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The permanence of land power at the center of military clashes to conquer territories

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The most intense phase of combats in the war in Ukraine, which began on February 24 of this year, revealed a new space for reflections on the war in the global panorama. Not that the conflict is unique in the world, because it is not. Violence has been witnessed in Africa, Asia, the Middle East for years, but without the impact derived from the appeal that the conflict in Eastern Europe has, since it involves a military power on one side, Russia, and on the other, the largest global military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The fighting that followed, despite all the discourse common to the military fetish, of an alleged obsolescence of land power in conflicts, served as a demonstration of its relevant role in a contemporary war. Naval and air means have their role in the struggle that takes place, but in essence, it is a combat between two armies and their associated forces, such as auxiliaries, paramilitary or mercenary forces. It ends up having more similarities with past wars, as the Western Front of the First World War, than with possible futures pointed out for a long time, dominated by the fetish of technology, which would have the power to remove ground combat from the war, almost as if making it a completely sanitized activity.

In spite of the plans of men, it may be said, with a touch of irony, that war had its own plans, in which land power holds high importance. However, it must also be said that it is not an isolated dimension of military force, nor can it be in a contemporary war. What the battlefields of the Twenty-First Century demonstrate is an ever-increasing interconnectedness between the various domains of military force, and their very effectiveness depends on this.

The videos of drones being used against ground forces such as armored vehicles and combat vehicles, artillery pieces or corps troops, demonstrate greater effectiveness for ground operations by means traditionally understood as air power. Several examples can be found, and in fact, this helps to understand the new doctrine of the army of the United States of America, the Multi-Domain Operations, which broadens the employment opportunities of each of the fields in contemporary conflict.

This way, land power demonstrates its importance and permanent presence as one of the pillars of support for military force, as a tool capable of imposing its will on an enemy by administering violence or the threat of violence. In an increasingly connected world, there is still room for the soldier, the first and most fundamental resource of land power, to be the one who controls and defends a territory, or who conquers it by his effort combined to technological platforms. And so it will be for some time yet, until another path is found, either through political solution, or technological evolution.

In this issue of the Meira Mattos collection we have a set of articles focused on issues focused on different processes in military organizations. Starting with education in the articles "Research on sustainable practices in military organizations - a systematic review of the literature" and "The history of military education in perspective - training of officers of the Agulhas Negras Military Academy (1989-2018)". Two other articles are focused on internal management "The customization of technology readiness assessment processes based on the TRL scale - development of a methodology for the Brazilian Army" and "Research on sustainable practices in military organizations - a systematic review of the literature".

Other articles deal with the important issues for the debates around national and international security and defense. Looking at border issues, and dialoguing with the dossier launched in January 2021 (CMM. v. 16, N.55), we have the articles "Health Security on the Brazil-Venezuela border - vulnerabilities and opportunities" and "Territorial walls and migration controls in Italy and Greece during the Syrian humanitarian crisis (2015-2018)".

Finally, the last two texts deal with important topics for the country, which are the Cyber issue and the reform of the UN Security Council. These are the texts: "Cyberspace, Logistics and National Security Threats, Not Necessarily in that Order" and "For a seat at the high table! Economic expression of national power as a factor of influence for the reform of the United Nations Security Council".

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COLEÇÃO MEIRA MATTOS: revista das ciências militares. Rio de Janeiro: ECEME, v. 16, n. 55, 30 dez. 2021. Available at: <http://ebrevistas.eb.mil.br/RMM/issue/view/1008>. Accessed 11 jun. 2022.


Social media and the spread of fake news in Nigeria: endSARS protest in perspective

Abstract: The last decade witnessed a massive twist in how information spread due to the advent of the internet and by extension the use of social media. Social media was used by Nigerian youths in 2020 to spread news and information concerning the activities of the Nigeria police unit responsible for anti-robbery operations (SARS) in the country, whom they accused of extortion, brutality and excessive use of force to quell crises. This later degenerated into a protest mostly in Abuja and Lagos with #ENDSARS slogan reverberating through social media. This study, therefore, was conducted to reveal how far was the social media used during the protest and to which extent was fake news circulated to fuel the crisis. A Descriptive survey research design was employed for the study where questionnaires in respect of the protest were generated and shared with 319 Nigerians to generate data. The result shows how social media was used to obtain first-hand information about the #ENDSARS movement which sometimes was enmeshed with fake news to draw sympathy for the protesters and turn citizens against the police and the Nigerian Government.

Keywords: Social media. Fake news. #EndSARS protest. Descriptive survey. Nigeria.

Resumen: La última década ha sido testigo de un gran cambio en la forma en que se ha difundido la información debido a la llegada de Internet y, por extensión, al uso de las redes sociales. Las redes sociales fueron utilizadas por los jóvenes nigerianos en 2020 para difundir noticias e informaciones sobre la actividades de la Unidad de Policía de Nigeria, responsable de las operaciones antirrobo (SARS) en el país, a quienes acusaron de extorsión, brutalidad y uso excesivo de la fuerza para enfrentar crisis. Más tarde, esto culminó en una protesta, principalmente en Abuja y Lagos, con el lema #ENDSARS, pidiendo el fin de la unidad de operaciones antirrobo, reverberando a través de las redes sociales. Este estudio, entonces, se llevó a cabo para revelar hasta qué punto las redes sociales fueron utilizadas durante la protesta y en qué medida se difundieron noticias falsas para alimentar la crisis. Para el estudio se utilizó un enfoque descriptivo, donde los cuestionarios relacionados con la protesta fueron creados y compartidos con 319 nigerianos para generar datos. El resultado muestra cómo se utilizaron las redes sociales para obtener información de primera mano sobre el movimiento #ENDSARS, que a veces estaba envuelto en noticias falsas para atraer simpatía para los manifestantes y poner a los ciudadanos en contra de la policía y el gobierno nigerianos.

Palabras clave: Redes sociales. Noticias falsas. Protestas #EndSARS. Investigación descriptiva. Nigeria.

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1 Introduction

More often than not, people do show their support or discontentment with government policies individually and or collectively in the exercise of their democratic right via different ways and means. Those who wish their voices to be heard do so via mass mobilisation of people in support of their cause. Compelling reasons and persuasion are necessary ingredients for mass mobilization and at the heart of this is the use of social media as a tool for sharing and dissemination of news and information. As a means of interaction, social media has become a handy platform for the mobilization of persons from various groups far and wide. The reliance on social media for news and information has permeated deep into the society of the 21st Century. Some of these social media outlets includes but not limited to; Facebook™, Twitter™, WeChat™, WhatsApp™, Snapchat™, Telegram™, Google™ among others. In the last decade, social media has been at the forefront of mass mobilization of people for or against government policies or their agents as demonstrated during the #Occupy Democrats, #Blacklives matters movement all in the US or the relentless sharing of pictures of the burning Amazon Rainforest in Brazil (ADETONA, 2019).

Nigeria, with a population of over 220 million people and active social media users of about 33 millions, present a unique opportunity for the citizens to use social media to engage one another and with the Government (AKINOLA; KAREN, 2021). While tremendous benefits are derived from the use of social media, they are largely unregulated platforms that could be easily exploited by criminals and non-state-actors. The ability of social media to generate online response real-time show the shrinking of government monopoly on the control of free speech. The widespread use and interconnected nature of these technologies have raised the desire of terrorists, rioters, fraudsters and other criminal elements to increasingly rely on the platforms for their activities. This interconnectedness not only affects how we link up with other people or do business but also how social media constitutes a threat to our personal privacy and security via the spread of fake and distorted news. Nigerians use social media to relay their grievances to the authorities as was the case during the EndSARS protest. The protest, which occurred in October 2020 and was directed at the Nigeria Police, was overwhelmingly covered by local and international media houses based on reports sent by those physically around the troubled areas. Information in the form of messages, pictures, audios and videos relating to the remote and immediate causes of the protest was shared to Nigerians via social media (UWAZURUIKE, 2020).

In the current dispensation, where social media generated content can be produced by individuals, the tendencies of fake and inaccurate news finding its way into society via social media are high. The kidnapping of the Chibok school girls and the subsequent hashtag movement that follows “#BringBackOurGirls” in 2014 was instructive. Fake news and misinforma-

tion were circulated using social media, which pitched the Government with the parents of the kidnapped school children. The 2018 Ebola outbreak in Nigeria also witnessed the spread of rumours relating to the possible prevention against the disease (TONYE, 2020). People were advised to bath with saltwater early in the morning as a possible cure. This led to the death of at least two persons due to excessive consumption of sodium chloride (TONYE, 2020). Another case in point was the chaos in Southeast Nigeria, where parents withdrew their children from schools based on social media stories accusing the Nigerian Army of using Phantom Monkey Pox Vaccine to kill school children, causing pandemonium (NWABUEZE; OKONKWO, 2018; OKON; EKPANG II, 2021). Of recent, the Covid19 pandemic was received by Nigerians with so much fake news about its origin, mode of transmission as well as possible medical therapy (NIGERIA, 2018). It is therefore necessary to query the basis of using social media by Nigerians during the EndSARS protest and to ascertain the extent to which fake news spread via social media.

During the EndSARS protest, youths, mostly from the Federal Capital Abuja and the commercial centre Lagos, moved to the street to voice their anger against perceived police injustice and brutality. While some claims by the protesters could be true, there are other unproven issues which were actively circulated using social media. It is against this backdrop that this research is centred toward assessing the role of social media in exacerbating the protest using fake news as a tool for mass mobilisation. The objective of the study is to find out the extent of the use of social media during the EndSARS protest, find out if fake news was deliberately circulated to gain support for the protest against the police and the Government.

Media Effect Theory and Technological Determinism Theory were used to get a clearer understanding of this study. Media Effect Theory focuses on the influence media has on many aspects of human life. According to Patti “Media influence is the actual force exerted by a media message, resulting in either a change or reinforcement in audience or individual beliefs” (VALKENBURG; OLIVER, 2020, p. 21-22). The Media Effect Theory comprises a group of theories that focused on the use of media in propaganda and persuasion. However, the theory that best situates this study is the Hypodermic Needle Theory which was propounded by “Harold Lasswell” (NWABUEZE; OKONKWO, 2018). The theory stressed that people are highly vulnerable to media messages and that the message would achieve its desired effects once it hit its targets irrespective of its authenticity. The uniqueness of this research work lies in its contrast with other publications on the same topic, which generally centred on the sharing of news and information without taking into cognisance how fake news could have played a pivotal role in shaping opinions and outcome of events. With earlier postulation about the use of social media in Nigeria to spread fake news, this research work therefore, looks into the possibility of using social media by Nigerians wittingly or unwittingly to amplify the EndSARS protest.

The study deployed a quantitative research method involving social media users on Facebook™, WhatsApp™ and Twitter™ platforms. An online closed-ended questionnaire through Google Forms was used to determine the views and ideas of users with regard to the research. The questionnaire was sent to participants via Facebook™, WhatsApp™ numbers and emails. The questionnaire survey was open from 6th to 13th August 2021. A total of 319 questionnaires were received and analysed using Microsoft Excel and PowerPoint tools. An important limitation to the study was the limited time frame and associated distance from the research area and place of research, which restricted data gathering to electronic means only. However, the work is augmented with other sources such as academic journals and accredited media houses reports.

2 Literature Review

2.1 Social Media

The advent of the internet brought a dramatic change in the way we receive and exchange information. The electronic mailing system paved the way for the use of social media as a tool for information sharing and dissemination. FASUNWON (2019), refers to social media as the novel information technology designed for communication between people. Social media has also been referred to digitally interactive system that aid in the creation and fast dissemination of information, views and ideas via online networking software (OBAR; WILDMAN, 2015). The complete control and seeming decentralisation of the way traditional information is collected and shared means that people have a potent tool to access a vast pool of data, be it videos, pictures and written material and quickly share via various social media interfaces at little cost. This also translated to the ability of individuals to make their voices heard from all corners of the globe concerning issues that affect them.

The speed and frequency of information dissemination using social media such as WhatsApp™, Twitter™ and Instagram™ outperformed that of the old traditional media outlets such as newspapers, radios and televisions. Social media also has the added advantage of instant reply to messages and live transmission of events, features that are severely lacking in the traditional media space (EKE-OKPALA; OMEKWU; MISS, 2014; EZEAH, 2013). Similarly, the ease at which people connect with one another such as families and friends, literally shrink the distance and break the barriers that separate them, which afford them the means to share and discuss issues of common interest irrespective of their geographical locations (OGHENETAGA; EJEDAFIRU, 2014).

2.2 Fake News

Fake news has been employed in the past as a means of propaganda to mislead opponents, especially during conflict. However, the phenomenon has been on the increase due to social media penetration in society. Academically, “fake news” is a combination of two separately distinct words “fake” and “news”. While “fake” refers to something not original/forged but intended to be presented and accepted as original/true, the term “news” signifies information about events and happenings (ADEKOYA, 2021). The combination of the two words “fake news” therefore refers to forged information created and presented as true. The basis behind most definitions of fake news is usually centred around the “intent”. MCGONAGLE (2017) defines fake news as deliberately fabricated news intended to be shared to mislead people into doubting verifiable facts. In all the aforementioned definitions of fake news, the main goal of those behind its spread is to create a delusional atmosphere to mislead their target audience with a clear mischief intent.

Of recent, fake news has drawn global attention due to its massive implication on democracy (ALLCOTT; GENTZKOW; YU, 2019). The persistent circulation of fake news has widened the gap between classes and further divide communities and societies (VARGO; GUO; AMAZEEN, 2018). It was reported that fake news was widely circulated during the 2016 US election claiming the endorsement of the Republican candidate Donald J Trump by Pope Francis, which led to serious confusion among the American voters (TANDOC JR; LIM; LING, 2018). Another fake news incident in 2016 was the purported online threat by the State of Israel to drop a nuclear bomb on the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, which cause apprehension in the Middle East (GOLDMAN, 2016). The possibility of political gladiators in Nigeria to explore the anger, confusion and economic hardship of the country to pitch one ethnic group with another for their political gain using fake news is very high (PATE; IBRAHIM, 2020). In 2018, the news of the killing of over 100 persons in Jos, Plateau State, was shared on social media as a retaliatory attack conducted by the Miyatti Allah Fulani group on Birom ethnic group. This piece of fake news further caused the death of several other innocent people despite the fact that it has nothing to do with Miyatti Allah (SADIKU; EZE; MUSA, 2018). Other instances of fake news shared on social media in Nigeria include; President Buhari’s rumoured death in 2017 and his marriage saga in 2019 and the claims of underage voting in the 2019 general elections in Northern Nigeria. These findings show the universal effect of fake news on communities and societies. This strengthens the need for fake news consciousness as a means of reducing and preventing the spread of fake news by the citizens.

2.3 Nigeria Police Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS)

The incessant attack on commuters and motorists in Lagos State, Nigeria's commercial centre, necessitated the Nigeria Police Force to establish the special anti-robbery squad popularly known as "SARS" in 1992 (MALUMFASHI, 2020). SARS personnel were specifically selected and specially trained to confront violent crimes such as armed robbery, kidnapping and thuggery. Their operation was usually conducted undercover, unchecked and unquestioned by the authorities (OLOYEDE; ELEGA, 2019). The "perceived" success of the unit's operations in Lagos saw the replication of similar units all over the country. However, within two decades of its establishment, Nigerians have mixed feelings about the SARS operation viz a viz its mandate.

SARS operatives were accused of several wrongdoings by the same people they were meant to protect. Report of extortion, corruption and even extrajudicial killings was on the rise against SARS (ADEPETUN, 2020). Many people became weary with the SARS operations and logged series of complaints to the police force headquarters with little or no success to addressing the problem (GEORGE, 2020). It was becoming obvious that the rationale behind the establishment of SARS was clearly defeated, and people were better off without them (AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, 2020).

2.4 #EndSARS Protest

The killing of a young man by SARS operative in Delta State South-south Nigeria on 20th October 2020 went viral on social media. Nigerians, took to the street to register their displeasure and requested for the complete disbandment of SARS with the "#EndSARS" slogan (AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, 2020). The international media houses were broadcasting live footage of the protest to their global audience. To douse tension and stop the protest from spiralling out of control, the Federal Government announced the immediate dissolution of SARS (OMONOBİ; AGBAKWURU; BRISİBE; G., 2020). However, disbanding of SARS was too small to appease the protester as they enumerated other demands that must be met by the Government before clearing the streets. The #EndSARS protest shares similarities with that of the #BlackLivesMatter, which was caused by the police killing of George Floyd on 26th May 2020, which was captured on video and shared via social media (EKOH; GEORGE, 2021).

