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ADDRESS AND CONTACT

Praça General Tibúrcio, 125, Praia Vermelha, Rio de Janeiro/RJ, Brasil.
CEP: 22290-270.
Tel: (21) 3873-3868 /Fax: (21) 2275-5895
e-mail: info.cmm@eceme.eb.mil.br

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Integrated Border Defense and Security: Challenges and Opportunities

Tomaz Espósito Neto 

Universidade Federal da Grande Dourados.
Dourados, MS, Brasil.
tomazneto@ufgd.edu.br

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Luciano Stremel Barros 

Instituto de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social de
Fronteiras (IDESF)
Foz do Iguaçu, PR, Brasil.
barros@idesf.org.br

Tássio Franchi 

Exército Brasileiro. Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior
do Exército, Instituto Meira Mattos.
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.
editor.cmm@eceme.eb.mil.br

Despite the different forms of integration and the strengthening of ties between countries (political, economic, cultural, military, technological), there is currently a process of (re) valuation of state action at the borders, especially to face a series of complex and diverse phenomena such as international migration, the increase in violence related to cross-border illicit acts (drug trafficking, arms smuggling, among others) and international health phenomena, such as the Covid-19 pandemic. These facts are not isolated, as the causes and consequences intertwine and/or spill over into other topics, such as Human Rights, Environment, Economy, geopolitical interests, among others. Moving the entire system there is a plurality of actors, state and non-state, who work in favor of their interests (individual or collective) at different local, regional, national and international levels. In addition, there are still geographic constraints, which differentiate border regions around the world, facilitating or hindering the presence and development of human activities.

As dynamic as some border regions are, the regulations of limits and possibilities for their development, responsibilities with the security and defense of the territory, remain under the tutelage of national states. The performance of complex spaces and scenarios increasingly requires an understanding of the different dynamics that occur in these regions and integrated action strategies. Whether local integrations between the various state bodies and agencies with non-state entities, or integrations between international entities to address transnational issues. This Dossier sought to bring texts to show the diversity and complexity of these themes.

The issue of international migration is a current and global situation. In Brazil, Operação Acolhida is one of the facets that shows the challenges of state action on the issue. To address it, the dossier brings articles such as: “The securitization of the Brazilian border in the face of the Venezuelan migratory crisis: analysis of the process of border planning from the perspective of Control and Reception Operations” and “Venezuelan refugees on the borders of Brazil during the covid pandemic -19: an analysis based on security studies”, as well as an interview with Major General Antonio Manoel de Barros, operational coordinator of Operação Acolhida. In this line of humanitarian aid, but with an international view of Brazilian action, is the article “The Action for Peacekeeping initiative and its pillar of performance & accountability in United Nations peace operations: a Brazilian perspective”.

Political borders continue to limit the performance of the Security and Defense forces of national States, except in cases that act under the aegis of international organizations. But the presence and performance of these state actors have an important weight in the organization of these spaces. From this point of view, we have articles such as: “The expansion of criminal organizations on the borders of South America and the initiatives of the Brazilian State”; “Eradication of illicit crops as a strategy of the Federal Police to reduce the supply of marijuana in Brazil” and in the international scenario ““It is not a priority”: an analysis of the prevention of terrorism in Portugal”. The classic theme of border disputes is also present in the dossier with the text “Dispute between Guyana and Suriname on maritime boundaries (2000-2007)”. In order to understand some issues related to the development of border areas and the weight of state actors, two texts were offered: “Stimuli and obstacles to economic and social integration at the border; the MERCOSUR border localities agreement”; and focusing on the Arco de Fronteiras Norte “The socio-economic reflex of the military presence in a municipality on the northern border: Barcelos-AM and the 3rd Battalion of Jungle Infantry”.

Knowing the complexity of such topics, the guest editors and the Meira Mattos Collection sought to bring some texts in order to foster debate with academia, society and agents working on some of the themes. Therefore, in addition to academic articles, texts from decision makers who have held positions in organizations operating in border areas and related topics were offered in this edition.

This dossier was organized and conducted by researchers from the project “National Defense, Borders and Migrations: studies on humanitarian aid and integrated security”, a PROCAD-Defense project supported by the Ministry of Defense and CAPES (led by the Command and General Staff School of the Army-ECEME), the Jean Monnet Chair at the Federal University of Grande Dourados (UFGD) and the Institute for Economic and Social Development of Borders (IDESF).

The expansion of criminal organizations into South America's borders and the Brazilian State's initiatives


La expansión de las organizaciones criminales en las fronteras de América del Sur y las iniciativas del Estado brasileño

Abstract: The purpose of this article is to discuss the international expansion of criminal organizations, specifically the First Command of the Capital (PCC), from Brazil to South America and other continents, based on a strategy of territorial domination in Brazilian prisons and international border regions, the security dynamics of which have shifted in this regional periphery. Thus, the goal is to emphasize the theoretical underpinnings of criminal organizations' economic and transnational governance strategies, as well as the production and commercialization processes of the coca-cocaine complex in South America and Brazil's subsequent inclusion in this global illegal trade, as well as the major policies for criminal disarticulation. In this way, this article represents a distinct perspective in the fields of International Relations, Geopolitics, and Public Security, but one that is as pertinent, given its significant influence on security concerns in Brazil and South American countries.

Keywords: borders; public security; criminal organizations; economic regulation of crime; The First Command of the Capital.

Resumen: Este trabajo busca discutir la expansión internacional de las organizaciones criminales, específicamente el primer comando de la Capital (PCC), de Brasil a América del Sur y otros continentes, a partir de una estrategia de dominación territorial en las cárceles brasileñas y en regiones de frontera internacional, cuyas dinámicas de seguridad han cambiado en esta periferia regional. Buscamos resaltar los conceptos teóricos sobre las estrategias económicas y la gobernanza transnacional de las organizaciones criminales, así como los procesos de producción y comercialización del complejo coca-cocaína en América del Sur y la respectiva inclusión de Brasil en este comercio ilegal global, que comprende también las principales políticas de desarticulación criminal. En este sentido, este ensayo constituye un enfoque diferenciado en el campo de las relaciones internacionales, la geopolítica y la Seguridad Pública, pero igualmente relevante, ya que tuvo un fuerte impacto en temas de seguridad en Brasil y países sudamericanos.

Palabras clave: fronteras; seguridad pública; organizaciones delictivas; gobernanza económica de la delincuencia; Primer Mando de la Capital.

Alex Jorge das Neves 

Universidade de Coimbra. Departamento de Relações Internacionais. Coimbra, Portugal.
alex.j.neves@gmail.com

Fernando José Ludwig 

Universidade Federal Tocantins. Curso de Relações Internacionais. Palmas, TO, Brasil.
fernandoludwig@uft.edu.br

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1 Introduction

The main scope of this article is to conduct a discussion on the economic and geographic expansion of the Brazilian criminal organization First Command of the Capital (PCC) to border regions of South America. Consequently, it seeks to visualize its activity in the main routes and corridors of international drug trafficking, aiming at the predominance of illegal marketing and the use of violence, raising the importance of discussion and understanding about the phenomena that contributed to the change of criminal dynamics in the South American peripheries, especially in recent decades (FERREIRA, 2019).

The expansion of the PCC was based on commercial, economic and expansion strategies of its national and international territorial influence, from the illegal marketing of drugs, combined with predatory criminal diversification, such as robberies and homicides, and settling in most of the Brazilian prison system, as well as in the main logistic routes and corridors, especially in the complex border regions of Brazil with neighbors of South America.

The Brazilian state has an extension of more than 16,800 kilometers with ten countries, almost half the circumference of the planet and about 7% of the international limits of the globe. In a monumental geographical area that extends from the Amazon, going to vital areas of the borders with Bolivia, Paraguay to Uruguay. Which, in turn, have greater geographic and logistical proximity to the Center, Southeast and South of Brazil, that are used as logistical platforms for illegal international trade (ANDRADE et al., 2019).

In order to discuss this process, the following starting question is important: what factors influenced the First Command of the Capital to view the border regions as an economic and geographic source of action in South America? The hypothesis is that this criminal organization began to visualize the possibility of acting more efficiently in economic terms in the control of drug trafficking from its expansion outside Brazil's international borders.

Understanding this geopolitical process is relevant to the construction of regional security and public security in Brazil, as it involves an actor that has influenced the security dynamics in several regions of the continent, despite mistakenly being a marginal theme in the studies of Ferreira (2019). In this sense, to carry out this article, a qualitative approach based on available bibliographical references, research, publications in newspapers, public policies designed in the region and empirical knowledge on the subject will be used.

This article was divided into two sections, the first of which seeks to make a theoretical analysis on the evolution of the production and commercialization of the coca-cocaine complex in South America and the respective insertion of Brazil in this context, contributing to the solidification of the PCC, which began to exploit this lucrative market. An analysis on the theoretical conceptions of criminal organizations and their methods of economic and geographical expansion will also be presented.

In the second section, the origin of the PCC and its relationship with the degraded Brazilian Prison System will be discussed, in addition to how the process of geographic and economic expansion took place and its establishment in border regions, which represented an important national and international consolidation. In the last section, some Brazilian federal actions with international projection in these geographical areas will be demonstrated.

2 Brazil's insertion in the world drug market: geoeconomic strategies of criminal organizations

With regard to the expansion of the PCC to regions with illegal borders and economic connections, it is important to explore how the coca-cocaine complex evolved in South America, as well as the respective insertion of Brazil in this market. Concomitantly, it is sought to highlight the theoretical references on the territorial, economic and transnational expansion strategies of criminal organizations, namely the appropriation of the PCC of such strategies.

2.1 Evolution of the coca-cocaine complex in South America and Brazil's insertion in the world drug trade

In the field of illicit economies, notably international drug trafficking, some criminal organizations have systematically structured and expanded their activities in the South American continent, such as the Brazilian illegal structures Red Command (CV) and especially the PCC, the focus of this article. It is essential to understand how the dynamics of the coca-cocaine complex took place and the inclusion of Brazil in this process, from the rapid growth of this illegal branch in the region.


Based on the construction elaborated by Machado (2011), the evolution of cocaine production and by-products (base paste, crack) in South America was classified into four phases. In this perspective, an initial phase took place in the 1970s, with the important leadership of the Colombian cartels and the beginning of Peruvian and Bolivian specialization. In a second phase, about ten years later, in the 1980s, the pressure of North American demand is the preponderant growth factor in this market, pointed out by several other researchers, such as Griffith (1993), who demonstrates the exponential demand of the United States as fundamental: it is "the starting point for one of the fastest growing and most profitable industries in the world", which gave rise to what this author calls "geonarcotics", that are the international diplomatic relations of security agencies induced by the violent and profitable phenomenon of narcotics and money laundering, which allows the feedback of this global criminal chain (GRIFFITH, 1993, p. 3).

The third phase of this process, between the mid-1990s and the 2000s, coincides with US actions in the war on drugs, which mainly involved Colombia, but reflected in Peru and Bolivia, considerably reducing the cultivation areas. According to Machado (2011), it contributed years later with increased productivity, because, as criminal activities adapt to adversities and state controls, new genetic engineering techniques were sponsored by criminal organizations, envisioning the North American market (LAMPE, 2016; MCCARTHY, 2011).

In the last phase, the production is decentralized to small areas scattered in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, including in regions where the coca plant is not endemic, such as in the extensive and low areas of the Amazon rivers, including in the border regions of Brazil with Peru and Colombia, making control difficult and facilitating illegal economic diversification, given the growing demand around the world. Such factors contributed to Brazil's insertion in this world trade, due to the

possibility of astronomical illegal gains, diversification of money laundering mechanisms and strategic location on the continent (MACHADO, 2001, 2011). This insertion was not quite regular, because at first Brazil was seen only as a transit country to Europe and the United States, with low domestic consumption and international traffic concentrated in the Amazon region and in specific parts of the southern borders, in addition to sparse marijuana productions within the Brazilian territory. The map below demonstrates these main coca, marijuana, and poppy production areas on the continent and the main routes and corridors that existed in the mid-1990s.

Map 1 – Drug Trafficking Network in the Amazon River Basin - 1996.




Source: Steiman (2002, p. 45).

Therefore, this scenario contrasts with the current reality of the 21st century, in which the Amazon region remains important, but with a significant shift to routes and corridors in the south-central region of the Brazilian borders, between Bolivia, Paraguay and Argentina, due to its own regular trade logistics for large consumer centers and export platforms, such as the Port of Santos, located less than one thousand kilometers from the border with Paraguay and fifteen hundred kilo-

meters from the border with Bolivia. In addition, there was an abrupt change in the level of drug consumption in Brazil (DROGAS..., 2016). The map below shows cocaine seizures from the period of Brazil's most evident insertion in this trade around 2000, being possible to observe that it involves all areas close to Colombia, Peru and more intense in areas close to Bolivia, Paraguay and São Paulo, regions where the PCC settled.


Map 2 – Geographical areas with the highest cocaine seizures in Brazil between 2000 and 2012



Source: Brasil (2016d, p. 539).


Marijuana has a lower market value than cocaine, however, it generates large volumes due to its low acquisition cost and a large part is imported from Paraguay. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the largest production of this product in the South American continent is located in areas very close to the borders of Brazil, namely between the states of Mato Grosso do Sul and Paraná. This facilitates the introduction and search for hegemony of control of the main routes and corridors by the PCC, as can be seen in the maps of the cultivation areas, main routes and seizures carried out by the Federal Police of Brazil.

Map 3 – Paraguay and Southeastern Brazil: marijuana production and trafficking routes



Source: Neves, Baptista et al., (2016, p. 557).

Map 4 – Geographic areas with the highest marijuana seizures in Brazil between 2000 and 2012



Source: Brasil (2016d, p. 541).

Cocaine and marijuana can be seen as the first phase of Brazil's insertion in this market, from the late 1990s. The other phases of this process are marked to the present day by the forms of "organization and adaptation, speed in decision-making and interaction between the legal and illegal" practiced by criminal organizations for economic expansion in the region (MACHADO, 2011, p. 13).

In this respect, Lampe (2016) e Machado (2011) emphasize that the greater the flow of legal goods and merchandise, the greater the volume of illegal merchandise, as criminal modes take over the same economic strategies as large corporations. In the case of the PCC, having originated in the largest state of Brazil, with consolidated road, air and port networks, in addition to being very close to the borders of Paraguay and Bolivia, contributed to its strengthening in Brazil and expansion of business to South America and other continents that will be demonstrated throughout this discussion (MACHADO, 2011). Understanding this evolution process of the coca-cocaine and marijuana complex, how criminal organizations are theoretically conceived and to what extent the PCC is framed in these premises will be discussed in the next session.

2.2 Criminal organizations and the strategies of geographical and economic expansion

The international literature on this topic is not consensual and there are several conceptual nuances used to designate criminal groups, in this sense, the contribution of Nicaso e Lamonthe (2005) is brought, and it demonstrates that, since the origin of these structures, criminals were worshiped a command structure, with their own symbologies, both in the past and in the current situation, criminal organizations have logics and practices similar to the normal economic and financial market, using the same logistical structures, with ample capacity for metamorphosis, seeking expansion and maximization of profits and power, enhanced by the volatility of the world financial system, which allowed the transformation of "geographic into financial territory" (NICASO; LAMONTHE, 2005, p. 2).

The understanding of McCarthy (2011) and Edwards & Gill (2003) goes in the same direction, for these authors, criminal organizations can be seen as companies, as they are part of the same economic system and provide illegal goods or services in exchange for money, without the need for a large and rigid hierarchical structure. For this author, the main goal of the main criminal organizations is to come as close as possible to a "vertically integrated business", as the Colombian cartels of Medellín and Cali have done, controlling all phases of the illegal cocaine industry (MCCARTHY, 2011, p. 157).

Over the years, the PCC has created a large hierarchical structure, whose command is carried out from within Brazilian prisons, seeking at all costs to achieve control of all phases of the illegal market, expanding its violent actions to the main twin cities¹ of the Brazilian international borders, heart of these transnational spaces, mainly with Bolivia and Paraguay, making it pos-

1 Twin cities are cities located in the international landmarks of two or more countries, separated by a river, square or street, connected through the economy and social, historical, political processes and main regions of international interaction between Brazil and ten countries of the continent (MACHADO et al., 2005).

sible to reduce the cost of cocaine and commercialized marijuana (HISAYASU, 2016b, 2016c). Meneguetti and Ferreira (2020) also advocate in this sense,

Its statute, the *Criminal Courts*, and its form of governance represents a political objective of claiming rights and questioning the monopoly of the use of force by the state, but for the economic purposes of the group in particular. Also, its high degree of structural sophistication points to this gang as a unique object of study. We will see in the next section the strong presence and international organization of the group characterizes the PCC not only as a Brazilian gang but a transnational gang. Violence reverberates in other territories and membership is no longer only a restricted factor in Brazil (MENEGUETTI; FERREIRA, 2020, p. 41-42).

Another important approach suggests that a criminal organization can be characterized as a conglomeration of connected people who commit crimes with a certain degree of planning, articulation and continuity, not being common and routine crimes, sometimes denoting a systemic condition, which eventually involves political connections and is supported by criminal actions, structures and illegal governance, in addition to the use of violence and diversification of the portfolio of illegal economic activities, divided into three modalities: crimes based on the demand and supply of illegal goods and products, including drug trafficking; predatory crimes that are committed with serious threats and violence, such as robberies and, finally, regulatory crimes, which are practiced in the establishment of illegal norms (LAMPE, 2016,).

For Lampe (2016), the structure and governance of criminal organizations are relevant to understand their dimension and structure, and to what extent they affect security and the International System, whether in a nation-state, region or globally. In this context, one of the predominant issues is understanding their cooperative dynamics and transnational connections. For this, it is necessary to verify compliance with three requirements: illegal activities that cross international borders; criminal organizations that are transnationally mobile or present in more than one country; and illegal governance that extends beyond international borders, based on the movement of people, goods and information (LAMPE, 2016).

Evidence indicates that the PCC has been carrying out continuous criminal actions for nearly three decades, having a systemic condition, well-defined hierarchy and expansionist planning as a regular transactional company, moreover, it has structures and practices criminal actions based on the demand and supply of drugs, not to mention extremely violent predatory crimes, such as robberies in Brazil and in border areas, for instance the robbery of 30 million euros on the triple border (Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil), considered the greatest robbery in the history of Paraguay. The actions of the PCC cross national borders, are present in almost every country in South America, in addition to being involved in cocaine exports and financial connections with several countries, enabling the circulation of criminals, illegal products and information management, as well as being an important international governance from the Brazilian territory (CUSICANQUI, 2012; DIAS; DARKE, 2016; HISAYASU, 2016a; HISAYASU; TOMAZELA, 2017).

Moving on to a final contribution on the concepts around criminal organizations, the analysis carried out by Ferreira (2017, 2019) is approached, which relates the importance of analyzing criminal structures such as the PCC in the scope of International Relations, including from the category of analysis on peace and conflicts conceived by Galtung (1969, 1990) on direct, structural and cultural violence. This author criticizes international security studies that have constantly neglected the topic and addresses the concept of violent non-state actor, which operates transnationally in the trafficking of drugs, weapons, robberies and practices of extreme violence. Thus, the PCC fits into this perspective because "it is not only armed and outside the control of the State, but it is also transnational and violent in a broad sense, making use of forms of direct, structural and cultural violence" (FERREIRA 2019, p. 151), such a view is in line with the statement that "of all illegal industries, narcotics are the most active and violent" (NICASO; LAMOTHE, 2005, p. 195).

3 Criminal cardinal and economic expansion and state responses

The purpose of choosing the term cardinal for this section is suggestive, since it is a word that synthesizes the territorial and economic expansion of this criminal organization born through a small group of prisoners in 1993 within the state of São Paulo. Over these three decades, the PCC adopted strategies that allowed to advance and expand its actions and the recruitment of members to all states of Brazil and to several countries, configuring, according to Lessing & Willis (2019), as the largest gang in the world and the leading global case for prison-based criminal governance.

3.1 Consolidación transnacional en América del Sur

According to data from the Brazilian Yearbook of Public Security, in 1993 the prison population in Brazil was approximately 126,200 prisoners (FÓRUM BRASILEIRO DE SEGURANÇA PÚBLICA, 2019), over the years there has been a progressive increase in the prison population, which is characterized as one of the pillars of growth of this organization, that can reach thousands scattered inside and outside prisons, without precise statistics. At the end of 2017, this Brazilian prison population was already over 700,000 inmates for a total of approximately 400,000 vacancies, with a precarious dynamic and difficulty in changing this scenario through public policies, configuring structural violence that generates direct violence under the terms proposed by Galtung (1969), opening space for criminal domination of the prison environment, based on rules established outside of state control.

At the beginning of the PCC's actions, the discourse adopted was to establish mechanisms for contesting the State for the precarious structures of prisons, presenting itself as a defense party for the system's inmates, which served to captain supporters until reaching the point of expansion in the prisons of the state of São Paulo, being a fundamental previous step for its cardinal expansion in all directions of Brazil and its international connections (FERREIRA, 2019).

In order to facilitate the understanding of the expansion process of this criminal organization, important contributions from Dias (2014); Dias & Darke (2016) e Ferreira (2019), which present approaches to this process, were used. In the analysis, the consolidation of the PCC had five main milestones, and it was preferred not to establish dates for these moments, because they would consist of a dynamic and concomitant form, not following an exact temporal sequence. The first milestone is obviously the foundation of this organization, that took place in 1993; the second phase can be characterized as the consolidation of this organization in the Prison System of São Paulo and in the coordination of criminal actions such as trafficking and robbery in this region of Brazil, using violent strategies and territorial consolidation brought by Dias (2014). In this period, Ferreira (2019) emphasizes crucial moments of demonstration of power that confirm its consolidation strategy, such as the rebellions that paralyzed the largest prison structure in Brazil, involving tens of thousands of prisoners in 2001 and 2006, which resulted in the death of hundreds of police officers and criminals.

The third phase occurred concurrently with the second and was characterized by the search for more profitable dynamics and territorial expansion, in an attempt to consolidate a vertically integrated criminal process theorized by McCarthy (2011), seeking for this, the supply of cocaine and marijuana directly from the border regions of Brazil with Paraguay and Bolivia, which made it possible to reduce costs and maximize profits as the main economic driver of growth of this organization in the South American continent. This moment is contradictory, because it was built jointly with the support of the Red Command (CV), born in the prisons of the state of Rio de Janeiro, still in 1979 (DANTAS; CLEMENTE, 2001; KONIG, 2016).


The fourth milestone of this process takes place with the consolidation of this criminal organization in all states of Brazil, which occurs gradually and progressively, outside of state actions, made possible by the chaotic structure of the Prison System combined with the violent process of territorial consolidation and economic expansion, in addition to the loyalty strategy of thousands of criminals, creating a network of action inside and outside prisons, being the key to the consolidation of the PCC. This phase also marks the beginning of a period of conflict in the regions of international borders, notably in the twin cities (DIAS, 2014; DIAS; DARKE, 2016; FERREIRA, 2019).

The fifth milestone takes place with the international consolidation in South America, with expansion of actions on the borders with Argentina, Paraguay, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia and Venezuela, changing the criminal dynamic in the border regions of the continent, which occurs simultaneously with the expansion of the international trafficking of cocaine to other continents. This phase is very important and was consolidated concomitantly with the others and from a temporal point of view, it began around the late 1990s and early 2000s, as soon as the PCC was established in the Prison System in São Paulo, supported by its current biggest rival CV, which already operated in the region. This international establishment aimed to get as close as possible to a structure of domain of the illegal drug chain and with clear signs of transnationality in the terms proposed by Lampe (2016) e McCarthy (2011), with the objective of expanding profits and predominance on the continent, starting from the border regions.

This establishment of international boundaries in the South American continent occurred in the areas of influence of the twin cities in several border regions, that, due to their strategic location, were used as important warehouses for the international drug trade, which changed the dyna-

mics of violence in some of these territories, not being homogeneous across all borders, as shown by the Ministry of Justice diagnosis (BRASIL, 2016e). However, the PCC initiated its activities in territorial areas located between the triple border of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay to the border areas between Brazil and Bolivia in Cáceres and San Matias, considered the poorest region in Bolivia with more than 60% of the population in the poverty line, according to a study by Sánchez Serrano (2018), due to the greater proximity to the logistical structures with the southeast of the country and respective export platforms, as can be seen highlighted on the map below.

Map 5 – Twin cities and main areas of insertion of the PCC in international borders



Source: Adapted from Steiman and Ribeiro. (2011, n.p.).


This region, approximately one thousand kilometers away, was where the main activities of establishment of the PCC took place at the borders and is still configured as the main warehouse for the international trafficking of drugs, weapons and smuggling in the southern cone of the continent.(HISAYASU, 2016a). Illustrating this perspective, between 2012 and 2015, 753 tons of drugs were seized in more than 16,000 kilometers on the Brazilian borders, with 78% of this volume occurring in the areas where the PCC is most active, in the border regions between Brazil, Bolivia and Paraguay highlighted in the previous map (ANDRADE et al., 2019).

The height of this fifth phase occurs precisely with the break with another Brazilian criminal organization, Red Command, which initiated its criminal activities on the borders of South America well before the PCC, changing the criminal axis in the region (HISAYASU, 2017). This occurred in 2016 with the PCC's action reported in several South American newspapers, which resulted in the death of trafficker Jorge Raffat in the Paraguayan city of Pedro Juan Caballero, a region that concentrates the main routes and corridors of drugs, weapons and smuggling in the southern cone of the continent, generating an unprecedented war between criminal organizations on international borders and in large and medium urban centers in Brazil (FERREIRA, 2019; FÓRUM BRASILEIRO DE SEGURANÇA PÚBLICA, 2018a; HISAYASU, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c).

This moment demonstrates the expansion of the PCC on the borders of Brazil with Paraguay and Bolivia and highlights its criminal territorial movements in other countries on the continent, generating a chain reaction, with violent disputes in the main border areas, in addition to the dispute within Brazilian prisons, that generated hundreds of deaths and countless rebellions, which contributed to the year 2017 being the most violent in the history of Brazil. That year, about 63,895 people were victims of homicides in the country, an average of 175 deaths per day (FERREIRA, 2019; FÓRUM BRASILEIRO DE SEGURANÇA PÚBLICA, 2018a, 2018b).

This movement confirms the evidence of the PCC's international connections in practically all South American countries, warehouses in East Africa, as well as recipient countries of the drug sent through Brazilian ports, especially the Port of Santos to Portugal, Spain, Netherlands, Balkans, Italy, among others, made possible by the partnership and international connection with other criminal organizations, such as the Italian Ndrangueta, one of the oldest in the world, findings from investigations by the Federal Public Ministry and the Brazilian Federal Police, in addition to the existence of financial movements in the United States and China, which are systematized on map 6 to facilitate the visualization of these international interactions (BENITES, 2015; CHASTINET; GUEDES, 2018; FERREIRA, 2019; HISAYASU, 2016b, 2016c; KAWAGUTI, 2014; NEVES; BETANCUR, 2019).

Map 6 – Criminal global connections



Source: The authors (2021).

Such connections confirm Brazil's inclusion in the international drug market, allowing high profits and contributing to the PCC's cardinal criminal geographic expansion strategy, even with all the main leaders arrested: "based on data provided by criminal prosecutors, it can be stated that 80% of the PCC's profit comes from drug trafficking of approximately 40 tons of cocaine/year, totaling US\$ 200 million/year" (FERREIRA 2019, p. 157).

From this expansion, involvement in violence and criminality in the peripheries of South America and despite the fact that this is the period of a new international governance called geonarcotics (GRIFFITH, 1993), it did not prevent the growth of these criminal organizations, due to the fragile South American international coordination and difficulties of the public security policies, which would change the reality of the prison system and more effective measures to prevent structural violence and the disarticulation of the PCC. It is important to note that Brazil began to have a Single Public Security System (SUSP) only in 2018, with the approval of Law No. 13,675, of June 11, 2018.

In order to visualize state policies to contain criminal organizations, the main initiatives in Brazil will be addressed, since at the regional level systemic policies were not built on the subject, as in the European Union (EUROPOL, FRONTEX, CEPOL), among other agen-

cies that articulate strategic, tactical and operational actions in a multilevel regional and global governance perspective (COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2017; FRONTEX, 2020; MARKS, 1993; MUNGIANU, 2013).

3.2 The Brazilian State facing PCC's growth on international borders

In response to PCC's growth, the expressive international public policies built at the regional level (Mercosur or Union of South American Nations) was not identified in the bibliography, for this reason, some Brazilian actions of international projection that broadly involved the theme of criminal transnational organizations will be demonstrated, namely: the Strategic Border Plan (PEF), the Integrated Border Monitoring System (SISFRON) and the Integrated Border Protection Program (PPIF). These initiatives were designed with assumptions of integration, cooperation and articulation between Brazilian security agencies (Military, Civil, Federal and Federal Highway Police), aiming at dismantling the trafficking of drugs, weapons, smuggling and the growth of criminal organizations in the regions of international borders (ANDRADE et al., 2019; BRASIL, 2016b).


The PEF was established through Decree No. 7,496/2011, involving the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Justice and Federal Revenue, providing for two main structures of national/international cooperation, the Integrated Border Management Offices (GGIF), established in the main twin cities with the objective of locally articulating integrated responses from the Military Police, Civilians, Fire Brigades, other local agencies and federal bodies (Federal, Federal Highway Police, Armed Forces, etc.), involving agencies from Brazil and border countries. The other structure of national character was designated as Joint Operations Center (COC), with a focus on interagency defense actions in the region (ANDRADE et al., 2019). Both structures did not have significant international action given the low international political priority on the subject and the fact that the countries neighboring Brazil did not participate in the construction of these measures. In addition to this perspective of interagency cooperation, three large hybrid operations involving defense and security agencies were instituted to curb transnational crime: Operations *Agata*, *Sentinela* and *Frenteira Blindada* (ANDRADE et al., 2019).

Another action instituted within the scope of the PEF was the National Strategy for Public Security at the Borders (ENAFRON), coordinated by the Brazilian Ministry of Justice, which implemented numerous actions and technological investments, trainings and coordinated actions with the subnational security agencies that worked in the areas of international limits, totaling approximately 100 million euros in investments between 2011 and 2014, resulting in thousands of tons of drugs and weapons seized. This program was discontinued at the National Public Safety Secretariat (ANDRADE et al., 2019).

These actions marked new perspectives for fighting transnational organized crime, but were severely discontinued as of 2014, impacted by the political moment Brazil went through and the absence of a consolidated National Public Security Policy, which was created only in 2018 (BRASIL, 2018), after the most violent year in the history of Brazil (FÓRUM BRASILEIRO DE SEGURANÇA PÚBLICA, 2018a, 2018b).

Parallel to the creation of the PEF and the updating of the National Defense Policy and the Brazilian National Defense Strategy in 2012 (BRASIL, 2012), the implementation of the Border Surveillance System (SISFRON) began in the same year, with initial completion forecast in 2021. This project is audacious, complex and with an estimated cost of over 2.6 billion euros, with the premise of enabling the Brazilian Armed Forces for interagency actions in the fight against transnational crime, to "guarantee the control and integrity of borders, in the face of challenges and border uncertainties" (ANDRADE et al., 2019, p. 65). The pilot project began its activities exactly in the region of greatest intensity of criminal actions of the PCC in the border regions with Paraguay and Bolivia, as can be seen in the map below.

Map 7 – SISFRON implementation map in areas with the greatest illegal flow in the border regions with Bolivia and Paraguay



Source: Neves, Silva and Monteiro (2016, p. 94).

Finally, the PPIF is a policy that redesigned the PEF, with few significant changes, being instituted through the Brazilian Decree No. 8,903/2016 (BRASIL, 2016a), reaffirming the need for international cooperation and articulation, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a preponderant actor in the context, with a view to articulating, in a more qualified way, integrated actions with other countries in South America. In addition, the PPIF began to have a formal concern with maritime regions, based on the conclusions of studies carried out by the Ministry of Justice, especially regarding the use of large Brazilian ports in international drug trafficking. The other important innovation of the PPIF was the creation of a national coordination and articulation structure to allow a more effective national and international management of the problems of these regions, however, it is still too early to assess the effectiveness of the PPIF actions and there has been no evaluation by SUSP on the topic (ANDRADE et al., 2019). In addition, the role of the Brazilian Armed Forces, within the scope of the PPIF, is highlighted by Operation Ágata, which, under the command of the Ministry of Defense and the Joint General Staff of the Armed Forces (EMCFA), sought to fight, essentially from the joint presence on Brazilian borders, international drug trafficking (FERREIRA; MEDEIROS, 2020).

It is also important to highlight that currently the Secretariat of Integrated Operations (SEOPI) of the Ministry of Justice manages the VIGIA Program, which has articulated operational actions with the Brazilian police, in the same way as the FRONTEX carried out in the European Union, including involving the recent Integrated Operations Center, inaugurated in the largest border conurbation in Brazil (Iguassu Falls). This program has sought to articulate other specialized structures of the state police (Military and Civil Police), such as the Foreign Exchange Operations Command (COD), the Special Border Security Group (GEFRON), Department of Border Operations (DOF), being essential for the National System for Monitoring and Evaluation of Security and Social Defense Policies (SINAPED), created within the scope of SUSP, to be able to carry out systematic evaluations of the main security policies, with a view to better directing the resources and efforts of security institutions from Brazil (ANDRADE et al., 2019; BRASIL, 2016c, 2019b; NEVES; GIMENEZ; OLIVEIRA, 2018; NEVES; SILVA; LUDWIG, 2019).

Finalizing our approaches to state policies aimed at reducing the influence and capital of the PCC, it can be concluded that they were important, they defined some guiding milestones that may reflect on actions with greater impact on these criminal organizations, however, it is still too early to say that they were sufficient to reduce severely the business of this criminal organization, especially due to the fact that Brazilian national policies in relation to the prevention of violence, changes in the Prison System and actions of financial decapitalization of criminal organizations are not consolidated. In addition, Brazil and the countries of the continent have great difficulties in articulating an integrated concertation of international solutions to reduce the influence of the PCC and other criminal organizations on the continent, as the European Union has been doing in the effort to articulate 27 independent and sovereign countries, in addition to its wider neighborhood in Africa, Middle East and in others regions of the globe.

4 Final considerations

As discussed throughout this article, the PCC has gone beyond the borders of Brazil and South America, building a significant criminal network that has contributed to changing violence and criminality at a regional level. Thus, it was sought to bring reflexive evidence on the inclusion of Brazil in the illegal drug trade route and the relationship with the PCC's criminal geoeconomic contours and respective international connections.

From this perspective, theoretical and empirical circumstances that contribute to the understanding of some factors that explain the expansion of the PCC to border regions were addressed. In this light, the PCC initially saw the possibility of economic expansion, enabled by the reduction of intermediaries with producers of the coca-cocaine and marijuana complex in South American countries, notably Bolivia and Paraguay, drastically reducing the cost of these illegal products. This action beyond international borders has significantly contributed to the economic profits obtained by drug trafficking, which can reach approximately € 180 million per year, leaving no doubts that the enhancement of profits was one of the main factors in the introduction of the PCC in these border regions (MAXX, 2017; RIBEIRO; CORRÊA, 2017; FERREIRA, 2019).

Secondly, the PCC is an organization that practices the territorial domain wherever it passes, using direct violence when necessary to establish this geographic control, in this perspective, the border regions become vital and strategic. Furthermore, this territorial movement allowed closer connections with suppliers of illegal weapons and ammunition, especially in Paraguay, supplying their criminal structures within the Brazilian territory.

Lastly, the connection with the main producers of the coca-cocaine complex in South America allowed its more competitive action in economic terms for the international drug trafficking in other continents, such as East Africa and especially Europe, establishing cooperative connections with criminal organizations in these regions. These factors corroborate the arguments used in this work about the insertion of the PCC at the borders in search of profits, territorial control, and also criminal hegemony in important areas of the continent, based on transnational governance and leadership, which was not followed by integrated public policies of regional scope to reduce the damage and disarticulation of this organization, despite the demonstrated initiatives, such as SISFRON, PEF, ENAFRON, PPIF and VIGIA.

Looking to the future, some actions deserve further analysis in the context of transnational cooperation, such as the impact of the transfer of the main PCC leaders to Federal Prisons, as well as the recent rapprochement of the Brazilian government with the European Union and the United States, for example the participation of members of the Italian, Portuguese and EU police forces in the 2nd Transnational Coordination Meeting in the Fight against Criminal Organizations held in Brazil (EU, 2019), in addition to the inauguration in December 2019 of the first Integrated Border Operations Center, created in the triple border of Brazil with Argentina and Paraguay, based on the models of North American Intelligence Centers called "Fusion Center" (BRASIL, 2019a, 2019b).

Despite all the initiatives, there is still a fragile international political agreement within the South American continent, fundamental for the process of building more assertive policies from the point of view of prevention, development of vulnerable areas involved with the production and marketing of drugs, weapons and smuggling, as well as the disarticulation of criminal organizations operating on the continent, such as the PCC. In-depth studies and analyzes in the field of International Relations, Police Sciences, Public Security, among other areas of knowledge, are essential to better understand these phenomena and point out alternatives for solving problems that affect millions of people in the peripheral areas of the continent and which, unfortunately, are not yet a priority focus of analysis and research.

Authorship and Collaborations

All authors participated equally in the elaboration of the article.

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Venezuelan refugees at the Brazilian borders during the covid-19 pandemic: an analysis from security studies

Refugiados venezolanos en las fronteras de Brasil durante la pandemia de Covid-19: un análisis a partir de los estudios de seguridad

Abstract: The Covid-19 pandemic impacted incisively on the migration issues in the Brazilian state of Roraima, producing effects both on the flows of migrants and refugees coming from Venezuela, as well as on the management of migration processes carried out by governments, international organizations, and civil actors. This paper aims to present and expose the situation of Venezuelan refugees on Brazilian borders during the Coronavirus pandemic, analyzing the migratory flow from international security studies, under the theory of Buzan and Weaver. For this, a clipping was conducted on the performance of the "Acolhida" Operation, launched by the Brazilian Army in 2018, considered a Humanitarian Logistics Task Force, focusing on the actions developed during the pandemic. Collaborative and solidary cooperation between national and transnational agents is necessary and urgent in order to mitigate the suffering of people who are vulnerable, such as the refugees, who before the closing of the border, arrived daily in large numbers to the Brazilian territory.

Keywords Clipping; Covid-19; "Acolhida" Operation; Refugees; Social Security.

Resumen: La pandemia de Covid-19 impactó de manera incisiva la problemática migratoria en Roraima, produciendo efectos tanto en los flujos de migrantes y refugiados de Venezuela, como en la gestión de los procesos migratorios que llevan a cabo gobiernos, organismos internacionales y actores civiles. El presente trabajo tiene como objetivo presentar y exponer la situación de los refugiados venezolanos en las fronteras brasileñas durante la pandemia del Coronavirus, analizando el flujo migratorio a partir de los estudios de seguridad internacional, bajo la teoría de Buzan y Weaver. Para ello, se realizó un clipping (recorte de reportajes) sobre la actuación de la Operación "Acolhida", deflagrada por el Ejército Brasileño en 2018, considerada una Fuerza de Tarea Logística Humanitaria, con foco en las acciones desarrolladas durante la pandemia. Se torna necesario y urgente la cooperación colaborativa y solidaria entre los agentes nacionales y transnacionales para mitigar el sufrimiento de las personas que se encuentran vulnerables, como los refugiados, que antes del cierre de la frontera, llegaban diariamente en gran número al territorio brasileño.

Palabras clave: clipaje; Covid-19; Operación "Acolhida"; refugiados; seguridad social.

Luísa Guimarães Vaz 

Exército Brasileiro. Escola de Comando e Estado - Maior do Exército.
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.
luisavaz1604@gmail.com

João Batista de Aguiar Filho 

Exército Brasileiro. Escola de Comando e Estado - Maior do Exército.
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.
joaoaguiaarf@gmail.com

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1 Introduction

National borders open and close from time to time, despite the liberal order's constant quest to reinvent itself, as in the current Covid-19 epidemic. Plagued by the growth of nationalism and the economic power of non-Western countries, the modern age faces an epidemic with reduced border access. The lines that draw the closure of accesses are being drawn into the social clusters of the States, as the worker migrates home after work ends and is not welcome in his or her own home. Isolation conglomerates and segregation centers resemble detention centers for individuals, and clearly, this presents itself as a process with no turning back for globalization led by the WTO (World Trade Organization), EU (European Union), and Free Trade Zones based on liberal norms (GHOSH; CHAUDHURY, 2020). John Locke's liberal ideas must face an undeniable fact. The current situation requires necessary preventive measures that are uncomfortable to the world before the pandemic and that resemble repressive devices for liberal interests, since for Locke, a state of perfect liberty would be the one that protects the rights to possessions and to people, according to the convenience of their interests, within the limits of protecting the natural rights of individuals, which are the right to life, liberty, and property. But this should happen in a natural flow, without the need for permission or dependence on the goodwill coming from another man (LOCKE, 1978).

