciences to CAPES and the Military Education System, being the first of this nature in the context of the Armed Forces.

The challenge of creating a new course, in parallel to the traditional corporate courses already in operation at the secular ECEME, which covered the diversity of subjects of interest related to Military Sciences and aimed at a universe of students composed of civilians and military personnel, brought in its incalculable innovative potential both for the Army and for the defense sector and academic society in general. At the end of 2012, something that could have been improbable was materialized by the approval of the master's proposal submitted and recommended by the Technical and Scientific Council of CAPES, a collegiate body of the institution responsible in the country for postgraduate studies at its highest level of complexity, thus ending this first phase involving studies for the creation and implementation of the IMM.

The approval of the "new master's course" revealed a new dimension for graduate studies within the scope of ECEME and the Army itself, implying plans and actions to meet this new reality from 2013 onwards and continuing until the end of 2016, characterizing the second phase of the trajectory of the IMM, the development of Military Sciences and other activities entrusted to the Institute in its creation ordinance. In the Defense academic community, this feat generated a strong impact due to the relevance and symbolism of having a Postgraduate Program conducted autonomously by an Armed Force, something still unprecedented in the country and an object of interest observed in other friendly nations.

Thus, the elaboration of a public notice with universal scope for the selection process of students, the adequacy of the School's internal structures, the increase of the library's collection and the Meira Mattos Collection as a scientific journal, as well as the organization of research lines in line with the proposed faculty, were some of the actions with a direct impact on research, graduate studies and knowledge management. With regard to strategic studies, the activities on demand of the Army General Staff continued at a lower intensity, with a depletion of human resources being observed at this stage, a trend that would be confirmed at the end of this period. All of this coexists with the functioning of the new academic master's course carried out with the other courses in operation at the School, already with the participation of professors and civilian students. In this case, the participation of the IMM in conducting the specialization courses is also included[1] promoted by the School, covering an average of about 200 works completed annually, dealing with themes related to Military Sciences.

As a result of this phase, the first numbers of academic and student scientific production stand out[2], as well as the participation in inter-institutional[3] nd individual research projects with funding from funding agencies, as well as the delivery of masters[4] trained in the approved course. Additionally, the institutional learning curve allied to these last two aspects was relevant in the decision-making process for the proposition of the new Doctoral course in Military Sciences at the end of 2015, following a similar trajectory to the submission process of the master's course, being recognized, approved and ratified by the CAPES CTC in 2016. Overcoming expectations, obstacles and anticipating deadlines, in less than four years, ECEME, through the IMM, had the first academic postgraduate program of the Armed Forces, the Postgraduate Program -Graduate in Military Sciences (PPGCM), including conducting a post-doctoral internship in Military Sciences, according to the National Post-Doctoral Plan (PNPD, 2014).

After the critical but successful development phase of the IMM's actions, especially in the training of human resources and research in Military Sciences, a new dimension of challenges is presented on the occasion of the result of the first four-year evaluation, in mid-2017, when PPGCM scored a 4 on a scale[5] from 1 to 7, having as criticality highlighted the lack of stability of its faculty in the Program observed over the last quadrennium.

This moment marks the beginning of the consolidation phase of the IMM, its processes and the Military Sciences, extending to the present day, concomitantly with the PPGCM evaluation period for the 2017-2020 quadrennium. During this period, among many achievements, the formation of a teaching staff of its own, stable and contextualized with the Program's proposal, through a public tender, combining hired teachers and teachers assigned by a formal term of teacher assignment stands out. This achievement has a considerable impact on the

1 Specialization in Military Sciences, with emphasis on National Defense CAEM (CCEM, CCEM Med, CDEM and CCEM ONA); Specialization in Military Sciences, with emphasis on Politics and Strategy - CPEAEx; Specialization in Military Sciences, with emphasis on Strategic Studies – CIEE.

2 The scientific production of the faculty and students of the PPGCM reached the number of 429 products during the first quadrennium of evaluation of the Program.

3 The PPGCM participated in 16 inter-institutional research projects with the participation of professors and students.

4 A total of 26 PPGCM students graduated from Masters in Military Sciences in the period considered for the first four-year evaluation.

5 Ministerial Ordinance No. 1,418, of 12/23/98, conditions the national validity of stricto sensu postgraduate diplomas to the merit recognized in the CAPES evaluation, carried out by specialized consultants from different areas of knowledge, working in higher education and in the search. Programs that receive grades 1 and 2 are no longer recommended by CAPES. Available on: https://www.gov.br/capes/pt-br/acesso-a-informacao/perguntas-frequentes/avaliacao-da-pos-graduacao. Accessed on December 5, 2021.

scientific production at this stage, making a total of 2089 products reported in the teaching and student production of the program.

Thus, it is observed that the expansion of the teaching capacity to propose and participate in research projects and research groups, producing relevant, innovative and impactful knowledge is shown as a reality, overflowing to the student body, increasingly adherent in his research with the themes of greatest relevance and interest in Military Sciences and Defense Studies. In the last four years alone, the PPGCM/IMM has participated, or is still under development, in 13 research projects funded by a research funding agency and by DECEx.

As for the training of human resources, with an annual average of around 100 students distributed in the master's, doctoral and post-doctoral internship courses, it is worth noting that in the last four years, 56 masters, 23 doctors and 13 postdocs.

In line with such achievements, the structural improvement of its facilities, information technology means, the updating of the library's collection and the permanent improvement and replenishment of the Institute's staff, among so many goals planned and achieved, allow us to infer the institutional effort in make the IMM advance its vision of the future. As an example, the permanent update of the ECEME library's collection is mentioned, with the acquisition of 653 national titles and 467 international titles in the period.

Regarding to strategic studies, in continuation of the activities developed by the extinct CEE/ECEME, since its creation, the IMM has planned and conducted 14 (fourteen) Cycles of Strategic Studies[6] , promoting debates on current topics of interest to the Army and Defense. The draining of strategic analysts, confirming a trend already observed and the lack of innovative structures capable of monitoring the situation in the Defense area, leads to the creation on September 20, 2017, within the ECEME scope, of the Praia Vermelha Military Observatory (OMPV), a matrix structure led by the Meira Mattos Institute (IMM) and organized in a "web" environment, which seeks to study subjects, by thematic areas, that are directly related to the performance of the Armed Forces, especially the Brazilian Army. Since its creation, OMPV has published 334 articles, among other products such as qualified clipping of subjects of interest, holding debate forums, interviews and participation in the media, registering around 204,866 hits on its internet page[7].

Another extremely relevant tonic was the approximation with institutions of higher education, research and strategic studies carried out in its relationship diagram. In this sense, the IMM participates in academic partnership instruments[8] with national and international universities, raising the profile of the knowledge produced at the School, as well as linking up with centers of excellence in national and international Defense studies. Such initiatives are fundamental for the Institute to establish the desirable link with the national academic

6 As an example, the themes of the Strategic Studies Cycles of recent years were "War of the future, Innovation and Defense Industry"; "Cyberspace: the new dimension of the battlefield"; "Geopolitical Perspectives and Their Implications for National Defense"; "Analysis of Military Strategies for Presence and Deterrence"; "Strategic Communication in the 21st century: new paradigms", among others.

7 Praia Vermelha Military Observatory. Available in: http://ompv.eceme.eb.mil.br/. Accessed on December 5, 2021.

8 DESMil, through ECEME/IMM, has cooperation agreements signed with UFRGS, UFPE, USP and UFRR; as well as an international Memorandum of Understanding with Kings College London, Universidad Complutense de Madrid and ESPE (Ecuador).

community of Defense Studies, while at the same time providing an international projection that is a conditioning factor for its institutional and academic evolution.

After completing a decade in effective functioning, it is observed that the IMM has accomplished a lot towards the purposes established in its creation ordinance, inspired by the example of its patron, Major General Meira Mattos, a senior officer and notable academic, combining the experience from weapons to academic reflection under a unique perspective to study the Military Sciences. To the Advisory Board of the Institute that enhances and illuminates its trajectory, a highlight for the significant contributions with its academic and military experience lent to the IMM. Equally important is the emphasis on the support received from the Army Education System, without which it would not have been possible for such results to be achieved.

However, far beyond some figures presented in its recent history, which certainly demonstrate all the institutional effort and the professionals and students involved in this purpose, much can still be done by the IMM in favor of education and defense. Today consolidated and much better known, in this second decade of existence it will certainly bring contributions to the academic and military environment, leveraging future generations of researchers and producing knowledge of excellence with impacts at the national and international level, a perspective that gives the IMM incalculable transforming power in the medium and long term, in line with the interests of the Army, Defense and Brazilian Society.

References

NUNES, R. F. O Instituto Meira Mattos da ECEME e o processo de transformação do exército brasileiro. Coleção Meira Mattos: revista das ciências militares, Rio de Janeiro, n. 26, 20 nov. 2012. Available in: http://www.ebrevistas.eb.mil.br/RMM/article/view/232 . Access in: 05 dez. 2021.

PROFESSIONAL ARTICLE DOI 10.52781/cmm.e011

The strategy of presence under the strategy concept and its roots in the Army's imaginary

La estrategia de la presencia a la luz del concepto de estrategia y sus raíces en el imaginario del Ejército

Marcelo Oliveira Lopes Serrano
Exército Brasileiro.
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.
serrano572@hotmail.com

Abstract: The strategy of presence is often talked about, but it has been the subject of very few studies. This paper intends to contribute in this direction by establishing the historical background of presence, followed by the presentation of the various definitions of strategy and the analysis of the notion of presence as a strategy according to such concepts, in order to validate or not its elevation to the condition of strategy per se. A conjectural approach follows due to the fact that the subject is impregnated in the imaginary of Army officers and, therefore, is marked by a significant degree of subjectivity. The methodology applied was simple: a historical analysis, to raise and understand the past facts related to the subject and its importance, followed by a conceptual analysis, to find out the coherence of the presence strategy with the strategy concept. A conclusion incites those responsible for strategic thinking to give preference to logic over the illusory aspects of the imaginary.

Keywords: Army; presence; strategy; doctrine; amazon.

Resumen: Se suele hablar mucho de la estrategia de la presencia, pero es un tema que ha sido objeto de muy pocos estudios. Este artículo pretende contribuir en este sentido estableciendo los antecedentes históricos de la presencia, seguido de la presentación de las diversas definiciones de estrategia y el análisis de la noción de presencia como estrategia conforme dichos conceptos, con el fin de validar o no su elevación a la condición de estrategia en sí misma. A esto se sigue un abordaje conjetural, ya que el tema está impregnado en la imaginación de los oficiales del Ejército y, por tanto, plagado de un grado significativo de subjetivismo. La metodología seguida fue simple: un análisis histórico, para plantear y comprender los hechos pasados relacionados con el tema y su importancia, seguido de un análisis conceptual, para verificar la coherencia de la estrategia de la presencia con el concepto de estrategia. Una conclusión impulsa a los encargados de poner en marcha el pensamiento estratégico a privilegiar la lógica sobre los aspectos ilusorios del imaginario.

Palabras clave: Ejército; presencia; estrategia; doctrina; Amazonía.

Received: Apr. 09, 2021
Approved: Oct. 28, 2021

COLEÇÃO MEIRA MATTOS
ISSN on-line 2316-4891 / ISSN print 2316-4833
http://ebrevistas.eb.mil.br/index.php/RMM/index

1 Introduction

Presence strategy is often talked about in Brazilian military circles, particularly in the Army, but, strangely, the attention given to the subject and the constancy with which it is referred to have not produced studies that correspond to the importance given to it; in fact, they are almost non-existent. And when they do exist, such as the Strategic Informative No. 1, 2015, of the Army Center for Strategic Studies (Centro de Estudos Estratégicos do Exército — CEEEx), they present it as a data, without any analysis to substantiate and justify it. The strategy of presence, therefore, hovers in a theoretical vacuum. Because of this, it can be said that, in a way, it exerts a kind of magic over the Army officers, because it makes them accept it spontaneously, without the need to understand its true meaning. This fanciful acceptance, without the need for proper substantiation by solid foundations, is not recommendable to those who have the task of thinking about the security and defense issues of a country, of debating them, and of transforming them into relevant and feasible military doctrine. This paper intends to contribute in this direction based on the following process: presentation of the historical background of presence in order to understand its historical importance and its influence on the way Army officers think, followed by an analysis of the logical coherence of its characterization as strategy with the concept of strategy, and finally a conjectural verification of the subjective factors surrounding it that led to this spontaneous rise to the condition of strategy.

It is not an easy task to specify at what exact moment, over the last decades, people started to talk not about presence, which is a much older subject, but about strategy of presence in the Brazilian Army. The fact is, however, that it was enshrined as such in the Army's manuals from the end of the last century and in those of the Ministry of Defense thereafter. What can be stated with undoubted certainty is that presence—both political and socioeconomic, as well as military —has been a constant concern of governments and the Armed Forces of Brazil throughout the ages.

2 Historical background of the presence

The remote antecedents of the concern with the presence of the State's living forces in the national territory go back at least to the 18th century, when Alexandre de Gusmão, based on the existence, though sparse and scant, of villages and settlements resulting from the exploratory action of the Brazilian explorers called "bandeirantes" across the central plateau and of military fortifications installed at strategic points along the Solimões/Amazonas rivers and some of its tributaries, eliminated once and for all the validity of the Tordesillas line and subsequent resolutions through the principle of *uti possidetis*, enshrined by the Treaty of Madrid in 1750, which guaranteed Brazil the general delineation of its borders, especially in the Amazon region and the Midwest, which remain in force with relatively minor changes until today.

In the second half of the 19th century, the presence in the Amazon had an influx of workers attracted by the rubber exploitation cycle. Besides the general increase in human presence motivated by this economic activity, the expansion of the rubber plantations into the region of Acre, then a Bolivian territory, resulted in the outbreak of the Acre revolution in

1902, under the leadership of Plácido de Castro, which was supported by the government of Rodrigues Alves (the Brazilian president), who sent an army brigade to the region to support the Acre desire to incorporate into Brazil and, at the same time, to strengthen the negotiating power in the ongoing dispute. The definitive incorporation of Acre, an achievement of the Baron of Rio Branco, was agreed upon by the Treaty of Petrópolis in 1907. This function of presence as a factor in settling disputes and defining borders was extinguished after this action.

Despite these internal migrations, the Brazilian backlands, or anecumenes, according to the erudite language of geopoliticians, remained isolated, sparsely populated and completely disarticulated, both among themselves and from the political and economic centers of the country. In the early 1930s, Captain Mário Travassos published *Projeção Continental do Brasil*, a work that strongly influenced Brazilian geopolitical thought over the following decades (MATTOS, 2011). Noting the rarity of countries whose territorial unities were strictly restricted to aspects of their physical geography, Travassos affirmed that the role of political geography was to bind the territory into a truly national entity and, in this respect, affirmed that the Brazilian territory was very propitious, "despite all its caprices, all its contradictions" (TRAVASSOS, 1938, p. 85). He advocated eliminating the divergent character of Brazil's largest natural region, the Amazon, and the most integrated and developed, the Platina, by articulating them through the pivot represented by the central plateau and its connections with the Atlantic. To achieve this end, Brazil's longitudinal communication routes, essential from the point of view of national unity, should be based on the plurality of means of transportation (TRAVASSOS, 1938), which today is called multimodal transportation. From then on, the presence, as the final expression of the actions of the various branches of the State in the effort to integrate these backlands, including the military, became the main focus of Brazil's geopolitics.

The much older idea of transferring the federal capital to the central regions of Brazil was then put into effect, as established by the 1891, 1934, and 1946 Brazilian constitutions, an action of utmost importance for the innerization of national development. The consequent construction of the Belém-Brasília highway, materialized the first longitudinal land connection between the Amazon and the rest of the country.

Until that time, the needs for political, military and socio-economic integration and presence, as well as the resulting state actions, had been driven by internal factors. From the 1960s on, pressures, or at least uneasiness, of external origin were added to these motivating factors, a fact that particularly affected the military, always jealous of the defense of national sovereignty, and especially the Army.

The Great Amazon Lake project, elaborated in 1964 by the Hudson Institute of the United States, generated many suspicions and intense debates in the Brazilian government, political and military circles. The damming of the Amazon channel, associated with six other artificial lakes in rivers of the Amazon basin, would create a kind of Amazonian Mediterranean Sea (QUEIROZ, 2014) with an area of about 400,000 km2, forming a huge lake system that would allow continuous navigability throughout the length of the South American waterway network and would serve to induce development by "connecting the main industrial centers to the subcontinent's raw material producers" (QUEIROZ, 2014, p. 271). Although viewed with sympathy by some of our Amazon neighbors, the proposal was soon met with suspicion in Brazil because of the Hudson Institute's close ties to the US government and its defense department in particular, a strong indication that the proposal was most likely associated with US interests. Itamaraty (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) eventually pointed out in a report the inconvenience of the project stating that "of the whole scheme of the great lake of the Amazon, hovered the barely disguised idea of an internationalization of the Amazon" (QUEIROZ, 2014, p. 282). From then on, the idea that overcoming underdevelopment and integrating the inhospitable backlands to the dynamic regions of the country were essential to the national security and defense policy was firmly established in military thought, expressed by the famous slogan: "Integrate not to Deliver". According to the interior minister at the time, General Albuquerque Lima,

> the Government is obliged to consider as a high priority the matter of the effective occupation of the empty spaces in the Amazon, that no occupation plan will be valid if it does not count on the decisive support of the Armed Forces, together, but that they should understand that it is an *operation of economic and social interest, according to the concepts of development* (1968 apud QUEIROZ, 2014, p. 276, our emphasis).

The Great Lakes project did not contemplate any concern for the environment, quite the contrary. However, ecological interests and their indigenous developments would soon come to represent the main threat to the internationalization of the Amazon. In 1972, by order of the Club of Rome, the *Massachussetts Institute of Technology* (MIT) published the report *The Limits to Growth*, in which it concluded that "the continued growth of the global economy would, sometime in the 21st century, exceed planetary limits, most likely resulting in the collapse of the population and the economic system" (apud NUNES et al., 2012, p. 3). The developed countries, following the line of the MIT report, defended the idea of "zero growth" at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, the first major meeting of heads of state to address the environmental issue, held in Stockholm, also in 1972. Considered highly unfair by developing countries, since zero growth would mean, in practice, reserving existing resources for already developed and industrialized nations, the idea was firmly rejected by Brazil and other countries, which prevailed by approving the clause that states have the sovereign right to exploit their resources according to their own policies, as long as they do not cause environmental damage to other countries.

Faced with all of these pressures on a region that was practically uninhabited and deprived of the resources and presence of the State, Brazil reacted by means of, among others, the following initiatives to apply the nation's living forces in this enormous territorial emptiness: the creation of the Superintendence for the Development of Amazonia (Superintendência do Desenvolvimento da Amazônia – SUDAM), replacing the inefficient organism that arose in the government of Getúlio Vargas; the implementation of the Manaus Free Trade Zone; the execution of the road plan for Amazonia, with emphasis on the construction of the Transamazon, Cuiabá-Santarém, Cuiabá-Porto Velho and Manaus-Boa Vista highways; the Rondon and RADAM[1] projects, and

1 Rondon Project: Army initiative in which university students from all over the country were taken to do short internships with the Amazon's unassisted populations, in order to learn about the region's problems and recognize its importance. RADAM Project: broad action of surveying the mineral resources of the Amazon.

the strengthening of military resources in the region through the creation of the Amazon Military Command, the current Amazon Flotilla and the 7thCOMAR (Regional Air Command), as well as subordinate military organizations.

The legal solution to the issue in Stockholm did not completely reassure the Brazilian authorities, especially the Armed Forces, because several governments and internationally prominent personalities began to make public pronouncements indicating their intention to promote some degree of internationalization of the Amazon, which increased on the eve of the new UN conference on the environment in Rio de Janeiro, the so-called ECO-92. The conference, however, once again favored Brazil and developing countries by ratifying the sovereign right guaranteed by the Stockholm Conference and enshrining the concept of sustainable development (NUNES et al., 2012).

Non-governmental organizations, in turn, had been gradually assuming prominence in issues related to environmental protection, particularly with regard to illegal deforestation and the demarcation of indigenous lands. Although the demarcation of these lands is a constitutional obligation of the Brazilian State, the pressure to grant extensive indigenous areas along the borders, covering regions rich in natural resources, has once again reinforced the suspicion in military circles, especially in the Army, of a disguised attempt at internationalization of the Amazon, through the blocking of these resources and a possible recognition of the existence of "indigenous nations" by the international community. In yet another strategic action to counter this possible threat and to increase protection and settlement in the northern arc of the Brazilian Amazon basin, the Army conceived and managed to get national approval for the Northern Border Project (Projeto Calha Norte) in 1985, which later became a program under the Ministry of Defense.

As a result of all these actions taken, the current presence of the Armed Forces in the Amazon is practically configured, in terms of the military sphere. Besides this, the concern with the effective occupation of the territory, that is, the presence of the State in its various aspects, and the Army's intense involvement in the debates related to it and in the resulting actions, was a constant in all the actions mentioned, permeating them in a chain of the same predominant idea, which ended up taking root in the Army officers' minds.

On the other hand, the installation and maintenance of military garrisons in the main political and socioeconomic centers and of fortifications at strategic points in Colonial Brazil was necessary to impose Portuguese sovereignty and law and to ensure the loyalty, or at least the passivity, of the population towards the overseas Kingdom. This presence, inherited from Portugal and later expanded, initially played a similar role in the Empire and in the Republic, due to the political instability of the first decades of both regimes, although, sometimes, as a result of politics meddling in the military, it itself served as a base for rebellious acts or acts contrary to the democratic principles of the nation, one of the most notorious examples being the uprising of the Natal and Recife garrisons and of some units based in the federal capital during the 1935 Communist Uprising.

Besides the specific focus on the lack or deficiency of state action in the Northern region of the country, which, it seems, was the main motivator of the whole process that came to result in the idea of the strategy of presence, this long-established linking of presence with the preservation of sovereignty and the maintenance of order also undoubtedly contributed in the same direction.

It is worth pointing out two fundamental aspects before closing this item: first, in order to introduce the following line of argumentation, the above-mentioned strategic actions were not justified by themselves; they were adopted by the government and the Brazilian Armed Forces with the unequivocal objective of supplanting existing adverse factors or of preventing real, potential or suspected antagonisms. Second, it is worth emphasizing that, due to their importance, continuity, and scope, they exerted an impactful effect on the imaginary of Army officers, marking it and strongly sedimenting themself in their way of thinking.

3 The strategy of presence in the face of strategy definitions

There is no question that presence, as a strategy, must necessarily fit into the corresponding concept. This concept, however, has expanded over the past two centuries. In his portentous *Traité de Stratégie*, Hervé Coutau-Bégarie states that "the whole history of strategy from the second half of the nineteenth century onward has consisted of its advance into the sphere of politics" (2001, p. 67). The concept of strategy, consequently, has not one, but several definitions, which have marked this evolutionary process[2].

Derived from the ancient Greek *strategos*, the word originally denoted the art of leading an army or, in more general terms, the art of command. Jomini defined strategy as the "art of conducting war on the chart, of encompassing the entire theater of operations" and *Clausewitz* considered it as "the theory concerning the employment of combats[3] in the service of war" (COUTAU-BÉGARIE, 2001, p. 65). Other definitions emerged up to World War I, all, however, revolving around the conduct of war, with some expanding the validity of strategy to peacetime as well. In the 1920s, the concept of strategy broadened once again beyond the purely military domain. Signaling this trend, Liddell Hart proposed the notion of grand strategy, whose function would be "to assess and develop the nation's economic and demographic resources in order to sustain its armed forces" (COUTAU-BÉGARIE, 2001, p. 69), with its horizons extending "beyond war toward subsequent peace" (COUTAU-BÉGARIE, 2001, p. 69). In the early 1960s, General André Beaufre stressed in strategy its character of action and reaction in the face of an adversary intelligence by identifying it as a "dialectic of wills employing force to resolve their conflict" (1998, p. 27). Following previous trends, pointed out by Coutau-Bégarie (2001), Beaufre stated that strategy, although unique in its objective and method, is subdivided when applied in specialized strategies, uniquely linked to a special domain of conflict. As the highest dimension, he placed total strategy, in charge of the political level, in charge of conceiving the total war[4] by establishing the appropriate mission and the appropriate combination of the various general strategies — political, economic, diplomatic and military — components of the intermediate

2 The new Manual of fundamentals: strategy (Manual de fundamentos: estratégia) EB20-MF-03.106, approved in 2020, provides a comprehensive list of definitions.

3 Coutau-Bégarie explains that he followed Raymond Aron in opting for "combats" as the more precise connotation of the German *Gefecht*, instead of "battle", a term contained in the definitions presented by Peter Paret, *Clausewitz*, in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, t. 1, Bibliex, 2001, p. 263, and by General Meira Mattos, *Estratégias Militares Dominantes*, p. 239.

4 In Beaufre's view, total war does not mean the culminating employment of the power of nations, as in the two world wars (although they do fit the concept), but simply the commitment of all expressions of national power, in various combinations, to resolve the conflict.

level. At the base of the pyramid, he placed the operational strategy, linked directly to the conduct of operations (1998).

According to Coutau-Bégarie (2001, p. 76), strategy is

> an exchange relationship, of a certainly particular kind, but one that can only take place in pairs. It is, to be sure, the child of politics, since it presupposes from the start the designation of an adversary and is fundamentally an action/reaction phenomenon.

Alluding to the current vulgarization of the concept, the same author further states:

> Everything has become strategic, and strategy is nowhere to be found anymore; the corruption of the concept has taken place. The only way out of this impasse is to return to the notion of the enemy and the dialectic of intelligences that it gives rise to. When there is no such dialectic, there is no strategy (COUTAU-BÉGARIE, 2001, p. 78).

As can be well noted, all these definitions and arguments are oriented toward armed conflicts, even when they go beyond military means. In Brazil, however, a peculiar vision emerged, motivated by the observation that underdevelopment was, at the time, the greatest threat to the country's security. The War College (Escola Superior de Guerra – ESG), established in 1949, became prominent as a center of strategic thinking between the 1950s and 1970s. Adopting the American notion of "national strategy", it defined it as "the art of preparing and applying national power", in all its expressions, "considering existing or potential obstacles", adverse factors and antagonisms, "to achieve or maintain the objectives set by national policy" (ARRUDA, 1983, p. 68). The ESG continues to adopt basically the same definition, with minor changes: "The art of preparing and applying power to conquer and preserve objectives, overcoming obstacles of all kinds" (ESCOLA SUPERIOR DE GUERRA, 2019, p. 46). According to this line of reasoning, strategy became as comprehensive as Beaufre's total strategy, by virtue of encompassing all expressions of power, but it replaced the intelligent adversary and the dialectic of wills with the much vaguer notion of obstacle, thus obscuring the link with war and attributing clear primacy to the adverse factors of underdevelopment, which undoubtedly diverted the focus of the concept, undermining its precision. A more recent definition, which goes back to *Clausewitz*, has been proposed by Colin Gray: the use of force or the threat to use it for political purposes (2016, p. 40).

As a result of all these definitions, it is unequivocally apparent that strategy is applied against an identified enemy or adversary or, depending on the specificity of the ESG notion, to overcome an unwanted condition, whether physiographic, social, economic, military, or of any other nature. In short, strategy fulfills its purpose by preparing power for a conflictive situation, by confronting and defeating an enemy, or by overcoming obstacles. Its action concludes when these objectives are achieved, and the meaning of the strategy also vanishes with the achievement of these objectives. And, at the time, the ESG made this aspect clear by linking the strategy to current national objectives, and not to permanent ones, thus indicating its evident temporariness (ARRUDA, 1983).

No prospect of armed conflict worries Brazil today, and the old obstacles of the state and military vacuum were filled by strategic actions that integrated the Brazilian backlands through the presence of political and socio-economic forces and that resulted in the current territorial organization of the Army. It is a very satisfactory organization, by the way, because it covers the whole country, including its most remote borders. Political and social instability, the cause of internal convulsions and attempts at secession in the past, has in turn been supplanted by communion around a sense of Brazilianness and the consolidation of Brazil's political institutions.

Now, if there are no obvious adversaries or the anticipation of armed conflicts, there is no reason to have a strategy according to the classic definitions presented[5] and, once the obstacles that motivated it have been eliminated, the strategy according to the ESG concept also dissolves. Moreover, art, a recurring term in these definitions, explicitly reveals itself through actions. Art consists of action and therefore is consummated in action, and there is no action in the presence itself. Strategy is also considered by many authors and by the Brazilian Army as a science[6] but as such, according to Coutau-Bégarie (2001, p. 143-153), it is linked to applied thought and strategic theory. As a science, therefore, it consists of the theoretical basis for the elaboration and execution of a strategy, but this is materialized through action, which has primacy. And just as there is no art in presence, there is no science behind it. One must, therefore, conclude that the elevation of the presence of military organizations in the national territory to the condition of strategy is unfounded, as it does not fit into any of the various forms of the concept of this art/science.

Presence, as it manifests itself today, consists of a mere conjunctural condition, a contingency. The purpose of preserving or maintaining objectives, contained in the ESG definition and in the Army's definition of military strategy (presented later), derives from the eventual persistence or later manifestation of some related obstacle. This purpose, indicative of an action to be taken, could serve as a counter-argument to justify presence as a strategy; it should be noted, however, that such an obstacle will require, if necessary, other strategic actions to be overcome, and presence in effect will not solve it at all. It should also be noted that General Meira Mattos, one of the greatest Brazilian military strategic thinkers, if not the greatest, makes no reference to it in his book *Estratégias Militares Dominantes: sugestões para uma Estratégia Militar Brasileira* (1986), an obvious sign of not recognizing it as a strategy. This, however, does not mean to deny the strategic value of the presence, because the appropriate location of its military organizations throughout the national territory favors the Army's strategic employment. Strategic value, however, is not the same as strategy, otherwise the Paraná River and the Northeastern salient, which were very important in the Paraguayan War and the Second World War respectively, would also have been strategies in their own right.

Despite what Army strategy manuals have established, the constancy of presence is circumstantial, it does not constitute a strategy, for the real strategy is found in the previous actions that resulted in the presence and those taken on the basis of it, not the presence itself. Even if a specific need requires the employment of military forces, presence is not characterized as strategy;

5 Employment assumptions, guiding military planning at its highest level, must be based on objective, not fanciful, indicators of the potential existence of these two aspects.

6 "Art and science of preparing the power to, overcoming obstacles of all kinds, achieve the objectives set by the policy" (BRASIL, 2020, p. 2-5).

it consists only of a trump card of probable strategic value, and its effect is more one-off than generalized. The obvious notion of being present if needed, inserted in its most recent definition (BRASIL, 2020, p. 4-5), is a ploy to cover up the flaw in the concept. Moreover, being present is a dynamic function, which implies a systemic approach, since it demands efficient command and control, effective means, and adequate logistics. Presence, on the other hand, is essentially inert, it does not induce, by itself, care for all kinds of means, nor concern for efficacy, since it embeds, as a supposed strategy, the illusory idea of acting by itself. Presence and being present are very distinct and, in a sense, antagonistic functions. Being present, on the other hand, does not constitute a strategy either, since it determines nothing about the actions to be performed on the stage of operations, but only consists of a preliminary phase of the strategy: the displacement and concentration.

To finish this conceptual approach, it is necessary to analyze the very definition of presence strategy. The 2004 manual C 124-1, Strategy, defined it as "the military presence throughout the national territory, with the purpose of guaranteeing the constituted powers, law and order, ensuring national sovereignty and integration, and contributing effectively to national development" (apud RODRIGUES, 2020, p. 58). The Military Doctrine of Defense, from 2007, characterized it with more restraint as the "military presence in the national territory and its extensions, with the purpose of fulfilling the constitutional purpose and subsidiary attributions" (apud RODRIGUES, 2020, p. 58). The new Strategy manual, of course, reproduces the definition of the Military Defense Doctrine. These definitions, however, are unsatisfactory and illusory. Unsatisfactory because tautological; they are explained by the very term they intend to define, presence; and illusory because unspecific; attributing to presence the constitutional mission of the Armed Forces, the core of the definitions, does not distinguish it in any way from any other high-level activity of the Army and the other services. It allows one to speak, for example, of "teaching strategy", "logistics strategy", "administration strategy", etc.,[7] because these pseudo-strategies can also be attributed to the Army's constitutional mission as its ultimate purpose. If one could speak of a presence strategy for this purpose, it would be much more logical to speak of an "Army strategy", not as a sectorial strategy promoted by the Land Force, but rather inherent to its mere existence, unrelated to any action.

4 The presence in the Army's imaginary

Presence has undoubtedly taken root in the Army's imagination, otherwise it would not going against the need of a consistent rationale to be accepted as a strategy. It is necessary, then, to investigate why it is considered as such, why it has assumed in the thinking of Army officers and, consequently, in military doctrine, this immanent condition of strategy in itself. Little can be stated categorically in this regard, since, after all, the imaginary is characterized by its subjectivism rather than by the logical foundation of objective arguments. It is possible, however, to conjecture on the

7 Not to be confused with teaching, logistical or administrative strategies, feasible, according to the concept, as a way to conduct these actions at the highest level.

basis of some certainties, because, as long as it is anchored in rational aspects, conjecture is useful for its capacity to unveil what is hidden and shed light on the object that one wishes to know.

The old strategy manual inserted presence and deterrence into the category of "security strategies," however, it did not explain what these would be. In the absence of a specific definition, it must be admitted that they fit the general definition of strategy, which confirms the previous argument. The fact that they are tied to security, a permanent concern, could indicate an intention to grant them equal permanence. Although it is possible to attribute a dissuasive condition to the Brazilian military means, imagining that the slender body of conventional weapons can exert the same effect as the massive force of nuclear weapons,[8] which would guarantee them a certain inherent dissuasive value, the same did not and does not apply to presence, because dissuasion requires a specific threat to be dissuaded, an enemy, therefore, even if potential, which necessarily inserts it in the dialectic of wills, while presence does not have this character of reciprocal action.

The current manual classifies presence, in addition to deterrence and others,[9] as a model of military strategy, which also does not evade the conceptual argument made. The fact that the new concept of presence strategy has excluded the idea of contributing to national integration and development, as seen above, does not automatically eliminate from the minds of the military, in particular the Army, its presumed strategic function, since it will be necessary for them to overcome the natural effect of inertia in the face of change, the stronger the more ingrained the idea, whose entrenchment the previous concept unequivocally indicated.

In this sense, it is symptomatic that the Army's strategy manual welcomes the developmental approach of the ESG strategy (BRASIL, 2020, p. 2-5). Besides not having the precise incisiveness of the conceptions of a warlike character, linked to the actions of force against an intelligent adversary, its view of strategy, derived from that approach, points to the Army's tendency to see itself as an agent of development and guardian of national institutions, historically represented by its presence in the national territory. As for military strategy, General Meira Mattos, in his work already mentioned and in line with those conceptions, states unequivocally that it is "the art of conducting war" (1986, p. 8). The definition in the old manual ignored this indisputable truth, and the current one presents it in a diluted form[10] General Albuquerque Lima's warning still reverberates, more than half a century later, in the Army's way of thinking, despite the fact that the national conjuncture has changed radically during this period of time and that the obstacles that caused it have been largely overcome. Not enough attention has been paid to this evolution of the Brazilian picture, and, in general, there is still an attachment to the idea that the Army is still *the pillar of the nation*, and not an *instrument* of it (SERRANO, 2004), an idea to which we are used to, and to its past condition of inductor of the country's development and sustainer of nationality, of which we are justifiably proud.

8 Before the advent of the atomic bomb, the incessant sequence of wars between great powers throughout history leaves no doubt as to the lack of effective deterrent power of conventional weapons. In these, such power is at best derisory, unable to dissuade the pursuit by war of political objectives considered important.

9 The other models listed fit well with the concept of strategy at its various levels, although one of them, that of resistance, also lacks a solid foundation, as well as being an unnecessary development of irregular warfare. Two others (independent action and alliance) are not purely military, as they have direct links to political action.

10 "Art and science of foreseeing the employment, preparing, guiding and applying military power during conflicts, considering the existing or potential obstacles, aiming at achieving or maintaining the objectives set by the political level" (BRASIL, 2020, p. 4-1).

Using a strong image, it seems satisfactory to rest on the laurels of the past, believing that it is still pertinent and necessary, on the part of military organizations, an integrating, developmental and moderating effort similar to the one of the past. And presence, artificially elevated to the status of a perennial strategy, would serve to feed illusions in this regard, giving the impression that it was inherent to the military purpose of the strategic actions carried out at that time.

The presence strategy, on the other hand, is also linked to the strong "territorialist" mentality that prevails in the Army. According to this mentality, which is the result of historical contingencies that have led the Land Force to act and intervene more frequently in internal security than in external security, the Army's operational military organizations feel imprisoned by portions of the national territory, something that bears some resemblance, one could well say, to a serfdom of the land. Presence would then serve as a *strategic corollary* justifying this *territorialism* (SERRANO, 2012). Besides the conceptual inconsistency, there is the inconvenience that, under this aspect, it constitutes a strong factor of resistance to any necessary structural transformation of the Army.

5 Conclusion

One can consider sufficiently demonstrated the incoherence of the notion of presence as a strategy, as well as *infer* to what degree its prevalence over being present in the thinking of the officers can indirectly weaken the concern with the Army's war means and, consequently, harm the operational efficiency of the Land Force and the doctrine that guides it. It is not a matter of criticizing the territorial organization of the Army, but of not attributing to it the unusual condition of strategy, which gives it the false idea of action (inherent to strategies), when in reality there is none, thus possibly obscuring the need for other actions and blurring the sense of priorities.

In the minds of those reflecting on strategic matters and drafting military doctrine, this inconsistency and the potential harmfulness of the central character assumed by the strategy of presence will undoubtedly clash with the resilient power of the imaginary. However, in this soul expression of ideals and stimulant of ways of thinking and acting, there is no room for unreasonable imaginations and attachments. For this reason, between the logical conclusions and the daydreams of the imaginary, one must always opt for the logical in order to avoid going down the path of illusion. Nothing justifies agreeing with the line that closes a famous Hollywood western movie: "When facts contradict the legend, publish the legend"[11].

11 *The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance*, starring James Stewart and John Wayne.

References

ARRUDA, A. de. **A Escola Superior de Guerra**: história de sua doutrina. 2. ed. rev. e ampl. São Paulo: Edições GRD, 1983.

BEAUFRE, A. **Introdução à estratégia**. Rio de Janeiro: Bibliex, 1998.

BRASIL. Ministério da Defesa. **Manual de fundamentos**: estratégia: EB20-MF-03.106. [S. l.]: Ministério da Defesa, 2020.

COUTAU-BÉGARIE, H. **Traité de stratégie**. 3. éd. Paris: Economica, 2001.

ESCOLA SUPERIOR DE GUERRA. **Fundamentos do Poder Nacional**. Rio de Janeiro: ESG, 2019.

ESTRATÉGIA da presença: antigos conceitos, novas ideias. **Informativo Estratégico**, Rio de Janeiro, ano 1, n. 1, abr. 2015. Available at: http://ebrevistas.eb.mil.br/CEEExIE/article/view/1145. Accessed on: October 29, 2021.

GRAY, C. **Estratégia moderna**. Rio de Janeiro: Bibliex, 2016.

MATTOS, C. de M. Brasil: geopolítica e destino. In: MATTOS, C. M. **Geopolítica**. Rio de Janeiro: Bibliex; FGV Editora, 2011. v. 1, livro 2.

MATTOS, C. de M. **Estratégias militares dominantes**: sugestões para uma estratégia militar brasileira. Rio de Janeiro: Bibliex, 1986.

NUNES, R. F. et al. Meio ambiente e defesa nacional: Brasil. **Coleção Meira Mattos**: revista das ciências militares, Rio de Janeiro, n. 25, jan./abr. 2012. Available at: http://ebrevistas.eb.mil.br/RMM/article/view/138. Accessed on: October 29, 2021.

QUEIROZ, F. A. Seria a Hileia uma arena de baixo custo na lógica de poder da Guerra Fria? O Caso dos Grandes Lagos Amazônicos (1964-1968). **OPSIS**, Catalão, GO, v. 14, n. especial, p. 266-286, 2014. Available at: https://revistas.ufg.br/index.php/Opsis/article/view/30416. Accessed on: November 30, 2021.

RODRIGUES, F. A Estratégia da Presença no contexto da transformação militar como peculiaridade de defesa do Brasil. **Revista Artigos Estratégicos**, Brasília, v. 8, n. 1, jan./jun. 2020. Available at: http://www.ebrevistas.eb.mil.br/CEEExArE/article/view/4844. Accessed on: October 29, 2021.

SERRANO, M. O. L. Exército: pilar ou instrumento da nação? **PADECEME**, Rio de Janeiro, set./dez. 2004.

SERRANO, M. O. L. Padrões comparativos para o dimensionamento do exército: quais utilizar? **Coleção Meira Mattos**: revistas das ciências militares, Rio de Janeiro, n. 27, set./dez. 2012. Available at: http://ebrevistas.eb.mil.br/RMM/article/view/111. Accessed on: October 29, 2021.

TRAVASSOS, M. **Projeção continental do Brasil**. 3. ed. São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1938.

ECEME

PROFESSIONAL ARTICLE DOI 10.52781/cmm.e012

Russian reflexive control: military theory and applications

Control Reflexivo Ruso: teoría militar y aplicaciones

João Ricardo da Cunha Croce Lopes
Exército Brasileiro. Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército.
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil
ricardo@croce.ggf.br

Abstract: The development of information security doctrine in the Russian Federation has been in the works since the first decade of this century. Currently, the doctrine is applied both at the governmental level and as an instrument for the application of military power. The present work presents how the Russian Federation is managing its actions based on the Reflective Control (CR) theory. As the theory involves the Russian understanding of information, technical data, cognitive contents and "information resources" are understood as technological and human, as well as being employed by the Strategic Communication system (Public Relations, Public Diplomacy and Security Systems of the Information), for a specific purpose. This work also describes the interaction of the CR with Doctrina Germazinov, the Information Warfare activities, with the use of non-military measures, the use of Cyber Warfare, social media and the "Controlled Chaos" measures, all with the objective to ensure success in Russian combat and development.

Keywords: Reflective Control; Strategic Communication; Cyber/ Information Warfare; Influence Operations and Controlled Chaos.

Resumen: El desarrollo de la doctrina de la seguridad de la información en la Federación de Rusia ha estado funcionando desde el primer decenio de este siglo. Actualmente, la doctrina se aplica tanto a nivel gubernamental como como instrumento de aplicación del poder militar. Este artículo presenta cómo la Federación Rusa está manejando sus acciones basadas en la Teoría del Control reflexivo (CR). Dado que la teoría implica la comprensión rusa de la información, los datos técnicos, el contenido cognitivo y los" recursos de información " se entienden como tecnológicos y humanos, así como, son empleados por el sistema de Comunicación Estratégica (Relaciones Públicas, Diplomacia Pública y Sistemas de Seguridad de la Información), para un propósito específico. En este trabajo también se describe la interacción de la CR con la doctrina Germazinov, las actividades de guerra de la información, con el uso de medidas no militares, el uso de la guerra cibernética, los medios sociales y las medidas de "caos controlado", todo con el objetivo de garantizar el éxito en el combate y el desarrollo ruso.

Palabras clave: Control Reflexivo;Comunicación Estratégica; Guerra Información /Cibernética; Operaciones de influencia y caos controlado

Received: Sep. 19, 2021
Approved: Nov. 20, 2021

COLEÇÃO MEIRA MATTOS
ISSN on-line 2316-4891 / ISSN print 2316-4833
http://ebrevistas.eb.mil.br/index.php/RMM/index

1 Introduction

One of the main goals of the commander in war is to interfere in the decision-making process of the enemy. This goal is often achieved through misinformation, camouflage, or other strategies. For Russia, one of these basic methods is the use of the Reflexive Control theory, which is defined as a way of transmitting specially prepared information to a partner or opponent in order to persuade them to make a predetermined decision, desirable for the initiator of the action (ЛЕФЕВР; СМОЛЯН, 2010). This method can be used against "decision-making processors", human or machine.

Despite the fact that the theory has long been developed in Russia, it still finds itself undergoing constant updates in the present day.

In this article, the military aspect of the Russian concept of Reflexive Control and its role as a weapon in the information war, in accordance with the military doctrine of Defense of the Russian Federation, will be presented.

The knowledge presented here was the result of studies done in Moscow, as well as its deepening carried out through the texts, doctrines, articles and lectures to which I gained access. Although there are several manuals and a vast material, many of these were not directly made available by my "comrades". The translation of technical terms was also a complicating factor, even after more than 10 (years) of contact with the Russian language. For these reasons, this article took a long time to be submitted.

2 Development

The nature of Reflexive Control Theory (RC) exists for much longer than similar concepts of information warfare and information operations. In fact, it appeared in Soviet military literature 40 years ago. Vladimir A. Lefebvre defined Reflexive Control as "a process in which one of the opponents transmits the other reasons for decision-making" (ЛЕФЕВР, 1984, p. 14).

The development of the Theory of Reflexive Control went through four periods:

- Research (from the early 1960s to the late 1970s);
- Practice-oriented (from the late 1970s to the early 1990s);
- Psychological / pedagogical role (from the early to mid-1990s);
- Psychosocial role (since the late 1990s).

The Soviet and then, after 1991, Russian armed forces have long been exploring techniques of using the theory of Reflexive Control (*especially at tactical and operational levels*): as a disguise (*to deceive*), for the purpose of misinformation as well as to influence the decision-making processes of the enemy. For example, the Russian army already owned, in 1904, the military camouflage school. In 1929, this school laid the foundation for the concept of camouflage and created guidelines for future generations (*Maskarovka*).

Reflexive Control is also seen as a means of information warfare. For example, Major General N.I. Turko, a professor at the Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Federation, established a direct link between information wars, operations and the strategies of Reflexive Control. He noted that the most destructive manifestation, in the tendency to rely on military force, is due to the possible impact of Reflexive Control of the opposite party, through the proper development of the theory and practice of information warfare, which is more significant than the direct use of military force.

Turko believed that Reflexive Control is the most important information weapon for achieving military goals even more than traditional "firepower". This view was shaped largely by his belief that the American use of information weapons during the Cold War did much more to defeat the Soviet Union than any other weapon, as well as was the source that caused its collapse. Finally, Turko mentioned reflexive governance as a method of achieving geopolitical superiority and as a means of managing military negotiations, an area that should be more recognized by countries entering into such negotiations with the Russians.