EndSARS protest thus entered into days and attract global attention as world leaders and important personalities were identifying with the protesters and showing empathy via social media. Leaders such as the UN Secretary-General and United States Secretary of State used their Twitter handles in support of freedom of speech and peaceful protest (UWAZURUIKE, 2020). Similarly, the then-Democratic Presidential candidate Mr Biden, former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, use Twitter hashtags in support of the protesters (LARNYOH, 2020; UWAZURUIKE, 2020). At home, the opposition party quickly mobilise massive support for the movement further fuelling and extending the crises to other areas.

2.5 Social Media and #EndSARS Movement

The speed of technological advancement and the increasing affordability of smart-phones brought about the spread of social media technology into the remotest parts of Africa and indeed Nigeria. Social media now serves as the backbone upon which Nigerians use for information sharing as well as mobilisation. This gives the EndSARS organisers and promoters the platform needed to organise rally remotely in different parts of the country. This was partly responsible for the initial success recorded by the protesters in terms of recognition, mobilisation and support. The protesters shared their location and called for support using Twitter™, WhatsApp™ and Facebook™ (KAZEEM, 2020). The protest thus, was able to register its digital presence both home and abroad, which give some disgruntled elements the power to manipulate digital contents to further fuel the crises. For instance, using social media, a popular actress Obianuju Catherine Ude popularly known as DJ Switch claimed to have witness killing of unarmed protesters by the Nigerian security forces, claim which she was unable to substantiate but further heated the polity. Similarly, a woman picture named Ugwu Blessing Ugochukwu was shared via Twitter claiming to have lost all her brothers to the SARS police, claim which her family lawyer debunked after some days, but the story was shared countlessly and drew sympathy for the protest and further aggravated the already bad situation. These fake stories encouraged other Nigerians who were alleged victims of police brutality in the past to share their experience on social media, calling for an end to SARS (OLOWOLAGBA, 2019). Video clips and pictures were mostly used by the protesters to share their stories as videos, pictures and images were easily manipulated and can pass a thousand messages depending on how they are framed and subsequently presented to the public (JAMIU, 2020).

Banks such as Guarantee Trust Bank™ and other cooperate organisation such as Oando™ gas station, Chicken Republic™, Bolt™ car hire services, flutter waves™ and **Rene™ supermarket** distributed various logistic items ranging from drinking water to food and offered 50% discount on taxi vehicle rides (DADA, 2020). Those who were not identifying with the protest were openly blackmailed online by the protesters or their political supporters (DADA, 2020). The social media companies also sided with the protesters as Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey launched a unique emoji in support of the EndSARS movement (UWAZURUIKE, 2020). In addition, social media was used to raise funds from Nigerians in the diaspora to support the movement. Digital platforms proved to be essential in funding the protest. Start-ups owned and operated by Nigerians was responsible for crowdfunding the movement, and it was estimated that around US\$380,000 was generated to support the protest (MALEFAKIS, 2021).

In another twist, the ProSARS group mobilised in support of the police unit and Government. The ProSARS shared video and pictures of the wanton vandalism of both Government and private properties by alleged EndSARS protesters. Pictures of slain security operatives were also shared on social media to show the extent of the protest and its atrocities. The Government claimed that hooligans used social media to indicate the location of foodstuff and relief materials meant for distribution to Covid19 infected areas. Numerous stores were pillaged all over the country with their content including the structures vandalised. The Inspector-General of Police claimed that social media was responsible for the deadly spread of the protest especially in Lagos and Abuja. Lagos state governor also attributed the chaos in the state to the spread of fake news using social media (ADEDIRAN, 2020).

Generally, one of the potent tools employed by both the protesters and the Government is the manipulation of news and information to win or discourage the protests. Thus, to outwit each other, all kinds of tactics were employed to distort the flow of genuine news to promote narratives and control public opinions. Both sides employed the use of social media in support of their cause with dire consequences. It is difficult to ascertain the true picture of events as both sides were accused of spreading fake news to further their goal. It was reported that 67 per cent of the source of fake news on EndSARS movement was shared by social media users (JAMIU, 2020). One of the fundamental components of any democracy is the press freedom and freedom of speech by individuals, which is globally becoming under serious threat by the incidence of fake news. Social media had been weaponized and is constantly fed with live bullets of fake news to the detriment of good social order and safety.


3 Data Presentation And Analysis

3.1 Demographic Evaluation

Based on political conveniences, Nigeria was divided into six geopolitical zones. The North East, North West and North Central all located in the Northern part of the country. While the South East, South West and South South are located in the Southern part of Nigeria. Out of the 319 responses received, 45%, 21.4% and 15.9% were from the North West, North Central and North East, respectively (**Graphic 1A**). Similarly, South West, South East and South South responded with 10.5%, 3.5% and 3.8%, respectively (**Graphic 1A**). The high percentage of respondents from the North is probably an indication of where the author comes from, as contact from phonebooks and emails were used to send out the questionnaire. Equally, 72.4% of the respondents were males, while females were 27.6% (**Graphic 1B**). Additionally, 88% of those who responded were between the ages of 20 to 50 years, and only 12% constitutes those from the ages of 51 and above (**Graphic 1C**). This is also an indication of the high number of Nigerian youths who are the most active on social media.

This finding also corroborate that of SAMUEL; STANLEY e OGECHUKWU (2019) who identify the majority of social media users in Nigeria as youths. The educational qualifications of the respondents show that, those with first degree and masters/PhD constitutes 86.3% (Graphic 1D). The educational background of the respondent was chosen to ensure that they are capable of making an informed decision while answering the questionnaires. The demographic distribution is summarised in the Graphic 1 below.

Graphic 1 – Showing demographic distribution (A), gender (B), age (C) and educational qualification of respondents (D).




Source: The author (2021).

3.2 Social Media Participation

Based on the responses, the data suggest an active social media participation by the respondent at 99.4 % (**Graphic 2A**), with participants having more than one active social media application. The number of active social media applications by the respondents were; 7.3%, 17.5%, 23.9%, 30.6% and 20.7 for one, two, three, four and five applications respectively (**Graphic 2B**). Similarly, all those interviewed affirmed their active engagement with social media up to 94.6% (**Graphic 2C**).

Graphic 2 – Showing social media participation by the respondents (A), those with more than one social media application (B), and frequency of engagement with the social media (C).




Source: The author (2021).

3.3 Reliance on Social Media for News and Information

The ease at which we move around with an internet-enabled smart mobile phones makes it easier to get connected with social media to obtain news as they break. 48.1 % of the respondents rely on social media for their news and information (**Graphic 3A**). However, they all differ on how accurate and reliable is the information they obtain. While 57.6 % affirmed the reliability of such information/news, 35% says the news is usually unreliable as such cannot be trusted (**Graphic 3B**). Some participants also go the extra length to verify the news they received from social media through other means. 78.5% claim to always verify the news they received, while 21.5% never cared to do so (**Graphic 3C**).

Graphic 3 – Showing respondent’s reliance on social media for news and information (A), the reliability of such news and or information (B), and the frequency of verifying such news and information with other sources (C).




Source: The author (2021).

3.4 Potential of Social Media to Spread Fake News

Those who claimed to verify social media news reported encountering misinformation and fake news entrapped within social media posts, with 95.9% of the respondent affirming that they had encountered fake news in social media (**Graphic 4A**). 68.3% of the participants agreed that misinformation and fake news is capable of exacerbating insecurity in Nigeria, while 19.3% disagree and 12.4% were neutral (**Graphic 4B**). To reduce the potential of using social media to cause chaos, 79.4% of the respondents were in favour of regulating social media by the Government, while 20.6% think otherwise (**Graphic 4C**).

Graphic 4 – Showing respondent’s encountering fake news and misinformation within social media posts (A), the possibility of such fake news to exacerbate insecurity in Nigeria (B), and the respondents’ views on the regulation of social media by the Government (C).




Source: The author (2021).

3.5 The Spread of the EndSARS Protest News on Social Media

Due to its wide publicity and coverage almost all those interviewed, 99.4% have had about the EndSARS protest, irrespective of their geographical locations (**Graphic 5A**). This finding is also in agreement with the work of OKON e EKPANG II (2021) who recorded high reliance on social media for news and information by Nigerians. 56.1% of the sample population were receiving update on the EndSARS protest through social media compared to 43.9% who get updated via the mainstream media (**Graphic 5B**). However, not all update on the protest was accurate. 29% said the update was accurate, while 25.8% said it wasn't accurate, 45.2% were undecided (**Graphic 5C**). 31.4% of the respondents were actively involved in restoring law and order during the protest, which makes them eyewitness to events and the ability to compare and contrast the news and information they received via social media vis a vis what is happening on the ground (**Graphic 5D**).

Graphic 5 – Showing respondent’s knowledge about the EndSARS protest (A), the means by which the respondents get an update about the EndSARS protest (B), the accuracy of the update obtained via social media (C) and the number of respondents who were actually involved in restoring law and order during the protest (D).




Source: The author (2021).

3.6 Using Social Media to Circulate Fake News During the EndSARS Protest

As mentioned in the literature review, many authors reported the inclinations of people to use social media to spread fake news. Additionally, Nigerians are notorious in using social media to mislead people especially during elections, with the aim of influencing voters’ choice (OKON; EKPANG II, 2021). Similarly, the Hypodermic Needle theory upon which this Research work is based adduced that people tend to believe whatever form of news and or information passed to them and could have tremendous impact on how they behave afterwards. The data obtained from this study also suggest the potential of fake news spread via social media. 78.1% of the respondents agreed that fake news was circulated during the EndSARS protest (**Graphic 6A**). Similarly, 62.3% of the survey were of the opinion that people reported the protest with prejudice (**Graphic 6B**). It is also evident that

social media users deviated from the initial goal of using social media for mobilisation but rather directing criminals to warehouses to loot Covid19 relief materials (**Graphic 6C**). It is also adduced from the survey (68.75%, not included in the Figure below) that the violent outcome of the protest, especially in Abuja and Lagos were fuelled by the spread of unverifiable news, which fans the anger of both parties to commit acts of wanton destruction to public and private properties. Finally, 65.1% of the respondents believed that the social media pressure mounted on the Government in respect of the activities of the SARS was responsible for scrapping the police unit (**Graphic 6D**).

Graphic 6 – Views of the respondents on the circulation of fake news in social media about the EndSARS protest (A), this shows the percentage of what respondents believe the EndSARS protest was reported with bias (B), the satisfaction that social media was used to mislead protesters to deviate from the EndSARS protest (C) and the number of respondents who believed that the pressure of protesters from the social media was responsible for banning the SARS police unit (D).



Source: The author (2021).

4 Summaries Of Findings And The Way Forward

This study clearly shows the interaction between social media and the actors of the EndSARS movement, especially from the protest organisers. This also is in line with many other research work which reported the use of social media during crises or unrest (OKORO; EMMANUEL, 2018). It was also reported by ONALEYE (2020) that, at the beginning of the EndSARS protest, many Nigerians resort to using social to keep abreast of the happening. As earlier discussed, social media serves as an avenue where citizens share their views and information thus, the highhandedness of the SARS was widely circulated using social media. A similar finding was also reached by OKON e EKPANG II (2021) who opined that national and international issues are easily reported and shared via social media. Other researchers also agreed that social media was used for mobilisation and sensitisation against certain government policy that are inimical to the society (ONALEYE, 2020; SHAW, 2016). Videos, pictures and audio recordings were used to report on the excesses of the police brutality to Nigerians and the world at large. This, as adduced by the respondents, was partly responsible for disbanding the SARS unit. Respondent believed that social media such as Facebook™, Instagram™, Twitter™ were also employed to direct protesters to predetermine places and locations away from security agencies to continue their protest unabated. The #EndSARS handle on Twitter™ was among the world most trending and undoubtedly the highest in Nigeria. This, with other remote issues, were probably responsible for the banning of Twitter™ by the Nigerian Government in Jun 2021, a move which about 72% of the respondent applauded.

On the issues of fake news and its circulation on social media during the EndSARS protest, the study shows an overwhelming agreement among respondents that fake news was widely spread on social media. The study could not ascertain if the fake news was intentionally or erroneously circulated to sway public opinion. However, there are evidences to prove that some of the circulated images were deliberately reconfigured and tailored “at lease by the originators” with intent to draw sympathy and turn the population against the police and indeed the Government. The lady who was claimed to have lost her brothers to police brutality, the fake shopping mall incident, the endorsement of the protest by the Catholic bishops of Nigeria are instructive in this regard (MWAI, 2020). This research differs from that of ADEKOYA (2021) where they could not link deliberate distortion of news and or information with the EndSARS protest. They claimed that fake news was indeed circulated during the protest with no intention to cause harm or sway public opinion.

The aforementioned issues bring to fore the dangers of unregulated social media by any nation or society. The National Assembly passed the Prohibition of Frivolous Petitions and Other Related Matters Act 2017 this however, failed to check the spread of fake and dangerous contents over the social media (SAMUEL; STANLEY; OGECHUKWU, 2019). While acknowledging the efforts by the legislators to draft and pass the social media bill, a concerted effort must be put in place by the state to check the misuse of social media to cause chaos. Some segments of the population are against social media regulation as they claim it is against the freedom of speech, they however, advocate for fact-checking and societal awareness on the dangers of social media misuse.

This also reinforces the need for digital literacy to equip society with the necessary skill for verifying news and information with other reliable news outlets or refutable organisations.

It is our responsibility to be on the lookout of news that are fake and could be injurious to the society. Some ways to ascertain the genuineness of a news include evaluating the news sources and consulting expert (SADIKU; EZE; MUSA, 2018). Evaluating means, scrutinising news sources based on their pedigree, authors credence, crosschecking with other sources, dates and locations as well as reliability of other previous news published by the same source. Fake news can also be recognised by consulting experts, such as fact-checking websites such as FactCheck.org, Snopes.com, PolitiFact.com, and ProTruthPledge.org or subject matter experts (SADIKU; EZE; MUSA, 2018). Once a news failed this litmus test avoid circulating such news. After identification it is our responsibility, the mainstream media and the Government to also fight the menace of fake news. This could be through media literacy which give an individual the ability to separate facts from opinions. Factchecking organisations in conjunction with social media giants could also weigh in to identify and clarify news that are fake. Artificial intelligence could also be deployed by social media tech to detect fake news using algorithms. The employment of third part mediators (social, legal, and economic) could also reduce the spread of fake news (SADIKU; EZE; MUSA, 2018). Social mediators could include the press, academics and activist. Legal mediators such as law and government enforcement agencies as well as economic mediators such as the social media and their clients could sanction fake news defaulters to sanitise the social media. Most importantly, people should severely be held responsible for the content they generate or share that is injurious to national security.

Nigeria with a population of 220 million is ethnically and religiously divided mostly according to the geopolitical zones of the country. There has been an endemic mistrust between these ethnically and religiously divided people which was responsible for the Nigeria Civil War in the 60s. The permeation of social media into the nooks and crannies of Nigeria has again exposed this ugly monster of division. The elite and politicians are taking advantage of this fracture to further fuel anger and mistrust between the predominantly Muslim North and the predominantly Christian South. Secessionist in the South East and South West are constantly using social media to call for the fragmentation of the Country. The farmers herders clash and the ethnoreligious fight in the Middle belt states is aggravated using the social media. For the continuous existence of the Nigerian State, it is imperative for the Government to implement the available regulations as regard social media usage in the Country and these regulations should be reviewed from time to time as the need arises to stop the country from sliding into anarchy.

5 Conclusions

This research work has demonstrated the role social media played in the EndSARS protest of October 2020 in Nigeria. It shows how youths of the ages between 20 to 50 years use their mobile phones to obtain news and information about the origin, remote and immediate causes of the protest. It also shows the deliberate spread of distorted or half-truth to cause panic and apprehension in society, which sometimes leads to loss of lives and properties. Social media can be regarded as a double-edged sword depending on how it is employed and used. While some Nigerians used it to further their hidden agenda, some employed the online tool to express their opinions and make their voices heard, which in this instance, resulted in the disbandment of the SARS police unit. Additionally, the protest had proved the power of social media as a tool for massive mobilisation and awareness that cannot be tamed by the Government or its agencies but which call for regulation to provide sanctity against abuse and misuse. It is also important for the tech giants such as TwitterTM, FacebookTM and WhatsAppTM to be more active and purposeful in using technology and algorithm to detect and remove harmful content in their platforms. They should also invest in social media awareness as part of their community public relation, for people to easily identify and report fake or inaccurate news.