The Covid-19 pandemic has generated unprecedented turbulence in multiple forces, both in political, social, economic, and epidemiological arenas around the world (GREER, et al., 2021). This moment is a "period of war", which accentuates the perception of three old crises: the much talked about ecological crisis; the crisis of global capitalism; and the biological crisis, evidenced in the current Covid-19 pandemic. The governmental apparatus has not been able to protect its citizens against the aggravation of such problems, instead it has legitimized the means to make it possible to reach this situation, which allows the question: on what validity do the Nation States stand? This question is difficult to answer, but in a way, we can elucidate that the states rely on an invisible frontier that has emerged with the virus, in which they balance guaranteeing the lives of their inhabitants and delaying the deaths caused by the spread of the disease (GHOSH; CHAUDHURY, 2020).

In Brazil, the first official notification of a person suffering from Covid-19 happened on February 26, 2020, in São Paulo. Throughout the country, the management of migratory processes and circulation flows were strongly affected, due to the sanitary measures adopted to confront the disease (GREER, et al., 2021), porous borders of international access also suffered from this ambivalence between the hospitality of access and the hostility of closure, one of them was the border with Venezuela, in Pacaraima, impacting the migratory flow by land of Venezuelans to Brazil (TEIXEIRA, 2021). While the rapid spread of the virus has revealed how connected we are, epidemiological measures seem to neglect those who seek help in other countries. For some individuals there is no right time to leave their nationality in the past and look for a safe place (BRASIL, 2021).

Brazil has developed over the years a profile of a hospitable country and this is reflected in our laws, as can be seen in the changes that have occurred since the Statute of the Foreigner (Law No. 6,815) of August 19, 1980, to Law No. 13,445 of May 24, 2017, known as the Migration Law. The Statute in question was created during the military period, and its main objective was to safeguard both national sovereignty and Brazilian interests against a possible foreign threat, that is, the immigrant was seen as a potential enemy (CLARO, 2020). Meanwhile, numerous changes can be observed with the Migration Law, which guarantees refugees the right to not be deported massively into the national territory, protection, and full equality, which involves access to the Unified Health System (CERÁVOLO; FRANCHI, 2020).

Despite these changes, with the new Coronavirus pandemic, the situation of Venezuelan refugees, which was already delicate, has become even worse. The closing of the border is supported by Law No. 13,979 of February 6, 2020, known as the "quarantine law", which determined the temporary restriction on entering and leaving the country by highways, ports, and airports, with the Brazilian government's claim that SUS would not support the treatment of foreigners infected by the new virus (ASENSI; RIBEIRO; FILPO, 2021). In many cases, migration works as a way to access health care, but when they arrive in Brazil, Venezuelans find a dissonance between the Unified Health System (Sistema Único de Saúde — SUS) and the health subsystem (MOREIRA; TORELLY, 2021).

Thus, the negative impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic are evident in all spheres around the world, especially in relation to social and humanitarian issues, essentially for vulnerable populations. One of these vulnerable populations, as seen earlier, are the refugees who leave their countries in search of better living conditions. The Venezuelans have felt the impact of the social and humanitarian crisis experienced in Venezuela and potentiated by the pandemic, where even with the potential contamination by the virus, many still seek refuge in other countries, one of them being Brazil. This article has the general objective of describing the migratory movement on the border of Roraima and Venezuela during the pandemic and to observe the impacts that occurred, especially in relation to Operation Acolhida, analyzing it from the perspective of Security Studies.

2 Sources And Methods

In order to achieve the proposed objective, which is to present and expose the situation of Venezuelan refugees on Brazilian borders during the Coronavirus pandemic, analyzing the migratory flow from the perspective of Security Studies, we first analyzed Barry Buzan's contributions and Security Studies applied to the social security agenda. As for the methodology, we used *clipping*, a tool for comparing information, which allows us to understand the vision of the communication vehicles about a certain subject. In other words, *clipping* is about a cut of the news broadcast in the media that portray the same object of study from different angles, addressing positive, negative and/or neutral perspectives (CARVALHO; CORDEIRO; MOREIRA; CORDEIRO, 2018).

This article will be divided into six parts. In the first part the problem is contextualized starting with the introduction. The second part presents the methodological framework. The third part illustrates Buzan and Weaver's theory of the new international security agenda. In the fourth part the origin of the increase in the flow of Venezuelan migration to the state of Roraima is reported, and the actors that act in this environment. The fifth part demonstrates the *clipping* method with information from Acolhida Operation. Finally, the sixth part presents the conclusions of the study.

3 Barry Buzan And The Social Security Agenda In The International Arena

Security studies face new challenges with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar conflict scenario with the US, still in the early 1990s, a period in which many publications were influenced by the end of bipolarity, and questioned the very nature of the studies published until then, which focused on the rivalry between the two superpowers and the threats of a nuclear war between them. Theorists and theories that had a broader scope on the security theme gained greater notoriety after this episode, such as the Copenhagen School, which played an important role in the evolution of International Security Studies (CERÁVOLO; FRANCHI, 2020).

The Copenhagen School was an organization of theorists who discussed securitization theory, developing a set of concepts and analytical frameworks that would enable the analysis of international security from a broader perspective, developed by Barry Buzan and other authors (TANNO, 2003). The concept of securitization as a social construction that supports the principles drawn by Onuf, a pioneer of constructivism, justifies that the world is a social construction created through discourses and social relations, that is, for a specific issue to be perceived as a security problem, it must first necessarily be declared a problem by some entity of social importance, this securitization process can be observed through discourse analysis.

Buzan and Weaver, two of the most respected authors of the Copenhagen School, proposed a new way to analyze the security theme, replacing it with a holistic approach to the security of human communities and nations. They examine the distinct character and dynamics of security in five sectors: military, political, economic, environmental, and social (CERÁVOLO; FRANCHI, 2020). Theoretically, there are conceptual distinctions between the political and military sectors, but what Buzan points out is the existence of a partial interchangeability that unites the two forces in the process of constituting government, as both are linked to the purpose of the state, in confronting dual-directional issues: inward, to the domestic construction and life of the state, and outward, to its position and relationship with other members of the international system.

In regard to military security issues, questions have arisen mainly about the internal and external actions by which human communities establish and maintain the machinery of government, for the exercise of government goes beyond the simple use of force. In other words, in terms and conditions of political legitimacy, the limit at which military resources are accepted is as important as the military considerations. In practice, the military security agenda revolves

around the ability of governments to maintain them against internal and external threats, but there may also be a need to involve the use of military power in the defense of states or governments against threats to their own existence, making a maintenance of their *status quo*, as in the case of the emergence of migrants or rival ideologies.

As far as society is concerned, the analysis of social security starts from those ideas and practices that identify individuals as members of a social group. Society is about identity, the self-conception of communities and individuals identifying themselves as members of a community. These identity ties are distinct, though often entangled with the organizational political spectrum, concerned with government. The focus has been on the institutional politics of the State, and consequently of the political and military sectors. If one approaches the nation, another sector enters the picture, the society.

The social security agenda is set by different actors in different eras and regions, but one of the most common problems that have been seen as a threat to social security is migration in a way that alters identity as a result of the changing composition of the population. The movement of people through geographical space is an old human habit in its history. We can consider this migration to occur because of a depopulation problem, people can make individual decisions to move for various reasons, be it plague, war, famine, natural disaster or extermination policies.

Migration operates most intensely as an intra-regional and neighboring region dynamic. It is easier to migrate over a short distance than over a long one, and by cultural impulses to travel to neighbors than to distant places. Different societies have different vulnerabilities and this will depend on where and how their identities are constituted. Depopulation threatens social identity by threatening its individuals, but it is not specifically a part of the social sector identity logic, except perhaps in cases where extermination policies are motivated by the desire to eliminate an identity in an extreme case, as happens with unemployment and crime, these are threats primarily to individuals, only if they threaten the collapse of state society do they become social security issues (BUZAN; WAEVER; WILDE, 1998).

4 The Venezuelan Migratory Crisis, The State Of Roraima And The Actors Involved

The flow of Venezuelans migrating to other countries increased significantly from the year 2015, when several countries in the American continent, including Brazil, had a significant increase in the number of records of the presence of Venezuelan refugees in their territories (SIMÕES, 2017). At the beginning of this year (2015), few Venezuelans settled in the country, there was a growing movement on the Brazil-Venezuela border of Venezuelan citizens to make purchases of various products, mainly food and medicines, but few remained in the territory. However, starting in 2016 the flow of Venezuelans to Brazil increased throughout the year, this new migratory movement came in search of medical-hospital services and with the intention of staying in the country. Venezuela has a border strip with other countries, the Venezuelan states to the South and East border only Brazil and Guyana, the limits with the states of Amazonas and Roraima, but the entrance door of the refugees ends up being through Roraima because of the access (CERÁVOLO; FRANCHI, 2020).

Roraima is a state located further north in Brazil and has dry borders with Venezuela and Guyana. The capital of Roraima, Boa Vista, is the only Brazilian capital located in the northern hemisphere of the globe. This interferes with the counting of the seasons in relation to the rest of the country (VIDIGAL, 2021). The state has peculiar characteristics, such as its remoteness from the political-economic center and the demarcation of 46% of the state as indigenous land, and presents problems of border and environmental illicit activities on the border strip. Roraima has a population of 576,568 (IBGE, 2018 apud CERÁVOLO; FRANCHI, 2020) and an annual income of 11 million reais. In addition, the electricity grid is disconnected from the national grid, and receives power from the Guri hydroelectric plant in Venezuela.

What calls attention are the causes that foment this great migration to the state of Roraima, more specifically to the country that originates this great flux of migrating people, the neighboring country to the national borders, Venezuela, which is not suffering from any serious environmental problem or going through a period of war. But what are or were the problems that became so severe that Venezuelan citizens left their country? (CERÁVOLO; FRANCHI, 2020). The author Gustavo da Frota Simões, adjunct at the Federal University of Roraima (Universidade Federal de Roraima – UFRR) assesses that the crisis in Venezuela has its origin prior to the year 2015, and divides the crisis into three faces: an economic, a political and a social one (SIMÕES, 2017).

In the last decade, Venezuela had a relatively high Human Development Index (0.634), higher than its neighbors in South America and the Caribbean (e.g. Brazil 0.611 and Colombia 0.592). The country was one of the founding states of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960, along with Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Currently, OPEC controls more than 80% of the world's proven oil reserves. Author Tássio Franchi, from the Army Command and Staff School (Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército – ECEME) evaluates each of the three fronts of the Venezuelan crisis, with this, the following table is constructed.

Table 1 – The three fronts of the crisis in Venezuela

Political	The country suffers from the lack of maintenance of democratic precepts, marked by the rise of a government with socialist leaning, in which there is no alternation of power, compromising the management and balance between the three powers, consequently affecting the legislative and judiciary powers, and affecting the ability to restrain or supervise the actions of the executive branch.
Economical	The country does not have sufficient domestic production to meet the needs of the domestic market demands, leaving it excessively at the mercy of import relations. Although Venezuela holds almost a quarter of the oil reserves, the infamous drop in the price of oil on the international market has directly affected the country's purchasing power.
Social	The political and economic crises have promoted a deep and acute crisis in the social sector. The high crime rates, attributed to the population's lack of access to basic supplements, such as food and medicine, become one of the main reasons for individuals to leave Venezuela, reasons pointed out by migrants who arrived in Brazil in 2017.

Source: Franchi, 2019.

This problem originated in the 1970s, after the year 1973, the high valuation of oil, mainly due to the creation of *Petróleos de Venezuela* (1976), when the Venezuelan State had more control over its oil and, consequently, obtained a larger share of foreign exchange. This has enabled the country to buy food products on a large scale with low prices and good quality in foreign trade. The domestic production of food was not able to compete with the foreign market, so, inevitably, there was a stunting of the food industry, which became unstructured over time, to the point of not being able to promote self-supply. Despite several presidents and ministers of agriculture trying to promote a better production framework for local producers since the 1980s, the import of basic products has been maintained because of the dividends from oil production. However, from the second decade of the 2000s, more specifically from July 2014, there was a systematic drop in oil prices in the international market, affecting Venezuela's purchasing power, consequently, it was unable to meet the demands of domestic consumption. In addition, the subsequent economic and political crises have resulted in a social crisis that has manifested itself, above all, in the amplification of internal insecurity. The result of these crises and the lack of internal physical security is what some authors identify as the "Venezuelan diaspora," because of its migratory process that began in 2005 (CERÁVOLO; FRANCHI, 2020).

Because they cannot and/or do not want to return to their country, for various reasons, many Venezuelans seek refuge in Brazil, and because of this, according to author Thiago Augusto Lima Alves, they are considered forced international migrants, who cross the national borders of their countries in search of protection. According to the UNHCR definition, refugees are those who are outside their home country for fear of their fundamental rights because of persecution on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. This is also due to widespread violence, severe human rights violations and internal conflicts; therefore refugees cannot or do not want to return to their country of origin because they do not have state protection (ASENSI; RIBEIRO; FILPO, 2021).

4.1 The state of Roraima and the acolhida operation

The Acolhida Operation, which, according to the Federal Government's official website is coordinated by the Casa Civil (Chief of Staff Office), operates in three axes, namely: border planning (provides for documentation, vaccination, and control operations by the Brazilian Army); shelter (includes offering shelter, food, and health care); and, finally, interiorization (aims at socioeconomic inclusion).

The operation counts on the participation of 11 ministries, as well as civil society organizations and international organizations, providing socio-economic inclusion opportunities to refugees and migrants. To get an idea of the importance of this type of humanitarian logistics operation, the operation in question has performed more than 217,000 social services; more than 46,000 Venezuelans have been recognized by Brazil as refugees; in addition, more than 255,000 CPFs—Brazilian document—have been issued. Also, about 155,000 residency applications were

granted. In relation to the Armed Forces, also according to the Federal Government's portal, approximately 4 thousand soldiers have already participated in the reception actions. According to information from the Federal Government's website, the operation:

It has reached the mark of 50,000 Venezuelan refugees and migrants interiorized in three years. They were welcomed in more than 670 Brazilian municipalities after arriving in Brazil in search of a better future with jobs and access to education and health services. Interiorization is one of the axes of the Acolhida Operation, which voluntarily takes Venezuelans from Roraima and Manaus to other cities as a form of socioeconomic inclusion, to reduce population pressure in these regions and offer better opportunities to migrants and refugees. (BRASIL, 2021, n.p.).

As for the refugee data in Brazil in 2020, according to the 6th edition of the Ministry of Justice and Public Safety's *Refuge in Numbers*, based on data provided by the Federal Police, in 2020 Brazil received a total of 28,899 requests for recognition of refugee status. Also, according to this edition, there was a negative variation (-65%) when compared to 2019, when the country received 82,552 requests. Still on the subject of numbers:

Most of the people who applied for refugee status recognition in Brazil in 2020 held Venezuelan nationality, or had Venezuela as their country of habitual residence. There were 17,385 requests for recognition of refugee status, which corresponded to about 60.2% of the total number of requests for recognition of refugee status received by Brazil that year. (SILVA, G. J. et al., 2021, p. 9).

Regarding Venezuelan applicants, 52.7% were male and 47.3% were female, most of them under 15 years of age, "which shows that the significant incidence of children and adolescents requesting recognition of refugee status is strongly correlated with the dynamics of Venezuelan forced international mobility" (SILVA, G. J. et al., 2021, p. 14). According to the aforementioned edition, 5,880 people were under the age of 15; 4,307 were aged 15 to 24; 4,443 were aged 25 to 39; 1,490 were aged 40 to 49; 817 were aged 50 to 59; and 448 were aged 60 or over.

As for the requests for recognition of refugee status considered by Conare in the year 2020 [...] it analyzed 63,790 requests for recognition of refugee status, with emphasis on the number of applicants for recognition of refugee status from Venezuela, 46,192 requests, which corresponded to 72.4% of the total number of requests considered by the Committee (and its General Coordination) in 2020. (SILVA, G. J. et al., 2021, p. 16).

Regarding the North Region, the state of Roraima concentrated the highest volume of requests for recognition of refugee status in 2020. In 2020, 75.5% of the requests considered by Conare were registered in the states that make up this region. These applicants for refugee status were mainly from Venezuela (43,183) (SILVA, G. J. et al., 2021).

5 The Clipping And The Acolhida Operation

The vulnerability in which refugees live is evident, in addition to the invisibility that was reinforced during the pandemic of the new Coronavirus. In light of the above, the present work will perform a clipping on Venezuelan refugees during the Coronavirus pandemic, exposing the characteristics and actions that occurred during this period, analyzing it from the theory of Buzan and Weaver's Security Studies and the Copenhagen School. There has been a decrease in the information and data, both released by the Federal Government and the traditional media about the migratory flow and Acolhida Operation during this period, due to the adversity of the situation. The closing of borders has made it difficult for refugees to access decent living conditions, often impacting their health.

It is evident that the closing of the borders is a liberal political decision, since it is paradoxical to the official claims that the restrictions on the circulation of refugees on the Brazil-Venezuela border were measures taken as a public health precaution, stating that the situation was due to "sanitary reasons related to the risks of contamination by the coronavirus". The blockade occurred when Venezuela had only 33 registered cases, while Brazil's air borders with Europe remained open, even after tens of thousands of cases were confirmed on the European continent. Access to national land borders, which is the main way for people to cross in search of protection and refuge, was restricted, while air borders, including Venezuela itself, remained open. The ordinance also establishes punishments for refugees: deportation and disqualification from refugee claims if the foreigner fails to comply with the restriction (BRASIL, 2020 apud RODRIGUES; CAVALCANTE; FAERSTEIN, 2020).

This decision by the Federal Government shows changes in the actions linked to Brazilian Foreign Policy and the tradition of Brazil as a diplomatic country. One of these milestones was Brazil's withdrawal from the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration in 2019, generating a "diplomatic discomfort" that indicated a change in the country's stance on such humanitarian issue, in addition to breaking with a historical approach of the country towards migration and refuge (SILVA; BAHDUR, 2020). In contrast, when the state of Amazonas had its health system in collapse, Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro, released cargo of hospital oxygen from *White Martins* produced in the country to the state in question (EXAMEMADURO..., 2021).

Still on these measures and protocols, at the very beginning of the pandemic, according to an article by Verdélío (2020) published on March 18, 2020 on the Agência Brasil portal, the government temporarily restricted the entry of Venezuelans for 15 days by land means, claiming that if the measure was not followed, the migrant would be deported and could not apply for refuge in Brazil. Moreover,

this measure was extended later on. Currently, there is a new ordinance in force, 655 of June 23, 2021, which, according to UNHCR Brazil (2021b), allows the exceptional entry of Venezuelans into Brazilian territory for humanitarian reasons, but the Brazilian borders remain closed.

The humanitarian crisis in which Venezuela finds itself has been going on for several years and has worsened since the beginning of the pandemic, and is not a focus on the International Agenda. In view of this, and analyzing the reports from various media, it was possible to extract some situations that occurred in order to verify the impact of the pandemic for the refugees and for the actions of Acolhida Operation, which will be exposed below. Still on the impact of the closing of borders, according to the portal Agência Senado, of the Federal Government, published on April 23, 2021, the pandemic intensified and worsened the situation of refugees, because:

The Mixed Commission on International Migration and Refugees debated this Friday (23) the situation of refugees during the health crisis in Brazil. Experts pointed out that the closing of borders with other countries to prevent the transmission of the coronavirus goes against international conventions and makes refugees' access to basic rights more precarious. (TEIXEIRA, 2021, n.p.).

In the year 2020, the Federal Government launched a financial benefit to provide emergency protection in the period of coping with the pandemic crisis. According to the G1 portal, published on March 24, 2021 Vidigal (2021), the government's difficulty in covering everyone during this period has had consequences for the refugees; those who get the aid end up helping other migrants in more vulnerable situations. The difficulty of access to aid sometimes led some to work in the informal market, despite the restrictions imposed, and many others were left without a source of income. It is worth noting that refugees in a regular situation in Brazil are also entitled to emergency aid, but there has been an interruption in the payment and even a difficulty in getting the documents to do so. Another important point highlighted in the aforementioned news is the issue of the world/activities having become, to a great extent, digital, but this digital "world" has not arrived for everyone, because many do not have access to mobile internet and, much less to a mobile device.

According to the news published by Veja, on September 10, 2020 and updated on March 05, 2021 (COM A PANDEMIA..., 2021), due to the pandemic, approximately 6,000 Venezuelans returned from Brazil (a fact that there was a big fanfare by the Maduro regime, in order to discourage Venezuelans to leave the country), because many of the refugees were dependent on informal income. Without income, they ended up evicted from their places of residence. This is characterized as a mixed migration flow. Another unfortunate issue aggravated by the pandemic were the cases of sexual abuse of women. According to a CNN report on November 22, 2020, (Martinez ,2020), the closing of borders and consequently "safe routes" have placed women and children in vulnerable situations, such as those of sexual abuse, kidnapping, and trafficking on the informal routes. In addition, the occurrence of xenophobia and discrimination with migrants and refugees has increased.

Still on the impacts of the pandemic for Venezuelan refugees, according to the Federal Government's website, published on May 28, 2021, the Ministry of Citizenship participated in the international conference, held by the United Nations, to discuss the reception of the refugees and their needs in order to build initiatives to ensure actions and support to the group. Also in the report it states that:

The Brazilian government, for its good performance in Acolhida Operation, was invited by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to join the Donors Conference of the R4V Platform – Response to Venezuelans. With the theme “Refugees and invisible migrants in Covid-19: disproportionate impacts on special protection groups”, the event took place from 24 to 28.05 (BRASIL, 2021a, n.p.).

Acolhida Operation has support from the Interagency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants in Venezuela, which was created in 2018 at the request of the UN Secretary General, who requested UNHCR and IOM to coordinate interagency operational and integration responses regarding Venezuelan refugees and migrants, its main functions/responsibilities include: drafting a harmonized response plan (RMRP); strategic coordination of the actions of UN agencies and civil society; articulating actions in support of Acolhida Operation; monitoring activities; and, finally, donor relations. The platform in question, according to the IOM Brazil portal, published on May 13, 2021, supported Acolhida Operation in resuming services to Venezuelan refugees and migrants in Manaus.

Disclosed in the same portal of the Federal Government, on August 21, 2020 (BRASIL, 2020), there was an investment of more than R\$ 630 million in the year 2020 in Acolhida Operation, to promote the inclusion of refugees in the national territory, besides stating that, since the beginning of the pandemic, the actions of the Brazilian government contributed to the internalization of more than 6.5 thousand Venezuelans. However, a decrease in internalization could be seen during the pandemic due to border closing measures and protocols.

Still about Acolhida Operation, according to a report from O Globo, published on July 07, 2021 (OPERAÇÃO..., 2021), despite this investment occurring in 2020, it states that the operation is at risk of being interrupted due to lack of resources, moreover, Braga Netto, Minister of Defense, states that this interruption may “compromise Brazil's reputation.” Netto also states that the current budget for this operation only allows to maintain the actions until the end of July this year, and asks for another 178.9 million reais to continue it until March 2022. According to the Minister of Defense, in March 2021 the operation had 13 shelters with a maximum capacity for 7,642 immigrants, where 10,000 meals a day were offered (O GLOBO/OPERAÇÃO..., 2021). In addition, the Ministry of Defense forwarded a letter to the Ministry of Economy and the President's Chief of Staff and attached to it a technical note stating that the request is “urgent and indispensable”. The amount requested from Economia was calculated according to the average amount spent on the operations (OPERAÇÃO...O GLOBO, 2021). According to the report published in Correio Braziliense on December 27, 2020, based on information from the newspaper O Estado de São Paulo, it states that the military wants to leave the operation. Also according to the report:

The Ministry of Defense is discussing in the Jair Bolsonaro government how to withdraw the Armed Forces from Acolhida Operation, created to receive and serve Venezuelans. Considered a model by the United Nations and one of the government's rare international assets, the operation is about to complete three years and has undergone changes in dynamics because of the reduced flow of immigrants caused by the covid-19 pandemic (CORREIO BRAZILIENSEMILITARES..., 2020, n.p.).

Regarding the structure, it is observed that:

Among the military, the Acolhida Operation is classified as a Humanitarian Logistics Task Force. The command is from the Army, which gives up space in the 3rd Special Border Platoon in Roraima to receive the immigrants. They also work in Boa Vista, the state capital, and Manaus, in the state of Amazonas, cities that concentrate Venezuelans and have shelters. Every three months, military personnel from the Navy, Air Force, and especially the Army are deployed from various commands in the country to take over as the contingent of the turn. (CORREIO BRAZILIENSEMILITARES..., 2020, n.p.).

The military, besides logistics, are also present in security and health care, along with other agencies. The report further states that:

The generals say that this “deviation” of function, as they classify it, occurs due to political and social pressure, as well as lack of personnel and organization in other government agencies. Despite the willingness to leave Acolhida, the military foresees difficulties in finding another body capable of taking over the main operational tasks—the service at the tip for refugees and immigrants escaping the widespread crisis in Venezuela (CORREIO BRAZILIENSEMILITARES..., 2020, n.p.).

According to the USP newspaper, published on May 05, 2021 (Capomaccio, 2021), the situation of immigrants in Brazil worsened during the pandemic. As adds the researcher, specialist in migration and refugees, Patrícia Nabuco, despite the Brazilian government recognizing Venezuelans as refugees, there is still a lot of prejudice and discrimination, mainly due to the fact that many procedures are only in Portuguese and not in other languages, and public employees are not always prepared to work with this population. Another important point is the difficulty in revalidating the diploma here in Brazil. The report points out that:

During the pandemic, refugees were not considered in public policies, many lost their jobs and had no access to emergency aid. Immigrants use the National Migratory Register (Registro Nacional Migratório – RNM), recognized since 2017—, but that access to it was done with the RG number, a document that immigrants and refugees do not have. In addition, other problems were faced from the first year of the pandemic, such as the prohibition of both entry and exit of foreigners in the country (CAPOMACCIOUSP, 2021, n.p.).

Finally, the last report analyzed in this paper, published in *Folha de São Paulo* on June 16, 2021, states that the world needs to do more for Venezuelan refugees, and the cost of not acting now puts regional stability at risk. Also according to the report:

The pandemic has further compounded the difficulties, increasing the numerous risks that Venezuelans face when trying to reach safety. The measures of prolonged confinement make it difficult for refugees and migrants to try to find employment. Women and girls, in particular, are exposed to even greater risks of exploitation and xenophobia (FOLHA DE SÃO PAULO MUNDO..., 2021, n.p.).

The report also talks about the importance of social and economic integration in Latin America and the insufficiency of international support, especially in relation to the UN, whose funding has been able to supply only half of the financial needs for the cause.

6 Concluding Remarks

The post-Cold War period was marked by the extension of the concept of International Security, in which international migrations began to be thought of within this security perspective. Certified this, it is observed that the impacts on the international security agenda, more specifically on the regional security agenda, make the Venezuelan migration crisis an international security instability problem, since not only Brazil receives refugees, but also Colombia, Peru, among other countries. However, many of these nations do not have good conditions to receive them and, according to UNHCR itself, some refugees are reaching a point of extreme unhealthiness, even though there are international policies for the reception, and the difficulties faced by refugees are aggravated in the current situation, especially in relation to economic and social issues.

The research also observed that the Covid-19 pandemic impacted incisively on migration issues in Roraima, producing effects both on the flows of migrants and refugees, as well as on the management of migration processes carried out by governments, international organizations, and civil society actors. Although there has been a consensus before that cooperation between nations produces good results when dealing with migration flows, recent events have made this more evident. Collaborative and solidary cooperation between national and transnational actors is necessary and urgent in order to mitigate the suffering of people who are vulnerable, such as migrants in situations of refuge, who before the closing of the border, arrived daily in large numbers to the national territory. This highlights the importance of increasing investments in interagency operations, focused on the social and economic integration of South America, in order to seek stability on the continent.

Despite the existence of Acolhida Operation, there were impacts on the operation's activities, which affected three axes of the work: border planning, shelter, and interiorization. The interiorization of refugees and migrants, which was not completely paralyzed during this

period, had some of its performance statuses compromised, such as the internalization of shelter and job vacancies. In addition, there was a need for the creation of the Area of Protection and Care (Área de Proteção e Cuidado — APC) in order to allow for the isolation of suspected and confirmed cases of COVID-19.

In relation to the media analysis performed in this article, it was possible to notice that there was no efficient approach to the refugees during the pandemic, with few reports about their reality. However, it is evident the negative impacts of the pandemic, mainly in relation to migration flows, also impacting the actions carried out by Operation Welcome, which was paralyzed, but, from the clipping, it could not be ascertained for how long. Despite these negative impacts, there has been a major effort by the actors involved to seek effective solutions in the protection of Venezuelan refugee applicants, despite limited resources to contain the spread of Covid-19.

Finally, the pandemic highlighted a greater need for collaboration and solidarity among nations to face this situation. Brazil needs UNHCR's humanitarian aid to help with the refugee issue, and in this context, international relations between countries and institutions will not be—or should not be—the same. Isolationist measures and closed borders will not solve the problems currently experienced, they have only worsened by being neglected. It is necessary, in this new international scenario, for us to think of new ways to refute old social bottlenecks, seeking paths traced by science, in order to increase international cooperation.

Authorship and Collaborations

All authors participated equally in the development of the paper.

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The securitization of the Brazilian border in the face of the Venezuelan migration crisis: analysis of the border ordering process from the perspective of Operations Controle and Acolhida

La securitización de la frontera brasileña ante la crisis migratoria venezolana: análisis del proceso de ordenamiento fronterizo desde la perspectiva de las Operaciones "Controle" y "Acolhida"

Abstract: This article investigates the dual role played by the Brazilian Armed Forces in the Brazilian Government's responses to the increase in the migratory flow on the border of the state of Roraima as a result of the Venezuelan political crisis, the operations Controle and Acolhida. Based on the theory of the Copenhagen School, the relationship between the operations regarding the ordering of the border, a structuring axis common to both initiatives, is discussed. We put the national response to the test, supported by structured participant observation made by the authors who were each inserted in one of the operations. The central issue addressed, specifically, asks whether Venezuelan migration is being securitized through the operations Controle e Acolhida, and what is the influence of each in this process. As a result, we carried out a theoretical confrontation with the main concepts of the Copenhagen School and discussed the securitization process, highlighting the impacts on the perception of security projected at national and international level, questioning the (im)balance between the proposed objectives for each of the operations and its results in the security and humanitarian fields.


Keywords: Brazilian Army; Migration; Operation Acolhida; Operation Controle; Securitization.

Resumen: Este artículo investiga el papel dual de las Fuerzas Armadas brasileñas en las respuestas del Gobierno brasileño al aumento del flujo migratorio en la frontera del estado de Roraima como resultado de la crisis política venezolana, a saber, las Operaciones "Controle" y "Acolhida". A partir de la teoría de la Escuela de Copenhague, se discute la relación entre las operaciones en torno al ordenamiento de la frontera, eje estructurador común a ambas iniciativas. Pusimos a prueba la respuesta nacional, respaldada por la observación participante estructurada, realizada por los autores, cada uno de los cuales se insertó en una de las operaciones. El tema central abordado, específicamente, se pregunta si la migración venezolana se está securitizando a través de las operaciones de "Acolhida" y "Controle" y cuál es la influencia de cada una en este proceso. Como resultado, realizamos un enfrentamiento teórico con los principales conceptos de la Escuela de Copenhague y discutimos el proceso de securitización, destacando los impactos en la percepción de seguridad proyectados a nivel nacional e internacional, cuestionando el (des)equilibrio entre los objetivos propuestos para cada una de las operaciones y sus resultados en los campos de la seguridad y el humanitario.

Palabras-clave: Ejército Brasileño; Migración; Operación "Acolhida"; Operación "Controle"; Securitización.

Guilherme de Araujo Grigoli 

Exército Brasileiro. Comando Militar do Planalto.
Brasília, DF, Brasil.
guigrigoli@gmail.com

Vanderson Mota de Almeida 

Exército Brasileiro. 1ª Brigada de Infantaria de Selva.
Boa Vista, RR, Brasil.
vandersonalmeidapqdt@gmail.com

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COLEÇÃO MEIRA MATTOS

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1 Introduction

Migration crises and their effects are one of the greatest challenges experienced by countries in the search for balance between feelings of humanity and nationality. The coexistence between the feeling of national belonging and the prospect of international support for border countries are at the center of political discussions that go beyond the locations where crises occur, the social perception of the affected areas, and the actors who participate in the process. They become, without a doubt, issues that orbit in political alignments, in international relations between countries and international organizations, and, above all, in the perception of the society that receives and is received.

In every major ongoing migration crisis, such as the Syrian war, or the case of South Sudan, or the Venezuelan issue addressed in this article, certain points drive the national and international discussion. Among them, the securitization process as a way to leverage resources; the media discourse acting as a formulator of social perception; the economic dispute in the post-insertion balancing process of these communities, and the respect for cultural differences during the integration of people in vulnerable situations.

Despite the vast international literature on migration, understanding the uniqueness of each of the humanitarian crises leads us to the need to investigate in greater depth the dynamics of the processes adopted by Brazil in relation to the Venezuelan migratory flow. This process needs to be thought from the perspective of complexity as a framework for analyzing the object of study, considering that the existing articulations have a temporary, changeable, chaotic character, that exhibit non-trivial and self-organized behaviors; whose response depends on the ability to adapt via learning or evolution, requiring a high integration of knowledge and competencies.

Thus, understanding the nature of the Venezuelan crisis is one of the fundamental factors to think about the analysis proposed by this article, since the essence of the event itself can demonstrate nuances intrinsic to Brazil's response, but particularly the articulations created in this context. The Venezuelan crisis has been going on for more than 16 years, the last five of which have attracted international attention due to the migratory impacts on the border countries and the weakening of the country's government.

Corruption, suspicion of electoral fraud, increasing reports of human rights violations, evidence of political persecution, and increased state repression have led to the coexistence of two governments one under the leadership of Nicolás Maduro, supported on the international stage by China, Russia, and Cuba; and, the other under the auspices of Juan Guaidó, president of Venezuela's National Assembly, self-declared president, supported by the United States, Brazil, and Colombia. It is worth noting that the division of countries in relation to international support reflects the natural quest for geopolitical insertion of their presences in South America. Brazil and Colombia, for geographical reasons, naturally mirror security issues in relation to the migration issue, becoming protagonist actors in the reception of Venezuelans, and consequently, in the opposition to the current regime of the country, to which they attribute the responsibility for the migration crisis. When it comes to China, Russia, and the United States, the strong economic issue surrounding their relationship with one of the richest countries in South America cannot be ruled out.

Added to political instability, the country lives under severe economic crisis that accumulates superinflation to the tune of 10.000%; shrinking Gross Domestic Product in the order of -18.9% in 2018, -20.2% in 2019, and -26.8% in 2020 (WORLD BANK, 2018; TRADING ECONOMICS, 2021); reduced employability; severe shortages of basic necessities; frequent interruptions in the supply of critical inputs such as drinking water, electricity, and fuel; a collapsed health system, aggravated in recent years by the COVID-19 pandemic, and with much of its population in a situation of social fragility analogous to slavery.

This scenario led to the exodus movement of about 5.4 million refugees and migrants from Venezuela, of which 4.6 million migrated to the Latin American and Caribbean region itself, including about 1 million in an irregular situation (R4V, 2021). In Brazil, between January 2017 and August 2021, 159,451 active residence registrations for Venezuelans were granted, 67,165 applications for recognition of refugee status were submitted, and 48,082 Venezuelans were recognized as refugees (BRASIL, 2021a). These numbers make this migratory movement the largest humanitarian crisis in Latin America, leading to the adoption of a response to the management of the Venezuelan migratory crisis by the Brazilian State, the International Humanitarian Support Organizations (IHSO) and the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) strongly marked by the multiplicity of efforts, collaborative action and a broad and integrated approach.

Decrees 9,285 (BRASIL, 2018a) and 9,286 (BRASIL, 2018b) recognized the situation of vulnerability arising from migratory flow to the State of Roraima, caused by the humanitarian crisis in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and began the structuring of the main joint management body of the crisis, defining the composition, powers and operating rules of the Federal Committee (MIGON; GRIGOLI, 2019). As a result of the aforementioned decrees, the Ministry of Defense published Ministerial Directives No. 03/2018 (BRASIL, 2018c) and No. 04/2018 (BRASIL, 2018d) establishing parameters and responsibilities for the execution of the operations Acolhida and Controle, respectively (OLIVEIRA, 2018).

2 Methodology

In epistemological terms, this research is inserted in the confrontation between the strategic-realist and the constructivist paradigms, since the Copenhagen School approach is in an intermediate position in the debate on security studies; whereas for constructivists, the proposal to divide the security agenda into thematic sectors is equivalent to the objectification (or naturalization) of the chosen sectors and, consequently, to an interference in the social construction of security (ERIKSSON, 1999).

Thus, this work deals with the dynamics expressed within the context of the construction of the perception about the migration issue, especially about the issue of border ordering and the discourse that involves the facts linked to Operation Control and Operation Acolhida, seeking to raise a perspective of how certain agents involved, directly or indirectly, work in the construction, or not, of the securitization discourse that permeates the responses to major cross-border events such as the Venezuelan migration crisis.

Methodologically, this research used a qualitative approach. Qualitative research allows for the construction of a holistic picture of the situation and the investigation of an issue in depth (BUI, 2014). The methods used were essential to elucidate and deepen the understanding of the operations that the Brazilian State develops in parallel, as well as to identify how the discourse of securitization that is projected onto them. Through the case study, the specific situation is analyzed so that, through induction, patterns can be found and a conclusion can be built. A single case study was prioritized due to the peculiarity of the humanitarian response adopted by Brazil in terms of the unprecedented articulation between the private and public sectors, as pointed out by Yin (2018).

Two data generation techniques were used, documentary research and structured participant observation. For the former, the primary sources used were Humanitarian Logistics Task Force (FT Log Hum) documents such as manuals, protocols, memos, directives, and reports, as well as documents from the 1st Jungle Infantry Brigade (1st Bda Inf SI) collected by the authors. The secondary sources were books by authors in the field of International Security, Migration and Securitization studies, as well as articles from academic journals focusing on the dynamics addressed, when possible, directed to the situation of the Venezuelan crisis. The publications used were preferably recent publications in English, Spanish, and Portuguese, published from 2018, the date of the worsening crisis in Venezuela and the creation of FT Log Hum, to the present day.

On the other hand, the present case study was conducted with the aid of structured observation by the authors of the article. Both occurred in 2020; one of them in Boa Vista - Roraima, involving the direct participation of the researcher at the site of the investigated event (ABIB; HOPPEN; HAYASHI JÚNIOR, 2013), exercising the function of operations officer of the 1st Bda Inf SI, Large Unit responsible for the development of actions related to Operation Control, and the second exercised by the other author as military coordinator of the Regional Center 11, belonging to FT Log Hum, on which falls the actions of Operation Acolhida. It is emphasized here that this technique was used not only to generate data, as is often the case, but also to support its interpretation. In this sense, the professional status and position of the authors favored the discussion of the data and also contributed to the interpretation of the results about the phenomenon (ANGROSINO, 2009).

In this way, this article investigates whether the border ordering process can be considered a securitized movement; analyzing the performance of the Brazilian Army as an actor in two operations, one of a humanitarian nature (Operation Acolhida) and another of a security nature (Operation Controle). That said, the guiding question of this article will be the following: "Is there securitization of the Venezuelan migration crisis through the response adopted by the Brazilian government?"

Finally, in addition to the introduction and these methodological considerations, this article is divided into four sections. What follows is a literature review focused on the main concepts of the securitization process addressed by the Copenhagen School, which will aid in the entire theoretical discussion of this paper. The fourth and fifth sections discuss border ordering from the perspective of Operation Control and Operation Acolhida. The sixth section summarizes the conclusions obtained by confronting the perspectives presented as the securitization process is discussed in the context studied.