By definition, Reflexive Control occurs when **the governing body conveys a controlled system of motives and principles that will serve as an excuse to come to a desirable solution, but the real intentions are kept in absolute secrecy** (ТУРКО; МОДЕСТОВ, 1996).

The "Reflection" encourages certain processes to simulate the reasoning of an enemy or to simulate a possible behavior of the enemy, forcing him to make an unfavorable decision for himself. In fact, the enemy comes to a solution based on the **representation of a situation he shaped**, including the location of detachments and structures on the opposite side, as well as the intentions known to him from opponents.

Initial ideas for decision-making are formed primarily on the basis of intelligence, data and other factors that are based on a sustainable set of concepts, knowledge, ideas and, finally, experience. This set is commonly referred to as a "filter" that helps the commander separate the necessary information from useless data, true data from false, and so on.

In military decision-making processes, the “human-machine-assisted” process is more prevalent. Currently, automated decision-making systems operated only by machines are not yet approved (SUTYAGIN, 2015). The adversary may try to influence the human being; and, by another process, the adversary may try to influence the machine.

In all decision-making processes, the importance of recurrent information collection and evaluation is emphasized, as well as a comprehensive approach in order to allow planners to create Lines of Action (LA) for their executions, as well as models for the LA of opponents. In this way, the Lines of Action are mostly based on intelligence and information provided by various Situational Awareness (SA) systems, weapons systems and the like. Thus, decision-making processes depend heavily on the collection of data that is real, correct and timely. Inaccurate and/or irrelevant information, as well as delays in submission, can seriously impair a decision-making process. In the context of machine-assisted decision-making, this means that false, irrelevant, or premature information can be introduced to the human, to the machine, or both. The Russian RC acts and both 02 (two) processes – Human and Machine-assisted Human.

The main task of Reflexive Control is also to explore, as a tool, morality, psychological factors and others, as well as personal characteristics of commanders. In the latter case, biographical data, habits and psychological differences can be used in deceptive acts. In a war where Reflexive Control is used, the party with the highest quality of "reflection" (*more able to imitate the thoughts of the other side or predict their behavior*) will have better chances to win.

The quality of "reflection" depends on a large number of factors, the most important of them – analytical skill, general erudition, the sphere of knowledge about the enemy and experience. The military author Colonel S. Leonenko (ЛЕОНЕНКО, 1995) added that in the past, strategy was the main tool of Reflexive Control, but today “tricks” and camouflage have replaced the method.

Although the formal terminology of Reflexive Control did not exist in the past, the opposing parties actually used it intuitively when trying to identify and collide with each other's thoughts, as well as plan and change their impressions of themselves, provoking a wrong (misleading) decision.

If successful, the RC on the enemy allows to influence military plans and awareness of the situation, as well as, their actions. Thus, Reflexive Control focuses more on the less tangible subjective element of "Military Art" than on the more objective "Military Science".

Achieving successful Reflexive Control requires a deep study of the "inner nature" of the enemy, his ideas and concepts; Leonenko described them as a "filter" through which all data about the outside world passes. A successful Reflexive Control represents the culmination of an information operation.

2.1 Reflexive Control Detailing

The history of the concept of Reflexive Control (RC) stems primarily from the work carried out by Vladimir Lefebvre from 1963 to 1967 in the Soviet Union. After the publication of two works Конфликтующие структуры (ЛЕФЕВР, 1967) – Conflicting Structures and Алгебра конфликта (ЛЕФЕВР; СМОЛЯН, 2010) – Conflict Algebra, Lefebvre's work became the subject of a classified report of the KGB in 1968. Lefebvre's main work (1984) is entitled *Reflexive Control: the Soviet concept of influencing the decision-making process of an opponent* (ЛЕФЕВР, 1984).

The processes of Reflexive Control are based on the Soviet (and now Russian) system, ethical legacies that are very different from those of the West (Christian), in which Russians have a particular understanding of what constitutes "truth".

According to Lefebvre, the concept of *vranyo* (вранио – lie/deception) refers to the "dissemination of untruths that have some basis in reality" (ЛЕФЕВР; СМОЛЯН, 2010) similar to *likelihood*.

Lefebvre defined the *Reflexive Control* as being "a process in which one of the opponents transfers to the other the foundations for decision-making" (ЛЕФЕВР, 1984, p. 81). In other words, there is a substitution of the motivating factors of the opponent to encourage him to make decisions that are unfavorable to him.

For the Armed Forces of Russia, **Reflexive Control** (RC) is the term used to describe **the practice of pre-determining the decision of an opponent in your favor, changing key factors in the perception of the opponent's world** (ЛЕФЕВР, 1984). The term is found mainly in the discussion of information warfare techniques. In this context, the practice represents a key asymmetric facilitator for obtaining critical advantages, neutralizing the opponent's strengths, causing him to choose harmful courses of action for himself.

Exploiting the moral stereotypes of behavior, psychological factors, personal information about the commander (biographical data, habits, etc.), the RC makes it possible to increase the chances of victory, however, it is noted that such tactics require information about the enemy with a high degree of detail and quality!

The manipulation of public opinion in the West through social networks, *troll* factories and networks of *bots*, while driving anti-US, anti-NATO and anti-elite narratives, are part of this policy.

The application of *Reflexive Control* to change the decision-making cycle of the control object (*target audience/decision-maker/public opinion*) acts through the influence of the idea of a situation of the object of control.

The control subject (*Russian*) takes measures to provide the control object with information that reflexively leads to action in the interests of the control subject (*Russian*).

Instead of denying information entirely, or providing false information, the intention of Reflexive Control is to manipulate the information available through information tools (capabilities relating to information warfare-systems, intelligence actions, espionage, other) to the object of control (*target*) so that they use this information to make a reflexive decision in the interests of the control subject.

> Example: **Real Situation → Control Subject X Control Object = action 01**
> **Real situation + the idea of the controller directing to change**
> **the decision cycle → influence messages for verisimilitude to the real situation.**
> **(targeting the desirable scenario) =**
> **Desired real situation → Control Subject + Control Object = action 02.**

As mentioned earlier, decisions are made through a fair, objective, accurate approach based on information relevant to the situation, influencing the approach, the situation changes.

Figure 1– Scheme of Russian Reflexive Control



Source: The Author (2021).

Attitudes, knowledge, and skills are analyzed to determine critical thinking skills, decision making, predictive (*and prospective*) judgment, problem solving, creativity, openness to experience, and other leadership behaviors.

According to the analyzed attitudes, the competencies of inference, Recognition of Assumptions, Deduction, Interpretation and Evaluation of Arguments are measured (indicators).

From the "score" of each leader and/or target (*public*), the persuasive action of Reflexive Control is shaped.

2.2 Opinions of military experts: Ionov, Komov and Chausov

Major M. D. **Ionov** wrote several articles on the subject of Reflexive Control (ИОНОВ, 1994, 1995). He was one of the first military theorists to assess the importance of Reflexive Control. The concept of "Reflexive Control" was not present in any Soviet military encyclopedia when he began to write in the 70s, so it simply could not exist! As a result, in his first articles, Ionov talked about "managing the enemy", and not about Reflexive Control.

At the same time, Ionov also understood the close relationship between advertising and reflexive Control and the need to combine the use of reflexive techniques to organize the management of Reflexive Control (ИОНОВ, 1994).

Ionov identified four main methods to help transmit information to the enemy in order to facilitate the organization of control over him.

1) Applying pressure by demonstration of force. Such a show of force can be exerted in various ways that span different aspects, from diplomatic or economic pressure, such as the threat of economic sanctions, threats of military action, such as increased combat readiness of the Armed Forces, or provocations close to declarations of war.

> The pressure of power, including the use of superior force, displays of force, psychological attacks, ultimatums, threats of sanctions, threats of risk (manifested through a focus on irrational leadership behavior, or delegation of authority to the irresponsible person), military intelligence, provocative maneuvers, weapons tests, restriction of enemy access or isolation of certain areas, increased combat readiness of the Armed Forces, formation of coalitions, an official declaration of war, support for the destabilizing situation of internal forces, disabling and publicizing victory, "pumping" and publicizing the victory, demonstrating relentless actions and showing mercy to an enemy ally who stopped resisting (ИОНОВ, 1994, p. 45, author's translation).

2) Providing false information. This approach suggests the use of camouflage, denial and deception "*Maskirovka*" (Doctrine of Dissimulation) at all levels in order to manipulate the announcement and reception of a situation. This includes showing great strength where.

> Methods of providing false information about the situation, including camouflage (showing weakness in a strong spot), creating false structures (showing "strength" in a weak spot), leaving one position to strengthen another, leaving dangerous objects in this position ("Trojan Horse"), hiding true relations between units or creating false ones, maintaining the secrecy of new weapons, bluffing about weapons, changing the methods of operation or the deliberate loss of documents (ИОНОВ, 1994, p. 46, author's translation).

3) Affecting the decision-making process of the opponent. Such an approach includes systematic modeling of processes, the publication of deliberately distorted doctrines, as well as the presentation of false information to the opponent's system and key figures.

> Provoking the enemy to find new directions of escalation or ending the conflict: a deliberate demonstration of a chain of Special Action, hitting the enemy's stronghold when he is not there, subversive activities and provocations, leaving open the route for the enemy to leave the siege, forcing the enemy to commit punitive actions that lead to the expenditure of its Armed Forces, resources and time (ИОНОВ, 1994, p. 46, author's translation).

4) Affecting the timing of the decision. Here, the element of surprise can be employed by the sudden start of a military operation or induce the opponent to focus on another area of conflict to slow the reaction.

> Impact on the enemy's decision-making algorithm, including the systematic conduct of games through which the dissemination of typical plans, publication of a deliberately distorted doctrine; Impact on controls and key figures transmitting false situation data; Backup form actions to act to neutralize the enemy's operational thinking; changing the timing of a decision that can be made through the sudden onset of hostilities; transmit information about the situation of a similar conflict - working in what appears to be feasible and predictable, the enemy makes an ill-considered decision that will change the path and nature of his operation (ИОНОВ, 1994, p. 47, author's translation).

According to **Ionov** (ИОНОВ, 1994), it is necessary to evaluate human goals for the Reflexive Control of a person or group, taking into account individual or group psychology, way of thinking and professional level of training.

Colonel S. A. Komov, a Russian military theorist, wrote about the informational impact of Reflexive Control and he was possibly the most prolific author on the topic of information wars in the 1990s. On the pages of the magazine "Military Thought", Komov supported the meaning given by Ionov to Reflexive Control, giving it another name, "intellectual" methods of information warfare. He listed the main elements of the "intellectual" approach to information warfare, which he described as:

- Distraction (deviation of attention) – creating a real or imaginary threat to one of the vital dislocations of the enemy (flanks, rear, etc.) during the preparatory phase of hostilities, forcing him to reconsider the common sense of his decisions);
- Overload (at the expense of large amounts of conflicting information often sent to the enemy);
- Paralysis (creation of perceptions of special threats to vital interests or weak spots);
- Exhaustion (forcing the enemy to perform useless actions and thereby exhausting the Armed Forces);
- Deception (provoking the enemy to redeploy his forces to the threatened region during the preparatory stages of hostilities);
- Division (convincing the enemy that he must act against the interests of the coalition);
- Calm (forcing the enemy to believe that pre-planned operations are being trained instead of preparing for offensive actions - and thus reduce their vigilance);
- Intimidation (creating an irresistible perception of superiority);
- Appeasement (by decreasing vigilance and creating the illusion of conducting planned training, and not preparing for offensive actions);
- Provocation (impose on the enemy data so that he performs beneficial actions on your side);

- Proposal (to offer information that touches the enemy legally, morally, ideologically or in other spheres);
- Pressure (to offer information that discredits the government in the eyes of the population) (КОМОВ, 1997, p.18-22, our highlights, author's translation).

Finally, the article of the Captain of the first rank **F. Chausov** (ЧАУСОВ, 1999), continues to discuss Reflexive Control, which is defined as the process of intentional transfer of certain information to the opposing party, which will have an impact on the decision-making by that party corresponding to the information transmitted. Chausov formulated the following principles of Reflexive Control:

- **the principle of purpose** – the process should be goal-oriented, using the full range of measures of Reflexive Control required;
- **the principle of updating** – planning should be "updated", providing a fairly complete picture of the intellectual potential of the command and personnel, especially in situations related to the global information space;
- **the principle of correspondence** – the mutual consistency of goals, place, time and methods of Reflexive Control must be observed;
- **the principle of modeling** – we must not forget to predict and model the actions and states of the opposite side during the execution of Reflexive Control;
- **the principle of anticipation** – current events must be anticipated and anticipated (ЧАУСОВ, 1999, p. 12, our highlights, author's translation).

It also includes **risk assessment**, the essence of which boils down to the danger of being mistaken in case of an incorrect assessment of the consequences. With this approach, the maximum risk will be if the enemy unravels the plan on its own.

2.3 The RC in the Russian Military Doctrine – Gerasimov Doctrine

In the first two decades of this century, Russia conducted operations in several former Soviet states, aimed at establishing a sphere of influence in these countries, and preventing NATO and the EU from expanding their areas of influence, as well as to protect Russian interests and ethnic minorities abroad (Russian ENS, 2021).

In this same period, Western analyses of the conflicts in which Russia took part focused on the different forces that Russia used to achieve its objectives: cyber forces in Estonia, conventional forces in Georgia and Special Operations Forces (FOpEsp) in Crimea area of Ukraine (BERZINS, 2014).

Western military specialists were especially interested in the operational teachings of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and how they supplemented their conventional military means with FOpEsp, transport, naval infantry and with rapid reaction forces. Others also speculated how Russia would use cyber resources in future conflicts. However, most of these studies it has a limited scope with only a focus on military *hard power*. In addition, most of them are based on Western assumptions about the Russian war mode, using military means within traditional domains air, sea and land, expanded with the new cybernetic domain. In reality, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFRF) changed its doctrine of war in an **operational concept** to achieve the goals of its foreign policy (ПОДБЕРЕЗКИ, 2014; ДОКТРИНА..., 2016; РОССИЯ, 2021; RUSSIAN, 2014).

In 2003, Russia launched a "*white paper*" in support of this new policy, which described a change in military thinking and defined a new operational concept based on the integration of strategic, operational and tactical elements. The concept was updated with the lessons of the Estonian and Georgian conflicts. It is characterized by the use of non-military means and non-traditional domains, such as youth groups Partisans, cyber-attacks, civilian media and forces "*proxy*". Vital to the new operational concept is the rapid destruction, disruption or control of communications, economy, infrastructure and political institutions to disrupt the command and control of the enemy, as well as total cyber dominance.

In this section this New Doctrine (NTG) is detailed, as well as, it is described the Russian operational framework and its links with information warfare activities, military concepts and strategic positions, followed by a brief exemplification of the application of the new doctrine in the conflict of Ukraine (Crimea), of 2014.

The main goal is to reveal tactical and operational level actions (*Strategic Communication and Reflexive Control activities*) of the new doctrine (NTG) and the cumulative effects and goals that these actions need to achieve in order to gain a better understanding of the new Russian operational concept (DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 2017).

2.4 The Russian approach to a conflict

In February 2014, the chief of the General Staff of the AFRF, general Valery Gerasimov, described in his article "*The Value of Science in Foresight*" (ВАЛЕРИЙ, 2013), the new operational concept based on the lessons of the Estonian and Georgian conflicts.

Gen Gerasimov explained that AFRF has developed unique situational planning models for applying military and non-military means, such as FOpEsp, forces "*proxy*", civil media and cyber capabilities to influence all actors, disrupt communication and destabilize regions in order to achieve their goals.

During the conflicts of Estonia, Georgia (BARABANOV, 2014), Ukraine (ANALYSIS..., 2014) (HAINES, 2015) and Syria (SUTYAGIN, 2015), Russia has established civilian capabilities such as youth groups and state media and mobilized Russian ethnic minorities abroad, appealing to feelings of marginalization, a sense of self-esteem and belonging, and a perception that "Mother Russia" has more to offer than the home country. Then Russia provoked international reactions and created a general perception of despair of the military and political leadership of the target countries, after which these countries were willing or forced to accept the new situation created by Russia (FRIDMAN; 2019; GALEOTTI, 2019; LANKINA; WATANABE, 2017; SZOSTEK, 2017).

The so-called "Gerasimov Doctrine" is an approach of society that causes a change of means and domains and poses a challenge to the Western mode of war due to unfamiliarity with its ways, means, effects and goals.

Gen Gerasimov described the current framework of the Russian operational concept as the use of "*all non-military methods in resolving interstate conflicts*" [1].

It incorporates six phases as shown in Figure 01: secret origin, escalation, the outbreak of conflict activity, crisis, resolution and ending with the restoration of peace.

This operational concept is a set of systems, methods and tasks for influencing the perception (RC) and behavior of the enemy, the population and the international community at all levels. He uses a systems approach based on "Reflexive Control" (perception management) to target the enemy leadership and change their guidance in such a way that they make decisions favorable to Russia and take actions that lead to a sense of despair within their leadership and establish a basis for negotiation on Russian terms. According to Ionov, in this case, Reflexive Control "considers psychological characters of human beings and involves intentional influence on their decision-making models" (BARTLES, 2016, p. 31, author's translation).

Figure 2 – The role of non-military methods in resolving interstate conflicts.



Source: Adapted from Герасимов, 2014.

The New Doctrine (NTG) has not evolved in a vacuum over the past decade, but it is a double reaction to the events that unfolded after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

1 Ivanovich, Mironov Sergey. Lecture at the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. The topic of the lecture: "Security and the role of military force in ensuring international security" Course: "Military-Political Aspects in international relations and arms control", 2017. Author's source.

First of all, the evolution is a reaction of the Russian leadership under President Vladimir Putin, to combat the cognitive model that reflects the internal structure of a decision-making system. This model offers an approach of interrelated mechanisms based on history, social conditions and linguistics, to deceive, tempt, intimidate or misinform the enemy. Reflexive Control mechanisms can cause psychological effects ranging from disappointment to suggestion. If one of these mechanisms fails, the overall Reflexive Control approach needs to engage another mechanism, or its original effects can degrade rapidly.

Finally, Russian operational art relies on concealment, also a technique of Reflexive Control, divided into two levels. Concealment of the operational level concerns the measures of "way to achieve operational surprise and is designed to disorient the enemy in relation to the nature, concept, scale and time of impending combat operations". (ГЕРАСИМОВ, 2014, p.19) and strategic-level concealment are "activities that surreptitiously prepare a strategic operation or campaign to disorient the enemy in relation to the true intentions of actions". (ГЕРАСИМОВ, 2014, p. 19)

Gen Gerasimov explained the new operational concept with some of the same principles as Georgi Isserson, one of the leading Soviet military thinkers before World War II. Isserson defined the operational art as the ability of direction and organization, in which operations are a chain of efforts throughout the depth of the operation area, with principles of shock, speed, efficiency, mobility, simultaneity, technological support and a decisive moment in the final phase. Gerasimov added to the notion of Isserson the application of asymmetric and indirect actions by civilian/military components, Special Operations forces and technical weapons (ISSERSON, 2013) to weaken the economy and destroy key infrastructure in a potential area of operations. The new operational concept is therefore a mere continuation of the existing Russian operational art with different means, not only in the physical domain but also in the information domain.

Russia uses "*extraterritorial forces*", both paramilitary and cyber, supported by institutions and companies (media or not), Spetsnaz fighters and *Cossack* to conduct different types of operations, such as unconventional, information, psychological and cyber operations, as well as assistance to security forces and **strategic communication**. Russia manages these military and non-military means through state-controlled enterprises and organizations under a centralized political command structure. This structure, coupled with the fact that the forces employed consist of a mixture of ethnic Russians and Russians abroad, make Russia not only explore social conditions, but also cultural and linguistic factors in the former Soviet states and at home to create "*extraterritorial forces*". <u>Studies the behavior, ethnic composition and demography</u> of all potential opponents to reveal advantages that can exploit to achieve their goals[2] (АННЕНКОВ et al, 2006, 2011, 2015).

2 Ivanovich, Mironov Sergey. Lecture at the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. The topic of the lecture: "Security and the role of military force in ensuring international security" Course: "Military-Political Aspects in international relations and arms control", 2017. Author's source.

2.5 Detailing the use of the Gerasimov Doctrine (ASYMMETRIC WARFARE GROUP, 2016; BARTLES, 2016; DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 2017;) (NTG) (GORENBURG, 2017), with emphasis on information warfare and Reflexive Control

For the complete understanding of the Doctrine, I will approach the Operational Art in 07 (seven) phases, that is, 01 (one) more than presented by Gen. Gerasimov (ГЕРАСИМОВ, 2014), aiming to present the total actions of the information doctrine (ДОКТРИНА, 2016), with Strategy / Reflexive Control of NTG.

The details must be accompanied with the assistance of the document contained in **Appendix n. 01**.

On the baseline, it lies from the development of time, from left to right.

Vertically, 03 (three) fields of action are delimited: military measures (at the base), non-military measures (at the center) and information warfare (at the top).

In the evolution of time, within each field, the actions of: Operational Objectives, Tasks at the Tactical Level, Reflexive Control Actions, the actions of the Gerasimov Doctrine and the necessary Financial Support / Diplomatic Effort are identified.

The description of the detail is approached, within the temporal phase, from the base to the top, presenting the triggering of the actions within each field.

Figure 3 – Frame of the base of the detail Appendix 1.



Source: The Author (2021)

Figure 4 – Strategy and Operational Art of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation



Source: The Author (2021)

a) Phase 0 – Preparation in Advance

Military Measures – Small infiltrations of FOpEsp and GRU are triggered in order to carry out subversive actions (support) and recognition. The means of the Strategic Missile Force and the GRU carry out a weekly update of Geoint data and detailed strategic reconnaissance. Military commands conduct military exercises within their area, but in the vicinity of the borders (Rec GE).

Non-Military Measures – Minorities are "triggered" or created, there is also the triggering of the "Nashi forces" (DENNING, 2015), Partisans or Cossacks, as well as the EMP aiming at future support. Economically, contracts are carried out between companies interested in the area, mainly infrastructure companies, as well as, the co-opting of elite elements in the target area, through financial corruption.

Information War – The networks, "backbones" and cyberinfrastructure are updated, initiating actions to enable the superiority of the internet and media. The operational goal is the local domain of information. The actions of Com Strategy/RC triggered are aimed at Suggestion and Dissuasion. The suggestion is directed at minorities and errors of local government (generation of enmities). Deterrence is aimed at hiding the strategic displacement, as well as, passing on the idea of "Lost Cause".

By way of example, the phase of early preparation for the conflicts of Georgia, Ukraine and Estonia began in 1991, when they all became independent and separate states from the Soviet Union, focusing on two separatist regions: South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Both regions did not have large ethnic Russian populations, but the inhabitants had a distinctly different culture and language from the Georgian population, more related to the areas on the north, inside Russia. Tensions in Ukraine soon followed, largely because of an ethnic Russian minority in Crimea who wished to join Russia. At the same time, the Estonian government passed a law that rejected Russian as an official language, forcing the Estonian language over ethnic Russians as a requirement to gain Estonian nationality. Russia saw these developments as a marginalization of the rights of ethnic Russians. In the following years, Moscow issued passports to ethnic Russians in all three countries, creating a Russian minority, which it promised to protect. Tensions escalated when Estonia joined the EU and NATO in 2004 and subsequently refused to build an oil pipeline together with Russia. In most cases, Russia infused the situation by granting citizenship to ethnic Russians or other inhabitants with complaints, creating Russian citizens in neighboring states. It is one of Russia's main strategic objectives to protect ethnic Russians wherever they are.

b) Phase 1 – Secret Origin

Military Measures – In this phase the support forces are structured, with the support of the GRU, aiming at the formation of local forces, EMP and foreign volunteers (Force Proxy) for the escalation phase. The activities of reconnaissance and monitoring of situational awareness remain, as well as, strategic displacement and military exercises in the border strip are intensified. At the tactical level, the movement of strategic deterrents (Def Aae, GE and Missiles) is already observed.

Figure 5 – Frame of military and non-military measures and their connections during the Secret Origin (check the complete diagram on the appendix).



Source: The Author (2021)

Non-Military Measures – Increased financial support for co-opting activities of partners "loyal to the cause". From the formation of minorities (with ethnic descendants or not) are triggered training action and establishment of areas of operations (includes the study and validation of key areas for "area denial"). The actions of Nashi (civil support in all fields) and business interests are also intensified. Intense work on the formation of political opposition is carried out. The operational objective is the formation of alliances and/or a coalition, as well as the gradual "weakening" of diplomatic relations.

Information warfare – At this stage, the Russian operational concept, for external media, is that of "military danger". That is, the actions of other stakeholders can militarily affect the target area, aimed at giving freedom of action for Russian military employment. The political strategic positioning is dissemination in traditional media. The activities of Com Strategy/RC are intensified with the objectives of provocation, distraction, information overload in the internal systems of the target area, and increase the degree of Deterrence.

c) Phase 2 – Escalation

Military Measures – Efforts remain in subversive measures, support to the sustentation forces in the target area, monitoring of situational awareness (prioritizing Intel, GE, AAe, Cyber) and the means of strategic deterrence are already positioned. In this phase, the first EMPs appear on the ground, mainly of logistics and support to civil activities (health and covered Peacekeeping). The most identified differential is the provision of military means in DTAs near the border, carrying out maintenance activities of military exercises. The Train Force of the Ministry of Defence is widely employed for logistics.

Non-Military Measures – At this stage, the first manifestations and actions of civil unrest are identified. The training of local non-military forces and volunteer foreigners is already in conditions of employment. In the financial market, capital flight and various cyber actions in the financial system are identified. The formation of political opposition is felt with the increase in the amounts of (planned) protests. The force support Nashi is fundamental, along with diplomatic actions, aimed at ensuring the strategic-operational objectives of Blockade and Economic Sanctions, along with political / diplomatic pressures aimed at the change of leaderships in the target area.

Information warfare – The Russian concept of "Indirect Threat" is worked out to exhaustion. That is, that the actions of the civilian population must be supported and any movement of military means is considered a threat. In the face of the international community, the strategic position adopted is to publicize the image that political leaders and institutions are inoperative in the target area, needing “help” to control the “chaos”. In this phase, cyber forces are already structured and begin activities across the spectrum of C2, critical infrastructure and decision-making. The actions of Com Strategy/RC are mainly directed at Pressure, Deception, Division, Overload and Justification, aimed at increasing freedom of action and increasing controlled chaos in the target area. With the aim of isolating the decision-making process of the leadership in the target area, Deterrence actions (isolation of decisions and civil unrest) are undertaken.

Activities in the conflict of Ukraine

The escalating phase of the crisis began after President Yanukovych of Ukraine fled the country in February 2014 and a pro-Western government took power. According to Russia, the new government acted against the security of Russians inside Ukraine. Russia used the discourse of international humanitarian intervention for its protection and of Russians abroad to justify an intervention, again in reference to Western arguments for validating NATO involvement in the Kosovo crisis.

The next step of the Russian operation was the media campaign to gain support in Crimea and Russia and isolate the Government of Ukraine, as depicted in the center of phases one and two: strategic communication. The television and Internet were the dominant media in Ukraine. In Crimea, in total, 95% of the population gathered their news from television channels, which were almost all Russian state-owned. About 50% of the population of Crimea gathered their news from the Internet, and 70% of Crimean internet users rely on their news collection on the two main available Russian social networking sites. Russians and Ukrainians analyzed information about feelings collected from the Internet, finding a score of 76% for pro-Russian feelings in the region. Independent news providers are rated with a reliable score of 30%, and foreign news providers only have 5% reliability. In short, it is reasonable to state that Russia established the domain of information in the first phase of the new doctrine (NTG) – hidden origin – and that it used extra means during the next phase to maintain this domain described as the goal of "local information domain".

The Russian information campaign began with the comparison of the Ukrainian government and its Western allies with Nazis, gays, Jews and other groups of people that Russia claimed to be part of the government's comparison with Nazi Germany. This theme remained throughout the conflict. Russia also accused the Western media of oversimplifying demographic maps, signifying Eastern and southern Ukraine as the predominant ethnic Russians. Meanwhile, diplomatic channels and the Russian leadership began to emphasize the same issues of marginalized Russian minorities seeking reunification with Russia.

On February 14, a cyberattack emerged, targeting one of Ukraine's largest banks, attacked by malware, aimed at supporting unrest in the country and portrayed as one of the non-military means in Appendix 1.

d) Phase 3 – beginning of hostilities

Military Measures – Measures of area denial (dispersion of means) and strategic deployment within the operational range are established. The activities of the escalation phase are maintained, but with the aim of triggering the opposing side in order for it to mistakenly react to a predetermined action (argument for self-defense). We highlight the control actions of the electromagnetic spectrum and the use of "drones".

Non-Military Measures – Pressure actions in the political, economic, psychosocial and civil unrest fields are maintained. Some locations in the target area are now controlled by Proxy Forces and designated as Vital Territory. These are infrastructure, media facilities, neighborhoods located in the main DTAs, etc. The "*green men*" can be observed, usually Security EMP for NGOs partisans of humanitarian aid.

Information warfare – The Russian concept of "military threat" is worked with the focus on the military means of the target area (*The Defense Forces attack their own people*). Military actions on the civilian population, humanitarian support or on some Russian military means is considered a threat. In the face of the international community, the adopted strategic position of disseminating the image that political leaders and institutions are inoperative remains, but contradictions are intensified, mainly by diplomatic means. Antagonisms, disagreements and internal enmities of the target area are exacerbated. The actions of Com Strategy/RC in this phase are directed to two strands: the first, with Pressure, Deception, Division, Overload and Suggestion are directed to the political and economic fields; and the second, with exhaustion, informational overload, deterrence and paralysis are directed to the military and science and technology fields. Measures aimed at blocking military and political C2 (isolating the source of power) are initiated.

Note – at home and abroad, the Com Strategy/RC system often operates in a public-private partnership with Russian oligarchs or businessmen, as well as through the co-opting of "independent" hackers by intelligence agencies. The strategy is **feeding existing resentments, stereotypes and vulnerabilities**. Every actor who weakens the dominant systems and helps to undermine confidence in the democracies of the target area is received as a partner.

Activities in the conflict of Ukraine

Local paramilitary forces and Cossacks stormed the parliament and replaced it with pro-Russians, led by Sergei Aksyonov. While pro-Russian sympathizers seized more key facilities in Crimea, volunteers from Russia came to their aid and a strong Russian army of 40,000 soldiers began exercises on the Ukraine-Russia border. In the days after the seizure, the Cossacks remained to protect the Parliament Buildings against the Ukrainian army or pro-Ukraine sympathizers. From February 28, the militants occupied military facilities, airfields, the regional media and telecommunications centers. They turned off telephone and internet communication in Crimea as more planes with new troops landed at the seized airfields. It is this combination of unconventional warfare by Special Operations forces and Proxy Forces, coupled with an overwhelming conventional force conducting exercises on the border, that either leads to a desired provocation for a reaction or deterrence/pacification to prevent one, as depicted in Appendix 08.

For provocation or deterrence/pacification to work, the government needs to be more or less isolated, burdened with misinformation as depicted in the center of Appendix 1. Therefore, the militants blocked radio and cellular traffic to further isolate Crimea from Ukraine. The cyberattacks coordinated by Russia began in early March and hit the Ukrainian government, as well as NATO websites. Cyber Berkut, a Ukrainian group, which may have ties to Russian intelligence services, organized the attacks. These attacks hampered the leadership of NATO and Ukraine, but did not lead to isolation or overload. The United States convened a UN mission in the region in March; Russia refused. Instead, prime minister Aksyonov of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, together with former Ukrainian President Yanukovych, called for Russian intervention on March 1 and an independence referendum on March 30.

e) Phase 4 – Crisis

Military Measures – The same measures are maintained as in the stage of the beginning of hostilities. However, logistics for military means are increased, according to the time planning of operations. The strategic deployment is practically completed and reconnaissance actions "at the limit of the area of responsibility" are triggered. Such actions can lead to small combats on the border (self-defense action and reaction).

Non-Military Measures – Proxy forces begin their most notorious activities with successive attempts to dominate areas of interest aiming at the operational goal of control of the target area. Subversive actions can be triggered in certain places (radio antennas, etc.), but always recognized as "acts of sabotage" by partisans (КРЕЦУЛ, 2015). In the political area, scenarios for negotiation are presented. However, with targeted EFD.

Information warfare – At the beginning of this phase actions are triggered for the economic isolation of the opponent. The measures of Com Strategy/RC of the previous phase are maintained, but the focus is directed to the political paralysis of the opponent, aiming at the operational goal that should be felt until the phase of armed conflict.

Activities in the conflict of Ukraine

With the Crimean government virtually removed, the effects of Reflexive Control such as distraction, pressure, suggestion and isolation (*local)* were successful. Russia was never able to completely isolate the Ukrainian government, however, as Western support for this government decreased during the conflict and the EFD was achieved.

f) Phase 5 – Military activities (armed conflict)

Military Measures – The doctrine of Russian military employment is applied, with area denial and massive employment of armored means. Actions are carried out with maximum speed and dispersion.

Non-Military Measures – Actions on the opponent's infrastructures are intensified by Proxy Forces. The pursued operational goal is the control of the vital territory. Actions of Military Economy (blockade of imports, breach of contracts, etc.) are triggered aimed at the replacement isolation of the opponent's MEM. In the diplomatic area, the pressures for validation of the intended scenario remain. Reports of corruption, image breakdown, discrediting, etc. are some of the activities developed with diplomatic objectives. Some companies are already present in "combat-free " areas providing infrastructure and logistical support. Contracts of contractors for reconstruction are signed.

Information Warfare – The strategic positioning sought is aimed at increasing any and all freedom of action. The operational goals of political isolation, perception of despair and acceptance of terms are sought endlessly. In the Com Strategy/RC the military side is maintained and the political side is directed towards the deception and distraction of the decision-making process. Before the public opinion is presented the proposed scenario and its acceptance is strongly worked. The message of restructuring the area with the employment of companies and support to the local population is the focus. Topics such as environmental protection and protection of local cultural heritage assets are raised. The help of entrepreneurs in the communication area is requested. However, in combat areas, all physical or informational access, of any media, is controlled. The monitoring of the theme on social media is strongly executed. As well as, the control of public opinion is accompanied.

Activities in the conflict of Ukraine

Then in the Russian approach were the tasks that would lead to provocations (a second time as a last resort) or exhaustion and paralysis of the Ukrainian government in Kyiv. Although the Ukrainian government decided not to be provoked strategically, the result at the operational level was devastating. The combined actions led to the breakdown of the morale of the Ukrainian forces in Crimea, through a combination of the Reflexive Control mechanisms of exhaustion and suggestion, as they handed over their bases, in many cases to join the Russian forces. The "Little Green Men" isolated the Ukrainian forces at their bases and then used the local Internet and media to start military information support operations, media campaigns and intimidation in combination with bribery.

By March 2, the militants had already cut the power lines at the headquarters of the Ukrainian Navy in Sevastopol, followed by the seizure of the communication facilities of the Ukrainian Naval Forces and the sabotage of all communication lines. A cyberattack in Crimean area did not occur. One reason for the absence may be that Crimea is a small area with only one internet hub, which was already in the hands of the “unknown” troops.

The Kyiv government admitted that the local police and armed forces in Crimea were corrupt, sympathized with the uprising or had low morale. Then Russian agents of influence penetrated the local intelligence and security forces. Together, the lack of communications and base support led to the tactical and eventually operational isolation of Ukrainian forces in Crimea and their perception of despair.

g) Phase 6 – Restoration of peace and signing of treaties

Military Measures – The withdrawal of part of the forces employed begins, leaving in the target area EMP for the formation of self-defense forces. The following stand out: Military Police troops, DQBRN, GRU, FOpEsp, FSB and Def AAe. Subsequently, in the event of annexation, AFRF troops will be deployed.

Non-Military Measures – Actions of withdrawals of foreigners and cataloging of the population are done. Civil-military partnerships for reconstruction begin their activities. Political organization and essential services are worked out and routine activities are supported.

Information Warfare – The strategic positioning sought is to maintain any and all freedom of action for acceptance of the terms. The operational goals of political isolation and acceptance of the terms is pursued incessantly. Themes of pacification of hostilities and return of economic activities are worked. The Com Strategy/RC is aimed at pacifying the target area, with the opening of places for visitation, inauguration of real estate projects and the encouragement of cultural tourism.

Activities in the conflict of Ukraine

In April 2014, Russia admitted that the "Little Green Men" were, in fact, AFRF Spetznaz and airborne troops. On March 16, Crimea held the referendum for independence ahead of schedule, and 96.77% voted for reunification with Russia (turnout was 83.1%). The Russian Duma (parliament) signed a treaty on March 18 formally incorporating Crimea into Russia, initiating the sixth phase, the restoration of peace. The conflict remains frozen (ØSTENSEN, Å.; BUKKVOLL, Ø. 2018).

3 Conclusion

The current Russian operational concept uses military and non-military means simultaneously and quickly in all physical and informational domains, through the application of asymmetric and indirect actions. Russia mitigates the capabilities of opponents, creates chaos, takes vital terrain and isolates the enemy leadership. Although Russia uses a conventional force in its superior operational concept and with which victory is almost certain, it does not want to employ military forces as such for its foreign policy.

The big fight is an unwanted escalation, as Russia seeks a psychological, not physical victory. Instead of military action, Russia wants to let the Strategic Communication System spread Reflexive Control. The culminating psychological effects of the Reflexive Control approach such as disorientation, suggestion, and concealment need to overcome provocation. In the end, it will cause exhaustion, paralysis and perception of despair among the political and military leadership of opponents. These plausible perceptions and misperceptions create the leadership for the final phase of the New Doctrine (NTG): **non-combat resolution**.

The evolution of the New Doctrine (NTG) and its framework is not over, since the Russian operational framework is anything but a fixed set of means and strategies. The Russian leadership can develop and employ new types of asymmetric means, depending on the situation in question.

In the opinion of General Gerasimov, each conflict has its own set of rules and therefore requires unique ways and means. On the other hand, the effects to be achieved must be related to phases and goals. Therefore, the lesson for possible future conflicts is not merely to fixate on the physical means of Russia, but, more importantly, to recognize the phases discussed and predict the effects desired by the opponent.

We found that the "Gerasimov Doctrine" tested its structure during the conflicts of Estonia, Georgia and Ukraine, and in all of them the desired final state was achieved.

Studies on the use of Strategic Communication combined with Reflective Control must be developed so that we can identify its effects, that is, us as a target, so that protective measures can be taken in a timely manner. In view of the latest activities of the companies Cambridge Analytica, SCL Group (defensa) and Psy-Group in the democracies of Australia, India, Philippines, Kenya, Malta, Malaysia, Romania, Trinidad and Tobago, Nigeria, United States and the UK – case Leave.EU (BORSHCHEVSKAYA, 2019; National Defense University, 2020. CSIS, 2020 and Congressional Research Service, 2021), which have modern features of the use of Reflexive Control, but not by the Russians.

References

АННЕНКОВ, В. И. etal. **Международная безопасность**: геополитические и военно-политические аспекты современности. Под общей редакцией проф. Анненкова В.И. Москва: РУСАВИА, 2015. 512 с.

АННЕНКОВ, В.И. etal. **Военная сила в международных отношениях**. Наставнический. Москва: КНОРУС, 2011. 496 с.

АННЕНКОВ, В.И. etal. **Безопасность России:** геополитические и военно-политические аспекты. Москва, 2006.

ANALYSIS: Russian military manpower – strengths, weaknesses, Ukraine standoff. **Caversham BBC Monitoring**, [London], May 15, 2014.

ASYMMETRIC WARFARE GROUP. **Russian new generation warfare handbook**. [S. l.]: AsymmetricWarfareGroup, Dec 2016. p. 68. Available in: https://info.publicintelligence.net/AWG-RussianNewWarfareHandbook.pdf. Access in: 18 nov. 2021.

ВАЛЕРИЙ, Г. Ценность науки в ожидании: Новые вызовы требуют переосмыслить формы и способы ведения боевых действий. **Военно-промышленный курьер**, 26 февраля 2013. Disponívelem: http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14632. Access in: 26 jul. 2017.

BARABANOV, M. Hard Lessons Learned: Russian Military Reform up to the Georgian Conflict. In: HOWARD, C.; PUKHNOV, R. **Brothers armed**: military aspects of the crisis in Ukraine. Minneapolis: East View Press, 2014. p. 80-81.

BARTLES, C. K. Getting Gerasimov Right. **Military Review**, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, v. 96, n. 1, p. 30-38, Jan/Feb 2016. Available in: https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20160228_art009.pdf. Access in: 19 nov. 2021.

BERZINS, J. **Russia's new generation warfare in Ukraine**: implications for Latvian Defense Policy. Latvia: Narional Defence Academy of Latvia, Apr 2014.p. 3-6. (Policy Paper, n. 2). Available in: https://sldinfo.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/New-Generation-Warfare.pdf. Access in: 19 nov. 2021.

BIKKENIN, R. Questions of theory: information conflict in the military sphere: basic elements and concepts. **Information Conflict in Military Sphere**, [s. l.], p. 38-40, Sep. 18, 2003.

BOLDYREVA, Elena, Cambridge Analytica: Ethics And Online Manipulation With Decision-Making Process. 2018/12/31 pg. 102. DO - 10.15405/epsbs.2018.12.02.10 Available in: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330032180_Cambridge_Analytica_Ethics_And_Online_Manipulation_With_Decision-Making_Process. Acessado em 19 Nov 21.

BORSHCHEVSKAYA, Anna. **Russian Private Military Companies: Continuity and Evolution of the Model.** Russia Foreign Policy Papers, Dec 2019. p. 21. Available in: https://www.fpri.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/rfp4-borshchevskaya-final.pdf. Acessado em 19 Nov 21.

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES. **Not so private military and security companies**: Wagner Group and Russian Prosecution of Great Power Politics. Washington, D.C.: CSIS, Sept25, 2020. Available in: https://www.csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/not-so-private-military-and-security-companies. Access in: 1oct. 2020.

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES. **Moscow's Mercenary Wars.** Washington, D.C.: CSIS, Sept 2020. Available in: https://russianpmcs.csis.org/. Acessado em 19 Nov 21.

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE. Sept 16, 2020. **Russian Private Military Companies (PMCs)** Available in: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11650. Acessado em 19 Nov 21.

ЧАУСОВ, Ф. Основы рефлексивного управления противником. **Морской сборник**, [s. l.], n.1, 1999.

DENNING, D. The rise of hacktivism. **Georgetown Journal of International Affairs**, Washington, D.C, Sep 8, 2015. Available in: https://www.georgetownjournalofinternationalaffairs.org/online-edition/the-rise-of-hacktivism. Access in: 19 nov. 2021.

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (United States). **Russia military power**: building a military to support great power aspirations. [Washington, D.C.]: DIA, 2017. p. 116.

ПОДБЕРЕЗКИН, А.**Анализ, стратегический прогноз и планирование в военно-политической области**. 2014. Центр военно-политических исследований, Московский государственный институт международных отношений, Университет МИД России, Московский, 2014. Available in: https://docplayer.com/64510400-Analiz-strategicheskiy-prognoz-i-planirovanie-v-voenno-politicheskoy-oblasti.html. Access in: 22 nov. 2021.

ДОКТРИНА информационной безопасности Российской Федерации.УтвержденаУказом Президента Российской Федерации от.п. 646, 5 декабря 2016 г. Available in: https://rg.ru/2016/12/06/doktrina-infobezobasnost-site-dok.html. Access in: 22 nov. 2021.

ГЕРАСИМОВ,В. В. Доклад начальника штаба Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации: роль государства оборонной организации страны в соответствии с новым положением о штабе, утвержденным Президентом Российской Федерации. **ВестникАкадемиивоенныхнаук,**[s. l.], tom 1, n. 46, с. 14-22, 2014. Available in: http://www.avnrf.ru/index.php/zhurnal-qvoennyj-vestnikq/arkhiv-nomerov/639-vestnik-avn-1-2014 . Access in: 5 apr. 2018.

FRIDMAN, O. On the "Gerasimov Doctrine": why the West Fails to beat Russia to the punch. **PRISM**, [Washington, D.C], v. 8, n. 2, p. 100-113, 2019. Available in: https://www.jstor.org/stable/26803233?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents. Access in: 18 nov. 2021.

GALEOTTI, M. **Moscow's mercenaries reveal the privatisation of Russian geopolitics**. In: OPENDEMOCRACY. London: open Democracy, Aug 29, 2017. Available in: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/chvk-wagner-and-privatisation-of-russian-geopolitics/. Access in: 29 ago. 2017.

GALEOTTI, M. The mythical 'Gerasimov Doctrine' and the language of threat. **Critical Studies on Security**, London, v. 7, n. 2, p. 157-161, 2019. Available in: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/21624887.2018.1441623?journalCode=rcss20. Access in: 18 nov. 2021.

GORENBURG, D. **Russia's military modernization plans**: 2018-2027. In: GORENBURG, D. Russian Military Reform. Cambridge, Nov 27, 2017. Available in: https://russiamil.wordpress.com/2017/11/27/russias-military-modernization-plans-2018-2027/. Access in: 27 nov. 2017.

HAINES, J. R. Russia's use of disinformation in the Ukraine Conflict - analysis. **EurasiaReview**, [s. l.], 18 Feb 2015. Available in: http://www.eurasiareview.com/18022015-russias-use-of-disinformation-in-the-ukraine-conflict-analysis/. Access in: 30 may 2021.

IBS Center for Management Research. Facebook–Cambridge Analytica Data Scandal. Available in: https://www.icmrindia.org/casestudies/catalogue/Business%20Ethics/BECG160.htm. Acessado em 19 Nov 21.

Institute For National Strategic Studies (NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY), Nov 24, 2020. **Russia's Escalating use of Private Military Companies in Africa**. Available in: https://inss.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/2425797/russias-escalating-use-of-private-military-companies-in-africa/ . Acessado em 19 Nov 21.

ИОНОВ, М. Д. Психологические аспекты управления противником в антагонистических конфликтах (рефлексивное управление). **Прикладная эргономика**,[s. l.], Специальный выпуск. n. 1, 1994.

ИОНОВ, М. Д. Управление противником. **Морскойсборник**, n. 7, 1995.

ISSERSON, G. S. **The evolution of operational.** Translated by Bruce W. Menning. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center's, 2013. Available in: https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/OperationalArt.pdf. Access in: 19 nov. 2017.

ЛЕФЕВР, В. А. Конфликтующие структуры. Москва: Высшая школа, 1967.