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The Impacts of Rohingya Refugee Influx on Bangladesh

Los impactos del influxo de refugiados Rohingya en Bangladesh

Abstract: The Rohingya, a Muslim minority ethnic group in Myanmar, were forcibly displaced to Bangladesh in 2017 on the ground of ethnic cleansing by the military government. This study aims to provide a comprehensive review of the socio-economic impacts of the Rohingya refugee influx on the host community. This paper uses push-pull and realism theories to identify the roots causes of this massive influx to Bangladesh. The study applies a qualitative method to analyze the impact of the Rohingya refugees on the economy of Bangladesh, complemented by a qualitative literature review. The results indicate that rising prices, along with falling wages of low-skilled workers are negatively affecting host communities. Environmental degradation, as well as excessive pressure on already strained infrastructure and public services, are major concerns. Further research is needed to identify other factors that could strengthen the effectiveness of the repatriation.

Keywords: Socio-economic impacts. Rohingya Refugee. Myanmar.

Resumen: Los Rohingya, grupo étnico minoritario musulmán de Myanmar, fueron desplazados a la fuerza en Bangladesh en 2017 por la limpieza étnica del gobierno militar. Sin embargo, desde el punto de vista geopolítico, China, India y Estados Unidos tienen importantes intereses geopolíticos substanciales en la región. La estrategia económica de China y Myanmar desempeñó un papel crucial en el influxo. Sobre la base de los factores mencionados, se recomienda un enfoque holístico esencial entre las diversas organizaciones internacionales, el país anfitrión Bangladesh y Myanmar para una repatriación sostenible de los Rohingya en Myanmar lo antes posible.

Palabras clave: Impactos socioeconómicos. Refugiados Rohingya. Myanmar.

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1 Introduction

Bangladesh, a small South-east Asian country with a large population and few resources, has given a safe haven for more than one million Rohingya people who have been forced to flee Myanmar. Bangladesh has been housing Myanmar refugees since 1978, a period that spans more than four decades. More than 742,000 people fled to Bangladesh since 25 August 2017 as a result of the Myanmar military's campaign of brutality and terror (UNHCR, 2019). The migration of Rohingya refugees into Bangladesh has had a significant influence on the local communities of Cox's Bazar and Bandarban (where the Rohingya took shelter) districts. The migration became one of the world's fastest-growing refugee crises at one point. Bangladesh shelters 4.73% of the world's total refugees despite having less than 0.31% of the world's population (UNDP, 2018). For the vast majority of the Rohingya refugees, Cox's Bazar has been their principal destination. According to the 2011 census, the population of Cox's Bazar is only 4, 71,768 people (BANGLADESH BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 2013). As a result, the Rohingya community in this district outnumbers the local community by a factor of 2.43. The national economy, security, and environment are all threatened by housing such a massive load. In the Rohingya community, a new pattern of economic activity is booming. The emergence of a small group of persons who have gained new job scopes as a result of the influx is said to be benefiting from these economic dynamics. According to various studies, the major ways in which migration affects the host community are increased commodity costs and lower wages for low-skilled workers. Environmental degradation, increased pressure on already-weak infrastructure and public services, and rising tensions between refugees and host communities are also major difficulties (UNDP, 2018).

Myanmar is a unique state in which geopolitics and genocide or ethnic cleansing have intermingled. Historically, there has long been a deep mistrust between Islam and Buddhism. On the corollary, USA, China, and India are all fighting for control of their own spheres of influence. The fact that Myanmar refuses to recognize Rohingyas as a separate ethnic group should not be seen in isolation. It has to do with territory and sovereignty (KARIM, 2021).

The repatriation has been in a stalemate for more than four years now. Despite numerous bilateral talks and diplomatic measures, Myanmar has so far been unable to create ideal conditions for the return of Rohingya. As the repatriation will be entirely on 'informed consent,' the Rohingya's wishes are crucial. No Rohingya has expressed an interest in returning to their homeland until the core problems are addressed. Myanmar's Citizenship Act of 1982 formally recognized the Rohingya as stateless. With the current military coup in Myanmar, which overthrew the democratically elected party and sparked widespread violence and protest, the Rohingya repatriation is the military's last priority. With this reality, it's realistic to assume that the Rohingya crisis will drag on for a long period.

1.1 Objective of the Study

In light of this, the primary goal of this study is to provide a comprehensive review of the economic impacts of the Rohingya inflow on Bangladesh. On the other hand, there is a direct link between the Rohingya crisis and China, India, and USA, s geopolitical interests in the region. The following are the specific objectives:

- To analyze the economic implications for the host community in the aftermath of the influx.
- To analyze the region's geopolitical implications of China, India, and USA.
- To analyze the main barriers of repatriation.

1.2 Research Question

The primary research question is:

- What are the economic impacts of Rohingya influx in Bangladesh?

The secondary research questions are:

- What are the region's geopolitical ramifications?
- What are the underlying reasons of the crisis, and how do they affect the repatriation?

1.3 Literature Review

The first wave of Rohingya refugees arrived in Bangladesh in 1978. It has been a safe haven for the Rohingya for more than four decades. The unprecedented influx of Rohingya refugees has wreaked havoc on security, the economy, and the environment. Because of the situation, relations between the two countries are strained. Despite several bilateral and diplomatic measures, no Rohingyas have been repatriated to Myanmar as of yet.

According to a UNDP report titled "Impacts of the Rohingya Refugee Influx on Host Communities," published in November 2018, the Rohingya refugee crisis has had a significant impact on host communities' livelihoods. Price adjustments and a drop in daily wage for laborers have had a particularly negative impact on the host community. Large quantities of in-kind assistance received as relief items are sometimes being sold by refugees in local markets, causing prices to go down. On the contrary, their purchases of other products drive up prices due to strong demand (UNDP, 2018).

The survey's net effect reveals a minor drop in price on food products and an increase in price on other categories. Wages for agricultural and other unskilled employees were also reported to be low. The inflow has placed a tremendous strain on the host community, which is aggravated by the country's comparatively low socioeconomic development. There have also been severe negative effects on government services and the environment (UNDP, 2018).

The many terminologies related to refugees which are covered in a UNHCR paper titled "An Introduction to International Protection". The research outlined the parameters under which some people can be classified as refugees and why others cannot, as per the 1951 Refugee Convention. This paper primarily focuses on the necessity for international refugee protection as well as the international legal framework for refugee protection (UNHCR, 2005).

Nour Mohammad's article "Refugee Protection Under the Constitution of Bangladesh: A Brief Overview" outlined the different international and national obligations that Bangladesh faces when it comes to refugee status. Despite the fact that Bangladesh is not a member to the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol, the Rohingya refugees were sheltered by Bangladesh under Customary International Law. Under "Executive order," the Bangladeshi government grants asylum seekers refugee status (Mohammad).

Myanmar is a unique country where geopolitics has collided with genocide or ethnic cleansing, according to a book titled "Ethnicity and Geopolitics of Rohingya Crisis. It's difficult to tell the difference between geopolitics and genocide/ethnic cleansing in Myanmar. There has long been a deep mistrust between Islam and Buddhism. In terms of geopolitics, USA, China, and India are competing for control of their own spheres of influence. By default, Bangladesh is struggling under the weight of imposed geopolitics (KARIM, 2021).

All of these works suggest that the influx has produced two economic groups: the first is the general public, who are severely hampered by price increases and low labor costs, and the second is a small number of people who benefit from the influx by gaining employment opportunities. On the contrary, the geopolitics of the sub-region is directly influenced by powers such as USA, China, and India. Everyone is putting their own agenda on the table and Bangladesh is being sucked into it by default. This dissertation aims to fill a research gap between the main issues of the humanitarian crisis and geopolitics, both of which are contributing factors to the successful return of the Rohingya to Myanmar.

2 Methodology

This research will be exploratory in nature, as primary data could not be collected owing to lack of time and resources. As a result, the research will be based on secondary data, which means that the data was not analyzed by the researcher but by others.

To make this study more substantial and logical, relevant books, journals, published articles, reports, electronic and internet sources and online newspaper are used and fully credited.

2.1 Limitations

Several aspects of this study must be taken into consideration. First, the study is not a primary one, and secondary data is interpreted based on main data, thus it could be deceptive.

Second, because the data was not gathered by the author, there is a risk of bias.

Third, because the crisis is far from resolved, the effects of the Rohingya migration on host communities are dynamics. As a result, some of the findings reported here may vary over time.

2.2 Rationale of Methodology

To begin, I used secondary sources to compile a list of significant literatures on the Rohingya crisis and its economic impacts on the host country. The information was then logically analyzed. While doing so, it became evident that the history of Myanmar and the Rohingya influx are inextricably linked. Later, it became obvious that there is correlation between ethnicity and the region's leading actors (China, India, and USA) in terms of geopolitics and geoeconomics. The biggest impediments to start the repatriation are ethnicity and the geopolitics of the area. As a result, this research has used this theoretical framework to describe the study's main argument.

2.3 Theory

Push-Pull and Realism theory are the theoretical approaches used in this study. "Populations with 'refugee' statuses are most influenced by push forces in a country or region," according to the Push-Pull Theory. In their home countries, refugees are frequently subjected to genocide-like conditions, mainly as a result of authoritarian governments or people hostile to religious or ethnic groups (Rosenberg, 2020). The Rohingya are denied their citizenship and basic human rights, were forced out by the Myanmar military on the grounds of ethnic cleansing. This is the driving force behind the influx of Rohingya into Bangladesh.

On the other hand, a promise of religious or political freedom, the availability of job opportunities or cheap land, and a plentiful supply of food could all be considered pull factors for moving to a new country (ROSENBERG, 2020). The pull factors in the case of the Rohingya influx are that Bangladesh, the receiving state, opened its border on humanitarian grounds, and the Rohingya historically discovered a better place to migrate.

According to the primary definition of Realism which states that human beings are egoistic and crave for power. Realists think that human egoism, desire for control, and reluctance to trust others lead to predictable results (ANTUNES; CAMISÃO, 2018). Accordingly, the brutal behavior and power-seeking mentality of Myanmar's military are consistent with Realism theory. As a result, this idea has been examined using realism and push pull theory, taking into account issues like as self-interest, national interest and national security.

2.4 Significance of the Study

It has been more than four years since the last Rohingya influx took place in Bangladesh. Despite various bilateral and diplomatic efforts, the repatriation process has failed miserably twice. So far, the UN has been unable to exert sufficient pressure on Myanmar to begin the repatriation process. It's worth mentioning that Bangladesh has been housing Rohingyas for more than four decades. Repatriations were successful during the last three times, however, the repatriation of the 2017 influx, could not be started till today. Bangladesh, as a small country, is incapable of bearing such a massive weight. On the other hand, China and India have considerable geopolitical and geoeconomics interests in Myanmar. As a result, these two countries don't not play a substantial role in resolving the crisis. The Myanmar persecution of the Rohingya appears to be motivated by more than ethnicity. Considering the intensity and timeliness of the topic, the author was inspired to do the research.

Map 1 - Cox's Bazar district in Bangladesh and Rakhine State in Myanma



Source: Asrar (2017).

For decades, the Rohingya have lived in Myanmar, a Buddhist-majority country. Under British colonial administration (from 1824 to 1948), there was extensive migration between today's Myanmar, India, and Bangladesh. Following Burma's independence in 1945, the government enacted the Union Citizenship Act, which listed the ethnic groups considered "indigenous" to Myanmar. The Rohingya were not recognized as one of Myanmar's 135 official ethnic groups.

3 History of Rohingya

The Rohingya ethnic community is predominantly Muslim. They make up 1% of the entire population, 4% of the population of Rakhine state, and 45% of Myanmar's Muslim population. During August an estimated 742,000 Rohingya refugees entered Bangladesh through the Cox's Bazar area. Children, women, and elderly men make up the majority of the refugees. This amount was added to the 278,000 Rohingya refugees who had been left over from two previous occurrences in 1978 and 1992. According to the latest Inter Sector Coordination Group (ISCG) report, the overall number of Rohingya refugees has now surpassed 923,000 (ISCG, 2018).

Following the 1962 military takeover, the government provided the Rohingya with fewer official documents. In 1974, all Burmese citizens were required to obtain national identification cards, while the Rohingya were only allowed to obtain international identification cards. By 1982, a new citizenship law had been passed that made it difficult for Rohingya to get full citizenship, leaving them stateless (MOHDIN, 2017).

The Myanmar government referred the Rohingya as Bengalis, outsiders, or worse, terrorists. This view of Rohingyas as foreigners and illegal immigrants justifies the group's systematic marginalization and the government's efforts to drive them out of their homes. It signifies that they have a place in Bangladesh. The distinction between these two terms—Rohingya and Bengali—is critical in understanding the Myanmar problem (MOHDIN, 2017).

3.1 International Legal Framework for Refugees

In the international arena, there are primarily two entities that offer legal basis for refugees. These are:

3.1.1 The 1951 convention

It is a legal framework that encompasses a wide range of issues concerning refugees for the first time. The cornerstone of international protection is Article 33(1), known as the Principle of Non-Refoulement. The clause forbids refugees from being repatriated to any country where their lives may be endangered or threatened (INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES, 2017).

3.1.2 The Protocol Of 1967

The 1967 Protocol's goal was to accept the 1951 Convention's application to modern refugee flows. States can accede to this autonomous instrument even if they are not party to the 1951 convention (INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES, 2017).

3.2 International and National Obligations on Bangladesh

Bangladesh is neither a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol. Bangladesh has signed a number of international human rights accords, some of which support refugee rights indirectly. However, unless particular provisions are incorporated into existing municipal laws or given effect through separate legislations, international human rights are not enforceable in courts of law. Even if a state is not a party to a convention, it must adhere to some universally acknowledged and recognized standard, referred to as Customary International Law. Similarly, while not being a signatory to the 1951 Convention or 1967 Protocol, Bangladesh has housed the Rohingya community in the country and wishes to repatriate them freely under Customary International Law (MOHAMMAD, 2012).

Under the Executive Orders of the Government of Bangladesh, the Rohingya asylum applicants from Myanmar were granted refugee status between 1978 and 1992. They were given refugee status on the surface. In the case of the 2017 migration, however, the Rohingya were not given 'Refugee' status in Bangladesh. They are referred to as "Forcefully Displaced Myanmar Nationals" in the government's official declaration (MOHAMMAD, 2012).

4 Socio-Economic Impacts on Host Communities

4.1 Rohingya Economy

Due to the presence of more than 1 million Rohingya in Cox Bazar district of Bangladesh, in post influx scenario of August 2017, a new economic activity has evolved centering this community. A massive humanitarian activity is presently working to help the community. This community has got enormous inflow of foreign aids, in terms of cash and products like- daily necessities, foods and grains etc. Some of these products are sold by the Rohingya to the local market with cheaper rate; again, the cost of other products which they need to buy from the local market are increased due to higher demands. So, the market equilibrium is shifting centering these economic activities. On the other hand, such huge manpower is putting pressure on the local workforce by reducing their wage. So, all these factors are central to the economic activities which can be defined as 'Rohingya Economy'.

4.2 Socio-economic Impacts on Host Communities

Socio-economic impacts on host communities are multi-dimensional, and encompass the micro, meso and macro-economic.


4.3 Microeconomic Impacts

According to a survey conducted by UNDP in November 2018, impact of Rohingya population among the Bangladeshis, at least 404 households were taken as a sample and the data collected from the sample through questionnaire was processed. This chapter uses the data as secondary source and tries to evaluate the impact of the influx on the host community and tries to find out relevant findings for this research.

4.3.1 Impacts on Wage

Both in Teknaf and Ukhiya (sub districts) of Cox's Bazar, wages for agricultural and other unskilled jobs are reducing. This is due to the Rohingya's lower salary as day laborers compared to the host community's workers. According to the survey data, the mean salaries of all laborers, as reported by households, fell from Tk. 417 pre-influx to Tk. 357 post-influx, implying that wages fell by more than 14% in Teknaf (Graphic 1) and nearly 6% in Ukhiya after the influx. Agricultural wage in Ukhiya, on the other hand, have dropped at a significantly faster rate. In the post-influx period, the average agricultural wage rate in Teknaf fell by 11%, while in Ukhiya it fell by 17%. The inflow is thought to have lowered earnings by 20% on average in Teknaf and Ukhiya. More than 70% of respondents in Teknaf and 50% in Ukhiya said the primary way the inflow has affected them was lower pay (UNDP, 2018).