3 The Copenhagen School and the Securitization of Migration

The extensive literature produced in the context of defining the concept of securitization goes through seminal authors who have worked on a new and comprehensive approach to security studies, including in this context societal security. Based on this conceptual perception, the discussion was broadened to think about its impacts on migration, its effects on the impacted regions, and the migration policies adopted. Aware that this process takes specific forms within each regional context, several authors have studied and worked on the nuances of the migratory phenomenon that Brazil is experiencing due to the Venezuelan crisis, discussing its securitization or not and, especially, thinking about the impacts on vulnerable people and the receiving society (CERÁVOLO, 2020). The following chart presents the main works and their authors that helped in the conceptual review, allowing the expansion and deepening of the analyses that guided this article.

Chart 1 – Theoretical approach and its main authors

Discussed topics	Authors
Addresses the pure concepts and contributions of the Copenhagen School to International Security Studies	Wendt (1992) Buzan, Wæver e Wilde (1998) Tanno (2003) Rudzit (2006) Peoples e Vaughan-Williams (2010) Wæver, Estrada e de Matos (2015) Silva e Pereira (2019)
Address the debate on the securitization of migration processes, whether forced or voluntary	Huysmans(2000) Póvoa Neto (2007) Bracante e Reis (2009) Bourbeau (2011) Fassin (2011) Patrício (2011) Oliveira (2014)
Addresses the Brazilian migratory process with a focus on Venezuela and its effects on Brazil	Aragón (2009) Franklin (2012) Paiva e Leite (2014) Simões (2017) Franchi (2019, 2020) Jubilut e Silva (2020) Silva e Albuquerque (2021)

Source: Prepared by the authors in an expansion of Cerávoló (2020).

For the purposes of this approach, we will work on the main concepts that have a direct impact on migration, regardless of the understanding that the theories of the Copenhagen School have been changing and its basic concepts are no longer the ones initially coined. Thus, for the purposes of this analysis we will understand the term security, securitization and security complex as presented by Buzan, Waever and Wilde (1998, p. 23, emphasis added):

Security is the movement that treats politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a particular kind of politics, or as something that transcends it.

Securitization can then be seen as an extreme version of politicization. [...] Security is thus a self-referred practice because it is in the context of this practice that it becomes a security issue – not necessarily because there is a real existential threat, but because it is presented as a threat.

To understand the securitization process one must understand three operational categories essential to the securitization process, they are: (1) referent objects; (2) securitizing agent and the (3) functional actors; these interact for success to occur in the securitization process of an issue, which depend on the analysis of the securitization discourses and the audience reception; the identification of the securitizing agent, justifying the reasons why this agent is responsible for the securitization movement; and the analysis of the emergency measures adopted to deal with the existential threats and their respective legitimation by the audience (SILVA; PEREIRA, 2019).

Once these processes and categories are understood, it is necessary to understand that the reading of the securitization process in the literature is divergent and there are two reasons for this. The first is that both the yes and the no may be accompanied by historical and empirical justifications or philosophical arguments understood as morally superior (BRANCANTE; REIS, 2009). The second concerns the limits between Politicization and Securitization, although Buzan, Waever and Wilde (1998) differentiate politicization from securitization of an issue by stating that the second process offers extraordinary tools (beyond politics and often the legal order) to solve the problem, understanding the line to think and apply these conditions is extremely complex, since there is a tenuous difference between the concepts as they are addressed

When analyzing the process of securitization of migration, we need to consider two essential points in this debate that divide the authors. The first refers to the issue of societal security that Buzan, Waever, and Wilde (1998, p. 8) define as "respect for the sustainability, within acceptable conditions of evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and customs," which would place the issue of migration as a conflict between the receiving nation constituted by the elements presented in the definition and the migrants, under the view that migration itself could constitute a threat to that nation.

On the other hand, authors critical to the concept of societal security point out that the securitization process is only valid in the discussion of immigration if it is strictly aimed at fighting terrorism and organized crime, it should only exist if it is to efficiently eliminate transnational

criminality, and not simply antagonize culturally different individuals, as Bigo (2001) points out, securitization does not affect survival, but rather intolerance toward differences; that social and historical changes are perceived as a threat or, in other words, that a structural phenomenon is transformed into an adversary.

In this context, it is fundamental to understand that any phenomenon can evolve from the condition of non-politicized to securitized, passing through the situation of politicized (BUZAN; WAEVER; WILDE, 1998). Perhaps the biggest question of analysis lies between the politicized and the securitized, since its boundaries are blurred and depend on the depth with which one questions the variables of the theory. Chart 2 briefly presents the main characteristics to define these states, and consequently to think about the movement of the Venezuelan migratory issue in Brazil.

Chart 2 – Evolution of the securitization process by the Copenhagen School

	Non-Politicized	Politicized	Securitized
Presence of the State	The State does not get involved in the debate, or even in actions that demand its leadership in the solution process.	The State is present in the public debate as an essential actor in the process.	The State is a protagonist since it takes actions outside normal political procedures.
Public Policy	No public policies are adopted or even changed to address the issue.	The State adopts specific public policies to address the issue, not the generic policies that already exist	The State adopts emergency public policies that go beyond the existing ones
Existential threat	The phenomenon is considered to be within normality and does not bring any perceived threat to the continuity of the State or Society.	The phenomenon presents implications for the State and for Society's perception of it.	The phenomenon is considered an existential threat to the continuity of Society or the State.

Source: Developed by the authors based on Buzan; Waever; Wilde (1998) and Buzan; Hansen (2009).

4 Border Ordering: Operation Controle Perspective

Operation Controle was authorized by Ministerial Directive No. 04/2018, February 28, 2018, of the Ministry of Defense, to complement the humanitarian actions of Operation Acolhida, in the state of Roraima. The Brazilian Army has been ordered to intensify surveillance on the border line between Brazil and Venezuela, specifically in the Roraima city of Pacaraima, the twin city of Santa Elena de Uairén, located in Venezuelan territory. In addition, the highways, especially the BR-174, which connects this border region to the city of Boa Vista, the state capital, would be more strictly monitored. All with the purpose of curbing cross-border crimes and supporting the control of migrants both entering and exiting Brazil, in coordination and cooperation with the Public Security Agencies.

The border between the Brazilian city of Pacaraima and the Venezuelan city of Santa Elena de Uairén is characterized by being a dry and permeable border, that is, without the presence of natural or artificial obstacles that hinder the access of illegal immigrants. The demarcation between the countries is identified by the presence of concrete markers along the border line, as shown in Figure 1. Thus, due to ease of access and border permeability, the flow of illegal Venezuelan immigrants, vulnerable or otherwise, was accentuated in early 2018.

Figure 1 – Border landmarks in Pacaraima, on the border between Brazil and Venezuela



Source: Photo by Vanderson Mota de Almeida (2021).

The main crossing points for illegal Venezuelan immigrants are located along a three kilometer stretch of the border in the urban core of Pacaraima, which runs from the BV-8 mark to the place known as "Miangué", as shown in figure 2. Often, Venezuelan smugglers lead immigrants to cross the border through alternative routes that circumvent legal entry into Brazil. These routes are also used by Venezuelans who enter the country to make small purchases in local commerce and return to Venezuela, practicing the crime of smuggling.

Figure 2 – Border in the PACARAIMA urban nucleus



Source: Adapted by the authors from Google Earth (2021).

According to IBGE data, Pacaraima had a population of 12,000 in 2018. The municipality lacked the infrastructure to accommodate the growing influx of migrants. "[...] in March 2018, 9,486 Venezuelans entered Brazil through the city of Pacaraima, an average of 316 migrants daily. In June of that same year, these numbers reached 16,200 monthly migrants coming from Venezuela [...]" (ALMEIDA, 2020, p. 68). In addition, the violence and crime rates have increased considerably, generating in the population a feeling of insecurity and even revolt against the immigrants. Thus, some residents of Pacaraima "opted to pay for private police patrols, in order to maintain a sense of security in their homes and commercial establishments" (MOREIRA, 2021, p. 30).

Given this scenario, the Amazon Military Command through the Controle Operacional Plan, of April 25, 2018, assigned the 1st Jungle Infantry Brigade, based in Boa Vista, to intensify actions to guard the border line with Venezuela, in order to curb cross-border crimes and prevent the illegal entry of Venezuelan immigrants to Brazil through clandestine routes that bypassed the Federal Police checkpoints, ensuring that access to the country was carried out only through the Border Post of BR -174, the only legal access through the municipality of Pacaraima. In addition, Roadblock and Control Posts have been deployed on BR-174, in the axis between Pacaraima and Boa Vista, to control the migratory flow and the traffic of foreign vehicles.

Figure 3 – Border Line surveillance during Operation Controle



Source: Photo by Vanderson Mota de Almeida (2021).

It must be considered that part of the immigrants entered legally, because they were looking for a new opportunity to live in the country. To do so, they tried to legalize their migration status with the Federal Police, and when they didn't have a place to wait for this regularization, they either settled in spontaneous occupations, either in Pacaraima or in Boa Vista, or stayed, voluntarily, in Operation Acolhida shelters. There was also pendular migration, that is, Venezuelans who, illegally or legally, entered Pacaraima to buy basic necessities such as food, medicine, and clothing, and returned to Venezuela.

In this context, daily, as already presented, Pacaraima received a considerable flow of immigrants that needed to be organized, in a joint work between Operation Controle, Operation Acolhida, and Public Security Organs (PSO) present in the municipality. Because of these numbers, the actions of Operation Controle to control the legal or illegal entry of immigrants was fundamental for Operation Acolhida to provide an adequate and humanitarian service to those who voluntarily sought the sheltering and internalization services, contributing to the ordering of the border and the reduction of social tensions between Brazilians and Venezuelans in the city of Pacaraima.

However, fighting cross-border crimes was the main action of Operation Controle. To this end, the troops of the 1st Jungle Infantry Brigade carried out patrols on foot and motorized, as well as establishing roadblock and control posts along the border line and in the urban center of Pacaraima. The goal was to combat drug and weapons trafficking, which might occur from Venezuela, as well

as to curb small robberies and thefts in local businesses, both by Brazilians and by Venezuelans in vulnerable situations who were looking for their basic needs.

In addition, the military presence in this border strip, performing surveillance actions, made it difficult for criminal organizations, either Brazilian or Venezuelan, to expand in this region by co-opting vulnerable immigrants for organized crime, aiming to control the drug and weapons trafficking corridor on the border between Brazil and Venezuela (OLIVEIRA JÚNIOR et al., 2021).

One of the main points for the greater effectiveness of Operation Controle is the cooperation between the Brazilian Army and the agencies located in Pacaraima, such as the Federal Police, the Federal Highway Police, the Military Police of the State of Roraima, the Public Security Task Force, the Civil Police, and the Internal Revenue Service. In this sense, the 1st Jungle Infantry Brigade promoted coordination meetings with all the agencies involved to encourage joint planning with the advice of these agencies.

In March 2020, the federal government restricted the entry of Venezuelan immigrants in Brazil due to the spread of the coronavirus in the country, through Ordinance No. 120 of March 17, 2020, from the Presidency of the Republic/Civil House (BRASIL, 2020, n.p.), which provided "on the exceptional and temporary restriction on the entry of foreigners from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela into the country, as recommended by the Brazilian National Health Surveillance Agency – Anvisa. During the course of 2020, further ordinances were enacted to repeal existing ones and extend the restrictions imposed.

With the closing of the border, the legal flow of immigrants practically ceased to exist. However, the Venezuelans have increased their attempts to enter Brazil through clandestine routes, mainly through the urban center of Pacaraima, either alone, with their families, or with the support of smugglers who charge money to help them cross the border, illegally, through places with easy access. Given this situation, the 1st Jungle Infantry Brigade readjusted the execution of actions and doubled the military personnel in Pacaraima, reinforcing the blockade posts and patrols on the border line, making it difficult for Venezuelan immigrants to enter illegally.

However, through the process 1001365-82.2021.4.01.4200, of March 21, 2021¹, the Federal Court ordered the Union to "[...] refrain from adopting any acts of deportation, repatriation or other compulsory measure of exit of immigrants in situation of reception (hypervulnerable) by the Humanitarian Task Force (Operation Acolhida) in Roraima [...]", which impacted the actions of the Federal Police, making deportations unfeasible. And also that "[...] refrain from carrying out ostensive patrols, checkpoints or documentary controls aimed at intimidating and preventing access of migrants to health care and social services, public and private, available in the Municipality of Pacaraima [...]", the latter with little effect because the patrols and roadblocks were not intended to intimidate or prevent access of vulnerable migrants to the national territory, but rather to bar entry by illegal routes, channeling the entry of migrants through illegal routes, channeling the movement to the landmark of the BV-8, the only legal access for entry into Brazil, in the municipality of Pacaraima.

1 Case available at: <http://www.mpf.mp.br/am/sala-de-imprensa/docs/decisao-liminar-impedimento-a-deportacao-de-migrantes>. Accessed on: Dec. 5, 2021..

On June 23, 2021, the federal government decreed Ordinance No. 655 (BRASIL, 2021b), which provides for the exceptional and temporary restriction on the entry into the country of foreigners of any nationality, as recommended by the Brazilian National Health Surveillance Agency, due to COVID-19. However, there was flexibility to receive foreigners for humanitarian reasons and the authorization to regularize immigrants who entered the country after March 18, 2020, when the border was closed.

With this, the flow of Venezuelan immigrants has increased towards the city of Pacaraima, requiring, once again, a greater intensification of the actions of Operation Controle in the municipality, such as the reinforcement of the existing staff, of approximately one hundred soldiers; the occupation of new checkpoints on the border line, especially in the urban center; the carrying out of foot patrols on trails and paths that allow the illegal entry of Venezuelans; and greater coordination between the actions of the Brazilian Army with the Public Security Agencies.

5 Border Ordering: Perspective on Operation Acolhida

Border ordering is one of the basic tasks of Operation Acolhida, in addition to shelter and internalization. This activity is important because it organizes and controls the flow of vulnerable migrants who enter the country in search of a new life opportunity, whether as refugees or as applicants for temporary residency. The execution of Operation Acolhida was authorized through Ministerial Directive No. 03/2018, under the coordination of the Ministry of Defense, with the employment of personnel and logistical means of the Armed Forces to support and cooperate with public agencies in the development of humanitarian activities in the State of Roraima (ALMEIDA, 2020).

In Pacaraima, FT Log Hum set up support structures to ensure the reception, identification, health surveillance, migration regularization and screening of immigrants, because the existing infrastructure in the municipality, whether from federal, state or municipal agencies, was not sufficient to meet the daily demand of Venezuelans who entered through this border region (ALMEIDA, 2020).

In this sense, the area of the 3rd Special Border Platoon, of the Brazilian Army was used to deploy the following facilities for the reception of vulnerable migrants in Pacaraima: a Support Base, a Reception and Identification Post, a Screening Post, an Advanced Service Post, an Indigenous Shelter, and Accommodation, which functioned with the cooperation of organs and agencies responsible for the migration issue, highlighting the Federal Police, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and the International Organization for Migration (ALMEIDA 2020).

At the Support Base, currently called the Pacaraima Base, is located the FAdvanced Command Post of the Operation Acolhida, which is commanded by a Colonel of the Brazilian Army. This is where the coordination of humanitarian actions and the organization of the border with the other institutions present are carried out. In addition, the base has lodgings for the military that make up the FT Log Hum contingent and a canteen that provides food not only for the military, but also for the civilian agents that take part in Operation Acolhida.

The Reception and Identification Post is headed by a senior FT Log Hum officer. There, vulnerable migrants are received and identified for the beginning of the migration regularization, shelter, and internalization processes, the last two of which are carried out for voluntary migrants. As for migratory regularization, the first step is for the vulnerable migrant to choose to apply for refuge or temporary residence. After identification, the migrant must present his or her proof of vaccination. If not, they are referred to the immunization group to receive the triple viral vaccine against measles, mumps, and rubella. Then, the vulnerable migrant is forwarded to the Sorting Station (ALMEIDA 2020).

The Screening and Identification Post is also headed by a senior FT Log Hum officer. In the post, initially, the vulnerable migrant does his or her registration with IOM, in case of request for temporary residence, or with UNHCR, in case of refugee request. After that, he obtains the following documents: the protocol for refugee or temporary residence request, made by the Federal Police; the Individual Taxpayer Registry, made by the Internal Revenue Service; and the Single Health System card, made by the Municipal Health Secretariat of Pacaraima (ALMEIDA 2020).

The Advanced Care Post, on the other hand, is formed by a health team from FT Log Hum. The site is a modular hospital structure composed of a triage room, pharmacy, nursing and outpatient facilities to serve migrants in cases of medical emergency, isolation and vaccination (ALMEIDA 2020).

As for sheltering in Pacaraima, the BV-8 housing is intended on a temporary basis for vulnerable migrants, whether men, women, or families, all non-indigenous, who are waiting for vacancies in shelters located in Boa Vista. Regarding the Janokoida shelter, this is for Venezuelan migrants of the Warao indigenous ethnicity. Both shelters are managed by FT Log Hum in cooperation with International and Non-Governmental Organizations such as IOM, UNHCR and the International Humanitarian Fraternity (ALMEIDA, 2020).

Due to the flexibilization of the entry in the country for vulnerable migrants, according to the Portaria nº 655, from the Staff of the Presidency of the Republic, from June 23rd 2021, as already exposed in this article, Operation Acolhida started to regularize 300 vulnerable immigrants, on average, daily. The limitation of this number took into consideration in addition to the capacity of the BV-8 housing, the availability of rapid tests and vaccines against COVID-19. "This number is in line with the maximum service capacity provided by the available means" (MIGRANTS..., 2021, n.p.).

It is worth mentioning that, on a daily basis, Operation Acolhida accommodates in the BV-8 accommodation about 400 migrants who are irregular and without a place to sleep, besides the 1300 already regularized migrants who are waiting for vacancies in Boa Vista's shelters. All this in order to reduce the number of Venezuelans roaming the streets of Pacaraima at night.

Finally, Operation Acolhida has assisted 1,666,413 Venezuelans at the Interiorization and Screening Post in Pacaraima by September 22, 2021, as shown in Figure 4. This border ordering process carried out by Operation Acolhida and complemented by Operation Controle made it possible to receive vulnerable Venezuelan immigrants fleeing the humanitarian crisis in their country, contributing to the process of welcoming and internalizing immigrants to other regions of Brazil.

Figure 4 – Service at the Initial Sorting Station (PACARAIMA)

Assistance at the Identification and Control Station (Pacaraima)

Agency	Activity		Qnt
UNHCR	Early Enrollment (a)		75.549
	Final Enrollment (a)		105.029
IOM	Early and Final Enrollment (a)		103.451
Federal Police	Asylum – Venezuelan (a)		50.183
	Temporary Residence Visa – Venezuelan (a)		75.567
	Visa appointment (a)		98.294
	Asylum Renewal (a)		3.355
	Documents duplicate (a)		767
	National Migration Registry Card (a)		7.883
Internal Revenue Service		Individual Taxpayer’s Register (a)	110.087
SOCIAL ASSISTANCE	Ministério da Cidadania (a)		109.221
	ICRC – (Restory Family Links) (c)		193.066
	Brazilian Red Cross (c)		1.447
	UNFPA (a)		64.826
	UNICEF	Protection (a)	47.647
		Super Panas Program (d)	9.536
VACCINES	DOSES (Applied to 263.380 people) (b)		610.505
Total number of assistances performed at the Identification and Control Post:			1.666.413

Accumulated data : (a) Since JUN 18; (b) Since OUT 18; (c) Since FEV 20; (d) Since FEV 21.

UPDATED ON 22 SEP 21

Source: FT Log Hum (2021).²

6 Analysis of the Securitization Process

When talking about theory and practice, countless times it is necessary to return to the conceptual bases of the theoretical body of practice so that, when confronting it with reality, it is possible to separate what is an impression, what is an external influence, and what is the researcher's previous conviction. In this context, the topic addressed by this article presents numerous possibilities to deviate from scientific analysis and be marked by one of these pitfalls.

As for the impression, it is more than notorious when observing the ongoing research in various scenarios that the mere presence of AF, regardless of the context in which it is employed, leads to the mobilization of part of the scientific community in the sense of attaching a securitizing discourse to the phenomenon, building from there the connections that were previously non-existent. In other words, securitization occurs in part through the perception of those who analyze and express an opinion, without it finding a basis in theory or, more importantly, in dialogue with the real fact.

With regard to external influence, once again, the researcher needs to escape from the discourse constructed by the media, by institutions external to the process, by countries of the regional environment interested in the result of the process, and other agents whose securitization,

2 Figure (slide 20) from the institutional lecture given by Division General Sérgio Schwingel, Commander of the Humanitarian Logistics Task Force and Operational Coordinator of Operation Acolhida, to the Student Officers of the Army Command and Staff School (ECEME), on September 24, 2021.

or not, may generate benefits in the short or medium term, because in the long run it is not possible to sustain this discourse in view of the bases necessary for its continuity. This assertion does not mean that the actors functional to the analyzed event should be disregarded, on the contrary, it is about understanding who effectively has this role in the phenomenon.

Finally, with regard to the previous convincing of the researcher, even though this is not an exclusive point of securitization analysis, but because this research is methodologically marked by participant observation, it is fundamental to return to the basic concepts of the theory to confront the collection and the impressions gathered, without allowing the process of convincing to supplant the theoretical application in the case studied

With these limitations and nuances, we tried to materialize what the main theoreticians of the Copenhagen School present as a basis for thinking about the process of securitization, confronting it with the operations in progress to see if it is possible to talk about the securitization of the Venezuelan migratory process in Brazil. Chart 3 presents the confrontation between the operational categories and the essential variables of the securitization process and the two ongoing operations developed by the Brazilian State. From the confrontation between these categories and the operations it is possible to better understand securitization as a whole.

This approach inserts not only the classic categories of the Copenhagen School, but also expands it, within the revision already made by its theorists to value the construction of the discourse, as well as seeks in the concrete case the result of this process by the adoption of actions that characterize the legitimization of this before the audience.

Chart 3 – Confrontation of Securitization Variables vs Ongoing Operations

	OPERATION CONTROLE	OPERATION ACOLHIDA
Reference Object (that which is existentially threatened and has a legitimate claim to survival) (BUZAN; WAEVER; WILDE, 1998).	Brazilian State: increasing homicide rates and the presence of foreign criminal organizations in Roraima.	Immigrants: vulnerability due to lack of basic needs, humanitarian crisis in the country of origin, and co-optation into organized crime.
Securitizing Agent (actor who securitizes issues by declaring something – a reference object – existentially threatened) (BUZAN; WAEVER; WILDE, 1998).	Federal Government representative adopts security measures to mitigate threats to the State of Roraima and order its border.	Representatives of the Federal Government, International Organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations, and National Organizations: adopt emergency measures to welcome and internalize immigrants.
Analysis of securitization discourse and its reception by the qualified audience. (SILVA; PEREIRA, 2019).	Intense flow of illegal immigrants across the Brazilian border. Initial manifestations of Roraima's society (local impact) on existential issues to the state, with a high level of engagement and receptivity by the audience.	Vulnerability of immigrants within the Brazilian State. Initial manifestations of the Brazilian society (national impact) about the nature of the adopted strategies, with low level of engagement and receptivity by the audience

	OPERATION CONTROLE	OPERATION ACOLHIDA
Atores Funcionais (important actors because they directly or indirectly affect the security dynamics of a given sector) (VILLA; SANTOS 2011)	Brazilian Army: responsible for fighting trans-border crimes and controlling the border line between Brazil and Venezuela. PSO: Responsible for migration control and combating cross-border crimes.	Armed Forces, International, Non-Governmental and National Organizations: responsible for humanitarian assistance to vulnerable immigrants.
Analysis of the emergency measures adopted to deal with existential threats and their respective legitimization by the audience (SILVA; PEREIRA, 2019)	Border ordering to hamper the flow of illegal immigrants into the national territory and to combat cross-border crimes. The actions to combat illegal activities were legitimized in view of the effectiveness of the reduction in crime rates despite the increase in the flow of immigrants.	Sorting out the border for receiving and organizing entry into the welcoming process. Reception and internalization of vulnerable immigrants to provide a better quality of life and new job opportunities within the national territory. The society of Roraima, the main impacted one, started to legitimize the actions of Operation Acolhida after understanding its results for the state.

Source: The authors (2021).

The confrontation of Chart 3 with the theoretical perspective of securitization presented in Chart 2 allows us to broaden the debate on the issue addressed and discussed in this article. Initially, it seems clear to us that there is no room to think of the phenomenon as **Non-politicized**, because the evidence of the discussion is clear in this sense, the existence of the Operation Acolhida and Operation Controle; the creation of state structures at various levels such as the Federal Committee for Interiorization and the FT Log Hum and; the debate established at various levels of the federation with the enactment of laws and regulations to address the issue are enough to rule out this condition.

The main debate lies in identifying if we are facing a **Politicized** phenomenon or if we are facing a **Securitization**. There is no doubt that a very fine line separates one situation from the other, as well as being extremely influenced by the analyst's perception of each of the parameters instituted to think about the debate, as well as the level of approach that is taken (national, regional, local). Thus, this debate will be guided by the theoretical points discussed in Chart 2, that is, the presence of the State, public policies, and existential threat.

Regarding the presence of the State, we observe that it is present in the public debate as an essential actor in the process, be it at the national level (Federal Government through the Ministries of Citizenship and Public Security), be it at the regional level (State Governments of Roraima and Amazonas through the Government Secretariats), be it at the local level (Governments of the Municipalities of Pacaraima, Boa Vista, and Manaus through the Government Secretariats). As far as Operation Controle is concerned, its political actions do not exceed the standards already adop-

ted; border monitoring actions focused on combating illicit activities were already being carried out before the increase in the flow of Venezuelan migrants. Joint action in integrated operations (with the participation of the Armed Forces and Public Security Agencies) has always been part of the daily initiatives adopted. Although the political procedures adopted in Operation Acolhida are not normal, they are intended to treat an unusual phenomenon, without essentially inserting them in the list of security actions that would lead to a securitization vocation. In this sense, regarding the condition analyzed, it is observed that the subject is primarily politicized, but minimally securitized.

When we think about the adoption of public policies, we observe that, despite the previous existence of Operation Controle, in its initial performance there was a moment in which it was directed to respond to unrest caused by xenophobia issues raised within the local society, that resulted in confrontations and violent acts between Brazilians and Venezuelans. However, the effective solution for the extinction of such events, in fact, extrapolated the actions of public security and focused on campaigns of enlightenment, not only of the local society, as well as its representatives. Two points were fundamental, both conducted by Operation Acolhida: they sought a) to make society aware of the benefits linked to the integration of the Venezuelans, as well as of the investments made by the federal government in the regional and local dynamics; and b) the commitment to adopt a broad strategy that allowed to relieve the pressure on the services and structures in Roraima, that is, the strategy of internalization, which called on the whole country to take part of the responsibility for the reception of Venezuelan migration. Still, within the debate on public policies, and considering the depth and quality of the national legislation on migration, it can be observed that the measures adopted dealt with the operationalization of a model to put into practice devices already consolidated in the normative references prior to the crisis.

Law 13,445/17 sought to harmonize with human rights, guaranteed by treaties to which Brazil is a signatory, and fundamental rights prescribed in the 1988 Federal Constitution, such as the right to liberty, security, and inviolability of the home. In line with these rights, the law establishes that the Brazilian migration policy will be governed, among other principles and guidelines, by the universality; the interdependence of human rights; the repudiation and prevention of xenophobia, racism, and any form of discrimination; the non-criminalization of migration; and non-discrimination based on the criteria and procedures by which the person was admitted into the national territory (MENDES; BRASIL, 2020, p. 83).

However, and despite the fact that Brazilian public policies for migration already have solid bases, one cannot fail to notice that new policies have been created at all levels of the federation on an emergency basis to deal with the security impacts, as well as the humanitarian ones. The internalization strategy is an example of emergency policies adopted on Venezuelan migration that directly impacts the situation in the state of Roraima, relieving the pressure and redistributing the responsibility for the state response by all the entities of the federation. Thus, as far as public policies are concerned, the theme was treated in a perspective closer to securitization, showing clear signs of the adoption of complementary measures to the common spectrum, taken on an emergency basis.

The last vertex of this analysis is based on the question of existential threat. In the meantime, it is important to emphasize that although the border crimes resulting from illegal immigration constitute a phenomenon with implications for the Brazilian state and naturally on society's perception of it, rarely has the discourse on immigration gone in the direction of deconstructing or threatening the existence of the state *per se*. The events that brought Brazilians and Venezuelans into conflict at the very beginning of the crisis are enough to think about the collapse of local society (Pacaraima and Boa Vista), but not enough to discuss the possibility of the bankruptcy of the Brazilian state.

Undoubtedly, it allows us to affirm this issue in two senses: the first reinforces that the discourse at the national level, analyzing the meetings of the National Committee for Refugees, of the Ministry of Justice and Public Safety, and of the Civil House, migration has always been placed as a humanitarian issue for which the Brazilian state cares and has a tradition of acting, never presented as a security issue in itself, although it is accessory in some cases. In a second point, the securitizing discourses, present mainly in the speech of politicians in Roraima, did not progress, since the local society soon realized that migration was not a security issue but a humanitarian and assistance policy. Such perspectives take the analysis of the existential threat issue to a politicized and non-securitized position.

7 Conclusions

This securitization behavior has been a constant when we deal with the subject of migration, because in the last migration flows two issues have been extremely highlighted. The security issue that is reflected through border weaknesses to transnational crimes and the difficulty of countries to establish adequate protocols to combat these, often a reflection of national policies adopted, and the economic issue, deeply marked by the interdependence of border regions, areas generally part of less favored belts in the financial context.

Regarding the first, what can be observed is that securitization through discourse has become a tool to amplify the search for governmental and societal resources to develop gaps left by the state regarding the protection of goods and people in the national boundaries in the face of growing criminality. In relation to the second, and probably in the same direction, the securitization discourse has strong economic roots to seek financing for the improvement of the social and living conditions of the population.

The Venezuelan migration in Brazil did not escape this scenario, but the establishment of two distinct operations managed to keep the migration away from the securitization character, even in view of the political movements mentioned above. Another point to highlight is that the Brazilian response demystifies that the presence of the armed forces alone is enough to lead to the securitization process. On the contrary, there is room for integrated action with other international, governmental and non-governmental organizations without necessarily plunging into this process.

It is also worth pointing out that the pre-existence of the Operation Controle and its integrated action with the PSOs contributes to defining the character of each action, not allowing an overlapping of demands. Such a point was specifically marked by the constitution of a completely different contingent to act in the Operation Acolhida, whose training was conducted under a different perspective, leaving the Operation Controle in charge of the troops that already exist in Boa Vista and that already dominated the expertise.

In parallel, the unleashing of Operation Acolhida put the migratory demands of vulnerable Venezuelans under a humanitarian perspective, welcoming them in a context of respect for human rights and social assistance policies. These are dealt with in an integrated effort by all civil and military, governmental or non-governmental, public or private, national or international institutions under the same prism: the guarantee of humanitarian aid to the population vulnerable to international forced displacement without attributing contours of threat to the receiving society, seeking its full integration into the national dynamics of the receiving country, respecting the customs, beliefs, and habits of the migrants.

Thus, having said that, resuming the guiding question of this paper "Is there securitization of the Venezuelan migration crisis through the response adopted by the Brazilian government?" What we can see and observe is that the Venezuelan migration in Brazil has acquired contours of a **politicized** subject; despite some attempts at securitization, whose actors have not managed to completely validate their discourse. The existence of an Operation whose main objective was to combat the problems arising from migration avoided the contamination of the object (migration) by the harmful effects (cross-border crimes), thus ensuring that the object was not securitized while the effects were treated within their nature (security and public defense).

As migration events, especially the forced ones, happen under extremely dynamic and volatile conditions, it is suggested that the continuity of the monitoring of this process be the basis for future studies, even comparative between different moments, given the political and economic nuances that involve the whole process triggered by the government response. Thus, allowing new analyses about the cross-cutting issues of the Venezuelan flow in Brazil.

Authorship Collaborations

All authors participated equally in the elaboration of the article.

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The “Action for Peacekeeping” initiative and its performance & accountability pillar in United Nations peace operations: a Brazilian perspective

Iniciativa Action for Peacekeeping y su pilar de desempeño y rendición de cuentas en las operaciones de paz de las Naciones Unidas: una perspectiva brasileña

Abstract: The article's main objective is to identify and compile information regarding the actions taken by the Brazilian State in compliance with the commitments assumed regarding the pillar of performance & accountability of the Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative. To do so, it is initially sought to present the A4P initiative, contextualizing it with the moment of its launch. Subsequently, a more in-depth analysis of the performance & accountability pillar was carried out to identify the commitments made by the various parties. Next, it is sought to identify in detail the actions taken by Brazil aimed at fulfilling the obligations assumed, based on two integrating aspects: the participation in the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System and the training of human resources. From a methodological point of view, this is a qualitative exploratory investigation, carried out through bibliographical and documentary research, complemented by interviews. As a result, the survey indicated that Brazil has been adopting concrete measures, which fulfill the commitments assumed and shall allow the country to send high-performance military and police officers for future peace operations.

Carlos Alberto Moutinho Vaz 
Exército Brasileiro. Centro Conjunto de
Operações de Paz do Brasil (CCOPAB).
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.
carlosvaz95@gmail.com

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Resumen: El objetivo principal del artículo es identificar y recopilar información sobre las acciones llevadas a cabo por el Estado brasileño, en cumplimiento de los compromisos asumidos en relación con el pilar de desempeño y rendición de cuentas de la iniciativa Action for *Peacekeeping* (A4P). Con este fin, inicialmente buscamos presentar la iniciativa A4P, contextualizándola con el momento de su lanzamiento. Posteriormente, se llevó a cabo un análisis más a fondo del pilar de desempeño y rendición de cuentas, a fin de identificar los compromisos asumidos por las diversas partes. A continuación, se buscó identificar en detalle las acciones impulsadas por Brasil, dirigidas al cumplimiento de las obligaciones asumidas, desde dos aspectos integradores: la participación en el sistema de preparación de capacidades de la ONU y la capacitación de recursos humanos. Desde el punto de vista metodológico, se trata de una investigación cualitativa exploratoria, realizada a través de la investigación bibliográfica y documental, complementada con entrevistas. Como resultado, la encuesta indicó que Brasil ha estado adoptando medidas concretas, que no solo cumplen con los compromisos asumidos, sino que también permitirán al país enviar militares y policías de alto rendimiento para futuras operaciones de paz.

Palabras clave: Rendimiento y Responsabilidad; Action for Peacekeeping; Compromisos; Operaciones de paz; Naciones Unidas.

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1 Introduction

Brazil is a founding member of the United Nations (UN) and, over the past seven decades, has actively participated in peace missions, thus materializing the Brazilian commitment to the collective security mechanism of that International Organization. Therefore, Brazil has already sent more than 57,000 military, police and civilian experts to 46 missions on five continents. In this context, it is worth mentioning the participation of the so-called “Suez Battalion” in the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in 1956, inaugurating the sending of Brazilian troop contingents for peacekeeping missions, which lasted until 2020, placing Brazil in prominent positions as a troop contributing country (TCC), in moments of larger participation (ANDRADE; HAMANN; SOARES, 2021).

However, at present, Brazil has a small quantitative representation in terms of deployed military and police, appearing in the ranking released by the Secretariat, relative to July 31, 2021, in the 65th position, with only 67 individuals serving in seven of the twelve active missions. It is noteworthy that, since the departure of Brazilian military units from the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH, in French) in 2017, and from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 2020, there has been no other Brazilian military unit deployed, with the country's participation restricted to individuals, who act alone or as part of small teams (UNITED NATIONS, 2021b).

Nevertheless, even with this small quantitative participation, Brazil still has a solid reputation within the United Nations, as a result of the high performance shown by the Brazilian military and police in current and past participations. This has enabled Brazil to maintain a relevant qualitative participation, which can be exemplified by the appointment, on April 9, 2021, of Major General Marcos de Sá Affonso da Costa as Force Commander of the United Nations Mission for Stabilization in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO, in French), a mission in which Brazil does not have deployed units, being the fourth Brazilian military to hold the position since 2013. Furthermore, the presence of Brazilian military and police officers at the United Nations Secretariat and Brazil's participation in the development of doctrinal manuals on peacekeeping operations also corroborate the country's prestige in this universe (HAMANN; MIR, 2019).

Even with this consolidated expertise and a successful past, Brazil needs to be aware of the evolution of the environments where the missions have been deployed, which characteristics of volatility, insecurity, increased hostile actions against UN troops and the deterioration of the humanitarian situation have shown growing challenges to blue helmets. In this sense, when examining recent trends in peacekeeping operations, Day et al. (2020), emphasize that the deployment of peacekeepers in places where there is no ongoing viable peace process, and where there may still be civil wars and the action of extremist groups, presents a high-risk scenario, not only for the deployed contingents, but also for the local populations to be protected by them.

In 2018, in order to adapt operations to the new reality, the Secretary-General launched the Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative, which has since then guided the efforts of the Secretariat, the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Member States with regard to peacekeeping operations. Brazil promptly endorsed the A4P, having, therefore, made commitments before the UN and the international community, whose fulfillment or not will indisputably reflect on the country's reputation.

The preliminary investigation indicated the absence of academic papers on the subject, particularly with regard to verification of compliance by Brazil with the commitments made when endorsing the A4P initiative. However, the initial research focused on the performance & accountability pillar indicated that the country has taken measures that materialize the fulfillment of its commitments on this topic, lacking only a more systematic investigation.

Thus, the main objective of this article was to identify and compile information regarding the actions carried out by Brazil in compliance with the commitments made regarding one of the eight pillars of the A4P initiative: performance & accountability. To this end, through bibliographic and documentary research, followed by content analysis and complemented by semi-structured interviews with representatives of the institutions involved in this theme, it was initially sought to understand the A4P initiative, contextualizing it with the moment of its launch. Subsequently, a detailed analysis was carried out on the performance & accountability pillar, seeking to understand its context and the scope of the commitments that materialize this pillar. Finally, it was sought to identify the actions undertaken by the Brazilian government since the launch of the A4P, which represent the effective fulfillment of the assumed obligations.

2 The Action for Peacekeeping initiative – conceptual aspects

The Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative was launched by the Secretary-General on March 28, 2018, at a meeting of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), called the High-Level Debate on Collective Action to Improve UN Peacekeeping Operations. The event can be framed in a progressive effort that was ongoing, uniting the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Member States, in order to promote the adaptation of peacekeeping operations to complex and high-risk environments, which made it increasingly difficult to fulfill the mandates, particularly with regard to the protection of civilians, in addition to putting the very security of peacekeepers at risk. In this context, the Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peacekeeping Operations (known as the HIPPO Report) can be indicated as the starting point for this effort, which also included as references other later documents, such as the Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers Report: We need to change the way we are doing business (known as the Cruz Report) and the Independent Special Investigation Report Into the Violence in Juba in 2016 and the Response by the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT, 2018).

In addition to responding to growing operational challenges, Coning (2020) argues that the A4P initiative arose from the financial pressure under which the UN was, especially from the United States of America (USA), in order to reduce the cost and increase the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. In his analysis, the author also includes the launch of the Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System (CPAS) and the adoption of Resolution 2436 (2018) by the Security Council, both discussed in the later section of this article, as the Organization's responses to that pressure.

In his A4P launch speech before the Security Council, the Secretary-General emphasized the challenges faced by peacekeepers in terms of mandates to be fulfilled, equipment, training, command and control, among others. He also highlighted the impact of such problems on the mortality of blue helmets as a result of hostile actions in 2017, which was substantially higher than the previous year. Furthermore, the Secretary-General identified the three areas on which collective efforts should focus: (i) reconciling expectations and reality in operations; (ii) making missions more robust and safer; and (iii) mobilizing greater support for political solutions and the deployment of well-organised, well-equipped and well-trained troops (UNITED NATIONS, 2018f).

Calling on all involved to action, Guterres stated that “this is why I am launching a new initiative, ‘Action for Peacekeeping’, aimed at mobilizing all partners and stakeholders to support the great enterprise of United Nations peacekeeping” (UNITED NATIONS, 2018f, n. p.). When introducing the initiative, he mentioned the seventieth anniversary of the peacekeeping operations, suggesting a collective effort so that the commitments that would govern the new initiative were discussed and agreed by the end of 2018.