ЛЕФЕВР,В. А. Рефлексивный контроль: советская концепция влияния на процесс принятия решений противником. Москва: Научные приложения, 1984.

ЛЕФЕВР, В. А.; СМОЛЯН, Г. Л. **Алгебра конфликта**. 4 е. изд. Москва: Книжный дом, Либроком, 2010.

ЛЕОНЕНКО, С. Рефлексивное управление противником. **Армейский сборник**, [s. l.], n. 8, 1995.

КОМОВ, С. А. Оспособахведенияинформационнойборьбы. Военнаямысль, tom 4, n. 7-8, c. 18-22, 1997.

КОНОНОВ Д.А., Кульба В.В., Шубин А.Н. **Информационное управление: принципы моделирования и области использования** //Труды ИПУ РАН. Т. ХХШ. - М.: ИПУ РАН. 2005. С. 5-29.Kononov D.A., Kulba V.V., Shubin A.N. Gestão da informação: princípios de modelagem e áreas de uso // Procedimentos de IPU RAS. T. XXSH. - M.: IPU RAN. 2005.S. 5-29.

КРЕЦУЛ, Р. Россия закрывает «черную дыру» на границе с Украиной.**ВЗГЛЯД.РУ,** Москва,1 июня 2015. Available in: https://vz.ru/society/2015/6/1/748541.html. Acessoem: 30 may 2021.

LANKINA, T.; WATANABE, K. 'Russian Spring' or 'Spring Betrayal'? The media as a mirror of Putin's evolving strategy in Ukraine. **Europe-AsiaStudies**, [London], v. 69, n. 10, p. 1526-1556, Dec 2017. Available in: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09668136.2017.1397603. Access in: 18 nov. 2021.

ØSTENSEN, Å.; BUKKVOLL, Ø. **Russian use of private military and security companies - the implications for European and Norwegian Security**. Oslo: Chr. MichelsensInstitutt, 2018. (FFI-RAPPORT, n. 18/01300). Available in: https://www.cmi.no/publications/6637-russian-use-of-private-military-and-security. Access in: 23 nov. 2021.

РОССИЯ. Президента. Стратегия национальной безопасности Российской Федерации, Москва, n. 400, 2 июля 2021 года. Available in: http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/QZw6hSk5z9gWq0plD1ZzmR5cER0g5tZC.pdf. Access in: 22 nov. 2021.

RUSSIAN. President of the Russian Federation. Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, approved by Russian Federation President V. Putin. In: RUSSIAN FEDERATION PRESIDENT. [Moscow], Dec 31, 2014. Available in: http://www.kremlin.ru. Access in: 30 may 2021.

RUSSIA'S new maritime doctrine. **Jane's Defense Weekly**, [s. l.], p. 4, Aug 14, 2015.

SUTYAGIN, I. Detailing Russian Forces in Syria. In: THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICES INSTITUTE. **Defense Systems**. London: RUSI, Nov 13, 2015. Available in: https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/rusi-defence-systems/detailing-russian-forces-in-syria. Access in: 30 may 2021.

ТУРКО, Н.И.; МОДЕСТОВ,С.А. **Рефлексивное управление развитием стратегических сил как механизм современной геополитики**: Системный анализ на пороге 21 века‖: теория и практика» Москва, февраль 1996 г. с. 366.

SZOSTEK, J. The power and limits of Russia's strategic narrative in Ukraine: the role of linkage. **Perspectives on Politics**, Cambridge, v. 15, n. 2, p. 379-395, 2017. Available in: https://eprints.gla.ac.uk/167897/. Access in: 18 nov. 2021.

ECEME

PROFESSIONAL ARTICLE DOI 10.52781/cmm.e013

Strategic communication and its systematization in the Brazilian Army: a proposal

La comunicación estratégica y su sistematización en el ejército brasileño: una propuesta

Antonio Cesar Esteves Mariotti
Exército Brasileiro. Comando Militar do Leste.
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.
capmariotti@gmail.com

Carlos Gabriel Brusch Nascimento
Exército Brasileiro. Estado-Maior do Exército.
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.
cs3245@gmail.com

Abstract: In today's world, societies and individuals are increasingly interconnected. The environment in which events thrive is constantly changing, making it difficult to build scenarios and adjust forecasts. This reality affects not only people, but also companies and institutions. This environment represents challenges and opportunities to be explored by organizations, as information has become a determining strategic element. In this sense, Strategic Communication has been presented as the most suitable tool for institutions and companies. Seeking to expand the reach of its communication, the Brazilian Army, through the Army General Staff, determined that the 34th class of the Army's Politics, Strategy and High Administration Course should carry out a study on Strategic Communication. In this sense, the objective was to verify the suitability of this tool as a vector for achieving the Strategic Objectives of the Brazilian Army, systematizing and conducting this activity in the Institution. This article presents some of the concepts covered in the scope of work, in order to clarify the topic. Subsequently, the proposal for systematization of the Strategic Communication sent to the Army General Staff will be presented.

Keywords: Brazil. Communication. System. Strategic. Aligned. Synchronized. Integrated. Strategy.

Resumen: En el mundo actual, las sociedades y los individuos están cada vez más interconectados. El entorno en el que prosperan los eventos cambia constantemente, lo que dificulta el desarrollo de escenarios y el ajuste de pronósticos. Esta realidad afecta no solo a las personas, sino también a las empresas e instituciones. Este entorno representa desafíos y oportunidades que pueden ser explorados por las organizaciones, a medida que la información se ha convertido en un elemento estratégico determinante. En este sentido, la Comunicación Estratégica se ha presentado como la herramienta más adecuada para instituciones y empresas. Buscando ampliar el alcance de su comunicación, el Ejército Brasileño, a través del Estado Mayor del Ejército, determinó que la 34ª clase del Curso de Política, Estrategia y Alta Administración del Ejército realizase un estudio sobre Comunicación Estratégica. En ese sentido, el objetivo fue verificar la adecuación de esta herramienta como vector para la consecución de los Objetivos Estratégicos del Ejército Brasileño, sistematizando y realizando esa actividad en la Institución. En este artículo se presentan algunos de los conceptos abordados en el ámbito del trabajo del CPEAEx, con el fin de aclarar el tema. Posteriormente, se presentará la propuesta de sistematización de la Comunicación Estratégica enviada al EME.

Palabras-clave: Brasil. Comunicación. Sistema. Estratégica. Alineada. Sincronizada. Integrada. Estrategia.

Received: Nov. 05, 2021
Approved: Dec. 01, 2021

COLEÇÃO MEIRA MATTOS
ISSN on-line 2316-4891 / ISSN print 2316-4833
http://ebrevistas.eb.mil.br/index.php/RMM/index

1 Introduction

In today's world, societies and individuals are increasingly interconnected. The environment in which events thrive is constantly changing, making it difficult to build scenarios and adjust forecasts. This reality affects not only people, but also companies and institutions. In order to define this new reality, the USArmy War College created the acronym VUCA to designate this volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous world (UNITEDSTATES, 2019).

This environment represents challenges and opportunities to be explored by organizations, as information has become a determining strategic element. For this, there was a need to establish connections with society, formed by different stakeholders, creating impressions that generate credibility and legitimacy, contributing so that the organization's strategic objectives are achieved (KUNSCH, 2020; REBELO; SOUSA; FAUSTINO, 2020). In this sense, Strategic Communication has been presented as the most appropriate tool by institutions and companies.

Seeking to expand the reach of its communication, the Brazilian Army (EB), through the Army General Staff (EME), determined that the 34th class of the Army Policy, Strategy and High Administration Course (CPEAEx) conduct a study of the Strategic Communication (Com Estrt). In this sense, the objective was to verify the adequacy of this tool as a vector for achieving the Brazilian Army's Strategic Objectives, systematizing and conducting this activity in the Institution.

For the purpose of this article, some of the concepts covered in the scope of the CPEAEx work will be presented, in order to clarify the topic. Subsequently, the proposal for systematization of the Strategic Communication sent to the EME will be presented.

It should be noted, initially, that the theme “Strategic Communication” is incipient not only in the EB, but also in Brazilian academic and business environments. Therefore, despite the fact that the concepts presented here involve knowledge and studies of the highest civil and military authorities on the subject, it can be considered that its reach has limitations in scope because the existing literature is based on a small number of scholars.

2 Methodology used

The data and information collected and analyzed by CPEAEx was used in this article, focusing on the presentation of the theoretical basis that supported the proposal for systematization of Strategic Communication in the Brazilian Army. For this, the Institution's singularity was considered, in order for this tool to be effective in contributing to the achievement of its fifteen strategic objectives, provided for in the Army Strategic Plan 2020-2023 (BRASIL, 2019).

The bibliographic research was carried out in sources of academic knowledge (books, journals and articles). At the same time, the documentary research used sources from the Ministry of Defense and the Brazilian Army, cited as references in the EME Basic Project on the subject, and documentation from the other Brazilian Armed Forces and from other countries and international organizations. In addition, documents used in the business environment for the planning of its own strategic communication were consulted.

The field research had a qualitative approach, through the interview technique, in order to understand the Strategic Communication in the business sector. Furthermore, military officials were interviewed to observe the reach of the topic within the Institution.

3 Conceptos de comunicación estratégica en los entornos académico y organizacional

In general, Strategic Communication, from the academic and organizational perspectives, presents a bias of hierarchization of its planning, directly influencing the flow of information of this system. For this, the planning would be organized in 03 (three) levels: strategic, tactical and operational[1], each with a different temporal objective (BRASIL, 2021c).

Despite the organization in levels, they are not isolated and incommunicable; on the contrary, they act with a constant exchange of data and information, both in a top-down and bottom-up sense[2]. Thereby, this communication aims to act in an integrated, aligned and synchronized way.

The understanding of the hierarchy and synchrony of actions is aligned with the best theory present, as observed through Self (2014) and United States, 2013. For them, the search for support and the achievement of the organization's objectives shall involve all levels, starting its planning at the highest decision-making level of the institution that adopts Strategic Communication as a tool.

In this sense, the strategic level is what is found at the top of the structure, with the so-called Senior Management of the organization. For this, it shall provide the subordinate levels of information that will serve as a basis for its planning. The highlight, in this case, is the propagation of the core of institutional thinking, through the mission, the vision of the future, the strategic objectives, the strategies and the goals to be achieved. In order for this information to effectively reach the other levels, integration and synchronization, within the entire structure, are essential.

At this level, the proper selection of stakeholders (or audiences of interest/interested parties). Each in its own way, Freeman (1984) and Ladeira (2009) highlight that there is a strong connection and interdependence between institutions and these audiences. At the same time that they support each other, insofar as they understand and reinforce each other's processes, the organization is responsible for mapping the relationship networks, giving it a global vision and guiding its competences. Still regarding the stakeholders, MOREIRA (2021) states that:

1 Business terminology is reversed in relation to military, with regard to tactical and operational levels. However, this does not influence the understanding of how planning shall work.

2 The flow of information in a top-down direction means that it comes, within the hierarchy, from the top of the hierarchy to the bottom. In turn, the bottom-up direction comes from the bottom to the top.

> An institution must relate to a wide spectrum of stakeholders, whether in the public sector or in the private sector [...] it is necessary to list and identify all the Institution's audiences of interest. Subsequently, and according to the strategic objectives of this Institution [...] the audiences must be gathered in an Interest Group for which the defined actions will be determined. (MOREIRA, 2021, p. 135).

Following the link of hierarchization, tactical planning, focused on the medium term, refers to the company's marketing, so that it uses its instruments in order to achieve its goals with the organization's target market (LIMA, 2007). In this direction, marketing is umbilically linked to the value of the brand and the products that the organization offers to society. It is noteworthy that, despite the term "marketing" being initially aimed at companies dedicated to the market and focused on profits, its tools can be used by the Brazilian Army (EB), especially with regard to the Strategic Objectives of the Army (OEE), listed in the Land Military Policy (PMT) (BRASIL, 2021c).

Aligned with this perspective, it can be stated that the “Brazilian Army” brand is consolidated with the National Society, recognized for its efficiency and deliveries. This package includes its motto ("Strong Arm, Friendly Hand"), as well as the services offered with strong added value, such as Homeland Defense, Support for Subsidiary Actions, Law and Order Guarantee Operations and Military Service, just to name a few. In addition, communicative actions, which are of social interest, are also widely used by the EB and, with this, strengthen the brand even more.

Further to the planning levels, following the academic and business perspective, there is the operational. For profit-oriented companies, these would involve their short-term actions, which can be represented by promotional plans. For institutions whose measure occurs without the search for profitability, this occurs through deliveries to society in immediate needs. In this context, for the EB, the operations themselves would be framed, involving the engagement of its stakeholders in the actions of the Ground Force (F Ter).

Despite the fact that the division into levels is relatively peaceful, the definition of Strategic Communication is not. Despite this, some ideas are repeated, especially with regard to the relevance of integration, social accountability and the fact that ComEstrt shall be understood as a result of the participation of participatory internal communication with managed and shared knowledge management; defining and applying resources in order to achieve previously established objectives (MOREIRA, 2021) With this, it appears that Com Estrt shall not only communicate the institution's strategic objectives, but also create an environment that favors their achievement.

4 Definition, premises and demands

Given the concepts studied in the Interdisciplinary Project, it is proposed that the definition of Strategic Communication in the EB is:

> the unit of **actions, words and images** in line with its **Mission, Vision, Values and its Strategic Objectives, in peace or in operations**, in an **aligned, integrated and synchronized way**, aiming to achieve its **stakeholders**, producing **long-term effects** (MOREIRA, 2021)

The following premises were listed for the systematization of Com Strt (table 1):

Table 1 – Premises for Com Estrt in the EB

PREMISES FOR STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION IN THE EB	
1	Strengthen and preserve the Force's image
2	Be guided by alignment, integration and synchronization, with centralized planning at the highest decision-making level
3	Contribute to the Transformation Process
4	All EB actions shall be supported by the pillars of credibility, transparency and opportunity
5	Information Operations in line and coordination with Com Estrt
6	Do not foresee the increase in staff to meet the demand for Strategic Communication
7	Prospective vision, with timely action
8	Com Estrt shall be dynamic and integrated
9	The EB is an unique organizational force
10	Com Strt shall be conducted since peacetime

Source: Moreira, 2021.

Table 2 highlights the demands for the systematization of Com Strt:

Table 2 – Demands for the systematization of Com Estrt in the EB

DEMANDS FOR THE SYSTEMATIZATION OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION IN THE EB	
1	Need for systematization
2	Integration with the Army Strategic Plan (PEEx)
3	Gradual deployment
4	Need for specialized staff
5	Conceptual and technical standardization
6	Use of the EB's organizational structure
7	Execution at all levels
8	Proposal at the political and strategic levels
9	Need for measurement and feedback

Source: Moreira, 2021.

It is also necessary to consider the guiding aspects of communication strategies and actions at the Institutional level: the **values** rooted in more than 370 years of existence and which are the Institution's support; the **guidelines** emanating from the **Force Commander** that will guide all Strategic Communication efforts within the Brazilian Army; as well as the **alignment**, the **integration** and the **synchronization** of this effort with the PEEx to achieve the Army's Strategic Objectives (OEE).

5 The strategic communication plan

The Strategic Communication Plan, developed at the Force's highest level, aims to guide the planning and execution of Strategic Communication activities, contributing to the achievement of the OEE.

The Army's Strategic Communication Plan (PCEEx) shall be based on the Army Commander's General Strategic Communication Guidelines (BRASIL, 2021b), defining institutional themes of interest to the EB, as well as the stakeholders to the Force, in addition to the respective strategic approach actions.

The General Strategic Communication Guideline will reference the preparation of the PCEEx, in line with the OEE established in the SIPEx, as well as the particular orders and guidelines issued by the Force Commander, as shown in Figure 1.

The Army General Staff (EME) will coordinate a meeting, in which representatives of all ODS, ODOp, C Mil A and OADI [3] will participate, with the purpose of preparing the PCEEx. The Plan will be distributed to the aforementioned bodies, as soon as it is approved by the Brazilian Army's Commander (Cmt EB).

Upon receiving the PCEEx, each Cmdo Mil A will be able to prepare its Strategic Area Communication Guideline for its subordinate levels, delimiting the Force's regional objectives in the region, at a detailed level.

Developments in the context and priorities listed annually in the PEEx review may lead to adjustments in the Com Strt. In this case, the Cmt will be able to issue a new Strategic Communication Guideline, for the alignment of activities developed in the PCEEx with the SIPLEx.

3 Sectoral Management Bodies, Operational Direction Bodies, Area Military Commands and Direct and Immediate Assistance Bodies (especially the Army's Social Communication Center [CComSEx] and the Army's Intelligence Center [CIE]).

Figure 1 – Strategic Communication Planning[4]



Source: Moreira (2021).

6 Strategic communication environments and cycles

The didactic way for the initial understanding of the systematization of Com Estrt was its division into **Strategic Communication environments** (figure 2). These comprise:

> the sets of individuals, agencies and systems that are used to collect, process, disseminate and act in accordance with the data and knowledge received, as well as the plans and decisions made, in order to meet the established Strategic Communication Needs (NCE) (MOREIRA, 2021, p. 370).

4 Abbreviations shown in the figure: ACE (Army High Command); Dtz (Guideline); ODG (General Management Body [EME]); Reu (meeting).

Figure 2 – Strategic Communication Environments



Source: Moreira (2021).

Strategic Communication shall be carried out after the due decision-making process, concluding about its processes and products. For this, two cycles of Strategic Communication are considered (figure 3):

Figure 3 – Com Estrt Cycles





1	GUIDANCE	NCE definition
2	OBTENTION	of data
3	ANALYSIS	of data and knowledge production
4	PLANNING	strategic communication
5	DECISION – D	by the highest authority
6	ACTION	to each target audience
7	REORIENTATION	Ctrl indicators

Source: Moreira (2021).

In the Initial Cycle, the Strategic Communication Plan will be deployed, while the Continuous Cycle indicates feedback and correction of the system's directions.

From the dissemination of PCEEx, the Com Estratégica actions will take place, with due control and corrective actions deemed necessary. Figure 4 summarizes schematically the Systematization of Com Strt in the EB.

Figure 4 – Systematization of Com Estrt. Environments X Cycles X Actors.



Source: Moreira (2021).

7 Strategic communication in the army planning system (siplex)

In order to be aligned with the Army's Strategic Objectives since its preparation, the PCEEx will coincide with the SIPLEX. Special emphasis shall be given to phase 3, in which the Army's Strategic Communication Objectives (OCEE) will be raised, in phase 5, in which the PCEEx will be prepared, and in phase 7, when the performance indicators will be monitored (figure 5).

Figure 5 – Insertion of Com Estrt in the SIPLEx[5]



Source: Moreira (2021).

The PCEx will be unique, deriving from it the other communication plans at the different levels of the Army. Figure 6 shows the insertion of PCEEx and Social Communication (Com Soc) and Institutional Relations (RelIttc) plans in the SIPEx.

Figure 6 – Preparation of the PCEEx and the annual Com Estrt guideline in the SIPLEx calendar.



Source: Moreira (2021).

5 Abbreviations in the figure: LBDN (National Defense White Paper), PND (National Defense Policy), END (National Defense Strategy); PSD (Sectoral Defense Policy); ESD (Sectoral Defense Strategy).

8 Essential components of strategic communication

8.1 Chain of command and technical channels

In order to meet the perspective of alignment, integration and synchronization of Strategic Communication actions, the main responsibility falls on the active military personnel. These are part of the initial target audience of PCEEx, a group that also includes veterans, civil servants, military dependents and students from Military Schools. This heterogeneous group forms the so-called internal public.

The traditional channels existing in the Army's organizational structure can be considered the most effective in reaching this target audience. Through the Chain of Command and Technical Channels, the transmission of determinations and the control of the results achieved will be supported, in addition, by all existing corporate tools, including bulletins, plans and digital control systems.

8.2 Social communication, institutional relations and digital media

Figure 7 – Social Communication, Institutional Relations and Digital Media



Source: Os autores (2021).

For Com Estrt to present itself in a systematic and effective way, the organization's internal and external communication channels shall be aligned and integrated. Thus, as seen in the previous figure, aiming to achieve its goals, the Institution employs the means that the communications revolution has brought to the current world, influencing the physical, human and informational dimensions and which go beyond the reach of classical Social Communication.

8.3 Intelligence

Com Estrt does not act in isolation, as seen. To speed up the flow of information, constant intelligence support at all stages is essential. This relationship starts from the orientation phase and supports the decision-making process. At this time, actors such as CIE, OADI/CmtEx[6], and the second sections of the Cmdo Mil A, are participants in the process.

The Intelligence Agencies (CIE and 2ª Seç) are also relevant in the planning actions of the PCEEx, the guidelines and fragmentary orders. The preparation of the Obtaining and Integration Plan with the acquired knowledge complements this work, with the Central (CIE), Class A (Cmdo Mil A) and Special (ODS and ODOp) agencies being responsible for the correct analysis of the data that will convert into the necessary knowledge for the planning phase.

It should be noted that, because most of the intelligence data is ostentatious, there is no need for specialized personnel for data collection actions, which expands the range of advisors who can support Strategic Communication. Even so, there may be information that, due to its sensitivity or difficulty in obtaining, are classified among the critical intelligence activities for the Com Estrt, as shown in Figure 8.

In this sense, the so-called **Critical Entry Vulnerability Points (PVCE)** shall be given special attention during the processing between the analysis structures (Ag Cl A from Com Soc, Ag Cl A from Intlg, Intelligence Centers, Celu Com Estrt) and structures intended for planning (as in the Army General Staff and in the EM Cmdo Mil A).

Figure 8 – Critical Intelligence Activities for Strategic Communication.



Source: Moreira (2021).

6 Army Commander.

Data that is not processed by the correct analysis process can lead to serious planning errors, which will lead to incorrect decisions. The best measures for the protection of the PVCE are the hiring of trained, specialized and efficient analysts and the exchange of data and information.

The **Exit Critical Vulnerability Points (PVCS)** guide the dissemination of orders and plans that will involve the Strategic Communication actions to be adopted by the entire Force. In this case, the principles of Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability and Inviolability of Information shall be ensured. In this way, the messages sent reach the correct recipients and no leaks occur in the Com Estrt execution process.

To this end, Cmt EB will use the direct assistance of its advisory bodies, which will select the target audiences for messages and actions, as well as indicate the necessary measures to safeguard the information produced in the decision-making process. The Cmt Mil A will be advised by their EM and specialized cells, reflecting the structure of the Force's highest level.

Figure 9 illustrates the locations in the Strategic Communication flow where the main PVCE and PVCS occur.

Figure 9 – Critical Vulnerabilities of the Strategic Communication System.



Source: Moreira (2021).

9 Conclusion

The purpose of this article was to provide the reader with an atmosphere regarding the proposed systematization of Strategic Communication within the Brazilian Army. Therefore, the methodology employed by the CPEAEx 2021 Interdisciplinary Project (PI) was clarified, in which doctrines, experiences and best practices were sought in the scope of institutions and companies, both in Brazil and abroad. The collected data, added to the EME's recommendations, were translated into the main concepts and fundamentals applied to the work.

The systematization itself was addressed in five topics of this work, in which the definitions, premises and demands of Strategic Communication in the EB were highlighted; the deployment and execution of the Strategic Communication Plan; the environments, cycles and main actors in the process; and also the essential components for the planning and execution of the Com Estrt in the EB.

Among the main observations of the PI design process, it was found that the structures necessary for the proper functioning of Strategic Communication in the Force practically already exist. However, the functioning of internal and external Communication channels does not always work synergistically.

It is, therefore, in this sense that the systematization of Com Estrt finds a wide space to organize and methodize the procedures between the chain of command and the technical channels, as well as the Social Communication and Institutional Relations systems. It was also observed the great need for the involvement of the Intelligence system, both to obtain reliable communication inputs, and to safeguard the flow of information.

For the good progress of Strategic Communication, the systematization of the process will be based on two main ideas: Com Estrt, to be effective, shall be **Integrated, Aligned and Synchronized**, at all levels; and for this to occur, it shall be centrally **planned at the highest decision-making level** and executed in a decentralized manner.

Therefore, this article is concluded with the certainty that the deployment of Com Estrt and its systematization will contribute to increasing the synergy of planning, execution and control of the activities of the Brazilian Army. To this end, it is essential that the alignment, integration and synchronization of communication in the Force are already collated in the EB Command and its indicators monitored at all levels, promoting, full-time, the necessary readjustments for the achievement and maintenance of the Strategic Objectives of the Army.

References

BRASIL. Exército. **Diretriz anual de comunicação estratégica 2021**. Brasília, DF: Rede Comando do Exército, 2021b. Msg_F_005.

BRASIL. Exército. **Plano estratégico do exército 2020-2023**: EB 10-P-01.007. [Brasília, DF]: Exército, 2019b. Available at: http://www.ceadex.eb.mil.br/images/legislacao/XI/plano_estrategico_do_exercito_2020-2023.pdf. Access on: 9 nov. 2021.

BRASIL. Exército. Portaria EME/C Ex nº 453, de 19 de julho de 2021. Aprova as normas para a criação e gerenciamento das mídias sociais no âmbito do Exército Brasileiro. **Boletim do Exército**, Brasília, DF, n. 30, p. 46-50, jul. 2021c.

BRASIL. Exército. Portarianº 1.886, de 14 de novembro de 2019. Aprova o Plano de Comunicação Social do Exército para os anos de 2020 a 2023 (EB10-P-11.001) e dá outras providências. **Boletim do Exército**, Brasília, DF, n. 48, p. 30, dez. 2019.

FREEMAN, R. E. **Strategic management**: a stakeholder approach. Boston: Pitman, 1984.

KUNSH, M.M.K. **Comunicação organizacional integrada na perspectiva estratégica**. In: FÉLIX, J. B. (org.).Comunicação estratégica: a visão de 23 renomados autores de 5 países. Brasília, DF: Ed. Rede Integrada, 2020. p. 85-100.

LADEIRA, D. L. **Teoria dos stakeholders no contexto da governança corporativa**: um estudo de caso. 2009. 104 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Administração) – Faculdade de Ciências Empresariais, Universidade Fumec, Belo Horizonte, 2009. Available at: http://www.fumec.br/anexos/cursos/mestrado/dissertacoes/completa/daniela_lopes_ladeira.pdf. Access on: 9 nov. 2021.

LIMA, Miguel Ferreira. **Gestão de marketing** / Miguel Ferreira Lima, Arão Sapiro, João Baptista Vilhena, Maurício Gangana – 8 ed. – Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2007.

MOREIRA, A. S. et al. **A comunicação estratégica como vetor da consecução dos objetivos estratégicos do exército**. Orientador: João Luiz de Araújo Lampert. 2021. Projeto Interdisciplinar (Especialização em Política, Estratégia e Alta Administração Militar) – Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército, Rio de Janeiro, 2021.

REBELO, C. T.; SOUSA, J. P.; FAUSTINO, P. Performance comunicativa e as redes sociais: a importância de estratégias que envolvam o usuário. In: FÉLIX, J. B. (org.) **Comunicação estratégica**: a visão de 23 renomados autores de 5 países. Brasília, DF: Ed. Rede Integrada, 2020. p. 319-331.

SELF, C. C.; Dewey, the public sphere, and strategic communication. In: HOLTZHAUSEN, D.; ZERFASS, A. (ed.). **The routledge handbook of strategic communication**. [Abingdon]: Routledge, 2014.

UNITED STATES. Army Heritage and Education Center. **Who first originated the term VUCA (Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity and Ambiguity)?**. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, May 2019.Available at: https://usawc.libanswers.com/faq/84869. Access on: 11 out. 2021.

UNITED STATES. Joint Chiefs Of Staff. Department of The Army. Department Of The Navy. Department of The Air Force. United States Coast Guard. **Commander's communication synchronization**: joint doctrine note 2-13. [S. l.: s. n.],Dec 16, 2013. Available at: https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/jdn_jg/jdn2_13.pdf. Access on: 9 nov. 2021.

PROFESSIONAL ARTICLE DOI 10.52781/cmm.e014

Investments in dual-use airport infrastructure, civil and military, in the Amazon region: a proposal of indicators

Inversiones en infraestructura aeroportuaria de doble uso, civil y militar, en la región amazónica: una propuesta de indicadores

Steven Meier
Força Aérea Brasileira.
Diretoria de Infraestrutura da Aeronáutica.
São Paulo, SP, Brasil.
meier.steven@gmail.com

Abstract: The airport infrastructure in support of border military units in the Amazon region is of a strategic nature, as it guarantees mobility and, above all, speed to reach the most distant corners of our country. The objective of this assignment is to propose indicators to facilitate decision-making by managers when investing resources in the region's aerodromes. The methodology adopted consisted of collecting information through documentary and bibliographic research. Pavement type data used in several aerodromes, their estimated useful life, as well as the date of completion of the latest interventions allowed us to predict the need for intervention in each location. The number of aeronautical accidents and incidents at each of the researched aerodromes also served as a subsidy for the intervention proposals. Finally, some recommendations were issued to the Army Command in order to improve the development of airport infrastructure in response to Special Border Platoons and increase the security of air operations

Keywords: Logistics. Airport Infrastructure. Amazon. Special Border Platoons. Documentary Research.

Resumen: La infraestructura aeroportuaria en apoyo de las unidades militares fronterizas de la región amazónica tiene un carácter estratégico, asegurando la movilidad y, sobre todo, la velocidad para llegar a los rincones más distantes del país. El objetivo de este trabajo es proponer indicadores que faciliten la toma de decisiones de los gestores a la hora de invertir recursos en los aeródromos de la región. La metodología adoptada consistió en la recolección de información a través de la investigación documental y bibliográfica. Los datos sobre los tipos de pavimentos utilizados en los distintos aeródromos, su vida útil estimada y la fecha de finalización de las últimas intervenciones permitieron predecir la necesidad de intervención en cada localidad. La cantidad de accidentes e incidentes de aviación en los aeródromos estudiados también subvencionó las propuestas de intervención. Por último, se formularon algunas recomendaciones al Mando del Ejército para impulsar el desarrollo de la infraestructura aeroportuaria al servicio de los pelotones fronterizos especiales y aumentar la seguridad de las operaciones aéreas.

Palapras-clave: logística. Infraestructura Aeroportuaria. Amazonia Pelotones fronterizos especiales. Investigación Documental.

Received: Nov. 05, 2021
Approved: Nov. 29, 2021

COLEÇÃO MEIRA MATTOS
ISSN on-line 2316-4891 / ISSN print 2316-4833
http://ebrevistas.eb.mil.br/index.php/RMM/index

1 Introduction

There are various studies on the Special Border Platoons, as well as on the logistical difficulties inherent to the Amazon environment, but none that address, identify or relate the need for airport infrastructure in favor of its logistical support.

The present study, therefore, aims to propose and apply indicators to classify the localities in the Legal Amazon where the military border units are based, be they Platoons, Detachments or Special Border Companies, in order to establish the appropriate priorities in the application of investments in airport infrastructure, considering, for this purpose, their dual use, civil and military, since these military border organizations are usually based in localities, towns or small cities, with which they share the use of aerodromes.

It should be remembered that, according to the Strategic Conception Air Force 100, the operation of National Air Mail is part of the particular subsidiary tasks of Aeronautics, highlighting the carrying out of national integration missions, "aimed at serving less developed localities or regions, difficult to access and devoid of other means of transport", in order to "alleviate the suffering of the most needy populations, assisting them with the possible means of accelerating their development towards full citizenship" (BRASIL, 2018b, p. 19).

It should also be noted that there are units that do not have the support of an airstrip, or that cannot be reached by road, such as the Vila Brasil Detachments, in the state of Amapá, and São Salvador, in Acre.

There are also the Platoons of Epitaciolândia and Plácido de Castro, both subordinate to the Border Command of Acre / 4th BIS, which do not have the support of an aerodrome, but, on the other hand, are supplied by roads.

All these localities were also analyzed in order to compose the proposed priority classification list.

Initially, a documentary search was carried out in order to collect data regarding the location of each PEF/DEF/CEF, as well as the logistical factors used in its resupply.

Also the object of this study was the data collection of accidents and aviation incidents occurred in these locations since 2010, where the airport infrastructure has been a contributing factor for the occurrence of the accident.

Finally, taking into account that these military units act as drivers of development and help to secure people in the region, as well as the possibility of raising resources from the National Civil Aviation Fund for investment in this airport infrastructure, it is important to highlight that there is a civil population around each PEF/DEF/CEF, as well as, in most cases, indigenous people served by FUNAI, who would also benefit from the execution of these works.

It is important to emphasize that these aerodromes are important parts of the transport network that serves the Amazon region, not necessarily because of their volume of traffic or the number of passengers transported, but, in some situations, because they are the main ways of connecting these military organizations and the communities that live in their surroundings with the rest of the country. Without them functioning, it is impossible to carry out aeromedical evacuations or even maintain the availability of health services offered by the Special Secretariat of Indigenous Health (SESAI) through the Indigenous Special Sanitary District (DSEI) operating in the Amazon region (BRASIL, 2021b).

Figure 1 – Location of border units in the Amazon.



Source: Elaborated by F. Lisboa of the Amazon Region Airports Commission (2021).[1]

1 Figures 1 and 2 were produced by Sd F. Lisboa, from the effective of COMARA, exclusively for this article.

2 Methodology

There are some maxims in the corporate world that cannot be ignored, whether in a private institution or a public body, civil or military. Kaoru Ishikawa, a Japanese engineer and business administration theorist, stated that "only what is measured is managed" (FALCONI, 2013, p. 3).

As we learn in school benches and especially in everyday practice, economics is a science that deals with scarce resources and unlimited needs. It becomes essential, therefore, to establish indicators for each process, so that the manager can make the best decisions when distributing budget.

How to define, however, the priorities when it comes to directing your resources? The greater importance of one locality over another seems somewhat ethereal, but "intangible elements that seem impossible to assess can be measured" (HUBBARD, 2015, p. 5).

Although there is a vast bibliographic source when it comes to Border Special Platoons (FRANCHI, 2013; MIRANDA, 2012; RODRIGUES, 2004; SILVA, 2007), few numerical data related to airport infrastructure could be extracted from this specialized literature.

Other researchers, such as Sant'anna (1998) and Théry (2005), have looked at the modes of transport available in the Amazon, as well as their development opportunities, but their focus has been directed to the waterway and road modes.

In this sense, there was an investigation in other sources, such as the National Civil Aviation Agency; responsible for the registration and approval of aerodromes in Brazil; the Department of Airspace Control, responsible for updating the Auxiliary Publication of Air Routes (ROTAER); the Aeronautical Accidents Investigation and Prevention Center (CENIPA); as well as the Amazon Region Airports Commission (COMARA) to search for data such as: registration status of aerodromes; types of airstrip pavements; history of aeronautical accidents and incidents at aerodromes that serve the PEF, in which the airport infrastructure has been a contributing factor; history of interventions carried out in the airport infrastructure of these locations, among others considered relevant.

In addition to presenting and proposing a series of possible indicators, it was also necessary to prioritize them.

After collecting and analyzing the available data, a case study was carried out in one of the most critical tracks currently in operation and which constitutes the only access route for the resupply of the 4th PEF, subordinated to the Roraima Border Command, located in Surucucu, in the municipality of Alto Alegre-RR.

Finally, recommendations were issued, some of which could be implemented immediately and others that could, if deemed appropriate, be adopted in the medium or long term.

3 Data Collection

There is a plethora of data that could be used to classify aerodromes according to precedence to receive investments, in order to meet civilian and military needs.

Some indicators are intuitive, for example, the available modes of transport and the travel time to get to the locality. If the only option to access the region is the air modal, this PEF, due to its isolation, will receive a higher priority.

What to say, however, about the river and land modals? At first glance, one would think that the PEF served by roads would be last in the order of priority, but what if the road conditions are so poor that the travel time is longer than that spent on river navigation?

The heavy rains of the period known as the Amazon winter often make it impossible or, at least, greatly hinder traffic for several months, as occurs, for example, in BR-156, which connects the cities of Macapá and Oiapoque, in the state of Amapá.

Another emblematic example is the BR-307, which connects the city of São Gapriel da Cachoeira to the District of Cucuí, in the state of Amazonas, in the region of the triple border between Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela. Although the road distance is only 202 km, the resupply of the Cucuí PEF is made by the river modal, in a journey of 36 hours in a vessel regionally called "bongo", because the road is practically impassable by vehicles that do not have four-wheel drive, still missing a bridge on arrival at the locality, which forces to unload the cargo and transport it in small boats from the final stretch to the barracks.

Security in airport operations seems to be another essential factor in setting priorities. In lay eyes, the simple fact that an airstrip is open to operations would indicate the guarantee of minimum safety requirements, but, unfortunately, this is not the Amazon reality.

The state of conservation of the runway, the possible presence of obstacles in its surroundings, the existence of dumps nearby, which constitute hotspots of attraction of birds, among other problems, compromise the operability of the aerodrome, and may culminate in the cancellation of its approval by of the National Civil Aviation Agency (ANAC).

The non-approval of an aerodrome makes it impossible for natural or legal persons to use it, as it constitutes an infringement provided for in the Brazilian Aeronautics Code (art. 302, item VI, letter f: “use airfield without regulatory conditions of use”) (BRASIL, 1986, n.p.), in addition to leaving an eventual operator overdrawn from the insurance guarantee in case of an accident.

Therefore, due to the lack of available data, such as the state of conservation of the lanes according to the PCI method (Pavement Condition Index); the presence of obstacles in the surroundings of the aerodrome, such as trees violating the surfaces of the protection zone; the lack of operational fencing, which allows the entry of animals into the aerodrome in critical phases such as landing and take-off; it was decided to start surveying aeronautical accidents and incidents that occurred on these runways between 2010 and 2020.

Another data used, according to the history of works carried out by COMARA, was the date of completion of the interventions and their respective forecast of durability, depending on the type of pavement adopted.

At first, the logistical flow executed by the Brazilian Army in supplying each of the 27 PEF/DEF/CEF existing in the Amazon region was mapped.

Basically, it can be said that the 8th Military Region (RM), based in Belém-PA, supplies the PEF/DEF/CEF of the states of Pará and Amapá, and that the 12th RM, located in Manaus-AM, does the same for the units of the states of Amazonas, Roraima, Acre and Rondônia.

According to Ferreira and Franchi (2020), the 12th RM has the support of other military organizations of the Brazilian Army located in Manaus, such as the Amazon Military Command Boat Center (CECMA) and the 12th Supply Battalion (12th BSup). The 12th RM is also responsible for coordinating the employment of Brazilian Air Force (FAB) transport aircraft through the Amazon Support Plan (PAA). In exceptional cases, helicopters of the 4th Army Aviation Battalion (4th BAvEx) are employed in this activity of supplying border units.

In the case of the Amapá Border Command / 34th BIS, the only unit studied here supported by the 8th RM, there is a sui generis situation that occurred in the resupply of the Vila Brasil Detachment.

Vila Brasil is about 102 km from the CEF of Clevelândia do Norte, by river, upstream of the Oiapoque River. Despite the distance being relatively close, the displacement by means of small boats called “voadeiras” takes approximately 5 hours to go and 4 hours to return.

This 102 km stretch, also known as Médio Oiapoque, is distinguished from other sections of its course by having greater current and closing the largest steps, where its most remarkable waterfalls and rapids unfold.

According to MORAES, we can notice “large muddy stretches, sometimes forming complicated systems: maze of islands, islets, channels and rapids that riot before rock outcrops distributed in dikes, rounded blocks and flagstones” (MORAES, 1964, p. 5).

Altogether, there are 11 waterfalls that need to be completed when traveling between Clevelândia do Norte and Vila Brasil. Some of them, such as the Rochelle Waterfall, require all personnel, material and the vessels themselves to be overflowed. In others, such as Caxiri, depending on the water level, it is only necessary to disembark the personnel so that the boatman can cross it.

The most interesting thing, however, is that while Brazilians face a huge challenge and expose themselves to high risks in waters often infested with sucurijus and poraquês, to carry out a simple resupply of their troops, on the other side of the river, facing the DEF of Vila Brasil, in French overseas territory, in a village called Camopi, there is a Detachment of the Foreign Legion, equipped with a concrete airstrip, 1000 meters long by 18 meters wide.

FAB, through a considerable effort of coordination of the Brazilian Army with the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, managed to carry out some resupply missions for the DEF of Vila Brasil in 2019 using, for this purpose, this Camopi track.

However, the obligation to carry out customs clearance in Cayenne, both at entry and exit from French Guiana, significantly increased the stretch to be flown, from 97 km (Oiapoque-Camopi) to 307 km (Oiapoque-Cayenne-Camopi), raising costs and reducing the availability of cargo to be transported.

Figure 2 – Resupply of the Vila Brasil Detachment by air



Source: Elaborated by F. Lisboa of the Amazon Region Airports Commission (2021).

Another additional need for coordination with the revenue and federal police involved the authorization to leave the country from Oiapoque, because if the International Airport of Macapá was used, the volume transported in each mission would be derisory.

The cooperation of the French government was not enough, there was still the need for authorization to fly over foreign military aircraft, which requires a minimum of seven days in advance, and the shipment of all the cargo transported in the flying boats to cross the Oiapoque river again at the border back to Brazil.

Regardless of the difficulties involved in transportation, the logistics data were raised with the commanders of the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 34th and 61st Jungle Infantry Battalions and will be analyzed in the following chapter.

4 Results Analysis

The first analysis performed with the collected data involved only the modals employed in the resupply of each border unit, as well as the time spent in this logistics operation.

In general, the classification of localities in this pre-analysis followed a fairly simple logic:

1) The units were ordered, in descending order, according to the time of dis-placement by the terrestrial modal. Locations not served by roads received a zero travel time, making them last priority.

2) Then there was a new arrangement, this turn of the time of travel by river, also in descending order. This reordering received priority over land travel time, but still left last priority to the locations served exclusively by the air modal.

3) Next, we proceeded to order according to the flight time spent of C-98 (Cara-van), from the longest flight time to the smallest, from the headquarters of the Battalion, or, in the case of the 6th BIS / Cmdo Fron Rondônia, from Porto Velho, which caused new changes in the orders made in Items 1 and 2.

4) Once the orders were completed, according to the time of displacement in the various modes, priority was given to those localities that had more restricted resupply options. This way, the locations that effectively use the air modal in its resupply were prioritized, first of all.

5) The penultimate selection criterion adopted consisted in verifying which localities are resupplied by means of the fluvial modal, since there are several rivers that have watery stretches and, therefore, are not used as a logistic route. The localities not served by the waterway were prioritized.

6) Finally, the criterion of verifying which localities use the terrestrial modal in their resupply was adopted. The locations not served by this modal were prior-itized.

The results of this preliminary analysis, at first glance, seem reasonable, but because of its simplicity, it contains a number of distortions that will be discussed and resolved later, by including new variables.

Table 1 – Pre-classification of military border units, according to the modes of transport used and the time of travel..

OM	BORDER UNIT	LOCATION	Travel time (h)		
			Aerial	Fluvial	Terrestrial
Cmdo Fron Amapá / 34º BIS (Macapá-AP)	1º PEF	Tiriós (Óbidos-PA)	02:05	0	0
Cmdo Fron Roraima / 7º BIS (Boa Vista-RR)	5º PEF	Auaris (Amajari-RR)	01:35	0	0
Cmdo Fron Rio Negro / 5º BIS (São Gapriel da Cachoeira-AM)	2º PEF	Querari (São Gapriel da Cachoeira-AM)	01:15	0	0
Cmdo Fron Roraima / 7º BIS (Boa Vista-RR)	4º PEF	Surucucu (Alto Alegre-RR)	01:10	0	0
Cmdo Fron Rio Negro / 5º BIS (São Gapriel da Cachoeira-AM)	3º PEF	São Joaquim (São Gapriel da Cachoeira-AM)	01:10	0	0
Cmdo Fron Acre / 4º BIS (Rio Branco-AC)	4º PEF	Santa Rosa do Purus-AC	01:00	292	0
Cmdo Fron Solimões / 8º BIS (Tabatinga-AM)	1º PEF	Palmeiras do Javari (Atalaia do Norte-AM)	01:10	192	0
Cmdo Fron Solimões / 8º BIS (Tabatinga-AM)	3º PEF	Vila Bittencourt (Japurá-AM)	01:10	120	0
Cmdo Fron Rio Negro / 5º BIS (São Gapriel da Cachoeira-AM)	6º PEF	Pari-Cachoeira (São Gapriel da Cachoeira-AM)	01:05	48	0
Cmdo Fron Rio Negro / 5º BIS (São Gapriel da Cachoeira-AM)	1º PEF	Iauaretê (São Gapriel da Cachoeira-AM)	00:55	12	0
Cmdo Fron Rio Negro / 5º BIS (São Gapriel da Cachoeira-AM)	7º PEF	Tunuí (São Gapriel da Cachoeira-AM)	00:45	48	0
Cmdo Fron Solimões / 8º BIS (Tabatinga-AM)	4º PEF	Estirão do Equador (Atalaia do Norte-AM)	00:40	72	0
Cmdo Fron Solimões / 8º BIS (Tabatinga-AM)	2º PEF	Ipiranga (Santo Antônio do Içá-AM)	00:35	120	0
Cmdo Fron Juruá/ 61º BIS (Cruzeiro do Sul-AC)	DEF	Marechal Thaumaturgo-AC	00:35	72	0
Cmdo Fron Rio Negro / 5º BIS (São Gapriel da Cachoeira-AM)	4º PEF	Cucuí (São Gapriel da Cachoeira-AM)	00:35	24	0

OM	BORDER UNIT	LOCATION	Travel time (h)		
			Aerial	Fluvial	Terrestrial
Cmdo Fron Rio Negro / 5º BIS (São Gapriel da Cachoeira-AM)	5º PEF	Maturacá (Santa Isabel do Rio Negro-AM)	00:30	14	0
Cmdo Fron Juruá/ 61º BIS (Cruzeiro do Sul-AC)	DEF	São Salvador (Mâncio Lima-AC)	-	24	0
Cmdo Fron Amapá/ 34º BIS (Macapá-AP)	DEF	Vila Brasil (Oiapoque-AP)	-	5	0
Cmdo Fron Amapá/ 34º BIS (Macapá-AP)	1ª CEF	Clevelândia do Norte (Oiapoque-AP)	01:30	0	14
Cmdo Fron Rondônia / 6º BIS (Guajará Mirim-RO)	1º PEF	Príncipe da Beira (Costa Marques-RO)	01:25	12	11
Cmdo Fron Roraima / 7º BIS (Boa Vista-RR)	6º PEF	Uiramutã-RR	00:45	0	6,5
Cmdo Fron Acre / 4º BIS (Rio Branco-AC)	2º PEF	Assis Brasil-AC	00:45	0	5,5
Cmdo Fron Roraima / 7º BIS (Boa Vista-RR)	3º PEF	Pacaraima-RR (Marco BV-8)	00:40	0	5
Cmdo Fron Roraima / 7º BIS (Boa Vista-RR)	2º PEF	Normandia-RR	00:35	0	3
Cmdo Fron Roraima / 7º BIS (Boa Vista-RR)	1º PEF	Bonfim-RR	00:25	0	2
Cmdo Fron Acre / 4º BIS (Rio Branco-AC)	CEF / 1º PEF	Epitaciolândia-AC	-	0	3,5
Cmdo Fron Acre / 4º BIS (Rio Branco-AC)	3º PEF	Plácido de Castro-AC	-	0	2

Source: The author (2021).