Graphic 1 - Wage impacts in June 2018(% change over pre-crisis period).



Source: UNDP household survey 2018 apud UNDP (2018, p. 73).

4.3.2 Impact on prices

Large amounts of in-kind help received as humanitarian items are being sold by refugees. Local retailers stated that products spilling out of the camps were being sold at reduced prices. On the other hand, refugee purchases of other goods raise prices.

Table 1 compares the information to prices reported in a September 2017 survey conducted by Action Contre la Faim. The prices indicated in the latter study confirm the refugee influx's initial inflationary effect, especially on rice, lentils, edible oils, and potatoes. They discovered that most commodities have experienced a 10% price hike (UNDP, 2018).

Table 1 - Pre- and post-influx prices of essential commodities (Tk)

Food item	PRI findings		Action Contre la Faim findings	
	Pre-influx	Post-influx	Pre-influx	Post-influx
Rice	32	38	35	38
Flour	28	35	23	26
Lentils	100	93	102	109
Edible oil	100	90	85	96
Potato	22	30	22	30
Sugar (gur)	60	62	59	60
Salt	22	25	26	32
Meat (beef)	440	500	n/a	n/a
Fish (fresh water)	130	150	n/a	n/a
Other vegetables (leafy and non-leafy)	25	30	n/a	n/a

Source: Action Contre la Faim Market Assessment 2017; UNDP household survey 2018 apud UNDP (2018, p. 71).


4.4 Meso-economic Impacts

4.4.1 Impacts on land and agricultural production

Between August 2017 and March 2018, refugee activity damaged at least 100 ha of crop land in Teknaf and Ukhiya, in addition to 76 ha of arable land occupied by refugee settlements and humanitarian agencies. Around 5,000 acres of land have been rendered useless as a result of sandy soil streaming down from the mountain slopes, which is currently being used for refugee accommodation (UNDP, 2018).

Between August and December 2017, an estimated 5,731 tube wells were built to provide water to the refugees (ISCG, 2018). The area's water levels are being lowered as a result of this

excessive reliance on groundwater (Graphic 2) The water levels around the camp areas are said to have lowered by 5 to 9 meters. Freshwater resources are scarce in the afflicted areas, particularly in Teknaf (Cox's Bazar). Irrigation wells are slowly drying up as the water table drops due to the degradation of watersheds and a major reduction in groundwater recharge (UNDP, 2018).



Source: UNDP (2018, p. 105).

4.4.2 Impacts on fishing and related activities

Fishing employs roughly one-third of the people of Teknaf (BANGLADESH BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 2018). For security reasons, fishing in the Naf River has been prohibited since August 2017, putting a tremendous strain on an estimated 30,000–35,000 fishermen and their families. Many fishermen have been forced to work as wage laborers, but the influx of refugees has resulted in fewer employment openings and lower daily salaries. According to government officials and a UNDP analysis, the fishing communities along the Naf River are likely to be among those hardest hits by the refugee crisis (UNDP, 2018).

4.4.2 Impacts on the environment

One of the most serious consequences of the immigration is environmental degradation. The inflow has ruined around 4,818 acres of forest reserves worth US\$55 million, according to the Cox's Bazar Forest Department. Those who rely on forest resources for a living have been robbed of their livelihood in many instances. Meanwhile, 750,000 kg of wood, plants, and roots are harvested as cooking fuel every day. A variety of wildlife species are also at jeopardy (UNDP, 2018).

4.5 Macroeconomic Impacts of the Refugee Influx

International aid, remittances, and wage incomes are the main sources of revenue for the Rohingya economy. A portion of the help finds its way into the local economy, benefiting local consumers by lowering the prices of items bought elsewhere. Other things purchased by the refugees from their immediate host community show the reverse pattern.

As a result of the UNDP 2018 survey, when only assistance inflows are considered, a dollar of help has a total economic impact of \$2.70. When the factor in the expenses of losing forest and water resources, the total comes to US\$2.3 billion (UNDP, 2018).

It appears that negative consequences are more localized than the aid effect. The immediate host community is the loser, even if Cox's Bazar and the rest of Bangladesh are generating static gains in the short term.

4.6 Impacts on Public Service and Public Goods Delivery

Teknaf and Ukhiya's public service delivery systems, which were built to serve a quarter-million people, now have to accommodate an additional million people. All services are overburdened, resulting in conflicts between the refugee and host communities, the majority of whom are poor and vulnerable.

4.6.1 *Impacts on governance*

The effectiveness of governance institutions is becoming increasingly more constrained in the face of this tremendous problem. Some local government and sector officials devote 50% or more of their time to Rohingya issues, causing public service delivery to be delayed, if not completely halted. They also work without pay on weekly holidays (UNDP, 2018).

4.6.2 *Impacts on solid waste management and water, sanitation and hygiene*

The public health engineering services, including solid waste disposal, are under significant demand. With an additional 10,000 tons of solid trash produced each month, waste management has become a top priority. Human waste has contaminated many water resources, including 86% of drinking water wells. Rainwater washes faecal particles downhill, spreading waterborne infections to both refugees and host communities. Washing clothes, cooking, and bathing are all done with water from ponds, canals, and wells (UNDP, 2018).

4.6.3 Impacts on roads

Increased traffic is wreaking havoc on already-degraded roads. Roads, dams, and bridges have all been severely damaged. The transit camps has left a massive path of infrastructure destruction and environmental deterioration. Damaged schools and schoolyards, as well as landslide-prone hills, are among these locations.

Around 45 % of residents in Teknaf and 62 % in Ukhiya said traffic congestion had grown in their neighborhood, while more than two-thirds said road conditions had deteriorated. According to the UNDP survey, 66.7% of respondent households in Teknaf and 70.41% of respondent households in Ukhiya blamed the Rohingya influx for road damage (UNDP, 2018).

4.6.4 Impacts on health services

Increasingly, health complexes and district hospitals are designed toward meeting the emergency requirements of refugees. Local health-care services are severely overburdened, and as a result, local residents do not receive the same level of care as migrants. According to a UNDP study, the Civil Surgeon of Cox's Bazar said that health centers were overwhelmed during the disaster period. Approximately half of the time, as well as that of doctors in health complexes, is now devoted to migrants. Members of the host community now had to wait longer for services. The situation has become more difficult as refugees are provided with free medication while locals must pay for it (UNDP, 2018).

4.6.5 Impacts on education services

Since the inflow, students from the surrounding community have dropped out or skipped lessons in order to assist their families with income-generating activities such as selling things at refugee camps. Parents are preventing their daughters from attending school because they are concerned about their safety. According to the UNDP survey, several participants expressed security worries as a result of the refugee surge, particularly regarding the mobility of women and girls (UNDP, 2018).

5 Broader Geopolitical Perspectives

Geographically, Myanmar is surrounded by India, China, Bangladesh, Thailand and Laos. Therefore, it has vital importance for all of these countries as a buffer zone. The Rakhine state (where the Rohingyas live) is believed to be full of natural resources and minerals. Geopolitically, USA, China, and India are competing to create their sphere of influence in the sub-region. It simply indicates that the ethnicity is not the only problem with the Rohingyas as there are some other underlying issues which need to be identified and analyzed (ZHENDONG, 2021).

5.1 China's Geo-politics

The "string of pearls" policy is used to assess China's Indian Ocean direction. Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka are viewed as "pearls" in the Chinese strategy under this policy. China is highly concerned about sea lanes of communication in the Indian Ocean (SAMARANAYAKE, 2012).

China is primarily interested in building pipelines and deep-sea ports in Myanmar. The first goal is to import natural gas from Myanmar. The second goal is to shorten the route for oil tankers and cargo ships sailing from the Middle East and beyond. Instead of passing via the congested and strategically important Malacca Strait and taking a long detour through Southeast Asia, these tankers can drop off the cargo in Myanmar. This will save 2000 miles, or about two weeks of travel time (KANTHAN, 2017).


In January 2017, China invested USD 18.53 billion in Myanmar (AHMED, 2018). A transnational pipeline developed by China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) that connects Sittwe, Rakhine's capital, to Kunming began operation in September 2013 as part of development initiatives. It is obvious that efforts are being made to transport Myanmar oil and gas from the Shwe gas field to Guangzhou, China (WEBB, 2017).

A parallel pipeline is expected to convey Middle Eastern oil from Kyaukphyu port to China. The gas pipeline was completed in 2014 and transports more than 12 billion cubic meters of natural gas to China each year. The oil pipeline, on the other hand, makes it easier for China to acquire oil from the Middle East and Africa, and it cuts the time it takes to transport such oil by up to 30%. The Shwe oil pipeline, in particular, is crucial to Chinese geopolitical objectives. 80% of China's imported oil goes through the congested Malacca Strait and the disputed South China Sea, which the US Navy might blockade if war breaks out between the two countries (WEBB, 2017).

These pipelines cause local conflict due to land grabs, inadequate compensation for damages, environmental deterioration, and an influx of foreign employees, rather than enhanced local employment prospects. Myanmar has an economic incentive to clear land for more development projects. It gives a boost to the country's already growing economy. All of this maneuvering takes place in the context of geopolitics (FORINO; MEDING; JOHNSON, 2017). This tendency is thought to have prompted the Myanmar military to pursue the Rohingyas, despite the fact that it tends to justify periodic attacks by local insurgent groups for their atrocities (WEBB, 2017).

China has been strengthening its naval cooperation with Myanmar over the years. It has supplied Myanmar with weapons and military equipment including missiles, fighter planes, radar, and warships, as well as training for its air and naval forces (CHEYANG, 2010). Using a barter system, China has donated military weaponry worth USD 2 billion. Myanmar's naval bases in Hanggyi, the Coco Islands, Akyab, and Margui have also benefited from Chinese assistance (KARIM, 2021).

Map 2 – China Myanmar Oil and Natural Gas Pipeline Project



Source: Adapted from Shwe Gas Movement apud Meyer (2015).

5.2 India's Geo-politics

India's Act East Policy aims to improve connectivity and market access in Southeast Asia, and collaboration with Myanmar is crucial. As a result, Myanmar's prominence as a geopolitical and geoeconomics partner has grown (KANWAL, 2010). Indian policy in South Asian regional is aggressive in order to establish a geopolitical space and create a barrier to Chinese advances. Many observers believe that India will pursue its "Hindu-Buddhist Peace Zone" in South Asia to balance out the Pakistan-China axis. Prime Minister Modi visited Myanmar shortly after the killing in September 2017 to counter Chinese influence in the country. India was influenced by geopolitics to refrain from condemning Myanmar's atrocities (AHMED, 2018).

The BJP government has sparked an ultra-nationalistic—Hindu-fundamentalist—feror to make India completely Hindu-centric. The fate of the Rohingya Muslims will be affected by this trend. It demonstrated this by threatening to expel 40,000 Rohingya refugees when it sought asylum in India. These Rohingyas have been labeled as “illegal immigrants” and a “threat to national security” by the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs. Human Rights Watch’s South Asian Director, Meenakshi Ganguli, observes that India sees the Rohingyas “through a singular lens—that they are Muslims” (KAMDAR, 2018, n.p.).

India has significant investments in the coastal regions adjacent Sittwe in order to gain a stronger footing in India’s northeastern states. By that India will have more control over the southern Bay of Bengal (HASAN, 2019). The Andaman Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal, which controls the activities in the western passage into the Malacca Strait, are then joined up with India’s only combined forces garrison.

India and Myanmar are working to construct a 1640-kilometer highway that will link India to Myanmar and Thailand. India refers to it as its Southeast Asian gateway and a response to China’s One-Belt-One-Road Initiative (BRI) (KARIM, 2021). As of mid-2017, India had provided Myanmar with around USD 1.75 billion in grants and credits. In the Rakhine state, it constructed the Sittwe power station. The 109-kilometer road project, which is part of the USD 484 million Kaladan Multimodal project, connects Palewa river-terminal to Zorinpui on Myanmar’s Mizoram border (AHMED, 2018).

The right to build, operate, and utilize an offshore hub for Myanmar gas usage has been granted to India. The link will be built between Mizoram, India, and Sittwe, Myanmar. It allows the states of northeast India to have direct access to foreign trade. This will also help to increase bilateral trade (KUPPUSWAMY, 2008).

The counterinsurgency operations cooperation with Myanmar is crucial in areas of strategic relevance. The militants fighting in northeastern Indian states have ethnic ties to the Myanmar on the other side of the border. For a long period, joint counterinsurgency operations have been carried out. In 2008, the countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Intelligence Cooperation, allowing them to share real-time “actionable” intelligence in order to better fight militants in the border region (KARIM, 2021).

5.3 US Grand Strategy

The US grand strategy appears to be aimed at distorting or delaying China-led infrastructure and maritime projects in the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean region. The Rohingya crisis had the potential to undermine the oil pipeline, which runs from Myanmar to China. Preventing the construction of this pipeline would be extremely beneficial to the US (KARIM, 2021).

The US is anxious that its efforts to restore human rights will undermine Aung San Suu Kyi, who is essentially a Western product. The NLD and its leader "cannot live in Myanmar without the aid of the United States and international community," according to a document published by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in 2003 titled "Burma: Time for Change." Between 2012 and 2014, the US gave Myanmar USD 375 million to create "democratic institutions" and drive "economic development" in order to pave the way for a new style of administration (WEBB, 2017).

Relating to the Rohingya problem, the US is playing both sides of the coin. On the one hand, Saudi Arabia, a close partner, is sponsoring and funding rebellion. The US, on the other side, is pursuing closer military collaboration with Myanmar in order to defeat the rebellion it helped to create. As part of America's regional "China containment policy," it is vital. Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated this plan in 2013: "We are going to encircle China with missile defense." As part of Obama's 2011 "Pivot to Asia" policy, this plan has resulted in a large rise in US military sales to China's neighbor like Myanmar. The construction of the Shwe oil pipeline to China should make America anxious because it will permanently remove the US ability to place a ban on 80% of China's oil supply (WEBB, 2017).

Both India and the USA have been conducting regular joint bilateral Malabar exercises in the Bay of Bengal. The US military has also cooperated with Myanmar's armed forces, with Myanmar taking part in the annual Thai-US military exercise. This, however, creates concerns that the military encounters between the two militaries may become more intense. The focus shifts to Myanmar's strengthening relations with the West, particularly with the United States, as well as the ramifications for China and India (STEINBERG, 2013).

6 Difficulties of repatriation

6.1 Core Analysis of the Difficulties of Repatriation

It has been more than four years of the Rohingya influx to Bangladesh. Despite various bilateral and diplomatic efforts, not a single Rohingya has returned to Myanmar till date. To understand the root causes as to why the repatriation could not be possible, we need to understand the history and culture of Myanmar. In my study, unless the root causes are addressed the Rohingya repatriation is far from the reality. To understand the core issues, below are the main causes for the failure of Rohingya repatriation:

6.1.1 Rohingya Statelessness

In 1982, Myanmar's Citizenship Act formally denied the Rohingya citizenship rights. To become a citizen, a person's ancestors had to be members of a national race or group that existed in Myanmar before the British occupation in 1823. The Rohingya were still considered unlawful immigrants who were brought in by British colonists. The Rohingya are now the world's largest "Stateless" people. Because they are not entitled to any legal protection from the government due to their "Statelessness" or lack of citizenship, they are more vulnerable. They are denied essential rights like as access to health care, education, and employment. The Rohingya situation will not be resolved unless the Myanmar government amends the Citizenship Acts, which is highly improbable (ABDELKADER, 2017).

6.1.2 The misunderstood roots of rohingya crisis

Though various humanitarian organizations and Western countries see the Rohingya as the world's most oppressed minority, Myanmar's government and the vast majority of its citizens see a foreign group with a separatist ambition fueled by Islam and funded from overseas.

The Rohingya crisis will be incredibly difficult to resolve due to this disparity in perspective. The term 'Rohingya' is extremely thorny for Myanmar's authorities. This is because, if the government recognizes Rakhine's Muslims as part of the Rohingya ethnic group, the Muslims would be granted autonomy inside the country under the 1982 citizenship law—ironically, the same statute that deprived the Rohingya of their citizenship. And there lies the crux of the problem. The Burmese are concerned that a Rohingya autonomous area along the Bangladesh border may encroach on Rakhine territory. The Burmese military, which has repressed Rohingya civilians, regards this as a threat. That may seem preposterous in a country where Muslims account for only 4% of the population, but many Burmese argue as a result of Arakan Revolutionary Salvation Army's expanding presence in Rakhine and surrounding areas (CALAMUR, 2017).