On August 16, 2018, materializing the A4P initiative, the Declaration of Shared Commitments was launched, a document that established the eight priority areas, or pillars, of the initiative and where the 45 commitments to be made are listed in relation to each of them. Very briefly, the areas addressed were the following: (1) political solutions; (2) women, peace and security agenda; (3) protection of civilians; (4) security of peacekeepers; (5) performance and accountability; (6) building and sustaining peace; (7) partnerships; and (8) conduct of peacekeepers. It is worth highlighting that the original document provided for only seven areas, one of which related to the women, peace and security agenda, which, despite having been initially included in the topic related to political solutions, was later deployed into an exclusive area. As for the commitments contained in the Declaration, they can be divided for better understanding into: commitments exclusive to the Secretariat, commitments shared between the Secretariat and Member States, and commitments exclusive to Member States (UNITED NATIONS, 2018a).

From the launch of the Declaration, the Secretariat began to encourage Member States to endorse the document, which would be an unequivocal manifestation of the adherence of each country to the commitments contained in it. In this context, Brazil was the 52nd State to endorse the Declaration, through a statement by Ambassador Nelson Antonio Tabajara de Oliveira, then Undersecretary-General for Multilateral Affairs, Europe and North America of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the occasion of the High-Level Meeting on Action for Peacekeeping, convened by the Secretary General on September 25, 2018, in the margins of the 73rd session of the General Assembly. Although this is the constant milestone on the A4P website as the endorsement by Brazil, it should be noted that the ratification had already been announced by Ambassador Frederico Salomão Duque Estrada Meyer, Alternate Representative of Brazil to the UN, at a meeting of the UNSC on peacekeeping operations, held on September 12, in which Brazil participated as a guest (BRASIL, 2018; UNITED NATIONS, 2018d).

The present work does not have the scope of analyzing in detail the evolution of the A4P initiative as a whole, but it can be stated synthetically that, since its launch, the agenda has occupied a central place in discussions on peacekeeping operations, within the scope of the Council of Security, the

General Assembly, the Secretariat, of international institutions related to the subject and of Member States themselves. In this context, it is also worth noting that, since 2019, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (known as C-34), a subsidiary body of the General Assembly with the attribution of carrying out comprehensive reviews on all issues involving peacekeeping operations, started to structure its annual report based on the thematic areas of the A4P (UNITED NATIONS, 2021c).

A relevant aspect to be highlighted is that the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) carried out a survey in August 2019, in order to gather the perceptions of the different actors involved on the progress in the implementation of the A4P initiative, as well as to register the concrete actions carried out by each partner. Brazil was one of the survey respondents, whose results were processed and compiled in order to support future decisions on the topic (UNITED NATIONS, 2019c).

Finally, as the most recent update of the A4P initiative, on March 29, 2021, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Secretariat held an event commemorating the three years of the launch of the A4P, in order to assess the progress made and identify the remaining challenges to its implementation. At the event, the Secretariat presented the A4P+, as a set of seven strategic priorities to accelerate the implementation of the commitments made in the eight thematic areas. The analysis of the A4P+ launch document demonstrates that the theme of performance & accountability was maintained, as two of the seven established priorities, called “3. Capabilities and mindsets” and “4. Accountability to peacekeepers”, deal directly with that subject (UNITED NATIONS, 2021a).

3 Detailing the Performance & Accountability pillar

In this section, it is intended to analyze in more detail one of the pillars of the A4P initiative, performance & accountability, highlighting the commitments that were made by the Secretariat and by Member States that, like Brazil, have endorsed the Declaration of Shared Commitments.

Before proceeding to the analysis of the issue within the A4P initiative, it is important to highlight that this issue was already included in multiple reference documents on peacekeeping operations. As a remote antecedent, the so-called Brahimi Report was analyzed, a seminal document on recent peacekeeping operations, resulting from the work of a high-level panel organized by the Secretary-General in 2000, as a result of failures in peace operations conducted in the previous decade. The report recognizes the precariousness of the deployment selection system then existing (the United Nations Standby Arrangements Systems – UNSAS), indicating opportunities for improvement, so that the troops could be really able to fulfill their tasks when deployed. The document superficially addresses issues such as the accountability of leaders for performance, but it is aspects related to training and equipment that receive special attention, due to the evident link between them and the setbacks suffered (UNITED NATIONS, 2000).

As a more recent antecedent, it was necessary to address the so-called HIPPO Report (2015), due to the influence of this document on the A4P initiative and the emphasis observed in it regarding the topic under study. It is highlighted here that, similarly to the Brahimi Report, the context of the establishment of the Panel that led to the HIPPO Report was also the inability of operations to deal with the growing deterioration of security conditions existing in the locations where the missions

were deployed, which required a change of posture. The report initially presents the four essential changes necessary for peace operations to be effective in the future, followed by new approaches proposed in areas considered vital for the operations. These concepts are operationalized in a later section, entitled "Empowering the field", which comprises a subsection called "Improving speed, capability and performance for uniformed personnel", where the origins of some of the commitments established later in the scope of the A4P initiative are clearly observed. In this context, the document highlights the need for a performance improvement system, connected to a global partnership for training. The report also addresses the harmful effects of embargoes (caveats) on the effectiveness of deployed troops, in addition to emphasizing the issue of accountability for performance, aspects also incorporated into the A4P (UNITED NATIONS, 2015b).

Also in 2015, the Secretariat launched the DPKO/DFS Policy Document on Operational Readiness Assurance and Performance Improvement, with the objective of increasing the operational readiness of military units to be deployed in peacekeeping operations. The document presents a Performance Improvement Cycle, consisting of four stages, the observance of which would result in units fully capable of performing their tasks effectively. Moreover, the document establishes a comprehensive pre-deployment certification process for each unit by the respective contributing country, covering not only aspects related to capacity building, but also issues related to the conduct of peacekeepers (UNITED NATIONS, 2015a).

In addition to the 2015 Policy Document, TCCs received even more specific guidelines on the preparation of their troops in the year 2018, through the DPKO/DFS Guidelines on Operational Readiness Preparation for Troop Contributing Countries in Peacekeeping Missions. Besides detailing aspects related to the minimum requirements for selecting peacekeepers and conducting pre-deployment training, the new document presents a definition of performance that allows for a better understanding of the topic:

Performance of a military contribution is often measured by conducting and delivering successfully mandated tasks, as determined by the Security Council, UN Secretariat, Troop Contributing Countries and Members States, Host Nation (host government and population) and other UN Mission stakeholders; performance is also measured by the conduct displayed by the troops while on deployment (UNITED NATIONS, 2018b, p. 4).

Turning to the analysis of the performance & accountability pillar within the A4P framework, it can be noted that the issue received special attention in the initiative's launch speech, in which the Secretary-General made six immediate requests to Member States. The fourth request specifically refers to performance-related issues, covering aspects that were later included in the Affirmation of Shared Commitments, such as pre-deployment training, embargoes (caveats) and triangular capacity building partnerships. As for training, the Secretary-General states

that “Troop and police contributing countries and their partners need to improve the level of training and preparation of peacekeepers”¹ (UNITED NATIONS, 2018f, p. 3).

Regarding the details of the commitments contained in the Declaration of Shared Commitments, related to the topic of performance & accountability, the document presents three long paragraphs on the subject, comprising a total of 12 commitments, categorized in the table below.

Table 1- Summary of commitments related to performance & accountability.

Commitments made by Member States	Commitments shared between Member States and the Secretariat	Commitments made by the Secretariat
<p>1) Provide well-trained and well-equipped military and police, and support the development and conduct of training activities for peace operations.</p> <p>2) Support the pre-deployment preparation of personnel and material, aiming at an effective performance, observing the verification and certification policies regarding human rights.</p> <p>3) Redouble efforts to clearly identify and communicate embargoes (caveats), or any updates relating to them, and work closely with the Secretariat to develop a clear, comprehensive and transparent procedure on embargoes.</p>	<p>1) Ensure the highest level of performance.</p> <p>2) Hold all peacekeepers, particularly leaders, accountable for effective performance, under common parameters, in the event of insufficient performance.</p> <p>3) Support a coordination mechanism (Light Coordination Mechanism) related to training, emphasizing the need for additional financial resources for this area.</p>	<p>1) Develop an integrated doctrinal system on performance, based on clear standards for all.</p> <p>2) Use performance-related data as information for planning, assessment, decisions on deployment, and preparation of reports.</p> <p>3) Communicate to Member States all necessary operational requirements.</p> <p>4) Provide effective logistical support to operations.</p> <p>5) Work with Member States to generate the necessary specialized capabilities, including with regard to language proficiency, supporting new approaches to improve force generation and equipment availability</p> <p>6) Provide Member States with training materials consistent with operational requirements.</p>

Source: Adapted from United Nations, 2018a.

The exclusive commitments of Member States and those shared between them and the Secretariat will be the subject of the following section. The Secretariat's exclusive commitments are not part of the scope of this research. Still, it is worth mentioning that the investigation revealed significant actions and progress by the Secretariat in terms of the fulfillment of its commitments. As a more relevant example, the launch, still in 2018, of the Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System (CPAS), which represented a

¹ Original: “Les pays fournisseurs de contingents ou de personnel de police et leurs partenaires se doivent d’améliorer le niveau de formation et de préparation des soldats de la paix”

milestone in terms of performance assessment and support for planning and decision-making, based on a objective methodology, grounded on analytical data and on clear and well-defined standards. The CPAS was promptly endorsed by the Security Council, through Resolution 2436 (2018), which also consolidated the UNSC's support for the A4P initiative, particularly with regard to aspects related to performance & accountability. In addition to the CPAS, the A4P initiative website provides a document called Key Achievements on Performance, which contains other actions and results obtained by the Secretariat in fulfilling its commitments (UNITED NATIONS 2018c, 2018e, 2019a).

The great relevance of the theme of performance motivated its inclusion as a central theme of the UN Ministerial Conference on Peacekeeping Operations, held on March 29, 2019 and entitled "Uniformed Capabilities, Performance and Protection". At the time, aspects such as staff training, strategic partnerships and the development of assessment standards were discussed. Speaking at the event, the Brazilian Defense Minister ratified Brazil's commitment to the topic, stating that "Lessons learned teach us that providing troops with effective training is essential for achieving good performance in the field". He also added that, "In the training area, Brazil has been carrying out concrete actions. [...] we send mobile teams and train contingents from other countries in Triangular Partnership Projects" (BRASIL, 2019a, n.p.).

One aspect that deserves to be highlighted is the intrinsic relationship between the performance & accountability pillar and another topic of the A4P initiative: the conduct of peacekeepers and peace operations as a whole. In this context, it is emphasized that the concept of accountability permeates both themes, being understood sometimes as accountability for performance, sometimes as accountability for the standard of conduct of the members of the missions. Thus, on June 28, 2021, in a speech at the event entitled "High-Level meeting on Strengthening the Conduct of Peacekeeping Personnel: Sharing of Good Practices", the Secretary-General highlighted the link between the areas, stating that "The vast majority of our personnel live up to the highest standards of conduct. But when they do not, it has a devastating impact on victims and survivors, and undermines our operational efficiency and our global reputation" (UNITED NATIONS, 2021d, p. 1).

It is also worth highlighting the transversality between the thematic area of performance & accountability and another of capital importance for operations, also included in the A4P initiative: the security of peacekeepers. The link between these areas was evident in 2017, in the report known as the Cruz Report (due to the leadership of Brazilian Major General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz in the preparation of the document). The report systematically addresses aspects related to performance, such as factors directly related to deaths of peacekeepers for hostile actions, and, consequently, recommends pre-deployment training and the selection of contributing countries with troops and police as areas where change should occur. Furthermore, problems presented in detail include pre-deployment operational readiness and mutual accountability for deficiencies in training, equipment and performance (UNITED NATIONS, 2017).

Finalizing the conceptual analysis on the performance and accountability pillar, it is worth emphasizing the importance of improving the performance of peacekeepers to mitigate the so-called "peacekeeping trilemma", faced by the Security Council, identified by Williams (2020).

According to the author, the three strategic objectives of the UNSC – to effectively fulfill complex mandates in high-risk environments, to minimize the risks to the security of peacekeepers and to reduce the financial costs of the missions – will not be able to be achieved simultaneously with the current system architecture of peacekeeping operations, with mitigation measures being suggested in order to ensure the effectiveness of the missions, even in the face of this situation. The first measure recommended and considered essential by the author is the improvement in the performance of blue helmets, due to its immediate positive impact on achieving those objectives. In this regard, Williams recognizes the importance of the recent, although still incomplete, efforts of the Security Council and the Secretariat to improve the performance of deployed troops.

4 Brazil's perspectives and actions

Before moving on to the main objective of this section, to analyze the actions carried out by Brazil, which show progress related to the fulfillment of the obligations assumed in the scope of the Declaration of Shared Commitments, with regard to the performance & accountability pillar, it is worth emphasizing the current relevance of the topic and the importance attributed to it by the Brazilian government.

Thus, on February 15, 2021, when speaking at the opening of the C-34 annual work, at the General Assembly, the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the UN highlighted the country's commitment to the A4P initiative, identifying the issue of performance as one of the priorities. In this context, he emphasized the intrinsic relationship between capacity and performance, stating that “Experience shows that the performance of peacekeeping operations is closely associated with pre-deployment training. Trained troops prevent fatalities and favour the overall implementation of mission mandates.” (BRASIL, 2021c, p. 3).

Moreover, on June 11, 2020, Brazil was elected to its 11th mandate as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, for the biennium 2022-2023. The application document sets out seven priority areas for the country's action in the Council, among which the efficient maintenance of peace. In this regard, the text emphasizes the solid history of Brazilian participation in peacekeeping operations, particularly highlighting (BRASIL, 2021b).

The starting point for analyzing Brazilian actions in compliance with its commitments is the country's participation in the United Nations Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS), due to the transversal nature of this system in relation to the commitments made, when considering a multiplicity of aspects related to the readiness of the offered troops, allowing the Secretariat to accurately identify, including through on-site observation, if the Member State meets the standards established in the different areas.

To contextualize, PCRS is the system adopted by the UN since 2015 in order to ensure the readiness and effective deployment of military, police and civil defense capabilities for employment in peacekeeping operations. This system replaced the former UNSAS, which fell into disuse precisely because it did not ensure the necessary predictability and reliability. In general, the PCRS classifies the capabilities offered by Member States (pledges) into four levels, with “level 2” being the one in which a unit is considered ready for deployment into an operation (UNITED NATIONS, 2019b).

The transition of Units from level 1 to level 2 in the PCRS only takes place after the successful conduct of an Assessment and Advisory Visit (AAV) by a UN team. The AAV is a quite comprehensive exercise, involving a wide range of activities in its two strands, advisory and assessment. As for the latter, it is worth highlighting the range of aspects assessed during the visit, in areas such as personnel, equipment, unit organization, leadership, accountability mechanisms, among others. Each of these areas unfolds into numerous and detailed check-lists, contained in the current edition of the document regulating the subject (UNITED NATIONS, 2020). Thus, it can be said that a unit that undergoes an AAV without any pending issues, being therefore raised to level 2 of the PCRS by the Secretariat, attests that the Member State has fully complied with the UN requirements and standards, regarding the preparation of that troop, in the most diverse aspects.

In Brazil's case, the country has offered military units, through the PCRS, since the launch of the system and has already received two AAVs for verification of specific units, considered of interest by the Secretariat. The first visit took place in April 2017 and resulted in the elevation to level 2 of all five units assessed, being three aviation units, an infantry battalion and a medical unit of the Level 2 Hospital type. The elevation was communicated to the Permanent Mission of Brazil to the UN by the Secretariat, and the Brazilian government was invited to start negotiations to elevate the units to level 3 of the PCRS.

In July 2021, under the 2020 edition of the Secretariat's Standard Operating Procedure on AAVs, which is much more comprehensive and detailed about the items to be inspected, Brazil received a new visit in order to assess four more units: one mechanized infantry battalion, an engineering company and two quick reaction force companies, one from the Brazilian Army and one from the Brazilian Navy. Once again, all verified units met the UN requirement standards in the various verified areas, being raised to level 2 of the PCRS by the Secretariat.

It can be said, therefore, that Brazil's performance in the PCRS ratifies the partial fulfillment of the commitment to provide well-trained and well-equipped military and police officers for peacekeeping missions. However, considering that the commitment also encompasses the development and conduct of training activities and that the military and police can also be deployed in individual missions, there will be further detail on personnel training later in this section.

Concerning the commitment with regard to the background check policies of the selected personnel, as well as pending human rights violations or other disciplinary issues, Brazil has a consolidated mechanism for checking military and police personnel planned for deployment, both in individual missions and in units. The Ministry of Defense issued specific Normative Instructions on the subject, both for troops and for individual missions, with the Peacekeeping Operations Deputy Chief being responsible for issuing certificates to be sent to the Secretariat before each deployment. This mechanism was verified by the Secretariat, during the AAVs, and no non-conformity with the foreseen legislation was detected. In addition, the Secretariat found that Brazil is a signatory to the main international instruments related to human rights and that the country has a solid legal framework related to issues regarding to the conduct of military and police officers, both in the administrative and criminal spheres (BRASIL 2019b, 2020).

As for the compromise on the issue of embargoes (caveats), the Secretariat and the Security Council have shown great concern regarding two different types of embargoes. The first refers to those that are presented by the TCC, at the time of the unit's offer in the PCRS or in the initial negotiations for deployment in a specific mission. The second, and even more worrying due to the impact on the effectiveness of the missions, refers to the so-called "hidden caveats", when an already deployed unit fails to perform some planned task, alleging national issues or using some subterfuge. In the case of Brazil, even though there has been no new deployment of troops since the A4P's launch, the country already has a consolidated history of not imposing restrictions of any kind on the execution of actions planned for each Unit. Furthermore, the Brazilian government has not imposed embargoes on troops registered in the PCRS, indicating that the units will be composed, trained and equipped to entirely fulfill the planned tasks. This aspect was also verified during the AAVs received by Brazil, contributing to the elevation of Brazilian units to level 2.

Moving on to the commitment regarding the accountability of all peacekeepers, particularly leaders, for effective performance, the survey found that the Ministry of Defense and the Single Forces adopt strict mechanisms for selecting military for leadership positions and that such military receive differentiated training in the so-called pre-deployment training architecture, which will be described below. Furthermore, the Normative Instructions of the Ministry of Defense on the employment of troops in peacekeeping missions establish a routine of assessment trips and follow-up trips for UN operational readiness inspections by Brazilian delegations, with a view to assessing the performance of troops deployed in several aspects, including the issue of leadership (BRASIL, 2019b).

As for the commitment to support the so-called Light Coordination Mechanism (LCM), to contextualize, it is an initiative initially proposed in 2017, aimed at building capacities (capacity building), particularly through the promotion, advice and facilitation of interaction between countries that are willing to act as providers of training and others that need to be recipients of such activity.

In 2019, Brazil was consulted by the LCM through an electronic form, where the country presented several initiatives, particularly as a provider of training activities, highlighting the sending of instructors and mobile training teams to other countries, as well as the receipt of foreign military and police for training in Brazil. As for the condition of training recipient, Brazil highlighted only the presence of foreign instructors in teaching activities at CCOPAB, collaborating for the preparation of Brazilian military and police. Thus, it was found that Brazil supports the LCM's conception, although it does not have the immediate need for a more proactive action of that mechanism, since the training partnerships in which the country is involved have already worked through existing arrangements. With regard to the allocation of financial resources, Brazil has not yet contributed with resources to the LCM, nor does it intend to do so in the short or medium term, as the country is still dealing with delayed financial contributions to the UN budgets, as already addressed by Hamann and Mir (2019).

It is noteworthy that, even outside the LCM's scope, Brazil has extensive experience in sending mobile training teams to train personnel from other countries, as well as receiving foreign military and police officers for training at CCOPAB. In this context Brazil's participation in the

UN triangular partnership program is highlighted, through initiatives such as the training of military personnel from four African countries, in the Management and Maintenance of Engineering Equipment Course, held by the Brazilian Army in 2019 (O BRASIL, 2020).

Deepening the analysis on the issue of pre-deployment training, an aspect of vital importance in terms of the commitment to ensure the highest level of performance and of transversal character in terms of other commitments, the survey indicated that Brazil has given great priority to the subject, what can be seen in the volume and excellence of the performance of the two existing preparation centers in the country: the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center (CCOPAB) and the Naval Peace Operations Training Center (COPazNav), since the creation of the centers and particularly after the launch of the A4P initiative.

CCOPAB had its remote origins in 2005, with the creation of the Peace Operations Instruction Center (COPaz) by the Brazilian Army, already in the context of Brazilian participation in MINUSTAH, in order to better systematize the preparation of personnel to be deployed. In 2010, the Ministry of Defense gave CCOPAB its current name, ratifying its position as a reference in training personnel for peace and humanitarian demining missions. Since then, the Center has conducted numerous training activities, both for individual and contingent missions, in addition to other programs aimed at specific audiences, such as journalists. CCOPAB's competence was even attested by the receipt of five course certifications by the Secretariat, two of them after the launch of the A4P initiative, the United Nations Staff Officers Course in 2019 and the United Nations Police Course in 2020.

Regarding the preparation of Brazilian troops registered with the PCRS, as a result of its experience in the successful deployment of Brazilian contingents in MINUSTAH for 12 years, CCOPAB developed a so-called "training architecture", consisting of a sequence of steps that culminates in the realization of field exercises aimed at certifying that units have achieved the operational capabilities and readiness required by the UN. In general terms, the systematic comprises three phases, the first consisting of specific preparation stages for military personnel in command positions, who will later replicate the knowledge acquired to the other members of the unit. The subsequent phase comprises thematic stages related to transversal aspects, such as the protection of civilians and civil-military coordination (CIMIC). Finally, the units go through the Basic Peace Operations Exercise (EBOP) and the Advanced Peace Operations Exercise (EAOP), when they are assessed and certified (BARBOSA, 2021).

In addition to preparing contingents, CCOPAB has played an important role in preparing Brazilian military and police officers for individual missions of different natures, as well as for the deployment of teams with a specific purpose, such as the Jungle Warfare Instruction Team (JWTT) sent to MONUSCO in a pioneering, far-reaching training initiative with a positive impact on peace operations. The Center's participation in the preparation of Brazilian general officers selected for Force Commander positions should also be noted, as has already occurred at MINUSTAH and MONUSCO.

Specifically regarding the training of police officers, the recent participation of CCOPAB in the United Nations Police Training Architecture Programme is noteworthy, a partnership launched in 2019 between the Secretariat and Police Contributing Countries (PCC). The purpose of the Program is to update police pre-deployment training modules in addition

to other related documents, operating through six Curriculum Development Groups (CDGs). In 2021, Brazil participates in CDG 03 (monitoring, mentoring and capacity building) and CDG 07 (competence assessment), through CCOPAB instructor military police officers.

Moving on to COpPazNav, the Center received its current nomenclature in 2019, having been initially created as the Marine Corps Peace Operations School (EopPaz-CFN) in 2008, in the context of the Brazilian participation in MINUSTAH, which included a contingent of Marines. In 2011, with the beginning of Brazilian participation in the Maritime Task Force of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the Brazilian Navy reformulated the School's tasks, renamed the School of Peace Operations with a Naval Character (EsOpPazNav), envisioning the increase of naval peacekeeping missions in order to meet the needs and the very vocation of the Force.

Recently, and even after Brazil's departure from the FTM/UNIFIL, which occurred in December 2020, COpPazNav has been conducting teaching activities aimed particularly at preparing military personnel for naval or riverine operations. In this context, it should be noted that the United Nations Maritime Task Force Course and the United Nations Military Riverine Unit Course, conducted by COpPazNav, respectively in 2020 and 2021, were certified by the Secretariat, being the pioneer Center in such certifications. In addition to training activities focused on naval and riverine aspects, COpPazNav has carried out training programs focused on transversal issues of peace missions, such as the Peace Operations for Women and the Humanitarian Operations

As common aspects of CCOPAB and COpPazNav, it is worth mentioning the integration of both centers with their partner institutions abroad and with the academic world, which has contributed to the improvement of teaching activities, including the continued training of the Brazilian centers' faculty. At the regional level, the participation of CCOPAB as a full member and of COpPazNav as an invited member of the Latin American Association of Peace Operations Training Centers (ALCOPAZ) stands out. In the world context, CCOPAB is also a member of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC).

Regarding the academic environment, the role of the Brazilian Network for Research on Peace Operations (REBRAPAZ) deserves to be highlighted, which since 2016 includes public and private, civil and military institutions that work with research and teaching on peace operations. The Network promotes events and periodical publications on the subject, in addition to integrating researchers and professors, civil and military, through thematic working groups. CCOPAB is one of the founders and full member of REBRAPAZ, and COpPazNav is currently an observer, with plans to ascend to full member status in November 2021.

Ratifying the quality of preparation of the Brazilian military and police, resulting from Brazil's actions in this area, when investigating the country's participation in recent peace missions, Hamann and Mir (2019) highlight that "Brazil has received praise from its peers and from UN itself not because of the number of deployed professionals, such as Ethiopia, India and Pakistan, but because of the good performance of its soldiers and the attitude of its leaders (military and diplomats)" (p. 6). When deepening the observation on the causes of the good performance presented, they add that "The good performance of the Brazilian troops results, to a large extent, from the quality of preparation. During MINUSTAH, Brazil invested time and money in the training of the various battalions that integrated the mission" (p. 6). In the

same context, the professionalism of the Brazilian troop was highlighted by the UN Military Advisor for Peace Operations, on the occasion of the acknowledgment to Brazil, at the end of the Brazilian participation in the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force (BRASIL, 2021a).

5 Final considerations

Brazil is experiencing a period of low quantitative participation in peace operations, unlike in past times, when the presence of Brazilian troops highlighted the country as a significant contributor. Even so, the historical performance of Brazilian peacekeepers in peacekeeping operations still assures them a solid reputation within the United Nations, which allows Brazil to maintain a significant qualitative participation, in addition to presenting itself as a clear option for future contingent deployments.

By endorsing the Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative, Brazil ratified its awareness of the growing challenges associated with today's peacekeeping operations, whose environments pose permanent risks to the blue helmets. In this context, the performance & accountability pillar is undoubtedly a central element, as it impacts on other aspects of capital importance, such as the capacity to protect civilians, currently considered the most important task in multidimensional missions. Thus, Brazil's fulfillment of the commitments made under the Declaration of Shared Commitments, in addition to being in line with the Brazilian tradition of honoring the obligations assumed in the international scenario, symbolizes that the country remains attentive to the current scenario of peace operations, participating proactively in the efforts of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretariat in improving existing operations and those that will be deployed in the future, for the complex, insecure and challenging scenarios of today and to come.

The survey indicated that, since the ratification of the A4P initiative by the Brazilian government, the country has taken concrete measures that materialize the fulfillment of the commitments made regarding performance & accountability, indicating that Brazil remains in a position not only to maintain the quality of punctual contributions of today, but also mainly to resume its tradition of sending high-performance troops for peacekeeping missions, even in the face of new challenges.

Thus, the sum between the expertise accumulated in the successful past participations and the country's proactive posture in training its personnel for future missions allow us to infer that, once invited by the United Nations and upon the country's decision to participate in a new operation, Brazilian blue helmets will live up to the expectations of the United Nations and the international community.

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Dispute between Guyana and Suriname over maritime boundaries (2000-2007)

Litigio entre Guyana y Surinam sobre los límites marítimos (2000-2007)

Abstract: This paper objective to analyze the main outlines of the dispute about the maritime limits between Guyana and Suriname and the scope of the arbitration award that delimited the maritime border between the two countries. Guyana and Suriname find themselves in a geopolitical position of fusion and meeting between the Caribbean and the Amazon region, providing a rich field of research. The methodology adopted consisted of consulting the specialized bibliography and analysis of official documents presented to the Arbitral Tribunal by both countries, as well as documents referring to the decision of the case. The main considerations about the research point out that the bilateral relationship between Guyana and Suriname was built on the basis of pendular dynamics, that is, they sometimes pointed to an approximation, sometimes to distance, in which attempts to define maritime limits were developed. The claims were arbitrated internationally, whose decision, establishing a single maritime limit, corroborates the gradual process of stability between the two countries.

Keywords: Guyana; Suriname; Maritime limits; Law of the Sea.

Resumen: Este trabajo tiene como objetivo analizar los principales delineamientos de la disputa acerca de los límites marítimos entre Guyana y Surinam y el alcance del laudo arbitral que delimitó la frontera marítima entre los dos países. Guyana y Surinam se encuentran en una posición geopolítica de fusión y encuentro entre la región del Caribe y la Amazonía, propiciando un rico campo de investigación. La metodología adoptada consistió en consulta a la bibliografía especializada y análisis de documentos oficiales presentados al Tribunal Arbitral por ambos países así como a los documentos referentes a la decisión del caso. Las principales consideraciones acerca de la investigación apuntan que la relación bilateral entre Guyana y Surinam se construyó bajo las bases de dinámicas pendulares, o sea, ora apuntaban para una aproximación ora para distanciamiento, en que las tentativas de definición de los límites marítimos se desarrollaron. Las reclamaciones fueron arbitradas internacionalmente cuya decisión, estableciendo un límite marítimo único, corrobora el proceso gradual de estabilidad entre los dos países.

Palabras clave: Guyana; Suriname; Límites marítimos; Derecho del Mar.

Yolanda Nunes Sousa 

Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro.
Faculdade de Direito.
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.
sousay07@gmail.com

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1 Introduction

When we analyze the man-sea relationship we contemplate in this spectrum the evolution of humanity itself, which over time became more plural and dynamic and presented new tensions in increasingly diverse spaces. In this diverse context, the activities developed by mankind gained new meaning as their needs were projected into different spaces, and distances were shortened.

Moura Neto (2014) comments that the oceans have established themselves as a fundamental link between peoples, serving as an element of economic and cultural integration as well as establishing themselves as a new horizon of opportunities and richness, but they have also served as the stage for many conflicts, disputes, accidents, limitations, and departures, constituting, paradoxically, a natural defense for coastal states and a means of rapprochement with distant nations.

It is in this context, with the emergence of new technologies and the discovery of new oil reserves and other mineral resources, that states have undertaken efforts to delimit their sovereignty and jurisdiction over maritime space. From this effort, after years of negotiations (the first conference on the Law of the Sea was held in 1958 and the final text was signed in Montego Bay in 1982), the current Law of the Sea was crystallized, under the aegis of the United Nations (UN)¹.

Guyana and Suriname signed the Convention in 1982, but only deposited their ratification deposits in 1993 and 1998, respectively. Since then, the two countries have continued to claim their sovereignty and jurisdiction over the maritime space, whose environment has been the scene of new oil reserve discoveries and where international companies are increasingly active in the region.

In this sense, the present paper seeks to analyze the main delineations of the dispute between Guyana and Suriname regarding maritime boundaries and the scope of the arbitration award that delimited the maritime boundary between the two countries. The year 2000 represented the high point in the dispute, when a new chapter, involving maritime boundaries and the CGX oil company, culminated in the internationalization of the dispute, leading Guyana to resort to an arbitration court in 2004.

In the first section of this paper, we will address some discussions with respect to perceptions in international relations and how they affect the behavior of states in order to understand how Guyana and Suriname have behaved over the years. In the second section, the claims of each country involved in the dispute will be exposed, highlighting the main historical elements and, finally, we will deal with the arbitration award, whose work defined a single line as the maritime boundary.

2 Perception and its role in the pattern of interaction between states

Realist theory, until the late 1950s, was dominant in the analysis of international relations. States as the main actors were seen as unitary and homogeneous agents, and subjective aspects were left out of the scope of analysis. It was from the 1960s, as Herz (1994) explains,

¹ See details in Sousa's (2018) text.

that international relations studies began to take a cognitive approach to international politics, including elements such as perceptions and false perceptions, psychological environment, belief systems, the role of ideas, etc. These works began to focus on the processing of information by states and how this affected relations between them.

Among these works, Robert Jervis' *Perception and misperception in international politics* highlights precisely the role of perceptions in relations between states, stating that they need to understand how they are perceived by others: whether they see them as threatening or reassuring, weak or strong (in capabilities and determination), as consistent and constant or changeable. In this sense, the author will point out that in order to understand some of the whys of the interaction patterns of states, it is necessary to analyze the decision making of the actors involved, where he focuses his discussion.

Jervis (2017) will take his approach from four levels of analysis: one is the level of decision making, the second is the level of bureaucracy (the functioning of the bureaucracy can determine policy), the third is the nature of the state and the functioning of domestic policy (states with the same internal attributes can react equally when faced with a given situation), and the fourth focuses on the international environment (how the environment affects behavior). We will not have space in this paper to analyze these four levels in detail, so we will focus on what the author himself highlights in his text: decision making.

The author will state that it is at the decision-making level that states perceive the behavior of others and form judgments about their intentions. These judgments are related to the way decision makers construct their beliefs about the world and their images of others. Jervis (2017) will state that this analysis is important for us to understand why states behave in different ways when faced with the same situations, and this is directly related to their perceptions.

These perceptions can take on an affective dimension and in these cases lend support to the proposition that when political judgments exhibit affective-cognitive consistency, the reason is that the "liking" or disliking of another State and views about its specific characteristics are linked through the actor's beliefs about the interests and intentions of others. Wendt (2013) will work with the same idea when he addresses in his paper the process of identity and interest formation.

For Wendt (2013, p. 429, translated) "[...] the distribution of power can always affect the calculations of states, but how this occurs depends on the intersubjective understanding and expectations, the 'distribution of knowledge,' that constitute the conceptions about oneself and others." In this sense, the author will address the construction of identities and interests by states.

For him identities are "[...] relatively stable understandings and expectations of the specific role about oneself [...]." These identities are relational and actors acquire them by participating in collective meanings and "[...] each identity is an inherently social definition of the actor grounded in the theories that actors collectively hold of themselves and others, and which constitutes the structure of the social world" (WENDT, 2013, p. 430, translated).

Still according to the author, these identities are the basis of interests. States define their interests in the process of defining situations, that is, within a social context that always varies according to contingencies.

The processes of identity formation under anarchy are primarily concerned with preserving the 'security' of self. Concepts of security, therefore, differ in the extent to which (and the form in which) the 'self' is cognitively identified with the other and, I want to suggest, it is on this cognitive variation that the meaning of anarchy and the distribution of power depends (WENDT, 2013, p. 433).

Based on this identification of the "self" in relation to the "other," Wendt will define three types of security systems. The way states identify with each other can constitute competitive, individualistic, or cooperative security systems, as shown in Table 1.

In this sense, the identification process between states will be marked by perceptions of the self and the other. Wendt claims that the principle of "[...] identity formation is captured by the symbolic-interactionist notion of the 'looking-self glass,' which states that the 'self' is a reflection of an actor's socialization" (WENDT, 2013, p. 439, translated). The author argues that this sense-making arises from the interaction between actors, and the conceptions and perceptions arising from these interactions are socially constructed, within a process of signaling, interpretation, and response, as Figure 1 demonstrates. It is through this interaction that identities and interests are defined.

Table 1 – Security Systems


COMPETITIVE	Negative identification. The gains of one are seen as loss of the other. Collective action is seen as nearly impossible, given the mistrustful environment.
INDIVIDUALIST	The States "[...] are indifferent in regard their own safety or the others'. [...] The position of a State in the power distribution is less important and collective action is more plausible." (WENDT, 2013, p. 433, 434, own translation).
COOPERATIVE	Positive identification. Security is everyone's responsibility. The "I" is defined in terms of community. National interests are international interests.

Source: The author, based on Wendt (2013).

This understanding leads us to understand the very institute of sovereignty, since it exists by virtue of intersubjective understandings and expectations. Within these expectations we can glimpse that sovereignty does not exist without an "other," since identities are relational and states when interacting mutually recognize each other's right to exercise political authority within a given territory, thus generating a specific type of state—the sovereign state. This type of interaction provides the social basis for states' individuality and security, and in this sense war presents itself as a practice through which states negotiate their individuality (WENDT, 2013).

If they treat each other as if they were sovereign, then over time they will institutionalize this mode of subjectivity; otherwise, this mode will not become the norm. [...] The fact that the practices of sovereignty have been historically oriented to produce distinct territorial spaces, in other words, affects the conception of what one must 'secure' to function in that identity, a process that may help to understand the 'rigidity' of territorial boundaries across centuries (WENDT, 2013, p. 454-455, translated).

Figure 1 – Signaling, interpretation and response process



Source: Wendt (2013, p. 442).

This conception helps us to understand the behavior of Guyana and Suriname when facing their claims to territory both in terms of land borders (New River Triangle case) and maritime borders. The type of state constituted in these countries, as in most of the world, was the imported European model that became institutionalized, of sovereign states whose concern for territorial defense and security is an almost insurmountable item on the political agenda.

In this sense, the socialization reflex among these actors has corroborated to institute a security system based on competitiveness and mistrust. This relationship is clearly noticeable when we analyze Guyana and Suriname's perspectives on the delimitation of their maritime space and how the quest to preserve their interests and resources culminated in threats to use force, deteriorating bilateral relations and dialogue-building channels.

The construction of identities and interests, as well as the perception of one in relation to the other, can define whether relations between states will be closer or further apart. In the case of Guyana and Suriname, the territorial issues have defined a pendulum relationship that has been characterized by rapprochement, with attempts at agreements and the establishment of treaties, and by distancing with focuses of tension and hostility as a result of the interpretation of maneuvers by each state. In the following sections, we will unfold the set of arguments of each state faced with the claim of maritime delimitations, in which we will note the different perceptions faced with the same facts and how these perceptions corroborated to define the behavior of the states faced with the dispute.

3 Historical-political construction of the maritime borders between Guyana and Suriname

The problem involving the borders of Guyana and Suriname is an inheritance from the colonial period, a pattern also followed by other former colonies that achieved their independence with territories not fully delimited. In the case of Guyana and Suriname, the delimitation was in charge of the British crown and the then Dutch government, respectively. The two countries declared their independence with several territorial disputes and this was reflected in the episode that occurred in the year 2000, which will be analyzed further on.

Therefore, for the understanding of the present study, we will highlight three important moments that were defining in the construction of the first attempts of a border delimitation agreement regarding the maritime space. However, it is important to emphasize that the establishment of maritime boundaries always needs a starting point from terrestrial space, and this starting point has been the element of greatest discussion in the whole problematic involving the present dispute.

The first moment to be highlighted goes back to the colonial period, with the agreement signed in 1799 between the British crown and the Dutch. In this agreement, the boundary that had been established in 1674 between the British and Dutch settlements, which was on the small river called Devil's Creek, was moved. This river remained for almost one hundred years the border between the colony of Suriname and Berbice, a colony in Guyana. However, in 1799

a new agreement established the west bank of the Corentyne River as the border between the two colonies (Donovan, 2003). Hoyle (2001) states that from then on this agreement made the Corentyne a Dutch river. The method adopted for this demarcation did not follow the rule of international law, which establishes a middle line in the middle of the river (called the *Thalweg*) as the line of demarcation between river borders, passing control of the entire Corentyne River to Suriname.

According to the arguments set out in the two Memoranda submitted to the Arbitral Tribunal in 2005, on the occasion of the arbitration proceedings brought by Guyana, the two countries agreed that the territorial relationship established in 1799 was legitimate, but that in the Surinamese understanding there was no specific legally binding understanding concerning the full scope of the legal implications of this cession of territory (Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2005a). Defining the land boundary would involve establishing a point where it would end so that maritime boundaries could be established from there.

The second moment that marks the delineations of this border construction reaches the year 1936, when a mixed commission was formed by British and Dutch commissioners to establish a milestone that would define the end of the land border, that is, the starting point to delimit the maritime spaces. This was the first opportunity for countries to define their territorial sea. On this occasion, the British and Dutch governments pointed to Point 61 (Point 1936 in Suriname nomenclature) as a possible landmark to reference for establishing the maritime boundary.

However, there was no consensus between the parties as to the said demarcation point. While Guyana (Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2005b) stated that in this period an agreement was reached that the maritime boundary should be a straight line emanating from the end of the land border (Point 61) at an angle of 28° to the three-mile limit of the territorial sea, which was then the customary boundary under international law, Suriname (Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2005a), on the other hand, stated that the said point was not legally binding, but acknowledged that the role of the joint commission was an attempt to define a definitive legal instrument regarding the land and maritime boundary and that it had a relevant place in the diplomacy and practice between the parties and their colonial predecessors.