The first distortion that can be observed in the table above refers to the PEF of Santa Rosa do Purus, 6th placed in the ranking of priorities. Although it is possible to resupply the Platoon by means of the river modal, using, first, the BR-364, from Rio Branco to Manoel Urbano, in a 4-hour journey, and then climbing the Purus River, in another 12 days of travel, this route is not usually used, except in exceptional situations for the transport of large volumes of material, as has been the case adopted by the 7th BEC in the year 2021 for the reconstruction of the aerodrome.

The second distortion comes from Marechal Thaumaturgo, 14th placed in the ranking, a locality endowed with airport infrastructure, but in such a precarious state that FAB ceased to operate at the aerodrome a few years ago and ANAC itself excluded it from the aerodrome register, according to Ordinance no. 3480, of November 26, 2020 (AGÊNCIA NACIONAL DE AVIAÇÃO CIVIL, 2020).

São Salvador and Vila Brasil appear, respectively, in the 17th and 18th positions, although they are not equipped with aerodromes that allow their supply. In the case of Vila Brasil, this need is relatively well explained by the interministerial effort expended in order to allow FAB to use the Camopi aerodrome in French Guiana, as reported in Chapter 3 of this work.

Consideration must also be given to the question of the interventions carried out in recent years at these aerodromes. Estirão do Ecuador, for example, ranked 12th in priorities for receiving investments, should have its airstrip completed in 2021. Because it is being made entirely of concrete, it is estimated to last approximately 50 years for this infrastructure.

Except for the performance of small periodic maintenance, such as the revitalization of horizontal signage, the replacement of sealant between the concrete slabs, the sealing of any cracks that may arise, among others of smaller magnitude, there is no talk of greater investments in Estirão do Equador before the year 2071, which is why this aerodrome would no longer have higher priority.

Based on the premise that there are various types of pavement in aerodromes that meet the PEF/DEF/CEF, the following maximum useful life parameters were adopted, according to the adaptation of the specialized literature (MACEDO, 2005)::

- Portland Cement Concrete (PCC): 50 years
- Hot Mix Asphalt (HMA): 20 years
- Double Bituminous Surface Treatment (DBST): 10 years
- Single Bituminous Surface Treatment (SBST): 10 years
- Soil, Gravel, Lateritic Concretion or Grass: 5 years

The maximum service life of fill dirt, gravel, bank gravel or grass tracks was estimated at half the service life of surface treatments, due to the absence of data on the durability of these types of coatings.

The data of the year of completion of each of the works of implantation or recovery of the aerodrome were collected in order to be able to estimate the need for intervention. In cases where it was not possible to determine the year of completion, the year 2021 was adopted in order to avoid unnecessary allocations of resources.

In this case, the same six steps adopted earlier were repeated, with the only difference being that, after Step 3, the classification, in ascending order, of the need for intervention was included. The localities that do not have an aerodrome (São Salvador, Vila Brasil, Epitaciolândia and Plácido de Castro) were canceled in this regard.

Tiriós, for example, which was in the 1st place of the ranking, due to the fact that it had the longest flight time to reach the PEF, having no other modes of transport than air, had its asphalt runway (CBUQ) enlarged and recovered in 2009.

Considering, therefore, a maximum useful life of 20 years, no further interventions will be necessary in that locality before 2029, which is why Tiriós ceases to have the highest priority.

Iauaretê, which is currently under construction and is expected to be completed in 2023, with its runway being entirely rebuilt in concrete, will not require further care until 2073, and should therefore lose priority.

Investigating the accidents and aviation incidents that occurred in these locations, where infrastructure has been a contributing factor, it is realized that there is a need to devote greater priority to aerodromes where operating conditions have become marginal, to the point of endangering the safety of air operations and, consequently, human lives.

Two apparent exceptions to the rule were the incidents that occurred in Vila Bittencourt and Ipiranga in 2011, in which the main tire burst at the time of landing. Because there was no major damage, these incidents were not investigated and, consequently, do not have a final report. However, it can be assumed that the airport infrastructure was not a contributing factor, since both runways had been rebuilt in concrete in the year 2008.

Thus, these two incidents were disregarded in order not to unduly interfere in the use of this variable.

Even with the adoption of these new variables (need for intervention, accidents and aeronautical incidents), the Detachments of São Salvador and Vila Brasil remained with low priority, because there was no criterion that prioritizes locations not served by aerodromes.

Therefore, there was a need to inform the feasibility of using the air modal for the resupply of these DEF, as well as to estimate a period for the start of the works, equivalent to the need for intervention for already consolidated aerodromes

Table 2 – Classification of border military units, according to priority for receiving investments in airport infrastructure.

Prior.	Location	Travel time (h)			Type of airstrip floor*	Intervention Need	Accidents and Incidents
		Aéreo	Fluvial	Terrestrial			
1	Surucucu	01:10	0	0	SBST	2021	7
2	Querari	01:15	0	0	DBST	2007	2
3	São Joaquim	01:10	0	0	DBST	2000	0
4	Auaris	01:35	0	0	DBST	2009	0
5	Santa Rosa do Purus	01:00	292	0	DBST	2021	0
6	Tiriós	02:05	0	0	HMA	2029	0
7	Pari-Cachoeira	01:05	48	0	SOIL	1994	1
8	Cucuí	00:35	24	0	DBST	1998	0
9	Maturacá	00:30	14	0	DBST	2008	0
10	Tunuí	00:45	48	0	SOIL	2010	0
11	Marechal Thaumaturgo	00:35	72	0	GRVL	2026	0

Prior.	Location	Travel time (h)			Type of airstrip floor*	Intervention Need	Accidents and Incidents
		Aéreo	Fluvial	Terrestrial			
12	São Salvador	-	24	0	-	2050	-
13	Vila Brasil	-	5	0	-	2053	-
14	Vila Bittencourt	01:10	120	0	CONC	2058	1
15	Ipiranga	00:35	120	0	CONC	2058	1
16	Palmeiras do Javari	01:10	192	0	CONC	2062	0
17	Estirão do Equador	00:40	72	0	CONC	2071	0
18	Iauaretê	00:55	12	0	CONC	2073	0
19	Bonfim	00:25	0	2	LC	2026	1
20	Pacaraima	00:40	0	5	HMA	2009	0
21	Assis Brasil	00:45	0	5,5	HMA	2023	0
22	Príncipe da Beira	01:25	12	11	GRASS	2026	0
23	Uiramutã	00:45	0	6,5	LC	2026	0
24	Normandia	00:35	0	3	SOIL	2026	0
25	Clevelândia do Norte	01:30	0	14	HMA	2028	0
26	Epitaciolândia	-	0	3,5	-	-	-
27	Plácido de Castro	-	0	2	-	-	-

Source: The author (2021).

Note: HMA (Asphalt); CONC (Concrete); GRASS (Grass); GRVL (Gravel); LC (Lateritic Concretion); DBST (Double Bituminous Surface Treatment); SBST (Single Bituminous Surface Treatment).

The amount of aviation accidents and incidents that occurred in Surucucu between the years 2010 and 2020 arouses attention and, in a way, justifies the occupation of the first place in the proposed new ranking of investments.

To better understand the situation of this aerodrome, we will conduct a case study with some data collected locally.

5 Case Study

On February 27, 2016, around 1:30 pm, local time, the FAB 2808 aircraft, a C-105 Amazonas, when making the approach to Runway 30 of SWUQ (Surucucu), touched off before the threshold, causing the retraction of the main landing gear, with the consequent exit to the right of the runway limits.

Figure 3 – FAB 2808 accident in SWUQ

Source: Marcelo Marques, G1 RR.

As a result, the Aeronautical Accidents Investigation and Prevention Center (CENIPA) recommended that the operation of this type of aircraft at the aerodrome of Surucucu be suspended until further studies are carried out regarding the operation of the C-105 in that locality, or until procedures are established that eliminate or at least mitigate the effects of the risks involved.

There are few options to get to Surucucu. Roads do not exist. The Mucajaí River, the closest to the site, has quite intense rapids, which restrict the navigation of larger vessels. Its waters do not bathe the Special Border Platoon based there, because about five kilometers in the middle of the forest separate them.

According to the Air Routes Manual (ROTAER), the local runway, code ICAO SWUQ, is 1080 meters long by 30 meters wide, with asphalt coating (BRASIL, 2021a).

What ROTAER does not report is that the longitudinal slope of the surucucu runway exceeds the maximum tolerance allowed by the Brazilian Civil Aviation Regulation (RBAC) 154, which is 2% where the runway code number is 1 or 2, as is the case in question (AGÊNCIA NACIONAL DE AVIAÇÃO CIVIL, 2019).

In the case of Surucucu, the maximum unevenness on the axis of the airstrip (PPD) is 33.09 meters, which gives us a longitudinal slope of 3.06%.

However, the same RBAC 154, in its Appendix G, item G.4 (a) (2), informs that the longitudinal slope along any stretch of a PPD, should not exceed 2% where the code number is 1 or 2.

Information obtained through the Technical Report of Topographic Survey nº RR004.52-NC.RT001, from August 2019, point out that, despite the slope of the runway as a whole being 3.06%, there are even more critical stretches, such as those ranging from 300 to 350 meters, starting from headland 30, where the slope exceeds twice the maximum allowed, reaching 4.95% (BRASIL, 2019).

Graph 1 – Longitudinal profile of the Surucucu airstrip.



Source: The author (2021).

In addition to this condition, which is quite critical, there is still a hill near the head of head 30, called "Tchotcho Mary", that violates the approach ramp, inducing the pilots to approach in a steeper trajectory than recommended.

Due to the characteristics of the relief and the slope gradient of the runway, all landings are carried out in the direction of the headboard 30 and all takeoffs use the headboard 12.

Runways with a length of less than or equal to 1,500 meters are considered short for the C-105 and, to operate under these conditions, there are some specific procedures such as: reduction of the maximum operating weight, stabilized approach, lower ramp than normal and maximum use of the brakes and the reverse of the engines during landing, among others.

The lower than normal ramp is used to favor the touch at the beginning of the runway and to make the most of its extension for the braking of the aircraft, also contributing to the maintenance of a lower descent ratio.

The presence of a hill near the head of the runway in Surucucu induces pilots to vary the descent ratio, making it difficult to maintain a fully stabilized approach.

The maximum use of the brakes and the reverse, in turn, contributes to the breakdown of the asphalt layer, which, in the case of Surucucu, is only a simple surface treatment.

The operating conditions of the runway, associated with the type of pavement, cause the need for constant interventions, which, in turn, promote more and more undulations and irregularities in the runway, decreasing the rolling comfort, generating additional efforts in the landing gear of the aircraft and, consequently, impairing braking.

The last major intervention in Surucucu was carried out by the Amazon Region Airports Commission (COMARA) in 2011, when there was the collection of the right main landing gear of a C-105 in the locality and the replacement of the entire runway surface was carried out, due to the existence of numerous holes that caused the detachment of fragments.

The machines and implements used by COMARA in this work can still be seen in Surucucu, such as vibrating rollers, wheel tractors, a track tractor, a loader, a grader, among others.

The logistical difficulties of transport impose such high costs that, in this case, it does not justify the removal of the equipment, which may be demanded again in the foreseeable future.

Between 2016 and 2019, a period in which the operations of the C-105 in Surucucu were discontinued, the Brazilian Air Force, through the Institute for Research and Tests in Flight (IPEV) and the Institute for Development and Industrial Coordination (IFI), prepared and approved a specific operational supplement for the operation of the C-105 in SWUQ.

With the flight profile of this supplement, the São José dos Campos Aeronautics Computing Center (CCA-SJ) developed a virtual simulation environment to enable the training of the C-105 crews.

At the same time, the Airspace Control Department (DECEA), with the support of COMARA, installed in Surucucu an equipment called APAPI, or Simplified Precision Approach Trajectory Indicator, in order to provide pilots with visual indications of the ideal approach ramp for landing.

All these initiatives have certainly mitigated the risks involved from the operation of the C-105 in Surucucu, which, despite of complex and with higher risk than a conventional takeoff and landing operation, it was considered feasible in a context of special operation with known and controlled risk.

As the risks have not been eliminated, it is considered highly desirable, if there is budgetary availability, to promote new investments in airport infrastructure, since the longitudinal slope of the PPD remains above the maximum 2% provided for in RBAC 154.

The proposal for Surucucu, therefore, goes in the direction of carrying out a large-scale intervention, correcting the longitudinal slope, so as to lower it to values less than 2%, and, at the same time, extend it from the current 1080 to 1500 meters in length.

Graph 2 – SWUQ longitudinal slope correction proposal.



Source: The author (2019).

The intention, as can be seen from the analysis of the figure above, is to make two cuts on the ground: one at the highest part of the track, reducing the height of headboard 12 by approximately 7.5 meters, and another at the summit of the Tchotcho Mary hill, which would become part of the track. In parallel, land the area between the headboard 30 and the hill, at a maximum height of 16.8 meters.

The cutting volume is slightly higher than the landfill, and the average transport distance of the material to be excavated is less than one kilometer.

The two greatest difficulties envisaged fall, first of all, on the transport of large equipment to Surucucu, as well as on the channeling of a 300-meter stretch of the Surucucu creek, which passes between the headboard 30 of the track and the Tchotcho Mary hill.

In 2011, COMARA dismantled larger machines, such as a motor grader, whose total weight was 14,371 kg, to transport it from Boa Vista by C-105 to Surucucu. It took four trips of C-105, as well as a Blackhawk transfer to take the cabin of the grader as an external cargo, due to the fact that its dimensions did not allow boarding in the internal compartment of the C-105.

This time, however, the proposal is to acquire specific equipment for the Surucucu project, such as excavators and bucket trucks, in such a way that the company that won the bid delivers the equipment already disassembled, in dimensions compatible with the load capacity of the C-105 or the Blackhawk, and reassemble them when they reach Surucucu, leaving FAB solely responsible for transporting the various components.

A boundary condition to be adopted during a work of this magnitude in Surucucu is that the runway continues to allow the operation of smaller aircraft, such as the C-98 Caravan, since this will continue to be the only way to access the locality.

As the C-98 operates at its maximum load capacity on lanes measuring 750 meters in length, even unpaved, this boundary condition does not impose insurmountable limitations on the execution of the work.

Another important factor to be taken into account during the executive planning for this work refers to the volume of material to be transported, since air support will be fundamental and the required amount of flight hours will not be negligible. The estimated flight hours, therefore, should not only be part of the project, but also be approved by the General Staff of the Air Force in order to guarantee full compliance

6 Recommendations

6.1 Aerodrome administration

According to the Auxiliary Publication of Air Routes (ROTAER), the aerodrome administrator is the "authority responsible for the administration of the aerodrome and the proper functioning of the maneuver area" (BRASIL, 2021a, p. 0.4-10).

ROTAER brings only information regarding the administrators of public aerodromes and helipads, which can be the State Government, INFRAERO, an Aeroclub, among others. The absence of any indication in that publication means that the public aerodrome or helipad is administered by the city hall.

But with regard to the use of the aerodrome, in addition to public, it can also be classified, according to the same ROTAER, in:

> **MIL** – Military: aerodrome intended, in principle, for the use of military aircraft.
> **PRIV** – Private: civil aerodrome, built in an area of private property, for the use of its owner, whose commercial exploitation is prohibited, and can only be used with the owner's permission.
> **PRIV/PUB** – Private aerodrome open to public traffic.
> **PUB** – Public: civil aerodrome, intended for aircraft traffic in general.
> **PUB/MIL** – Public aerodrome that has military installations of the Air Force Command.
> **PUB/REST** – Restricted Public: civil aerodrome, built in an area of public property, for use reserved to the public agency that has it under its jurisdiction, whose commercial exploitation is prohibited, and can only be used with authorization from the respective public agency (BRASIL, 2021a , p. 0.4-4, emphasis added).

Of the 27 Special Border Platoons and Detachments currently operating in the Amazon region, only four do not have an airstrip in their vicinity.

Of the 23 existing aerodromes, therefore, only two are public, Ipiranga and Clevelândia do Norte, managed, respectively, by the municipal governments of Santo Antônio do Içá-AM and Oiapoque-AP; four are military, Tiriós, Príncipe da Beira, Estirão do Ecuador and Iauaretê, administered by the Belém Air Base, the second by the Brazilian Army and the last two by COMARA; ten are private, nine managed by FUNAI: São Joaquim, Cucuí, Querari, Pari-Cachoeira, Maturacá, Vila Bittencourt, Palmeiras do Javari, Auaris and Surucucu, and one administered by the Department of

Highways of Acre (DERACRE): Santa Rosa do Purus; and seven lost their approval, for not having complied with ANAC's requirements, five being administered by the municipal governments where they are located: Uiramutã, Bonfim, Normandia, Pacaraima and Tunuí, and two administered by DERACRE: Marechal Thaumaturgo and Assis Brasil.

Practically a third of these 23 aerodromes had their homologations revoked by the National Civil Aviation Agency (ANAC), due to the existence of non-conformities not remedied by the administrator, being excluded, therefore, from the register of aerodromes.

Once excluded from the register, the aerodrome, in thesis, is closed to air traffic. The operation of civil aircraft to support and complement the logistical effort in service to the PEF makes this activity, therefore, irregular, constituting an infringement provided for in the Brazilian Aeronautics code, in addition to subjecting the operator to non-insurance coverage in case of a possible accident or incident.

Another interesting detail concerns the fundraising of the National Civil Aviation Fund (FNAC) to invest in these aerodromes. One of the essential conditions for the aerodrome to be able to receive resources from FNAC is that it be included in the ANAC aerodrome register as a public type aerodrome.

The aerodromes managed by FUNAI are all private, as the entity is characterized by being a public foundation that has legal personality under private law.

In this sense, it is recommended that the Brazilian Army carry out management to take over the administration of the aerodromes that meet the PEF, classifying them as public type, in order to guarantee their homologation conditions, as well as to make it possible to raise funds from the FNAC via formalization of decentralized execution terms with the National Secretariat of Civil Aviation.

6.2 Anemometric stations

When it comes to the deployment of a pioneer runway, one of the main concerns of the designer refers to the orientation of the runways, since they must be aligned with the direction of the prevailing winds.

How to determine, however, this direction?

The students of Professor Wolney Ramos Ribeiro, who taught Earthmoving at the Aeronautics Institute of Technology (ITA) between 1977 and 2003, and who had previously accumulated 20 years of experience building airstrips in the Amazon region, used to hear picturesque stories about the empirical methods adopted in determining the direction of the wind.

From the 1950s to the 1970s, the prevailing wind was determined by observing an eventual inclination of the trees or even consulting the local indigenous populations, according to Professor Wolney.

The situation today, however, is completely different. Although it is no longer so common to implement pioneer runways, even though there is still a demand for it, ICAO Annex 14, which deals with the Aerodrome Project, recommends that wind data (direction and speed) be collected for a minimum period of five years, with no fewer than eight daily observations spaced equally in time, ie every three hours (INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, 2016, p 3-2).

This data collection occurs through the deployment of an anemometer or an anemograph, installed at a height of 10.0 meters from the ground (±1.0 m), in an area free from the effects of air disturbances caused by nearby objects, as recommended in the Aeronautics Command Manual dealing with the Installation of Surface and Altitude Meteorological Stations (BRASIL, 2018a).

To better clarify what would be an area free of objects in the vicinity, the same Manual directs that the towers of the anemometers keep the minimum horizontal distance of ten times the height of the obstacles existing in the surroundings of the tower (BRASIL, 2018a).

Considering, therefore, a relatively flat terrain, in a forest area, with trees reaching the maximum height of 20 meters, the ideal would be that a circular clearing, of 200 meters of radius, would be opened in order that the anemometric station would be installed in the center of this circle.

Finally, it is recommended that management be carried out for the installation of anemometric stations in the geometric center of the areas where new airstrips are intended to be deployed, such as Vila Brasil-AP, São Salvador-AC and any other localities not provided with airport infrastructure, but where the Brazilian Army intends to deploy a PEF in the future.

6.3 Maintenance of aerodromes

Some aviation accidents and incidents would be easily avoided if simple aerodrome maintenance measures were adopted.

On October 13, 2014, for example, the pilot of a C-105 Amazonas aircraft, after landing in Querari, tried to dodge holes in the center of the runway and ended up touching the tip of the left wing in bushes existing on the side of the runway.

Although the damage was slight – just the breakage of the navigation light acrylic –, this episode is classified as an aeronautical incident and could have had more serious consequences, including taking the aircraft out of operation.

Another incident, this time in Surucucu on May 26, 2010, also involved a Casa C-105 aircraft and originated from the presence of a foreign object present on the airstrip.

After landing, during the reverse application, a rock hit the tip of one of the aircraft's right propeller blades. The damage, once again, was slight, but it involved replacing this blade.

Loose stones along the runway, or any other objects unduly present in the operational environment of the aerodrome, which have the ability to cause damage to aircraft, shall be characterised as FOD (*Foreign Object Damage*) and must be eliminated.

One of the practices adopted in aerodromes managed by the Brazilian Air Force consists of tasks of the "Search FOD" type, when the unit's personnel are positioned in a profiled manner along the width of the runway and aircraft parking lot and walk from one end to the other, collecting all loose objects (especially stones) that could cause damage to the aircraft.

The recommendation, therefore, is that the personnel of the PEF carry out a weekly "Search FOD" or at least on the eve of the PAA aircraft landing.

In addition to searching the FOD and the removal of trees and bushes on the sides of the runway and in the approach and take-off areas, another recommendation, for aerodromes that have fences around the operational area, is that the access gates be kept closed to avoid the inadvertent entry of animals and that a periodic inspection be carried out on the perimeter of the aerodrome, in order to verify and guarantee the integrity of the fence

6.4 Pavement management system

The lack of an adequate pavement management system for the aerodromes that meet the PEF prevents preventive maintenance from being scheduled on these airstrips. Interventions are usually performed when the pavements are in critical condition, therefore requiring heavier interventions such as restorations or even the complete reconstruction of the runway (CORDOVIL, 2010, p. 17).

The Brazilian Air Force addressed this need in 2003, when the first version of ICA 85-10 was published, which deals with the implementation of an Aerodrome Management systematic within the scope of the Air Force Command (BRASIL, 2017).

Annually, the Air Force Command issues a report on the state of conservation of the network of airport pavements under its administration, seeking a rational prioritization of the investments necessary for the conservation and rehabilitation of these pavements.

By means of periodic monitoring, which in the case of the runways that support the PEF, due to their low air traffic, could be done every three years, it would be possible to raise data indicating the condition of the pavements, that is, numbers that express the structural, functional, aesthetic and security aspects of the airport infrastructure.

This way, it would be easier to offer the appropriate support to decisions regarding the establishment of effective and economic strategies to provide and maintain, over time, a network of pavements in operational conditions.

It is therefore recommended that the Brazilian Army adopt an airport pavement management system in order to monitor the state of the airstrips that serve the border units, proposing the appropriate interventions at the most appropriate times

6.5 PDAIM update

The Air Force Command has a Plan for the Development of Aerodrome of Military Interest, better known by the acronym PDAIM, whose last update dates from 2005.

According to that publication, aerodromes of military interest are all those aerodromes, whether civilian, shared or military, capable of supporting civil or military aircraft engaged in actions of military interest (BRASIL, 2005).

Among the various criteria for selecting aerodromes of military interest, there are those that are of interest to the Brazilian Navy and Brazilian Army commands.

Most of the municipalities where the border units are located are contemplated in the aforementioned plan. However, due to the activation of new Detachments, after the publication of the last edition of the PDAIM, it is recommended, by the Brazilian Army, to carry out efforts to include in the PDAIM other locations that it deems of interest, such as Vila Brasil, in the municipality of Oiapoque-AP.

In addition to the inclusion of new areas of interest, it is also recommended to carry out management so that each aerodrome is equipped with an aircraft parking yard with minimum dimensions of 130×80 meters, in order to allow the simultaneous and unrestricted operation of two KC-390 aircraft.

7 Conclusion

The present work proposed to present and apply a series of indicators to classify the aerodromes in the Legal Amazon that serve dual civil and indigenous communities, as well as border military organizations, be they Platoons, Detachments or Special Border Companies, in order to establish the appropriate priorities in the application of investments in airport infrastructure for the benefit of the country.

As we have seen, there is a fruitful debate about the limitations and opportunities for improvement in the various modes of transport in the Amazon region (SANT'ANNA, 1998; THÉRY, 2005).

The data used in the logistical supply of each location were collected according to the different modes available, whether by land, river or air.

Those locations that had more restricted resupply options and that were located farther from their distribution centers received due priority.

The information regarding the types of pavements used in each of the aerodromes objects of this study, their estimated useful life, as well as the date of completion of the last major interventions in each locality served as a subsidy for a proposal of new interventions in a time horizon for the next 50 years.

In this order, Surucucu, Querari, São Joaquim and Auaris were the tracks that received the highest priorities and therefore deserve special attention from the authorities involved.

The first of them, Surucucu, as it was the scene of two accidents and five aeronautical incidents in the last decade, was the subject of a case study, which pointed out the need to rebuild the runway, with the proper correction of its longitudinal slope.

Some recommendations were issued in order to promote the development of airport infrastructure in service to military border units, as well as increase the safety of air operations in these locations.

The first of these concerns the assumption, by the Brazilian Army, of the administration of the aerodromes that serve the PEF, the surrounding population and any indigenous communities, in order to guarantee their approval conditions, as well as to make it possible to raise funds from the FNAC for their maintenance.

The second recommendation is to carry out management for the installation of anemometric stations in areas where new airstrips are intended to be deployed, in order to collect wind data, for a minimum period of five years, in order to define the best direction of the runway axis.

The third recommendation is a very simple procedure to be implemented, but one that will bring greater safety to air operations at these aerodromes, such as the periodic collection of debris on the runway surface, the removal of trees and bushes on the sides of the runway and in the approach and take-off areas, as well as keeping the access gates to the operational area closed, in order to prevent the inadvertent entry of animals.

The fourth and penultimate recommendation refers to the possibility of adopting an airport pavement management system, with the aim of monitoring the state of conservation of the airstrips that serve the border units, proposing the appropriate interventions at the most opportune moments.

Finally, it is recommended that the Brazilian Army take steps to include the Vila Brasil runway (to be built) in the Development Plan for Aerodrome of Military Interest, as well as to propose the expansion of the aircraft parking aprons to the minimum dimensions of 130×80 meters, aiming at the simultaneous and unrestricted operation of two KC-390 aircraft.

Due to the lack of data available on the state of conservation of the lanes according to the PCI method (Pavement Condition Index) and the presence of obstacles in the surroundings of the aerodrome, an opportunity to improve this work is glimpsed from the survey of this information by technical teams, including surveyors and airport pavement specialists.

These recommendations, if well planned and financed, can be transformed into actions with expressive dual results, both for the defense sector and for the support and quality of life of communities along the Brazilian border, as they would promote better operating conditions for civil and military aviation.

References

AGÊNCIA NACIONAL DE AVIAÇÃO CIVIL (Brasil). Projeto de aeródromos. **Regulamento brasileiro da aviação civil**: RBAC, nº 154, emenda nº 6. [Brasília, DF]: ANAC, 2019. Available in: https://www.anac.gov.br/assuntos/legislacao/legislacao-1/boletim-de-pessoal/2019/37s1/anexo-i-rbac-no-154-emenda-06. Access in: 17 nov. 2021.

AGÊNCIA NACIONAL DE AVIAÇÃO CIVIL (Brasil). Superintendência de Infraestrutura Aeroportuária. Gerência de Certificação e Segurança Operacional. Portaria nº 3480, de 26 de novembro de 2020. Exclui o Aeródromo Privado Marechal Thaumaturgo (AC) no cadastro de aeródromos. **Diário Oficial da União**: seção 1, Brasília, DF, ano 158, n. 240, p. 103, 16 dez. 2020. Available in: https://www.in.gov.br/web/dou/-/portaria-n-3.480-de-26-de-novembro-de-2020-294342630. Access in: 18 nov. 2021.

BRASIL. Ministério da Defesa. Comando da Aeronáutica. Comando-Geral de Apoio. **Gerenciamento de aeródromos no Comando da Aeronáutica**: ICA 85-10. São Paulo, 2017.

BRASIL. Ministério da Defesa. Comando da Aeronáutica. Comissão de Aeroportos da Região Amazônica. **Relatório Técnico RR004.52-NC.RT001, reforma e ampliação do Aeródromo de Surucucu-RR**: estudos e levantamentos topográficos. [S. l.: s. n.], ago. 2019.

BRASIL. Ministério da Defesa. Comando da Aeronáutica. Departamento de Controle do Espaço Aéreo. **Instalação de estações meteorológicas de superfície e de altitude**: MCA 101-1. Rio de Janeiro: [s. n.], 2018a.

BRASIL. Ministério da Defesa. Comando da Aeronáutica. Departamento de Controle do Espaço Aéreo. Instituto de Cartografia Aeronáutica. Gerenciamento de Informações Aeronáuticas. **Publicação auxiliar de rotas aéreas**: ROTAER. Rio de Janeiro: Comando da Aeronáutica, 2021a. Available in: https://aisweb.decea.mil.br/downloads/rotaer/rotaer_completo.pdf. Access in: 5 apr. 2021.

BRASIL. Ministério da Defesa. Comando da Aeronáutica. Estado-Maior da Aeronáutica. **Planejamento**: DCA 11-45: concepção estratégica força aérea 100. Brasília, DF: Comando da Aeronáutica, 2018b. Available in: https://www.fab.mil.br/Download/arquivos/DCA%2011-45_Concepcao_Estrategica_Forca_Aerea_100.pdf. Access in: 18 nov. 2021.

BRASIL. Ministério da Defesa. Comando da Aeronáutica. Estado-Maior da Aeronáutica. **Planejamento**: PCA 11-17: plano de desenvolvimento de aeródromos de interesse militar. Brasília, DF: Comando da Aeronáutica, 2005.

BRASIL. **Lei nº 7.565, de 19 de dezembro de 1986**. Dispõe sobre o Código Brasileiro de Aeronáutica. Brasília, DF: Presidência da República, 1986. Available in: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ leis/l7565compilado.htm. Access in: 12 oct. 2021.

BRASIL. Ministério da Saúde. Secretaria Especial de Saúde Indígena. **EDS, Renovatio e SESAI realizam mais de 2.300 atendimentos no DSEI Alto Rio Negro**. Brasília, DF: Secretaria Especial de Saúde Indígena, 17 set. 2021b. Available in: https://saudeindigena1.websiteseguro.com/coronavirus/viewNoticiaGeral.php?CodNot=8b64cef243. Access in: 12 oct. 2021.

CORDOVIL, R. M. **Um programa de gerência de pavimentos para o Comando da Aeronáutica - estudo de caso**: Bases Aéreas da Região Sul. 2010. 127 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Engenharia Civil) – Programa de Pós-Graduação em Engenharia Civil, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre, 2010.

FALCONI, V. **O verdadeiro poder**: práticas de gestão que conduzem a resultados revolucionários. 2 ed. Nova Lima: Falconi Consultores de Resultado, 2013.

FERREIRA, L. F. T.; FRANCHI, T. Os desafios às operações de logística na Amazônia: fricção no abastecimento de unidades de fronteira. **Revista Hoplos**, Niterói, v. 4 n. 6, p. 83-102, 2020. Available in: https://periodicos.uff.br/hoplos/article/view/42752. Access in: 16 nov. 2021.

FRANCHI, T. **Da conquista do inferno verde à proteção do paraíso tropical**: o discurso militar brasileiro sobre a Amazônia no século XX. 2013. 332 f. Tese (Doutorado em Desenvolvimento Sustentável) – Centro de Desenvolvimento Sustentável, Universidade de Brasília, Brasília, DF, 2013.

HUBBARD, D. W. **Como mensurar qualquer coisa**: encontrando o valor do que é intangível nos negócios. Tradução de Ebréia de Castro Alves. Rio de Janeiro: Qualitymark, 2015.

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION. **Aerodromes**: volume I - aerodrome design and operations. 7th ed. [Montréal]: ICAO, July 2016. Annex 14 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation.

MACEDO, M. C. **Estudo para base técnica de um sistema de gerência de pavimentos para redes regionais de aeroportos**. 2005. 232 f. Tese (Doutorado em Engenharia) – Instituto Tecnológico de Aeronáutica, São Paulo, 2005.

MIRANDA, W. D. **Defesa e Exército na Amazônia Brasileira**: um estudo sobre a constituição dos Pelotões Especiais de Fronteira. 2012. 170 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Ciências Políticas) – Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciências Políticas, Universidade Federal do Pará, Belém, 2012.

MORAES, J. de M. O Rio Oiapoque. **Revista Brasileira de Geografia**, Rio de Janeiro, ano 16, n. 1, p. 3-61, jan./mar. 1964. Available in: https://biblioteca.ibge.gov.br/visualizacao/ monografias/GEBIS%20-%20RJ/RBG/RBG%201964%20v26_n1.pdf. Access in: 6 apr. 2021.

RODRIGUES, U. B. **Pelotões Especiais de Fronteira**: sua importância para vivificação das áreas fronteiriças e manutenção da integridade territorial. 2004. Dissertação (Mestrado) – Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército, Rio de Janeiro, 2004.

SANT'ANNA, J. A. **Rede básica de transportes da Amazônia**. Brasília, DF: Ipea, jun. 1998. (Textos para discussão, n. 562). Available in: http://repositorio.ipea. gov.br/bitstream/11058/2404/1/td_0562.pdf. Access in: 14 oct. 2021.

SILVA, J. J. G. da. Logística e mobilização nacional na Amazônia Ocidental: reflexo para os Pelotões Especiais de Fronteira. **Caderno de Estudos Estratégicos de Logística e Mobilização Nacional**, Rio de Janeiro, n. 1, p. 51-75, 2007.

THÉRY, H. Situações da Amazônia no Brasil e no continente. **Estudos Avançados**, São Paulo, v. 19, n. 53, p. 37-49, 2005. Available in: https://www.revistas.usp.br/eav/article/view/10045. Access in: 14 oct. 2021.

PROFESSIONAL ARTICLE DOI 10.52781/cmm.e015

The Spin-In of Strategic Organizational Communication for the Brazilian Army

El Spin-In de la Comunicación Estratégica Organizacional para el Ejército Brasileño

Abstract: The Brazilian Army has been seeking to improve its communication in a society that is increasingly connected and fast in the process of information. Thus, it is intended to identify, in the civilian environment, the knowledge related to the organizational strategic planning, environments, types, theories, definitions, characteristics, components, and planning, strategic communication plans, marketing, process, and performance indicators, in order to migrate to the military sector, a spin-off in the process, in this case, specifically the Army, identifying and suggesting its applicability to the Force, and the consistency with the existing documentation.

Keywords: Strategic communication. Spin-in. Organizational. Army.

Resumen: El Exército Brasileiro busca mejorar su comunicación en una sociedad cada vez más conectada y rápida en el procesamiento de la información. Así, busca identificar, en el ambiente civil, el conocimiento relacionado con la planificación estratégica organizacional, ambientes, tipos, teorías, definiciones, características, componentes, planificación, planes de Comunicación Estratégica, marketing, stakeholders, e indicadores de desempeño para, a través de un proceso de spin-in, migrar al sector militar, en este caso, específicamente al Exército, identificando y sugiriendo su aplicabilidad por fuerza y consistencia con la documentación existente.

Palabras-clave: Comunicación Estratégica. Spin-in. Organizacional. Exército.

Alexandre Santana Moreira
Exército Brasileiro. Escola de Comando e Estado Maior do Exército.
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.
alex_smor@yahoo.com.br

André Luis Costa Pitangueira
Exército Brasileiro. Escola de Comando e Estado Maior do Exército.
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.
pitangueira.mb@gmail.com

Received: Sep. 20, 2021
Approved: Nov. 29, 2021

COLEÇÃO MEIRA MATTOS
ISSN on-line 2316-4891 / ISSN print 2316-4833
http://ebrevistas.eb.mil.br/index.php/RMM/index

1 Introduction

Current times present us with an environment in which the informational dimension has assumed a relevant role. It is in this condition that large institutions and organizations feed the competition for the market in search of customers who contribute to the achievement of their mission and strategic objectives.

The great connectivity of people, in a dynamic and fast way, generates a large volume of information that is propagated through websites and interactive mechanisms, making communication independent of traditional media, within a VUCA[1] world (MOREIRA, 2020).

There is a need to establish connections with society, formed by different stakeholders, creating impressions that generate credibility and legitimacy, contributing so that the organization's strategic objectives are achieved (REBELO; SOUSA; FAUSTINO, 2020).

For this, communication shall be umbilically associated with the organization's management system and be part of its organizational culture (BUENO, 2005), requiring consistent and unified planning, in order to align, integrate and synchronize actions, images and messages of the entire organization.

Strategic Communication ceased to be a purely sectoral activity and began to be treated at the highest level of organizations, the strategic level. In this context, in which techniques and processes are being imported from the civilian environment to develop a technical-scientific framework for the military sciences and, consequently, for the Brazilian Army, pointing to the occurrence of a *Spin-in*[2] process.

From the above, this work aims to understand this Spin-in process that has been taking place, as well as its benefits for the growth of Strategic Communication in the Brazilian Army, based on the interdisciplinary project of ECEME on Strategic Communication.

2. Organizational Strategic Communication

2.1. Organizational Strategic Planning

The starting point for planning and carrying out an institution's Strategic Communication is, undoubtedly, its Senior Management. It is responsible for defining its strategic objectives, preparing the institutional mission and visualizing its vision of the future, all of which is supported by the values listed for the organization.

This work is fundamental for the survival of the institution or company as it focuses on the long term, with a macro vision, in a situation idealized as feasible. To this end, such Management shall have full situational awareness based on reliable information, focused on the needs of the market in which it is inserted.

1 The members of the US Army War College began to use the acronym VUCA to designate this volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous world in their studies. (US Army Heritage and Education Center, 2019)

2 Through the Spin-in process, innovations originated in the civil sector, after being conveniently tested there, begin to be successfully applied in the military sector. (DAGNINO, 2007, p. 202)

Once the strategies and actions to be carried out are established, they must be communicated to its employees, so that everyone can contribute to the achievement of pre-established objectives.

2.2. Communication Environments

Currently, the population is exposed to an immense volume of information with an enormous amount of messages being made available to people. This makes the complete processing all this information impossible. Therefore, most of them is discarded. One way to overcome this situation is to have the same message transmitted in each of the company's communication channels. With this, the message received from several sources is more likely to be viewed, understood and fixed. The way to organize this is by subordinating Strategic Communication to the company's global organizational strategy (TĂNĂSESCU et al., 2014).

The messages are subordinate to themes and are constructed with precise information, for specific stakeholders, to create the desired effects. The messages are conceived in such a way as to build a web of arguments with previous and future communications and with themes for a specific time, place, media and audience. Its flexible and more dynamic nature gives communicators and planners the space to maneuver in the cognitive perspective of the informational environment to create more varied effects according to the planned strategy.

Social networks currently make up a virtual and digital reality, support the interoperability between systems, the personalization of this new world and the constant sharing of information, however, for their best use, it is vitally important to plan consistent strategies to ensure that the opportunities and challenges of the technological revolution are harnessed by institutions and entities.

The quality or measurement of success on the social networks of websites with indicators such as likes, followers, number of views, shares and positive or negative comments is a fundamental resource for assessing the return of intervention policies and strategies of companies or governments and the necessary adaptation to the expectations of consumers or users.

Social and digital media are fundamental agents of simultaneous and multidirectional communication, in the sharing of content and experiences. For its use, it is vital to always plan communication strategies and/or tactics that demand social networking in order to provoke the direct or indirect engagement of communities and consumers.

Social networks are also outstanding tools at a functional, social and psychological level in the decision-making process, indicating that there is a value that shall be attributed to them and managed in a strategic way.

It will always be essential to design communication strategies and tactics that trigger social networking, in order to provoke the direct or indirect involvement of communities and consumers.

Further on the study of the communication environment, it is worth highlighting the increase in the occurrence of terms such as "misinformation", "fake news", "post-truth" and others, which have been addressed in a generic way and through specific actions of truth manipulation and lie propagation and, sometimes, being detected and worked on as part of a complex and very well-planned web.

2.3. Types and Theories of Communication

Communication between the emitter (sender source) and a receiver (recipient) is established through a vehicle, channel or transmitting medium, which are subject to noise or interference, feeding back continuously. This flow of information is called a communication process that can be one-way (television or radio, for example) or both ways (telephone, radio, messaging application, among others).

Among the existing types, Institutional Communication has an informational, articulation and positioning focus of the brand and image. It aims to transmit the culture, vision of the future and values, as well as present or publicize the company/institution, adding abstract value to the recipient of this communication (message).

Marketing Communication, on the other hand, stimulates consumption and also involvement with the products generated in each line of action or in each project. It presents the characteristics that differentiate and value their product from market competitors, aiming to gain the loyalty of those who are already consumers of the brand and, also, to attract new consumers through this communication.

Internal Communication informs and involves employees and other stakeholders of each project. The transmission of the message throughout the hierarchical chain is the main goal. It is through this that the guidelines, ideas and determinations of the Senior Management reach all those interested in the process. It ensures that everyone works in the same direction. This communication is essential for the company's success and shall always guide the strategic objectives so that the actions and attitudes of all are always directed towards this.

Quirke (1996) highlights that internal communicators will need to understand the institution's business, have knowledge of the market, products and the profile of the audience with which the company operates, in addition to show that internal communication can indeed be used as a business strategy.

Integrated Communication includes, aligns and integrates external communication, whether marketing or institutional, and internal, aiming to achieve the organization's objectives (MASSIE; ANDERSON, 2003) and create a positive image of trust in the organization and build long-term relationships (DUNCAN, 2002).

Integrated Communication encompasses all interested parties, from employees to customers, including the community in which the organization operates (STUART; SAROW; STUART, 2007). The message recipients are external and internal audiences (RISTINO, 2013).

Integrated Communication is bidirectional. There is interest in dialogue with interested parties (CHICCO; CHANDLER, 2002). This form of communication allows receiving and sending messages, through which it aligns the organization with the objectives of the interested parties (POLLACH et al., 2012).

Kick and Pereira (2011) state that an institution's communication is the mirror of its organizational culture, and shall be in perfect alignment with the company's objectives. In addition, organizational communication will be responsible for the disclosing of the company/ transparency in the sharing of information at the external and internal levels. Furthermore, they also concluded that the organizational factors under study (structure, leadership, culture and communication) influence the implementation of the companies' Strategic Planning, in the same way that the latter influences them.

2.4. Marketing

According to Lima (2007, p. 39) "Marketing Mix is the set of marketing tools that the organization uses to achieve its objectives in the target market." Such tools are presented as the 4Ps of marketing: product, price, place (or distribution) and promotion.

The current definitions bring to the mix up to 3 points beyond the previous ones, but for the purposes of this study, it was agreed to add only the 5th P: People, since it is the focus of the work in development and permeates the four previous aspects.

This concept is important in the context of Strategic Communication as the "Ps" of marketing are identified in an institution's strategic planning.

On the "cause-related marketing", it has already been reported in internet surveys that around 77% of Brazilians expect companies/institutions to be able to collaborate more with society, that is, link their brand to a noble and relevant cause. However, attention should be paid to this cause not being out of the context of the moment or having little or no connection with its finalistic activity. Delicate social causes or those related to tragedies of great popular commotion shall be avoided.

On the "purpose-related marketing", it can be verified that the brands of institutions guided by relevant and legitimate purposes tend to inspire and attract their stakeholders with greater efficiency.

Digital Marketing are actions of communication that institutions can use by means of internet, mobile telephony or other digital means, in order to disseminate, disclose and market their products or services, conquering new clients and improving their relationship network. It encompasses the practices to promote products or services through the use of electronic distribution channels, to then reach the stakeholders quickly in a relevant, personalized and more efficient way.

This type of marketing is translated into actions shaped for digital media, in order to achieve, in these channels, the same efficiency and effectiveness of direct marketing and, simultaneously, potentiate the effects of traditional marketing. In its operation, digital channels, means and tools are normally used.

2.5. Strategic Communication Definitions

In 2005, in a reference to Management, Argenti, Howell and Beck (2005, p. 61) defined Strategic Communication as "the communication in line with the company's general strategy, with a view to promoting its positioning".

Two years later, Hallahan et al. (2007, p. 4) stated that the essence of Strategic Communication is the fact of "purposefully advancing the (organization's) mission".

In the complex contemporary world, citizens and organizations, inserted in a democratic environment, are daily submitted to an immense volume of information, within which the media have become the main actors.

In the current context of the informational dimension, globally, principles and values such as ethics, truth, argumentation preceded by reputable reflection, among others, are aspects that do not matter, given the search for the primacy of information.

Organizational communication is also conceptualized as strategic when it involves all employees, always achieving the best results, mobilizing through adequate communication, at the right time and to the public of interest, thus continuously contributing to the learning of each individual employee and the collective whole, seeking to continuously correspond to organizational challenges (PEREIRA, 2014).

Organizational Communication professionals are faced with the need not only to equip their institutions for this new environment: the tools have to be adequate. They shall allow: visibility; transparency; present relevant and coherent speech; and strengthen the institution's identity.

In this sense, Moreira (2020) reinforces that it is through strategic planning and an integrated management of Communication that the ideal conditions are obtained to define the policies, guidelines and actions that will guarantee the desired results and, also, reach the objectives defined by the organization.

For Pereira (2014), Strategic Communication consists of a set of planned, well-defined and structured actions so that the organization's objectives are met. This communication results in changes in attitudes and produces changes in the behavior of the organization's members, guiding them in a way that all its components feel motivated and integrated so that the goals are achieved. Communication involves the institution as a whole – directors, employees, associates, volunteers, etc.