6.1.3 Geo-Politics of China, India and Usa

In that region, China has essentially two objectives. The first is to import Myanmar natural gas. The second is to shorten the route for oil tankers and cargo ships sailing from the Middle East and beyond. Instead of passing via the congested and strategically important Malacca Strait and taking a long detour through Southeast Asia, these tankers can drop off the cargo in Myanmar. Myanmar received an investment of USD 18.53 billion from China in January 2017 (AHMED, 2018).

India has also made significant investments in the coastal regions surrounding Sittwe in order to gain a stronger footing in India's northeastern states. With a stronger footing in Sittwe, India will have more control over the southern Bay of Bengal (Hasan 2019). India refers to it as its Southeast Asian gateway and a reaction to China's One-Belt-One-Road Initiative (BRI) (AHMED, 2018).

The US grand strategy appears to be aimed at distorting or delaying China-led infrastructure and maritime projects in the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean region, as part of the BRI (WEBB, 2017). China's and India's current corporate interventions, as well as USA geopolitical relevance in the region, have all play crucial roles in resolving the Rohingya situation. Ethnicity is not the only reason for the influx.

6.1.4 Informed consent of Rohingya for safe return to Myanmar

Both the governments agreed to repatriate several thousand refugees in late 2019, however, none of the refugees in the selected groups wanted to return to Myanmar. Rohingya leaders have stated that they will not return until their citizenship rights are assured. Meanwhile, the UN has criticized the repatriation plans, claiming that the Rohingya are still in danger in Myanmar. "As grim as the situation is for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, their prospects back in Myanmar are even worse," argues CFR's Joshua Kurlantzick (apud ALBERT; MAIZLAND, 2020, n.p.).

6.1.5 The Role of ASEAN

The ten ASEAN members have not coordinated a response to the escalating situation. The UN Refugee Convention and its Protocol have yet to be ratified by all ASEAN countries. Because of its members' commitment to the principle of noninterference in each other's domestic affairs, ASEAN has been fairly silent on the plight of the Rohingya and the growing numbers of asylum seekers in member nations. "They aren't going to take collective action on Myanmar, with Myanmar as one of its members," says Kurlantzick (apud ALBERT; MAIZLAND, 2020, n.p.).

6.1.6 Russia, China and India role to resolve the crisis

Myanmar and key military leaders should face an arms embargo and other sanctions, according to the UN fact-finding team. However, certain members of the Security Council, such as Russia and China have resisted increased pressure on Myanmar's government, claiming that it is attempting to restore stability (ALBERT; MAIZLAND, 2020).

6.1.7 Post military coup in Myanmar

Myanmar's military has seized power after detaining de-facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi in a military coup on February 1, 2021. The government has announced a one-year state of emergency. The coup comes after the ruling National League for Democracy won a huge election victory in November 2020. Khin Maung, the leader of the Rohingya Youth Association, told Anadolu Agency, "The repatriation was already uncertain, now it has been destroyed" It will have a significant impact on our safe return to our homeland." "The UN must act against the Myanmar military," said Mayyu Khan, another Rohingya at the Ukhiya camp in Cox's Bazaar (KAMRUZZAMAN, 2021, n.p.).

6.1.8 Foreign aid is a barrier of repatriation

NGO workers and local elites, who profit economically, do not want a successful repatriation; their living standards are higher than in Myanmar, and foreign aid is indirectly to blame for the repatriation (MUHIUDDIN, 2019).

7 Conclusion

It has been more than four years since a campaign of state-led violence drove hundreds of thousands of Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar into Bangladesh, resulting in a massive humanitarian crisis. Those fleeing persecution largely crossed into Cox's Bazar, a coastal tourism zone of Bangladesh. The Rohingya refugee crisis has had a significant impact on the livelihoods of host communities, particularly in Cox's Bazar. The inflow has placed a tremendous strain on the host society, which is worsened by the fact that these areas of Bangladesh were already dealing with significant issues due to relatively underdeveloped infrastructure. Price changes and a drop in daily wage for laborers have had a particularly negative impact on the host community. There have also been severe negative consequences for public services and the environment.

In the two most impacted sub-districts (Teknaf and Ukhiya), the socio-economic condition is changing. Price adjustments and salary increases, in particular, and their impact, are key issues. The environment bears the significant effects of refugee arrivals. In some situations, these effects may pose substantial threat to individual health. It is impossible to stress the importance of ensuring good public service delivery and increased social protection measures, especially in the worst-affected areas of Cox's Bazar and Bandarban districts.

Myanmar is one of the world's most diverse countries, with the government officially recognizing 135 ethnic groups except the Rohingya. The 1982 Citizenship Act denied Rohingya Muslims citizenship. Deprivation and human rights violations have long been a part of the Rohingya experience, which prompted the first exodus of Rohingyas to Bangladesh in 1977. In 1991–1992, 2012, and the influx resumed. The worst atrocities against the Rohingyas, which resulted in one million of them fleeing the nation, occurred in August 2017.

China, India, and the USA all have significant geopolitical stakes in this region. China is interested in Myanmar's gas and oil, therefore, pipelines linking from a deep-seaport have already been completed. China is keen to connect the Bay of Bengal in order to avoid the strategically crucial Malacca Strait, through which majority of the country's energy resources now transit. The "string of pearls" policy is used to analyze China's Indian Ocean orientation (two-ocean strategy). Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka are viewed as "pearls" in the Chinese strategy under this paradigm. India is progressively advancing with its counter-strategy against the "String of Pearls." in the Indian Ocean. India has a grand strategic goal of putting in place its more muscular "Act East Policy". The USA is playing both sides in the Rohingya crisis. On the other side, the USA is pursuing closer military ties with Myanmar in order to defeat the insurgency that it helped to create. This is an amazing puzzle and geopolitical game.

For more than four decades, Bangladesh has served as a safe haven for Rohingya Muslims. Despite the Bangladesh government's bilateral and diplomatic efforts, no Rohingyas have been repatriated to Myanmar. There are numerous obstacles for long-term repatriation. International and regional groups must be willing to work together to develop a practical plan that addresses the core problems. The UN and other international organizations must be more assertive in pressuring Myanmar to begin the repatriation process at the earliest.

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How the national security policy and strategy can address insecurity from environmental resource allocation and utilisation in Nigeria

Cómo la política y la estrategia de seguridad nacional pueden abordar la inseguridad de la asignación y utilización de recursos ambientales en Nigeria

Abstract: The level of insecurity in Nigeria has steadily increased during the last decade, with many of the conflicts related to environmental resource allocation, utilisation and management. Problems such as the shrinking of the Lake Chad and its resultant degradation of economic livelihood, have coalesced with the recruitment of impoverished persons by religious extremist groups to create the Boko Haram crisis in the North East. These crises have come to involve the use of arms and have snowballed into widespread inter-ethnic violence, kidnappings and organised crime. Noting the rise in these environmental conflicts, this research seeks to investigate how the national security policies/strategy can address resource allocation, utilisation and management, with a view to preventing such conflicts in Nigeria. The paper will adopt a case study approach by comparing the Nigerian situation with Brazil, which is similar to Nigeria in income inequality, demographic disparity, resource endowment and conflicts arising from these factors. The paper will conclude that the current Nigerian National Security Policy and Strategy must emplace specific provisions that improve the allocation, utilisation and management of environmental resources as is done in Brazil

Keywords: Conflicts. Environment. Resources. Policy. Case Study.

Resumen: El nivel de inseguridad en Nigeria ha aumentado constantemente durante la última década, con muchos de los conflictos relacionados con la asignación, utilización y gestión de los recursos ambientales. Problemas como la contracción del Lago Chad y su degradación resultante de la subsistencia económica, se unieron con el reclutamiento de personas empobrecidas por grupos extremistas religiosos para crear la crisis de Boko Haram en el noreste de Nigeria. Estas crisis llegaron a involucrar el uso de armas y se convirtieron en violencia interétnica generalizada, secuestros y crimen organizado. Al observar el aumento de estos conflictos ambientales, esta investigación busca examinar cómo las políticas/estrategias de seguridad nacional pueden abordar la asignación, utilización y gestión de recursos, con el objetivo de prevenir tales conflictos en Nigeria. El artículo adoptará un enfoque de estudio de caso que compara la situación nigeriana con la de Brasil, que es similar a Nigeria en desigualdad de ingresos, disparidad demográfica, dotación de recursos y conflictos derivados de estos factores. El documento concluirá que la Política y Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional actual de Nigeria debe establecer disposiciones específicas que mejoren la asignación, utilización y gestión de los recursos ambientales, como se hace en Brasil.

Palabras clave: Conflictos. Medio Ambiente. Recursos. Política. Estudio de Caso.

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1 Introduction

The increasing spate of internal conflicts that have sprung up since the end of the Cold War has led to an emphasis on the reform of national security systems in developing, as well as developed countries. The prevalence of these security challenges across the globe has necessitated the need for security policies and strategic reforms that will prevent conflicts that arise from the utilisation and management of resources. In Africa for instance, the high level of poverty and social inequality for the vast population in the continent, has mostly metamorphosed into intractable conflicts like ethno-religious crisis, agitation for resource control, farmer-herders conflicts, and terrorist activities.

The connection between the environment and man's ability or inability to explore it to his advantage, has led to contradictions and conflicting interests, resulting in unrest, mostly in the underdeveloped world. For over a decade, Nigeria has continued to witness a tremendous setback in its socio-economic development fuelled by ethno-religious crisis, Niger-Delta militancy, kidnapping, herders-farmers clashes, cybercrimes, armed banditry and the Boko Haram insurgency. In the North East, domestic terrorism and organised banditry has ravaged the country for the last decade. The conflict between pastoralists and local farmers in Benue, Nassarawa, Kaduna, Katsina and Plateau States is mostly due to dwindling grazing areas and increased demand in meat for the increasing population. In Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States, the Boko Haram insurgency has been prevalent, occasionally spreading to Niger and Kogi States. The Jos and Kaduna crises which have lingered can be attributed to ethnic and indigene-settler cleavages that manifest themselves in land and boundary disputes. In addition, large portions of the north west, central and south East of the country have witnessed increasing occurrences of rural banditry and kidnapping.

According to Salawu (2010), the remote socio-cultural, political and economic reasons that propel the use of illegal force and violence in Nigeria include government's neglect, oppression, domination, exploitation, victimisation, discrimination, marginalisation, nepotism and bigotry. Kwaja (2009) also identifies fragility of the institutions of the state in terms of their ability and capacity to manage diversity, corruption and bad governance, rising inequality between the rich and poor, gross violation of human rights, environmental degradation, contestations over land, struggle for resource control, and unequal distribution of resources, as the underlying causes of violent conflicts in Nigeria.

Unlike Nigeria, there are no known terrorist groups in Brazil. However, organised crime, trafficking in drugs and environmental crimes pose significant threats to state security, particularly the police. According to the Brazil Country Report (2021):

[...] the main threat comes from drug-trafficking organisations, and organised crime, particularly gangs based in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, which have a national reach. They control drugs and weapons smuggling; their readiness to engage police in armed confrontations poses the risk of collateral death or injury for visitors. Brazil is a drug

transit country and a major consumer of drugs. Remote and sparsely populated frontiers facilitate illegal gold mining, drug trafficking, contraband and weapons smuggling especially along the border with Paraguay and the Amazon region. On the other hand, some form of organised crime prevalent in Brazil, is due to the exploitation of environmental resources. Deforestation is a major challenge faced due to the economic activities of cattle pastoralists, miners, loggers and farmers. The implication of the deforestation in the Brazilian Amazonia is that it destroys environmental services that are important for the whole world, and especially for Brazil itself (FEARNSIDE, 2017).

Londoño, Andreoni and Casado (2020) observed that the COVID-19 pandemic has also led to an increase in deforestation in Brazil because the government has been pre-occupied with the global pandemic, while unchecked illegal activities have taken place. According to Mueller et al. (1994), the Brazilian Amazon is better known for problems associated with deforestation and environmental change. Land conflict is not new to Brazil, and has accompanied the process of frontier expansion that started more than 500 years ago with Portuguese settlement.

Nevertheless, both poverty and landlessness have persisted despite development policies that distributed billions of dollars on highway construction, loans, and outright subsidies (HALL, 2000). Conflict in the Amazon is multifaceted and involves numerous actors (e.g., some of the Amerindians, miners, loggers, ranchers and small farmers). Brazil is an economically and socially heterogeneous country, with a complex federal governance framework and a constitution that recognises the people's right to an ecologically balanced environment. This makes implementing environmental policies and programmes on the ground challenging. The stringency of environmental requirements and the level of compliance vary substantially across jurisdictions, reflecting local priorities and capacity constraints.

The paper therefore examines how security policies and strategy can address insecurity arising from environmental resource allocation, utilisation and management in Nigeria, using Brazil as a case study. The paper is divided into seven subtitles which include the introduction; conceptual and theoretical framing; security challenges and national security policy in Nigeria and Brazil; addressing insecurity from environmental resource allocation, utilisation and management; and conclusion.

The paper will seek to address the following research questions:

- i. What are the environmental causes of insecurity in Nigeria and Brazil?
- ii. What is the nexus between environmental resource allocation/utilisation and insecurity in Nigeria and Brazil?
- iii. How has security policy shaped or mitigated security challenges in Nigeria and Brazil?
- iv. What national security policy can be adopted to address environmental insecurity in Nigeria, taking examples from Brazil.

The broad objective of the study is to ascertain how policy can address insecurity caused by environmental resource allocation, utilisation and management; using a comparative analysis of Nigeria and Brazil. The specific objectives are to examine the environmental causes of insecurity in Nigeria and Brazil; to evaluate the impact of security policies in mitigating security challenges in the two countries; and to articulate specific security policies that can address environmental insecurity in Nigeria, using Brazil as a case study.

2 Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

The causal relationship between environmental scarcity - the insufficiency of renewable resources - and the outbreak of violent conflict is complex. Environmental scarcity emerges within a political, social, economic, and ecological context and interacts with many of these contextual factors to contribute to violence (HOMER-DIXON; PERCIVAL, 1998). Homer-Dixon's theory of environmental scarcity attempts an analytical relationship between environmental factors and conflict in human society. Scarcity of renewable resources (also known as *environmental scarcity*) can contribute to civil violence, including insurgencies and ethnic clashes" (HOMER-DIXON, 1999).

Contextual factors include the quantity and vulnerability of environmental resources, the balance of political power, the nature of the state, patterns of social interaction, and the structure of economic relations among social groups. These factors affect how resources will be used, the social impact of environmental scarcity, the grievances, arising from these scarcities, and whether grievances will contribute to violence. There are three types of environmental scarcity: (1) supply-induced scarcity, caused by the degradation and depletion of an environmental resource; for example, the erosion of cropland; (2) demand-induced scarcity resulting from population growth within a region or increase per capita consumption of a resource; either of which heightens the demand for the resource; (3) structural scarcity arising from an unequal social distribution of a resource that concentrates it in the hands of relatively few people, while the remaining population suffers from serious shortages (HOMER-DIXON; PERCIVAL, 1998).


Two patterns of interaction among these three types of scarcity are common: resource capture and ecological marginalisation. **Resource capture** occurs when increased consumption of a resource combines with its degradation: powerful groups within society - anticipating future shortages - shift resource distribution in their favour, subjecting the remaining population to scarcity. **Ecological marginalisation** occurs when increased consumption of a resource combines with structural inequality in distribution. Denied access to the resource, weaker groups migrate to ecologically fragile regions that subsequently become degraded (HOMER-DIXON, 1994). Peluso and Harwel (2001) argue that the inequitable distribution of returns from resource extraction activities has been a factor in violence.

Homer-Dixon predicted that "in coming decades the incidence of violence will probably increase as scarcities of cropland, freshwater, and forests worsen in many parts of the developing world". Homer-Dixon's theory integrated physical variables (stocks of natural

resources, population size and growth, resource-consumption per capita and social factors (market dynamics, and social and economic structures) in a single model that emphasises the importance of thresholds, interdependence, and interactivity within complex environmental systems (HOMER-DIXON, 1999).

Hartmann (2017) also contributed to the discourse on the relationship between environment and conflict when he presented the idea of strategic scarcity and environmental conflict. The figure below was used to express diagrammatically the nexus between resource scarcity and conflict.