Both the 1799 agreement and the work of the joint commission were provisional in nature. The text of the 1799 agreement itself is configured as being “[...] some arrangements by which all the Ends wished for might be obtained without precluding the final Regulations which, on determining the future fate of the Colonies, their Sovereign or Sovereigns in time being, might judge proper to establish with respect to the Boundary” (Donovan, 2003, p. 52). This fact is proven in the powers’ own behavior, in the years that followed, as they continued their attempts to find a definitive solution. However, Hoyle (2001) states that by 1936 there were already political elements in place for a final agreement to be reached and that had it not been for World War II, perhaps the powers would have finalized an agreement.


Both Guyana and Suriname agreed that the joint commission developed a line to delimit the territorial waters adjacent to the two colonies. However, the Guyanese argument pointed to a 28° line (later changed to 34° with the principle of equidistance) while Suriname pointed to a 10° line, clai-

ming that this line delimited its territorial sea as well as the maritime areas beyond it (PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, 2005a).

In the 1950s, other attempts were made by the colonies to reach a definitive solution, but none were successful. As Donovan (2003) notes, border issues between the two countries had little relevance until the discovery of important natural resources, such as the gold deposits in the New River Triangle area and the offshore oil opportunities on the continental shelf. In this sense, resolving these issues was economically expedient for both nations.

It was precisely in 1958 that the British crown formalized the first oil exploration concession on Guyana's continental shelf, and the California Oil Company (now Exxon) was awarded the contract (Donovan, 2003). It was from the 1950s that both countries began issuing concessions to foreign companies for oil exploration and these concessions or permits, when viewed against each other, clearly show an area of overlapping maritime boundaries, as shown in Figure 2. This area of overlap is the result of the different positions adopted by the parties, in which Suriname defended a 10° line (red line) to define the maritime limit and Guyana defended a line following 34° (black line), making up an area of 31,600 km² placed in dispute and rich in hydrocarbons.

Figure 2 – Concession area and overlap



Source: Adapted from Permanent Court of Arbitration (2005a).

Finally, the third formal opportunity for an agreement came at the time of the independence of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana in 1966, when the UK hosted direct negotiations between Guyana and Suriname (not yet independent). The purpose of these negotiations was to explore a formal boundary agreement once again, and they were held at Marlborough House in London. On this occasion, Guyana affirmed its position on delimiting the territorial waters from a line of equidistance, and there was no consensus on the part of Suriname, which defended other criteria for establishing the delimitation, such as the chain of geographical circumstances (Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2005b).

The years that followed saw little dialogue around a definitive agreement between the two countries, and the other negotiations that did take place had no practical effect, such as the 1991 Memorandum of Understanding (Donovan, 2004). Both continued with their oil exploration concessions to foreign companies and Suriname founded its own national oil company (Staatsolie) in the 1980s. In June 1998, Guyana issued a prospecting license to the company CGX Resources Inc. and it was from the year 2000 that CGX's activities were challenged by the Surinamese government. According to Moreira (2012), Suriname carried out maneuvers with armed ships to expel the CGX drilling vessel, as it claimed that it was developing activities in space belonging to its territory. According to statements from the CGX crew to the Arbitral Tribunal (United Nations, 2007), they feared violent action and withdrew from the concession area.

Bharrat Jagdeo, then president at the time of Guyana in an address to the nation, thus spoke about the relationship between the two countries and the events concerning the border issues:

You are familiar with all our differences with neighboring Suriname on border issues. One of them - the one concerning our maritime border - has been the object of current controversy in a context that has a bearing on our development prospects. [...] Suriname has taken aggressive measures to frustrate the prospection and exploration of hydrocarbons in our territory (Lima, 2011, p. 118, translated).

In the same month of the event, Guyana and Suriname held a ministerial meeting in Trinidad and Tobago, under the good offices of the Prime Minister of the host country, in order to broker a negotiation. On another occasion, at the 21st Meeting of CARICOM Heads of Government, held in St. Lucia, the country's capital. Vincent and the Grenadines on July 2-5, 2000, the CARICOM Presidents and Prime Ministers issued a statement on Guyana and Suriname, reaffirming the importance of resolving the dispute by peaceful means.

However, in late 2003, Guyana stated that there was no prospect of resolving the separate dispute that arose with Suriname over the threat of the use of force in June 2000. It understood that further attempts to negotiate a maritime delimitation agreement would be futile and fruitless. The only viable option, according to Guyana's argument, would be to invoke its rights under the 1982 Convention and initiate the arbitration process (Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2005b).

4 The 2007 arbitration award

As seen in the arguments of Guyana and Suriname, both had different claims regarding the delimitation of the Territorial Sea, the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf. However, the issue involving the Territorial Sea was the one with the greatest inflection, since this directly involves the baseline, i.e., the land starting point at which the maritime zones are established and, according to the previous arguments, both parties disagreed on the location of this point, since it involved another border pendency on the Corentyne River, as seen.

In light of this, the Court was faced with four questions to be elucidated. The first concerned the Court's own legitimacy to deal with the case, as Suriname in its argument stated that there were no jurisdictional prerogatives for the Court under the Convention, as it involved land border issues. The second question concerned the delimitation of the Territorial Sea in light of the evolution of the Law of the Sea and the domestic legislations of both contending parties. The third, similar to the second, also concerned the delimitations of the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf, and finally, the Tribunal would have to verify whether Guyana's accusation of the threatened use of force by Suriname on June 3, 2000 constituted a violation of international rules.

Of these four agendas, we will specifically address the issues related to the definition of maritime boundaries in order to clarify the position of the Court as well as the jurisprudence developed to resolve disputes of this nature.

4.1 Territorial Sea Limits

Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade (2014) in his text analyzes the indications for fixing the maritime lateral limits and highlights the principle of equidistance (which would be the rule according to Article 15 of the Convention)² and special circumstances (which would be the exception, given its indeterminate character) and states that there are those who intend to establish a hierarchy between them: "[...] thus, the equidistance method would apply, in the absence of agreement, unless there were special circumstances" (Trindade, 2014, p. 169, translated). This vagueness or lack of a specific method has translated into several conflicts of interest on the part of the states, including Guyana and Suriname, as each has used a method adopted in the jurisprudence that best suits their claims. In this sense, the arduous task of the courts is to establish the most equitable method possible that meets the political and economic welfare of the nations involved.

In this sense, the Arbitral Tribunal responsible for judging the case object of this study interpreted the special circumstances principle in a combined manner, that is, it stated that "[...] the function of the 'special circumstances' conditioned in Article 15 is to ensure an equitable delimitation; and the combined 'equidistance-special circumstances' rule, in effect, gives particular expression to a general rule [...]" (United Nations, 2007, p. 95, translated). The Court agreed that

2 Article 15: Delimitation of the territorial sea between states with adjacent or opposite coasts: When the coasts of two states are adjacent or opposite each other, neither state has the right, unless otherwise agreed by both, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line, the points of which are equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each of these states is measured. However, this article shall not apply when, by reason of the existence of historical titles or other special circumstances, it is necessary to delimit the territorial sea of the two states differently.

special circumstances that may affect a delimitation must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis and stated that "international courts and tribunals are not restricted by a finite list of circumstances" (United Nations, 2007, p. 95, translated).

In the Guiana-Suriname case the arbitration found that navigational interests constituted such special circumstances. In this regard, the Court referred to the work of the 1936 Joint Commission which adopted the 10° line as the boundary between the 3-mile territorial sea of both countries and which at the time took into account the navigational circumstances and Suriname's sovereignty over the entire Corentyne River.

Against this background and based on the international courts' own jurisprudence, the Court concluded that the special circumstances of navigation could justify the adjustment to the median line of equidistance (which is the rule under the aforementioned Article 15) and that the historical record amply supports the conclusion that the predecessors of the parties agreed to the 10° boundary line because at the time the Corentyne River belonged to the territory of Suriname and the said line provided adequate access across the territorial sea to the western channel of the said river (United Nations, 2007).

When defining the question of special circumstances, from the starting point to follow the 10° line (Point 1936/61) the Court proceeded in the extension and proportion of the line that would follow delimiting the territorial sea, considering that in the works of the Joint Commission of 1936 there was only a territorial sea of 3 miles, whose expansion to 12 miles occurred much later in light of the development of the Law of the Sea itself. When Guyana and Suriname expanded their territorial waters, they did not make any effort as to how this space would be delimited, which would even affect the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf.

According to Suriname's argument, the Court should establish that the 10° line, which served for the 3 miles, automatically be extended to the current 12 miles. However, the Court considered two issues: the first concerned the fact that Guyana objected to the 10° line in the 1960s, long before countries extended their territorial seas, and there was no reason to now claim that a 10° line should extend to 12 miles as a result of a change in the law. The second question concerned the Court's own position on the issue of navigation. An automatic extension of the line would no longer be relevant in the case of special circumstances, and Guyana's position on establishing the equidistance line would also affect historical navigation arrangements (Tanaka, 2007; United Nations, 2007).

Faced with these issues, the Tribunal would have to find a method that met the 10° line up to a distance of 3 miles but that contemplated a line through the 12-mile extension and connected with the line that would uniquely delimit the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. In this regard, as mentioned earlier, the Court adopted a mixed method of equidistance and special circumstances in order to produce an equitable result for both parties.

The Court established that the line of delimitation in the territorial sea would be drawn from the point where the 10° line intersects the 3-mile limit, at which point the equidistance line drawn intersects the 12-mile limit, as shown in Figure 3. In the judgment of the Court, this delimitation prevents a sudden passage of the Corentyne River access area and interposes a gra-

dual transition from the 3-mile point to the 12-mile point ensuring, in this sense, navigational conveniences (United Nations, 2007).

Figure 3 – Court Decision on the Territorial Sea



Source: Adapted from United Nations (2007).

In this regard, the Tribunal took into account the work of the 1936 Joint Commission, the conduct of the parties in relation to the 10° line, and the special circumstances concerning the issues of navigation and Suriname's sovereignty over the Corentyne River. By not following the customary law norm (the *thalweg*), which defines the boundary delimitation when it is rivers, Guyana and Suriname made historical arrangements of an unusual nature in Law where they established, by agreement even if provisional as Guyana argued, that the 10° line would be the boundary between the territorial seas of both countries and that Point 61/1936 would be the starting point for that purpose. Therefore, the Court made use of all these elements to justify its jurisdiction over the case, within the provisions of the Convention itself.

4.2 Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf

According to article 74 of the Convention, the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between states with adjacent coasts or facing each other must be made by agreement between the interested parties in order to reach an equitable solution. If an agreement is not reached within a reasonable time, the states concerned must resort to the procedures seen above, namely the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the International Court of Justice, arbitral tribunal, and special arbitral tribunal.

In South America we have interesting examples of countries that have used bilateral agreements to delimit their respective adjacent maritime areas. Brazil established agreements with France (French Guyana) in 1981 and with Uruguay in 1975, contributing to friendly relations in the maritime space. Argentina and Uruguay also established the practice of bilateral agreement between their maritime borders, with the signing of a treaty in 1973 (Trindade, 2014). Article 74 further spells out that until an agreement is reached, the states concerned, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to reach provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, they shall do nothing that might compromise or hinder the conclusion of a definitive agreement and such arrangements shall not prejudice the definitive delimitation.

These same provisions also accompany the delimitation of the continental shelf. What differs between these two legal regimes are the rights and duties that the coastal state has with respect to these spaces. In this sense, Menezes (2015) explains that the exclusive economic zone is under the set of the "surface space", which covers the territorial sea, the contiguous zone and the high seas, and that the continental shelf is circumscribed in the "submerged space", which disciplines about the care of marine life, the bed and subsoil and the area of the seabed.

In relation to the continental shelf, this was subject to regulation by the Geneva Convention³ of 1958, but only gained practical attention by the States after the declarations of the United States, recognizing the extension of the land mass towards the sea as belonging to the territory of the coastal State. The North American declarations pushed Mexico (1945), Argentina (1946), Chile (1947) and Brazil (1950) to claim rights over this space as well. The Geneva Convention had adopted a double criterion of depth and exploitability for the definition of the continental shelf, however, the 1982 Convention enshrined the criterion of definition following the geological sense of this space (MENEZES, 2015).

It is interesting to note that the work carried out to define the extent of the continental shelf included the economic possibilities of exploiting minerals in the seabed, especially hydrocarbons. The importance given to the resources found in the maritime space finds in the case between Guyana and Suriname a great precedent, given that the interest in this space gained volume on the agenda of these states as the discovery of oil in the region gained visibility, as we have seen in previous arguments. In this sense, the delimitation of the

3 This Convention refers to the four texts that were signed at the First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.


maritime areas between the two countries has become a priority in bilateral relations that have not been able to reach an agreement, therefore resorting to international arbitration.

When we analyze the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal concerning the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of Guyana and Suriname we can see that it followed the delineations of the jurisprudence in similar cases. In this sense, the Court's great desire was not merely to establish a satisfactory method of delimitation, but to seek an equitable solution that would take into account the factors relevant to the case.

In this regard, the Court assessed that the drawing of a single maritime boundary would be the most feasible solution, although this does not have its origin in the Convention "[...] but is based directly on state practice and law as developed by international courts and tribunals" (United Nations, 2007, p. 108, translated). According to the view of the arbitration, such a decision would avoid possible future conflicts concerning practical issues in relation to the rights of each state in these areas. Given this, the Court's position followed the jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals that establish two phases when proceeding to delimit the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the continental shelf (CS). The scheme shown in table 2 demonstrates the process adopted by the court.

Tanaka (2012) lists what these special circumstances would be, dividing them into two groups: those related to geographical factors and those that are independent of geography. The special circumstances relating to geographical factors are: configuration of the coastline; proportionality; baselines; presence of islands; geological and geomorphological factors; and presence of third states. Those that are not imbricated with geographical aspects are: economic factors; conduct of the parties; historical rights; security interests; navigational factors, and environmental factors.

Table 2 – EEZ and CS delimitation process



Source: The author (2021).

Regarding the case of Guyana and Suriname the Court evaluated both geographical and non-geographical aspects, as it reflected on the configuration of the coastline and the conduct of

the parties in relation to the EEZ and CS. In this regard, since the equidistance line is the line where each point is equidistant from the closest point to the baselines, the Court considered assessing the relevant coasts from which the provisional equidistance line would be drawn. In the Court's opinion, the relevant coastline for determining Guyana's provisional equidistance line extends from Devonshire Castle Flats to the vicinity of Point 61/1936 and the relevant coastline for Suriname extends from Bluff Point, the point on the east bank of the Corentyne River used in 1936 as the mouth of the river, to a point on Vissers Bank (United Nations, 2007), as Figure 4 points out.

When we evaluate the arguments of the parties, both agree that the geography of the coast is of fundamental importance in the process. However, Suriname believes that the dispute should be resolved solely on the basis of the coastal geography of the delimitation area. Guyana, on the other hand, claims that the resolution of the dispute depends not only on coastal geography, but on history, including the conduct of activities by the parties.

Thus, the Court held that the peculiarities of the maritime areas to be delimited can be taken into consideration, however, they are only relevant circumstances that may or may not be considered pertinent to adjust or shift the provisional delimitation line. After evaluating this item, the Court concluded that the geographical configuration of Guyana and Suriname does not represent a circumstance that justifies adjusting or shifting the provisional equidistance line in order to obtain an equitable solution (United Nations, 2007). This is justified by the fact that there are no large promontories, islands, peninsulas, bays or other features of this nature on the coasts of the parties, configuring a relatively regular coastline as shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4 – Configuration of the coast of Guyana and Suriname



Source: Adapted from Google Maps (2021).

After considering the geographical aspects, the Court proceeded in the analysis with respect to the conduct of the parties. It is worth remembering that these two special circumstances were pointed out by the parties and the latter had special emphasis in Guyana's arguments. In this regard, the arbitration examined the conduct of activities in the disputed area by Guyana and Suriname, especially the practice of oil.

Tanaka (2012) comments that the influence of the parties' conduct is very limited in case law regarding maritime delimitation. He states that the only exception is the Tunisia/Libya judgment, which clearly took this conduct into account. In this case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) attached great importance to a line of fact drawn as a result of concessions for oil and gas exploration granted by both parties.

In the mentioned case, the ICJ itself analyzed that oil concessions are generally not in themselves considered as relevant circumstances justifying adjustment or shifting of the provisional delimitation line. This would only be possible through an express or tacit agreement between the parties (United Nations, 2007). In this regard, the Arbitral Tribunal stated that it found no evidence of any agreement between Guyana and Suriname relating to such a practice and that the conduct of activities concerning oil concessions cannot be taken into account as a factor in adjusting the provisional equidistance line.

In examining the configuration of the coastline and the conduct of the parties, the Court decided that it does not consider that there are any circumstances on the continental shelf or in the exclusive economic zone that would require an adjustment to the provisional equidistance line and that there would be no factors that could make the equidistance line determined by the Court unequal. Because the parties did not choose to argue the relative distribution of living and non-living natural resources across these zones, the Court did not take these issues into account (United Nations, 2007).

After the judgment issued by the Court, Suriname in 2007 showed displeasure in an emergency session of the Surinamese Parliament, instituting an opposition motion in which it urged the government to establish a national review commission to examine the judgment and challenge it. According to Surinamese officials, the decision was not fair and equitable, as Guyana was granted 65% of the 31,600 square kilometers, while Suriname received the remaining 35% (CGX Energy, 2007).

Also according to CGX Energy (2007), the opposition consulted several experts by creating a panel in order to challenge the calculations made by the Court. This panel had the objective of listing several legal arguments with which the government of Suriname could challenge the arbitration award. However, President Venetiaan at the time consulted several other local and international experts and universities in the Netherlands and the UK to comment on the panel's arguments, and the government was advised not to challenge the report based on its findings.

This was the thirteenth international trial in the field of maritime delimitation under the auspices of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. Tanaka (2007) comments on the arbitration award in the following terms:

Overall it appears that the Guyana/Suriname arbitration ensures the continuity of case law in the field of maritime delimitation. At the same time, the Guyana/Suriname

arbitration sheds some light on several issues which have not been adequately addressed by international courts and tribunals in this field. For instance, it is worth noting that the Tribunal explicitly regarded navigation as a special circumstance in the delimitation of the territorial seas.³¹ It is also notable that the Tribunal addressed the question of whether and how, in the absence of an agreement to do so, a delimitation should be extended from the previous limit of territorial sea (3 nm) to a newly established limit (12 nm) (Tanaka, 2007, p. 33).

In light of these issues, arbitration in the present case makes significant contributions and sheds light on disputes that have not yet been properly addressed by the countries involved. This concerns the countries north of South America and as Chaves (2016, p. 52, translated) concludes, "the Guianas Plateau has a multidimensional geopolitics, and that in these possibilities, its Amazon-Caribbean nexus represents enormous potential for South America-Caribbean integration." In this sense, the current developments in relation to the political crisis in Venezuela draw attention to border disputes that remain frozen, both with respect to land space and, especially, to maritime space, since the latter is intertwined with the issues of oil exploration, a much-disputed resource in the region.

These frozen disputes concern the issues in the Essequibo between Guyana and Venezuela, whose dispute is both land and maritime, and pendencies between Venezuela and Colombia in the Gulf region, whose implications are also focused on oil prospecting areas.

5 Concluding remarks

In light of the above, we can see that the Court decided with the intention of achieving an equitable result between the parties, based on the long-standing jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals, producing a solution that, as seen in the previous sections, would probably not have been achieved by other means, given the degree of deterioration in bilateral relations between Guyana and Suriname.

In 2017, the award turned 10 years old, and according to the events related to the opposition's motion in 2007 and the evaluation of it by experts from renowned institutions, it is unlikely that Suriname will yet intend to challenge the Arbitral Tribunal's decision. In a region whose scenario is still unstable in terms of territorial integrity, if we take into account the litigations still pending solution, we will verify that the best path to be followed by these two small centers of power is to intensify a cohesive regionalization process that allows the construction of more open and transparent dialogues, consolidating development policies in a more favorable, integrated environment that breathes more security when it comes to its borders, be they maritime or land borders.

Another point that deserves attention is the oil industry, which, with respect to the maritime space between Guyana and Suriname, presented itself as the central issue in the claims, as demonstrated throughout the discussions presented. Treves (2007) comments that since the Convention regulates most aspects of the Law of the Sea, its relevance is obvious to the oil and gas industry, since its spectrum is wide, from the discovery of new wells around

the world with the application of new technologies, to exploration, refining, and transportation issues that directly impact navigation issues and the protection and preservation of the marine environment. In this sense, the Court could be used more, presenting today an idle potential that, however, can act to the benefit of the states in settling questions concerning such important activities in the maritime space and those concerning border delimitations.

The resolution of the maritime dispute between Guyana and Suriname may have potentially influenced the Guyana government's November 19, 2018 submission to the International Court of Justice of a memorial concerning the Essequibo dispute with Venezuela. This conflict has both a land and a sea dimension and, in this sense, Guyana has chosen the Court to settle the matter, since Venezuela is not a signatory to the Convention on the Law of the Sea. The case studied in this paper took three years in trial process until the final decision (2004-2007), however, between Venezuela and Guyana the time lapse may be longer, because it will be necessary to work on both fronts: land and sea. The resolution of this long-standing dispute in the Essequibo region can contribute significantly to the region's development process, which is plastered by border conflicts, and the case analyzed here can serve as a parameter in issues concerning the maritime space.

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The socioeconomic impact of the military presence on the north borders: Barcelos-AM and the 3rd Jungle Infantry Battalion

El reflejo socioeconómico de la presencia militar en la frontera norte: Barcelos-AM y el 3º Batallón de Infantería de Selva

Abstract: Brazil has 588 municipalities in its Border Band, some of which are in regions still lacking in development, such as those located in Arco Norte. Therefore, the present work proposes to carry out a case study of the presence and contribution of a Military Organization of the Brazilian Army in the city of Barcelos-AM, to answer the following questions: how the presence of the 3rd BIS directly contributes to the generation in employment and income in the municipality of Barcelos-AM, in 2018? Does this presence significantly add income to the municipality? Does it generate jobs? Is it an alternative for the young population? These questions guide the objective of understanding the impact of the State's role in a region distant from the great economic centers and geographically isolated from the rest of the country and how state investment promotes development. In this context, the research has as its method the analysis of economic indicators that collaborate with the composition of the HDI in the municipality of Barcelos. The work is based on bibliographic research, primary data and government documents.

Keywords: Defense; Borders; Presence Strategy; Development; HDI.

Resumen: Brasil tiene 588 municipios en su Franja de Frontera, algunos de los cuales se encuentran en regiones que aún carecen de desarrollo, como los ubicados en el Arco Norte. Por lo tanto, el presente trabajo se propone realizar un estudio de caso de la presencia y de la contribución de una Organización Militar del Ejército Brasileño en la ciudad de Barcelos-AM, con el fin de responder a las siguientes preguntas: ¿cómo la presencia del 3º BIS contribuye directamente a la generación de empleo y renta en la ciudad de Barcelos-AM, en 2018? ¿Esta presencia agrega significativamente ingresos al municipio? ¿Genera empleos? ¿Es una alternativa para la población joven? Estas preguntas orientan el objetivo de comprender el impacto del papel del Estado en una región alejada de los grandes centros económicos y geográficamente aislada del resto del país y cómo la inversión estatal promueve el desarrollo. En este contexto, la investigación tiene como método el análisis de indicadores económicos que colaboran con la composición del IDH en el municipio de Barcelos. El trabajo se basa en investigaciones bibliográficas, datos primarios y documentos gubernamentales.

Palabras clave: Defensa; Fronteras; Estrategia de Presencia; Desarrollo; IDH.

Carlos Henrique Arantes de Moraes 

Exército Brasileiro. Comando da
22ª Brigada de Infantaria de Selva.
Macapá, AP, Brasil.
chdemoraes@gmail.com

Dan Milli Pereira 

Exército Brasileiro. Escola de Comando e
Estado Maior do Exército.
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.
danmillipereira@gmail.com

Tássio Franchi 

Exército Brasileiro. Escola de Comando e
Estado Maior do Exército.
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.
tasfranchi@gmail.com

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1 Introduction

Throughout the twentieth century, the Brazilian Amazon had a central role in several public policies that sought to consolidate ownership, colonize, integrate, and develop the region (HEMMING, 2009). It was mainly during the colonial period that the limits of the country expanded from the Treaty of Tordesillas towards the Andes, through the channel of the Amazon River and its tributaries. Through the construction of forts and villages, the Portuguese Crown took possession of the area, ratifying the fact in several treaties such as Madrid (1750) (CASTRO, 2009). The Empire of Brazil fostered the region's colonization, including the direct participation of military personnel through the founding of military colonies that had a dual function, that of defense and of developing agriculture and other productive activities (PAIM; FRANCHI, 2020). As territorial disputes ceased and the delimitation of borders was consolidated, the last being the Pirara issue, in 1904, in the current territory of the state of Roraima (OLIVEIRA; MAGALHÃES, 2008), the Brazilian state was more concerned with integrating the region. In the transition period from the 19th to the 20th century, the figure of Marshal Candido Rondon incorporated the integration actions not only of the region but also of the indigenous people, through the various commissions for the installation of telegraph lines, recognition and demarcation of borders and the creation of the Indian Protection Service (RODRIGUES, 2017). During Getúlio Vargas' governments, attempts at integration and the creation of policies and agencies with the specific function of developing the Amazon continued, such as the Westward March (MAIA, 2010) and the Superintendency for the Amazon Development-SUDAM (FRANCHI, 2013). During the period of military governments, several actions between 1964 and 1985 can be observed. The creation of the Manaus Free Trade Zone, by the then president Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco; the Carajás, Serra do Navio and other mining poles and projects; the expansion of the road network and the state's presence, creating a more effective network of communication and control in the region (BECKER, 2009). In the 21st century, regional integration plans have continued and expanded with initiatives such as the "Growth Acceleration Plans (PAC I and II) and the Initiative for the Integration of Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA). That, according to Edna Castro, "assume the same competitive integration orientation, adopting a modernization model based on mega investment projects. Both are articulated by the conception of integration and development axes" (CASTRO, 2012, p. 45). In addition, a whole series of hydroelectric plants were implemented to supply the region with an essential element for modern development, electric energy (MORETTO, 2012). Generally, in the Amazon, "human occupation has increased in obedience to the economic cycles experienced in the region" (THÉRY, 2005, p. 40).

In the National Defense Policies of Brazil (BRASIL, 2020c), the aspect of contribution to development can be seen among the official arguments present in the document and in other public policies developed by the Armed Forces that translate into actions and procedures regarding defense matters and security in the region, highlighting the doctrinal manuals of the Brazilian Army for *Operations in the Jungle* (BRASIL, 1997a), *Survival in the Jungle* (BRASIL, 1999) and the Jungle Infantry Battalion (BRASIL, 1997b) that deepen the Land Force's action in the region.

The local diversity, added to Brazil's vast territorial extension and the difficulties in developing the region, demand a more effective national posture in the management and sustainable regional development (BECKER, 2009; MEDEIROS FILHO, 2020). In this context, the Amazon presents as a particularity a low population density, lack of infrastructure such as highways and ports, which sometimes hinders economic development and integration with the rest of Brazil. This enables the emergence of “peripheral areas and spaces that are not legally appropriate” (BECKER, 2009, p. 35), and may allow for a resurgence of geopolitical and securitization themes due to the regional social and economic condition (MEDEIROS FILHO, 2020).

All these characteristics presented grow in importance the subject of debate on the military presence in the Amazon, particularly in the most displaced municipalities in the border strip. Where the weakness in economic development enhances threats to security and defense, which requires actions from the Armed Forces to assist in the development and integration of these regions and not just in the territorial defense function. From this, questions arise on how a Military Organization contributes to the local development of municipalities far from large urban centers? Does the presence of a military organization generate significant income and employment opportunities to the municipalities? To answer this question, we chose to analyze a particular case: the municipality of Barcelos and the 3rd BIS.

Barcelos is a municipality that is characterized by being one of these spaces. Located in the north of the state of Amazonas, more precisely in the Negro River microregion, with an estimated population in 2020 of 27,638 people and over a land area of 122,461,086km² (IBGE, [2020]). In 2010, the city received a Military Organization from the Brazilian Army, meeting the institution's strategic priorities, deterrence, and presence (BRASIL, 2017).

Having presented the context, this article sought to answer the following question: *How does the presence of the 3rd BIS directly contributes to the generation of employment and income in the city of Barcelos-AM, in 2018?* For this purpose, the text is organized as follows. In the first part, the theoretical and methodological foundations of the research. This is followed by a presentation of the Presence Strategy and a discussion of the socioeconomic data collected, after which the conclusion of the study.

2 Theories and methods

2.1 Methodological framework

The methodology applied in this research is a case study. According to Yin (2001, p. 20), this methodology is used for Political Science purposes and can be used for organizational and managerial studies, regional planning, and studies in public institutions, contributing to our understanding of social and political phenomena.

It also allows an investigation to preserve the holistic and significant characteristics of real-life events (YIN, 2001), as in the case of this study, the deployment of a Military Organization in a municipality within the state of Amazonas, causing changes to the region and the maturation of some local sectors.

In accordance with the aforementioned methodology, the socioeconomic field of Barcelos society will be raised as a theoretical variant (dependent), analyzing some operational variants (independent) that influence that field, such as the GDP rate, the GDP per capita, the formal employment rate and the contribution to local trade.

The municipality of Barcelos was chosen to feature in this case study not because it is a simple sampling unit (GEORGE; BENNET, 2005; YIN, 2001), but to confront a Brazilian geopolitical theory, checking for applicability and positive results, still in contemporaneity.

Regarding the location of a Military Organization in the Amazon, the case of Barcelos is the most recent¹, so much so that it is still in the process of deployment. This offers different data from other municipalities, also border and Amazonian, which have consolidated representations of the Brazilian Army. Furthermore, after more than a decade since the beginning of the deployment, it is expected that the local effects already have perception in the variants chosen for the analysis of the case study.

2.2 Theoretical framework

This study dialogues with the works of authors Carlos de Meira Mattos (2011a; 2011b), Bertha Becker (2009), Oscar Medeiros Filho (2020), Fernando da Silva Rodrigues (2020a; 2020b), Hervé Théry (2005), Therezinha de Castro (1994), José Augusto Drummond (2002), Lia Osório Machado (2005), among other authors who offer support for thinking about the Amazon in general and specifically the role of military organizations in the region. The notes of these authors will be of great value for understanding the geopolitical dynamics and securitization of the Amazon region.

For Mattos, “borders define the distribution of political areas and reflect, to the extent that space is power, the power relations between states” (2011a, p. 108). Machado (2005), on the other hand, deals with the definition of border with complexity due to different state organizations and, with that, different notions over time. The author also approximates the concept of border with the emergence of the understanding of sovereignty, since it was necessary to limit the “space policed by the sovereign administration” (MACHADO, 2005, p. 246). These relations, when stable, allow a peaceful coexistence and the fulfillment or establishment of peace treaties.

Nevertheless, the formation of borders results from a dynamism, arising from the population growth, the land valuation and the pressure of contiguity, this last element comprises Friedrich Ratzel's concept of living space (MATTOS, 2011a). In this sense, the border, as it is a sensitive area, shall have a clear and precise delimitation, avoiding the emergence of a critical area with confrontations and/or clashes with neighboring states (MATTOS, 2011b).

1 The 22nd Jungle Infantry Brigade was deployed in Macapá-AP after the 3rd BIS, in 2018, however, there was already the presence of the 34th Jungle Infantry Battalion in the city.

According to geographer Bertha Becker (2009, p. 23), the occupation process in the Amazon has three periods. The first of these effected the “slow and gradual appropriation” of the region by Portugal and, consequently, by Brazil. She also highlights the dependence on the foreign market to encourage occupation, the use of the geopolitical strategy to ensure the occupation of strategic locations and ensure sovereignty over the territory, in addition to the exploration of an occupation model that relied on population contact between metropolis and indigenous peoples, encouraging development through endogenous growth.

The second period identified by Becker (2009), called “regional planning”, took place between 1930 and 1985. At that time, territorial occupation in the Amazon occurred through various government incentives to develop the region, for example, the Central Brazil Foundation (1944), the Superintendence for Economic Valorization of the Amazon (1966), the deployment of highways Belém-Brasília (1959) and Brasília-Acre (1960), the creation of the Manaus Free Trade Zone (1957), the Calha Norte Project (1985), among others (BECKER, 2009, p. 24).

In the last period highlighted by Becker (2009, p. 27), the author cites an “emptying of the national developmentalist model and an increase in the participation of traditional peoples in local decisions”. Although there is an emptying, there is a concern by the state to reactivate its borders, through integration, which allows the fight against illicit activities, assigning a “new strategic role” (BECKER, 2009, p. 56).

Thus, Becker’s studies (2009) reveal a focus on the internal issues of the Amazon borders. Her studies verified the dichotomy between potential natural resources and environmental restrictions, which highlights the difficulty of meeting the socio-environmental and technological scientific fields due to the difficulty in inserting the region into extra-regional markets (DRUMOND, 2002). The extractive economy, sometimes seen as the Amazon’s hope, has no scale or significant weight in the composition of the GDP of the states (CAVALCANTE et al., 2011) and ends up promoting the maintenance of what Drummond (2002) points out of regions with a rich nature and poor people.

Medeiros Filho (2020, P. 78) characterizes the Amazon border as a “challenge to the Brazilian state, demanding the adoption of exceptional territorial policies”. The characteristics already mentioned, such as low population density and logistical difficulties, resulting from natural factors, make the region “peripheral”, lacking an active state policy. For this, Medeiros Filho (2020) presents the concepts of border and frontier, as a new approach able to overcome the limitations of traditional approaches that were often restricted to the meaning of limits. These concepts fit into the municipality of Barcelos, as part of its territory lies on the border with Venezuela, characterizing the border, which refers to a contact strip, the point of separation between territories over which the border states exercise their sovereignty.

On the other hand, the municipal administrative headquarters of Barcelos is located on the frontier, relatively far from the border line and corresponds to the notion of periphery, underexplored regions. This location demands from the state a different attention from that addressed by the borderline, they go beyond the military or diplomatic issues of a jurisdiction between two states, enhancing the country’s internal ills.

The distinction between the notions border (“border division”) and frontier (“periphery border”) is important to the extent that they give rise to different military concerns. While the first suggests classic-type threats (geopolitical issues), the second refers to insurgent threats, whose roots generally lie in the state’s own vulnerabilities (security issues). Both, however, are at the root of the meaning of National State and Armed Forces as its military instrument (MEDEIROS FILHO, 2020, p. 80).

It is verified that Medeiros Filho (2020, p. 90) still evokes the Army’s republican actions for regional development, to combat certain vulnerabilities, in the order of internal sovereignty and territorial integrity. In this sense, Barcelos is in the frontier, which confers not only geopolitical, but also security concerns.

In the scope of a frontier area, Barcelos presents development difficulties. According to data from the Border Diagnosis (NEVES; SILVA; MONTEIRO, 2016), the Negro River basin region suffers from social inequality, the amount of population without income and families below the poverty line. In addition, Barcelos has low urbanization rates, small state and no municipal public security personnel, no federal agreement in the different ministries – except for the Ministry of Integration, moderate assistance dependence on the Bolsa Família, very low level of connectivity in telecommunications and negligible density in transport infrastructure (NEVES; SILVA; MONTEIRO, 2016).

In this sense, the concepts presented by Medeiros Filho (2020) are in line with the studies by Mattos (2011b) and Becker (2009), due to the need to develop peripheral areas, reducing the country’s vulnerabilities, in the geopolitical field or in the security field.

Indeed, on a timeline, Mattos (2011b) notes that an orderly population growth at the border reflects the dynamism between neighbors, contributing to regional peace and stability. Nevertheless, Becker (2009) pays attention to the state’s strategic role in integrating these regions, combating illicit activities and encouraging local economy.

It is also worth highlighting in this theoretical framework the understanding of presence strategy. Beaufre defines strategy as “the art that allows, independently of any technique, to master the problems that the entire duel poses within itself, precisely to allow the techniques to be used with maximum efficiency” (1998, p. 27). In other words, using what is available as efficiently as possible to overcome obstacles that distance the goal to be achieved. Nonetheless, the Brazilian army understands that:

[...] the Strategy, based on the political guidelines, indicates the paths to be followed to overcome or avoid the obstacles that may come before the achievement of objectives, that is, it establishes the way to translate and impose the political will, which, in turn, shall be the expression of the national will, a constitutive element of power” (BRASIL, 2020a, p 1-8).

Therefore, by employing a presence strategy, the Land Force articulates the existence of military forces in certain places in the national territory and, in addition, identifies the ability to move quickly to any region of the country (BRASIL, 2020a), with the purpose of overcoming threats identified by the policy.

Particularly for the Amazonian environment, "the strategy of presence implies, in addition to making itself present (mobility), being present (vivification), with the involvement of government bodies, both civilian and military" (ESTRATÉGIA, 2015, p. 4).

In 2015, the Brazilian Army, through its Center for Strategic Studies (CEEEx), introduced a new concept of protection, meaning beyond sovereignty and territorial integrity, achieving "protection to the Amazonian populations (indigenous or not), the environment, the natural resources, and the strategic terrestrial structures" (ESTRATÉGIA..., 2015, p. 5), this concept emphasizes that the threats found in the defense of the region can reach different actors and/or narratives.

In 2020, studies linked to CEEEx verified the validity of the presence strategy, but indicated the need for technological improvement in communications and means of military organizations that fulfill this role.

When studying the strategy of the Brazilian Army's military presence, we understand that the concern with the role of territorial presence is still valid, but the current model shall be gradually revised in conjunction with technological advances in the field of communications and transport. This advance shall allow the construction of a presence combined with other necessary and permanent military forces and state agencies, provided with great mobility, despite the lack of definition in the budget forecast (RODRIGUES, 2020a, p. 67).

However, other institutions should join this strategy,

The Presence Strategy, within national defense, shall be effectively thought of as a system of interagency operations, with a joint operations command, with the capacity to act at the borders, and in the Guarantee of Law and Order (RODRIGUES, 2020b, p. 67).

The Brazilian Army continues with the presence strategy, particularly in the Amazon region, where the Special Border Platoons and other OMs are located in the main penetrating routes in the country. Certainly, no longer with the vocation to increase its territory, as used by Portuguese expansionism, but to guarantee sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, the presence strategy provides a character that goes beyond the military field and encourages regional development and integration, whether through the injection of resources into the local economy, as will be seen below; or through subsidiary actions that contribute sporadically to


operations ranging from medical and dental care to populations to interagency operations to repress illegal activities in the border area (PAIM; FRANCHI; FRANÇA, 2019).

Finally, the increase in the effort of the presence in the Amazon meets the work presented by Bertha Becker and Carlos de Meira Mattos, throughout the 20th century, in the strengthening of the State's presence in the Amazon region in order to confront external or internal threats that lean over the border of Arco Norte.

3 The Brazilian Army's presence in Barcelos-AM

The territory of the municipality of Barcelos is located in the Calha Norte of the Amazon River, in the basin of the Negro River. The Calha Norte region of the Amazon River is delimited by the entire territory north of the Solimões-Amazonas River and is characterized by being one of the most geographically isolated regions in the country. The only major roads that cross the region in the longitudinal direction are the BR-174, in Roraima and the BR-156, in Amapá. Thus, the regional connection with the rest of Brazil is limited to a few flights at precarious airports (NEVES; SILVA; MONTEIRO, 2016) and the main means of transport is river, made by regional boats that suffer restrictions during flood periods and ebb of rivers².

Figure 1 – Negro River Microregion



Source: The authors (2021).

2 Precipitation varies greatly throughout the year and the region has a high rate of evapotranspiration. The existence of basically two distinct rainfall regimes can be identified, one rainy, with high precipitation and directly influenced by the seasonal migration of the ZCIT in the southern direction, and the other less rainy, with no defined drought period (FISCH; MARENGO; NOBRE, 1998; SOUZA; AMBRIZZI, 2003).

The Negro River basin corresponds to an area of territorial extension of approximately 715,000 km², whose characteristic is the variation of the water level, which varies on average from 10 to 12 meters according to the annual seasonality (SOBREIRO, 2016) and the dark hue, due to the presence of a high load of dissolved organic acids from decomposing organic matter, coming from the “igapó” forest (SIOLI, 1985). The municipality of Barcelos is located on the right bank of Negro River, it is considered the largest municipality in terms of territorial extension in the state of Amazonas with 112,450.76 km² (IBGE, [2020]). The main economic activities in the middle Negro River basin region are swidden agriculture, extraction of forest resources (fruit, wood, and piassava fibers), hunting of wild animals, handicraft and fishing in different modalities (subsistence, commercial, ornamental and sports). Contributions to the local economy are the benefits of Federal Government programs such as Bolsa Família and Bolsa Escola, in addition to retirement and salaried positions such as teachers, health workers and military personnel (SOARES et al., 2008).