Some of the main areas of performance of Strategic Communication are linked to organizational identity and culture, which corresponds to the management of its intangible assets, as the reputation of an organization depends decreasingly on advertising effort and increasingly on Strategic Communication and its integral focus.

In another definition, it is observed that the opportunities are in the field of image, therefore Strategic Communication is at the service of managing intangible assets such as image, reputation, corporate social responsibility and the brand understood as a company brand and not just a brand product.

Oliveira and Paula (2007) present the five components of Strategic Communication, which are procedural treatment of communication, insertion in the decision-making chain, relationship management; the systematic use of process planning and monitoring.

At the organizational level, Strategic Communication is developed through integration in six areas in Organizations: business management, marketing, public relations, communication technologies, communication policies and social and informational marketing campaigns (HALLAHAN et al., 2007).

According to Carrillo (2014), the Strategy shall have some focal points which are: the communication management; the Stakeholders (or audiences of interest); the models capable of measuring the benefit of Strategic Communication (Indicators); the demand for new professionals; and the integration of internal and external communication.

Next, in possession of all the concepts and definitions described above, it is possible to present a definition for Strategic Communication at an academic and organizational level, as an effort of communication management carried out in the long term, around an organization, in order to achieve that the relations with all stakeholders linked to it contribute positively to achieving the goals defined in the company's global strategic vision. The pursuit of such objectives will set in motion a tactical action mechanism that will unfold into communication action plans, with a defined temporality, to achieve the defined objectives (MOREIRA, A. S. et al, 2021).

2.6. Stakeholders

Ladeira (2009, p. 26) defines that the "stakeholders" refer to all parties involved in a process. The author also defends that an institution that intends to have a stable and long-lasting existence in today's world shall simultaneously meet the needs of all its stakeholders.

For this to occur, the strategic actions adopted shall result in a benefit greater than their total cost, thus, the term stakeholders, according to Ladeira (2009), designates all people, institutions or companies that, in some way, are influenced by the actions of one of them.

The dependence relationship between the organization and its so-called stakeholders, which varies depending on the related interests, is then verified. Ladeira (2009) states that placing the company at the center of the strategy and mapping its links with the most relevant stakeholders greatly contributes to having a global vision, in order to develop behaviors and skills. According to him, such initiatives shall permeate the so-called “relationship networks” with stakeholders. This theory shall be worked in conjunction with the institution's strategic planning. The greater alignment of these two references allows the production of better results for organizations.

By aligning the organizations' objectives to the demands of the stakeholders, the institution demonstrates its concern in fulfilling its mission, in the case of public organizations, or shareholders, in the case of private companies.

2.7. Strategic Communication Planning and Plan

Regarding the concept of communication, not limited to just a process of transmitting information, Margarida Kunsch (2016, p. 90) instructs us that “communication in organizations exerts an expressive power and its relevance grows more and more. Hence the need to be strategically thought out and planned.”

In this line of thought, Margarida Kunsch also highlights the strategic dimension of Organizational Communication, which for her “can be considered from two perspectives. The first is based on a more conservative and rational vision, centered on results, and the second, on a more complex perspective, which takes into account the humanistic issue and uncertainties and seeks new methodological alternatives to rethink and plan Strategic Communication.”

Therefore, it emphasizes the importance of strategic communication planning being based on analysis of scenarios, research and audits with knowledge of the organization as a whole. With the elaboration of a strategic communication plan that is well systematized and aligned with organizational principles, the communication area will no longer have a merely tactical and instrumental function, being considered strategic. With this, it will make it possible to add value to organizations, combining efforts in fulfilling its mission, achieving global and strategic goals, in the institutional dissemination of its values and in actions to achieve its vision of the future in the context of a world perspective, under the aegis of ethical principles (KUNSCH, 2016).

For Kunsch (2008, p. 106-108), contemporary organizations, in general, need to seek the balance between their own interests and the interests of their stakeholders. For this, it is necessary to strategically plan organizational communication actions to consolidate effective relationships. “This objective will only be achieved through conceptual, technical and specific bases, properly selected, and integrating all communication activities”.

In order for Strategic Communication and its components to come into effect, they depend on a specific organizational environment. According to Bueno (2005, p. 16), this communication only happens in certain cultures and management systems, because it depends on the perspective of strategic administration planning. “It can only be thought of, implemented and exercised if the organization adopts and practices strategic management”.

This practice consists of a wide range of processes, scenarios and plans, which allow the organization to reach positive results according to its objectives, mission, values, etc., based on the integration of the organization's strategies. Its practice implies greater flexibility in processes, changes in attitudes of the members of the organization and integration in processes and resources aiming at new strategic solutions that will contribute to the organization's adaptation to its environment (BUENO, 2005; KUNSCH, 2003, 2008).

Therefore, when it comes to Strategic Communication, it is necessary to analyze whether these assumptions presented "are effectively present and whether they define, in their formulation, in their implementation and, above all, in terms of their link with the management process" (BUENO, 2005, p. 15) of the strategy.

The Communication Strategic Planning process presents the following steps proposed by Kunsch (2003):

Table 1 – Stages of the Strategic Communication Planning (SCP) process

Strategic Communication Planning (SCP)	
1. Research and Construction of Strategic Diagnosis	a. Identification of Mission, Vision and Values
	b. Business Definition
	c. Analysis of the External, Sectoral and Internal Environment
	d. Strategic Diagnosis of Organizational Communication
2. Strategic Planning of Organizational Communication	a. Definition of the Communication Mission, Vision and Values
	b. Establishment of Objectives and Goals
	c. Determination of Objectives and Goals
	d. Outline of General Strategies
	e. Relationship of Specific Projects and Programs
3. Strategic Management of Organizational Communication	a. Plan Disclosure
	b. Implementation
	c. Control of Actions
	d. Evaluation of Results

Source: Kunsch (2003).

Strategic Communication has been considered an activity of great relevance in the context of large companies and, for this reason, such organizations sometimes have specific advice to deal with the matter. This section seeks to systematize its actions through a Strategic Plan or a Communication Policy of the company.

A Communication Policy levels the understanding of the organization's communication role; aligns guidelines, methods and premises; guides processes and procedures; clarifies responsibilities and directs the focus and means, allowing different organizational instances and different relationship audiences to identify and live well with the company's interaction paths.

2.8. Performance Indicators

The macro-objective of improvement actions in any institution will consist of fulfilling its strategic objectives, focusing on the fulfillment of the institutional mission and based on its institutional values and vision of the future.

In this highly competitive world, it is necessary to have a situational awareness to be able to measure how the institution is in relation to the market in which it operates. To this end, the use of performance indicators is the tool adopted for its measurement.

According to Brasil (2016, p. 7) apud Association of Business Process Management Professionals (2013), indicator is the "measure endowed with substantive meaning, which informs something about an aspect of reality. It is a simple or intuitive representation of a metric or measure to facilitate its interpretation when compared to a reference or target".

In order for these performance indicators to have their effectiveness guaranteed as a tool for the institution's management, it is necessary to adopt a system that has definition, planning, evaluation and the implementation of actions resulting from the analysis of achieved and measured results.

It is also worth highlighting essential characteristics for such indicators, which are usefulness, representativeness, availability and traceability. Only with these characteristics it will be possible to assemble the historical series that will allow the verification of the trend and the achievement of the objective.

Finally, the importance to be given to the measurement process is also highlighted, which shall be carried out by trained personnel in order to guarantee the purity of the data obtained, preferably from primary sources, as well as its correct storage for verification, validation and consultation in the future.

3 The spin-in of organizational strategic communication for the BA

The use of various techniques, processes and knowledge of strategic organizational communication from the civilian environment through the military environment will generate a spin-in effect for the Brazilian Army's communication sector, contributing in a robust way, due to the great experience of the actors involved in the field and knowledge consolidated over time.

From the analysis of the concepts of the organizational environment, communication obtains significant importance for the creation of a favorable environment for the achievement of the Brazilian Army's strategic objectives.

Currently, Strategic Communication at the BA takes on its own characteristics, with a leading role in the use of digital media, wide and rapid dissemination of narratives, facilitated by the projection and capillarity of the Force nationwide.

For a better understanding of the importance of Strategic Communication, it is necessary to analyze the Institutional dissemination actions that the Force carries out in order to obtain greater transparency, credibility and confidence in the development of its strategies.

The strategy is predominant in the proactive strengthening of the Force's image, through the presentation of the history, values and deliveries of the Brazilian Army, with penetration into the population's thinking through the use of media, especially digital media.

The Army's Strategic Conception, as part of the fourth phase of the Army's Strategic Planning System (SIPLEx), constitutes a very valuable document that presents a conceptual basis, the result of several studies, analyzes and evaluations, and which has as main objective to indicate how the Land Force shall be used to fulfill its mission (BRASIL, 2014).

Thus, the Strategic Conception establishes how the Land Force is organized, articulated and prepared, being able to act throughout the national territory, using employment strategies based on the Military Doctrine of Defense, emphasizing the strategies of deterrence and presence. The Strategy of Presence, aimed at psychosocial and political expressions, is based on the development of the defense mentality and on the integration of military expression into society, which is a touchstone with Strategic Communication, as it opens up the possibility of disseminating to the Brazilian population the Army's mission, as well as its Strategic Objectives (BRASIL, 2014).

Furthermore, according to the Land Military Doctrine, military operations in a broad spectrum have the premise of a combination, simultaneous or successive, of offensive, defensive actions and of cooperation and coordination with agencies, in war and non-war situations. All these actions are presented as a window of opportunity for the use of Strategic Communication, as they are situations that require firm and clear responses from the Land Force to provide efficiency and effectiveness to operations (BRASIL, 2014).

In this sense, the Army's Social Communication Center (CCOMSEx), considered by Strategic Conception as a Body of Direct and Immediate Assistance (OADI) of the Army Commander, has an extremely important role in the effectiveness of Strategic Communication (BRASIL, 2014).

The 2021-2022 Army Commander's Guideline (BRASIL, 2021b), published in August 2021, is presented, in its introduction, as an update of the same 2019 document.

As in the previous version, there is an emphasis on the challenges related to technology and the "technological, innovative and globalized world, where change remains the watchword and the contemporary scene remains complex and uncertain" (BRASIL, 2021b, p. 8). This will require the Brazilian Army to continually adapt to the diffuse and diverse threats that arise in this context.

This update presents, as a novelty in its structure, the Army Commander's intention transcribed below:

> My intention is to intensify actions aimed at transforming and modernizing the Brazilian Army, so that it is fully inserted and adapted to the Era of Knowledge, as well as strengthen the Force's human dimension, especially with regard to the continuous improvement of the professional-military training, the cult of values and traditions and support for the Military Family, thus contributing to the solidity of internal cohesion and the availability of highly qualified and motivated staff (BRASIL, 2021b, p. 13).

Further in the document, readers are presented with four premises – the same as in the previous version – the first of which is closely linked to the theme of this work:

- Strengthening the Army's image as a state institution, cohesive and integrated into society.
- Technical training of the military to face the challenges of modern warfare, based on values, traditions and military ethics.
- Continuity of the process of transformation and rationalization of the Brazilian Army.
- Improvement of the deterrent capacity, based on a high level of preparation and the incorporation of new capacities (BRASIL, 2021b, p. 16-19).

In general, there is an alignment with the OEE and with the Army's Strategic Planning System (SIPLEx) and, therefore, its correlation with the Force's Com Estrt. This understanding stems from the fact that, in order to achieve the objectives proposed by the Cmt Ex Guideline, there is a need to strategically communicate its assumptions and specific guidelines, in order to influence all BA stakeholders (BRASIL, 2021b).

It is also possible to correlate the Com Strt with Institutional Relations and the Com Social. There are guidelines that cover both coordination and integration and the measurement of results in these areas, aspects that can be adapted to the reality of Strategic Communication (BRASIL, 2020).

The sharing of information related to the BA and its current narrative, particularly through social media or messaging applications, shall be disciplined, according to guidelines established by the Army General Staff (EME) (BRASIL, 2020).

Also, at the discretion of the Cmt Ex, an ad hoc Office may be set up to study and conduct relevant institutional issues or crises and that the organization of the Com Estrt structure shall not imply the creation of positions.

In this sense, the General Strategic Communication Plan presents the following proposal for structuring:

> a. Governance: exercised by Cmt Ex, advised by EME.
>
> b. Technical-executive body: Army Social Communication Center (CCOMSEx), responsible for the planning, execution and coordination of Com Estrt actions, under the guidance and evaluation of the EME.
>
> c. Vectors: military area commands (Cmdo Mil A), Operational Management Body (ODOp), sector management bodies (ODS) and direct and immediate assistance bodies (OADI), through institutional relations, social communication and by the use of digital media.
>
> d. Ad hoc Office: composed of representatives of the BA bodies/commands with responsibilities on the topic to be managed. It will be convened by an act of the Cmt Ex and will be episodic, temporary and flexible (BRASIL, 2020, p. 47, emphasis added).

The Force's Human Dimension shall, at all levels, be aligned, integrated and synchronized with the major themes, in accordance with the strategic narrative established by Cmt Ex (BRASIL, 2020).

Subsequently, it is highlighted that Com Estrt shall be guided by alignment, integration and synchronization, in addition to observing the following premises:

- align the established narratives for themes of strategic relevance with the narratives defined by the Army Commander (Cmt Ex);

- integrate the communication vehicles used by the Institution so that the themes disseminated by them are coherent with the Army's Strategic Objectives (OEE) established in the PEEx, without duplication of efforts or narrative mismatch. The OEE, in line with the Cmt Ex guidelines, serve as guidance for the Force's Com Estrt; and
- synchronize the narratives at all levels of the Institution, in such a way that the Com Estrt actions are disclosed at the appropriate time and are interrelated, in order to produce the desired synergistic effect (BRASIL, 2021a, p. 1).

In the search for greater alignment and integration of Strategic Communication actions, a structural and cultural approach to the implementation and systematization of this important process of our Force is necessary, based on the monitoring and evaluation of various indicators.

Next, the guidelines for the planning and execution of the Com Estrt within the Brazilian Army are presented, at the institutional and operational levels, where several stages can be contemplated, with emphasis on taking into account the guidelines of the highest level, in order to serve as a reference for the alignment of the narrative at all levels and echelons; build narratives with their respective strengths, in line with established guidelines and objectives; and establish indicators that will serve to guide the development of communication throughout its execution (BRASIL, 2021a).

The Annual Strategic Communication Guideline also highlights some aspects that may be taken into consideration for each phase of planning: defining the priority target audiences, institutions and stakeholders that may be necessary, in accordance with the Institutional Relations Plan; define the subjects that shall be explored throughout the activity; define the subjects that shall be avoided; define the type of effort to be undertaken, either with emphasis on the use of force or subsidiary actions, based on the Brazilian Army's motto: Braço Forte - Mão Amiga (Strong Arm - Friendly Hand); and define the high or low communication profile (BRASIL, 2021a).

Furthermore, it is presented that the planning and execution of the Com Estrt shall be guided at the institutional level by the OEE, and at the operational level, it shall be guided by the Desired Final State of the operation (BRASIL, 2021a).

In the final considerations of the Guideline, the Army Commander emphasizes that the Brazilian society has always given the Land Force a prominent role in national life. In the contemporary scenario, marked by uncertainties and rapid transformations, the realization of Com Estrt is essential to continue strengthening the Institution's image. Finally, it highlights the importance of the commitment of each Force member, in addition to improving cohesion and integration with Brazilian society (BRASIL, 2021a).

Thus, based on the studies carried out, the Brazilian Army seeks to adopt a broader concept of Strategic Communication, as follows:

> The BA's Strategic Communication is the unit of actions, words and images in line with its Mission, Vision, Values and its Strategic Objectives, in peace or in operations, in an aligned, integrated and synchronized way, aiming to reach its stakeholders, producing long term effects (MOREIRA, A. S. et al, 2021, p. 353).

4 Conclusion

The purpose of this work was to succinctly present the main lessons learned from the study carried out in the organizational environment on the topic of Strategic Communication, as part of an interdisciplinary project requested by the Army General Staff, within a spin-in process for the military sector.

One of the lessons learned indicates the need for synchronization, integration and alignment of strategic communication actions with the Brazilian Army's mission and strategy.

Synchronization of Strategic Communication in the BA understood as the execution of ad hoc meetings and the measures established in its referred plan, in which it establishes the actions and those responsible.

The integration of Strategic Communication in the BA understood in order to enhance its results, based on a plan prepared and approved by the institution's Senior Management. This is a complex activity and will involve all its employees with a focus on the established strategic objectives.

The alignment of Strategic Communication in the BA understood as the coordination of documents, norms and guidelines, directing actions towards integrated activities within a general objective established by the Senior Management.

From the above, the need to study Strategic Communication in depth can be seen, due to the growing evolution of concepts and practices in society, making clear the need for constant updating, which makes it challenging and open to new studies from different perspectives.

References

ARGENTI, P. A.; HOWELL, R. A; BECK, K. A. **The strategic communication imperative**. MIT Sloan Management Review, Cambridge, v. 46, n. 3, p. 61-67, Apr 2005.

ASSOCIATION OF BUSINESS PROCESS MANAGEMENT PROFESSIONALS. **Guia para o gerenciamento de processos de negócio corpo comum de conhecimento**. Versão 3.0. Chicago: ABPMP, 2013. Available at: http://ep.ifsp.edu.br/images/conteudo/documentos/biblioteca/ABPMP_CBOK_Guide__Portuguese.pdf. Access on: 1 nov. 2021.

BRASIL. Exército. **Diretriz anual de comunicação estratégica 2021**. Brasília, DF: Exército, 2021a.

BRASIL. Exército. **Diretriz do comandante do exército 2021-2022**. Brasília: Exército, 2021b. Available at: https://4rm.eb.mil.br/arquivos/Links%20Uteis/2021/13.1%20DIRETRIZ%20CMT%20EB%202021-2022%20(04%20AGO%2021)%20-%20livreto.pdf. Access on: 3 nov. 2021.

BRASIL. Exército. **Concepção estratégica do exército**. Brasília. 2014.

BRASIL. Exército. EB20-MT-11.003: **Gestão de Indicadores de Desempenho**. Brasília. 2016

BRASIL. Ministério da Defesa. Portaria - C Ex nº 1.237 de 23 de novembro de 2020. **Aprova a Diretriz geral de comunicação estratégica no âmbito do exército**. Boletim do Exército, Brasília, DF, n. 48, p. 45-48, nov. 2020.

BUENO, W. da C. **A comunicação empresarial estratégica**: **definindo os contornos de um conceito**. Conexão – Comunicação e Cultura, Caxias do Sul, v. 4, n. 7, p. 11-20, jan./jun. 2005. Available at: http://www.ucs.br/etc/revistas/index.php/conexao/article/view/146/137. Access on: 30 abr. 2021.

CARRILLO, M. V. **Comunicação estratégica no ambiente comunicativo das organizações atuais**. Comunicação e Sociedade, Braga, v. 26, p. 71-80, 2014. Available at: https://revistacomsoc.pt/article/view/1146. Access on: 1 nov. 2021.

CHICCO G.; CHANDLER R. **Integrated communications:** Reaching in and out, Pharmaceutical
CHARAN, R. **Desafio**: fazer acontecer, a disciplina de execução nos negócios. 3. ed. Rio de Janeiro: Negócio Editora, 2002.

DAGNINO, R. P.; CAMPOS FILHO, L. A. N. **Análise sobre a viabilidade de revitalização da indústria de defesa brasileira**. BBR-Brazilian Business Review, Vitória, v. 4, n. 3, p. 191-207, set./dez. 2007.

DUARTE, J. A. M. **Estratégia em Comunicação**. In: FÉLIX, J. (org.). Comunicação estratégica: a visão de 23 renomados autores de 5 países. Brasília: Rede Integrada, 2020. p. 219-289.

DUNCAN, T. R. I**MC: using advertising and promotion to build brands**. Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2002.

ESTRADA, R. J. S.; BRITO, I. G.; PASINI, M. P. B. **Comunicação do planejamento estratégico**: um estudo em uma indústria de bebidas. Revista Espácios, Caracas, v. 34, n. 9, 2013. Available at: https://www.revistaespacios.com/a13v34n09/13340913.html. Access on: 2 nov. 2021.

HALLAHAN, K.; et al. **Defining strategic communication**. International Journal of Strategic Communication, [London], v. 1, n. 1, p. 3-35, 2007.

KICH, J. I. F.; PEREIRA, M. F. **A influência da liderança, cultura, estrutura e comunicação organizacional no processo de implantação do planejamento estratégico**. Cadernos EBAPE. BR, Rio de Janeiro, v. 9, n. 4, p. 1045-1065, dez. 2011. Available at: https://www.scielo.br/j/cebape/a/jFSwbjvrkHd9tn4fDkhVMkD/abstract/?lang=pt. Access on: 2 nov. 2021.

KUNSCH, M. M. K. (org.). **Comunicação organizacional estratégica**: aportes conceituais e aplicados. São Paulo: Summus Editorial, 2016.

KUNSCH, M. M. K. P**lanejamento de relações públicas na comunicação integrada**. 4. ed. rev., ampl. e atual. São Paulo: Summus, 2003.

KUNSCH, M. M. K. **Planejamento estratégico da comunicação**. In: KUNSCH, M. M. K. (org.). Gestão estratégica em comunicação organizacional e relações públicas. São Caetano do Sul: Difusão Editora, 2008. p. 106-108.

LADEIRA, D. L. **Teoria dos stakeholders no contexto da governança corporativa: um estudo de caso. 2009**. 104 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Administração) – Faculdade de Ciências Empresariais, Universidade FUMEC, Belo Horizonte, 2009. Available at: http://www.fumec.br/anexos/cursos/mestrado/dissertacoes/completa/daniela_lopes_ladeira.pdf. Access on: 2 nov. 2021.

LIMA, M. F. et al. **Gestão de marketing**. 8. ed. rev. e atual. Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2007.

MASSIE, L.; ANDERSON, C. L. I**ntegrating communications: is the ideal achievable?** Corporate Communications, [s. l.], v. 8, n. 4, p. 223-228, 2003.

MOREIRA, A. S. et al. **A comunicação estratégica como vetor da consecução dos objetivos estratégicos do Exército**. Orientador: João Luiz de Araújo Lampert. 2021. Projeto Interdisciplinar (Especialização em Política, Estratégia e Alta Administração Militar) – Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército, Rio de Janeiro, 2021.

MOREIRA, M. H. T. **O impacto das fake news nas estratégias de comunicação das organizações públicas brasileiras**. In: FÉLIX, J. (org.). Comunicação estratégica: a visão de 23 renomados autores de 5 países. Brasília: Rede Integrada, 2020. p. 390-411.

OLIVEIRA, I. de L.; PAULA, M. A. de. **O que é comunicação estratégica nas organizações?** São Paulo: Paulus, 2007.

PEREIRA, M. J. de S. **Comunicação estratégica no contexto organizacional**. Revista Internacional de Ciências, Rio de Janeiro, v. 4, n. 2, p. 37-50, jul./dez. 2014. Available at: http://www.e-publicacoes.uerj.br/index.php/ric/article/view/7480/10592. Access on: 3 maio 2021.

POLLACH, I. et al. **The integration of CSR into corporate communication in large European companies**. Journal of Communication Management, [s. l.], v. 16, n. 2, p. 204-216, 2012.

QUIRKE, B. **Putting communication on management's agenda**. Journal of Communication Management, [s. l.], v. 1, n.1, p. 67-79, 1996.

REBELO, C. T.; SOUSA, J. P.; FAUSTINO, P. **Performance comunicativa e as redes sociais: a importância de estratégias que envolvam o usuário. In: FÉLIX, J**. (org.). Comunicação estratégica: a visão de 23 renomados autores de 5 países. Brasília: Rede Integrada, 2020. p. 319-331.

RISTINO, R. J. Integrated strategic communication: influencing and changing public opinion and behavior. North Charleston: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2013.

STUART, B. E.; SAROW M. S.; STUART, L. **Integrated business communication:** in a global marketplace. Chinchester: John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2007.

TĂNĂSESCU, D.; LUPU, M.-M.; PETRESCU, M. **Comunicarea integrată**, Ed. Bibliotheca, Târgoviște, 2014.

US Army Heritage and Education Center. **Who first originated the term VUCA (Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity and Ambiguity)?** USA: 2019. Available at: https://usawc.libanswers.com/faq/84869. Access on 11 jul. 2021.

ECEME

ARTICLE PROFESSIONAL
DOI 10.52781/cmm.a016

The Impact of Private Military Companies in Military Operations

El impacto de las Empresas Militares Privadas en las Operaciones Militares

Percy Nyati
Exército da África do Sul.
Pretoria, Gauteng, África do Sul
prcynyati@gmail.com

Abstract: The aim of this article is to analyse the employment of Private Military Companies (PMC's) inmilitary operations and UN missions. The PMC's operate throughout the world, commissioned by governments, intelligence agencies, private industries, warlords, drug cartels and rebel groups to support their militaries and investments. These companies share not only similar corporate aims but also a professional ethos; they are largely run and staffed by ex-military personnel. The existing literature confirms the fact that Africa is the largest theatre of PMC's operation next to Iraq and Afghanistan (GWATTWA, 2016). This phenomenon continues to raise serious concerns to the national armed forces, as most governments are still reliant on their military forces to protect their borders and vital interests. Traditionally military function has been known to be the sole responsibility of the state; (SINGER, 2008) however, the PMCs are continuing to infringe on that mandate. The international system has undergone a significant change since the United States (US) terrorist attack incident in September 2011, where the PMC's has become broadly acceptable elements of the Global War on Terrorism (GWT). Therefore, this article will look into the employment of PMCs in different countries and analyse the trend and legalities involved. Finally, a conclusion will be drawn to identify measures to curb or minimise the threats posed by PMCs to state militaries and military operations.

Keywords: The employment of Private Military Companies (PMCs).

Resumen: El propósito de este artículo es analizar el empleo de empresas militares privadas (EMPs) en operaciones militares y misiones de la ONU. Las EMPs operan en todo el mundo, encargados por gobiernos, agencias de inteligencia, industrias privadas, jefes militares, cárteles de droga y grupos rebeldes para apoyar a sus fuerzas armadas e inversiones. Estas compañías comparten no solo objetivos corporativos similares, sino también un espíritu profesional; están en gran parte dirigidas por ex militares y también los emplean. La literatura existente confirma el hecho de que África es la mayor etapa de operación de las EMPs, junto con Irak y Afganistán (GWATTWA, 2016). Este fenómeno sigue siendo motivo de grave preocupación para las Fuerzas Armadas Nacionales, ya que la mayoría de los gobiernos siguen dependiendo de sus fuerzas militares para proteger sus fronteras e intereses vitales. Tradicionalmente, se ha sabido que la función militar es responsabilidad exclusiva del Estado; (SINGER, 2008) sin embargo, las EMPs continúan violando esta norma. El sistema internacional ha experimentado un cambio significativo desde el incidente del ataque terrorista en los Estados Unidos (EE.UU.) en septiembre de 2011, donde las EMPs se han convertido en elementos ampliamente aceptables de la guerra contra el Terrorismo (GT). Por lo tanto, este artículo analizará el uso de EMP en diferentes países, y analizará la tendencia y las legalidades involucradas. Finalmente, busca identificar, en la conclusión, medidas para frenar o minimizar las amenazas que plantean las EMPs a las fuerzas armadas y operaciones militares estatales.

Palabras clave: Emprego de Empresas Militares Privadas (EMPs).

Received: 15 may 2020
Accepted: 22 jul. 2020

COLEÇÃO MEIRA MATTOS
ISSN on-line 2316-4891 / ISSN print 2316-4833
http://ebrevistas.eb.mil.br/index.php/RMM/index

1 Introduction

Private Military Companies (PMCs), embodyan industry operating openly on the global market, organised along permanent corporate lines and showing signs of growth rather than contraction, at times creating a challenge for military operations. Recently there has been an increased prominence in the old profession of PMCs operating in armed conflicts, purely on the basis of profit. A definition of PMC is therefore essential to achieve a mature understanding of this modern phenomenon. The PMCs are essentially business organisations that trade in professional services intricately linked to military activities and warfare. The functions of PMCs fall into three broad types of activity: combat support, military support and security services.

Moreover, PMCs are corporate bodies that specialise in the provision of military skills, including combat operations, strategic planning, intelligence, risk assessment, operational support, training and technical skills. Members of these organizations are colloquially called as 'mercenaries', otherwise known by their companies as contractors and or security experts, meanwhile their business is considered as Private Security Sector.

These companies have managed to formalise the historically known profession of mercenaries into private contractors, by providing military services to states and non-state entities in exchange for payment.

At times they are viewed as simply resourceful service providers that operate in areas of conflict, who can also assist when governments need additional military support/service.

The war in Iraq and Afghanistan along with 'Global War Against Terror' (GWAT) can be mentioned as one of the examples, where the PMCs are extensively employed.

Since 2001 some of these companies have generally been referred to as Private Military Companies (PMC), Private Security Companies (PSC) and Private Military and Security Companies (PMSC)[1]. This paper will however, use the overarching term of 'PMC' to refer to all private personnel engaging in military operations, combat in particular.

Today, the international system is experiencing a huge increase in the number of PMCs operating on the international stage. They are in every respect global actors, operating on every Continent (KINSEY, 2006). It is reported that the United States (US) is the world's largest employer of private military and security services in the world. That the US is the world leader in the use of contractors can be seen in the Graph 1 below (ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, 2012).

1 The issue of the reluctance of PMC to be associated with the term 'mercenary' is examined for Sarah Percy in "Mercenaries: the history of a norm in international relations".

Graph 1 – Geographical distribution of private security contractors



Source: Internet Accessed on Sep 6, 2018 (Refer to End notes 3).

US is the world's largest consumer of private military and security services and as such, also there is a large amount of data of other government's employing PMCs which will be discussed in detail later in the paper.

An anti-corruption organisation, Transparency International has taken a focus on PMCs and came to the conclusion that while the sector is growing, it still lacks transparency, oversight and at times violating the International Law. The organisation argued that the traditional government function is now being delegated to PMCs, which poses a serious challenge for military organisations. Given that companies involved in international affairs are not subject to international law, the governments of countries that participate in military interventions are required by certain agreements to ensure that PMCs comply with International Humanitarian Law (IHL).

The risk associated with the employment of PMCs is therefore becoming increasingly difficult to attribute responsibility or accountability. Some of these companies can also contribute to the instability of countries, more so because most PMCs interventions occur in countries where there is collapse of rule of law or and political instability.

A Brazilian Professor, De Leon Petta, wrote that the weakening of the national state power and its monopoly on violence would actually lead to the PMCs to operate as an alternative forms of military that can be hired anywhere through irregular means. These companies will operate freely causing troubles in the domestic or public policy, or too many international repercussions.

The document would therefore, investigate whether the use of PMCs has an effect on the very foundation upon which the military should operate and if so, what is the impact on military operations.

The study is divided into four distinct sections, the first, serves to assist in providing various definitions of PMC's. The second part deals with the role of International Law/ Statutes (IHL) to PMC. The third part examines the growing reliance on PMCs by United Nations (UN) and further analysis factors behind the emergence of the PMC's. Examples where the PMC's are employed by national militaries and private companies (corporate link).

Identification of the advantages and disadvantages. In this chapter the writer will mention some of. Lastly the writer will analyse the South African position on the matter at hand and conclude by summarizing the recommendations and address problem areas of PMCs.

2 Private military contractors-private military companies definition

Definition and Legal Basis with reference to International Humanitarian Law (IHL). This paper will start by defining Private Military Companies (PMC's), in order to give a clear understanding and context of this modern military practice. A distinction between the PMC's and mercenaries also needs to be clarified, as the focus will only be on PMCs, albeit used as synonyms at times.

PMCs work predominantly for governments; they are corporate bodies that specialise in the provision of military skills, including combat operations, strategic planning, intelligence, risk assessment, operational support, training and technical skills. Most of the companies work under contracts drawn up with legally constituted governments, unlike the mercenary, that do not "do business" with simply anyone in the market. Beyond this, the trend is already apparent that the PMCs may in the future work increasingly with, and for, international institutions such as the United Nations (UN), its agencies, or other legitimate humanitarian organizations.

The PMCs, predominantly of U.S. or British origin, are permanent structures established like any other corporate organisation. They function and are structured along the lines of any other business entity. They have a clear hierarchy, including executives and boards of directors, a corporate identity, and shareholders who have the right to demand a degree of business transparency. The industry is also heterogeneous and includes both reputable companies and ad hoc ventures of lesser quality and with less focus on military operational ethics.

These companies have managed to formalise the known profession of mercenaries by providing military services to states and non- state entities in exchange for payment.

Mercenaries have historically prospered in times of unstable conditions or following changes in the existing order.

This was the case in the employment of mercenaries in the Belgian Congo and in Angola in particular, in the breakaway Nigerian province of Biafra, and since then in Zaire, Chechnya, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Eritrea, Kashmir, Liberia, Sierra Leone, lately in Afghanistan and many more other countries (UNITED NATIONS, 1997). An Article 1 of the United Nations (UN) Convention defines a mercenary as any person who is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict, motivated essentially by the desire for private gain. The convention further defines that, is any person specially recruited locally or abroad for the purpose of participating in a concerted act of violence aimed at overthrowing a Government or otherwise undermining the constitutional order of a State. Such a person has not been sent by a State on official duty; and is not a member of the armed forces of the State on whose territory the act is undertaken. Lastly the Oxford English Dictionary defines a mercenary as “a hired soldier in foreign service”. The noun “mercenary” is inherently, used as a common phrase and a pejorative term, at times used loosely but generally to propagandize the issue of PMC operations.

It is also worth mentioning that a State that has ratified either or both of the UN and African conventions against mercenarism has an obligation to prosecute and punish mercenaries accordingly. The above definitions would therefore assist to give a clear context and not to confuse or use the two theories as synonyms; this paper is not about mercenaries, but, about the PMCs.

3 PMCs in accordance with international humanitarian law-analysis

Under customary and International Humanitarian Law (IHL), civilians lose protection against direct attack either by directly participating in hostilities or by ceasing to be civilians altogether, namely by becoming members of State armed forces or organized armed groups belonging to a party to an armed conflict[2]. Members of organised armed groups belonging to a non-State party (PMC) to the conflict cease to be civilians for as long as they remain members by virtue of their continuous combat function. Therefore, the status of PMC employees in an armed conflict under IHL is determined, on a case-by-case basis, in particular according to the nature and circumstances of the functions in which they are involved (INTERNATIONAL..., 2013).

Unless they (PMCs) are incorporated in the armed forces of a State or have combat functions for an organised armed group belonging to a party to the conflict, the employees of PMCs are civilians as mentioned above. Accordingly, they may not be targeted; they are protected against attack unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities. If, however, the PMCs members carry out acts that amount to taking a direct part in hostilities, they lose protection from attack during such participation. If captured they can be tried for merely participating in hostilities, even if they have not committed any violations of IHL. Guarding military bases against attacks from the opposing party, gathering tactical military intelligence and operating weapons systems in a combat operation are some of the examples of direct participation in hostilities in which PMC personnel may be involved.

The States cannot absolve themselves of their obligations under IHL by contracting PMCs, the law requires that States to observe the law when employing PMCs in military operations. Moreover, States must ensure that mechanisms exist for holding accountable the PMCs employees suspected of violating the law.

Several international initiatives have been undertaken with a view of clarifying, reaffirming or developing international legal standards regulating the activities of PMC. Ensuring their compliance with standards of conduct reflected in IHL and human rights law. Therefore, a Montreux document was drafted as an initiative to provide guidelines for the PMCs.

2 Regarding the terminology of “loss of protection against direct attacks” used in the Interpretive Guidance.

a) Montreux Document

Following a joint initiative of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) meeting (INTERNATIONAL..., 2013)[3], where 17 States endorsed the document on PMCs. This Document reaffirmed the existing legal obligations of States with regard to PMCs. The ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law further provides the explanation (MELZER, 2009). In view of the serious consequences for the PMC combatants/individuals concerned, the above document endeavours to clarify the precise modalities that govern such loss of protection under IHL. The document recommends a catalogue of good practices for the practical implementation of existing legal obligations.

The effective take up and implementation of the Good Practices will be a marker of States' commitment to ensuring accountability of PMCs and the States that contract them, and justice for the victims of abuses in military operations. The framework is based on three overarching principles, the State duty to protect all human rights from abuses by, or involving, transnational corporations and other business enterprises; the corporate responsibility to respect all human rights; and the need for access to effective remedies. However, the Montreux Document failed to address the most critical aspects of the Law of Armed Conflict, duty to protect and responsibility to respect, even though this construction constitutes the consensus formulation in relation to the standard governing business and human rights.

The failure of IHL to establish the exact legal status of PMCs effectively defers the problems to the national level. However, the above-mentioned initiatives and other states have endeavoured to come up with workable solutions to address issues related to the PMC.

b) International Peace Operations Association (IPOA)

The other initiative comprises leading private security and military companies, including companies registered in US, are members of the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA), which in 2005 adopted a specific Code of Conduct written mostly by INGOs. The organisation decided to take every practicable measure to minimize loss of life and destruction of property. Signatories agreed to follow all rules of IHL and human rights law that are applicable as well as all relevant international protocols and conventions, including but not limited to, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). According

3 The 2008 Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security CompaniesRegarding the terminology of "loss of protection against direct attacks" used in the Interpretive Guidance. The 2008 Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies.

to the values & mission of the association, the organization bases its operations respect for human rights, transparency, corporate accountability as well as ethics. Though these rules are not enforceable, member companies are expected to abide by them[4].

Domestic laws differ enormously regarding the legality of outsourcing of military services to private companies: some countries maintain an outright prohibition of such outsourcing; others even criminalize the serving of nationals in such companies as such service is assimilated with mercenarism (i.e. South Africa). The corporate nature of PMCs is a barrier to their accountability for violations of international law (CROW; JOHN, 2017).

No international court has jurisdiction over these corporations and there is no pre-existing mechanism in place bound by international law to account and manage for PMCs use of force.

In many legal systems the provision of military and security services is subject to strict licensing and vetting procedures for individual employees, while in others it may be treated as part of the exercise of economic freedoms.

The UN as the proponent of human rights neither provides a legal basis for peacekeeping operations nor does it mention PMCs, therefore, the next discussion will focus on the role of PMCs in UN missions.

4 The employment of pmcs in united nations (un) operations

This chapter will analyse the employment of PMCs in UN peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. The utilisation of PMCs by international organisations raises distinct and complex legal issues. It must be taken into account that there is limited amount of information available about PMCs contracted to UN, as information on security arrangements is often both proprietary and confidential. In 1989, the General Assembly passed resolution 44/34, the International Convention against the Recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries (the only official document that is closely related to PMCs) and the regulation entered into force in 2001.

The use of private security contractors has always been controversial issue at the UN, which also commissioned a feasibility study in the late 1990s to determine whether Private Security Companies (PSC) could maintain security in the refugee camps established in (former) eastern Zaire, following the Rwandan genocide. The idea was abandoned as it was found to be too costly and politically controversial. Also there has been criticism and concerns raised of the unacceptable behaviour by some of the PMCs. The resolution urged the UN to take precautions that its hiring practices don't alter the international character of the organisation or endanger its staff. To this point UN efforts to regulate the private security industry have been largely inadequate,

4 Available at: http://ipoaworld.org/. Access on: Sep 18, 2018.

mainly due to the fact that the nations who most likely to employ PMCs, including the US, have not ratified the Convention.

The UN Working Group on Mercenaries has previously urged the international community to assist in regulating PMCs and a draft resolution was submitted to the General Assembly and Human Rights Council. However, countries that heavily use PMCs are not keen to pass a legally binding resolution. As such, the Working Group strongly reiterated the need for an international, legally binding convention to ensure adequate human rights protections for all affected by the activities of the PMCs.

An example that can be mentioned in this regard is the incident that took place on 4 August 2017, where a federal appeals court reviewed the murder conviction of a former Blackwater[5] private military contractor and ordered resentencing for three PMC employees involved in the deadly 2007 Nisour Square tragedy that killed or injured at least 31 Iraqi civilians[6]. As discussed above, the eventual convictions of these four individuals were considered anomalies as private military contractors have largely operated without legal oversight or consequences. This new ruling could result in significantly reduced sentences for the three contractors, which can have negative consequences for future military operations in general.

It is also worth noting that PMC that have triggered the most criticism are those which ‘sell’ purely military services to conflict states and take direct part in hostilities[7]. These types of PMCs are hired by weak states, which are usually in civil war and need military reinforcement so as to confront the opposing groups. In this case the PMC has a key role in the outcome of the conflict because it strengthens one conflicting party against the other. Thus, the lack of accountability mechanisms between PMCs and governments are disconcerting and urgent action is necessary to ensure that PMCs are adequately regulated.

a) Privatisation of Peace-Keeping

The PMCs are not only hired by states, but UN has used private security companies during its missions worldwide since the 90[8]. However, the organisation has always stressed the fact that it only hires PSC (UN Doc. A/69/338 2014, 2).

It is difficult to make a clear distinction between security (PSCs) and military (PMCs). Usually, the companies offer a wide range of tasks in military operations which include security and military tasks at the same time. However, it is not possible to draw a clear line between these

5 American Private Military Company founded in 1997 by former Navy SEAL officer Erik Prince.

6 United States v. Slatten, 865 F.3d 767, 820 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 4, 2017) (“For the foregoing reasons, we vacate defendant Nicholas Slatten’s first degree murder conviction and remand for a new trial. Further, we vacate defendant Evan Liberty’s conviction for the attempted manslaughter of Mahdi Al-Faraji. The Court remands the sentences of Liberty, defendant Paul Slough and defendant Dustin Heard for resentencing consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, the Court affirms the judgment of the district court.”); see United States v. Slough, infra note 11 (detailingthe original convictions and sentencing of the four Blackwater contractors).

7 PMCs are divided into three categories according to the type of services they provide (military supportfirms, military consulting firms and military provider firms). In practice, this distinction is not confirmedbecause there are companies that offer several and different types of military assistance.

8 Ver United Nations General Assembly 68th Session A/68/339.

two categories, given that most of the personnel from non-combat PMSCs come from combat background. In October 2007, the UN released a two-year study that reported that although hired as "security guards", private contractors performed military duties. Due to this, it suffices to conclude that the UN hires PMCs to perform military and security tasks.

It should be noted that when referring to own contracting, the UN does not use the term ‘military’ and has expunged this word from security services. In UN language, the term private security company (PSC) is normally used. While the UN may wish to play down the military aspect, these companies are connected directly or indirectly to the same corporate PMC web (*which will be discussed later in the document*).

Although UN publishes lists of contractors, it does not mention the specific tasks which they were hired for. The reliance on these firms is growing as its personnel become increasingly targeted in conflict zones. According to the Standing Committee for the Security at least 71 UN and associated personnel, 53 peacekeepers and 18 civilians, including 2 police personnel and 15 contractors, were killed in malicious attacks in the line of duty during 2017.

The casualties in 2017 are the highest number ever recorded by the Committee. In the past five years, at least 310 UN personnel have died in deliberate attacks (UNITED NATIONS, 2018). Graph 2 below illustrates casualty suffered by US soldiers and contractors in Afghanistan:

Graph 2 – Statistics of PMC casualties in Afghnistan



Source: Global Data and Statistics.

In countries like Afghanistan and Somalia, the UN is reluctant to rely on local police forces, therefore, resorts to private contractors to protect its personnel and facilities.

Legitimate concerns have been raised that the use of PMCs to provide protection for UN staff may create conditions where personnel are more vulnerable to attack.

b) Growing Demand of PMC in UN

Since 1990s the demand for UN delivery on the ground has increased massively over recent years. The formulation of a 'culture of protection' and the 'responsibility to protect' established that the international community had responsibilities that transcended sovereign borders.

Accordingly, UN peace operations have evolved considerably in scope, from interpositioning and observation to peace- making, and further to post-conflict reconstruction (UNITED NATIONS, 2001; INTERNATIONAL DE DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTRE, 2001).

During this period there was also a shift away from western states as prominent troop providers, towards developing nations largely taking over this task. At the same time, the new operational environments have often been characterised by complex conflict structures and multiple emergencies. Not only do they tend to require more comprehensive operations, but they also represent the riskiest operational environments for international relief or peace operations personnel.

Combined, these factors have put the UN under enormous stress in terms of human, financial and organisational capacities, and have consequently greatly contributed to the increased UN use of PMCs/PMSC/PSC.

Additionally, the peacekeeping principles i.e. consent, impartiality and use of force only for self-defence, need to be analysed despite the above-mentioned context detailing the IHL regarding the PMCs. Doug Brooks, the President of the International Stability Operations Association (ISOA), claims that using PMCs for humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping would be, efficient and better. He argues that PMCs could solve the current peacekeeping crisis by providing easily available, well-trained and well-equipped personnel within a very short space time. A subsequent UN report emphasized the importance of rapid deployment and on-call expertise for peacekeeping operations (INTERNATIONAL ALERT, 2001). Despite these apparent benefits, there has been a decisive push against the normalisation of PMC use in UN; in 1998, the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan famously declared that "the world may not be ready to privatise peace" (UNITED NATIONS, 1998, n.p.) which seems to ring true in most diplomatic and academic circles today that the employment of PMCs is undesirable for UN operations. The UN often uses PMCs to protect diplomats and humanitarian actors.

In the past UN has even contemplated to outsource peacekeeping to PMCs when no state was willing to send troops. Contrary to Doug Brooks'assession, Peter W. Singer, said that "the profit motive clouds the fog of war." "Profit maximization encourages PMCs to hide operational failures, overcharge, and prolong conflict". PMCs have the option to break contracts when the job becomes too difficult or non-profitable meanwhile compromising military operations. The UN would have no guarantee that the companies would stay in a deteriorating security situation or runs over budget and or if a PMC employees misbehave, the UN would have little recourse.

The employment of PMCs to stop conflict in a weak state does not build the legitimacy of the state's public authority. The underlying problems will remain, conflicts will reignite and PMCs will continue to profit. Lastly, many scholars are of the view that "if the UN had greater capacity to conduct effective peace operations; private companies would not be needed". In the absence of countries contributing troops, PMCs becomes a viable alternative to traditional humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. It is therefore critical that all the UN requirements are fulfilled when needed. Therefore, the next discussion will concentrate on the very factors which influence the existence of PMCs.

c) Factors influencing the existence of PMCs

There are several drivers or justifications for the contracting out phenomenon which are common around the world. The changing environment of warfare, growing instability and increased globalization has created a market for PMC services. Several factors have contributed to the countries increased use of contractors for support services are as follows:

- The increased requirements associated with the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and other contingencies;
- Policy to rely on the private sector for needed commercial services that are not inherently governmental in nature;
- Initiatives, such as competitive sourcing and utility privatization programs;

Most African countries are normally plagued by a host of intra-state instabilities, lawlessness, criminality, civil wars, ethnic clashes, recurrent coups d'état etc. The countries embody various forms of non-state violence and a clear absence of the state's monopoly over force and all forms of organised violence (CAWTHRA; LUCKMAN, 2003). With violent challenges faced by politically unstable countries.