Figure 1 – Environment, Strategic Scarcity, and Conflict



Source: Hartmann (2003).

Relating Homer-Dixon's theory of resource scarcity to the environmental resource management in Nigeria, one would see that Nigeria has suffered security challenges for decades as a result of majorly, structural scarcity arising from an unequal distribution of resources. Although Brazil also suffers the same structural challenge, Nigeria has challenges in the struggle for limited resources due to population growth, degradation/depletion and the struggle for limited environmental resources. For instance, the major remote and immediate precipitators of the conflict between pastoralist and farmers in Nigeria, is the struggle for limited environment resources. Economic inequality and poverty, which are caused by structural factors and government failure to evenly allocate scarce resources often results in conflict.

Issues of draught, water/rain, pastures, population expansion, migration, deforestation and land tenure system borders around the environment. The scarcity of environmental resources vis-à-vis the increasing demand for them by both farmers and pastoralists constitute the fault line for hostilities in both countries where illegal miners and loggers are key in the

conflicts of illegal land usage and extraction. The insecurity in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria orchestrated by the militants is also precipitated by the impact of the activities of oil multinationals in that region which has negative impact on the environment. Oil spillage, environmental degradation, gas flaring, water pollution has adverse effects on human, aquatic and other agricultural activities within the Niger Delta region, which has led to conflicts in the region. For instance, Kadafa (2012) pointed out that, oil exploration in Nigeria has had several environmental and human consequences for the indigenous people who inhabit the area surrounding oil extractions. The social and environmental cost of oil production has been extensive. They include destruction of wildlife and biodiversity, loss of fertile soil. Pollution of air and drinking water, degradation of farmland and damage to maritime ecosystem, all of which have caused serious health problems for the inhabitants of the area surrounding oil production.

This research will adopt a qualitative method that will be obtained from peer reviewed journals, government legislations and related publications/gazette and research from external organisations. Moreover, the research is aimed at evaluating specific policies that can affect the use or allocation of resources and its effects on regional conflicts in Nigeria, with an intention of proffering workable national security policy inputs that will address insecurity.

3 Evaluating National Security Policy Strategies in Nigeria and Brazil: A Comparative Analysis

One of the fundamental responsibilities of any state is the provision of a safe and secure environment for its citizens. It is also the responsibility of state to regulate the activities of individuals and entities as they seek to make a living in the secure environment created. Consequently, specific policies need to be put in place to address the various factors that could cause insecurity. Nigeria and Brazil are very similar in their demographic and societal structures. They have both experienced various but similar cases of insecurity resulting from social inequality, the clamour for resources such as land, minerals, water, tree logging and oil wealth. Unlike Nigeria, Brazil has no religious or ethnic conflicts to contend with. Both countries are classified as developing countries, although they are both regional leaders on their respective continents. Importantly, both countries have a population that exceeds 200 million, which makes curbing insecurity a challenge.

Nigeria, for instance, has had to face so many violent conflicts, as a result of both environmental and non-environmental factors. Nigeria's National Security Strategy (NSS) outlines the threats from:

management such as population explosion and unplanned human settlements, periodic environmentally induced human conflicts among which are pastoralists-farmers conflicts and water resource conflicts as well as environmental disasters caused by natural and human factors. The most prominent threat factor is climate change with the

associated global warming which causes high sea levels, ocean surges and coastal floods. Climate change is associated with environmental degradation. Desertification in the North and both erosion and floods in the South threaten food security. Desert encroachment is partly responsible for the loss of grazing reserves and obliteration of grazing routes, which is directly linked to pastoralists-farmers conflicts. Climate change has also contributed to excessive flooding across the country causing huge human and economic losses. Natural and man-made hazards including natural disasters, pollution and related threats from within and neighbouring countries constitute national security threats. Although Nigeria is not located within the major seismic zones of the world, over the years, several earth tremors have occurred across the country with the latest happening in Mpape-Abuja in September, 2018. These environmental threats undermine national security and underscore the need for adequate containment strategies and contingency plans (NIGERIA, 2019).

The above encapsulation shows that environmental changes and the struggle for resources provide the objective as well as the subjective context for the high level of insecurity in Nigeria. This may have informed Egwuatus' observation, as cited by Jega (2007) that "the distribution of national wealth is very uneven and poverty is the first threat to peace and stability". Similarly, Jega pointed out that "90% of national wealth is in the hands of only 10% of the population (JEGA, 2007). 44% of the population is young, and an average of three million people are thrown into the saturated job market without skills every year". Accordingly, a combination of widening gap in income inequality, worsening unemployment situation and perceptions of group discrimination and marginalisation based on ethnic, religious, and communal differences create rigid identity divides based on us versus them syndrome; fan the embers of group hatred and ignite tensions and even violent conflicts (JEGA, 2007, 1999). It is therefore considered a root of conflicts and uprisings in Nigeria. It particularly creates situations in which individuals, left to fend for themselves, engage in criminality or terrorist activities considering that they have nothing to lose. These dispositions culminate in a state of national insecurity in Nigeria.

Nwanegbo (2005) noted that:

internal conflicts in Nigeria are actually and mainly caused by contest over the control of scarce resources and it is those who are, or feel deprived, are those who try to either protect or defend their interests and vent frustration in what ends up leading to inter-ethnic conflicts, inter group wars or civil revolutions. He also argues that internal conflicts have caused a lot of damages to both the political, economic, social and environmental order in Nigeria.

For instance, the Niger-Delta crisis stemming from environmental degradation and marginalisation, has had a huge impact on national insecurity and economic crisis. In addition sea piracy, arms smuggling, oil bunkering, drugs smuggling and banditry all lead to economic crises and hardship.

The Boko Haram insurgency, banditry and herders-farmers clashes are remotely caused by environmental factors such as **climate change, struggle of land possession, marginalisation and inequality**. According to Eme (2011), this is also known as “political economy of violence.” Another major contributor and enabler of conflicts in Nigeria is religious intolerance or extremism. Although this shows itself in most conflicts in the country, it is important to understand it is not a root cause of conflicts by itself. On the contrary, it is a strong factor that exacerbates already existing fault-lines or conflicts. As this research is focused on conflicts related to environmental factors, religious crises will not be discussed further.

In Brazil, it is impossible not to be shocked by the dimension of urban criminality and violence. Between 1979 and 1997, the homicide rate in Brazil increased from 11.5 to 25.4 murders per 100,000 inhabitants. In the same period, while the population increased 65 percent, the homicide rate increased 120 percent. In 1999, Recife (capital of the state of Pernambuco) and Vitória (capital of the state of Espírito Santo) had higher murder rates than war-torn Colombia (HUGGINS, 2000). In 2001, Brazil was the country with the largest percentage of murders committed by firearms, firearms caused 78 percent of all homicides committed that year (UNESCO Report, 2002). Practically every day, the Brazilian press reports on a fresh and dramatic case related to kidnappings, police violence and corruption, drug-crimes, or prison riots. It reached the point that entire commercial neighbourhoods in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo were forced to close doors during business hours by the edicts of drug gangs. The reason for these menace, is not farfetched as inadequate wages, unemployment, larger population of young men, poverty, rapid and unplanned urbanisation, and lack of integrated public security strategies. Most peculiar to Brazil, is the availability of drugs and massive gun ownership. Ecological challenges caused by deforestation, mining, rivalry between loggers and farmers, farmer-herders clashes over land usage, are also a source of conflicts and insecurity (EMÍLIO, 2003).

Poverty and the scramble for environmental resources in Nigeria has led to conflicts, social dislocation and population displacement; it heightens citizenship questions; encourages hostility between ‘indigenes’ and ‘settlers’, and it dislocates and disrupts family and communal life. It also creates a general atmosphere of mistrust, fear, anxiety and frenzy; dehumanisation of women, children, and men especially in areas where rape, child abuse and neglect are used as instruments of war. This in turn deepens hunger and poverty in the polity; creates an atmosphere of political insecurity and instability, including declining confidence in the political leadership and apprehension about the system. It also creates a governance deficit as a result of the inefficiency of security agencies (IBRAHIM, 2002).

Chapter II Section 14(2)(b) of the Nigerian Constitution, declares that the “security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government” (FRN, 1999). The country’s third place ranking on the Global Terrorism Index, and its being listed as one of the most fragile countries on the Fragile States Index, are an illustration of the challenging security environment in the country. Realising the complexities of 21st century security and the need for strategic responsiveness, Nigeria crafted its maiden National Security Strategy of 2014 (NIGERIA, 2014) in an attempt to address the security challenges in an over-arching manner. The strategy basically presents an overview of Nigeria’s national security process and security architecture and examines Nigeria sectorial security strategies, monitoring and oversight mechanisms. Many of the policy initiatives were aimed at improving the economic and welfare situation of citizens in order to cushion the effects of poverty. Examples of these policy initiatives were the YOUWIN programme, that financed Small and Medium Scale Enterprises and the involvement of government in the agricultural value chain, among others. The policy also strengthened the existing Afrocentric policy of government through supporting other African countries during crises situations in order to avoid a spill-over effect into Nigeria. The improvement in the security situation after the introduction of the strategy paved way for relatively hitch free general elections across all parts of Nigeria in 2015.

Despite these initiatives, the NSS 2014 did not address the root causes of the internal security ruptures such as ethno-religious conflicts, pastoralists and farmers conflicts, proliferation of small and light weapons, kidnapping, terrorism, and illegal migration and financial crimes. The evolving nature of the external and internal security threats necessitated a review of NSS 2014. This led to the articulation of the National Security Strategy 2019 (NIGERIA, 2019). The NSS 2019 outlines the major security concerns of the nation for which policies and strategies have been articulated and how the government plans to deal with them. It states that:

The Strategy envisages the unique characteristics of the risks and threats we face in a world that is constantly undergoing changes. In other words, a strategy that orients state action towards current and perceived future challenges by using available resources flexibly and efficiently. The Strategy will also enhance our prevention, protection and response capabilities to security threats in an increasingly complex environment (NIGERIA, 2019).

The NSS 2019 recognises that the security environment has continued to evolve, giving rise to emergent challenges, including the intensification of pastoralists-farmers conflicts, escalation of banditry, and significant upsurge in kidnapping, among other violent crimes (ONUOHA; OGBONANYA, 2020). The concept of security adopted, however, reflects a contemporary paradigm shift from a state-centric focus on security to one which is comprehensive and redirects security agencies towards emphasising human security. While this shift in focus is fundamental and commendable, the NSS 2019 does little to enable the security institutions internalise the cultural and structural changes required to achieve its

objectives. As a result, regime security is still prioritised, often resulting in allegations of unprofessionalism, human rights violations, and abuses of office, which in turn exacerbate the security and governance deficit. The absence of specific policies injects that realign security organisations to address identified threats in a wholistic manner has resulted in inter agency rivalries, which are inimical to their efficacy and statutory function (ONUOHA; OGBONANYA, 2020). Consequently, in spite of all the human and capital efforts, insecurity in Nigeria has continued unabated.

The unity of *Política Nacional de Defesa* (PND, National Defence Policy) and *Estratégia Nacional de Defesa* (END, National Defence Strategy) expresses civil-military realignment of re-democratization. Brazil's first public defence policy (PDN, PND's predecessor) was published in 1996. It paved the way for the creation of the *Ministério da Defesa* (Ministry of Defence - MoD), turning the military ministries into subordinate commands. This was followed by END in 2008. PND and END were brought in line in 2012 and approved by Congress in 2013. Since then, the MoD presents PND-END as a unity – P&E (BRAZIL, 2012). PND defines eleven objectives which include: guarantee of sovereignty over national assets and territorial integrity; contribution towards the preservation of national unity and cohesion; contribution to regional stability and contribution to the maintenance of peace and international security; and to enhance Brazil's projection in the concert of nations and its greater participation in international decision-making processes. It also includes keeping the armed forces modern, integrated, trained and balanced, increasing their professionalisation, operating in joint fashion while being adequately distributed over the national territory; raise awareness within Brazilian society of the importance of defence subjects; develop the national defence industry to obtain autonomy in indispensable technologies; structure the armed forces around capabilities, providing them with personnel and materiel compatible with strategic and operational planning and developing the potential of defence logistics and national mobilization (BRAZIL, 2012, p. 29-30).

In many ways, the National Strategy of Defense marked a clear turning point in frontier security. Of critical importance is that the strategy introduced what it calls the triple imperative of *monitoring and control*, leading to requirements for *mobility* and ultimately *presence*. These three concepts govern the mid-term and long-range development of capabilities and structure for each branch of the armed forces, and provide near-term guidance for the growing scope of roles that increasingly includes tasks in support of law enforcement. A specific policy inject that illustrates this is the END Legislative Decree 373 which grants the Armed Forces the power to operate within a 150m area from the land borders of the country. Within this area, the Armed Forces are constitutionally granted powers to carry out law enforcement duties to prevent the smuggling of drugs and persons and prevent environmental crimes such as deforestation and illegal logging. Under this framework, the Integrated Border Control System (SISFRON) is an ongoing project that will facilitate the Brazilian Army to expand its capability. SISFRON is a border monitoring, sensing, decision making and integrated action support system, aimed at strengthening the presence and capacity of action of the State in the border strip.

The measure, which is the second phase of the ‘Army Strategic Program SISFRON’ (Prg EE SISFRON), will see equipment and infrastructure delivered to units in the area of responsibility of the 13th Motorised Infantry Brigade, headquartered in Cuiabá in Mato Grosso state, and of the 18th Border Infantry Brigade, headquartered in Corumbá in Mato Grosso do Sul. These states border Bolivia and Paraguay respectively (BARREIRA, 2020). Implementing SISFRON over the years has resulted in gradually improved interdiction in the frontier zone against narcotics, weapons, and other illegal commodities. The way ahead intensifies integrated military and police operations, emphasises the technical and procedural refinement of surveillance and communication capabilities, and strengthens security collaboration with neighbouring countries.

Moreover, military infrastructure and presence, which includes the increased number of soldiers in preexistent military organisations, the increase in military units in the Amazon, the creation and expanded number of Special Border Platoons at the borderlines, the implementation of the Amazon Surveillance System (SIVAM) linked to the Amazon Protection System (SIPAM), and the acquisition, renovation and expansion of military equipment, has helped to reduce crime rate in Brazil. The Federal Police also expanded its operations in the Brazil-Colombia border with Operation COBRA, which started in 2000 (MONTEIRO, 2016).

Regarding the high level of national awareness around the ‘Green Amazon’, its richness and potentialities, as well as the fact that the importance of guaranteeing national sovereignty over this territory is already well established in the imagination of the Brazilian population, Brazil coined the concept of ‘Blue Amazon’ to refer to country’s maritime sphere of interest and responsibility. The obvious association between the Blue Amazon and the ‘Green Amazon’ is the ability to control and exploit the natural resources beyond Brazil’s Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ). Brazil therefore filed an application with the United Nation’s Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UNCLOS) to delineate 1000km beyond its continental shelf as the blue Amazon. Accordingly there are specific policy articulations that enable the Brazilian Navy to carry out maritime operations in this area (CARVALHO, 2019). This transfer of the national awareness of the Green Amazon to the maritime environment facilitates a quick and efficient introduction to the need for a maritime awareness amongst diverse actors, both nationally and internationally (CARVALHO, 2019).

With respect to the issue of drug abuse in Brazil, the National Secretariat on Drug Policies (SENAD) as an agency of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security coordinates the activities of drug abuse prevention, care, and social reinsertion of users (GARCIA, 2008). Brazil’s national policy on drugs stipulates the implementation of prevention programs in public and private teaching institutions, where educators at the three levels (primary, secondary and universities) should receive training for continuing education. Even though, studies have revealed Brazilian teachers’ unpreparedness to perform this function, due to either fear and/or lack of information and skills, the program is still required in the reorientation policy of the government (FERREIRA et al., 2010).

Applying the examples of Brazil to the Nigerian setting will call for a security strategy that not only captures the key internal and external threats, but that articulates constitutional reforms that allow security forces to operate in a wholistic manner to counter the threats. The National Security Agencies Act which enables the coordination of the various security organisations, needs to reflect the realities of 21st century threats and the peculiar Nigerian situation. Security organisations must be enabled by law to act in the same sphere with overlapping responsibilities such as the example of SISFRON and SIPAM.