The Negro River access road, given the characteristics presented, serves as one of the trafficking routes between Brazil and Colombia, in addition to being a border with Venezuela as well. Despite the trafficking of drugs, women and children, the main illegal trade route that takes place in the region is weapons, particularly due to the dynamics of armed paramilitary groups from neighboring countries (TOBÓN, 2011).

In different historical periods, the presence strategy allowed Brazil to guarantee the territory. Greed over the Amazon territory has been occurring since the colonial period, with the Portuguese and Spanish crowns disputing control of the region. By the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494), what we now call the Brazilian Amazon was under Spanish possession. However, the Portuguese Empire encouraged military expeditions to take possession and build military forts with the intention of setting up a kind of “defensive ring” (BENTO, 2017, p. 82; CASTRO, 1994, p. 144), which made possible the diplomatic rationale for *uti possidetis* years later to confirm Brazil’s sovereignty (REZENDE, 2006). In the imperial period, military forts went beyond the mission of defending territorial integrity. As Mattos (2011b, p. 118) exposes:

Subsequently, we will see that this symbolic experience – strong-population – bore fruit, and the Empire, in 1840, when creating the Military Colonies, intended to extend them as a process of population fixation in certain points of the uninhabited land frontier; the fort was no longer needed, but the barrack would replace it, offering social support to the adjacent population.

The expansion to the west with the purpose of definitively occupying and integrating that region with the rest of the country, as well as a kind of response to the securitization issues on the international agenda, are objectives pursued in the most recent history of the presence strategy.

Currently, the Armed Forces have 44,369 military personnel in the Amazon region. In particular, the Brazilian Army has 29,699³ soldiers (BRASIL, 2019a, p. 45), which represents 14.12% of the institution's⁴ staff and the majority of the military in the region.

In Barcelos, the military presence began in the 18th century, more precisely in 1755, when the place had the name of Mariuá. On the banks of Negro River, Mendonça Furtado – Marquis of Pombal's brother – created the Captaincy of São José do Rio Negro. The creation of a captaincy within Amazonas, which today gave rise to the state of Amazonas, indicated “Pombal's geopolitical determination to effectively occupy the Amazon” (RIBEIRO, 2005, p. 82).

In this way, the city of Barcelos materializes the presence strategy since a historical period when the borders between the National States were not consolidated. Nevertheless, with the transfer of the provincial capital to Manaus in the 19th century, the barrack located in Barcelos was emptied. Its staff was divided between the new capital and the Fort of São José de Marabitanas, located in the district of Cucuí, in São Gabriel da Cachoeira-AM.

After a long period without a military presence in Barcelos, in 2007, the Brazilian Army began the work to transfer the 3rd Infantry Battalion, headquartered in the city of Niterói-RJ, to the municipality of Barcelos-AM. Its activation was carried out in 2010 and, to meet a drastic change in geographic region, the name became the 3rd Jungle Infantry Battalion (BIS), adapting the organization of its resources and personnel to a specific environment such as the Amazon Forest.


Currently, the 3rd BIS is in the deployment phase with its Organizational Framework (QO) incomplete. This measure is common in the arrival of an Army OM in new locations, the deployment is carried out in phases until the full range of the military force (QO) and the necessary means to operate (Material Chart), reaching operational fullness.

Considering the existing manuals in the Brazilian Army, a BIS consists of a commander, its General Staff, a Command Company and three Marine Companies (BRASIL, 1997b, p. 1-6). Currently, the 3rd BIS has only one Command Company and one Marine Company, subordinate to the Command and General Staff (see Figure 2). The installation of the other two Marine companies shall take place in a likely future scenario.

3 This number is the result of the sum of 20,259 military personnel in the Amazon Military Command with 9,440 in the Northern Military Command.

4 The state of Tocantins is not being considered, although this Federation Unit belongs to the North region by the IBGE, the territorial division of the Military Commands includes Tocantins as the area of responsibility of the Planalto Military Command.

Figure 2 – Current organization chart of the 3rd BIS



Source: Prepared by the authors based on BRASIL, 1997b.

In view of Figure 2, the 3rd BIS has three fractions, each with its own organization, whose sum of these three fractions represents an effective number foreseen in that Military Organization, shown in Table 1.

The command of a Military Organization has seven military personnel (BRASIL, 2003a), and it is responsible for producing intelligence knowledge, carrying out situation studies, drawing up plans and orders and supervising their execution (BRASIL, 2003c).

The Command and Support Company of a BIS is composed of a Commander and a Sub-Commander, plus seven Platoons, namely, Command, Health, Supply, Maintenance and Transport, Anti-Tank and Mortars (BRASIL, 2003b).

Finally, the 3rd BIS also has a company of Marines responsible for the tactical maneuver of the Battalion, having three Marine Platoons, a Support Platoon and a Command Section (BRASIL, 1997b).

Table 1 – Staff expected to meet the current Organizational Framework of the 3rd BIS

	Battalion Command	Command and Support Company	Marine Company
Commander	1	1	1
Sub-commander	1	1	-
Staff	5	-	-
Command Section	-	-	18
Marine Platoon	-	-	35 (x3)
Support Platoon	-	-	18
Command Platoon	-	54	-
Health Platoon	-	24	-
Maintenance and Transport Platoon	-	31	-

	Battalion Command	Command and Support Company	Marine Company
Supply Platoon	-	34	-
Anti-Tank Platoon	-	17	-
Mortar Platoon	-	42	-
Communications Platoon	-	25	-
SUM OF EACH FRACTION	7	229	142
TOTAL	378		

Source: Prepared by the authors based on BRASIL, 1997b, 2003b.

From the Organizational Chart of the 3rd BIS and Table 1, it can be inferred that the current number of military personnel serving in Barcelos-AM is 378 military personnel⁵, highlighting the trend towards an increase in the number, as explained above.

Table 2 – Staff expected to meet the current Organizational Framework of the 3rd BIS

	Command and Staff	Marine Company	Command and Support Company	TOTAL
Colonel	1	0	0	1
Lieutenant Colonel	1	0	0	1
Major	2	0	0	2
Captain	3	1	2	6
1st Lieutenant	0	2	5	7
2nd Lieutenant	0	2	4	6
Sub-Lieutenant	0	1	1	2
1st Sergeant	0	1	2	3
2nd Sergeant	0	4	13	17
3rd Sergeant	0	13	35	48
Corporal	0	32	71	103
Soldier	0	86	96	182
SUM	7	142	229	378

Fonte: Elaborado pelos autores com base em Brasil, 1997b, 2003b.


⁵ It should be noted that there may be variations. The Brazilian Army's personnel handling body always uses this Organizational Framework to support the movements (transfers) of military personnel, however there may be small distortions, both for greater and for lesser, in certain periods.

From Table 2, it is also possible to verify the number of soldiers in each rank or military graduation, allowing an approximate approach to the absorption of Barcelos citizens by the 3rd BIS.

The personnel of Corporals and Soldiers are occupied by citizens who provide compulsory military service, in accordance with Art. 143 of the Federal Constitution (BRASIL, 1988). This obligation is about 1 year, allowing the possibility, through volunteering, to remain for up to 8 years in the provision of the service.

Therefore, the sum of personnel of Corporals and Soldiers of the 3rd BIS indicates that, at least, 285 military personnel serving in that unit are citizens who resided in the municipality when performing the mandatory military enlistment. Given this data, added to Table 2, it can be inferred that the majority of the effective Military Organization is made up of citizens originally residing in Barcelos, even before the Mandatory Military Service.

Graph 1 – Proportion of Officers/Sergeants and Corporals and Soldiers in the 3rd BIS



Source: The authors (2021).


Regarding the personnel of Officers and Sergeants, there is the condition of career military personnel who enter the institution through an examination. This fact does not prevent Barcelos citizens from accessing these posts, but the career military personnel's hometown or residence is not an object for allocation, thus they may serve in any Military Organization in the national territory⁶.

⁶ It should also be noted that the gateway for citizens to join the posts of career Officers and Sergeants in the Brazilian Army is through the holding of annual public examinations for different training schools (AMAN, IME, EsFECEx, EsSEEx, ESA and EsLog are the main examples).

There is also the condition of temporary Officers and Sergeants, who do not need examinations to enter the institution. In the case of Officers, during enlistment, depending on the educational situation, the young conscript may be referred to Military Organizations or educational establishments for training temporary officers. Since in Barcelos there are no such establishments, this possibility is practically impossible for citizens who enlist in the municipality. As for the posts of temporary Sergeant, they are soldiers who stood out in the ranks of Soldier and Corporal, through a training course in the Military Organization itself, being promoted to 3rd Sergeant, if there is a vacancy to be filled.

This shows that a sample of 285 “local” young people, corresponding to 1.1% of the estimated 25,718 inhabitants in Barcelos, have direct contact with the 3rd BIS. In more detail, this universe makes up 9% of the municipality's young male population, as shown in Graph 2. This is considering that the Compulsory Military Service reaches only the male gender and, according to legislation, its focus would be young people aged 18 years.

Graph 2 – Number of young people from Barcelos in direct contact with the Brazilian Army



Source: Prepared by the authors based on IBGE, [2020].

In this contact, values that stimulate civic awareness are passed on to these young people, consolidating the duty of defending the homeland, shaping the national feeling and, finally, taking care of the development of the defense mentality and integration of the military expression with society, according to the Army's strategic conception (BRASIL, 2020c). The consequences generated by this contact will be inferred in the next section, particularly in the social and economic fields of Barcelos society.


4 Socioeconomic contributions of the 3rd BIS for the municipality of Barcelos

The strategic conception of the Land Force "derived from studies, analyzes and evaluations, which indicates how the Army shall be used to fulfill its mission" (BRASIL, 2017, p. 5) regarding the strategy of presence, the fundamental aspects are the military, psychosocial and political fields, without referring to the economic field. However, in this work the latter will be taken into account, because the understanding of development cannot be separated from an active economy.

In addition to the isolation of the municipality of Barcelos, the fact that there are no major mining or development projects in the municipality's territory also weighs in, and its income comes from payments to civil servants and extractive activities, with emphasis on the trade of ornamental fish (LADISLAU, 2017). This corroborates Drummond's (2002) explanations about regional economic development, where he warns that the abundance of natural resources in a region does not necessarily provide good development. In addition to local historiography, "economic growth means the increase in the productive capacity of the economy and, therefore, in the production of goods and services in a given country or economic area" (VIEIRA; SANTOS, 2012, p. 347). Thus, it is understood that economic growth is a proportional reflection of regional development, cited in the Strategic Defense Action (AED) No. 17, as an action to "intensify the contribution of various government sectors to the protection, development and greater integration of the Amazon region with other regions of the country" (BRASIL, 2020c, p. 64, emphasis added). In the case of the 3rd BIS in Barcelos, part of the deployment costs were covered by the Amazon Military Command and part by the Calha Norte Program (NEVES; SILVA; MONTEIRO, 2016, p. 69).

Initially, an increase in the local economy is noticeable when looking at the sequence of GDP and GDP per capita recorded by the IBGE in recent years.

Graph 3 – Monitoring of GDP and GDP per capita in Barcelos




Source: The authors (2021).

As shown in Graph 3, municipal GDP and GDP per capita have increased since the beginning of the works in 2007. After the activation of the 3rd BIS, in 2010, the curves confirmed the upward movement, mainly in the GDP, demonstrating that the presence of the Military Organization can influence regional economic development.

Furthermore, this proof can be seen in the ratio of the degree of formalization of work by employed persons, over 18 years old, and the total number of people. In 2000, the first census to measure this data, Barcelos had a ratio of 12.28. After ten years, in the last census of 2010, with the presence of the 3rd BIS in the city, this ratio increased to 29.84, demonstrating an increase in formalized work, either by signed work papers or by civil servants (IBGE, 2013).

The neighboring municipality of Santa Isabel do Rio Negro, which has the same characteristics as Barcelos, located in the northern Amazon region, bordering Venezuela and in the Negro River micro-region, showed a drop in the ratio of formalized workers from 16.63 to 12.96 in the period considered of increase (IBGE, 2013).

Graph 4 – Comparison of the ratio between formal jobs in Barcelos and Santa Isabel do Rio Negro



Source: Prepared by the authors based on IBGE, [2020].

Graph 4 shows that the Negro River micro-region did not feature an increase in formal employment in the period considered, including a slight drop, considering that São Gabriel da Cachoeira decreased this ratio from 31.72 to 29.52. The only municipality in the region to show improvement was Barcelos, allowing to infer that this increase may have been caused by some endogenous factor.

According to the IBGE Cities portal ([2020]), in 2018 the occupied population of Barcelos corresponded to 1,128 inhabitants, considering that this figure includes uniforms residing in the municipality. The 378 military personnel represent 33.51% of registered jobs, corroborating a lot for the growth in the numbers presented in Barcelos.

Another possibility with the deployment of the 3rd BIS in Barcelos is the increase in the average monthly salary of formal workers. In 2018, this record was of 1.6 minimum wages,

corresponding to R\$ 1.760,00⁷ per worker. The salary of a recruit soldier corresponds to R\$ 1,078.00, plus the 20% special location bonus⁸ the soldier in his mandatory military service begins to receive a gross salary of R\$ 1,293.60.

It is emphasized that this value refers to compulsory military service. If the person volunteers to remain serving in the Army after a year of mandatory service, the salary of a career soldier is R\$1,765.00, with the sum of the bonus from a special location, his gross monthly salary becomes R\$2,118.00, exceeding the average of the 1.6 minimum wages measured by the IBGE.

Nevertheless, a greater economic movement is expected in the city with the consumption of the 378 military personnel who necessarily reside in Barcelos. Although there is no way to measure what each soldier, along with his family, spends on local trade, a portion of these salaries will be used in local trade to purchase basic items and services such as food, clothing, vehicle maintenance, fuel, among others, by each of these resident families.

Based on the remunerations, as shown in Table 3, it is possible to unveil an approximate⁹ maximum value that the military can inject into the local economy.

Table 3 – Gross monthly salary of military personnel expected for the 3rd BIS in Barcelos

	Salary (R\$)	Special Location Bonus (+20%)	Effective foreseen in the 3 rd BIS	TOTAL (R\$)
Colonel	11.451,00	13.741,20	1	13.741,20
Lieutenant Colonel	11.250,00	13.500,00	1	13.500,00
Major	11.088,00	13.305,60	2	26.611,20
Captain	9.135,00	10.962,00	6	65.772,00
1st Lieutenant	8.245,00	9.894,00	7	69.258,00
2nd Lieutenant	7.490,00	8.988,00	6	53.928,00
Sub-Lieutenant	6.169,00	7.402,80	2	14.805,60
1st Sergeant	5.483,00	6.579,60	3	19.738,80
2nd Sergeant	4.770,00	5.724,00	17	97.308,00
3rd Sergeant	3.825,00	4.590,00	48	220.320,00
Corporal	2.627,00	3.152,40	103	324.697,20
Career Soldier	1.765,00	2.118,00	55	116.490,00
Conscript Soldier	1,078,00	1.293,60	127	164.287,20
SUM				1.200.457,20

Source: Prepared by authors based on BRASIL, 2019b.

⁷ Calculation performed on the value of the federal minimum wage in 2021, R\$1,100.00.

⁸ Monthly remuneration due to the soldier, when serving in inhospitable regions, according to Provisional Measure No. 2,215-10 of August 31, 2001.

⁹ It is noteworthy that these values are generalized, the net remuneration of each soldier may contain bonuses or individual discounts, according to the Military Remuneration Law (BRASIL, 2001).

According to Table 3, it is inferred that military personnel serving in the 3rd BIS can inject approximately R\$1,200,457.20 monthly into the local economy. This can encourage local trade and economically active citizens to stay in the city, putting aside the displacement to large urban centers.

Moreover, there is the increase of services aimed at the daily life of an operational barrack. The administrative autonomy of the 3rd BIS took place in 2016, starting contracts with private companies to meet its demands. These companies may be based in any part of the national territory, however, by law, when entering into these administrative contracts, they have the obligation to deliver the service or material where provided, usually at the headquarters of the public body.

The incipency of operability in the region points to a growth in the acquisition, whether of material or service, to achieve the required operational capacity of an OM in the border strip, promoting local trade or integration of the region with various parts of the country.

Even incipient, the increase in demand can already be noticed. In 2016, the 3rd BIS, according to the government portal *Comprasnet* (BRASIL, [202-]), signed only one price registration contract, while in 2020 this amount rose to seven contracts.

Based on the 5th BIS, a unit already consolidated in the municipality of São Gabriel da Cachoeira-AM, located in the same micro-region of Barcelos, with similar logistical characteristics. This unit, in 2020, signed 24 price record contracts. They are intentions to acquire materials and contract services of different demands, such as, for example, acquisition of a vessel engine, device with satellite telephone service, patrolling and instruction material that are not yet found in the intentions of the 3rd BIS, and may in the future be required to reach operational capacity.

Table 4 – Items of intentions to acquire materials and contract services for the 3rd and 5th BIS in 2020.

3 rd BIS purchasing intentions in 2020	5 th BIS purchasing intentions in 2020
Aquisição de Gás e serviço de recarga	Food supply service
Aquisição de Gêneros Alimentícios	Acquisition of instruments for musical band
Aquisição de Peças para manutenção de viaturas	Internet delivery service
Serviço de manutenção de maquinários em geral	Acquisition of river passage
Aquisição de insumos para odontologia	Water filtration service
Aquisição de insumos para exames laboratoriais	Vehicle maintenance service
Aquisição de mobiliários em geral	Acquisition of furniture in general
	Acquisition of material for building maintenance
	General machinery maintenance service
	Acquisition of furniture in general
	Acquisition of foodstuffs
	Acquisition of veterinary equipment

3 rd BIS purchasing intentions in 2020	5 th BIS purchasing intentions in 2020
	Acquisition of vessel engine Acquisition of office supplies Satellite phone service Acquisition of satellite equipment Acquisition of fuel Acquisition of equipment for patrolling and instruction Acquisition of office supplies Air taxi service

Source: Elaborated by the authors based on BRASIL, [202-].

These intentions to purchase materials and contract services, shown in Table 4, can generate effects first on the local economy, directly, and secondly, on regional integration.

In the local economy, some private companies already point to the use of the demand of the 3rd BIS. When analyzing the price records on the government website *Comprasnet*, from the period between 2016 to 2020, the CNPJ registered with addresses in Barcelos have already signed values above R\$ 670,000.00 in purchase intention for the Military Organization (BRASIL, [202-])¹⁰.

In addition, the presence of companies whose CNPJ are registered in municipalities within the Amazon can also be seen, where there is the presence of already consolidated Military Organizations. São Gabriel da Cachoeira, Tabatinga and Tefé, all from the state of Amazonas, are examples of this fact. This can demonstrate that the presence of the public body in those cities encouraged local trade to adapt to the peculiar forms of contracting or acquisition imposed by the public administration.

Indeed, these contracts between the Military Organization and private enterprise strengthen regional integration. Once again, when analyzing the purchase intentions of the 3rd BIS, it is verified that there are contracts signed with companies from all geographic regions of Brazil. Both in the case of material acquisition and in the provision of the service, these companies are obliged to carry out the delivery in Barcelos, which allows to increase the logistical flow of entry and exit from the municipality.

Finally, in addition to increasing the presence of state institutions in Barcelos, contributing to defense thinking and integrating civil society into the military arm, the deployment of the 3rd BIS relies on the injection of local currency circulation, either through the private income of the military personnel now residents, or for public expenditures aimed at meeting the demand of operational activities of the Military Organization. This allows to foster trade, integration with the rest of the country and, consequently, develop the region.

¹⁰ SRPs N^o 02/2017 and N^o 02/2019.

5 Conclusions

Among the municipalities within the Border Strip, some of the most isolated are located in the Calha Norte of the Amazon River. A region that, by rare exceptions, has a low population density, the presence of state agencies, major economic development projects, which generate a low offer of formal employment and income generation opportunities. Even being in one of the regions with ample mineral resources and biodiversity, these places remain with low development rates, which deserves the special attention of the Brazilian state.

The maintenance of borders and national sovereignty over their territory is a legitimate and constitutional concern of modern nation-states. Historically, the processes of possession, colonization and integration of the Amazon region were made with the presence of military units on the borders. Presence that sometimes, as in Arco Norte, coincide with poorly developed regions, where they end up assuming a role of support for development. But the question remains, how much do military units contribute to local development? In the specific case of this article: how does the presence of the 3rd BIS directly contribute to the generation of employment and income in the municipality of Barcelos-AM, in 2018?

The results found show us that: (i) considering the total number of military personnel residing in Barcelos, there is a significant monetary injection in the city in the form of salaries; even when looking only at corporals and soldiers recruited from the local population; (ii) Still regarding this specific group of military personnel (Cb/Sd) the occupation of military personnel in Barcelos is attractive with a higher average salary than that of the municipality; (iii) Another point is the increase in the number of formal job vacancies offered to the young male population (of military age) generated annually by the vacancies of corporals and soldiers in the period. Considering, even in the analyzed period, the decrease of vacancies in the Negro River micro-region. Finally, in addition to the military's particular economic incentives, (iv) the injection of capital in the form of contracts for the acquisition of material and services from local companies is already significant and shall increase as the 3rd BIS staff is expanded to three marine companies.

In this way, this case study of the deployment of a military unit in Barcelos-AM, points out that the presence strategy in a city isolated from the border strip can collaborate not only with Defense, but also with local development in a significant way.

Authorship and Collaborations

All authors participated equally in the elaboration of the article.

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'Not a priority': An analysis of terrorism prevention in Portugal


'No es una prioridad': Un análisis de la prevención del terrorismo en Portugal


Abstract: The purpose of this study is to understand the mechanisms behind counter-terrorism operations in Portugal, focusing particularly on their prevention framework. The choice of this case study was motivated by the fact that despite having escaped major terrorist attacks in the period following 9/11, Portugal nonetheless, has to uphold its own counter-terrorism strategy due to its membership of the European Union. In this sense, elite interviews have been conducted in order to determine the components of the Portuguese preventative framework when it comes to terrorism, how it is aligned with European Union standards, and how it has prevented different forms of terrorism. The main findings of this study demonstrate that there is negligible effort in Portugal in terms of preventing terrorism, which is justified by the unimportance of the terrorist threat in Portugal, but also by the excessive securitization of this issue. This study offers reflections for both research and practice.

Keywords: Portugal; Counter-terrorism; Prevention; Radicalization; Elite interviews.

Resumen: El objetivo de este estudio es comprender los mecanismos subyacentes a las operaciones de lucha contra el terrorismo en Portugal, destacando su situación de prevención. La elección de este estudio de caso fue motivada por el hecho de que Portugal, a pesar de haber escapado a grandes ataques terroristas en el período posterior al 11 de septiembre, tuvo que defender su propia estrategia de combate al terrorismo debido al hecho de ser miembro de la Unión Europea. En este sentido, se realizaron entrevistas de élite con el objetivo de determinar los componentes de la situación preventiva portuguesa en lo que respecta al terrorismo, cómo estar de acuerdo con los estándares de la Unión Europea y cómo ha prevenido diferentes formas de terrorismo. Las principales conclusiones de este estudio demuestran que existe un esfuerzo insignificante en Portugal en la prevención del terrorismo, lo que se justifica por la poca importancia de la amenaza terrorista en Portugal, pero también por la excesiva titulización de esta cuestión. Este estudio ofrece reflexiones tanto para la investigación como para la práctica.

Palabras clave: Portugal; Contraterrorismo; Prevención. Radicalización; Entrevistas de élite.

Augusto Xavier Magalhães Sampaio 
Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL), Centro de Estudos Internacionais.
Lisboa, Portugal.
axmso@iscte-iul.pt

Raquel Beleza da Silva 
Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL), Centro de Estudos Internacionais.
Lisboa, Portugal.
Faculdade de Economia da Universidade de Coimbra.
Coimbra, Portugal.
raquel.beleza.silva@iscte-iul.pt

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1 Introduction

The factors which drive a nation's approach to counter-terrorism are highly debated. Counter-terrorism studies is a recent field with a small academic research base and it is characterized by its known issues in defining widely acceptable concepts and functions in a world fueled by secrets and speculation. It has been described as a field composed of experts without proper qualification who produce research based on conjectures (STAMPNITZKY, 2010). In this vein Hoffman has characterized counter-terrorism studies as a "huge and ill-defined subject [that] has probably been responsible for more incompetent and unnecessary books than any other outside the field of sociology" (HOFFMAN, 1992, p. 25). However, Stampnitzky (2010) considers that despite it being impossible to obtain a consensus in this field, particularly in defining what counter-terrorism is, this should not mean that the field ought to be abandoned but rather analyzed from an out of the box perspective. Counter-terrorism is a political matter and as such it is necessary to study and understand the context and the actors related to it.

This study focuses on Portugal, a nation mostly unaffected by terrorism when compared to some of its European counterparts. However, in line with Skleparis and Knudsen's (2020) approach in their study of counter-terrorism policies in Greece, it is necessary to comprehend what has differentiated Portugal from other contexts. To achieve this, it is essential to study the Portuguese counter-terrorism effort, its policies, and the requirements the nation must meet, and how it has chosen to do so, as a member state of the European Union, who is obliged to fulfil certain directives, regardless of the existence of a high or low terrorism threat at the national level.

Despite its initial impression of imperviousness, Portugal has contended with terrorism both before and after 9/11 (DA SILVA, 2019). In 2020, the prosecution of eight Portuguese nationals linked to Daesh proved the effectiveness of the national counter-terrorism legislation (also known as CT law) by convicting for crimes of supporting and collaborating with a terrorist organization. Although these individuals all presented the same path, which was the emigration and consequent radicalization outside of national territory, there is an alert to the presence of potential push and pull radicalization factors (EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S EXPERT GROUP ON VIOLENT RADICALIZATION, 2012) in Portugal. In this vein, we consider it important to question what exactly is being done in terms of preventing radicalization towards terrorism in this country.

Additionally, following what has been happening in other countries, Portugal has been witnessing a surge of extreme right-wing (ERW) inspired violence and threats, which has been traced to the rise of a far-right political party, whose racist and xenophobic discourse has encouraged attacks against Roma and colored people in Portugal (EUROPEAN NETWORK AGAINST RACISM, 2020). The radicalization of ERW actors in Portugal has also been flagged in relation to the nation's measures to contain the COVID-19 pandemic and the consequent social and economic difficulties observed during this time, as lockdown brought about a 60% increase in discrimination-related crimes (SISTEMA DE SEGURANÇA INTERNA, 2020). With this scenario in mind, this study, which was carried out in the context of an MA disser-

tation, aims to explore how counter-terrorism policies and strategies, particularly preventative ones, have been applied in the post 9/11 era in Portugal by posing two key research questions:

- How has counter-terrorism legislation been applied in Portugal in the pre-criminal space since 9/11?
- What are the efforts put into place in Portugal in terms of preventing and countering terrorism in the pre-criminal space?

2 Methods

2.1 Participants

From the eight participants in this study, six are academics and two are police officers. Four of the six academics have a PhD degree and have conducted academic research on the topic of counter-terrorism; the other two are about to finish their PhD degrees. Out of these six interviewees, two come from the psychology field and have extensively studied radicalization processes towards terrorism; two others have studied the 2015 Portuguese counter-terrorism strategy, one of them having directly contributed to its development and the other studying it from a critical studies perspective. The remaining two are currently developing studies on counter-terrorism development as a part of their PhD dissertations. The two police officers have decades of experience of working on terrorism prevention.

2.2 Interview procedure

A semi-structured interview schedule was used where the questions encouraged the narration of participants' experiences and perspectives on counter-terrorism in Portugal, enabled probing for more information and clarification of answers, and allowed participants to elaborate on areas of particular interest. The interviews took place via Skype due to the restrictions of the COVID-19 pandemic. Participants were able to talk for as long as they wished, with the interviews lasting between 30 and 90 minutes. All interviews were recorded, fully transcribed, and anonymized with participant consent.

2.3 Data analysis

The transcribed interviews were analyzed using NVIVO 12 software. A thematic analysis approach was used when analyzing the results. Clarke and Braun (2016) describe thematic analysis as a methodology that permits the researcher to organize and identify patterns and key topics throughout the data, thus allowing the researcher to recognize collec-

tive experiences. In other words, it helps in identifying what are the common topics referred to by the interviewees. This method of analysis allowed to search for common denominators across the entire data field and their association with key teams to provide answers to the research question.

3 The essentials of counter-terrorism

After 9/11 various states began to realize that their perception of the terrorist threat did not match the seriousness of the issue at hand. Therefore, in the early 2000's different states began to develop prevention programs and carry out amendments in their legislations. This offered them the necessary tools and the legislative flexibility deemed necessary to convict perpetrators and investigate potential threats.

To address the phenomena of terrorism and extremism it is necessary to first define these much-debated concepts with reference to the existing literature. Lindalh (2020) defines terrorism as the premeditated use, or threat of use, of physical force to address a political statement relating to a current issue in time. As an example, the attacks in Madrid in 2004 were a response to the Spanish deployment of troops into Iraq in 2003. This same author defines extremism as the process that leads an individual to identify with an ideology or system of beliefs which is employed by violent organizations and, in some cases, may also lead to engagement in violent actions (LINDAHL, 2020).

Smith, Stohl and Al-Gharbi (2018), in turn, define counter-terrorism as the set of policies and actions created to attain a goal that must be broader than simply addressing terrorist violence. To this effect, these authors believe that counter-terrorism must also be involved in a communication process due to the fundamental role of the media in disseminating the terrorist message. Thus, counter-terrorism must address public unrest and create the perception that people are secure, and their way of life is not under direct threat, countering the main goal of terrorism which is to spread fear (SMITH et al., 2018). In addition, counter-terrorism must also be about preventing, identifying, and addressing the factors that led to radicalization in the first place (GIELEN, 2017).

When discussing counter-terrorism strategies there are two areas in which a government may invest: counter-terrorism legislation and preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) programs. The first pertains to a nation's legislative powers; in other words, to the methods that intelligence services may use to gather information, to the actions that police forces may take in capturing and detaining suspects, and to the way the judiciary system can process perpetrators. After 9/11, there was increased pressure to create such legislation and a demand for tougher legislative reforms. The second available tool at the disposal of counter-terrorism efforts are the preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) programs. At the heart of such programs is the anticipation of the terrorist threat, which comprises "a non-coercive attempt to reduce involvement in terrorism" (VAN DE WEERT; EIJKMAN, 2020, p. 492). As radicalization is seen as the process preceding terrorist violence (KUNDNANI; HAYES, 2018), such policies are based,

according to Skleparis and Knudsen (2020, p. 5), on three basic “truths” about radicalization: 1) “radicalisation is a risk that can lead to terrorism”; 2) “terrorism can be stopped by re-routing or reversing radicalisation at an early stage”; and 3) “radicalisation is measurable”. In this scenario, detecting signs of radicalization (or, in other words, ‘at risk’ individuals) is key within P/CVE efforts. In most countries, the responsibility of such detection has fallen not only on the security apparatus, but also on frontline practitioners working at the local level (CRONE, 2016).

Despite being viewed as a collective effort, particularly in the case of EU member states which must comply with European mandates, counter-terrorism did not always work in this way. Countries such as Spain or the UK have faced terrorist threats using their own efforts and strategies, particularly because such countries had already dealt with their own specific threats – Spain dealt with ETA¹ while the UK dealt with the IRA². Bearing in mind these threats, some countries began to follow an approach of securitization to counter-terrorism. Floyd (2020) defines securitization as establishing security as a political process whose issues represent security threats, which in turn means that governments approach the so-called threat urgently as they see it as possibly impacting their own existence. This narrative allows for measures which may be seen as unorthodox but justified as necessary to address the issue (FLOYD, 2020). One of the challenges faced by securitization is that the idea of what is considered as a security matter becomes ill-defined and may encompass various sectors of society (CHARRET, 2009). This not only reinforces surveillance mechanisms but also severely limits the information available on the subject as most matters are deemed as a security risk (CHARRET, 2009).

Due to what some described as scrutiny, through the actions of various prevention programs towards certain communities, particularly Muslim communities, critical scholars have questioned whether counter-terrorism policies make an impact to diminish the threat or whether a more political and societal approach is needed to address this issue (GUNNING, 2007). Stephens, Sieckelinck and Boutellier (2019) also recognize this fundamental issue shared by Jackson (2016) and Gunning (2007) that P/CVE policies have influenced the stereotyping of Muslim communities and the labelling of certain levels of the population as ‘possibly dangerous’.

Through the analysis of some of the measures currently implemented in Western societies, it becomes clear that theoretically, P/CVE policies work towards the promotion of a non-violent nation and the increase in tolerance, societal values and developing a sense of empathy towards the victims of these attacks. However, this is not necessarily the case. Jackson (2017) describes the current anti-terrorism framework employed by most Western nations as outdated and primitive. He states that choosing to respond to acts of extreme violence with violence will do nothing more than promote the endless cycle of terrorism (JACKSON, 2017). This author presents evidence

1 Euskadi Ta Askatasuna.

2 Irish Republican Army.

that violent counter-terrorism can slow the number of terrorist incidences. However, this is only on a temporary basis (JACKSON, 2017). In the end, such operations cannot solve the grievances that led to the creation of terrorist organizations; therefore, it cannot be expected to solve the issue (JACKSON, 2017).

Jackson (2015) argues that after 9/11, what was known as old terrorism, mostly based on political motivation and its related research, began to be seen by many as something which could not be used to understand what is now known as the new terrorism, motivated by religious factors. This means that previously identified patterns could no longer be used to study the phenomena. However, this new form of thinking did not bring anything new to counter-terrorism studies (JACKSON, 2015). In this vein, Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) scholars have been focusing on documenting and studying the nature of the threat and have highlighted the fact that after 9/11, counter-terrorism brought dire consequences with the exaggeration of the War on Terror, which led to a consequent increase in surveillance (JACKSON, 2015). In this regard the CTS approach has provided criticism on how political leaders describe the War on Terror and even how the media portrays it (JACKSON, 2015).

Jackson (2016) suggests that this demonstrates an epistemological crisis in counter-terrorism, precisely through this observable lack of knowledge of what terrorism actually is, ultimately describing it as unpredictable. The author provides a simple example which highlights this issue. The death of Osama Bin Laden presumedly marked a stepping stone in the fight against terrorism with many believing it would be the end of Al-Qaeda but there were no programs that ended, no funding that was terminated, nor any laws that were no longer applicable (JACKSON, 2016). In fact, in the short years after Bin Laden's death, the counter-terrorism effort intensified and in the face of this incongruence, the CTS, non-violence framework, as a methodology, questions the known methods and enriches P/CVE prevention by suggesting an approach that promotes community-based ideals and not one that tightens surveillance and increases discrimination on what are considered to be communities at risk of being radicalized (JACKSON, 2016).

Even though these programs have been growing steadily in the post 9/11 era, evaluation of these programs is virtually non-existent and so their success could be a matter for much debate (GIELEN, 2017). Bearing in mind this lack of program evaluation, it can still be stated that there is no common approach to prevention. Each country is a specific case and in Crone and Nasser's work (2018) of their comparative analysis of the Danish and Lebanese preventative framework, it is observed that the Danish strategy, mostly based on welfare state, cannot be applicable to the Lebanese example, whose strategy mainly depends on security with high levels of securitization. In this regard, each nation defines its road to prevention, and it is important to state that there is not universally appropriate scenario. In this vein, we now explain the methods behind our study of counter-terrorism operations in Portugal, focusing particularly on its prevention framework.

4 Results and discussion

4.1 Post 9/11 counter-terrorism legislation

When discussing the Portuguese approach to counter-terrorism, the majority of interviewees displayed some form of knowledge about what constitutes the existing policies in this area. Interviewee 8 demonstrated that the legislation does not only impact his daily work, but that he has extensive knowledge of the changes that were introduced post 9/11 and is in a position where he can influence possible future changes. This interviewee was involved in the first instance of conviction of an ETA member arrested in Portugal, in accordance with Portuguese CT Law (also known as law 52). As such, Interviewee 8 described law 52 by stating: “Law 52 is inspired in the European Union’s decision of July 2002, where countries such as Portugal who did not yet have a specific legislation for combating terrorism started to use this one”.

Whether discussing terrorism on a domestic or an international level, it became quite clear that the EU reality and demands must always be taken into consideration. In this vein, various interviewees mentioned the 2017 EU notification to Portugal regarding the fact that its terrorism legislation did not match EU directives. In this context, six participants believed this notification to be justifiable and one believed that this merited action from the Portuguese side. Only two interviewees claimed that the existing legislation was robust enough to comply with EU regulation and be used to convict crimes of terrorism. Interviewee 1 believed that it was crucial to keep abreast of European policies, an opinion shared with Interviewee 2, who mentioned that the best way to combat terrorism is for Portugal to transpose EU policies into its own policies in this area. Interviewee 5 mentioned that in response to the EU’s 2017 notification, the Portuguese parliament began to approve new measures in haste. However, four years later, nothing palpable has been observed in terms of actions and plans. Most interviewees also believed that change would not occur soon due to this issue not being prioritized in Portugal, particularly when it must deal with the extenuating circumstances surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic, which have greatly shifted the government’s focus and priorities (a phenomenon also observed in other EU member states).

In contrast, two interviewees believed this EU notification was not problematic as it was also sent to other countries, not only to Portugal. Interviewee 3 went a step further and described this action as a political obligation, not meaning that Portugal has not been delivering with its counter-terrorism legislation. This interviewee believed that in this aspect, Portugal deserves merit for keeping an up-to-date legislation in comparison to other EU countries in the post 9/11 period.

Considering the results mentioned above, in what concerns that application of Portuguese counter-terrorism legislation in the post 9/11 era, there have been few opportunities to observe it in practice. It is mainly believed by Portuguese counter-terrorism actors that the legislative framework is well structured and robust and seems to have been positively

applied in the few opportunities that appeared in the post 9/11 era, such as the convictions of the Portuguese foreign fighters who joined Daesh. This is an observation previously shared by De Faria Costa (2015) upon his conclusion that Portugal does possess the proper legislative capacity to process a terrorist threat. From a European perspective, though, Portugal seems to have lagged behind on its compliance with European regulation. However, this is mostly seen as formality due to the country's involvement within the European Union and is thus not considered as a failure in counter-terrorism.

4.2 A abordagem portuguesa à prevenção do terrorismo

4.2.1 *Diminished threat consideration*

Portugal's positioning within the EU and the fact that it is a gateway into Schengen Space was considered a key factor to be taken into account in counter-terrorism discussions. Bearing this in mind, the public perception remains that thus far Portugal has been able to elude the terrorism threat.

Three of this study's participants considered the terrorism threat as real, although one specified that this occurs on a very small scale, but equally related this threat to the country's involvement in the European Union. The five remaining participants referred to Portugal as a marginal country in the affairs of terrorism, particularly Al-Qaeda/Daesh-motivated terrorism. Two participants believed that Portugal was able to evade this kind of threat, with one referring to the fact that the issue does not concern him deeply, since Portugal is not the same as Spain or France, purely because we have a much smaller Islamic community and also due to the fact that Portugal has not had a terrorist event in recent years. However, despite these claims, this interviewee stated that in any case vigilance must remain due to the nation's involvement with the EU. Two other participants believed that terrorism is not an issue of public concern and one referred to the fact that the national coverage of this topic, in comparison with other EU member states, has aided in creating a sense of non-urgency. Interviewee 5 added an interesting remark by stating:

Portugal has faced terrorism, both from extreme right and extreme left in the last 50 years, and this domestic terrorism is not a part of our collective memory, they are not present to the public or in the academic population, so it seems like we have deleted this from our collective memory, so this is even an additional point that adds to the population not being concerned about this topic.

This statement was, however, countered by interviewee 6 who stated:

[...] after the 2015 attacks from Daesh, there was a survey done to measure the feeling of insecurity and we realized that the Portuguese have a disproportionate fear of something happening here in comparison with other countries that have suffered from terrorism, [...].

Only one interviewee believed that most of the Portuguese population recognizes the country is not immune to terrorism. Opinions diverge immensely on this topic and a consensus is difficult to obtain. However, seven of the eight interviewees all referred to the same point, which is the recent rise of ERW extremism both on a European and a national level. These same seven interviewees considered the threat as one that needs to be and must be monitored, and the possible radicalization of individuals towards violence addressed via a preventative framework. In this regard, a couple of interviewees observed:

I think we need to take the threat of the extreme right seriously and this is not easy as we now have a party in parliament, and they have neo-Nazi militants and it's difficult to condemn this. But this should be taken more seriously, fighting it on a more political level³.