Many African governments have also turned to the PMCs as a means to uphold and defend the state. Destabilising conditions have created both a demand and a market opportunity for PMCs.

The reliance on private military/security contractors is increasing throughout the world; already private security guards far outnumber uniformed police and military combined in many countries, as follows:

- In South Africa for example, private security industry is among the largest in the world, with over 9,000 registered companies, 450,000 registeredactive private security guards and a further 1.5 million qualified (but inactive) guards; security personnel are actually more than the combined South African Police and Defence Force (EASTWOOD, 2013).

- In Latin America, the ratio of private security guards to police officers is 6.7 to 1 in Guatemala and 4.9 to 1 in Brazil.

- The Argentinean guards at the airports will be privatized, which had previously relied on the Air Force police (ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, 2012, p. 139). The oldest and simplest justification for government is to protect citizens from violence. In other words, should the state fail to honour its obligation to protect its people, the PMC will emerge as organised entities to take over that role.

Once this occurs, the state has failed in its quintessential function, of protecting its citizens. Governments can only stretch so far, meaning some people are more than willing to pay private military companies to go the extra mile in protecting their assets.

Firms operating in crisis zones around the world require protection as well, which has created a need for more vigilant and military service providers. At times, these companies also assist governments and armed forces, providing highly military trained personnel and logistical support. Currently there are 23,525 private contractors in Afghanistan providing a wide variety of services, worth over 2.6 billion dollars per year, to the US Department of Defense (ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, 2012).

The dangers of states failing in their essential security function are unambiguously prevalent in some of the African countries, especially countries where the PMCs were employed. There are indications that military personnel will to some degree be replaced by private contractors in several countries. There is also big idea from the PMCs to extricate US soldiers from this quagmire, and somehow being the solution to the crises in Afghanistan. Not surprisingly, the private-military industry is behind this proposal. Erik D. Prince, a founder of the private military company Blackwater Worldwide, and Stephen A.Feinberg, a billionaire financier who owns the giant military contractor DynCorp International, each see a role for themselves in this future. An employment of PMC by US will be analysed and discussed further in the document.

d) United States use of PMCs

Nearly 300 companies from the US and around the world supply PMCs in Iraq almost as large as the regular force members. About 126,000 men and women working for PMCs serve alongside about 150,000 American troops, the Pentagon has reported. Never before has the US gone to war with so many civilians on the battlefield, doing military functions ranging from armed guards, military trainers, translators, interrogators, chefs and maintenance workers and technicians, previously done only by state militaries. While other countries' armed forces may not be engaged in combat as US forces, there is still a strong appeal to the logic of contracting out. In theory, at least, contractors should be cheaper than professional military personnel in that they can be let go when there is no longer a need for them and none of the additional costs, such as health benefits, dependents' allowances, pensions, and the like are required (FRANCO, 2015)[9].

The Department of Defense (DOD) has long relied on contractors to provide the US military with a wide range of goods and services, including weapons, food, and operational support in military operations.

The employment of PMCs in Afghanistan is depicted in the Graph 3 as follows:

9 It is worth noting that the Brazilian lower house, the Câmara, approved a bill in January 2015 to outsource labor.

Graph 3 – U.S. Forces and Contractors in Afghnistan



Source: Private Security Monitor.

Contrary to common perceptions, majority of civilian contractors in the war zones actually not Americans and foreigners are the ones who are dying the most as the US accelerating outsourcing functions previously performed by soldiers. The irony about the above is that US is the biggest employer of these PMCs due to the fact that the PMCs headquarters are situated in US and hire the required skills from all over the world.

The US Labor Department does not publish the details of the nationalities of the contractors it listed as killed or wounded, suggesting that doing so would actually be in violation of personal privacy under the US Privacy Act. Despite the lack of reference to contractors in official documents and the main line press, the use of private contractors continues today as an important phenomenon as is indicated by the fact that even after the departure of US troops from Iraq in December 2011, there still remained almost 11,000 private contractor[10]. The US Federal Criminal Statute prohibits US citizens from enlisting or from recruiting others from within the US to serve a foreign government or party to a conflict with a foreign government with which the US is at peace.

5. Pros and cons of PMC Advantages of PMCs

This paper will further analyse the factors behind the use of the PMC's by identifying the advantages and disadvantages of the industry. The divergent narratives of those in support or against the PMCs have created a serious debate in the military and academic fields. The proponents maintain that the use of PMCs non-combat roles has a place in efficient military operations as follows:

10 Schwartz & Church (2013) Department of Defense's Use of Contractors to Support Military Operations: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress Congressional Research Service, p. 25. "Table A-2. Contractor Personnel and Troop Level in Iraq" These included private security contactors and others.

a) Advantages

- Privatisation and outsourcing some of military functions can reduce public spending and increase efficiency due to limited number of personnel in operations.
- The cost of training is borne elsewhere (combat ready soldiers).
- Using contractors saves money and frees up the military to concentrate on its core missions rather than non-military tasks.
- Moreover, casualties among PMC employees would not cause the same political problems that the deaths of a country's armed forces would do.
- The Congressional Budget Office in US estimated that the reduction in the number of armed forces since the late 1980s has reduced retirement fund payments alone by nearly $12 billion (CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, 2004).
- Without PMC capacity, the US would have to maintain a much larger standing military (BROOKS, 2004).
- The PMCs can be mobilized on short notice to add to existing military capabilities.
- PMCs in UN operations performing selected tasks that the organisation does not have the capacity or means to deliver.
- Others believe terrorism and violent extremism are not only the problems for governments alone to solve, therefore PMCs can assist.

Employing the national militaries for non-combat operations weakens the military by distracting it from its core mission of fighting wars.

The armed forces should not be used in operations that are not fundamental to national security, such as drug interdiction and nation- building. Those against the use of PMCs maintain that the private companies should not be used in military operations. The arguments of those against the use of PMCs in military operations highlight the dangers that are associated with the business. By providing state-like military and security services, PMCs attain state-like agency in the sense that they perform a core state sovereign function. This significantly challenges the notion that military function as the sole monopoly of the state. The growing existence of PMCs can only be reduced if national governments can take the following into considerations:

b) Disadvantages

- To delegate these functions is to abdicate an essential responsibility of government that raises immense questions of sovereignty.
- By privatising the military/security function, the decision-making process is privatised as well.
- Government agencies are no longer the exclusive mechanism for executing foreign and military policy (SINGER, 2008, p. 35).
- It challenges the current standard of public trust to the national militaries.

- There are a number of cases mentioned above of PMCs found to be involved in unethical behaviour.
- Various PMCs have been linked to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) worldwide, contravening various UN arm embargoes and undermining the demilitarisation agenda in general[11].
- The now PMC, defunct Executive Outcomes (EO), has used indiscriminate weapons in their tactical field operations, namely the cluster fuel air bomb, which is viewed as immoral under national military codes and international conventions pertaining to the conduct of war (VINES apud MUSAH; FAYEMI, 2000, p. 174).
- More maliciously, a few PMCs have acted as covert proxy agents for their home states. Dyncorp, a US PMC, has engaged in counter- guerrilla warfare, reconnaissance, and fire fights with Columbian rebels, as many speculate on behalf of the US government (SINGER, 2008, p. 37).
- In the case of UN the PMCs services are not always directly procured by UN; they may also be seconded to an operation by a member state or provided by third parties who can pose serious threat.
- PMC can prolong conflicts for profits.
- PMCs are often too small to deal with serious conflicts and Military Operations.

The PMCs are still not globally welcome, but in some instances they have been embraced as needed and capable of conducting military operations. The major powers like US and UK, have accepted PMCs as valuable service to implement foreign policy. However, UN and other States and non-state organizations strongly disapprove of these PMCs ("mercenary") groups because they have been accused of human rights violations and lack of accountability in the past.

Nowadays, PMCs have become corporate entities which have transformed the manner in which the military operation used to be conducted. There are companies that are capable of succeeding where nation states or UN has not accomplished its mandate due to various reasons but the regulations/law must be strengthened in this regard. The next topic will therefore, discuss the relationship between the PMC and the corporate web or the PMC as corporate entities.

a) PMC Corporate Web

In some countries around the globe the war (privatisation of war) has become an area of business activity and therefore a profitable sector. In this context, private armies were developed, namely commercial enterprises or PMCs, which offer military services usually in fragile and or unstable states. 'Mercenaries' have adapted to

11 Sandline (UK PMC) supplied arms to the Kabbah regime and rebel supporters in 1998, going against a UN imposed arms embargo; Brown and Root (US PMC) along with IDAS (Belgian PMC) supplied weapons and services to the opposing factions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo against a UN arms embargo (MUSAH; FAYEMI, 2000, p. 26). See also MUSAH; FAYEMI, op. cit. p. 923.

changing trends in management and warfare by transforming into corporate entities under the title of private security contractor, or PMCs. Many PMCs form an intrinsic part of larger corporate web of companies and industries. This network of subsidiaries and affiliates covers a comprehensive array of services i.e. mining, manufacturing, communications, engineering, consulting, transportation, security, production, services, and infrastructural (MUSAH; FAYEMI, 2000, p. 1).

b) Economic Exploitation of Unstable States by PMC Corporate Web

Nowadays, war has become an area of business activity and therefore a profitable sector in this regard. In this context, PMCs were developed, namely commercial enterprises, which specialise in military services usually in fragile states facing a crisis i.e. a civil conflict.

The collaboration of corporate firms represents a powerful linking up of diverse economic interests that have essentially led to the creation of hegemonic corporate empires (CILLIERS, 1999, p. 2-7).

The corporate networks have come to part-own some states in Africa, for example, both the Angolan and Sierra Leonean governments are experiencing the long-term drawbacks of sub-contracting their state security functions to PMCs. Both states experiencing intra-state instability, civic lawlessness, the looting of natural resources, and violent challenges to the state, have sought security through PMCs. Unable to provide financial payment to the PMC for its services, these two governments have resorted to payment through mining and mineral concessions (MUSAH; FAYMI, 2000, p. 23). In Angola, Executive Outcome (EO) was paid over US$40 million a year in diamond and offshore oil exploration and extraction concessions (PECH, 1999, p. 86). They made use of these concessions through their affiliates Diamond Works and Branch Mining. Similarly in Sierra Leone, EO/Sandline was compensated for their service through the selling off of 30% of the country's diamantiferous land to Diamond Works.

This concession is worth an estimated over US$200 million (MUSAH; FAYMI, 2000, p. 912). What this essentially represents is "the long-term mortgaging of a country's natural resources undermining the right to independent development and ultimately state sovereignty.

The above-mentioned deals are largely motivated by profit, whilst at the same time exploiting the economic and security instability of these countries. There are clear pragmatic threats and opportunities that arise with the use of PMCs in military particularly in African continent. The key to harnessing its perils and promoting its attributes can only come through regulation and clear rules of engagement being set. Some of these companies are operating under the false pretence as security companies, but engaging in combat military activities. These companies are primarily responsible to shareholders rather than their nation's states.

c) Powerful PMCs

In 2017 July, the Trump administration confirmed America's affinity for PMCs when the president's advisers recruited Erik Prince, the founder of Blackwater Worldwide security firm and Stephen Feinberg, owner of the military contractor DynCorp International, to draft alternative military strategies in the Middle East that rely primarily on private contractors and also to develop proposals to rely on contractors instead of American troops in Afghanistan. It is for this reason that this document highlights the involvement of PMC Corporate in diplomatic and military affairs. The data in Graphs 1, 2, 3 indicates some of the most powerful PMCs in the world as follows:

- **Academy**

Originally going under the name Blackwater USA, American PMC ACADEMI was established in 1997 by ex-U.S. Navy SEAL Erik Prince. Blackwater was awarded its first government contract in 2000, where more than 100,000 sailors were trained for action. Blackwater was heavily and controversially involved in the Iraq War. According to its official website, ACADEMI offers "stability and protection to people and locations experiencing turmoil." It also works with states, local government, global commercial clients, numerous law enforcement and intelligence organisations and agencies and allied governments around the world.

Figure 1 – American PMC 'ACADEMI

Source: Security Degree Hub, [2018].

- **Defion Internacional**

Defion Internacional, is a PMC situated in Lima, Peru, it supplies military specialists who are mostly recruited from Latin America. These personnel are often contracted out to other companies; in fact, the company first became known when it trained recruits to work with Triple Canopy[12] in Iraq. It has bureaus in Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Iraq and Dubai, and specializes in training, logistics, bodyguards, drivers and administrative personnel. Latin American security staff stationed in the Middle East has been described as "guns for hire." The last PMC by the name of 'Executive Outcomes' is depicted in Figure 2 below:

Figure 2 – Executive Outcome Logo

Source: Global Security, [2018].

12 Triple Canopy, founded by former Delta Force commandos in 2003, is one of several PMC that have appeared in recent years to support US military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and other countries.

Executive Outcomes is one of the companies that effectively established Private Military Companies (PMCs) as an industry. It was founded in 1989 in South Africa and registered in Britain in 1993. According to the company's website, Executive Outcomes its sole purpose was to bring stability to the region by supporting legitimate governments in their defense against armed rebels.

The intermixing of paramilitary and commercial ventures made it difficult to determine the number of mercenaries (PMC operatives) involved in various countries. Additionally, persons who are "employed by or accompanying the armed forces" overseas may be prosecuted under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 (MEJA) or, in some cases, the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). But even with this statutory authority, some contractors "might fall outside the jurisdiction of US criminal law, even though the US is responsible for their conduct as a matter of state responsibility under international law and despite that such conduct might interfere with the ability of the Multi-National Forces in Iraq to carry out its US mandate."

6 South african stance on PMC'S

This chapter will analyse the South African position on the matter at hand, which led to the government introducing a law preventing civilians and former soldiers from offering military/ security servicesto foreign conflicts. The Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation Act, or 2006 was introduced in response to the increase of PMCs industry in military operations.

The legislation was passed after a number of South Africans were involved in several attempted coups and conflicts in African states and other parts of the world.

The Act outlaws mercenary activity and allows the government to declare certain conflicts prohibited to all South African citizens[13].

In 2004 more than 70 South Africans were arrested in Zimbabwe in a plane which flew in from South Africa, on suspicions of mercenaries activities. The alleged leader, ex- Special Air Service (SAS) officer Simon Mann (the son of a former UK Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher) was also arrested. The Boeing 727 (N4610) was impounded, carrying three crew and 64 former soldiers (mercenaries) recruited in South Africa. The majority of those alleged to have been the mercenaries planning to carry out the coup in Equatorial Guinea were South Africans and former members of Special Forces. This incident point to the dangers associated with PMCs, operating in foreign countries. Subsequent to the aforementioned incident, the South African Government enacted Act No. 27, 2006 signed on 12 November 2007. The Act aimed to:

- Prohibit mercenary activities by South Africans.
- Regulate the provision of assistance or service of a military or military-related nature in a country of armed conflict.
- Regulate the enlistment of South African citizens or permanent residents in other armed forces.

13 South African Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act (RFMA).

- Regulate the provision of humanitarian aid in a country of armed conflict. The Act provides for extra-territorial jurisdiction for the courts of the Republic with regards to certain offences and it provide for penalties for offences related to the Act.

The Act was also in response to the concern of the cabinet with the increased participation of South African citizens in conflicts around the world. For instance, In 2005 the South African private military company, Specialised Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection International (STTEP) was hired by the Nigerian government to provide military training for the offensive against Boko Haram (FREEMAN, 2015)[14]. Its chairman, Eeben Barlow, was the founder of the South African Executive Outcomes, which ceased operations in 1998.

The recent case took place in 2018, in March, where a South African citizen, William Endley, a former career officer in the South African Army was sentenced to death in South Sudan, Juba. According to media reports Endley was accused of training rebels to fight against the South Sudan's government and the court agreed, convicting him of treason (ALISON, 2018).

However, on 02 November 2018 Mr Endley was pardoned by PresisdentSalvaKiir and released after having spent over two years in jail.The case of Endley gives a clear indication that still more has to be done to deter citizens from engaging in foreign military related activities. It is evident from the small number of prosecutions and convictions under the Act that there are some deficiencies in the Act, which still need to be addressed urgently, in order to ensure that countries, effectively combats the unlawful recruitment of serving or former South Africans soldiers.

7 Recommendations

The PMCs activities in internal or foreign military operations are inevitable in many States and military organisations. This widening use of PMC presents a new legal and ethical challenge for military operations. Therefore, stronger regulations and protocols are urgently needed to regulate the PMC activities. This paper offers six recommendations as follows:

a) States

- States must come up with a Convention to regulate the PMCs from a national, regional and international level. It is very important for States to work together to align theirlegal norms and to share information so that PMCs do not find any gab to exploit. States must ensure that the relevant standards are met and that the law is respected.
- Creation of all PMCs register employed by the State in order to promote transparency and set the limits of this industry.

14 "Run by Colonel Eeben Barlow, a former commander in the South African Defence Force, the group of bush warfare experts were recruited in top secrecy in January to train an elite strike group within Nigeria's disorganised, demoralised army" (FREEMAN, 2015, n.p.).

- This register must be made available to UN as it is the relevant body to create and maintain this register (especially when the UN Convention on PMC has been amended/strengthened accordingly).
- Signatory Countries should identify which functions conducted by armed forces are deemed to be 'inherently governmental' and must therefore be performed only by national armed personnel and which can be contracted out to PMCs.
- Interconnected systems between State security structures to monitor the activities of the PMC,
- i.e. Employees, Weapons, contracts etc. There is a need for mandatory information sharing between the States and UN departments.
- The troop contributing countries must always be prepared to support UN when the need arises, to prevent PMCs from seizing the opportunity.

b) Internation Humanitarian Law (IHL).

- Law of Armed Conflict.The existing legal framework (IHL) needs to be strengthened further as it does not elaborate with enough detail and accuracy for States and PMCs. Such international regulation of PMC will reduce their vulnerability to criminal and military violations in military operations.
- The IHL must ensure that mechanisms exist for holding accountable the states employing the PMCs suspected of violating the law.
- The PMCs found guilty of contravening the law must be prosecuted accordingly by the nation states and the offence must also be forwarded to UN for further scrutiny.
- PMC (Corporate) Industry: Corporates rendering service to military operations must be subjected to stringent vetting and selection process prior employment.

c) Military career path

- Reskilling. Resources and programs to help soldiers to prepare for their next step of transitioning into civilian status, opportunities must be created for soldiers exiting the force. The initiative would discourage soldiers from joining the PMCs.
- The serving members must be made aware of legal consequences for any violation of the laws governing the PMCs.

8 Conclusion

This article studied the role of the PMCs in military operations in order to analyse the role of PMCs, by examining the threats posed to the military operations (particularly to National Militaries). It is inevitable that the role of PMCs is likely to be on an upward trend, by continuing to play a major part in the military operations for the foreseeable future. Therefore, diligent oversight and regulation of PMCs industry, is necessary to ensure that it is strictly regulated in line with IHL. The PMCs have paradoxically been the solution to market induced complications and pressures faced by the states as well as the international organisations like UN. At times thePM-Cshave acted as rescuer for the crumbling states, brought solutions to a difficult sovereign function, thereby representing an extended capacity of the state through private agents. However, in some instances the conduct of the PMCs was found to be problematic.

The de-monopolisation of violence (which belongs to the state) contains inherent threats with regards to excess, lack of transparency, lack of accountability, and ultimately lack of control. The existence and acceptance of the PMCs in military operations forever alters the social fabric of the state regardless of the numerous benefits and advantages that they may bring. Privatisation of military and the commodification of violence represent a significant abdication of the state's responsibility to fulfil its social contract. Military and security provision has been at the core of the state.

The document has addressed the role of PMCs in United Nations and came to a conclusion that despite the apparent benefits, the employment of PMCs is undesirable for the organisation.

UN insisted that, private contractors have not been used in combat roles. It was mentioned that UN uses PMCs for a wide range of services, including armed and unarmed security, risk assessment, security training, logistical support and consultancy but not combat. The use of armed private security contractors in combat operations has always been controversial issue at the UN and the organisation continue to be against the normalisation of (combat) PMCs in UN missions. In addition the use of PMCs, in peace operations can be useful only in non- combat operations.

The primary role of the International Humanitarian Law highlighted in the document is to ensure that all the PMCs strictly adhere to all relevant international laws and protocols on human rights. The PMC often recruit former soldiers, which poses a threat to national security of those respective nations. Not only does the employment of PMCs can affect diplomatic relations, but also the contravention of International Law by individual employees. Thus, South Africa has enacted an Act to regulate the enlistment of South African citizens or permanent residents in other armed forces, and to regulate the provision of humanitarian aid in a country of armed conflict. The law was passed in response to the government concerns to prevent South African citizens in participating in conflicts around the world.

In conclusion it is not the intention of this article to vilify or to encourage the use of PMCs;hence the advantages and disadvantages were highlighted. Consequently, a clear distinction between military functions to be performed only by national armed personnel and which can be contracted out to PMCs must be clarified. It is unavoidable that the PMCs will continue to be used by many countries in military operations, but the unchecked expansion of PMCs in some instances, has yielded negative results including inability to resolve conflicts in many countries where they operated. Some of these companies were implicated in human rights violations in Iraq as mentioned in the document.

This article has exhibited the effect (positive/negative) of PMCs to States, organisations and Military organisation in order to suggest solutions to the security and legal issues associated with PMCs in military operations.

Epigraph

"The World may not be ready to Privatise Peace."

Kofi Annan (08 April 1938 – 18 August 2018), Seventh Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) 1997- 1998. Annan and the UN were the co-recipients of the 2001 Nobel Peace Prize.

Acknowledgements

I Colonel P. Nyati, would like to express my gratitude to Colonel Marcelo Nascimento Gomes (Brazilian Army Senior Officer) for his support and guidance.

References

ALISON, S. South Africa takes sides in South Sudan. **Mail & Guardian**, [Johannesburg], Mar 2, 2018. Available at: https://mg.co.za/article/2018-03-02-00-south-africa-takes-sides-in-south-sudan/. Access on: May 26, 2020.

BROOKS, D. Contractors Face Iraq Combat. **PBS Newshour**, [S. l.], Apr 6, 2004.

CAWTHRA, G.; LUCKMAN, R. Democratic control and the security sector: the scope for transformation. In: CAWTHRA, G.; LUCKMAN, R. (ed.). **Governing insecurity**: democratic control of military and security establishments in transitional democracies. London: Zed Books, 2003. p. 21-24.

CILLIERS, J. Africa in the new world: how global and domestic developments will impact by 2025. Tshwane, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2008. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265229889. Access on: Sep 25, 2018.

CILLIERS, J. Private security in war torn African states. In: CILLIERS, J.; MASON, P. (ed.). **Peace, profit or pluder?**: the privatization of security in war-torn African societies. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 1999. Cap. 1. Available at: https://issafrica.org/research/books-and-other-publications/peace-profit-or-plunder-the-privatisation-of-security-in-war-torn-african-societies. Access on: May 27, 2020.

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE. Military compensation: balancing cash and noncash benefits. **Economic and Budget Issue Brief**, Washington, D.C., Jan 16, 2004. Available at: https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/108th-congress-2003-2004/reports/01-16-dodcompensation.pdf. Access on: Sep 18, 2018.

EASTWOOD, V. Bigger than the army: South Africa's private security forces. **CNN Business**, [Atlanta], Feb 8, 2013. Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2013/02/08/business/south-africa-private-security. Access on: Sep 22, 2018.

FRANCO, B. M. Capital sobre, trabalho desce. **Folha de S. Paulo**, São Paulo, 9 abr. 2015. Available at: http://feeds.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/opiniao/215181-capital-sobe-trabalho-desce.shtml. Access on: May 24, 2020

FREEMAN, C. South African mercenaries secret war on Boko Haram. **The Telegraph**, [London], May 10, 2015.

GLOBAL SECURITY. Military. **Excutive Outcome**. [S. l.]: Global Security, [2018]. Available at: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/executive-outcomes.htm. Access on: Sep 18, 2018.

GWATIWA, T. T. Private military and security companies policy in Africa: regional Policy Stasis as agency in international politics. **Scientia Militaria**: South African Journal of Military Studies, [Stellenbosch], v. 11, n. 2, p. 68-86, 2016. Available at: https://www.ajol.info/index.php/smsajms/article/viewFile/151279/140856. Access on: May 25, 2020.

INTERNATIONAL ALERT. **The politicization of humanitarian action and staff security**: the use of private security companies by humanitarian agencies: International Workshop Summary Report. Boston: Tufts University, Apr 2001. Available at: https://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/Politicisation_HumanitarianAction_Staff%20Security_EN_2001.pdf. Access on: May 26, 2021.

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF TH RED CROSS. **Montreux document**: 2008 guidance. Geneva: ICRC, 2008. https://www.icrc.org/en/document/ihl-and-private-military-security-companies-faq. Access on: Sep 9, 2018.

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTRE. **The responsibility to protect**: research, bibliography, blackground. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001. Available at: https://www.idrc.ca/sites/default/files/openebooks/963-1/index.html. Access on: Sep 11, 2018.

INTERNATIONAL humanitarian law and private military/security companies - FAQ. In: INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF TH RED CROSS. **Article**. Geneva: ICRC, 2013 Available at: https://www.icrc.org/en/document/ihl-and-private-military-security-companies-faq. Access on: Dec 10, 2013.

MELZER, N. (ed.). **Interprative guidance on the notion of direct participations in hostilities under international humanitarian law**. Geneve: International Committeee of th Red Cross - ICRC, 2009. Available at: https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf. Access on: May 5 2021.

MUSAH, A-F.; FAYEMI, K. (ed.). **Mercenaries**: an african security dilemma. London: Pluto Press, 2000. Available at: https://books.google.com.br/books/about/Mercenaries.html?id=qPe-cfAumzMC&redir_esc=y. Access on: Sep 22, 2018.

ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES. **Report on citizen security in the Americas, 2012**. Washington, DC: OAS Hemispheric Security Observatory, 2012. Available at: https://www.eir.info/2017/07/29/substituting-u-s-troops-for-private-military-contractors-in-afghanistan/. Access on: Sep 11, 2018.

PECH, K. Executive Outcomes: corporate conquest. In: CILLIERS, J.; MASON. P. (ed.). **Peace, profit or plunder?**: the privatization of security in war-torn african societies. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 1999. Cap. 5. Available at: https://doc.uments.com/hexecutive-outcomes-a-corporate-conquest.pdf. Access on: Sep 21, 2018.

PERCY, S. **Mercenaries**: the history of a norm in international relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

ROGERS, **A. Someone else's war**: mercenaries from 1960 to the present. London: Harper Collins, 1998.

SCHREIER, F.; CAPARINI, M. **Privatising security**: law practice and governance of private military and security companies. Geneva: Centre for the Democratic control of Armed Forces, 2015. (Occasional paper, n. 6). Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/266317378. Access on: May 26, 2020.

SCHWARTZ, M.; CHURCH, J. **Department of Defense's use of contractors to support military operations**: background, analysis, and issues for Congress Congressional Research Service. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, May 17, 2013. Available at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43074.pdf. Access on: Sep 13, 2018.

SECURITY DEGREE HUB. **Privative security companies in the world**. [S. l.]: Security Degree Hub, [2018]. Available at: https://www.securitydegreehub.com/most-powerful-private-security-companies-in-the-world/. Access on: Sep 18, 2018.

SINGER, P. W. **Corporate warriors**: the rise of the privatized military industry. 2nd. ed. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2008.

SOUTH AFRICAN. Act n. 27, 2006. Prohibition of mercenary activities and regulation of certai activities in countru os armed conflict at, 2006. **Government Gazette**, Republic of South Africa, v. 509, n. 30477, Nov 16, 2007. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Mercenaries/WG/Law/SouthAfrica2.pdf. Access on: Sep 18, 2018.

TRIPLE CANOPY. In: WIKIPEDIA: the free encyclopedia. [San Francsico, CA: Wikimedia Foundation, 2018]. Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TripleCanopy. Access on: Sep 18, 2018.

UNITED STATES. Departament of Defense. **Report of the defense science board task force on outsourcing and privatization**. Washington D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Sep 2004. Available at: https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb/commun.pdf. Access on: Sep 16, 2018.

UNITED STATES. High Commissioner for Refugees. **Report on the question of the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights of peoples to self-determination**. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1997.

UNITED NATIONS. Press Release. **At least 71 United Nations, associated personnel killed in malicious attacks against peacekeeping operations during 2017**. New York: United Nation, Jan 26, 2018. (ORG/1663). Available at: https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/org1663.doc.htm. Access on: Sep 11, 2018.

UNITED NATIONS. Press Release. **Secretary-General reflects on "Intervention" in thirty-fifth annual ditchley foundation lecture**. New York: United Nation, June 26, 1998. (SG/SM/6613). Available at: https://www.un.org/press/en/1998/19980626.sgsm6613.html. Access on: Sep 11, 2018.

UNITED NATIONS. Secretary-General. **Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the protection of civilians in armed conflict'**. New York: United Nations, 2001. p. 9-45. (UN Doc. S/2001/331). Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1477249. Access on: Sep 11, 2018.

UN Resolution 44/34, International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries. Available at: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/44/a44r034.htm. Access on: Sep 18, 2018.

ECEME

PROFESSIONAL ARTICLE DOI 10.52781/cmm.e017

The missing spice in cyber education in Nigeria: national security perspective

El condimento que faltaba en la educación cibernética en Nigeria: la perspectiva de la seguridad nacional

Shehu Saidu Shehu
Nigerian Army.
Abuja, Nigeria.
saidisco@yahoo.com

Abstract: Since the advent of the internet, cybercrime has become a recurring decimal in Nigeria. Many nations are battling to protect their cyber space from criminals, for national security and integration. As a result of this, efforts are being made by governments to protect their citizens and image from online crime. Some of these efforts include cybersecurity education which entails awareness raising programmes to the general public in order to sensitize them about cybercrime. Several awareness raising programmes have been conducted to universities and other educational institutions and public and private institutions. However, it was observed that such programmes have never been conducted to the clergy who are fundamental agent, perhaps one of the most important spice that tends to create influence in the life of most Nigerians. It is against this backdrop that this research seek to utilize quantitative data to reveal how the clergy in Nigeria have been left out in the propagation of cybersecurity awareness among the general public. The objective of the study was to analyze the role and influence the clergy have on their congregation and suggest ways such influence can be utilized to improve cybersecurity awareness in Nigeria for enhanced national security in the country.

Resumen: Desde el advenimiento de Internet, la cibercrimen se ha convertido en un diezmo periódico en Nigeria. Muchas naciones están luchando para proteger su ciberespacio de los delincuentes, para la seguridad nacional y la integración. Como resultado, los gobiernos están dirigiendo esfuerzos para proteger a sus ciudadanos y su imagen de la delincuencia en línea. Algunos de estos esfuerzos incluyen la educación en ciberseguridad, que implica programas de sensibilización del público en general con el fin de sensibilizarlo sobre el delito cibernético. Se llevaron a cabo varios programas de sensibilización en universidades y otras instituciones educativas e instituciones públicas y privadas. Sin embargo, se ha observado que tales programas nunca se han llevado a cabo al clero, que son agentes fundamentales y quizás uno de los condimentos más importantes que pueden influir en la vida de la mayoría de los nigerianos. Es en este contexto que esta investigación busca utilizar datos cuantitativos para revelar cómo el clero en Nigeria ha sido excluido en la difusión de la conciencia de ciberseguridad entre el público en general. El objetivo del estudio era analizar el papel y la influencia que el clero tiene en su congregación y sugerir formas de usar esta influencia para mejorar la conciencia de ciberseguridad en Nigeria con el fin de aumentar la seguridad nacional en el país.

Received: Apr. 04, 2020
Accepted: Jul. 12, 2020

COLEÇÃO MEIRA MATTOS
ISSN on-line 2316-4891 / ISSN print 2316-4833
http://ebrevistas.eb.mil.br/index.php/RMM/index

1 Introduction

One of the most significant technological phenomenon that has positively affected the way of life of humans around the world is the emergence of cyberspace. Cyberspace is a virtual global domain that is increasingly impacting almost every aspect of daily life. The domain is fast shaping communication, learning as well as collaboration among individuals and organizations. It is also transforming nations by dismantling barriers to commerce and creating opportunities for innovations (OMODUNBI e colab., 2016). However, new risk and vulnerabilities that threaten national economies and security lie behind the growing dependence on cyberspace (TIIRMAA-KLAAR, 2016). Having the requisite knowledge of these existing threats which will lead to managing the risks and building appropriate prevention and recovery capabilities are the essential elements of cybersecurity. Nowadays, cybersecurity is crucial for nation's economic development and national security as cyber criminals are using the cyberspace to perpetuate nefarious acts (NELLY, 2016).

The term 'cybercrime' symbolizes online insecurity and risk and it is widely used today to describe the crimes or harms that are committed using networked technologies (OSHO e ONOJA, 2015). Conversely, cybersecurity is the protection of cyberspace systems and network from damage, unauthorized use or exploitation. It is also the method used to guard the reliability of networks and systems against fundamental cyber threats, like cyberterrorism and cybercrime. As nation states are dependent upon vast array of cyberspace networks and systems for economic development, the breach of these networks could have dire implications to national security (HILTS, 2018). Also, considering that national security is the foremost responsibility of every government, nations are developing their cybersecurity efforts in order to provide a safe and resilient cyberspace for economic development. More so, the increased cyber capabilities of cybercriminals to carry out cybercrime have certainly put the national security of states at risk (HARE, 2010).

In October 2008, U.S. intelligence officials revealed that European law-enforcement officials uncovered a highly sophisticated credit-card fraud ring that used an advanced high technology to funnels account data to Pakistan from hundreds of grocery-store card machines across Europe (SIOBHAN, 2018). Similarly, in early 2016, an attacker group named "Lazarus", traced to North Korea, stole a total of over US $100 million, mainly from the Bangladesh Bank by penetrating the Alliance Access software used by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) networks, which carries worldwide financial transactions in a (up to that point) secure and standardized way. In the same vein, an attack on Maersk by the NotPetya ransomware later in 2017 cost the shipping giant up to $300 million (KOCH e GOLLING, 2018).

Within Africa, South Africa have experienced the highest number of cyberattacks from cyber criminals. According to Dahir (2018), South Africa records high number of cyberattacks annually as 67% of corporations have allegedly been attacked. These attacks were estimated to have cost South African economy $242 million thereby increasing unemployment rate in the country and affecting means of livelihood (VERMUELEN, 2016). Estimating the net loss generated by cybercrime is a challenging task. Official numbers published by government or non-government bodies are weak indicator as only those cases filed with them are included. However, the most recent report indicates that the global cost of cybercrime is about $600 Billion USD including gains to criminals and cost to companies for recovery and defence (LEWIS, 2018).

Nigeria has over 120 million Internet users representing 24 per cent of all Internet users in Africa (INTERNET WORLD STATS, 2019). This internet usage consist predominantly of mobile internet usage as against fixed broadband subscriptions. However, this growing dependence on internet usage comes with threat exposures and vulnerabilities especially in a country popularly known for "yahoo yahoo"[1] (TADE e ALIYU, 2011). Research has revealed that 80% of these yahoo yahoo boys are youths and sometimes students of various higher institutions (ARANSIOLA e ASINDEMADE, 2011). Government agencies down to the general public have all been victims of these group of people.

This group of criminals continue to thrive despite several hard and soft efforts emplaced by the Nigerian government to curb the ugly menace in the country. The hard effort employs utilizing the various cybercrime legislations to deal with the arrested offenders whereas the soft effort entails cybersecurity education, training and skills. At the invitation of the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) in October 2018, Global Cyber Security Centre (GCSCC) undertook a review of the maturity of cybersecurity capacity in Nigeria using the Cybersecurity Maturity Model (CMM)[2] which is composed of 5 distinct dimensions of cybersecurity capacity. In the third dimension, GCSCC reviews the availability of cybersecurity awareness raising programme for both public and executives. However, it was observed that the Centre did not consider awareness raising programmes to the clergy who are an important spice[3] of the cultural fabric of communities and, as such, can influence decision making, ideologies, and moral and ethical behaviors of people (PINTER e colab., 2016).

The purpose of this research therefore is to reveal how the clergy in Nigeria have been left out in the propagation of cybersecurity awareness to the general public, the group worst hit by cybercrime. The objective of the study was to analyze the role and influence the religious leaders have on their congregation and suggest ways such influence can be utilized to improve cybersecurity awareness in Nigeria for enhanced national security in the country. The study is significant as the outcome would assist in policy improvement and would add to the existing body of knowledge in cybersecurity.

1 Yahoo Yahoo is a slogan used in Nigeria referring to cybercrime.

2 See Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model for Nations (CMM), Revised Edition at; https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/cybersecurity-capacity/content/cmm-revised-edition. Access on: Sep 21, 2019.

3 Spice is used here to mean "an attribute that makes something appealing, interesting or engaging".

The research was an applied one that employed empirical data that were collected and analysed. Field method of data collection using interviews and Questionnaires was utilized and the collected data were analysed quantitatively. Additionally, the sample size of the study was calculated using Taro Yamane Sample Size Formula. The study adopted cluster random sampling and the generated data was presented using charts to illustrate the relationships between the variables in the study. The study is limited to the clergy as well as 6000 to 8000 words.

2 Literature review

2.1 Background

Internet usage and subscribers have grown exponentially in Nigeria within recent years. Consistent with Section 89 Subsection 3(d) of the Nigerian Communications Act 2003 (NCA 2003)[4], the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC, 2019) report stated that the number of active mobile phone and internet subscribers in Nigeria is about 175 million and over 120 million respectively. The high number of internet subscribers are mostly youths seeking for productive employment, social engagement and increased global connectivity. However, with this growing prosperity and digitization comes threats, risks, vulnerabilities and cybercrimes that could undermine national security. Cybercrimes are essentially criminal activities where computers, network or electronic information technology devices are the source, tool, target or place of crime. Cybercrimes are effected by way of illegal access into another's data base, illegal interception, data interference, system interference, misuse of devices, forgery and electronic scams (BAIDEN, [S.d.]).

2.2 Cybercrime

In Nigeria, cybercrime has become one of the main avenues for pilfering money and business espionage. Within the Nigerian cyberspace, Serianu (2017) revealed that the cost of cybercrime in Nigeria is about $649 million with 81% of cyber incidents caused by proliferation of fake news, ransomware and internet scams and the category most hit are the general public. In August 2019, the US authorities unearthed and charged 80 people, most of whom are Nigerian yahoo yahoo boys in $46 million internet scam (FARIVAR, 2019). The scammers were alleged to have victimized individuals and small and large businesses by using a tactics referred to as "business email compromise (BEC)"[5].

4 The act mandated NCC to monitor and report on the state of the Nigerian telecommunications industry, provide statistical analyses and identify industry trends with regards to services, tariffs, operators, technology, subscribers, issues of competition and dominance, etc, with a view to identifying areas where regulatory intervention would be needed.

5 A BEC is an exploit in which the attacker gains access to a corporate email account and spoofs the owner's identity to defraud the company or its employees, customers or partners of money.

The FBI and Nigeria's anti-graft agency, the EFCC[6], revealed that 167 people in Nigeria and 74 in the United States had been arrested, weeks after US officials released a list of Nigerians suspected of being behind the online scam. Such arrested cyber criminals and several others are usually prosecuted by EFCC in line with the extant laws so as to serve as deterrence to others. Therefore, aside the arrest and prosecution of the criminals, the government requires a robust cyber education initiative focusing on awareness raising programme on cybersecurity risks and threats as well as how to address them, for the general public, government stakeholders and private sector.

2.3 Cyber Education

It was envisioned that lack of security best practice awareness, user education and sensitization programmes could be the principal factors attributed to exposing most Nigerians to cyber threats. However, it was realized that there exist a lot of cybersecurity awareness initiatives organized by some organizations in collaboration with ONSA, National Information Technology Development Agency (NITDA), EFCC, Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), and NCC among others aimed at raising awareness of executes and the general public about the importance of cybersecurity. Such initiatives include annual National Cyber Security Awareness Month (NCSAM) organized by International Centre for Leadership Development Nigeria (ICLDNG). The last NCSAM was held in October 2018 (ICLNG, [S.d.]). Others are the provision of specialized academic courses in cybersecurity at Nasarawa State University (CCS-NSUK, [S.d.]), First Technical University (TECH-U, [S.d.]), Federal University of Technology (SICT-FUTMINNA, [S.d.]) and Nigerian Defence Academy Kaduna (NDA, [S.d.]).

There equally exist an annual cybersecurity conference referred to as Cyber Secure Nigeria Conference organized by the Cybersecurity Experts Association of Nigeria (CSEAN). The association aims to bring together cybersecurity research from both industry and academic (CSEAN, [S.d.]). Additionally, service providers such as the E-Payment Providers Association of Nigeria (E-PPAN) were also said to participate in public awareness campaigns, particularly around the use of electronic payment platforms. Furthermore, an uptake of international security professional certification such as ISACA and International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) 27000 series was observed (GCSCC 2018). Outside academic and official establishments, there exist some cybersecurity related community programmes for children. This programme is part of summer school offered to primary and high school pupils (DIGITAL PEERS INTERNATIONAL, 2019).

6 EFCC means Economic and Financial Crimes Commission.

The aforementioned awareness raising programmes appeared to have been all encompassing. However, GCSCC who was invited by ONSA to undertake a review of the maturity of cybersecurity capacity in Nigeria with a view to enabling Nigeria gain an understanding of its cybersecurity capacity in order to prioritize investment in cybersecurity capacities strategically observed that there is a need for greater partnership between academia and industry in cybersecurity research. The Centre further observed that adequate resources to facilitate cybersecurity education in the universities needed to be provided and membership of CSEAN is only open to IT students, graduates and professionals and those without IT training who work in organization where they make decisions that relate to IT. He further observed that rather than a complete month, NCSAM was only conducted for two days due to the constraints of other initiatives taking place. Following the review of the maturity of cybersecurity education, GCSCC made some recommendations aimed at providing advice and steps to be followed for the enhancement of existing cybersecurity capacity of Nigeria. A perusal of the review made by GCSCC revealed that there was no mention of any awareness campaign organized to the religious leaders in the mosque and churches among the list of all the places where cybersecurity awareness raising campaign was enumerated. It was also observed that the composition of stakeholder for the review by GSCSS did not include the clergy neither were they captured in the recommendations of the Centre.

2.4 Influence of the Clergy on the Nigerian Populace

Nigeria is a country divided roughly in half between Christians, who live mostly in the southern part of the country and Muslims in the northern part with a minority of the population practising religion indigenous to Nigeria. (NWAUBANI, 2014), a BCC writer and novelist, revealed that in Nigeria, a country that lays claim to a great percentage of Africa's most acclaimed entertainment celebrities and intellectuals, the Facebook and Twitter pages with the highest number of followers are those of the clergy. She further revealed that many religious leaders in Nigerian are regarded as superstars and play a positive role in the country. She added that should the leaders of Nigeria's five largest churches hint that no-one should have anything to do with the renowned novelist, Chinua Achebe, the author's fan base and book sales in Nigeria would instantly, unquestionably plummet and his works would be struck off the national curriculum, irrespective of how widely acclaimed he is around the world. In Nigeria, most who belong to one religion or the other perceive spirituality as a part of religion. On this issue, Aja (2019, Vol. 73(2) p. 82 – 87) stressed that:

> They tend to define spirituality in a variety of ways, including believing or having faith in the transcendent, having hope in the transcendent, having a relationship with the transcendent and being religious, opening one's heart to the transcendent, going to church, going to the mosque,appeasing the transcendent, doing all that the transcendent commands, observing religious tenets. Some may define spirituality using a combination of two or more of these definitions. The transcendent here could be God, Jesus, Allah, or gods, depending on the religious tradition. Adherents of the Islamic religion, as well as those of traditional religion, believe in the supremacy of God.

Passion for religion has crept deep into all facets of life of Nigerians and hardly can it be relegated to the background. The religious prohibition of family planning was attributed to be the main ingredient that inhibited the success of family planning programme in Nigeria (LAWANI e colab., 2015). Likewise, Nwaubani (2014) revealed that when Nigerians were convinced that their votes wouldn't count in 2007 general elections unless they get registered, people queued for hours simply because their pastors enjoined them to do so. The BBC reporter added that religious leaders also played key roles in battles against Polio, HIV and tackling the Ebola outbreak in Nigeria by passing on relevant information and stressing the urgency of the situation from their pulpits. Therefore, the clergy could turn out to be Nigeria's greatest assets in cyber awareness raising campaign if their immense influence was harnessed in more structured and focused ways.

3 Methodology

The method of data collection adopted in this study was field method. This method utilized a combination of interviews and questionnaire methods. The primary data for the study was collected from cybersecurity professionals who are deployed in agencies such as ONSA, NITDA, NCC, EFCC, Defence Space Administration (DSA) and Nigerian Army Cybersecurity Centre. Others are the clergy from the various places of worship. Since the greatest population of Nigerians are Muslims and Christians, the clergy studied were those in the mosque and churches. Two sets of questionnaires were sent out. One was to target the professional audience in order to unravel whether they had ever considered the clergy for their awareness raising programme. The second questionnaire was to the clergy in order to know their level of cyber awareness and whether they had ever received any form of awareness campaign. The Questionnaires whose reliability was $\alpha = 0.94$ and 0.73 for the clergy and the cybersecurity professions respectively as against Cronbach's Alpha recommended $\alpha = .70$ (UNIVESITY OF CALIFORNIA, [201 -]) was used to generate data and the collected data were analysed quantitatively using Microsoft Excel. As the respondents were in Nigeria, the researcher sent the questionnaires through WhatsApp to Squadron Leader Ngulde and Flight Lieutenant Akintunde who assisted with the distribution, supervision and retrieval (BASSIC- RESEARCH, 2019)[7].