Nigeria needs to prevent the free movement of illegal persons, drugs and weapons along its borders, especially along the northern and eastern borders. Accordingly, it will need to adopt a hybrid model that creates border security zones, in which various security agencies exist and operate to prevent illegal incursions, under a unified structure. Such a structure should be tasked and equipped to be able to cover the extent of the border with ground and air surveillance, and have the statutory authorisation to design and carry out operations. Like the Brazilian example, an area of around 50 km should be delineated from the hard border with the neighbouring countries for the armed forces to operate.

Nigeria's security policy recognises that:

The environment is a strategic resource that should be optimally harnessed to achieve stability, prosperity, social harmony and the well-being of society. Our mission is to protect and conserve the environment by preventing and mitigating natural and anthropogenic threats to environmental security and sustainability. This we will seek to achieve by exploiting environmental resources through international best practices in a sustainable manner and protecting Nigeria's unique biodiversity. Erosion and flooding have destroyed communities, agricultural lands and other critical infrastructure across the country thereby threatening lives and livelihoods. To mitigate these problems, we will continue to adopt, as well as to deepen a Whole-of-Government approach, while collaborating with the private sector and civil society (NIGERIA, 2019).

Nevertheless, conservation is threatened by deforestation, unregulated logging, population growth, forest fires, overgrazing, bio-piracy, farming, wildlife poaching, unregulated industrial exploitation of timber, weak institutional regulatory capacity at all levels of government and the presence in forests and forest reserves of criminal gangs and armed groups. Government must therefore emplace broad-based partnerships that will drive much-needed involvement in reforestation and conservation efforts (NIGERIA, 2019). The perennial problem of shortage of grazing lands for herders which brings them into deadly clashes can also be prevented by a deliberate policy that diminishes open grazing while promoting the practice of ranching as The National Livestock Transformation Plan attempts to do. This must however be supported with a security structure specifically articulated to mitigate the security threats to the grazing areas, as early challenges already suggest (ONUOHA; OGBONANYA, 2020).

Despite this articulation, and the presence of certain organisations, focused on environmental management and conservation, such as the National Emergency Management Agency, the National Park Service or the National Inland Waterways Authority (NIWA), the efficacy of these outfits is undermined by a lack of integration alluded to in the NSS. Nigeria should therefore articulate specific policies that bring together capabilities required for search and rescue, environmental protection and management which are already inherent among the security organisations under one structure, for effectiveness. For instance, a strategic project to recharge and maintain the Lake Chad should be articulated with the inclusion of the Nigerian Navy, NIWA and the Army. This ensures that the structure and employment of security organisations is based on threat prevention and mitigation rather than institutional approaches.

Strategic implementation of policies such as mass education of individuals at all levels such as the one adopted in Brazil, should be replicated in Nigeria's learning and religious institutions, in order to curb intractable conflicts in the country. Such strategic security and educational policies should introduce programs targeted at preventing community violence, drug abuse, crime, murder, terrorism and banditry (ONYEMAECHI; STEPHEN, 2014).

Achieving national security to a great extent still depends on military, police and associated security operatives. To this extent, these institutions deserve strengthening and reorganisation through adequate legislation and provisions in the Nigerian National Security Policy. The legislations and policy initiatives must also address the problem of coordination that persists otherwise this will continuously constrain and block the attainment of national security (NWEKE, 2011).

4 Conclusion

All nations of the world face one security challenge or the other. Nigeria and Brazil are no exceptions and have grappled with these problems with varying degrees of success. On the Brazilian side, recent changes in legislation have ushered new structures in the security apparatus. These changes have allowed for holistic long term approaches to addressing the root causes of crime and violence stemming from resource exploitation, gang violence and drugs. Specific policies have also been aimed at improving education and preventing the rise in income inequality. While the security problems in Nigeria far outnumber those of Brazil, the strategy of institutionalising reforms in Brazil could certainly be beneficial to Nigeria. Successive Nigerian governments have faced great challenges in efforts to guarantee security in the country. The most prevalent threats have included abject and persistent poverty, terror attacks, kidnapping, herder-farmers clashes and ethno-religious conflicts. Additionally, wide income disparity and inequality, social exclusion and the scramble for natural resources such as grazing lands, mineral resources and oil wealth have led to large scale insecurity, threatening to turn Africa's most populous country into a failed state. Ironically, the presence of multiple security agencies operating in the same space and the increasing spate of insecurity

suggests that a more comprehensive security policy should be articulated. Specific policy formulations should be made to address the root causes of unrest, such as trafficking in small arms, illegal grazing and minerals extraction. Additionally, the security policy must restructure and realign the security agencies in order to prepare them to meet the peculiar asymmetric threats of the 21st century.

This paper examined the peculiarities of the Brazilian system and how specific injects in the END, enhanced the ability of the Armed Forces to participate in law enforcement operations in the Amazon region, the extent of the land borders and in coastal activities in the Blue Amazon. These policy initiatives provided the framework for strategic programs such as SISFRON which prevents the activities of smugglers, traffickers and illegal migration within 150km of Brazilian border space. Given the peculiarities of the Nigerian security environment and the lack of coordinated efforts within the various security agencies, a proposition to create structures than occupy and monitor the ungoverned spaces in the Lake Chad region, enhance navigability and thereby increase economic activity is suggested. Such a policy direction would prevent the use of this ungoverned space by terrorist groups, as it would also prevent the continued degradation of the environmental resource.

Despite the presence of the military and stand alone immigration and customs forces, securing the expansive northern and eastern borders of Nigeria has remained a challenge that the country has yet to surmount. This paper argues that a comprehensive national security policy has the potential to significantly reduce economic insecurities and enhance economic efficiency, equity, growth, and stability given the socio-economic inequality in the country. It would also reposition the security agencies to effectively prevent emerging threats at their root, rather than respond to them at a mature stage of development. Such a policy direction also ensures the strategic and continued evolution of the security agencies and ensures that the country's high spending on security has a spin off effect on the economy of the country. Noting that insecurity in Nigeria has displaced millions of people resulting in extreme economic and security pressures, a realignment of the national security policy to deliver specific programs that address the root causes of conflict is paramount.

Finally, if the governments' quest to mitigate insecurity is to succeed, it must address the identified problems with the security institutions and enable them to act, by way of legislation. The government must institutionalise and build on appropriate accountability and transparency mechanisms within the institutions while demonstrating good governance and the political will to address the security challenges. The war against insecurity should be won by raising governance standards. Accordingly, legislation, policy and strategies must be reworked with a focus on addressing the identified threats to insecurity. As the National Security Adviser (NSA) stated during the official launch of the NSS 2019, "a national security strategy document is meaningless if its contents are not holistically implemented" (NIGERIA, 2019).

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Insecurity and economic development in Nigeria: Boko Haram insurgency in perspective

Inseguridad y desarrollo económico en Nigeria: la insurgencia de Boko Haram en perspectiva

Abstract: The Nigerian authorities have been contending with insecurity in the insurgency, banditry, cyber warfare and especially terrorism. Accordingly, efforts have been made by the Federal Government of Nigeria to tackle these security threats particularly against the *Boko Haram Terrorist* (BHT). The efforts include non-kinetic measures of economic incentives and strategic communications to degrade support for the sect's dastardly acts. Where these failed, kinetic measures which entail military and paramilitary operations have been utilised to defeat the threats. However, some challenges have militated against the efforts employed by Nigeria to curb insecurity. It is against this background that this research seeks to conduct a detailed qualitative analysis of secondary data using triangulation method to draw logical conclusions. The objective of the study is to analyse the effect of the insecurity due to BHT on the ED of Nigeria and suggest strategies to address the challenges for enhanced ED.

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Keywords: Insecurity. Economic Development. Boko Haram Terrorists.

Resumen: Las autoridades nigerianas han luchado contra la inseguridad en la insurgencia, el bandidaje, la guerra cibernética y especialmente el terrorismo. En consecuencia, el Gobierno Federal de Nigeria ha realizado esfuerzos para enfrentar estas amenazas a la seguridad, especialmente contra el *Grupo Terrorista de Boko Haram* (BHT). Los esfuerzos incluyen medidas no cinéticas de incentivos económicos y comunicaciones estratégicas para disminuir el apoyo a los actos cobardes de la secta. Cuando estas fracasaron, se utilizaron medidas cinéticas que incluían operaciones militares y paramilitares para derrotar las amenazas. Sin embargo, algunos desafíos militan en contra de los esfuerzos de Nigeria por contener la inseguridad. Es en este contexto que esta investigación busca realizar un análisis cualitativo detallado de datos secundarios utilizando el método de triangulación para sacar conclusiones lógicas. El objetivo del estudio es analizar el efecto de la inseguridad debido al BHT en el ED de Nigeria y sugerir estrategias para abordar los desafíos para alcanzar un ED perfeccionado.

Palabras clave: Inseguridad. Desarrollo económico. Terroristas de Boko Haram.

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1 Introduction

The history of human civilization is replete with conflict and warfare which have resulted from nations' quest to safeguard the sovereignty and wellbeing of their citizens. The global security environment from early XIX to late XX centuries was shaped mainly by external threats that resulted in inter-State conflicts. This defined the conflicts of the 2^a World Wars through to the end of the Cold War era. However, the contemporary security environment post-cold war has witnessed a shift in the spectrum of conflicts to intra-State, precipitated by internal threats from non-state actors. Notwithstanding the enduring nature of warfare, its character (as alluded by Sun Tsu) is 'constantly changing' as characterized by the nature of post-cold-war conflicts which include terrorism, insurgency, banditry, and cyber warfare amongst others (BARBER, 2000). These security threats have effects on safety and wellbeing of citizens, commerce, education, employment, and other socio-economic activities. Nations therefore, aim to develop strategies to mitigate their peculiar security threats to foster an enabling environment for national development.

Security is the freedom from danger and threat to a nation's ability to protect and develop itself, promote its cherished values and legitimate interest to enable it improve the well-being of its citizens (UMARU; PATE; HARUNA, 2015). It is also a situation where every citizen in a country can go about their daily activities without fear or any form of threat to lives and belongings (IGBUZOR, 2011). This implies that people must not only be protected from external attacks but also from devastating consequences of internal upheavals such as unemployment, hunger, diseases, ignorance, homelessness, and socio-economic injustices. The antithesis of security can be characterized by a vulnerability to harm and loss of life, property, or livelihoods. Insecurity, therefore, has the potential to disrupt human needs, resources, production processes, critical infrastructures, services and product outlets which are essential catalysts for Economic Development (ED).

ED refers to the achievement of sustained rates of growth on income per capita to enable a nation expand its output at faster rates than its population growth (TODARO; SMITH, 2014). It involves growth and improvement in the areas of safety and security, agriculture, health, education, industry, trade, and transport among others. It ensures the promotion of the entire system of production, human capital development and investments for overall national growth. Therefore, Krueger et al. (2016) describe ED as change in the nation's economy involving qualitative as well as quantitative improvements. Nevertheless, national efforts towards achieving ED are often impeded by the identified security threats which include insurgency, terrorism, banditry, kidnapping and economic sabotage amongst others. This situation can erode the development efforts of the population thus, highlighting the importance of security as a panacea for ED in any society.

Insecurity has a profound effect on ED of various countries around the world. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the US for instance had significant costs estimated at

about \$90 billion (KUNREUTHER; MICHEL-KERJAN; PORTER, 2003). In Europe, the March 11, 2004 Madrid train bombings set the Spanish government back by 'more than €211.58 million (\$249.66 million); out of which, 63.4 per cent corresponds to the loss of 191 human lives and injuries caused in almost 1600 people affected directly by the attacks' (BUESA et al., 2006). In Africa, according to a 2015 study by the Institute for Economics and Peace, crime, and violence in South Africa carried a high economic price of \$66.7 bn (R989 bn), equivalent to 19 per cent of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (HOW MUCH..., 2016). All these adversely impacted the overall ED of the affected countries.

Within the last 2 decades, Nigeria has been plagued by numerous security challenges which have adversely impacted its ED. These range from the Boko Haram Terrorist (BHT) insurgency in the North East (NE), armed banditry and kidnaping in the North West (NW) and the farmers and herders' crises in the North Central regions of the country. Others are secessionist movement in the South East and South West and crude oil bunkering in the Southern regions. The Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) employed various kinetic and non-kinetic measures in addressing these myriads of security challenges. Kinetic efforts are those that require security forces to conduct combat operations while non-kinetic efforts include a broad set of options to include infrastructure development, economic stimulus and humanitarian aid (D'ANTONIO et al., 2014). One of the non-kinetic efforts was the Amnesty Programme in the Niger Delta Region (NDR) in 2009. Others currently in place aimed at socio-economic development through poverty reduction include the N-Power and Trader Moni programmes. Some of the kinetic efforts which are ongoing include Operation DELTA SAFE against pipeline vandalism and crude oil theft in the NDR and Operation HADIN KAI (OPHK); a Counter Terrorism Counterinsurgency (CT-COIN) operation in the NE against BHT. Similarly, Operation SHARAN DAJI was initiated in NW Nigeria against banditry and kidnapping. Notwithstanding, insecurity has remained generally rampant necessitating review of FGN's efforts and approaches in combating the security threats hindering ED.

This research would be limited to insecurity in Nigeria occasioned by BHT activities in the NE vis a vis its impact on ED. The paper would rely heavily on information obtained from secondary sources which include textbooks, journals, magazines, seminar papers and articles from newspapers and internet websites. This would be critically analyzed using descriptive method of documentary analysis to draw logical conclusions. The rationale for the choice of the sources was to make up for the non-use of questionnaires and interviews. Accordingly, the data generated from the secondary sources were analyzed using triangulation method (exploiting multiple sources to increase validity of results), with all the relevant issues such as research problem, research questions and research objectives listed in the form of themes and sub-themes. Inferences were later drawn from the documentary records to explain the issues under investigation for validity and reliability. The research methodology is qualitative in nature, adopting descriptive analysis.

2 Overview of insecurity and economic development in nigeria

2.1 Concepts of Insecurity and Economic Development

Insecurity as a concept is not new to societies and has existed over time. Nevertheless, it is pertinent to have a clear understanding of security in order to grasp the meaning of insecurity. Adofu & Alhassan (2018) perceive security as a social contract in which the people willingly surrender their right to the government which oversees their survival. Similarly, McGrew (1988) opines that the security of a nation hangs on two important pillars; firstly, the maintenance and protection of the socioeconomic order against internal and external threats and secondly, the promotion of a preferred international order which minimizes the threat to core values, interests, and domestic order. This clearly points to the need of the Armed Forces to secure against external aggression and to the importance of law enforcement agencies to maintain internal order. To this end, Nwanegbo & Odigbo (2013) see security as efforts by a nation to contain internal/external aggression, control crime, eliminate corruption and enhance growth towards improved quality of life for every citizen. Based on the foregoing, insecurity could be seen as the absence of security as discussed above. It is a condition where vulnerability to harm, loss of life, property or livelihood exists (ACHUMBA; IGHOMEREHO; AKPOR-ROBARO, 2013). This is characterized by vulnerability of an individual or group to danger or harm against which they cannot take defensive action.

In conceptualizing ED, it is noteworthy that growth and development are generally known to mean increase in both quantity and quality of available resources. Nonetheless, to Thirlwall (1999), development implies change in the process of economic and social transformation within the countries. It often follows an orderly sequence with shared characteristics across countries. Also, Todaro and Smith (2014) delineated the 3 basic societal objectives namely life-sustenance, self-esteem, and freedom. They surmised that life-sustenance is concerned with the provision of basic needs, self-esteem (feeling of self-respect and independence) and freedom (peoples' ability to determine their destinies). It is to be noted that all the foregoing concepts makes humans the ultimate beneficiaries of development through their inter-relations with the society to transform the environment. Therefore, the whole essence of development is to improve the potentials and capacities of mankind to overcome challenges and generally enhance the conditions for existence.

2.2 Theoretical Link Between Insecurity and Economic Development

Theories abound to serve as lenses to explain insecurity and ED such as seen by Wendt (1999) to include Development Theory, Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare Theory and the Frustration-Aggression Theory (FAT) amongst others. This study will however be hinged on the FAT developed by John Dollard et al. (1939), flowing from which Wendt (1999) believes


that aggression results from blockage or frustration of a person's efforts to attain a goal thereby causing aggression. Relatedly, if the cause of the frustration cannot be confronted, the aggression shifts onto an innocent target manifested through violence. The FAT can thus be used to explain riots, insurgent activities, and revolutions. In economic sense, the theory attempts to explain the correlation between poverty and insecurity, implying that emergence of conflicts especially in developing countries is caused by the prevalence of poverty. It further predicts that ED will be hindered in an environment of insecurity as currently witnessed through BHT activities in NE Nigeria, with wide possible range of policy responses for mitigation. It is in this regard that FA Theory was chosen as the theoretical framework for this study.