Recently there have been increasing concerns about radicalized right-wing individuals, and in Portugal too. In fact, just last week there was a report which stated that, Portugal has had the 6th biggest increase of this phenomenon in the EU and there should be a focus on more preventative programs which address this type of radicalization⁴.

The rise of the ERW phenomena has clearly shown itself to be one of the largest common denominators in this study. The socio-economic struggles associated with the COVID-19 pandemic seem to have fed this phenomenon, which has seen a growing tendency in Portugal, particularly in younger age groups who can easily access online content related to this extremist ideology.

4.2.2 Secrecy and information sharing gaps

Secrecy was always expected to be a part of counter-terrorism operations and as such it was important to comprehend the road Portugal has chosen and its level of transparency, not only towards society in general, but amid counter-terrorism experts and even amid those employed by the security services. For this study, it was imperative to determine

³ Interviewee 6.

⁴ Interviewee 4.

the existing P/CVE policies in Portugal and secrecy seems to play a major role in determining the community's know-how and the efficiency of inter-agency collaboration.

From the interviewee sample, six of the eight interviewees were not able to name the existing prevention policies in Portugal, including a current member of a security force. All six interviewees attributed this to the secrecy surrounding counter-terrorism affairs, despite their efforts to investigate this matter on a deeper basis. Two of these participants believed that the secrecy is needed in order not to alarm the public unnecessarily, while the other four considered this lack of information as an issue and the disclosure of further information as a necessary step. Interviewee 6 stated:

[...] the people need to know what is happening, they need to be informed. Most of the population believes that the government does not do anything to the benefit of the population and in this case it would be very important for the Portuguese citizens to know about this and that something is being done to prevent terrorism.

Interviewee 4 also provided an interesting remark, mentioning that due to the secrecy surrounding the topic, there is an increased difficulty in evaluating our preventative capacities by stating:

Proving what is done on the prevention side is difficult. If it is done correctly then we cannot prove it because nothing happened. That is the thing with prevention plans. The fact that nothing has happened so far in Portugal may be because our preventative work has been outstanding. We really have no way of knowing.

Secrecy also proved to be a factor in the interviewees' ability to name the services that operate in a preventative capacity in Portugal. Three interviewees were not aware of any branch or service that acts on this basis. Three other interviewees pointed to the PJ⁵ as instrumental in the prevention of terrorism but once again were not able to describe their activities towards prevention of terrorism. The remaining participants attributed this responsibility to various branches. Interviewee 7 claimed it is a part of all security forces in Portugal, including the PSP⁶ and the GNR⁷ who patrol the streets daily, which is an act of prevention. Interviewee 8 attributed this to a collaboration between the PJ who works on criminal prevention, the Portuguese services (SIS⁸, SIRP⁹ and former SEF¹⁰) who investigate and monitor for potential cases of radicalization, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which acts on the reports of these entities.

5 *Polícia Judiciária* [Judiciary Police].

6 *Polícia Segurança Pública* [Public Security Police].

7 *Guarda Nacional Republicana* [National Republican Guard].

8 *Sistemas de Informação de Segurança* [Information Security Systems].

9 *Sistemas de Informações da República Portuguesa* [Portuguese Republic Information Systems].

10 *Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras* [Foreigners and Border Service].

Various interviewees referred to the 2015 national strategy for combating terrorism, which was created precisely to further enhance the nation's preventative framework. However, six of these eight interviewees had no information on this strategy's implementation. The remaining interviewees who did possess knowledge of this strategy believed that what was developed is sufficient. However, opinions differed once again. On the one hand, interviewee 3 affirmed that the strategy is already in place, even though most people working in this field are not aware of this fact. This interviewee went to great lengths to describe the strategy and the pillars it contains: Detecting, Protection, Pursuing and Response – thus mirroring what is the existing EU counter-terrorism strategy. On the other hand, Interviewee 8 claimed on the 2015 national strategy: “[...] it is not a priority. The national strategy for counter-terrorism was left alone for six years. It remains in the ‘basket’ for now”.

Instead, interviewee 8 described a set of activities performed by the PJ as the only organism in place that handles criminal terrorism investigations. These activities consisted in strategic communication to deconstruct the messages passed by terrorist organizations, several programs to aid victims and families of actors who have become radicalized and, in 2014, an awareness session with the civil sectors to inform all relevant actors of what to do if confronted by a potential case of radicalization (including teachers, doctors, psychologists, and civil servants).

The information appears to surround a very particular set of individuals and even so, opinions diverge. It was necessary then to ascertain how the information flows between the individuals and agencies that do possess it. All participants referred in this regard to UCAT¹¹. UCAT is not an organism or an entity itself but a place where representatives from all security services in Portugal can share relevant information concerning terrorist activities. This unit was created after 9/11 but it is not without its flaws. A few interviewees shared:

“I interviewed a secretary of state who was involved in the organization of the Euro championship in Portugal in 2003, around the time of the creation of UCAT and he was unanimous on their struggles, the sharing of information”¹².

“UCAT was born with some issues, but I believe the issue in Portugal is due to the excess of entities and not the lack of entities. We have too many entities and what we need to urgently improve is the coordination of the units”¹³.

Out of the totality of the interviewees, only one believed that information was properly shared between the various services. The remaining ones identified issues behind this procedure but recognized the necessity of having such an information sharing system. Two of these interviewees emphasized this aspect by referring to the fact that the sharing of information is a central axis on which preventing and combating terrorism turns. These individuals believed that steps must be taken to fix these issues. However, Interviewee 3 believed that this will not be possible as this issue is deeply enrooted in the Portuguese security forces. Interviewee 3 referred that one

11 *Unidade Combate Anti-Terrorismo* [Anti-Terrorism Combat Unit].

12 Entrevistado 3.

13 Entrevistado 5.

of the issues is the fact that each service responds to a different entity. Therefore, each of these services will hold the information until they deem it necessary to share with the others. This is a practice that has been occurring for decades and, therefore, can be very difficult to alter.

As seen above, secrecy is undoubtedly the largest point to consider in this study. It divided interviewee opinion and seemed to be focused on a very particular set of individuals demonstrating that securitization pervades counter-terrorism efforts in Portugal. Proof of this is that most academic interviewees in this study were not able to describe in detail the 2015 national strategy against terrorism, its current implementation state or even the P/CVE programs currently in practice. Only one participant demonstrated specific knowledge of the implementation of the 2015 national strategy to combat terrorism because his research led to direct contact with policymakers who claim that this strategy is successfully implemented. However, this is directly opposed by the information provided by one of the most experienced individuals in the field of counter-terrorism in the country: a person who operates within this field on a daily basis and who possesses no knowledge or evidence of the implementation of this strategy. Information appears to be limited to the academic population, which proves to be a constraint in developing studies and research in this field, a factor which has also been observed in the study conducted by Charret (2009) on securitization. As for the strategy itself, comprised of five pillars – Detect, Prevent, Protect, Pursue and Respond – it appears to present various similarities to the EU's approach to P/CVE and was praised for the inclusion of the extra pillar *Detecting*. However, this was the extent of the information possessed by the interviewees.

As mentioned previously, in the work of Crone and Nasser (2018), it is possible to see that the Danish welfare state strategy could not be applied to the Lebanese case, which was mostly due to the much higher securitization of the latter context. This is another factor to take into consideration. As it was ascertained that securitization can also be observed in Portugal, this means that the Portuguese strategy cannot be the same as the one observed in the UK or Germany, for instance. These nations focus on the employment of the public sector to carry out P/CVE programs. However, this could be hardly applied to Portugal, as both Portuguese citizens and the academic community are mostly unaware of the nation's counter-terrorism approach and would find it difficult to work in such a secretive environment.

The exclusiveness of the information surrounding counter-terrorism activities also creates a difficulty in evaluating the country's efficiency in combating terrorism. It is the opinion of several academics that this focus does not exist or not as much as it should. Nevertheless, security actors do provide examples of various programs deployed at the EU level to further develop prevention. However, they also justify the secrecy as necessary so as not to unduly alarm the population. Although this approach has shown itself to be sound throughout the years, this precisely fits Floyd's (2020) definition of securitization. It is this author's belief that too much prevention can also be a bad thing as it can not only create an incorrect perception of the threat, but it can also create a space where maladjusted individuals can take this as an opportunity to investigate extremist ideals and

even reach a point of radicalization where they may search for alternatives and ideals where they believe they may fit in.

4.2.3 Losing the focus on radicalization

Radicalization was one of the key themes during the interviews, particularly the role that prisons play in this area. Interviewee 3 concurred that prisons are fundamental in radicalization and that working towards prevention in this setting must be of paramount importance and that Portugal can learn an immense amount from the examples of countries like the UK or France.

Interviewee 8 once again referred to the PJ's work in this sector, in initiating the appropriate actors into how to react when faced with radicalized individuals. There is a belief that all management within prisons is aware of how to handle this, and the interviewee even mentioned that there is a hotline created specifically to report this phenomenon. The remaining interviewees presented a different opinion. Four interviewees were not aware of the existence of radicalization strategies in prison and interviewee 1 considered this to be a failure in the prevention of terrorism. Interviewee 6 shared an interesting example of the identification of an inmate who was displaying signs of radicalization but when reported internally, no action was taken:

I have a colleague who works in a prison, and she knows nothing of terrorism in there. Three years ago, she told me she was speaking with a client who said that once he got out, he was going to join Daesh. My colleague had already flagged that case to the prison's director, but the director chose to ignore it.

Two other interviewees ultimately classified this matter as one that needs urgent action to improve our preventative framework, with the creation of training and content which can be equally accessible to all prison related staff.

It is agreed that prisons can be places of terrorist recruitment and several countries have developed programs to address radicalization under these circumstances (KORN, 2016). This is something that is not found in the Portuguese prison system, which demonstrates virtually no approach to inmate radicalization. Once again, in this study, there are those who confirm that these approaches exist and those who deny such claims. It remains unclear what the actual situation is, but the testimonies of this studies' interviewees support the idea that this information is only shared on a hierarchical level. Prison directors appear to be informed but the same cannot be said of the guards who observe these inmates and sit in a privileged position where they can identify possible radicalization factors. This lack of focus can be mentioned as one of the nation's biggest gaps in counter-terrorism prevention and one whose results directly support Ferreira Mairos and Machado's (2018) findings on their study of the Portuguese approach towards inmate radicalization. As mentioned by the authors, this study also found that there is no active planning, nor any training provided to the professionals of these institutions on possible radicalization signs or what to do in such instances.

Beyond prison related matters, radicalization also took a key place in the discussions on daily prevention, particularly since it is public knowledge that there have been Portuguese nationals who became radicalized and went on to fight for the ranks of terrorist organizations. The radicalization of ERW actors is also a factor to consider. Two interviewees possessed no knowledge of existing radicalization programs but shared an equal opinion on the importance of addressing this phenomenon.

The remaining participants have, at some point, studied these processes and pointed to the SIS, PJ and former SEF as actors in this process. Interviewee 8 explained that all known foreign fighters, for example, were radicalized outside of Portuguese borders and all of them were accounted for, except for one individual who is presumed dead. Despite demonstrating knowledge on work towards radicalization, several participants believed a more structured approach would bring added benefit to the preventative framework. Interviewee 3 believed there are guidelines on how to handle radicalization but mentions that Portugal would benefit from adding this in the form of a legal diploma. Interviewee 4 has studied the protection of the Portuguese society in the face of violent radicalization, particularly the process of youth radicalization and ERW extremism. This interviewee believed that the creation of programs and added funding for these investigations depends on the relevance of this topic, and at this moment, the topic is not considered as relevant, despite a steady increase of ERW radicalism.

Bearing in mind the information analyzed above, it can be said that Portugal displays a solid security framework in place, with various actors performing roles in criminal prevention and the monitorization of radicalized individuals and with the PJ having once again a key role in this regard. Lack of actors is not a problem, and some academics even state that the security sector would benefit from a better organization and a smaller number of actors with clearly defined roles. However, there are other limitations to consider regarding the Portuguese radicalization approach.

The employment of civil society organizations in prevention can be a way to address radicalization, as many countries have demonstrated. However, as observed previously in this study, there has been no concrete evidence of the employment of this sector in the prevention of radicalization. As it stands, securitization and the overall necessity of secrecy hinder this approach towards radicalization in Portugal.

Despite the existence of a few programs, dating back a few years, the preventative framework would benefit greatly from the employment of those who are in positions that can identify individuals who display extremist radicalization traits. In this regard, there is a desire to increase the focus on the youth sector and programs which are extended nationwide to all schools, not just the areas where problems are known to exist, which could prove to be an asset in the future. It is important not only to train these individuals to detect but to explain how they aim to separate these potentially radicalized individuals from their extremist ideologies, focusing the solution at the root of the issue.

Despite this lack of focus on employing the general public, this does come with a benefit. Portugal seems to have evaded the fundamental issues detected by Jackson (2016) regarding the stigmatization of minorities, which has been detected in the case of the Netherlands towards

the Moroccan community (VERMEULEN, 2013) and in the UK towards Muslim communities (ABBAS, 2017; HEATH-KELLY, 2013; MARTIN, 2018).

4.2.4 Addressing prevention gaps

The final key theme identified in these interviews was a lack of focus on engaging terrorism in the pre-criminal space which can be associated with the gaps in the preventative framework. Four of the interviewees, including a member of a security force, believed that focus on preventing violent extremism in the pre-criminal space is not sufficient as it stands.

Interviewees 7 and 8, both believed that prevention comes first and foremost from the daily activities of the security forces, particularly from the PJ. Their criminal prevention activities ensure that focus is turned onto the pre-criminal space, however there is room for improvement. Funding comes into play in this field, and as already said, funding depends on the relevance and priority of the topic. If Portugal is viewed as a marginal nation outside of the various terrorist organizations scope, then funding naturally diminishes.

The participants laid out a series of best practices that should be followed in order to address this gap in the pre-criminal space. Interviewee 5 was of the opinion that the 2015 national strategy for combating terrorism, already laid out, is positive and would successfully aid our preventative framework if implemented by stating: “This strategy would be enough. It is a heading that is defined and as a course of action for the country it seems appropriate”.

This input was shared by three other participants who attributed the same importance to this strategy. One interviewee believed that by following what are known European best practices, Portugal could share the same level of efficiency as the UK or Spain. Two other interviewees believed there should be an increased focus on youth prevention and not only on the most troublesome regions. Interviewee 1 stated: “There should be a focus on creating programs for youth radicalization and online content by extending existing programs on cyber bullying and crimes of sexual nature”.

Interviewee 3, who studied the 2015 strategy at great lengths, gave a different opinion, believing this focus is real, confirming that: “[...] it exists, and I have been in the middle of it. It’s being done and in very good hands, but I also know that the population do not know what is being done but it is being done, that I can assure you”.

However, as mentioned before, the lack of focus on civil society prevention was once again identified as this interviewee highlighted the positive work done in France in involving the general public in the active moral responsibility to prevent terrorism and urged us to follow the same thought process.

Ultimately, it can be stated that Portuguese pre-criminal prevention does exist, particularly in the action of the PJ. However, it is scarce, and it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the few programs that do exist. As it stands, it cannot be stated that Portuguese P/CVE programs fit within the scope of combating terrorism effectively in the pre-criminal space. It remains unclear whether we will ever be able to witness the implementation of a national stra-

tegy or an increase in civil prevention awareness. At this stage in time, the focus seems to have shifted to the COVID-19 pandemic and is not expected to change in the foreseeable future.

5 Conclusion

This study aims to understand how counter-terrorism legislation has been applied in the post 9/11 era in Portugal. The main findings demonstrate that the largest issue is keeping up with European requirements, a necessity due to the nation's EU membership, but that neither hinders nor diminishes the strength of the existing legislation. Additionally, this study's purpose is to understand the effort made in Portugal in terms of preventing and countering terrorism. Throughout this study it was possible to comprehend that the Portuguese P/CVE strategy is mostly non-existent. Several limitations have been encountered in this domain, most noticeably securitization and a lack of focus on prison radicalization. The current Portuguese strategy appears flawed, which is not much different from other contexts where neither strategy nor framework have been able to address the fundamental issues that led to terrorism in the first instance.

Portugal does not present P/CVE strategies, but it has managed nonetheless to maintain a very low terrorist threat and it is important to reflect on why a nation with seemingly no approaches, can be successful in preventing terrorism. Undoubtedly, the fact that Portugal is a marginal country plays a part here, just as mentioned by most participants in this study. Another potential factor can be that Portugal plays a small role in the international arena as it has not been involved in any major conflicts in decades.

Even though Portugal lacks P/CVE approach, it certainly does compensate with its legislative capacity. Portugal seems to maintain a very low profile of interest regarding Al-Qaeda/*Daesh* motivated terrorism. Additionally, the terrorism cases that went through the criminal justice system have been effectively criminalized, which also discourages such activities. However, one must still bear in mind the fact that ERW extremism has been increasing throughout Europe, and Portugal is no exception. The COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant effect on individuals who have been presenting themselves as discontented with government-mandated isolation and the social and economic struggles that have surfaced consequently. It is of fundamental importance to dedicate efforts towards this phenomenon, as Portuguese preventative strategies could have a ripple effect in increasing extremism if not done properly.

Authorship Collaborations

All authors participated equally in the elaboration of the article.

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Stimuli and obstacles to the economic and social integration at the border; the MERCOSUR border localities agreement

José Eduardo Martins Felício

Presidente Prudente, SP, Brasil.
felicio_j@yahoo.com

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Author's Biography

Retired diplomat. Positions held as Ambassador: Montevideo, Uruguay, from 2006 to 2010. Havana, Cuba, from 2010 to 2013. Asunción, Paraguay, from 2013 to 2016. Elected Executive Director of the MERCOSUR Social Institute, for two years, from 2017 to 2019.

On April 30, 2021, the Planalto Palace published the information that the President of the Republic had forwarded to the National Congress the MERCOSUR agreement on linked border localities, signed on December 5, 2019.¹

As reported, "the agreement aims to provide the legal bases of international law so that Mercosur governments guarantee citizens of linked localities of participating countries the right to obtain a border vicinal transit document, which facilitates circulation between nations and confers benefits in areas of study, work, health and trade in subsistence goods.

Holders of the border document will be able to study and work on both sides of the border. They will also be entitled to transit by exclusive or priority channel, when available, at border posts. The right of service in public border health systems may be granted in conditions of reciprocity and complementarity."

Undoubtedly good news, but the story omits important background from previous decades. Neither does it mention the years consumed by the agreement processed within the scope of MERCOSUR, nor the negotiations in SGT-18, the group in charge of border issues in the regional bloc. For all these reasons, I share with the reader certain experiences acquired in direct contact with the inhabitants of the border and their concerns.

At the outset, however, I would warn. This text is not intended to minimize the permanent national interest in defending the territory and the need to maintain surveillance over Brazil's extensive land border, in an attempt to reduce the ever-present trafficking and criminality. Nor is the author's intention to ignore the importance of government agencies in charge of border controls, in particular the Armed Forces (FFAA), the Federal Revenue, ANVISA, the Federal Police and the Ministries of Agriculture and Health.

What is intended is an approach to the issues related to the border from the point of view of its inhabitants, Brazilians and foreigners.

¹ <https://www.gov.br/planalto/pt-br/acompanhe-o-planalto/noticias/2021/04/presidente-jair-bolsonaro-encaminha-acordo-do-mercosul-sobre-localidades-fronteiricas-vinculadas>

In this respect, the MERCOSUR agreement falls short of the desirable. At first glance, it is noted that the agreement favored a vision of the national state and the central government around those issues. In other words, public law prevailed over private law, the latter in the interest of the border citizen. The agreement should have the citizen and the border communities as the main subjects and give them concrete benefits. On the contrary, it prescribes more abundant rules about documentation, cancellation of rights and government cooperation than concrete rights and benefits. Its Article III, when describing the rights of citizens, does so in a generic way and seeks to value current regulations.

What border inhabitants want is:

- to receive health care in their country and in the neighboring country, without discrimination and aware that the costs will be paid, without impediment, in local currency or in foreign currency, by official bodies or corresponding health plans;
- to consult doctors of any nationality and carry out health exams in their area, freely contracted by the competent public and private agents;
- to be able to enroll themselves and their families in public and private educational establishments in border cities, without bureaucratic excess or unreasonable requirements;
- to get a job on any side of the border, without any document obstacles, and to have their labor and social security rights recognized;
- to drive with private vehicles and have public transportation in the region, without nationality restrictions and exempt from fees and additional vehicle insurance;
- to carry their personal belongings, electronic equipment, appliances and purchases of subsistence goods to any side of the border, without being disturbed by abusive inspection;
- to have their rights and benefits recognized by simply presenting an identifying document as a border inhabitant;
- that all their documents and certificates are valid on both sides of the border where they reside, in the original language.

O Artigo III não concede direitos aos cidadãos da fronteira de maneira adequada, deixando Article III does not adequately grant rights to border citizens, failing to address their basic interests. The annexes to the agreement could clearly detail the benefits, but are limited to issues of transit and emergency assistance. They therefore seem insufficient from the point of view of border communities.

It is possible that many of the agents that negotiated the MERCOSUR agreement are unaware of the reality or the different realities in Brazil's extensive land border. Some may not know that a city like Tabatinga, on the border with Colombia, only has "access to the rest of Brazil" by air or river. It is also possible that someone may think that Uruguaiana, in Rio Grande do Sul, is on the border with Uruguay, a statement that I have already heard from a fellow diplomat.

Furthermore, those who negotiate on behalf of the Brazilian government are often in Brasília, thousands of kilometers from the border, with no opportunity to visit border localities. And they will not know the situation in those distant communities, nor that each of them

has its own peculiarities and that, strictly speaking, it would be necessary to legislate around distinct particular situations. This is a crucial issue: national laws, of course, apply in Brazil and neighboring countries as harmonious units; and the laws do not cover individual situations in border localities. For example: in the absence of specific agreements, in Brazil, to bring in someone who has died “abroad”, a few meters from their home, the same procedures required to bring a deceased from another continent would be necessary. This bureaucratic situation led to the improvisation of residents in Santana do Livramento, who often put the deceased citizen “on the other side” in a vehicle, right there in Rivera, to enter Brazil and declare death “on this side”, avoiding the bureaucracy then required for repatriation.

This and many other situations can only be known in direct contact with the border communities. So we have “different borders”, for example, dry borders, where vicinal circulation is free, making it impossible to implement strict controls. And here, beware, because there will always be those who defend building walls in an attempt to better supervise. The situation is different when there are natural barriers, rivers, mountains and forests. How then to control each border? Will it be possible to supervise and reduce crime drastically in places where the presence of the state is precarious, where delinquency often prevails?

Therefore, it seems to me necessary to add policies for the inclusion of border inhabitants to the indispensable supervision and defense of the territory. And this is possible with the knowledge of the different border realities. It may be necessary to complement the MERCOSUR agreement and the various existing bilateral instruments, with specific regulations or “statutes”, depending on the locality.

In indigenous lands that go beyond national borders, there are situations to be observed. Sometimes they are from the same tribe, family members who live in different countries and for which national boundaries make little or no sense. The Ashaninka, for example, are inhabitants of Acre, with relatives in adjoining lands in Peru. I recall a case presented to the Brazilian Government at the beginning of this century, in which the Ashaninka of Brazil complained that their relatives “on the other side” wanted, as well as “on this side”, to curb logging, which was allowed in Peruvian territory, in the Ashaninka lands. The fact required negotiations with the Peruvian government, in order to establish a specific regime or a “statute” that contemplated the situation.

There is, therefore, the need to associate the indisputable obligation of central governments to defend the national territory and guarantee security with peculiar border situations, with community interests and the rights and obligations of citizens.

As for education, there are important needs in technical and higher education on the border, with the exception of a few urban conglomerates on the Midwest and South borders. The result is an exodus of young people who could contribute to the progress of their home regions, if they remained. Another obvious consequence is that, without proper education, those who are unable to emigrate to study end up being co-opted by criminals, who offer them employment and remuneration in illegal activities. The phenomenon that is well known in the

slums of Brazil is repeated on the border, where children and teenagers get their first job at the hands of drug dealers.

As I have already had the opportunity to say to the president of a neighboring country, central governments, in this case, have to compete with criminals and win the competition, offering border communities opportunities for development and decent employment.

Also in education, governments must offer bilingual education and ensure that students have equivalent benefits in border schools. Here is another curiosity: the “plan ceibal” for digital inclusion, adopted in Uruguay, which grants, among many benefits, a laptop computer to each student in primary education, had a lot of repercussion. Great success across the country. At the border, schools distributed the equipment, but one day the question arose as to whether foreigners could also receive laptops. The bureaucracy said no, but the foreigner, Brazilian for example, was at the Uruguayan school “on the other side”, where was also a Uruguayan relative. With good reason, they claimed the same benefits. So, the central governments, oblivious to the “banalities” of the border, had to pay attention to the laments of the children and their families and try to solve the problem.

We are facing practical, humanitarian issues, where only sensitivity and common sense can replace the rigidity of laws and regulations designed at the national level. For this reason, in many cases, informal understandings between citizens and authorities in border communities end up supplementing the gaps that national laws do not facilitate.

There is a need for creative solutions, in addition to the establishment of “statutes” capable of contemplating the desires and needs of specific communities on each border, in particular the more densely populated ones in the Midwest and South of Brazil.

With regard to “statutes”, it is worth mentioning that, in celebration of the thirtieth anniversary of MERCOSUR, this year, the Citizenship Statute is being disclosed². The Statute derives from decision 64/10 of the Common Market Council (CMC)³, approved when the regional bloc completed 20 years. The decision established an action plan for the elaboration of the Statute in the last 10 years, which should be “fully implemented on the 30th anniversary of MERCOSUR”.

The action plan advocated a set of fundamental rights and common benefits for “mercosurian” citizens, including related to border integration. From the reading of the MERCOSUR Citizenship Statute, it can be verified that it is a compilation of rights or expected benefits, since many of the elements listed are not in force or are not being observed by national authorities.

The Statute stipulates, for example, the exemption from the translation of personal documents to process applications for residence in another state. Despite the strict rule, this is not observed, at least in Uruguay, where official certified translation is required to process residency application.

In the case of border integration, decision 64/10 determined the full implementation and gradual expansion of the integrated control areas, which, as is known, only exist in a few

2 <https://www.mercosur.int/pt-br/estatuto-cidadania-mercotel/>

3 http://www.cartillaciudadania.mercosur.int/oldAssets/uploads/DEC_064-2010_PT_Estatuto%20Cidadania.pdf

localities, due to a number of difficulties. In the implementation of the control areas, all sorts of obstacles arose, from the lack of construction of appropriate sites by some countries, to even the refusal of agents from neighboring countries and from Brazil, such as the Internal Revenue Service and the Federal Police, which even argued that they should be granted per diem to work in another country, “on the other side”, or that they could not adequately carry out their respective tasks if they were not allowed to work unarmed in another country.

Stimuli for the development of depressed regions on the border are necessary and urgent. Much was discussed in MERCOSUR regarding productive integration. There was talk of integration of wood and furniture chains, livestock and leather industry, mining and metallurgy, without any practical result.

Some integration has occurred due to the interest of automotive companies headquartered in Argentina and Brazil, which in the last decade have installed auto parts factories, mainly in Paraguay, taking advantage of the lower cost of energy and labor and the maquila regime in force in the country. For export purposes, inputs can be imported tax-free in Paraguay, where labor-intensive goods are produced, such as electrical cables for vehicles. Paraguay benefited from a greater offer of employment to its nationals, stimulus to the economy and indirect taxes and to the increased exports.

Another sector that has evolved a lot in recent years was that of clothing, which is also motivated by the cost of energy, labor and lower taxes in neighboring countries. For countries such as Paraguay, there are social benefits with labor and labor training. For companies, higher profitability represents the possibility of reducing final costs with cheaper components and less taxes.

But there are those who are against the integrationist process, arguing that companies create jobs in other countries at the expense of the labor market in Brazil. Brazilian politicians have publicly manifested themselves in this regard, including in sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in questioning the ambassadors. In part, they are right when they seek to defend workers/voters in their respective electoral bases, but they ignore the more than eloquent comparison of the labor market in Brazil with those of the smaller countries in our neighborhood. In other words, establishing a small industry in Paraguay or Uruguay, which employs one or two hundred workers, represents a great benefit, which would not even be felt in the context of the much more powerful Brazilian economy.

Offering employment in border regions also serves to add job opportunities, usually concentrated in trade. Trade in border localities presents important vulnerabilities due to exchange rate fluctuations. In the case of neighboring countries, the sale of all kinds of imported products flourished, mainly from China, which attract Brazilian consumers. Due to high import taxes in Brazil, tourists, importers and Brazilian “sacoleiros” visit the border, some frequently, where they purchase electronics, cigarettes, perfumes, clothing, toys and numerous items for household use. However, when the dollar values or the Brazilian currency loses value, these acquisitions fall drastically.

Another relevant aspect to note is the consumption of daily goods, fuel and food, which move supermarkets and small local businesses. The exchange rate situation is also deci-

sive for these establishments, to the point of conditioning fluctuations, sometimes drastic, in the volume of purchases on one side or the other of the border. Past economic plans, which entailed currency freezing or currency devaluation measures, directly affected border trade. And they even resulted in protests from merchants and incisive government managements. In order to have an idea of the repercussions, just remember that when the real was implemented, with a value higher than the US dollar, in some borders it was possible to observe stores that suddenly disappeared, such as in Chuí/Brazil, where “ghost streets” appeared in places where once flourished a thriving trade.

It is important to emphasize that exchange rate fluctuations have deleterious effects on the offer of employment, especially in stores and transport in border localities. There, once again, criminals win the competition with governments in the recruitment of labor.

I will not comment on the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on border exchanges, as this is an extraordinary phenomenon. I just recall that it caused the closure of the Friendship Bridge, in Foz do Iguaçu-Ciudad del Este, with disastrous economic consequences on the Paraguayan side.

Itamaraty itself seems averse to updating the treatment of border issues. There remains for decades the same Division of Borders, through which genius diplomats passed, such as the writer Guimarães Rosa. If he were alive, he could take over the Division's head today without any surprises and continue working as he did in his time. In other words, there has been no fundamental change and the Demarcating Commissions for boundaries remain there, the same periodic campaigns to physically check the marks implemented on the border, some for nearly a century.

What I mean is that the Ministry of Relations should have already created a sector of Border Integration. The sector could benefit from permanent communication with the consulates that exist at the borders, with local public administrations in Brazil and neighboring countries, and from visits to localities to contact the communities. This would greatly increase the perception of the distant central government about the concerns of local citizens.

Missions of the border integration sector would allow a better understanding of life in the localities and their economic activities, in order to value small and medium-sized producers and seek to better insert them into the national economy. Border missions could discover curious facts in conversations with farmers who have adjoining properties in two countries. They may abound in practical issues that they consider absurd, insoluble under national law, but which could be circumvented with common sense.

There are cases, little known, of properties in two neighboring countries, where vineyards are cultivated, and the grapes are processed in wineries “abroad”, very close to the plantations. In order not to set up smuggling, the grapes have to travel several kilometers and be exported, with documentation, health certificate and applicable taxes. Hence a question: would it not be possible to allow the holder and holders of adjoining lands to build paths of a few hundred meters, through “their” border, to transport production and benefit it on another property “abroad”? It would be logical, but the answer will probably be negative, if the inquiry is made to the tax and police authorities, in light of the current regimes.

A sector dedicated to border integration in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could serve to improve understanding between the authorities in the surrounding localities, promoting effective cooperation and reducing mistrust. Improving understanding between security agents would be critical in cities where smuggling and trafficking proliferates. Border integration missions have great potential to improve official assistance to communities and would greatly assist in the formulation of specific policies. Border citizens, often in need of support, would undoubtedly feel better assisted. The border committees that exist today in most localities can act less randomly if stimulated by integration missions. In systematic actions, committees can serve the purpose of bringing authorities closer together and at the same time listening to communities, their complaints and needs.

The issue of border security deserves a separate debate, but I risk a few remarks. Despite the fact that the FFAA have not neglected to defend our territory and the territorial sea, an aggression against Brazil by another country seems highly unlikely today. But threats remain to our natural resources on land and at sea, to the environment and to the security of Brazilians, the latter due to cross-border crime. There are frequent reports of trafficking in goods, people (adults and minors), drugs and weapons that supply criminals in large cities. The fight for the control of trafficking takes place daily between factions, in large cities, within Brazil and at the borders. In the fight against delinquency, successive governments have implemented force modernization programs in Brazil, with training and technology. Large resources were and are spent on programs such as “Calha Norte”, SIVAM-SIPAM and SISFRON.

The investment is high and produces results, with more and more voluminous and frequent seizures, but it is not enough to definitively end trafficking. This is because cross-border crimes are highly profitable, especially in the weapon and drug trade, with enough income to pay lawyers, elect representatives, attract politicians and gather allies in the judiciary.

Surveillance has modernized with unmanned aerial vehicles, cameras, facial recognition systems and scanners. Modern and more sophisticated controls have increased effectiveness, but criminal groups have also improved and it has not been possible to neutralize them. This situation makes clear the need to support controls with longer-term measures, such as the policies we advocate, in order to favor border communities.

In the fight against crime and violence at the border, there is an urgent need to stimulate police cooperation. Moreover, the operations of the Armed Forces would certainly be much more effective if they were always carried out in conjunction with the forces of neighboring countries. And the intelligence services would have to cooperate more closely. Therefore, overcoming mistrust is essential. With this objective, the additions of the Federal Police and the Revenue Attachés, which in recent years were assigned to our embassies in neighboring countries, have been very useful. But it is not always possible to bring collaboration closer, for fears of leaking information that would serve to commit crimes rather than curb them. By the way, it must be recognized that the mistrust that hinders the exchange of intelligence information is present between the intelligence agencies of the same country, and that some politicians and their parties are tempted to establish their own services in parallel, for also mistrusting the official agencies existing in the police and the FFAA.

Another aspect to consider is the regulation for the use of fertilizers and agricultural defensives at the border. The rules applicable to adjoining properties are often different and an effort should be made to make them compatible. What is the use, for example, of banning a chemical in a country if on the property on the other side it can be used and dumped on border lands, rivers and springs?

The description and comments on the cases presented above sought to demonstrate that the MERCOSUR agreement on linked border localities does not satisfactorily address – and it was not expected – the needs and deficiencies experienced in the daily lives of communities bordering Brazil and neighboring countries. The MERCOSUR agreement has, therefore, to be enriched by additional texts, protocols, statutes, whatever is necessary, including practical actions by the government, to better meet the objectives of satisfying citizens, as much as possible, and strengthen security.

Governments, generally relentless in tax collection, should be impeccable in putting quality services in education, health, welfare, work, transport and housing available to the people, in addition to implementing public policies for economic and social integration at the border.

Eradiation of illicit crops as a federal police strategy to reduce the marijuana supply in Brazil

Marcos Paulo Pimentel

Polícia Federal. Coordenação-Geral de Cooperação
Internacional. Brasília, DF, Brasil.
marcos.mpp@pf.gov.br

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Author's Biography

Marcos Paulo Pimentel is a Federal Police Chief, Coordinator of the Repression of Violent Crimes of the General Coordination of the Police for the Repression of Drugs, Weapons and Criminal Factions of the Federal Police. Graduated in Law, with a postgraduate degree in Public Security and a Master's Degree in Top Management in International Security by the *CUGC/Universidad Carlos III of Madrid*.

Drug abuse remains a cause of global concern, object of wide debates related to supply and demand, among other aspects related to the topic.

Combating drug trafficking, in this context, is a multidisciplinary challenge that still lacks definitive answers as to its effectiveness, being dealt with in heated discussions over the last decades.

Marijuana, extracted from *Cannabis*, is the most consumed illicit drug in Brazil, as well as in most of the world, attracting the attention of much of these debates.

Ineffective policies to reduce demand and a certain encouragement by some segments of society end up transforming the large marijuana consumer market into an attractive incentive for criminal organizations to explore the illicit production and trade of this substance, despite its lower added value when compared to other drugs, such as cocaine.

As it is the most widespread illicit drug, public policies focused only on mass incarceration of traffickers of this substance have the potential to collapse prison systems, and it should be remembered that the user is not subject to penalties of restriction of freedom.

Strategies to combat trafficking based on the mere drug seizure and the arrest of their transporters have proved to be insufficient to dismantle criminal organizations, having allowed them to strengthen over the past few years.

The seized drug shipments are, in fact, a mere business risk assumed by the traffickers, because, as a rule, for each seized shipment, others manage to reach their destination, enabling the sustainability of this business model that is exclusively aimed at profit.

Similarly, the arrest of transporters or members of lesser relevance in the criminal structure also does not dismantle the respective organizations, as such individuals are easily replaced and often do not even have knowledge of relevant information that could provide judicial evidence against the real articulators of criminal drug trafficking schemes and laundering of the respective profit.

Faced with the need to change paradigms and adopt a more effective model for combating the trafficking of drugs and weapons, crimes against property and criminal factions, the participation of the Federal Police in recent years has been based on three directives emanating from its central unit: decapitalization of criminal organizations through in-depth money laundering investigations; arrest of leaders and international cooperation.

With regard to reducing the marijuana supply, in addition to these guidelines, the body's national strategy also includes the systematic eradication of illicit *Cannabis* crops, divided into two main scenarios: the Paraguayan territory and the North and Northeast regions of Brazil.

The Brazilian demand is basically met by two large producing poles, one in the Northeast region of Brazil and the other in the east of Paraguay, near the border between both countries. Other production centers are known to the authorities and are the object of actions by the Federal Police, but correspond to a small share of the supply in the national territory.

The Federal Police's strategy to eradicate illicit crops as a basis for the repression of marijuana trafficking has shown significant results and presents itself as a more effective and efficient approach compared to the mere drug seizure in the later stages of the logistics chain of this illicit trade.

In this context, the analysis of the illicit crop eradication strategy can be divided into two scenarios, with their peculiarities, one in Brazil and the other in Paraguay.

Map 1 – Map with the main producing areas of the marijuana consumed in Brazil.




Source: Brasil, 2021.

In both scenarios, the eradication takes place through the extraction of the *Cannabis* plants identified and located through previous intelligence actions, with subsequent destruction by controlled burning in the cultivation area itself, considering the impossibility of removal. Each operation has an average duration between 8 and 20 days, a period in which the teams move between several cultivation areas previously identified in a given region.

Considering that most of the national marijuana supply comes from the cultivation areas in Paraguay, one of the largest producers of this drug in the world, this article is limited to addressing this specific area of interest in the neighboring country, in which joint actions of eradication of illicit crops were named Operation *Nova Aliança*.

Marijuana production in Paraguay comes from illicit crops concentrated in regions near the border with Brazil. Departments such as *Amambay*, *Canindeyú*, *Concepción* and *San Pedro*, are the main sources of the drug that supplies trafficking in Brazil.

Figure 1 – Map of marijuana producing zones in Paraguay.



Source: Paraguay, [2019?].

In this scenario, the Federal Police does not command the eradication actions, but carries out joint actions with the National Anti-Drug Secretariat (SENAD) of Paraguay to enable

the destruction of the drug before its harvest, thus preventing its entry into Brazilian territory, likely destination of about 80% of the marijuana produced in that country.

Conjointly, the initial planning of the number of annual phases of the operation and their durations is made. Subsequently, joint intelligence surveys are carried out to define the points at which illicit crops will be eradicated in each phase performed.

As for the operational execution itself, SENAD provides human resources, generally with the performance of other bodies, to ensure the safety and performance of the activities of harvesting and destroying the material, in addition to fuel for aircraft. On the other hand, the FP provides helicopters for the displacement of the teams, as well as financial resources to complement the necessary structure. Brazilian federal police officers travel to Paraguay to man the helicopters and to integrate teams with SENAD.

Therefore, true integration and international cooperation with a view to seeking more effective solutions to regional problems can be seen, which ends up strengthening even more the relations between both countries and the feasibility of expanding the modalities of joint action.

It is an exemplary application of the concepts of shared responsibilities between nations in the fight against transnational crime and drug trafficking.

Also in this context, Paraguayan agents are invited to participate in editions of the Illicit Crops Eradication Operations Course (COECI) held periodically by the Federal Police in Brazil.