The secondary sources of data was obtained from relevant journals, seminars, conference papers as well as magazines. Others are online newspapers, unpublished researches and other relevant materials from the internet. Taro Yamane Sample Size Formula with a margin error of 5% and confidence level of 95% was used to calculate the sample size of the study (QUORA.COM, [S.d.]). This resulted in about 98 and 65 sample size of the study for the clergy and cybersecurity professionals respectively. The study adopted cluster random sampling as the clergy considered were only those who administer within the security services living area. Equally, the second respondents from the professional point of view considered were those

7 The questionnaires can be accessed at: https://drive.google.com/open?id=1LdXeL5f7iCNwCE2xXC9AeEc1HU4PREdR. Access on: Sep 21, 2019.

employed professionally to deal with cybersecurity. This is because all the organizations who plan and execute the awareness campaigns always do it in collaboration with the government agencies. The data generated was presented using charts to illustrate the relationships between the variables in the study.

The theoretical paradigm that would be used to analyze the use of the clergy in cybersecurity awareness by the cybersecurity professionals is the Theory of Planned Behaviour. The core claim of this theory is that it seeks to predict behavioral intention, or how likely a person would be performing a particular behavior. The researcher added that a person is more likely to perform a specific behavior if the behavior is deemed important and if he/she believes others would approve of the behavior (AJZEN, 2002; BLOOMFIELD, BOMMARITO, KUHL, 2015).

4 Analysis and presentation of data

This chapter presented and analyzed the data collected from the respondents. The analyzed data was represented in numbers and percentages. Furthermore, each question from the set of questions on the questionnaire was analyzed in a chart form so as to show the details of the responses. Eighty-Nine questionnaires were administered to the clergy whereas sixty- five were issued to the cybersecurity professionals. All the questionnaires were returned and duly completed.

4.1 Analysis of Data Obtained from the Clergy

The data analyzed in this section is that of the clergy. The data was not analyzed in terms of those who administer in the mosque or church but as data from the religious centres. There were 16 questions in all and each question was given a rating of 1 to 5 with 1 being the feeblest and 5 the sturdiest.

4.1.1 Knowledge of the Internet

The researcher requested to know whether the respondents browse the internet and how often they do it. The responses from the respondents are as shown in Graph1 below.

Graph 1 – Chart of Respondents' View on Knowledge of theInternet



Source: Author (2019).

Graph 1 above shows that 71.43% of the respondents browse the internet very well where as 15.31% browse the internet well while 6.12% never browse the net. The high percentage of those who browse the internet as against the low percentage of those who do not correlates with the report of NCC which stated that there are 120 million internet subscribers as at 2019 (NIGERIAN COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, 2019). The figure equally revealed that 70.41% of the respondents visit the internet most frequently against 7.14% who do not visit the internet. The outcome of the survey on the two questions therefore proved the veracity of the NCC report.

4.1.2 Knowledge of Cybersecurity

The researcher requested to know whether the respondents have any knowledge of cybersecurity, read or heard about it. The survey result of the respondents' view on the questions are as shown in Graph 2 below.

Graph 2 – Chart Showing Respondents Knowledge of Cybersecurity



Source: Author (2019).

Graph 2 above revealed that 66.33% of the clergy claimed to have no knowledge about cybersecurity. The report further revealed that 71.43% of them had neither read or heard about it. The figure further revealed that 8.16% of the respondents claimed to have had a very good knowledge of cybersecurity whereas 10.20% opined having knowledge about it. On the other hand, 7.14% of the respondents indicated having a very good knowledge of cybersecurity through either reading or hearing about it from someone while 9.18% revealed good knowledge of reading or hearing about it as well. The sharp variance between the respondents who have no knowledge of cybersecurity to those who had known about it might indicated that those who have heard about it did so not necessary as a result of a cyber awareness campaign organized in the place of worship.

4.1.3 Knowledge of any Cybersecurity Awareness Campaign Organized in a Place of Worship

The researcher inquired whether any cybersecurity awareness campaign had been organized in the places of worship of the respondents and the result of field survey on their view is as shown in Graph 3 below:

Graph 3 – Chart Showing the Result of Knowledge of any Cybersecurity Awareness Campaign Organized in a Place of Worship



Source: Author (2019).

FromGraph 3above,it can be seen that 86.73%oftherespondentshadnoknowledge-ofany cybersecurity awareness campaign conducted in their place of worship. It could therefore be deduced that the high percentage obtained here has given credence to the analysis of the researcherinSection4.1.2thatthelittlepercentageoftherespondentswhohaveknowledgeof cybersecurity did that on their own accord and not as a result of cybersecurity awareness campaign organized forthem.

4.1.4 Knowledge of Cybercrime

The researcher asked whether the respondents are aware of cybercrime and the result of the survey is as shown in Graph 4 below.

Graph 4 – Chart Showing the Result of Knowledge ofCybercrime



Source: Author (2019).

Graph 4 above revealed that 72.45% of the respondents have no knowledge of cyber-crime. The revelation here is potentially worrisome if considered within the context of the result obtained in Section 4.1.1 and the revelation by Business Day (AKIYODE-LAWANSON, 2019) that Nigeria ranks third at 37.72% by share of users attacked by mobile malware.

4.1.5 Knowledge of Yahoo Yahooand 419[8]

The researcher enquired whether the respondents have knowledge of Yahoo Yahoo and 419 in Nigeria and the result of the survey is as shown in Graph 5 below.

Graph 5 – Chart Showing the Result of Knowledge of Yahoo Yahoo and 419



Source: Author (2019).

8 419 is generally used to describe fraudulent activities. It originated from Section 419 of the relevant extant laws of Nigeria which criminalizes financial fraud and internet scam or cyber-fraud in Nigeria.

From Graph5, it could be seen that 81.63% and 76.3% of the respondents are aware of Yahoo Yahoo and 419 respectively. The high percentage obtained here might be as a result of a popular antic of the Yahoo Yahoo of sending fraudulent messages to dupe GSM network subscribers. Tade and Aliyu (2011) revealed that the criminals having knowledge of the working of the telecommunication promotions, cloned it and exploited it to defraud Nigerians by sending fraudulent messages on their phones concerning a huge amount of money they have won. The researchers further revealed that the criminals then request the victim to send a certain amount of credit to a particular number before calling the number to negotiate how the prize would be picked up. Such acts therefore made Yahoo Yahoo and 419 very popular in Nigeria.

4.1.6 Knowledge of Correlation between Cybercrime, Yahoo Yahoo and OnlineFraud

The researcher requested to know whether the respondents are aware that cybercrime is the same as Yahoo Yahoo and 419. The result of the study is as shown in Graph 6 below.

Graph 6 – Chart on Respondents' view on any Knowledge of Correlation between Cybercrime Yahoo Yahoo and Online Fraud



Source: Author (2019).

From Graph 6 above, it could be seen that 71.43% of the respondents are not aware of any correlation between cybercrime, Yahoo Yahoo and 419. From the results obtained in Section 4.1.4 and Section 4.1.5, it could be seen that the respondents have ample knowledge of Yahoo Yahoo and 419 but have no idea what cybercrime means. Therefore, the fact that they are not aware that Yahoo Yahoo, 419 and cybercrime means the same thing indicated that they see Yahoo Yahoo and 419 from the prism of duping an individual and having nothing to do with cyberspace.

4.1.7 Knowledge of any Action to be Taken when Hit byCybercrime

The researcher inquired whether the respondents have any knowledge of the actions to be take when hit by cybercrime. The result of the survey is as shown in Graph 7 below.

Graph 7 – Chart Showing the Result of Action to be Taken when Hit by Cybercrime



Source: Author (2019).

Graph 7 revealed that 69.39% of the respondents have no knowledge of the action to be taken when hit by cybercrime. The chart further revealed that only 12.24% were aware of the action to be taken. The high percentage of those who were not aware of the action to be taken is not surprising owing to the lack of knowledge of cybersecurity by the respondents. This lack of knowledge by the respondents can be said to be worrisome especially with the CBN (CBN, 2019) circular to all deposit money banks notify them of its policy to implement charges for withdrawals and lodgments on individuals and corporate bodies in order to enforce the government's drive to a cashless society. The circular stated the charges as 3% and 2% to be meted out on individuals for cash withdrawals and lodgments respectively while 5% and 3% apply to corporate organizations. The fact that the charges are effective 31 March 2020 means that all financial activities in the country will be online with effect from that date. There fore, the need for aggressive cybersecurity awareness campaign to mitigate the risk inherent in cyberspace.

4.1.8 Knowledge of being Affected by Yahoo YahooBoys

The researcher inquired whether the respondents had ever been hit by Yahoo Yahoo boys and the result of the field survey is as shown in Graph 8 below:

Graph 8 – Chart Showing Result for Knowledge of being Affected by YahooYahoo



Source: Author (2019).

Graph 8 revealed that 61.22% of the respondents were well hit by Yahoo Yahoo boys while 12.24% were moderately hit. The high response observed here might be as a result of being hit by GSM scam or an encounter with the "distress traveler". The phenomena of a distress traveler is a scenario in Nigeria where a criminal, neatly dressed and looking responsible, paints a scenario of being stranded and short of bus fare and begs for assistance to reach his destination when in effect, he is only employing that tactics in order to defraud people of their money.

4.1.9 Knowledge About ReligiousWorship

The researcher requested to know the attendance of the congregation to the places of worship and whether they visualized their attendance as mandatory on them. The response of the respondents' is as shown in Graph 9:

Graph 9 – Charts Showing Result for Knowledge about Religious Worship



Source: Author (2019).

From Graph 9 above, it could be seen that 81.63% of the respondents believe that the populace attend the various worship very well. Equally, 83.61% of the respondents believe that the congregation visualize that coming to worship is mandatory on them. This therefore correlates with the revelation by Ajah (2019) that most people who belong to one religion or another in Nigeria perceive spiritually as part of the religion. The obtained result also correlated with a BBC 2010 survey which revealed that 87% of Nigerians said religion was very important to their lives. Another BBC report of 2014 also revealed how meetings of Nigeria's mega- churches pack football stadiums full.

4.1.10 Influence of the Word of the Clergy on the Congregation

The researcher requested to know the view of the respondents towards how their preaching's are taken to heart by their congregation and the resultant effect therein. The result of the survey is as shown in Graph 10 below.

Graph 10 – Chart Showing Result for Influence of the Word of the Clergy on the Congregation



Source: Author (2019).

From Graph 10 above, it could be seen that 80.61% of the respondents believe that the congregation are totally submissive to their preaching. Additionally, the survey revealed that 82.65% of the respondents are also of the view that the spread of the cybersecurity awareness will be wide if they use their pulpit to propagate it. The two results obtained in this research goes in tandem with the BBC 2010 survey as revealed by Nwaubani (LETTER..., 2014) that majority of people in Nigeria are deeply committed to the practices and major tenants of both Christianity and Islam. The obtained result from the survey may have equally emphasized Nwaubani's stance that the books published by the clerics are best sellers in a society that is frequently accused of having a poor reading culture. The report further revealed that text messages instructions from renowned clerics are usually taken seriously in Nigeria, and most often go viral.

4.1.11 Effect of Cybersecurity Awareness Campaign on Mitigating Cybercrime

The researcher requested to know whether the respondents believe that the activities of the cybercriminals could be drastically curtailed if there is great awareness of cybersecurity and criminality. The result of the survey is as shown in Graph 11below.

Graph 11 – Chart Showing the Effect of Cybersecurity Awareness Campaign on Mitigating Cybercrime



Source: Author (2019).

Graph 11 above revealed that 68.37% of the respondents are optimistic that great awareness of cybersecurity could help curtail the activities of cybercriminals. This revelation is supported by 10.20% who also believe that awareness campaign could have a militating effect on the activities of cybercriminals. The result obtained herein is akin to the revelation by Johnson e Bowers (2003) that publicity can tremendously improve the effectiveness of crime reduction. The researcher added that a carefully organized awareness campaign may represent a powerful cost effective tool in crime prevention.

4.2 Analysis of Data Obtained from Cybersecurity Professionals

This section discussed the data obtained from respondents who are deployed in cybersecurity related fields within the various governmental agencies. Such agencies included ONSA, NITDA, EFCC, DSA and Army Space Command. Respondents from private organizations were not considered because they always organize cybersecurity awareness campaigns in collaboration with the government agencies. The data was not analyzed in terms of that obtained from each agency but as data from the professional agencies. There were 4 questions in all and each question in the questionnaire was given a rating of 1 to 5 with 1 being the feeblest and 5 the sturdiest.

4.2.1 Conduct of Cybersecurity AwarenessCampaign

The researcher requested to know whether the respondents had ever been engaged in the conduct of cyber awareness campaign and the result of the survey is as shown in Graph 12 below:

Graph 12 – Chart Showing Result for Conduct of Cybersecurity Awareness Campaign



Source: Author (2019).

From Graph 12 above, it could be seen that 84.62% of the respondents strongly agreed to have taken part in cybersecurity awareness campaigns. The sharp contrast in the frequently of those who strongly agree to have taken part in awareness campaigns to 7.69% of the respondents who agreed to have taken part revealed that almost all the staff across the agencies had in one way or the other been engaged in cybersecurity awareness campaign. This revelation tallied with the finding of GCSCC's (2018) review of the maturity of cybersecurity capacity in Nigeria which revealed that national initiatives for cybersecurity awareness raising takes place in Nigeria. It further revealed that October 2018 was NCSAM additional to other pocket of awareness-raising activity that existed in the nation. The review further revealed that organization such as CSEAN, (E-PPAN) were said to participate in public awareness campaigns while a number of Nigerian universities offer cybersecurity courses along with some cybersecurity researches.

4.2.2 Conduct of Cybersecurity Awareness Campaign in any Place of Worship

The researcher requested to know whether the respondents had ever organized any cybersecurity awareness campaign in any place of worship and the result of the survey is as shown in Graph 13 below.

Graph 13 – Chart Showing Result for Conductof Cybersecurity Awareness Campaign in any Place of Worship



Source: Author (2019).

Graph13 above revealed that 92.31% of the respondents strongly agreed that they had never organized any form of awareness raising campaign in any religious worship centre. The high percentage gotten from the survey corroborated the view of Lieutenant Colonel M. B. Fakandu, Assistant Director, Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP), ONSA, when interviewed on phone that his office had never conducted any cybersecurity awareness campaign to a religious institution since his appointment into the office. He added that a perusal of the official archive equally revealed no evidence of an earlier activity of that nature. Furthermore, Mr. Sa'ad Abubakar, Head of Cybercrime Unit of EFCC shared the same view when he was interviewed on phone. The duo also professed having no knowledge of cybersecurity awareness campaign organized by other cybersecurity agencies because it had never been brought up at the National Cybersecurity Advisory Council neither was it brought up at the Nigerian Computer Emergency Response Team (ngCERT) routine meetings (BASSIC-RESEARCH, 2019).

4.2.3 Influence of Religion to theSociety

The respondents were asked the influence of religion on the society and their responses are given in Graph 14 below:

Graph 14 – Chart Showing Result for Influence of Religion on the Society



Source: Author (2019).

Graph 14 above revealed that 61.54% of the respondents believed that religion has a tremendous influence on the society in Nigeria. 15.38% also believed that religion does have an influence on the Nigerian populace. The result obtained in this investigation might be said to concur with Ojonemi e Colab., (2014) that religion in Nigeria and faith are critical aspects of everyday life and influences laws, thoughts and attitudes. The researchers further stated that religion plays a major role in the formulation of policies and major public projects owing to the importance ascribed to it.

4.2.4 Impact of Religious Leaders in Propagating Cybersecurity Awareness

The researcher requested to know the impact religious leaders can have in the propagation of cybersecurity awareness and the result obtained are as shown in Graph 15 below:

Graph 15 – Chart Showing Result for the Impact of Religious Leaders in Propagating Cybersecurity Awareness



Source: Author (2019).

From Graph 15 above revealed that 69.23% of the respondent believed that religious leaders can have a great impact on propagation of cybersecurity awareness. The figure further revealed that 15.38% of the respondent believed that the clergy can have an effect in the propagation of cybersecurity awareness. The revelation could be said to be true considering that the religious point of view on family planning had been inhibiting the success of all organized interventions aimed at increasing contraceptive uptake in Nigeria thereby leaving the country with one of the lowest Modern Contraceptive Prevalent Rate (mCPRP) estimated at 9.8% (NPC-ICF, 2014). However, having known that religious leaders in Nigeria can substantially influence and shape people's ideas and views about issue, Nigerian Urban Reproductive Health Initiative (NURHI) decided to partner with the religious leaders to promote awareness on the use of contraceptives. Adedini e colab (2018), who documented the research revealed that the decision of 66.4% of the women who agreed to family planning was influenced by continued inspiring statements in support of family planning in public gathering and through the media by the clergy.

5 Summary of findings

The study investigated the missing spice in cybersecurity education in Nigeria: National Security Perspective. To achieve that, sixteen and four research questions for the clergy and cybersecurity professionals respectively alongside interviews were generated for the study. The data obtained were quantitively analyzed and presented using charts to illustrate the relationships between the variables in the study. Consequently, the summaries of the findings are:

a. The clergy have ample knowledge of the internet and visit the internet frequently.

b. The clergy have no knowledge of cybersecurity.

c. The clergy never had any cybersecurity awareness campaign organized in their place of worship.

d. The clergy have no knowledge of cybercrime.

e. The clergy are aware of Yahoo Yahoo and 419 but have no idea that it is the same as cybercrime.

f. The clergy had in one time or the other been affected by cybercrime.

g. The clergy do not know the action to be taken in the event of a cyber-attack.

h. A great number of people always attend services in various places of worship.

i. Messages from the pulpit have great influence on the Nigerian masses.

j. Cybersecurity awareness campaign will have a great militating effect on cybercrime.

k. Cybersecurity professionals have conducted a lot cybersecurity awareness campaigns.

l. Cybersecurity professionals have never organized any cybersecurity awareness campaign to places of worship.

m. Religion has a tremendous effect on the Nigerian society.

n. Inclusion of the clergy in cybersecurity awareness campaign will have a great resultant effect in cyber education to the Nigerian society.

In line with the findings of the study, it is recommended that future cybersecurity awareness campaign should be organized to the clergy in order to drive the maximum benefit inherent in their influence on the Nigerian society.

6 Conclusion

Over the past decade, the internet has experienced an explosive growth with the number of hosts connected to it increasing daily at an exponential rate. As the internet grows to become more accessible and more services become reliant on it for their daily operation, so does the threat landscape. States gradually come to terms with the cyber perils and established guidelines, policies and institutions to deal with it. Despite that, internet fraud is definitely expected to rise as the amount of e-commerce increases on the internet and the current drive by the Nigerian government to press home its cashless policy. In view of this, various programmes were designed by the government to raise awareness of cybersecurity risk and threats as well as how to address them in order to serves as a veritable tool for mitigating the perils of cybercrime and enhancing national security. However, the drive by the government might not be felt owing to the fact that all the organized cybersecurity awareness campaign were around training institutions and official coffers whereas the greater population of the country are unemployed. Consequently, with religion being a fundamental agent and perhaps one of the most important factors that tend to create influence in the life of most Nigerians, utilization of the clergy could therefore turn out to be the governments greatest asset in its cybersecurity awareness campaign.

Acknowledgement

Glory be to Allah SWT, whose eternal mercy had enabled me to accomplish this project. I would like to express my profound gratitude to my distinguished supervisor, Col Marcelo Gomes. Beside my supervisor, I would like to extend my deepest gratitude to my country for giving the opportunity to be a part of BASSIC 2019. I also want to thank my family for the unending support, my instructors for their guidance and colleagues for their great assistance.

References

ADEDINI, S. A. et al. Role of religious leaders in promoting contraceptive use in Nigeria: Evidence from the Nigerian Urban reproductive health initiative. **Global Health Science and Practice**, [Baltimore], v. 6, n. 3, p. 500-514, 2018.

AJA, V. T. The relevance of patients' spiritual care in the Nigerian cultural context: a health care chaplain's perspective. **The Journal of Pastoral Care & Counseling:** JPCC, [Thousand Oaks], v. 73, n. 2, p. 82-87, 2019.

AJZEN, I. Perceived behavioral control, self-efficacy, locus of control, and the theory of planned behavior. **Journal of Applied Social Psychology**, [S. l.], v. 32, n. 4, p. 665-683, Apr 2002.

AKIYODE-LAWANSON, J. Cybercrime: Nigeria ranks 3rd most attacked country in Africa. **BusinessDay**, Lagos, Nigeria, Mar 9, 2019. Available at: https://businessday.ng/technology/article/cybercrime-nigeria-ranks-3rd-most-attacked-country-in-africa/. Access on: Sep. 21, 2019.

ARANSIOLA, J. O.; ASINDEMADE, S. O. Understanding cybercrime perpetrators and the strategies they employ in Nigeria. **Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking**, [New Rochelle, NY], v. 14, n. 12, p. 759-763, Dec 2011.

BAIDEN, J. **John Baiden, BSc., MBA., M.Sc., (distinction) JD, LL.M (distinction)** 1. [s. d.]. p. 1-14.

BASSIC-RESEARCH. **BrazilWarCollege - Google Drive**. [S. l.: s. n.], 2019. Available at: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1LdXeL5f7iCNwCE2xXC9AeEc1HU4PREdR. Access on: Sep. 21, 2019.

BLOOMFIELD, C.; BOMMARITO, R. K.; KUHL, M. **Supporting military families through research and outreach public awareness campaigns**. In: SEMANTIC SCHOLAR. [S. l.]: Allen Institute for Al, July 2015. Available at: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/7432/6da820ae48d452f08754e8b7d3cef0de969d.pdf. Access on: June 6, 2020.

CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA. **Cash-less Nigeria**. Abuja: Central Bank of Nigeria, 2019. Available at: https://www.cbn.gov.ng/cashless/#targetText=The Central Bank of Nigeria,N3%2C000%2C000 for Corporate bodies. Access on: Sep. 21, 2019.

CENTRE FOR CYBERSPACE STUDIES. **Keffi, Nigeria: CCS-NUSUK**, 2019. Available at: https://www.ccs-nsuk.net/. Access on: Sep. 21, 2019.

CYBER SECURITY EXPERTS ASSOCIATION OF NIGERIA. **Lagos, Nigeria: CSEAN**, 2019. Available at: https://csean.org.ng/. Access on: Sep. 21, 2019.

DAHIR, A. L. Cybercrime is costing Africa's business billions. **QuartzAfrica**, [S. l.], June 2018. Available at: https://qz.com/africa/1303532/cybercrime-costs-businesses-in-kenya-south-africa-nigeria-billions/. Access on: Sep. 21, 2019.

DIGITAL PEERS INTERNATIONAL. **Programs**. Abuja, Nigeria: Digital Peers International, 2019. Available at: http://www.digitalpeers.org/programs.html. Access on: Sep. 21, 2019.

FARIVAR, M. How dozens of nigerian scammers stole millions from people, businesses.**Voice of America**, [S. l.], Aug 24, 2019. Available at: https://www.voanews.com/usa/how-dozens-nigerian-scammers-stole-millions-people-businesses. Access on: Sep. 21, 2019.

HARE, F. The cyber threat to national security: why can't we agree?. In: CZOSSECK, C.; PODINS, K. (ed.). **Conference on cyber conflict:** proceedings 2010. Tallinn, Estonia: CCD COE Publications, 2010. Available at: https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/1_Proceedings2010FullBook.pdf. Access on: June 10, 2020.

HILTS, S. A perspective on cyber security from the Canadian nuclear private sector. In: LEUPRECHT, C.; MACLELLAN, S. **Governing cyber security in Canada, Australia and the United States:** special report. Ontario, Canada: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2018. p. 19-21.Available at: https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/SERENE-RISCweb.pdf. Access on: Sep. 21, 2019.

INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT NIGERIA. **Cyber Security Awareness Month in Nigeria**. Abuja: ICLDNG, 2018. Available at: https://icldng.org/cyber- security-awareness-month-ng/. Access on: Sep. 21, 2019.

INTERNET WORLD STATES. **Africa Internet Users, 2019 Population and Facebook Statistics**. [MadiaPradexe]: Miniwatts Marketing Group, 2019. Available at: https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm. Access on: Sep. 21, 2019.

JOHNSON, S. D; BOWERS, K. J. Opportunity is in the eye of the beholder: the role of publicity in crime prevention. **Criminology Public Policy**, [S. l.], v. 2, n. 3, p. 497-524, July 2003.

KOCH, R.; GOLLING, M. **The cyber decade:** cyber defence at a X-ing point. In: MINÁRIK, T.; JAKSCHIS, R.; LINDSTRÖM, L. (ed.) **10th International Conference on Cyber Conflict:** CyCon X: maximizing effects. Tallinn, Estonia: NATO CCD COE Publications, 2018. p. 159-185, 2018. Available at: https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/CyCon_2018_Full_Book.pdf. Access on: June 10, 2020.

LAWANI, L. O.; IYOKE, C. A.; EZEONU, P. O. Contraceptive practice after surgical repair of obstetric fistula in southeast Nigeria. **International Journal of Gynecology and Obstetrics**, [Malden, MA], v. 129, n. 3, p. 256-259, Feb 2015.

LETTER from Africa: the power of religion. **BBC News**, [London], Nov 7, 2014. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-29692580. Access on: Sep. 21, 2019.

LEWIS, J. **Economic impact of cybercrime – no slowing down**. Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Feb 2018. Report. Available at: https://assets.website-files.com/5bd672d1924b9893a632c807/5c171d5e85ed62697a79e351_economic-impact-cybercrime.pdf. Access on: June 10, 2020.

NATIONAL POPULATION COMMISSION; ICF INTERNATIONAL. **Nigeria demographic and health survey 2013**. Abuja: NPC; Rockville, Maryland: ICF International, 2014. Available at: https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR293/FR293.pdf. Access on: June 10, 2020.

NIGERIAN COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION. **Industry Statistics**. Abuja: NCC, 2019. Available at: https://www.ncc.gov.ng/stakeholder/statistics-reports/industry-overview#view-graphs-tables-6. Access on: Sep. 21, 2019.

NIGERIAN DEFENSE ACADEMY. **Intelligence and cyber security**: academic branch. Kaduna: NDA [201-]. Available at: https://academics.nda.edu.ng/faculties/military-science-and-interdisciplinary- studies/intelligence-and-cyber-security/. Access on: Sep. 21, 2019.

OJONEMI, S. et al. Deficit in religious practice in Nigeria: implications for national development. **Developing Country Studies**, [S. l.], v. 4, n. 4, p. 184-194, 2014. Available at: https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/234681546.pdf. Access on: June 10, 2021.

OMODUNBI, B. et al. Cybercrimes in Nigeria: analysis, detection and prevention. **FUOYE:** Journal of Engineering and Technology, [Oye Ekiti], v. 1, n. 1, 2016. Available at: https://engineering.fuoye.edu.ng/journal/index.php/engineer/article/view/16. Access on: June 10, 2020.

OSHO, O.; ONOJA, A. D. National cyber security policy and strategy of Nigeria: a qualitative analysis. **International Journal of Cyber Criminology**, [Gujarat], v. 9, n. 1, p. 120-143, Aug 2015. Available at: https://www.cybercrimejournal.com/Osho&Onoja2015vol9issue1.pdf. Access on: June 10, 2021.

PINTER, B. et al. Religion and family planning. **European Journal of Contraception and Reproductive Health Care**, [London], v. 21, n. 6, p. 486-495, Dec 2016.

SERIANU. **Africa cybersecurity report2016**. Kenya: Serianu, 2016. Available at: http://www.serianu.com/downloads/AfricaCyberSecurityReport2016.pdf. Access on: June 10, 2021.

SCHOOL OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY. **Minna, Niger State**: Federal University of Tecnology, c2016. Available at: https://sict.futminna.edu.ng/. Access on: Sep. 21, 2019.

SIOBHAN, G. Fraud ring funnels data from cards to Pakistan. **The Wall Street Journal**, New York, Oct 11, 2018. Available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122366999999723871. Access on: Sep. 20, 2019.

TADE, O.; ALIYU, I. Social Organization of Internet Fraud among University Undergraduates in Nigeria. **International Journal of Cyber Criminology**, [Gujarat], v. 5, n. 2, p. 860, 2011. Available at: https://www.cybercrimejournal.com/tadealiyui2011julyijcc.pdf. Access on: June 10, 2020

TECH-U. Faculty of natural and applied sciences. Ibadan, Oyo State: **First Technical University**, [201-]. Available at: https://tech-u.edu.ng/faculty-of-natural-and-applied- sciences/#. Access on: Sep. 21, 2019.

TIEMO, P. A.; NELLY, D. B. Efforts in combating cyber crime and criminality in Nigeria. **Information and Knowledge Management**, [S. l.], v. 6, n. 3, p. 23-28, 2016. Available at: https://www.iiste.org/Journals/index.php/IKM/article/view/29271/30060. Access on: June 10, 2020.

TIIRMAA-KLAAR, H. Building national cyber resilience and protecting critical information infrastructure. **Journal of Cyber Policy**, [London], v. 1, n. 1, p. 94-106, 2016.

UNIVESITY OF CALIFORNIA. Institute for Digital Research & Education Statistical Consulting. SPSS. Frequently asked questions. **What does Cronbach's alpha mean?**. Los Angeles: UCLA, [201-]. Available at: https://stats.oarc.ucla.edu/spss/faq/what-does-cronbachs-alpha-mean/. Access on: Sep. 21, 2019.

VERMUELEN, J. Anonymous hacks SA government database. **MyBroadband**, Olifantsfontein, South Africa, Feb 12, 2016. Available at: https://mybroadband.co.za/news/security/155030-anonymous-hacks-sa-government- database.html. Access on: Sep. 21, 2019.

WHAT is Yamane sample calculation?. In: QUORA. [S. l.: s. n., 2017?]. Available at: https://www.quora.com/What-is-Yamane-sample-calculation. Access on: Sep. 21, 2019.

PROFESSIONAL ARTICLE
DOI 10.52781/cmm.e018

Ignoring soft power – the *mea-culpa* moment for nations' Trying to achieve influence in the global commons: the indian perspective

Ignorando el SoftPower - el momento Mea-Culpa de las Naciones Unidas Tratando de Lograr Influencia en Los Bienes Comunes Mundiales: La Perspectiva India

Saikat Chatterjee
Indian Navy.
New Delhi, India.
chatsnax@gmail.com

Abstract: With the advent of emerging economies such as China and India, which have a highly productive and influential human capital spread globally and are also fast emerging as economic giants, the concept of soft power is ideally applicable for both national assertion and its effective relevance in the international arena. The paper aims to establish this concept as a better suited strategic outreach for an emerging nation with specific relevance to India and while doing so dwells on a wide spectrum of instruments including foreign affairs, political science, sociology apart from the nations geography which India may factor to influence the global influence, in exercise of its National Power, to derive favourable impact in the global commons.

Keywords: Soft Power; Global commons; Polity.

Resumen: Con el surgimiento de economías emergentes como China e India, que cuentan con un capital humano altamente productivo e influyente repartido globalmente y que también están emergiendo rápidamente como gigantes económicos, el concepto de soft power es idealmente aplicable tanto a la afirmación nacional como su efectiva relevancia en la arena internacional. Este artículo tiene como objetivo establecer este concepto como una estrategia de alcance más apropiada para una nación emergente con relevancia específica para la India y, al hacerlo, discutiremos un amplio espectro de instrumentos, que incluyen asuntos exteriores, ciencias políticas, sociología, así como la geografía de naciones en la que India puede tener influencia global, en el ejercicio de su Poder Nacional, para obtener impacto favorable en los bienes comunes globales'.

Palabras clave: SoftPower; Bienes Comunes Mundiales; Política.

Received: Apr. 04, 2020
Accepted: Jul. 12, 2020

COLEÇÃO MEIRA MATTOS
ISSN on-line 2316-4891 / ISSN print 2316-4833
http://ebrevistas.eb.mil.br/index.php/RMM/index

1 Introduction

Soft Power, a term used in international relations and public diplomacy, was coined by Joseph Nye[1] to describe co-option of power in contrast to the more conventionally recognised *HardPower* (comprising militaryaction).This essentially referred to acountry's ability to influence others behavior or "the ability to shape what others want", without being coercive, which is "the ability to change what others do" (NYE, 2004a). While in definition[2], Soft power could be the ability to achieve something; Political, financial, social etc. to influence control or dominion; application of the same in representative terms as a national tool remains allusive; despite being a key contributor to contemporary diplomacy used by most influential nation states. While Nye in his description stressed on the ability of the facet to shape the preferences of others by attraction, and thereby leading to acquiescence [...] he made a distinct reference to the compelling ability of soft power, that persuades one to align to..your desire owing to your cultural or ideological appeal. In international transactions we increasingly witness nations' achieving favourable outcomes pursued indirectly through the global admiration of values, that most others aspire to tail, which is a cogent simile and a key element of leadership in global terms. This virtue may be extended in terms of ones' national power to entice, to frame issues or establish the agenda (NYE, 2004b, p. 5-6,11).

In today's world of changing paradigms with dynamic transformations in international polity, one witnesses the emergence of a subtle power-play amongst nations that occupy the high table (in opinion building), signifying an increase in stated positions taken by most, while relying profoundly on their ability to influence perceptions rather than enforcing them. It can therefore be fairly assumed that the relevance of Soft Power in contemporary times has attained a pedestal that countries may no longer ignore and need to embrace to further finetune and suit ones' own statecraft. This further becomes more relevant for countries which are fast emerging, with the potential to break regional barriers and establish global prominence as they increasingly wield greater influence far beyond their own shores. It therefore assumes importance to consider the attributes of soft power that an aspiring nation must employ to promote its aim of establishing influence in the global commons. The paper aims to study this facet while looking through the prism of evolving paradigms in international order which, in today's age (riddled with trade burdens, recession, terrorism etc.), demands stability, peace, and prosperity and seeks a strong-and-stable, assertive-yet-tolerant nation state which can contribute effectively to global stability and order. India, with its large human capital of highly educated and young work force (spread globally in well-established positions), strong historic and cultural base and pluralistic society (with leading

1 Joseph Nye é um cientista político americano. Ele é o co-fundador, acompanhado deRobert Keohane, da teoria das relações internacionais do neoliberalismo. Ele desenvolveu o conceito de soft power em seu livro de 2004, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.

2 Definition from Collins English Dictionary (2018 ed)

socio-economic and fiscal indicators) stands at the cusp to seize this opportunity through leverage of its soft power. As a study case, the paper attempts to chronicle the evolution of soft power to establish its relevance and explore the determinants that India must manoeuvre being sanguine of its ambitious development goals. It has also been an endeavour to reconnoitre whether failure to realise this potential, despite having favourable socio-economic indicators would devoid her of the venerable traction she so desires, which could be an irrevocable missed opportunity.

2 The Ancient Construct of Soft Power

Soft power as a subject is not an entirely new thought. A more historical look into the ancient texts of India and China would lead one back by over thousand years, where soft power was perceived as a key determinant in state-craft. As prescribed in ancient proverbial wisdoms: to use soft-and-gentle means to overcome the hard-and-strong (以柔克刚 *yi rou ke gang*); and drips of water can penetrate a stone (滴水穿石 *di shui chuan shi*). Sun Tse[3], a military strategist advocated over 2500 years ago, on winning a battle without a fight. Similarly, the Chinese philosopher Confúcio[4] believed that the ruler should win the allegiance of people with virtue (then, perceived as soft power) not by force (hard power). Similarly, Mencius[5] advocated rule in Kingly Way[6] (王道 *Wang Dao*) rather than the tyrant way (霸道 *Ba Dao*) (WANG, 2006). Lao Tze[7], , a contemporary of Confucius, described in *Tao Te Ching*, "I know the benefit of *Wu Wei*. (无为 No hacer nada); the softest can win the hardest. Invisible force can pass through the intangible." Similarly, in the works of *Kautilya*[8] , written centuries ago notably the *Arthashastra*[9] , ago notably the Arthashastra10, much *Sandhi* (mutual friendship) and *Doota* (Ambassador to propagate countries position) which resonates to the modern day Soft or Smart Power. As these scholars had to deal with real life situations, at a time when military power and economic power were the two recognised pillars of national security, the guiding values were of pragmatism and realism and both the theories propounded were acceptable in combination, to secure

3 Sun Tse (known as Sun Tzu, Born: 545 BC, Qi) was a Chinese general, military strategist, writer and philosopher who lived in the Eastern Zhou period of ancient China. He is traditionally credited as the author of The Art of War, an influential work of military strategy that has affected Western and East Asian philosophy and military thinking.

4 Confucio (Born: 551 BC, Lu) was a Chinese philosopher and politician whose philosophy is also known as Confucianism, emphasized personal and governmental morality, correctness of social relationships, justice and sincerity.

5 Mencius (Known as Mengzi, Born: 372 BC, Zou) was a Chinese Confucian philosopher who has often been described as the "second Sage", that is after Confucius himself. Living during the Warring States period, he is said to have spent much of his life travelling around China offering counsel to different rulers, with notable works on Right to revolution as an aspect of the Mandate of Heaven.

6 The kingly way referred to governing by moral example whereas the tyrant way involved governing by brutal force

7 Lao-Tze (also rendered as Lao Tzu, Born: 601 BC, Chu), was an ancient Chinese philosopher and writer. He is the reputed author of the Tao Te Ching, the founder of philosophical Taoism, and a deity in religious Taoism and traditional Chinese religion.

8 Minister to emperor Chandragupta Maurya, 4th Century BC.

9 Arthaśāstra (अर्थशास्त्र) is an ancient Indian treatise on statecraft, economic policy and military strategy, written in Sanskrit and brings out the art of combining military power and diplomatic persuasion in the pursuit of national self-interest (with something subtle and smart such as smart power.

the kingdom or Nation State. However, quite clearly, in contrast to *Kautilya*,world, wherein, means of hard power such as covert operations could be discussed in public, todays' age of neo-thinking forces you to make ethical choices which weigh-in heavily on *ethics in strategic thought*. The legal debate in US over the limits on use of torture and practice of rendition is an example. In effect, soft power though an ancient concept has assumed greater relevance in modern day management the sources of which need to be established clearly in the present-day context while correlating the ancient values so propounded to draw correct lessons on the evolution and application of Soft Power.

3 Soft Power - Contemporary Rendition and its Elements

Analysis of contemporary understanding and its modern rendition as postulated by one of its leading proponents, Nye (2004a), emphasised on the influence behind soft power (as an interaction between states) to be contingent on the pre-existing preferences of the other party. Consequently, soft power is only meaningful in the context of a conflict of objectives, where persuasion and attraction may be employed to influence behaviour. The significant question therefore concerns the extent to which a country is willing to alter the perception of its objectives under the influence of another. Although Nye coined the term in 1990, the concept of Soft Power has its origins in the works of Hans J. Morgenthau[10], Klaus Knorr[11] e Ray Cline[12]. For instance, Morgenthau (1967) identified nine elements of national power, among which national character, morale, the quality of diplomacy and the quality of government to be closely associated with intangible sources of power, i.e. soft power. Similarly, Carr[13] postulated that power over opinion is not less essential for political purposes than military and economic power (and has always been closely associated with them). These ideas were since summarised and popularised in recent years by Nye (Gill and Huang, 2006). On the other hand, the management and psychology literature has long promoted the benefits of using referent (soft) power over coercive (hard) power (Cristo, 2005). According to Raven[14] e French[15] (1959),there are five bases of power: *reward, coercive, legitimate, referent and expert*. Soft power is thus described as a kind of referent power that is based on identification and attraction, which yields the greatest influence in relation to the other powers. Nye (1990) in his proposition, identified three sources as: *American*

10 Hans Joachim Morgenthau (Born: 1904 Germany) was one of the major twentieth-century figures in the study of international relations.

11 Knorr, Klaus (Born: 1911, Germany) was a theorist and writer, who explored the bases of National economic power and the derived utility of military power.

12 Ray Steiner Cline (Born: 1918, US) was an official at the United States Central Intelligence Agency best known for being the chief CIA analyst during the Cuban Missile Crisis, with notable works including World Power Assessment: A Calculus of Strategic Drift.

13 Edward Hallett "Ted" Carr CBE FBA (Born: 1892 London) was an English historian, diplomat, journalist and international relations theorist, and an opponent of empiricism within historiography.

14 Bertram Herbert Raven (Born: 1926, US) is an American academic, who has been a member of the faculty of the Psychology Department at UCLA since 1956, where he is currently a professor emeritus. Best known for his early work in collaboration with John R. P. French, with whom he developed an analysis of the Five Bases of social power.

15 John Robert Putnam French Jr. (Born:1913 France) was a Professor Emeritus in psychology from the University of Michigan.

culture, international laws and institutions, in consonance with American multinational corporations. But the list has since been pragmatically finetuned to *culture, political values and foreign policy:* "the attractiveness of its culture, the appeal of its domestic political and social values, and the style and substance of its foreign policies" (Nye, 2004b). In contemporary analysis one must therefore understand that policy, by definition, is the course or general plan of action adopted by a state, therefore, a country's foreign policy itself cannot be a separate form of soft power but the mere manifestation of its hard power (political power in the case of military intervention; economic power in the case of aid or sanction). It would however be prudent to calibrate the overt employment of such means in today's age (no matter how inseparable it may be in substance, as an integral part of a nations' power). Core values and domestic institutions, therefore, assume even greater significance in today's society and culture, which are capable and mandated to stimulate sustainable effects well before the application of hard power. A discernible upsurge of countries in the Middle-East (Qatar, UAE, and more recently Saud Arabia etc.) willing to reach out to the global commons (unshackling traditional barriers), while attempting to expand their social acceptance and thereby indirect influence in world affairs, serves an example to understand the relevance of this new phenomenon.With the effect being more permeated, the concept (of soft or cultural power) in today's context (though protracted) is hugely relevant as an effective tool in exercise of national influence.

4 Components and Application of Soft Power.

While delving though a large proportion of the sources of Soft Power Nye (2004A), lists a wide range of various examples as the proxy measures of Soft Power with innumerable examples that contribute to the concept, which stretch far to an extent that the term comes to mean almost everything (HOAGLAND, 2004). One must therefore extract from these examples the sources (cause) and impact (effect) to relate to its application. It is also important to note that sources and resources are not power per-se but potential for the power. The owners' (nations') of these resources must therefore convert them into desired power. Four key factors must be in place for power conversion: *Economic Capital, Political Structure, Social Capital and Social Structure* (TREVERTON; JONES, 2005). A key question though still remains unanswered: whether the sources of soft power are universal or vary from one culture to another? Both China and India have for instance rich cultural resources, but do they have the same level of soft power? If cultural power is soft power, why does a country like Egypt (history of seven thousand years) seem weaker compared to the US (founded only two hundred years ago)? Clearly, culture per se is not soft power but a source of potential soft power. In a fairer analysis Nye relates the frame in context of the changing global power equation which has witnessed the rise – or return – of India and China, in conjunction with the communication revolution which has infused power to many new stake holders, especially those who enjoyed these elements in the past. He also suggests there exists a need to avoid the "Thucydides Trap"[16] , referring, inter-alia, to the fear mongering which can be achieved in the application of soft power. Nye concluded that for the success of the basic principles, there was a quintessential need for credibility in strategic communications[17] and the understanding of nations' to seek out solutions which are amicable and acceptable while exerting the ultimate goal of "smart power".

5 Soft power weighed against Hard power.

As discussed, the distinction between soft and hard power is a tricky one (see Figure 1)

Figure 1 – Elements of Hard and Soft power



Nye argues (2004a,p.9) on the relationship between the two forms, stating: soft power does not depend on hard power, some have however termed it as a derivative (HUNTINGTON, 1996). A fact in the modern age of the global commons remains that people do not admire cultures that areexerted through the power of "coercion". Therefore, while in some cases, hard power may support the basis for Soft Power, in manifestation or representation, it is Soft Power which will be accepted. Therefore, while there are different understandings of soft power, and

16 Identified in classical times by the ancient Greek historian Thucydides is a deadly trap where, "It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable." The past 500 years have seen 16 cases in which a rising power threatened to displace a ruling one. Twelve of these ended in war. Of the cases in which war was averted, Spain outstripping Portugal in the late 15th century, the United States overtook the United Kingdom at the turn of the 20th century, and Germany rose in Europe since 1990 while the ascent of the Soviet Union followed its implosion by 1990.

17 Nations use strategic communication to exhort to the world their point of view such as the celebrated channels: BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) of the UK or CNN (Cable News Network) of US and more recently the RT (Russian Television of Russia or Chinese CGTN (China Global Television Network). The work by Al Jazeera of Qatar since its inception in this field is well established.

particularly, about the relationship between soft and hard power (see Table 1), it is necessary to distinguish between potential and real soft power.

Table 1: Relation between Hard and Soft Power

HARD POWER	SOFT POWER
Ability to change others' position by force or inducement	Ability to shape preferences of others by attraction
Military and economic powet	Cultural Power
Coercion, force	Co-option, Influence
Tangible, easy to measure, predictable to certain degree	Intagible, hard to measure, unpredictable
Ownership specified	Unspecified, multiple sources
controlled by State or organizations	Mostly non-state actors, uncontrollable
External, action, push.	Internal, reaction/response, pull
Direct, short-term, immediate effect	Indirect, long-term, delay effect
Manifested in foreing policies	Communicated via nation branding

Simply put, a country with rich sources in soft power does not necessarily have the "power" at its disposal.

In other words, the existence of soft power sources is a mere deposit, a country however needs to have the will and ability, to tap into the deposit and convert this *Potential into Real Power*. Consequently, there is no country in the world that could exert significant soft power if it is in dire economic situation. A country must also find effective means - distribution channel or communication media, to "sell" this to the wider audience with some form of economic power or hard power to lend it credibility. To a greater or lesser extent, many countries in the world possess the cultural potential to influence others but lack the firm will in the geopolitical arena to communicate their agenda. While for discreet assessment a comparison between the two forms of power exhibits a number of distinctive attributes, due to its diversified sources, soft power is difficult to measure and control, though it delivers far more substantially. Similarly, while Soft and hard are related because they are both aspects of the ability to achieve one's purpose by affecting the behaviour of others, the distinction remains in its degree(NYE, 2004B) and relation. Therefore, when compared to *Military Power, Economic Power* is soft; but *Economic Power* (aid or sanction)) is hard power when compared to Culture. Secondly, "all power depends on context – who relates to whom under what circumstances – but soft power depends more than hard power upon the existence of willing interpreter(s) and receiver(s) (NYE, 2004B). In terms of effects and visibility, Kurlantzick (2006) further classifies soft power as notoriously difficult to evaluate and measure, with the impact of hard power normally direct and immediate, straight and visible. In comparison, the effect of soft power is indirect and takes much longer to appear, a sentiment acceded to by (NYE, 2004A, P. 99). One must however relate to effectiveness of any power which depends on the acceptability and perception of the target audience or host country (Syria and Afghanistan being examples). A number of contextual variables affect the deployment of soft power by one country to another and the effect of such efforts on the latter, including geographic proximity, cultural similarity, historical relations and economic ties. Soft power in context therefore assumes relevance in today's context of interdependencies, progressive vision and multilateralism.