The main benefit of the illicit crop eradication strategy prioritized by the Federal Police to reduce the supply of marijuana in Brazil is the possibility of destroying larger quantities of the drug with less investment and in less time. However, it is not the only one.

The concentration of efforts and results in eradication actions provides conditions for the body's other investigations to go beyond the mere seizure of marijuana in national territory.

As stated, the Federal Police's fight against drug trafficking is guided by three guidelines: decapitalization of criminal organizations through in-depth asset laundering investigations, arrest of leaders and international cooperation.

The adoption of the eradication strategy as a priority for reducing the marijuana supply allows the body to apply efforts to effectively dismantle the criminal organizations that mediate such trafficking and that concentrate the profit of the illicit activity.

Due to the very nature of the eradication actions, with large movement of people and aircraft in the region, there are few possibilities of obtaining the so-called "surprise element" and the arrest of those responsible for the crops, which is why arrests in these circumstances are rare.

It is worth mentioning that, usually, *Cannabis* producers are criminals who, despite the amount of drug produced, obtain reduced profits and end up having less importance within the illicit scheme, and can easily be replaced if arrested.

Thus, the strategy allows expressive results without the need for arrests of minor importance that end up burdening the already overloaded prison system, leaving for police investigations the function of identifying and arresting the true leaders, in addition to financially dismantling the structured criminal organizations that act in the distribution of the drug.

The operational risk, although present, is also smaller when compared to pulverized police actions aimed at seizing drugs at later stages of the logistical chain, when it is already in the hands of heavily armed criminal organizations, sometimes in conflicted areas.

The eradication strategy also allows the expansion of the front of action against environmental crimes, mainly the planting of *Cannabis* in conservation areas, as well as in attention to indigenous issues when criminal organizations seek to cultivate in these communities.

Faced with the ever multifaceted characteristic of combating drug trafficking, the joint eradication strategy leaves room for the performance of other government partners or the private sector in order to promote agricultural alternatives to the illicit planting of *Cannabis*, with dissemination of knowledge and agricultural techniques, reinforcement of producer cooperatives, provision of credit lines and encouragement of regional economic development with a view to discouraging illegal production.


In addition to these benefits, the strategy of eradicating illicit crops to reduce the marijuana supply in Brazil has produced expressive statistical results, showing its success.

Given the vast planted areas, as well as the characteristics of the terrain and available logistical resources, eradication operations in Paraguay produce more significant results than those carried out in Brazil.

A measure of comparison that can be used is the amount of drugs seized by the Federal Police through ordinary local operations, ostensible action by the security forces or police investigations.

In 2020, approximately 546 tons of marijuana were seized by the Federal Police, a record in the historical data series, equivalent to more than double the total number of marijuana seizures in 2019. Such a mark is evaluated within the scope of the FP as an impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, which would have increased the demand for the drug, in addition to hindering both the realization of eradication actions in Paraguay and the ordinary police action due to the respective sanitary restrictions.

Graph 1 – Chart of marijuana seizures by the FP in Brazil.




Source: Brasil, 2021.

The phases of Operation *Nova Aliança*, to eradicate illicit crops in Paraguay, were seriously impaired in 2020 due to the closing of borders and other restrictions also imposed by the neighboring country. Thus, the FP directed its actions towards eradication in the national territory, carrying out, in that period, nine operations in the States of Pernambuco, Bahia and Pará.

The result was the historical record also in the amount of marijuana destroyed in Brazil, reaching the mark of approximately 697 tons¹.

Graph 2 – Graph showing the results of *Cannabis* eradication operations in Brazil




Source: Brasil, 2021.

It is observed that the result of eradication actions in Brazil in 2020 was higher than the historical record of seizures in the same period. In the previous year, eradications in Brazil were almost double the total number of seizures in 2019.

Nevertheless, in Paraguay, the series of results are even more expressive, as already pointed out.

¹ According to studies carried out by the FP's technical area, each *Cannabis sativa* Linneu plant in that region produces, on average, three hundred grams of marijuana (BRASIL, 2008).

Graph 3 – Graph of the results of *Cannabis* eradication operations in Paraguay.

Source: Brasil, 2021.

Even with all the difficulties related to the COVID-19 pandemic, two eradication operations were carried out in Paraguay in 2020, lasting ten days each, reaching the apparently modest result of approximately 1, 015 tons of destroyed marijuana.

Although this result does not stand out in the context of the respective historical series, this amount is equivalent to obtaining, in twenty days, almost double the entire marijuana seizure carried out by the FP in Brazilian territory throughout that year.

Table 1 – Individual results of *Cannabis* eradication operations in Paraguay by the Federal Police in 2020.

Operation	Date	Location	Hectares	Chopped marijuana (kg)	Seeds (kg)	Camps	Projected weight ² (t)	Total eradicated ³ (t)
XXII	15 to 24/08	Maria Auxiliadora e Alpasa	143	91.230	1.875	80	429	520,2
XXIII	03 to 12/11	Santa Ana Resort	137	83.718	1.337	116	411	494,7
TOTAL	2020	Paraguay	280	174.948	3.212	196	840	1.014,9

Source: Brasil, 2021.

² According to the calculation methodology used by the National Anti-Drug Secretariat of Paraguay, each hectare of *Cannabis sativa* Linneu produces an average of three tons of marijuana.

³ Total eradicated is the sum of projected weight and chopped marijuana, both in tons.

In 2021, with the intensification of actions, the results were even more expressive.

Table 2 – Individual results of *Cannabis* eradication operations in Paraguay by the Federal Police in 2021 (updated until May 1, 2021).

Operação	Data	Hectares	Maconha prensada (kg)	Maconha picada (kg)	Sementes (kg)	Acampamentos	Peso projetado (t)	Total erradicado (t)
XXIV	06/03	525	570	17.770	580	97	1.575	1.592,8
XXV	14/03	635	880	22.610	520	104	1.905	1.927,6
TOTAL	2021	1.160	1.450	40.380	1.100	201	3.480	3.520,4

Source: Brasil, 2021.


Comparing the results of the eradication strategy with those of other Federal Police actions to reduce the marijuana supply, a criterion for measuring effectiveness based on the amount of kilograms of marijuana seized or destroyed per day of the eradication operation in comparison with the results of all other FP units throughout the year can be established.

Thus, it can be seen that, over the years, the results of eradication actions in Paraguay have been unquestionably higher than those of seizures by the Federal Police. The eradications carried out in Brazil, under this criterion, were also more effective than the seizures from the other activities of the body.

It should be noted that, unlike the routine police action, which occurs daily throughout the year, eradication actions occur in reduced windows of time. This means that greater results are obtained with less operational effort.

The difference in effectiveness per day worked is even more discrepant, considering, in 2021, the average operating results per eradication operation day compared to the results of all other FP units throughout the year.

Graph 4 – Individual results of *Cannabis* eradication operations in Paraguay by the Federal Police in 2021 (updated until April 30, 2021)⁴.



Source: Brasil, 2021.

Under this prism, it is possible to see that, in 2021, eradication actions in Brazil were about 20 times more productive than the other actions that led to seizures since the beginning of the year.

Operation *Nova Aliança*, in Paraguay, produced a result approximately 183 times greater than the regular actions of the Federal Police and partner bodies, also surpassing by almost 9 times the amount of drugs destroyed in eradication actions in Brazilian territory.

The investment required to carry out such operations is still relatively low, considering the results obtained and the expenses inherent to the other activities of ostensive police and judicial police.


The 24th phase of Operation *Nova Aliança*, carried out between February 23 and March 8, 2021 in Paraguay, cost the Federal Police just over 50,000 US dollars, mostly related to the use of aircraft and daily expenses, resulting in the destruction of the equivalent to 1,593 tons of marijuana, that is, almost 114 tons of drug destroyed per day of operation.

Considering that the Federal Police's total annual budget in 2020 was equivalent to approximately US\$1,500,000,000⁵, the PF's investment in the 24th phase of eradication in Paraguay was equivalent to about 0.003% of the body's total budget, to achieve, in just two weeks, triple the total record of marijuana seizures by the Federal Police in the entire year of 2020.

⁴ The methodology developed by the author consists of establishing a direct relationship between the estimated amount of ready marijuana that fails to enter the illicit market as a result of eradication actions and the number of days of operation. Therefore, it is compared with the amount of marijuana seized by the actions of the Federal Police and partner bodies in relation to the days of the year, in this case limited to April 30, 2021.

⁵ 8 billion reais converted to the US dollar exchange rate on December 31, 2020..

Graph 5 – Graph of the percentage of the PF's budget used in the 24th phase of Operation *Nova Aliança* in Paraguay (in 2021) compared to the body's annual budget in 2020.




Source: Brasil, 2021.

Far from being metaphorically compared to “drying up ice”, as some preach, systematic eradication actions constitute the most effective strategy of the Federal Police in reducing the marijuana supply, with high productivity and relatively low cost.

The analysis of marijuana seizures, taken monthly, leads to three main conclusions: 1) the amount of drug destroyed during each eradication phase is much higher than the amount seized; 2) after the eradication actions in Paraguay, drug seizures in Brazil tend to decrease and 3) some time after the eradication action, the amount of seized marijuana increases again in Brazil.

Graph 6 – Monthly comparative graph of eradications in Paraguay and routine seizures.



Source: Brasil, 2021.

Such data demonstrate the positive impact of eradication actions in Paraguay to reduce the marijuana supply in Brazil.

In the medium term, these results tend to be even greater due to the development of methodologies involving geointelligence, with new techniques for analyzing satellite images through improved algorithms and artificial intelligence, to better target operational efforts.

The systematic eradication of such illicit crops brings significant benefits in the scenario of combating drug trafficking, allowing the application of more human and material efforts to effectively dismantle criminal organizations from the body's guidelines (decapitalization through asset laundering investigations, arrest of leaders and international cooperation).

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Interview with the Operational Coordinator of Operation *Acolhida* Major General Antonio Manoel de Barros.

Major General Antonio Manoel de Barros

Exército Brasileiro. Boa Vista, RR, Brasil.

Operational Coordinator of Operation "*Acolhida*",
between January 2020 to August 2021.

Interview held in: July 2021..

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Interviewers

Gustavo da Frota Simões 

Exército Brasileiro. Escola de Comando e
Estado-Maior do Exército, Instituto Meira Mattos.
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.
gufsimoes@gmail.com

Tássio Franchi 

Exército Brasileiro. Escola de Comando e
Estado-Maior do Exército, Instituto Meira Mattos.
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.
editor.cmm@eceme.eb.mil.br

Presentation

The increase in the migratory flow in Roraima in recent years, mostly composed of Venezuelans, led the Brazilian government to structure a federal response in the form of an inter-ministerial, interagency operation and with the collaboration of various sectors of civil society and even international organizations, the Operation *Acolhida*. Within this operation, the coordination of logistical support, management of resources and part of the processes was in charge of the Humanitarian Logistics Task Force, commanded by a general officer of the Brazilian Army.

In early January 2020, Major General Antonio Manoel de Barros replaced Major General Eduardo Pazuello as Operational Coordinator of Operation *Acolhida* and commander of FT Log Hum. He remained in this function until August 2021, when the command was passed to Major General Sérgio Schwingel. In addition to the command of hundreds of military, the coordination with the various actors that collaborate with the operation is also assigned to the position.

At that time, no one would have been able to imagine that, besides the challenges of consolidating Operation *Acolhida* and increasing numbers of internalizations, Gen Barros would also be responsible for managing a "crisis within a crisis", or the COVID-19 epidemic within the scope of welcoming Venezuelan refugees.

General Barros remained as the operational coordinator of *Acolhida* during the beginning, the intensification of the epidemic and the stabilization of the response with the efforts to adopt sanitary measures, the opening of targeted hospital beds and already in that year of the vaccination process.

It seems appropriate to us, in this dossier of the Meira Mattos Collection, to bring to the public an interview that was conducted with General Barros shortly before his departure from the position of director of the operation. In this conversation with us, General Barros talked about challenges and possibilities for Operation *Acolhida*.

In the field of challenge, in addition to the COVID-19 epidemic, Barros talks about the difficulties of increasing the number of internalized people, despite the efforts made during the health crisis not to interrupt this process. He also talks about the two other pillars of *Acolhida*: sheltering and border reordering.

In addition to these aspects in the strategic and political fields, General Barros analyzes the operational and tactical aspects of Operation *Acolhida* and Operation Controle, as well as the governance within the scope of *Acolhida* with regard to the relationship with other governmental and non-governmental agencies, in addition to United Nations bodies.

Finally, General Barros talks about the legacy of *Acolhida* to Brazil, to the Brazilian Army and its doctrine, and to the Venezuelan and Brazilian people. Moreover, he outlines important possibilities and new paths for the Operation.

Unprecedented in Brazil, the interview with Major General Barros is, undoubtedly, an extremely rich material for civilians and military, general public or academics, in short, for all Brazilians who want to know more about this humanitarian response conducted by the Brazilian Government since 2018. The interview is below, have a good reading.

Interviewer: Since 2018, Operation *Acolhida* has been developing actions within that tripod of border reordering, welcoming/sheltering, and internalization of Venezuelans. For you, what is the importance of Operation *Acolhida* in these three axes?

General Barros: Well, this is the face of Operation *Acolhida*, it is the essence of Operation *Acolhida*. This structure expresses well...I could even say how Operation *Acolhida* got organized, it is very interesting. Since I am a military, we plan how to do in military operations – not that it was with this idea, but it ended up reflecting. I will give an example, when there was the crisis in 2018, the first problem was to organize the border because the accumulation of people was very large and we did not have an adequate structure in the Brazilian state. So, the first effort was to organize the border. Well, in a second moment, almost simultaneously, we began to think about how we were going to welcome these people, because we had hundreds of people in Boa Vista in a really catastrophic situation, something Boa Vista had never done. And this required a lot of work and a lot of action. And here comes the focus, the idea, that we really had to get people out of here with internalization, and then internalization began to progress. The first year, to give you an idea, about 4,000 people came out of it. In the next year, there were more than 20 thousand people. So, this really shows the process that Operation *Acolhida* was developing, was maturing to give the answers,

and the very essence of Operation *Acolhida*. There is no way to talk about Operation *Acolhida* if we do not visualize these 3 axes.

Interviewer: The idea now is for us to deepen some of these axes that you highlight as the very essence of the Operation. First, with regard to sheltering, for those who know it, for those who have been abroad, it is clear that there are differences between the Operation *Acolhida* shelters and the so-called refugee camps that we see, mainly in Africa, in other continents, even in the Middle East, even in Europe, these refugee camps have very big differences. For you, what are the advantages of this sheltering model that Operation *Acolhida* has built over the years in relation to what has been developed in other parts of the world, mainly in Europe, the Middle East and Africa?

General Barros: First, the Brazilian solution begins there. It is already beginning for us, Brazilians, to look for a solution that really expresses our essence, whether through the laws and the formation of our own nationality, as we are as Brazilians. We are vehemently opposed to the situation in the refugee camps, we do not even admit this word. And why is that? The Shelter was precisely to provide people with dignified humanitarian treatment, evidently in a humanitarian crisis. And then I start talking about social protection, I do not know refugee camps personally, I have not visited, what I know is from reading, studying and so on. And I do not criticize the refugee camp either, let's make it very clear, every one builds the solution that is possible. But we rule it out, first by the level of social protection that is sought within this. So, imagine leaving people who do not know each other, couples of families sometimes with single parents, people who are sometimes already vulnerable, LGBTQIA+ also, women alone with children, alone teenagers, imagine this as a space for coexistence. So, when we were, the first thing is an effective for it not to be as large as in the refugee camp, because otherwise you cannot offer this social protection that we are talking about, which is already complex. Moreover, these shelters that allow the integration of the person with the local society. You put, for example, in an isolated space of the city, 5 or 10 thousand people who would be typical of a refugee camp, it does not make the slightest sense. So, there are up to 1,000, 1,500, more or less, generally speaking, within cities, seeking protection. I often say that in fact here many UN agencies have also had to learn a bit because when they offer a service in a refugee camp, basic services make a lot of difference. I was talking to the [incomprehensible word: 00:03:41 - Cut 2], for example, the washing problem, from the hygiene part, where it was talked about the need of hand washing and so on. Of course it is important, but when our children have diarrhea, the main factor is not that as it is in the refugee camp, which sometimes even has a problem with drinking water, our problem is not that, is another, is the malnutrition and doing a follow up with the children to gain weight. And this, in a refugee camp, is very difficult. And there have already been attempts to do this, to put shelters for 5,000, 10,000 people outside the

city, we do not accept it because of these characteristics. And there is also another aspect, even if it was wanted to do this, it would not work, because the Brazilian law does not oblige the person to stay in the shelter. So, you see, what attractive would we then have to put a "refugee camp" away from the city for 5,000, 10,000 people in isolation? What would be the attractive for these people to go there? What legal instrument would I have? Then, there is not the slightest possibility. And the essential factors were these: to provide quality, dignity, higher quality humanitarian treatment. And we understand that in the refugee camps this is not possible due to several aspects.

Interviewer: : In your first approach, you talked about the border reordering and the focus and essence of Operation *Acolhida*, then we addressed the issue of sheltering, and the third base of this structure of Operation *Acolhida* is precisely the internalization that are also some responses created by the Brazilian government and by Operation *Acolhida* itself with respect to the structure and dynamics of this migration process. It is a gateway to a remote place, not very dynamic in economic terms, and this strategy of internalization, as you also evaluated, which has been accelerating in recent years, recently passed the mark of 50 thousand internalized people. How do you evaluate the internalization?

General Barros: That is right, internalization is another solution, even when translating into English it does not make much sense within that. We had two decrees, a presidential decree that actually admits the crisis and another that composes the ministries committee and then the subcommittees came out within that. In fact, I am going to talk about the reorganization of this governance later, I think it is important and if I do not speak, please remind me, Gustavo. Well, within that, the Ministry of citizenship that was and is in the lead, either of the sheltering or of the internalization, but we are the ones who really conduct the whole process. That is why we can do this here, there is an institutional alignment, in addition to the strategies. And I have this authority as operational coordinator. I have three functions, as an effective military task force commander I could not do, but as operational coordinator of the civilian house, I can lead and adjust this, evidently within this alignment. And what happened, when we were in the first year that the citizenship had the *modus operandi* and the task force was not involved, if we look at the numbers. And I used to talk a lot with Pazuello about this, 18 passed, this was in 2019, that was the previous operational coordinator. And then the decision of the task force getting involved in internalization was made, because we had the responsibility to conduct a process, we did not have the exit valve which is internalization and we had a big problem, because there is no point in just building shelters, that is what is happening now, and that is where this whole task force structure was put. So, when we look at May 2019, we see that internalization is starting to increase a lot, and this was already the first very important milestone. And the modalities of internalization began to be seen, that is also very important, which is to reunite family reunion as it says it is doing; the social gathering that friends from shelter to shelter, that is, there are institutions that have another level of shelters. We talk about shelter, but in Brazil they are even considered a home if they are along with UN agencies; and the most important, which is the signaled job vacancy. Well, these four began to

provide a very great dynamism. And if you asked me what internalization is: internalization is the socioeconomic integration of the Venezuelan beneficiary by the other Brazilian municipalities with the social protection of life. So, it has to be strictly within the legality process. This took place in 2019, within that, it increased a lot, there were around 22 thousand, but how to sustain this? And then, at the beginning of 2020, we put in place a more adequate structure, called the Coordination Center for Internalization (CCI) here in Roraima, which coordinated all this, all these modules. And then we put several adjustment modules, such as the one we talked about, plus the logistics module, the audit module, for example, the communication module, and an important module for training and education. You see, these people had to be prepared for the job market. So, a physical structure was made and all these entities that worked in the internalization of civil society began to be included and there was no synergy within that, so this was sought within the same environment. And when we looked at Brazil, how to do it for Brazil too, then came the regional centers of internalization, a total of 12, which have the same geographic distribution as the military regions, because the army that handles the logistics at the end. So, in the military region, we managed to find a representative from each military region and we started a work to strengthen these [incomprehensible word: 00:05:47 - Cut 3], it took a year to do that. So, we had almost no representation, only the military, and now we have several civil society institutions. And now the citizenship puts a representative in every [incomprehensible word: 00:06:00 - Cut 3] within that. So, the [incomprehensible word: 00:06:04 - Cut 3], works this integration process regionally, oils the gears, links with the internalization coordination center. That is why, even with the pandemic, we managed to internalize another 19 people and then imagine what it was like to internalize during the pandemic. We had 3,000 in January and February, and then in March, which was the month of the pandemic, we went to 1,500, and then we went to a little more than a thousand within that. So, the internalization was in this crescent. Today, for example, when we talk about training and education, which was another step, we are working and uniting in three main axes: we have the literacy axis, the language content, literacy/language; the cultural adaptation, the second axis, which is much broader than that; and professional training itself. Today I have a specific Secretariat for training and education. So, you can see that, in addition to increasing quantity, we also increased quality. Right now, we are in a situation of flexibilization of the border and we have a bold goal of 2,500 people in July. What was the last advance of all this? The last advance, in terms of strategy, is that we are moving from the finalized job opening to the finalized job opening in companies, in other words, we made this contact in retail. We started with JBS, it was the first. We started by doing a direct connection work with companies and it is not true that, even with the economic crisis we are going through, of 14 million there are no jobs for these people, because many Brazilian jobs do not want it and it is also another very relevant factor in this aspect. Imagine that JBS has an annual plan of about 1,400 people per month, it needs to replace 1,400 people per month, for example, if it makes a direct connection here, we know what its demand is, we are able to make the selection, it reduces the cost for the company and we place this person wherever he or she goes. Of course there are several problems. Just yesterday we spoke with Jeep, Fiat, in the southern region of Brazil, precisely offering this. So, it was very simple in the evolution of internalization in the Brazilian solution,

in the solution that really is the solution. And in terms of general improvement, we also started looking at local integration, which is another problem, because many people do not want to leave here. So, within the internalization, we also pulled an aspect for the local internalization. In general, this is about internalization. And now it is at 53 thousand. We have already passed 53 thousand people now, Gustavo.

Interviewer: You have now mentioned this response to the internalization in the pandemic issue, which brought a series of challenges, a series of impacts for all areas. Undoubtedly, Operation *Acolhida* had a number of challenges with regard to the pandemic. What actions were developed by Operation *Acolhida* in the prevention and treatment of migrants and members of the Operation itself who were affected by the disease, by covid?

General Barros: Well, that is very interesting. I say covid is a crisis within another crisis. This pandemic came when we were already having a humanitarian crisis, and we created a protocol in January 2020 that was to identify and isolate. Let's remember that we did not have the tests and did not know much about it, I am talking about January 2020. I remember well that in March, precisely on March 17th, the first suspected case happened and there was no testing, we followed the protocol, this happened in the afternoon, and from Saturday to Sunday we isolated more than a thousand people. 600 people in Pacaraima, 300 people here and 100 people in Manaus, all who had contact with this supposed person. And then we put a covid office together with the agencies, and we started having 3 meetings daily. On Sunday, at 6 am, everyone was isolated, that was what we could do. There was no testing here in Roraima, I had to talk to the secretary of health, send a sample there to Manaus, he did it, made an exception for us and fortunately on Sunday afternoon it came out negative, but it turned on a light. We started to work hard, I had an average of 12, 13 thousand Venezuelans at that time in direct responsibility. Imagine if the first case of covid here in Roraima happened to be a Venezuelan one, how it would foster xenophobia, and we were very concerned about people not understanding that. We started to work hard and to carry out monitoring and isolation measures within what could be done, we made a very strict protocol and took hygiene measures within the shelters, that was what could be done. We removed the field hospital from the border and put it in Boa Vista because we understood that it was the best place to do it. But there were still many doubts because the local public system here was very deficient, extremely deficient, at that time there was even a lack of masks, an absence of alcohol gel. We started making masks together with the Venezuelans themselves, just imagine what we had to do. And then came a solution from *Acolhida*, an action that I had to take and that worried me a lot, the construction of the protection and care area. The care area would be a field hospital and the protection area an isolation area. And why don't we talk about the field hospital's isolation area? We talked here and we saw it, and when we talked about the isolation area, due to the experiences of agencies in other countries, people would even flee, in the case of Ebola and everything, the person felt confined

to death, so we put the protection area, but actually it was an isolation area for suspects and confirmed who did not need a hospital. And the care area, as we did not know how far we were going to be able to actually put a hospital up and running, there were many doubts in this regard. So, on the 17th and on the 21st the field hospital began to be set up and a month later we had 80 beds. And then we started building a much broader field hospital with a firm that was here, with civilians and so on. After a month there were 80 beds. And then came the first question, "Am I going to treat only Venezuelans or am I going to treat Brazilians too?", and I came to the conclusion that it was not possible to treat only Venezuelans because this would further distance Operation *Acolhida* from the population, even if it was not a responsibility. And we sought a partnership, a term of cooperation through the civil house, with the state, with the city hall and with the University, the University here. It was difficult because we knew that June would be the peak of the pandemic, we started to do parallel work raising this, and the first big difficulty I had was to talk about what would be the size of the care area. We thought of 1,200, given the prognosis of the pandemic. We worked hard and in May we closed 786 beds, space for 786, a herculean job with a company here. The city hall did its part, but the State did not honor its share of inputs, because we entered with structure, management and the material part, but the State had to put the personnel and inputs, and it did not honor this. Very difficult, and we were in May and it started to have a huge peak here, the HGR was in deplorable situations, and then with the Ministry of Health, we made a partnership with Sírío-Libanês, Itaú Bank, in which a contribution of input resources came in late May. On June 17, we opened the field hospital and began treating Brazilians and Venezuelans. I had numerous difficulties. On the same day, we had a doctors' strike here – and I would like to record this because this has to go down in history – there was a lack of doctors here and by a court decision, doctors without CRM could work within *Acolhida* and, at the opening day, local doctors abandoned their posts. Look at the difficulty we had. This is already history, that is why I can talk about it. But we moved on. Very difficult, but what matters is that, from June to December, we treated around 6,000 people in the care area, almost 6,000 people, and only 11% Venezuelans, the rest Brazilians. Our covid mortality rate was 3,2%, the field hospital in São Paulo 13%, there was an ICU inside the hospital. So, it worked out really well. Moreover, we also opened a UBS within the protection area in partnership with the city hall, and 7,000 people were treated there. From June to December, we had 13 thousand visits from the general population. We were unable to maintain it and in December we transitioned to the state government. So you can have an idea, we transferred over 220 thousand items to the state, such as a loan for it to work, and so on. Today it is a legacy. And here comes something very important, the structures remained as a legacy, evidently the state had to afford the rent and so on, but it got something ready. And today there is a maternity hospital and a covid back-up hospital. And where the protected area used to be, which was for 1,000 Venezuelans, today we have the Pricumã shelter dedicated to the health vulnerable, together with the health center that we are serving. Within all of this, the *Acolhida* health center emerged, which will be addressed in another conversation. We have improved this service, and it will be another great legacy that

I would like to talk about in another opportunity. We spent about 52 million, more or less, of Federal money within that and, as far as I know, it was the field hospital that most assisted people in Brazil and with the best results rate for the treatment of covid.

Interviewer: General, you mentioned the issue of governance. I want to ask a question regarding governance and especially highlight another Operation, together with Operation *Acolhida*, which is Operation Controle. Perhaps in this question you will be able to deepen the issue of governance and change, as you have already signaled in this issue of reorganization. But basically, to provide this humanitarian aid, the welcoming, the internalization and the security of the border, in addition to the reordering, the very security and monitoring of this border, that actually requires a great articulation with Operation Controle. That is, Operation *Acolhida* going hand in hand with Operation Controle, in addition to various government agencies and entities. You have already mentioned here several ministries that are part of it, civil society organizations, whether national or international, international organizations. How is this governance, this integration, and what are the main challenges? What are the main challenges of this articulation, this governance in favor of an integrated border security of Brazilians and this welcoming, this humanitarian aid?

General Barros: I will start here at the operational level and then I will go to the strategic and political. So, at the operational level, the first time I saw the design, I particularly thought it should be different, because we have Operation Controle carried out basically by the brigade here in Selva and we have that today [incomprehensible word: 00:01:57 - Cut 5] linked to the Amazon military command linked to the Ministry of Defense with its typical attributions of border security and we have Operation *Acolhida* with a humanitarian character. Of course they touch each other, and they touch each other particularly when we talk about intelligence because we are dealing with the same human material, with the same problems. I thought there should be a command in quadrant or Controle is under Operation *Acolhida* here and today I am totally against that initial idea of mine. Totally against and I will explain why: they are completely different actions, we cannot mix humanitarian action with trivial ostensible typical security of border strip, it will not work well within that. So, I work with legitimacy and legality. My legitimacy, for example, is reinforced when there are several UN institutions working with me and my legitimacy is reinforced when I take a person who is on the street and, even if they sneaked into the country, I do not leave them on the street to avoid collapsing even more, I can do this in terms of Operation *Acolhida* without breaking legality. Operation Controle does not have this purpose. Operation Controle is the security of the border strip, to maintain law and order within the border strip, not only with the brigade, but with all other mechanisms. So, I think this division is very good, it characterizes things very well. Well, of course, those who coordinate and control Operation Controle and Operation *Acolhida* must be in deep coordination and synergy. So, this

I think was also another design that was really good in terms of conduct, to be very specific. Many times people come to ask me, "General, what is being done to bar the unofficial, alternative ways of entry?", and I answer, "This is not my problem, who does this is Operation Controle, my problem is coordinated with Controle and providing a humanitarian solution". For example, it is already very easy within that, when we raise the level of political strategic governance, then we do have committees of ministers that are for macro crises and so on. We will see that in fact this decree is a conduct, it is a federal intervention in the state, in the conduct of the process, if we take a look at the decree, that is what it is. And we have the subcommittee on the border strip, the subcommittee on shelters, on welcoming, on internalization, on health. The operational coordinator is linked to the Civil House. The operational coordinator has the mission to conduct the actions and can connect with the local political authorities of government and state, with the city halls and so on, the operational coordinator can establish terms of cooperation. Of course they have to be linked to the subcommittees and so on. This has positive aspects, but the subcommittees sometimes also have to be very clear what their part is, their part is not management, their part is governance and when this gets mixed up, it causes a lot of distress to the operational coordinator. What is the future? The future is to have only one subcommittee, and this change is being proposed, a subcommittee, in which the operational coordinator is also part of this subcommittee, and no longer 4 or 5 subcommittees, and the council and minister is only triggered in the event of a serious crisis. And then there will be more agility to the political strategic processes, more focus on these subcommittees on governance rather than management, and more strength to the operational coordinator to accelerate the institutional alignments that are needed. Because the biggest challenge I have here is to make institutional alignments, with governmental and non-governmental institutions, in order to respond in a timely manner due to the crisis. So, things are very dynamic here and the operational coordinator has to look for this alignment and give this answer. This, Gustavo, is my main challenge in terms of leadership, in terms of governance and in terms of management.

Interviewer: General, we will now change the focus of the questions to the impacts that Operation *Acolhida* brought, or could bring, in relation to the Brazilian army's doctrine. How do you assess the impact of Operation *Acolhida* on the Brazilian army's doctrine regarding, mainly, actions of border ordering, humanitarian aid, civil-military relations, as you yourself put it, one of the great challenges in terms of governance? What teachings, practices, and actions could the *Acolhida* task force incorporate or have already incorporated into the army's doctrine? Is there a channel for dialogue with the army doctrine center?

General Barros: Yes, undoubtedly. The ground operations command, through its doctrine center, has already done some work on this last year. So, the civil affairs company, for example, is being built based on the experience of Operation *Acolhida*, evidently there are many particularities here. So, this civil affairs doctrine is being greatly strengthened now with Operation *Acolhida*. Yes, the army is taking advantage of this. When we talk about impacts, it is evident

that military operations, whatever their nature, always have the same foundations. You will only change some details in the middle of the planning, but the fundamentals are the same. This is not Haiti here, so if you want to do everything that was done in Haiti here, it will not work. We are in national territory, it is another type of target audience, it is another dynamic of governmental and non-governmental institutional relations, it is another type of exposure to public opinion, and so on. So, there is no point in saying that this is the same, of course Haiti has given a lot of subsidies and it is a success case. And we need to register Haiti in one way and we have to register Operation *Acolhida* in another way. Well, the teachings are the most diverse, so much is the way we do it and that is why recognition comes. The recognition is much more international than national in this aspect, because we have built a way. It is very interesting that many people come here to see how we are doing, for example, how you talked about shelters and not refugee camps, when talking of internalization, when talking of training and various other aspects that we are doing. So, yes, here is a success case, the army is attentive. I think there is a possibility of enormous amplitude for use. Yes, I am absolutely sure, that it is the doctrinal milestone that will improve the doctrines of the Armed Forces.

Interviewer: What are the legacies that Operation *Acolhida* has left for Brazil and for Roraima specifically? Which are the most important, what would you highlight in terms of legacy?

General Barros: We have tangible and intangible legacies. I say that the intangible is to create a methodology, a doctrine, on how to do this within this crisis, this makes us stronger. And this, strategically, I believe is very important because Brazil, due to its geostrategic position, will continue to be a destination for a migration crisis. The migration crisis has always occurred in the history of mankind, it has never ceased to occur, and it is now reaching South America more strongly. So, when we look at Brazil by the connections, by its position, when you look, despite all the problems, the size of our economy, when you look at the geographic diversity, when you look at the diversity of our formation – Look, the what is happening in São Paulo with Bolivians and so on – we are different. So, either we take advantage of this experience that we have and strengthen ourselves to give options in the migratory crisis, or society will suffer. The first intangible legacy is the use within that, because when we give this answer, Brazil has an advanced law in terms of migration, Brazil has mature institutions that can work in different groups, Brazil has a mixed nationality formation, these are all the aspects that lead us to be a reference for this century for that future within the migratory crisis. And that will be very clear if we know how to take advantage of all this experience. Because if I do not do this, in fact, it is not that I am not responding to a migration crisis, it is not just that, I am failing to protect my society because then I do not know who gets in, I do not have an immune barrier against diseases, for example, there are many cases of measles, which is a disease that existed in Brazil, vaccination is needed within that; I no longer know about the violence of trafficking, organized crime, use these people

in the big cities and more misery, more violence will arrive in the big cities. So, it is not just a matter of humanitarian character, it is also a matter of protecting our own society. When we go to tangible aspects, and the crisis shows this, we start to see the state of Roraima, a state with 600 thousand people, 700 thousand people, almost a neighborhood if we compared it to São Paulo, inside of the Amazon, strategic, and it becomes visible. So, we see that the economy of Roraima has benefited from the crisis in this aspect of job creation and so on, it has become the focus of the Federal Government for public policies. And of course some more concrete legacies, I just said today that the state is using the care area as their hospital, in record time in a crisis; we now have the *Acolhida* health center which was the result of the partnership with SÍrio-Libanês, through the leadership of the Ministry of Health, we are going to have a medical residency of SÍrio-Libanês here, the first time in the Amazon and we owe it to *Acolhida*, it will start now in August. A restructuring of the center with tomography has been established, with all the assistance part, because in Pacaraima there is no x-ray, so you can have an idea. So, we are going to have a health center in Pacaraima and a health center in Boa Vista. We have already attended more than 56 thousand visits from November so far, all the epidemiological control of covid testing is being done by the health center. So, the health center is already being and will be another very strong legacy within that. Well, I will stop here, talking about the economic aspects that the region has been benefiting from and the structure, in this case, linked to health, of course, which will already be for the State, in addition to learning, several universities here, for example, are doing several courses and taking the cases of Operation *Acolhida*.

Interviewer: And we wanted, let's say, also for you to reflect and bring your thoughts on the future of Operation *Acolhida*. What are your impressions? What are your expectations, in terms of the development of Operation *Acolhida* for this period of 2021 and for the coming years?

General Barros: Well, Operation *Acolhida* is always in a process of maturity, as we talked about. Improving, reinventing itself, as we had the APC, as the health center, as we talked about internalization. So, some aspects when we talk about it in a more holistic way, this crisis started in 2018 here, with two presidential decrees, we are in the third year going to the fourth. And the Armed Forces have over 600 military here, and there is no representation from other Ministries here, there is only one Ministry of Citizenship. So, what model do we want? Are the Armed Forces going to be taking care of a humanitarian crisis? This draws a lot of attention in the world, that is, you have the Armed Forces effectively taking care of a humanitarian crisis under the coordination of a general, they do not understand how we manage to do this, but that is where our positive side comes from. But the Armed Forces are not supposed to remain forever in a situation like this, as we have Operation Pipa, which has been distributing water for 20 years. In this aspect, the restructuring of Operation *Acolhida* is being worked on, without ever compromising Operation *Acolhida*. So, we are, for example, hiring people for positions that are not essential in the management, we are with trading floors in this sense, we think of a way

to do it, for us to leave 650 military troops to fall by half even now in December, without compromising the Operation in the first step: the creation of a management unit, see, I did not have a management unit here, they used army management units. So, the creation of a management unit that is being done; the relocation of the base, for us to remove the base from within a military structure, this is also being done on a trading floor, it will be in an area here in Boa Vista where we will put all agencies, all people in the same environment, but it is not going to be in the military area anymore, just for us to untie it within that; the improvement of internalization itself, as we were talking about and I passed very quickly, and that is very important; the consolidation of the health center that is being consolidated within that, within this governance. It has a CNPJ, it has a CNES which is its record. Integrated with the SUS to serve Brazilians as well, we are waiting for this to serve Brazilians within that legacy we talked about, which previously was only Venezuelans. Look at this, this has to consolidate; and the PID *Acolhida* in which it is actually every part of information technology with welcoming process that is very important. Look, before we used data from several partners, this cannot happen. We have to have a single database, this database has to be from the Brazilian state and the Brazilian government, and we started with something, warrant officer and I, behind *Acolhida*, something very simplistic. Now we are on another level as a database and we are implementing it. And why do we say PID *Acolhida*? Because it is not only a welcoming, it is digital identification of beneficiaries inside the shelters, tracking of these personnel, for example, the hospital care itself, everything digitized within that. So, PID *Acolhida* goes there. See, these are very important aspects that are providing a different appearance, I could talk about the demilitarization of Operation *Acolhida* in this sense without compromising. This is already happening and this will be consolidated a lot next year. The next step would be the transition of governance and this is more complicated, who takes the place of the General? Who takes the place of staff decision makers? We have a plan for this to involve the ministries, but that would be another step a little more complex and I do not think it will come out that soon, but at some point, it will have to. And all this without losing the quality of the Operation, see that it is a very big challenge. So, the tendency is to improve, restructure the Operation in these various aspects, reducing the military personnel within that and making a transition to contracted services, and in the second moment making a transition of governance. Would the final state be without military? Of course not, because as we have 12 ministries, the MD is part of it, so I would have to make a contribution, but it cannot be like we all are now, we are just military, conducting this whole Operation. So, this is the future. And why is Operation *Acolhida* working? There are three important factors, first, we have a legal basis within migration that is inclusive, not every country has this; second, institutional maturity of governments. See, the decree was in the previous government, the government was changed and Operation *Acolhida* was maintained, this is a governmental institutional maturity; and the third is our nationality, our formation of nationality, how we are as Brazilians. We are mixed, of course we have problems, so we are in essence a welcoming people. Our formation was that of miscegenation. So, when we go to the legal basis, to the basis of institutional maturity and in our essence of our nationality, is when we can build this solution that obviously

has to continue to be worked on, this is an extremely important aspect. Another aspect that I want to emphasize is the participation of the Armed Forces. Our Armed Forces exist to serve their people. Each armed force has a specificity, we are not English, German and American, we are Brazilian. And, fortunately, in the formation of our Armed Forces, in the strengthening of our nationality, particularly from the 19th century onwards, after the Paraguayan War, we have been molding ourselves within that. A very strong Portuguese legacy in which the Armed Forces did everything in the small country and that was out there in the world looking for advanced technology, but with a small armed force, they used the Armed Forces and the Church. We took this in a certain way and that is why we are very involved in national development, and why the Brazilian army has a strong arm, a friendly hand, this is our DNA, I am talking about the case of the army. And then specifically, when these crises come, the Armed Forces are called because we are a differential in terms of that. What is the big challenge? We do not replace institutions that have an obligation to do. So, Operation *Acolhida* is having this success for having these factors, but also for the state of readiness that we have in terms of the Armed Forces, but we also have to think a lot so that the Armed Forces are not replacing all the institutions that have obligations to do. The migration crisis is something that is happening and will continue happening here in the 21st century, involving our Brazil. That is what I had to say.



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