6 Dynamics of Managing Soft Power

Based on the assessments thus far, the problem devolves to try and calibrate Soft power in order to design its employment and efficacy. In a normative study by the RAND Corporation[18], s, it was suggested that the best single indicator of a country's attractiveness (soft power) may be poll responses to the question "where would you like to live other than your own country" (TREVERTON; JONES, 2005).There existed a view that only the West or the countries with democratic institutions could yield soft power. It has similarly been claimed that communist countries (viz. erstwhile USSR, China) despite their rich culture, have not been able to develop Soft Power (RAMAN, 2005). This may not be true as a country alone may not have monopoly on soft power question is not who can or cannot develop soft power, but to whom it is *Soft Power*. It is clearly undeniable that whilst America has seen a decline in its Soft Power (NYE, 2004c), China's soft power has been on the rise, primarily in Southeast Asia, but also in Africa and Latin America (BUSINESS WORLD, 2005; KURLANTZICK, 2006; NYE, 2005). China's national image in developing countries, particularly in Africa, is much more positive than in the west. For example, the "Beijing Consensus[19]", a term coined by Branch (2006) is seen by many developing countries as a viable alternative to the western model or the "Washington consensus"[20]. There are many published examples of Chinese soft power in Africa (THOMPSON, 2005), however, it is important to note, especially for emerging countries, that the influence and good relationships China has enjoyed in Africa are not merely the result of its charm and friendly policies (soft power), but

18 RAND Corporation is an American non-profit global policy think tank created in 1948 by Douglas Aircraft Company to offer research and analysis to the United States Armed Forces. It is financed by the U.S. government and private endowment, corporations, universities and private individuals.

19 The China Model / Beijing Consensus (also known as the 中國模式 or Chinese Economic Model) refers to the political and economic policies of the People's Republic of China that began to be instituted by Deng Xiaoping after Mao Zedong's death in 1976.

20 The Washington Consensus is a set of 10 economic policy prescriptions considered to constitute the "standard" reform package promoted for crisis-wracked developing countries by Washington, D.C.-based institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and United States Department of the Treasury.[1] The term was first used in 1989 by English economist John Williamson.

a product of four decades (since 1960s) of concerted investment (by the Chinese government) to cultivate such good will, through investment in reputational capital, and an intended strategy to build relations through aid, trade, medical teams, economic doles[21] and educational programmes (that elucidates the context and measure of Soft power in broader sense).

7 National (Soft) Power and Global Influence.

A State remains non- influential as long as it remains passive and detests the display of desire how much so ever potential it may retain. This latent potential, in any power relationship can be comprehended in relative terms and is mostly transactional between the two parties. Conventional wisdom suggests that this would give rise to inequality as the stronger party will exert power over the weaker; as the richer would over the poorer. One must however be seized of the fact that power equilibrium between two parties does not change instantly and is a protracted evolution as described in the *Yin-Yang Philosophy*[22] (deriving weakness in the strength and a strength in the weakness). Similarly, interactive Soft Power *waxes-and-wanes* based on world geopolitical events and relations between two countries and changing perceptions (CRISTO, 2005; WALCH, 2004). It is in fact being increasingly witnessed in international polity, how the power relationships both bilateral and multilateral are being wielded through international instruments and influence groups' or congregations[23], and there is a growing appetite to embrace space to shape national influence, a fact which is empirical and can be verified through *Soft Power Indices*[24], that measure them in pragmatic terms.

8 Competing for Soft Power Dominance - New Paradigm

Power is desirable and therefore sought by all. It is therefore pertinent to assess how global competition is shaping this domain. Countries' increasingly compete against each other for attention and attraction in the same fashion as commercial brands fight for market dominance. History shows this might not be achieved with impunity due to various factors, some of which may be internal; just as the futile

21 As per John Hopkins institute, the Chinese government extended US $ 143 Bn loans to the African countries between 2000-2018.

22 **Yin and Yang** is a principle, dating from the 3rd century BCE, premising that all things exist as inseparable and contradictory opposites, as a fundamental concept in Chinese philosophy and culture in general.

23 Major Global groups that debate and formulate policy instruments such as OECD, G7, G 20, IMF, World Bank , WTO, SCO etc are increasingly becoming the rules governing bodies that formulate policies for international transaction.

24 According to the Soft Power 30, an annual index published by Portland Communications and the USC Center on Public Diplomacy for 2018, the United Kingdom is the leading sovereign state in soft power. While India does not figure on the list, this year's report features a chapter dedicated solely to Asia, listing 10 countries in the region, ranking India's soft power as eighth.

efforts by the Shah[25] of Iran (in early 70s) to conjure global outreach[26] resulted in failure. One country's gain in soft power, generally leads to the loss of influence of another. This draws particular relevance to the rise of the Asian economies. Nye (2005), for instance regards the rise of China's soft power at America's expense, one that proclaims fight for power dominance and challenges world order. One may relate the development of over 300 *Confucius Institutes*[27] by China worldwide is an effort in exerting that influence just as the apparent attempt to counter this very influence by the Japanese through the recently launched program to open a hundred *Genki*[28] schools overseas. While the means to compete for soft power enhances, so does the level of sophistication in its scope and span; albeit all aimed to exert the influence of national power.

9 Influence of Soft Power and National Outreach

World over, several countries today suffer an image problem caused due to dramatic changes taking place internally (politico-economic and social landscapes); and externally (owing to the effect of outdated stereotypes). Despite globalisation, free tourism and the advancement of technology, particularly the Internet, it is surprising that huge gaps and barriers still exist in the understanding between countries and cultures. Developing countries, especially large economies such as India with rising economies suffer from subdued brand awareness or tamed perceptions. In most cases this is aggravated by a subdued intent to make good use of the reticent Soft Power potential. The argument therefore arises on countries having rich sources or potential, lack the resource adequacy (technical and financial knowhow) to convert them into realisation. While nations across the world have been seized of the need to tell the story of their nation to the target international audience, it needs to be beyond simplistic propaganda, and one with subtlety and sensitivity (PILON, 2005); also termed as *Country or Nation Branding* (ANHOLT, 1998; OLINS, 2002). Some nations' have practiced this for ages, such as the French[29] did in the 17th Century (MELISSEN, 2005). As a subject for academic research, however, nation branding is a relatively new arena (FAN, 2006; PAPADOPOULOS, HESLOP, 2002). There is still no agreement about what the concept is and whether a nation can be branded (ALDERSEY-WALLIAM, 1998; GUDJONSSON, 2005). To some, it is sim-

25 Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, also known as Mohammad Reza Shah, was the last King of Iran from 16 September 1941 until his overthrow by the Iranian Revolution on 11 February 1979.

26 The shah of Iran attempted to showcase Iran as a modern state in the early 70s to gain the pedestal of the top league of nations.

27 Confucius Institute is a public educational organization under the Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China, whose stated aim is to promote Chinese language and culture, support local Chinese teaching internationally, and facilitate cultural exchanges.

28 Offers short and long-term Japanese Intensive courses with accredited and award-winning Japanese language and culture school GenkiJACS

29 France as a nation (in early 17th century) went to much greater lengths in remoulding their country's image abroad, ahead of other European countries, and put enormous efforts into managing their country's reputation, seeing it as one of the principal sources of a nation's power, of which they reap benefits to this day.

ply another term for country of origin effect or place marketing (KOTLER, 2002). One must however remember, in a globalised world, everything attractive has a price, and if not as a direct return it certainly pays back as influence in dividend for a nation. Nations' must therefore manage and control their brand image to be able to compete effectively with others while, actively repositioning and branding to gain the competitive advantage over others (GILMORE, 2002) with accompanying factors such as tourism and foreign investment. We can therefore establish the need for a consistent and all-embracing national brand strategy which determines the most - realistic, competitive and compelling strategic vision for the country; supported, reinforced, and enriched by every act of communication between the country and the rest of the world (ANHOLT, 1998). In essence, such branding concerns the application of marketing through communications techniques to reshape the international opinion of the country as a cross-cultural communication process which very much resembles the advertising process: awareness –attraction– preference and a quintessential prerequisite for any nation desiring to influence the world while narrating its own story (without losing relevance of its own roots and past).Therefore, while there is no substitute for conscious development of a nation's brand (OLINS, 2005), and economy has and will continue to play a critical role for countries who peruse this path, as seen through the late 20th and early 21st century[30] one must not lose sight that the world as it appears has become a gigantic stage on which nations are competing against each other for both attention and affection; and Nation branding holds the key to win this 'global contest of perception'. While developing such strategy a nation must be cautious to be sensitive, lest its efforts are construed otherwise and loses its relevance. For instance, while most countries welcomed China's growing influence (PEW..., 2007 apud SHARFIQ, 2010), many in the West saw it as a threat (NYE, 2005), or Sinoization" of Asia (TREVERTON; JONES, 2005). Successful campaigns help create a more favourable image among the international audience, thus enhancing the country's soft power which goes beyond just finding a catch phrase or window-dressing. This requires deep study of a nation's soft power sources through destination marketing with specific commercial purposes (promoting tourism or inward investment) and its inclusion into mainstream ambassadorial missions just as enacted in the US policy[31] of 2005.

30 South Korea and Spain showcased their nations in mega events in the 1980s and 1990s just as China did in Beijing Olympics 2008 and Shanghai World Expo 2010. Similarly, Brazil and UK showcased their countries' spectacle in 2012 and 2016 respectively.

31 The US state department has an under-secretary for public diplomacy with a mission of "turning around anti- American sentiment in the world".

10 Soft Power and Nation Branding

There are three key components in nation branding: *political, economic and cultural* (FAN, 2008b). These three are intertwined and need to work in synergy to achieve the same goal of promoting the nation's image. Nation branding should be distinguished from a nation brand as there is not necessarily a direct link between the two. A nation's 'brand' exists with or without any conscious efforts in nation branding, as each country has a current image to its international audience, be it strong or weak, clear or vague (FAN, 2006, p. 12). A nation brand can be defined as the total sum of all perceptions of a nation in the mind of international stakeholders which may contain some of the following elements: people, place, culture/language, history, food, fashion, famous faces (celebrities), global brands etc. Clearly, these are also the sources of potential soft power identified earlier in the paper. Therefore, to transform soft power from its potential source into real power, a number of issues need to be addressed, which may include – enhancing the competitiveness of cultural industry through necessary media infrastructure (which would provide a stage to showcase the nation, just as Japan[32] employed the concept in the 80s). China on the other hand despite almost everything being Made in China, had been suffering a big deficit in terms of cultural exports, which it lately, acknowledged[33] and has been very effectively working to overcome. Similarly, whether a unique cultural product from a country can serve as a form of soft power depends on how one markets the product. As a case in point, while*Tae-kwon-Do*[34] from Korea could become one of the most widely practiced martial arts in the world (even an Olympic event),*Kung-fu*[35] of *Shaolin* remains still largely unknown outside China.

11 India – Soft Power Potential and Realities

While soft power and its relevance for emerging economies is well established, application of its dynamics in the Indian context (with potentially leading indicators) brings forth many misgivings in deliverance. Since the early 21st century, in keeping with India's rise on the world stage, the scholarly and policy communities in India and abroad have witnessed a steady increase in writings on India's Soft Power. Many of these assessments were

32 Japanese prime minister is quoted as saying that Sony and Matsushita (Panasonic) are the left and right faces of Japan (Fan, 2008b). Such brands emerge from the stability and success of a country's political and economic institutions – the foundation of its hard power – and consequently contribute to nation branding in aggregate.

33 First published in 2005 in an article of the influential People's Daily "While we are great in cultural resources, we are not strong in cultural industries".

34 Tae Kwon Do (Korean 태권도/跆拳道), is a Korean martial art, characterized by its emphasis on head-height kicks, jumping and spinning kicks, and fast kicking techniques. The combative sport was developed during the 1940s and 1950s by Korean martial artists with experience in martial arts such as karate, Chinese martial arts, and indigenous Korean martial arts traditions such as Taekkyon, Subak, and Gwonbeop and included in Olympics in 2000.

35 The Chinese martial arts known in China as Wushu(武 術 ; wǔshù) and the West as kung fu (/ kʊŋ FU/; Chinese : 功 夫 ; pinyin : gōngfu). In China , the expression *kung fu* any style of martial art, or task done to perfection, not just martial arts. There is also another widely used term in China : *Kuoshu(pinyin : Guoshu*) - which means "national art" - imposed by the Chinese government to designate martial art (*Wushu*) in a more nationalistic way.

optimistic, placing faith in India's potential as a *Civilizational Great Power* [36] with considerable resources arising from its culture, domestic ideology and geography (PANICKKAR, 1945)and diplomacy. However, when we equate this in terms of sheer impact, *Indian Soft Power* does not measure up to the expectations. Significant sections of public opinion in the West and in Asia still maintain a dilemma on rather being favourable to this idea on India. This can primarily be adjudicated to the difficulty an evaluator faces while identifying the significant role played by soft power in India's diplomatic gains since the early 1990s. While writing in 2003, prominent Indian foreign policy analyst C. Raja Mohan even argued:

> The spiritualism of India has attracted people from all over the world, and its Gurus have travelled around the world selling yoga and mysticism. Bollywood has done more for Indian influence abroad than the bureaucratic efforts of the Government. From classical and popular music to its cuisine, from the growing impact of its writers and intellectuals, India now has begun to acquire many levers of Soft Power.(MOHAN, 2003).

It can be safely assumed in consonance with majority consensus in literature that India has historically possessed considerable soft power resources arising from its universalist culture, democratic and political institutions. However, translating this into effective use as a stimulant of national influence has been visibly absent. Though the recent accounts of concerted efforts by New Delhi[37] to channelise resources – including engagements through its large diaspora living abroad[38], , into generating soft power might depict nascent foreign policy outcomes (HALL, 2012), these effects are gradual and yet to expound. As a matter of fact, for a country which was almost destined to provide significant moral leadership in the post-Cold War world, India's soft power resources in the past have commonly proved not up to the task (BLAREL, 2012). Various surveys and impressionistic reviews of India's cultural capital among publics around the world have concluded that world opinion is still nowhere near as favourable as it should have been, given the potential and expectations (HYMANS, 2009).

36 A civilisation state is a country that claims to represent not just a historic territory or a particular language or ethnic-group, but a distinctive civilisation. It is an idea that is gaining ground in states as diverse as China, India, Russia, Turkey and, even, the US. una civilización distinta. Es una idea que ha ido ganando terreno en estados tan diversos como China, India, Rusia, Turquía e incluso Estados Unidos.

37 Capital of India.

38 Many successful engagements with the Indian Expat community were witnessed through interactions/ conclaves during the Indian Prime Minister's visits abroad post his election victory in the year 2014 and 2019.

Figure 2: India's GDP in relative terms (@2018 data)



Source: How Much, 2017.

Here we must reflect that analysts, have paid insufficient attention to the manner in which India's soft power resources conflict with each other and send mixed messages to international audiences. Also, the increased emphasis on India's soft power has not accompanied its rise along traditional economic power dimensions which relates to its GDP (PPP) vs Per-Capita gap (see Figure 2 and Graph 1), which is known to have a noticeable impact on the relevance of India's human capital and in-turn its foreign and public diplomacy influence[39] (SHARP, 2003 apud MELISSEN, 2005, p. 8). FLastly, as with any state, the credibility of India's soft power lies in the coherence of its national identity, and India has not yet resolved the many contradictions[40] in its self-image in a manner that might lend to the successful utilisation of its latent soft power resour-

39 Public diplomacy is a key ingredient of soft power's potency. Public diplomacy is "The process by which direct relations with people in a country are pursued to advance the interests and extend the values of those being represented".

40 Countries image that contrasts between lagging human development indicators while being one of world's leading IT and service provider with an exceptionally successful Space program.

ces. The missing link that comes to mind therefore is of unstructured application and a need for effective application followed with prudent projection to gain the desired effects from the reticent Power potential.

Graph 1 – India's GDP (PPP) Vs Nominal



Source: World Bank, 2018.

12 India's Soft Power Indices - What Must be Done?

Just as public diplomacy does not focus on specific policy issues (a task better suited to lobbying); neither is it ideological in its content (like propaganda). There exists a need for India to focus on "building long-term relationships that create an enabling environment for government policies" (NYE, 2004, pág. 107). Arguably, it may appear that India did consider its soft power resources, since the early 21st century and to some extent been promoting its credentials around the globe to its own people (SURI,2011), who however, tended to mostly know and care little about their nation's foreign policy (KAPUR; MEHTA; KHOSLA, 2009);thereby translating to ineffective action. The deficit in approach has therefore been largely internal. Among the various commentators who have enumerated these endeavours, Tharoor (2008, p. 40) has perhaps been the most enthusiastic, while he commented famously:

> When India's cricket team triumphs or its tennis players claim Grand Slams, when a Bhangra beat is infused into a western pop record or an Indian choreographer invents a fusion of Kathak and ballet, when Indian women sweep the Miss World and Miss Universe contests or when Monsoon Wedding wows the critics and Lagaan claims an Oscar nomination, when Indian writers winthe Booker or Pulitzer prizes, India's soft power is enhanced (THAROOR, 2008, p. 40).

Clearly, India's soft power resources have been and are multi-faceted which include- sports, music, art, film, literature, and even beauty pageantry, but are they adequately understood and branded when compared to the potential mandate of a steeply aspirational India; perhaps not. While one may suffix to the aforesaid list, India's anti-colonial history, democratic institutions, free press, independent judiciary, vibrant civil society, multi-ethnic polity, secularism, pluralism, skilled English- speaking workers, food, handicrafts, yoga, its status as a responsible nuclear power, the rapid growth of the information technology sector in India's Silicon Valley, and the existence of a large Indian diaspora in certain western countries (BLAREL, 2012; HYMANS, 2009; MALONE, 2011; MOHAN, 2003; PURUSHOTHAMAN, 2010), it remains an intriguing facet with similarity to the plethora of soft power resources and diversity it brings along just as in case of China (CHO; JEONG 2008; Garrison 2005), Russia (HILL, 2006), or Japan (LAM, 2007). PIt is therefore difficult to comprehend what precisely are the key inhibitors that stalls India despite such mutually homogenous facets and enablers to affect global opinion and influence of a diversely complex country like India. "India will overtake the US economy by 2030" which heralds " "**A new world economic order**" – with India possessing an economy which is like "an elephant starting to run" (SINGH, 2019) [41] (See Graph 2)

One thing that emerges therefore is despite having favourable factors, they remained largely unused thus resulting in dwarfed survey indices[42] that delude India from the high pedestal it so deserves. To sum up the Indian Context, there exists a great paradox in both *concept and potential application*. As soft power rests on attraction, the "power" lies not in the hands of India alone (which might possess it), rather more so in the *responses and reactions* of the party (in this case the global arena) which it is intended for. Therefore, there needs to be an **effort to bring clarity and erase the existential deficit** (internally and externally).Also, in view of its unique nature, a nation's soft power over another cannot be exploited purposely in any coherent way (BLECHMAN, 2005), which being an intangible, uncontrollable and unpredictable force, unless structured, organised and coordinated Nye (2005) , would never yield India the desired results. There needs to be **cogent effort in synchronising the resources of India's soft power.** Finally, human feelings such as attraction and affection can be fickle, therefore influence of soft power is difficult to sustain (TREVERTON; JONES, 2006). India therefore needs to **build sustained and substantial means which permeates the target nation and imbeds the message for lasting impact** in consonance with existing realities and paradigms in global polity.

41 IMF Prediction on World GDP indices (World Economic Forum review 2019)

42 Soft power Index of India

Graph 2 – Standard Charteredestimates: GDP predictions (2030)



Source: Singh, 2019.

13 India's Soft Power - Contemporary Context

Developing the Soft power resources of India in present day context can be best summarised under following heads:

a. **__Diplomatic Initiative.__** In practice, India's soft power remains weak for two primary reasons. First, Indian diplomacy has neglected soft power as an important tool of statecraft and has only recently understood the relevance of 'cultural diplomacy'. Second, soft power cannot really exist without some initial hard power achievements. A country will only be able to realistically tell a 'better story' if it has material power to build its soft power on. While goodwill for India abroad has largely been generated in an unplanned manner, New Delhi does retain the capacity to accentuate this through 'public diplomacy' (developing a framework of activities) by which it may seek influence on public attitudes supportive of national interests. India has recently demonstrated this intention notably, by creating a Public Diplomacy Division in India's Ministry of External Affairs (in 2006), with an objective to intensify the dialogue on foreign policy issues with all segments of the society (at home and abroad). However, such efforts are fairly nascent and effects could only be seen as broader engagements are witnessed as a result of GoI (MEAs) new-found and extensive outreach (See Fig 3).

Figure 3 – India's Look East Policy



b. **<u>Building Human and Cultural Capital.</u>** Most notable development in recent times has been the explicit incorporation of the 'Human and cultural' element into India's foreign policy. The Indian Council for Cultural Relations[43] has set up over 20 cultural centres in over 20 countries whose activities range from film festivals to book fairs and art exhibitions, aiming to present an image of India as a plural multicultural society. While the human capital has been omni present it witnesses enhanced global engagement beyond own shores through such initiatives. The Indian government today is encouraging the use of *Hindi*[44] abroad by organising annual and rotating World Hindi Conferences, offering classes in its different centres. Offering religious diversity through consciousness societies such as ISKCON[45] and inaugurating temples abroad[46] (maiden initiative) for expats is an effort to assert the cultural links as well. Similarly, despite India's important democratic achievements, New Delhi had historically shied away from promoting this strength abroad, this saw some positive slew since early 2000 (notably in co-

43 Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR), founded on 9 April 1950, is an autonomous organisation of the Government of India, involved in India's external cultural relations, through cultural exchanges with other countries and their people.

44 *Hindi* (India's national language), is an Indo-Aryan language spoken in India (by over 300 million people) and across the Indian subcontinent. Modern Hindi is the standardised and Sanskritised register of the Hindustani language, which itself is based primarily on the Khariboli dialect of Delhi and other nearby areas of northern India.

45 The International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON), known colloquially as the Hare Krishna movement or Hare Krishnas, runs over 850 worship centres world-over. It is a Gaudiya Vaishnava Hindu religious organisation, founded in 1966 in New York City by A. C. Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupada. Its core beliefs are based on the Hindu scriptures, particularly the Bhagavad Gita and the Bhagavata Purana, and the Gaudiya Vaishnava tradition, which has had adherents in India since the late 15th century and American and European devotees since the early 1900s.

46 The temple in UAE estimated to cost Dhs400-450m is being built on land donated by the Abu Dhabi government with collaboration with India and the foundation stone was laid in 2016.

ordination with the international community). In 2005, India joined the UN Democracy Fund and contributed $25 million, making it the second biggest donor after theUS ($38 million). The specific activities enacted include – International Electoral Assistance and programs to strengthen the rule of law and to fight corruption. Even at the regional level, India's decision to link its development assistance with projects of democracy promotion to regional countries (see Figure 4) and increased value of exchange and public interactions such as in Afghanistan[47], are examples of soft power outreach. These regional initiatives are termed as neo *Soft Power Approaches*[48] are framed around the concept of *'non-reciprocity'*, *'connectivity'* and *'cooperative- asymmetrical responsibilities'*[49], and are indicative of a willingness to use own economic attractiveness to persuade neighbours positively.

Figure 4 – India's ongoing development assistance



Fuente: Gol, 2018.

47 The Afghanistan example is interesting as India has direct national interests at stake in the stabilisation of that country. However, India has deliberately refused to send any military mission and instead pursued a soft power strategy to gain Afghan goodwill by delivering $1.3 billion in economic and logistical assistance. Since 2001, India has concentrated on the reconstruction of Afghanistan through aid for building infrastructure like dams and roads and providing scholarships for Afghan students. Ordinary Afghans seem to have appreciated India's 'soft' involvement in their country as 74 percent of them have a favourable image of India according to a 2009 ABC/BBC/ARD poll.

48 The efforts initiated since the 1980s were greater political investment in different regional institutions such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the South Asia Cooperative Environment Programme, the South Asian Economic Union and BIMSTEC which were created to enhance cultural and commercial ties and to rebuild its trust deficit with neighbouring countries while promoting mutually beneficial Free Trade Agreements.

49 The Indian-American community played pivotal role in improving India's image in American minds which greatly contributed to the Indo-US rapprochement. The lobbying efforts carried by the US India Political Action Committee (USINPAC) proved to be crucial to get the much-debated Indo-US nuclear deal passed in the US Congress.

c. **Securing Outreach Benefits** Just as in the beginning of the 1990s, as it became evident that the *Overseas Chinese community* was contributing to China's economic development, India began its outreach[50] cefforts to wealthier expatriates who were well situated to play a vital role in strengthening ties between India and other countries. A relevant continuum of this can be appreciated from the Prime Ministers successful expat engagements[51] in the recent past. While it is apparent that India has slowly yet progressively realised the two dimensions of power, especially for its aspiring global dimension, its political and economic appeal would not be effective unless it develops robust political institutions along with sustained high economic growth rates (that give legitimacy and credibility to play leadership role in the world). As key indicators point, India has credible soft power advantages over the other rising powers, and because of its democratic experience, this rise has been perceived as *complementing rather than challenging* to the existing international order. The need therefore is to use this potential to promote publicly the pluralist nature of its politics, society, as a cooperative and stabilising force in today's increasingly divided international power matrix.

14 Conclusion

As has been amply analysed, Soft power in its true form is intangible, relative, context-based, and controlled largely by non-state actors with its relevance and ultimate effectiveness depending on the perception and response of the target audience. This however remains a challenge to achieve in reality especially in today's materialistic and polarised world. With the bottom-line of any two countries in a power relationship getting mutually benefitted being the premise, it assumes importance for an emerging power like India (identified as traditionally an accommodating nation) to employ its cultural, Social and Human capital resources as key elements of leverage to its advantage. While globally accepted brands can play key role in promoting positive image in the global commons, the absence of a coherent and succinct nation branding campaign will mar this opportunity. India must therefore introspect closely to conjure the potential of its effective cultu-

50 In 2000 Indian Government established a High-Level Committee on Indian Diaspora to review the status of People of Indian Origin (PIOs) and Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) in the context of constitutional provisions, laws and rules applicable to them both in India and countries of their residence. By studying the characteristics, strengths and weaknesses of this community, which represents twenty million people worldwide, this committee aimed to study the role that PIOs and NRIs may play in the economic, social and technological development of India. In exchange for their contribution and based on the committee's recommendations, the Indian government reformed citizenship requirements in 2004 and eased the legal regime governing the travel and stay of PIOs in India.

51 The Prime Minister of India, in his scheme of enhanced public interaction with Indian expats and diaspora visited the US in 2014 and more lately in 2019 during the 'Howdy Modi' event. Similarly, he has had interactions in Singapore and the UAE in 2015, the Town Hall event in London (UK) in 2018 which are a few among major outreach programs.

ral products which may be showcased to promote national image as a vital cog in creating long- lasting impact in image branding. Also, since Soft power and nation branding are two closely linked concepts, India will need to supplement its efforts with stable outwardly policies which reflect the global sentiments and align with the core of sustenance and of *Universal Good.* Effective and prudent use of soft power through public diplomacy and nation branding through more focused, culturally unbiased and a proactive approach to create international influence in the world should form the backbone of Indian influence and outreach in the use of its soft power potential which draws heavily from its civilizational past and aspirational present (in full measure). A lot remains to learn for India from the examples of both the US and China (both at distinct junctures of cultural and civilizational advent-line). As a rising power India seems to now realised well, that brand and image value assumes great importance which is also a necessity if is aims to wield influence in the world polity which will both augment and expand its acceptance and impact as a power centre; and utilising the reticent potential despite leading indicators may no longer be sustainable for the developmental objectives the nation so desires.

15 Recommendations

Algunas recomendaciones que se pueden tomar de esta evaluación como imperativos clave para la India y el futuro de la aplicación de su soft power se enumeran a continuación:

a. Rejuvenate *Multinational Brands of Indian origin* [52] as the de- facto *Brand of the Nation* as elements that propagate nation branding.

b. Promote the enormous soft power (in the form of global brands and power wielding multinational companies) as tangible manifestations of India's soft power resource.

c. Help promote the new and modern image of India through greater *Foreign Direct Investments* utilising the liberalisation process and graduate progressively to a global manufacturing hub for international firms (committing long-term productive investments in the country).

d. Hard sell the fashionable aspects of Indian culture (viz music, food, style and religion) which have gained prominence in many parts of the world, in a centrally coordinated *'Charm Offensive,'* akin to the Chinese.

52 With each passing day, India Inc is acquiring companies abroad, becoming world-popular suppliers and are recruiting staff cutting across nationalities. Some of these include Asian Paints, Tata, Sundaram Fasteners Apollo, Venky's, Mahindra, ITC, Reliance group, OVL etc.

e. In an effort to increase its international clout, mould its public diplomacy initiatives to one that tells a '*Better Story*'.

f. Devise norms through debates to determine the right mix between *Soft* and *Hard* power in order to achieve effective and real influence, to what Nye, termed as 'Smart Power.'

g. To remain relevant and an attractive power, which can wield influence, there exists a need to present a more compelling *Development Model that is 'All Embracing and Democratic'.*

h. Since soft power has a fluctuating value, India will need to *resolve its social and economic inequality* to retain the soft power edge.

j. Implement policies that promote an equitable and efficient society, that not only commands a major share of the global wealth, but *celebrates Human Wealth* as the ultimate beneficiary.

k. Build institutional (macro-economic and structural) reforms and physical infrastructure, without constraining federal regulations, efficient bureaucratic structures and eradicate the perception of corruption which deters both monetary and exploratory investments.

l. Establish the power construct that explores the *Effects Based Approach* [53] of military establishment (Hard Power) with economic growth as an edifice to supplement the Soft Power elements in union.

m. Model the strategy to manage 'nation's image in the eyes of foreign audience', with *objectives* which may be pursued in *short, medium* and *long-term* time frames.

n. In the present age of the global commons and communication revolution, implement measures to achieve the right messaging to accrue crucial benefits in *opinion building* and initiate *proactive dialogue* wherever course correction is mandated.

p. Keep a clear sight of mutual interdependencies and social security structures of the current world order both regionally and internationally.

53 Effects-based operations (EBO) is a United States military concept that emerged during the Persian Gulf War for the planning and conduct of operations combining military and non-military methods to achieve a particular effect. An effects-based approach to operations was first applied in modern times in the design and execution of the Desert Storm air campaign of 1991.

q. Better utilise the more socially accepted and dynamic *alternatives to Western cultural values* such as Indian Soap Operas, entertainment and perhaps the well-established and acclaimed film industry, popularly dubbed *'Bollywood'*[54], to promote the model for political and cultural development (similar to what Hollywood did during the Cold war).

r. Assume leadership position in guiding transformational approaches to global social acceptance through initiatives such as *Yoga*[55] which is now practiced around the world as a social health and wellness revolution.

s.Popularise and hard sell home grown and traditional sports (particularly which trend socially) and gather popular support such as the Super and Premier leagues (with huge bounties attached) for *Cricket e Kabaddi*[56]. With an intent to make them more accessible to people across the globe. Indian films have never really promoted a certain model for political and cultural development.

t. Utilise the large (global) *Diáspora India*[57] as a means of Indian diplomacy which has been regarded and considered to be a major asset internationally (for having added value to every system that it has been associated with).

u. Use India's unprecedented democratic record (amongst most decolonised countries), as a strong soft power resource.

v. Exploit the new international consensus around democracy, human rights and market-oriented economic reforms which reinforce the *'Indian Appeal'* [58] of a new global order of larger commons in established and stable societies that *restore* hope and *demonstrate good will* as an institutional alternative to Western political systems.

54 One of the largest and farthest-reaching mediums for Indian culture and today the world's largest film industry

55 Yoga is a group of physical, mental, and spiritual practices or disciplines which originated in ancient India. Yoga is one of the six orthodox schools of Hindu philosophical traditions.

56 *Kabaddi* is a contact team sport, played between two teams of seven players each with ancient accounts of the sport appearing in the histories of ancient India.

57 There are today millions of Indians spread as far as Fiji, Malaysia, Mauritius, South Africa and Trinidad. While many of these Indians originally migrated as labourers for the British Empire in the 19th century, a new wage of richer and educated expatriates have found their way to the US, Canada and Australia in the last decades. These immigrants have come to play major roles in the political spheres of these different countries.

58 India's democratic, federal and secular political model (although not always perfect) could be considered as an institutional model of reasonable accommodation of minority rights, and of flexible adjustment to different ethnic and linguistic claims.

w. Explore the recent technological achievements[59] as critical soft power resources that extend the nation's accomplishments and prove attractive to others to overcome *stereotypical* image of *underdeveloped impoverishment.*

x. Aid the impression of a modern economy backed by dynamic research base (that leads world innovation) with cutting edge technologies such as the ISRO[60] model on space sciences).

y. Finally, leverage the soft power elements consistently as effects-based resources as diplomatic instruments rather than merely articulated rhetoric[61] .

59 Indian information technology firms such as Infosys Technologies and Wipro, the achievements of other multinational companies such as the Tata and Mahindra Group and the Reliance empire; and the now global reputation of the Indian educational institutions, have contributed to the development of a new image of India as a technological and economic powerhouse.

60 The Indian Space Research Organisation (founded in 1959) is the space agency of the Government of India headquartered in the city of Bengaluru. Its vision is to "harness space technology for national development while pursuing space science research and planetary exploration"ciudad de Bengaluru. Su visión es "aprovechar la tecnología espacial para el desarrollo nacional mediante la investigación en ciencia espacial y exploración planetaria"

61 India's political leadership and its diplomatic instruments have traditionally aimed to capitalise its resources with discreet and disjointed references to cultural diversity, diaspora, political values and economic growth story. These have amounted to rhetoric for image-polishing, and not national image building. Need therefore is to put in place structured and sincere attempts to exploit this huge soft power potential.

References

ALDERSEY-WILLIAMS, H. Cool Britannia's big chill. **New Statesman**, United Kingdom, p. 12-13, Apr 10, 1998.

ANHOLT, S. Nation-brands of the twenty-first century. **Journal of Brand Management**, v. 5, n. 6, p. 395-406,1998.

BLAREL, N. **India:** the next superpower: India's soft powe: from potential to reality. London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 2012. (SR010).

BLECHMAN, B. M. Book review, "Soft power: the means to success in world politics". **Political Science Quarterly**, [S. l.], p. 680-681, 2004.

BUSINESS WORLD. **The rising "soft power" of China and India**. [S. l.: s. n.], May 30, 2005.

CARR, E. H. **Twenty years' crisis, 1919-1939:** an introduction to the study of international relations. New York: Harper & Row, 1964.

CRISTO, D. A. Book review, "Soft power: the means to success in world politics". **American Economist**, [S. l.], v. 49, n. 2, p. 99, 2005.

CHO, Y. N.; JEONG, J H. China's soft power: discussions, resources, and prospects. **Asian Survey**, [Oakland, CA], v. 48, n. 3, p. 453-472, May/June 2008.

FAN, Y. Country of origin, branding strategy and internationalisation: the case of Chinese piano companies. **Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies**, [London], v. 6, n. 3, 2008a. Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14765280802283618. Access on: Aug 22, 2019.

FAN, Y. **Key perspectives in nation image:** a conceptual framework for nation branding. England: Brunel University Research Archive, 2008b. (Working paper). Available at: https://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/1872. Access on: June 16, 2021

GARRISON, J. A. China's prudent cultivation of "soft' power and implications for US policy in East Asia. **Asian Affairs:** an Amercican Review, [Oxfordshire], v. 32, n. 1, p. 25-30, 2005.

GILMORE, F. A country – can it be repositioned? Spain – the successful story of country branding. **Journal of Brand Management**, [S. l.], v. 9, n. 4/5, p. 281-293, 2002.

GUDJONSSON, H. Nation branding. **Place Branding**, [S. l.], v. 1, n. 3, p. 283-298, 2005.

HALL, I. India's new public diplomacy: soft power and the limits of government action. **Asian Survey**, [California], v. 52, n. 6, p. 1089-1110, Dec 2012. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/279219850_India's_New_Public_Diplomacy. Access on: Aug 27, 2019.

HILL, F. Moscow discovers soft power. **Current History**, [Washington, DC], p. 341-347, Oct 2006. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/20061001.pdf. Access on: Sep 23, 2019.

HOAGLAND, J. Elasticity. **The New Republic**, [S. l.], p. 30-34, May 17, 2004.

HOW MUCH. Visualizations. **Visualize the entire global economy in one Chart**. [S. l.]: How Much, 2017. Available at: https://howmuch.net/articles/the-world-economy-2017. Access on: June 17, 2020.

HUNTINGTON, S. **The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order**. New York: Simon & Schuster,1996.

HYMANS, J. E. C. India's soft power and vulnerability. **India Review**, [S. l.], v. 8, n. 3, p. 234-265, 2009.

KAPUR, D.; MEHTA, P. B; KHOSLA, R. Climate change: India’s Options. **Economic and Political Weekly**, v. 44, n. 31, Aug 2009.

KURLANTZICK, J. China’s charm: implications of Chinese soft power. **Policy Brief**, Washington, DC, n. 47, June 2006.

MALONE, D. M. Soft power in Indian foreign policy. **Economic & Political Weekly**, Mumbai, v. 46, n. 36, Sep 2011. Available at: https://www.idrc.ca/sites/default/files/sp/Documents%20EN/EPW-Soft- Power-3-September-2011.pdf. Access on: Sep 10, 2019.

MELISSEN, J. (ed.). **The new public diplomacy:** soft power in international relations. [England]: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005.

MELISSEN, J. **Wielding soft power:** the new public diplomacy. Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2005. (Clingendael diplomacy papers, n. 2). Available at: https://www.jura.fu-berlin.de/fachbereich/einrichtungen/oeffentliches-recht/lehrende/bolewskiw/dokumente/1__Creative-Diplomacy/Melissen_Wielding_Soft_Power.pdf. Access on: June 16, 2020.

MORGENTHAU, H. J. **Politics among nations:** the struggle for power and peace. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967.

NYE, J. S. **Bound to lead:** the changing nature of american power. New York: Basic Books, 1990.

NYE, J. S. **Soft power:** the means to success in world politics. New York: Public Affairs, 2004a.

NYE, J. S. The benefit of soft power. **HBS Working Knowledge**, Boston, Feb 2004b.

NYE, J. S. The decline of America's soft power. **Foreign Affairs**, Congers, NY, May/June, 2004c.

NYE, J. S. The rise of China's soft power. **Wall Street Journal**, New York, Dec 29, 2005. Available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB113580867242333272. Access on: June 17, 2020.

OLINS, W. Branding the nation: the historical context. **Journal of Brand Management**, [California], v. 9, n. 4-5, p. 241-248, Apr 2002.

OLINS, W. **Nation branding in Europe**. [S. l.: s. n.], 2005. Available at: www.saffronconsultants.com/Common/Downloads/Nationbranding.pdf. Access on: Sep 12, 2019.

PAN, E. China's soft power initiative. In: COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS. **Backgrounder**. New York: CRF, May 2006. Available at: www.cfr.org/publication/10715. Access on: Aug 22, 2019.

PAPADOPOULOS, N.; HESLOP L. Country equity and country branding: problems and prospects. **Journal of Brand Management**, [California], v. 9, n. 4-5, p.294-314, Jan 2002.

PILON, J. C. Book review, "Soft power: the means to success in world politics". **Mediterranean Quarterly**, [S. l.], v. 16, n. 2, p. 125-131, 2005.

PURSHOTHOMAN, U. Shifting perceptions of power: soft power and India's foreign policy. **Journal of Peace Studies,** [Oslo], v. 17, n. 2/3, Apr/Sep 2010. Available at: https://www.academia.edu/1559443/Shifting_Perceptions_of_Power_Sof t_Power_and_Indias_Foreign_Policy. Access on: Aug 22, 2019.

RAMAN, B. **Chinese quest for soft power**. [S. l.]: South Asia Analysis Group, 2005. (Paper n. 2209).

RAMO, J. **Brand China**. London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2006.

RAVEN, B.; FRENCH, J. R. The bases of social power. In: CARTWRIGHT, D. P. (ed.). **Studies in social power**. Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1959.

SHARFIQ. M. N. Do education and income affect support for democracy in Muslim countries? Evidence from the Pew Global Attitudes Project. **Economics of Education Review,** [S. l.], v. 29, n. 3, p. 461-469, June 2010.

SINGH, K. India will overtake the US economy by 2030 In: WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM. **Agenda**. Cologny: World Economic Forum, Jan 8, 2019. Available at:https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/01/india-will-overtake-the-us-economy-by-2030. Access on: Oct 22, 2019.

SURI, H. Purposeful sampling in qualitative research synthesis. **Qualitative Research Journal**, [United Kingdom], v. 11, n. 2, p. 63-75, Aug 2011.

THAROOR, S. India as a soft power. **India International Centre Quarterly**, [New Delhi], v. 35, n.1, p. 32-45, 2008.

THOMPSON, D. China's soft power in Africa: from the "Beijing consensus" to Health diplomacy. **China Brief**, [S. l.], v. 5, n. 21, 2005. Available at: www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=32003. Access on: Sep 15, 2019.

TREVERTON, G. F.; JONES, S. G. **Measuring national power**. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, National Security Research Division, 2005. Available at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF215.html. Access on: Oct 10, 2019.

WALCH, R. Book review: "Soft power: the means to success in world politics". **America**, [S. l.], p. 22-23, Aug 2004.

WANG, J. Chinese conception of soft power and its policy implications. In: INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CHINA IN THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER, 2006. **Proceeding** [...]. Nottingham, UK: Nottingham University, 2006.

AUTHOR GUIDELINES AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The entire submission process should be performed through our editorial management system, available at:

http://ebrevistas.eb.mil.br/index.php/RMM/index (Short URL: bit.ly/cmmbr)

In case of doubts or technical difficulties, please contact us by email: info.cmm@eceme.eb.mil.br

The manuscript:

1) It must be original and unpublished;
2) It must not have been published or be in assessment process by another journal, and an eventual submission to another journal will only occur after the assessment return;
3) A substantially similar version must not have been published in annals of events.

Guidelines for Authors

The following guidelines are essential to good editorial flow. Please, read the instructions carefully to be sure that your article meets all requirements. Complete regulatory requirements must be accessed directly in our system.

Article submissions are open in a continuous flow. Other publications such as interviews or technical reports will be selected directly by the editorial team.

Focus and Scope

The *Coleção Meira Mattos* is an interdisciplinary journal that publishes scientific articles related to Security, Defense and Military Sciences, promoting a dialogue between academics and professionals and integrating questions about Armed Forces and Society. It publishes peer-reviewed articles and, occasionally, interviews and selected technical reports on current issues of interest to the area.

Formatting

The papers should be submitted in Word or RTF format.

Structure

Language: articles may be submitted in Portuguese, English or Spanish.

Title: The title should be brief, limited to 22 words (including, if any, the subtitle).

Abstract: with a maximum of 150 words in the language of the text and in English (when submitted in Portuguese or Spanish). It must describe the objectives, methodology and results.

Keywords: at least three and at most five.

Tables, graphics and images: Use editable formats whenever possible so that translations can occur directly in the image. The quality of the images should be 300dpi when they are not from Word/ Excel (tables and graphics). The graphic content should be included only if they provide indispensable information for the article's understanding.

Word limit: The article should have between 6000 and 8000 words, including pre-text and references. However, major or minor articles may be published as long as justified by the content of the contribution.

Footnotes: Notes should be included as little as possible and only for essential information. They should be included on the same page as the note, do not use endnote. Avoid using notes to reference, privilege the use of author-date citations directly in the text. For notes of informative texts available on the Internet that are of interest to the reader and which are not direct or indirect citations, such as news, institutional or corporate websites, electronic documents, tables or statistical data, the link and access date must be indicated, as following example:

[Explanatory text]. Available at: [website]. Access on: [month abbr. Day, year].

More information available on the Brazilian Army website. Available at: www.eb.mil.br. Access on: Jul. 2, 2019.

Other Recommendations

Indication of financing: it should be indicated as a footnote of the title if the research is financed and who financed it. Also indicate, when available, the process number. According to the following structure:

Study/Research project financed by the [funding body], through [project/program], [notice/process].

Example:

Study funded by the Brazilian Ministry of Defense and the *Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior* (CAPES), through the Program of Support for Teaching and Scientific and Technological Research in National Defense (*Pró-Defesa*), notice 27/2018.

<u>Data about the author(s)</u>: they must be informed only in the metadata filled in the system when submitting the article. Only the full name, institutional association and e-mail address will be published.

Example:

Tássio Franchi

Exército Brasileiro, Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército, Instituto Meira Mattos. Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.

editor.cmm@eceme.eb.mil.br

We will not accept articles with more than 4 (four) authors/co-authors.

The authors should have at least a masters or similar degree and, preferably, one of them should have a doctorate degree.

Additional documents: Other documents may be inserted during submission to assist reviewers in the article assessment process. However, only the article will be published and made available in the journal.

Citations and References

CMM adopts the Brazilian standards for references and citations, respectively ABNT 6023:2018 and 10520:2002.

For authors not familiar with the ABNT standard, we ask that you adapt your citations and references as much as possible according to the following examples. All references and citations will be reviewed by experts, ensuring their uniformity. However, articles standardized in other presentation standards will not be accepted.

See the full standard requirements and examples of references and citations on our website.

Copyright Statement

The *Coleção Meira Mattos* (CMM) is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)

<u>Under this license, CMM allows to:</u>

Share — copy and redistribute the material in any support or format

Adapt — remix, transform, and create from material to any purpose, even if commercial.

Note

For any reuse or distribution, you must make clear to third parties the terms of the license to which this work is submitted.

Acknowledgements

Our acknowledgment for the the financial and administrative support from the following institutions and their related agencies. As well as all staff who get involved directly and indirectly with the Coleção Meira Mattos.

Ministério da Defesa

Departamento de Ensino

Divisão de Cooperação Acadêmica

Departamento de Educação e Cultura do Exército

Diretoria de Educação Superior Militar

Dir. do Patrimônio Histórico e Cultural do Exército

Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército

Coordenadoria de Avaliação e Desenvolvimento da Educação Superior Militar no Exército

EB Conhecer

Coleção Meira Mattos

revista das ciências militares

Publication **Edition**

EXÉRCITO BRASILEIRO
Braço Forte - Mão Amiga

ECEME

INSTITUTO
MEIRA MATTOS
ESCOLA DE COMANDO E
ESTADO-MAIOR DO EXÉRCITO

PPGCM