2.3 Historical Background of Boko Haram Insecurity in North East Nigeria

The Nigerian National Security Strategy (2019) identified several threats in the country's domestic environment which undermine the well-being of its citizens. These include terrorism, banditry and militia activities manifested through kidnapping, armed robbery, and cattle rustling. Others include vandalism of critical national infrastructure, crude oil theft and illegal bunkering resulting from poverty induced socio-economic challenges (NATIONAL..., 2019). Of all the security threats bedeviling Nigeria, the BHT clearly tops the chart as the most potent. According to Adamu (2010), Islamic extremism in Nigeria dates back to the 1970s when Mohammed Marwa led an uprising known as Maitatsine Movement in Kano (ADAMU, 2010). He noted that the movement orchestrated a major uprising in the early 1980s that led to wanton loss of lives and property in Northern Nigeria after Mohammed Marwa's death. In 1995, Abubakar Lawan established the Ahlissunna Wal Jama'ah Hijra or Shabaab Group (Muslim Youth Organisation) in Maiduguri, Borno State (SOYINKA, 2012 apud COMOLLI, 2015). The group was a conservative non-violent Islamic movement.

In 2002 however, Lawan left Nigeria to pursue further Islamic Saudi Arabia and in his absence, a committee of shaykhs appointed Mohammed Yusuf as leader of the sect (COMOLLI, 2015). Under Yusuf's leadership, the group adopted various names like Muhajirun, Ahlis Sunnahwal Jama'a and Nigerian Taliban, among others, while their relationships with international organisations are contained in **Figure 1** (Big Allied and Dangerous Data, 2013). Their ideology according to Stohl (2004) is premised on an orthodox Islamic teaching which treats anything western as completely un-Islamic. It is the rejection of these (Western) institutions that earned the group its popular name - *Boko Haram*, literally meaning Western Education is forbidden. Nevertheless, the group prefers to be called by its real name - *Jama'atu Ahlissunnah Lidda'awati Wal Jihad*, meaning People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad (COMOLLI, 2015). The core objective of BHT is to replace the secular Nigerian State with Islamic Sharia Law while its ranks is filled with disaffected youths, unemployed graduates and destitutes mainly from Northern Nigeria.

Figure 1 – BHT Relationship with International Organizations



Source: Big Allied and Dangerous (2013 apud CIBRA, 2018, p. 36).

According to Comolli (2015), Yusuf led the first spate of violence on Christmas Eve 2003 in Kanama and Geidam, Yobe State, when the sect attacked public buildings and police stations. They later attacked Bama and Gwoza police stations in Borno State on 21 September 2004, killing several policemen and stealing arms and ammunition (ADAMS, 2004). He related that, it was in July 2009 that BHT attacks took a new dimension, when they staged a major revolt in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states, where they attacked police stations, prisons, government offices, schools, churches, and mosques. A Joint Military Task Force operation was launched in response, leading to the arrest of Yusuf and his subsequent death in police custody. The sect consequently went underground and re-emerged in 2010 under the leadership of Yusuf's former second-in-command, Abubakar Shekau as a more dynamic and vicious insurgent group

fighting the Nigerian State for the revenge of the death of its pioneer leader (ADAMS, 2004). The group under Shekau transformed into a monster that spread terror across Nigeria through strings of armed assaults, assassinations as well as suicide and vehicle borne Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks against soft targets. Some of these, as compiled by Comolli (2015) from 2011-2014, are chronicled in **Table 1** below.

Table 1 – BHT Attacks in Nigeria from 2011 to 14.

Serial	Date	Event	No Killed	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
1	16 Jun 11	First ever suicide bombing in Nigeria targeting the Police Headquarters	unspecified	
2	26 Aug 11	Suicide attack against the United Nations building in Abuja (100 wounded)	25	
3	Sep 11	Assassination of Baba Fugu (late Yusuf's In-Law) for offering negotiations	1	
4	Nov 11	Series of attacks in Yobe State	150	
5	25 Dec 11	Suicide attacks at Saint Theresa Catholic Church in Medulla, Niger State	unspecified	
6	20 Jan 12	Multiple attack in Kano State including Prison (50 – 100 prisoners escaped)	250	
7	Jan 12	German engineer Edgar Fritz Raupach is kidnapped in Kano (killed in May)	1	
8	8 Apr 12	Easter Sunday suicide bomb attack in Kaduna.	unspecified	
9	26 Apr 12	Bombing of This Day building in Abuja and Media Outlet in Kaduna	unspecified	
10	6 Oct 12	Three Chinese workers are killed in Maiduguri	unspecified	
11	16 Feb 13	Kidnaps of 7 foreigners working for Setraco in Bauchi (executed 10 Mar 13)	7	
12	18 Mar 13	Bombing in Sabon Gari, Kano	Over 70	
13	16-17 Apr 13	BHT attack on JTF in Baga, Borno State	Over 185	
14	6 Jul 13	BHT attack on a school in Mamundo, Yobe State killing school children	25	
15	28 Sep 13	BHT attack on College of Agriculture in Gujba, Yobe State killing students	40	
16	Dec 13	Attack on Maiduguri Airport and Air Force Base destroying two helicopters	unspecified	
17	14 Apr 14	BHT abducts nearly 300 schoolgirls in Chibok, Borno	unspecified	
18	14 Apr 14	Twin bombs detonated by BHT in Abuja.	88	
19	1-3 Jun 14	BHT attack in the Gwoza area.	Over 200	
20	25 Jun 14	A bomb attack on Banex Plaza in Wuse, Abuja	21	
21	23 Jul 14	Bomb blasts in Kaduna	82	

Source: Comolli (2015).

3 Implications of insecurity on economic development in the north east of nigeria

Terrorism, insurgency, armed banditry, and kidnapping occasioned by BHT have adversely impacted ED of NE Nigeria in several ways. Some implications include worsening safety and wellbeing of citizens, threat to food security and poor micro-economic indices as discussed below.


3.1 Safety and Well-Being of Citizens

The incessant BHT attacks in NE Nigeria has impacted safety and well-being of the citizens with adverse effect on socio-economic activities in the area. For instance, Muazzam (2014) related that the BHT attack on Federal Government Girls College in Chibok, Borno State resulted in the abduction of over 230 female students. Also, the UNDP, 2020 (NORTHEAST..., 2021), estimated that the BHT insurgency in the Northeast has killed about 350,000 people since it began in 2009. Ironically, both Christian and some Muslim faithfuls are afraid to go to their places of worship out of fear of BHT attack. Some members of the National Youth Service Corps posted to Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states had to abandon their national duty due to fear of attacks by BHT (AWOJOBI, 2014). Hence, the worsening safety and well-being conditions resulting from BHT attacks has caused local inhabitants to desert the NE region with attendant effects on commercial activities which are key enablers for economic growth. This has displaced businesses and other socio-economic activities with the consequence of decline in GDP of the states in the region that snowballed into an overall stunted ED in Nigeria.

3.2 Threat to Food Security

The Food and Agricultural Organization (c2021) noted that agriculture currently employs about 70 per cent of the labour force in Nigeria making it a major socio-economic activity especially in the country's Northern region. However, BHT activities in NE Nigeria have forced farmers to abandon farms and markets due to risks to their lives, thereby posing a huge threat to food security and socio-economic development in the region. It is worthy to note that agricultural production has a multiplier effect on ED. For example, some farm produce serves as raw materials in the value chains for agro-allied industries while their by-products have various uses including poultry and fish feeds as well as other applications (ABDULWAHAB, 2020). Nevertheless, the period between 2009 and 2014 recorded a plummeting of agricultural contribution to the GDP economic index from 37.3 - 19.1 per cent (THE WORLD BANK, c2021). Details are in **Graphic 1**. Although according to Statista (2021), this figure has improved to 22.19 per cent of Nigeria's GDP in 2021 (see **Graphic 2**), the effect of BHT activities greatly impacted socio-economic activities of the region leading to rising inflation and unemployment.

Graphic 1 – Agriculture (% of GDP), 2009-14.



Sorce: The World Bank (c2021).

Graphic 2 – Agriculture (% of GDP), 2019-21



Sorce: Statista (2021).

3.3 Poor Macro-Economic Indices

Over the years, Nigeria's macro-economic indices have remained low owing to the identified security threats. Some of these indices include increasing unemployment, rising inflation, endemic poverty and slowed development, out of which the first 2 shall be elucidated.


3.3.1 *Increasing Unemployment*

The heightened insecurity in Nigeria has greatly impacted the source of livelihood of the citizens especially in the NE where agriculture and commercial activities have been hard hit. The unemployment situation has been further worsened in 2020 due to the COVID 19 pandemic. Chronological data from the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics (NBS) shows consistent rising rate of unemployment in the past years. The unemployment rate in the country was put at 33.3 per cent at the end of 4th Quarter 2020 but is estimated to slightly drop to 32.5 percent at the end of 2021 (VARRELLA, 2021). This situation is more so in the NE states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa with unemployment rates of 33, 38.4 and 34 per cent respectively (NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 2020a). It is pertinent to note that unemployment further exacerbates insecurity as jobless youth become readily available for recruitment into criminal activities that hinder ED. Consequently, Nigeria needs to device more measures to curb insecurity as well as boost socio-economic activities in the country to reduce unemployment.

3.3.2 *Rising Inflation*

Over the years, inflation which according to Encyclopedia Britannica (INFLATION, 2021) is - an inordinate rise in the general level of prices - has gradually increased due to rising insecurity which has disrupted agriculture and other socio-economic activities by causing scarcity. The result was that all sectors of the market including food, clothing, housing, and furnishing were affected by this worsening inflation and increase in the costs of commodities (NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 2020b). Nigeria's annual inflation rate measured by the Customer Price Index (CPI) eased to 18.12 per cent in April of 2021 for the first decline since August 2019. This figure represents a slightly lower rate from a four-year steady rise to 18.17 per cent in March 2021 (TRADING ECONOMICS, 2021). Graphic 3 gives the graphical representation of rising inflation from Aug 20 to Jul 21. Inflation tends to generally reduce the purchasing power of individuals with the potential to increase criminality in the society thereby exacerbating insecurity which hinders ED.

Graphic 3 – Rate of Inflation from Aug 20 - Jul 21



SOURCE: TRADINGECONOMICS.COM | NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, NIGERIA

Source: Trading Economics, 2021.

4 Current efforts towards mitigating effects of insecurity on economic development in the north east of nigeria

The effects of BHT insecurity earlier identified have taken a toll on the Nigerian economy especially in the NE region. At present, the government has many ongoing non-kinetic and kinetic efforts targeted at mitigating their impact on the overall ED in Nigeria. Some of these efforts will be discussed successively.

4.1 Non-Kinetic Efforts

The combined effects of insecurity in NE Nigeria have increased poverty and hunger in the region. This made the FGN to advance economic and social investment schemes as part of the non-kinetic efforts. Nigeria established the National Social Investments Programmes (NSIP) in 2016, to tackle poverty and hunger across the country through equitable distribution of resources to the vulnerable (NIGERIA, 2016). Some of the schemes under the NSIP include the N-Power program to assist young Nigerians between ages 18-35 years to develop skills and given stipend of N30,000 (\$60) per month. Another was the Government Enterprise and Empowerment Programme which is a micro-lending intervention that targets traders, artisans, enterprising youth, farmers, and women in particular, by providing non-interest loans of between N10,000 and N100,000 (\$20-200) to beneficiaries. Since commencement in 2016, the NSIP has supported more than 4 million beneficiaries across the country (NIGERIA, 2016).

Additionally, the Nigerian Ministry of Labour and Employment initiated a social program in 2020 to employ 1000 artisans each from the 774 Local Government Areas (LGAs) of the country, (AS THE..., 2020). As at 24 Jun 21, about 413,630 Nigerians drawn from rural communities and mostly itinerant workers in different LGAs have benefited from the program (AGBAKWURU, 2021). All the identified efforts above are envisaged to stimulate socio-economic activities in order to reduce poverty and hunger. The government has also been undertaking sensitization and advocacy programmes in print, electronic and social media as part of strategic communications to discourage acts that are inimical to the nation and foster peace. There is need to strengthen non-kinetic measures that would support and give the desired effects to kinetic efforts in tackling insecurity in NE Nigeria.

4.2 Kinetic Efforts

Nigeria is presently conducting several operations to stifle the security threats across the nation. For instance, Operation WHIRL STROKE was created to combat farmers and herders' clashes in the North Central region while Operation HADARIN DAJI was to tackle kidnapping, armed banditry and cattle rustling in the Northwest region. Relatedly, Operation DELTA SAFTE is protecting critical national oil and gas infrastructure in the Southern region, while OPHK which is a CT-COIN operation is battling BHT insurgency in the Northeast. Other kinetic lines of operations through paramilitary security agencies include border control by the immigration and customs services and normal policing duties by the civil police and the civil defence corps.

Despite the various kinetic efforts advanced by the government to nip the prevalence of security threats in the bud, more needs to be done. An example is the lack of synergy between the military and other paramilitary lines of operations where some agencies tend to work independently leading to poor coordination of efforts and slow momentum of operations. The FGN may consider central coordination and streamlining of all kinetic lines of operations through a hub such as Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA). The challenge also exists of porosity of borders being exploited by the criminal elements to smuggle small arms and light weapons (SALW) into the country which has continued to fuel the BHT insurgency. There is thus the need to mitigate these challenges to effectively curtail insecurity for improved ED.

5 Challenges involved in curbing insecurity for enhanced economic development in north east of nigeria

Having examined the current efforts employed by Nigeria to mitigate the effects of insecurity on ED, there is need to highlight some challenges it faces towards achieving its end-state of restoring peace in the nation. The challenges include duplication of roles of security agencies, negative use of social media, porous borders and inadequate integrated data management systems. These are evaluated in the succeeding paragraphs.

5.1 Duplication of Roles of Security and Law Enforcement Agencies

The Nigerian Security and Law Enforcement Agencies (NSLEA) are mandated to enforce the laws governing the federation in order to maintain internal security. The main NSLEA include Nigeria Police Force (NPF), Department of State Services, Nigeria Immigration Services (NIS), Nigeria Customs Services (NCS) and in special cases, the Armed Forces of Nigeria. Over the years, additional agencies such as the Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC), Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) as well as Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) among others, were created to address specific issues deemed overreaching for the NPF. Nevertheless, the Police Acts were not amended to excise the roles of the new agencies thereby creating overlap of functions among the agencies. This has hampered coordination of the efforts by NSLEAs to combat insecurity as manifest through relentless inter-agency rivalry and struggle for relevance and supremacy. As a result, the NSLEAs are unable to effectively mitigate the negative impacts of insecurity on socio-economic development.

Despite the creation of FRSC and NSCDC to complement the NPF, the security of forest reserves for instance was not explicitly assigned to any agency. The forest reserves, therefore, became safe havens for insurgents, armed bandits and other violent criminals who have devised ways to evade the NSLEAs in perpetrating their acts. Another example of duplicity of functions is that of the ICPC mandated to rid Nigeria of corruption through lawful enforcement and preventive measures (INDEPENDENT CORRUPT PRACTICES AND OTHER RELATED CRIMES COMMISSION, c2021) and EFCC which is responsible for economic and financial crimes in Nigeria (ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRIMES COMMISSION, c2021). The rivalry between the 2 agencies has the potential to jeopardize some cases bordering on economic crimes. There is therefore the need for the FGN to streamline the roles of the existing security agencies to bridge gaps in legitimacy and enhance their efficiency to mitigate existing and emerging security threats.

5.2 Negative Usage of the Social Media

Negative use of social media is a challenge to curtailing insecurity in Nigeria. Tanimu (2010) posits that globalization has aided the BHT insurgents in creating a medium for the growth of insurgency through the use of its tools. The sect carved a niche for itself by spreading its messages through the internet and other global media such as satellite television. Their demands and goals are made known to potential insurgents, who may be inspired to imitate them having been stimulated by elaborate accounts of their acts on the media. BHT Also uses camcorders to record videos preaching their ideology and false propaganda messages of successes recorded against Nigerian security agencies. Additionally, they record videos of public executions and beheading of captured victims, all of which are uploaded onto the internet as a media campaign at the tactical level with tremendous strategic impact.

This brought them to the international limelight to the extent of catching the attention of Al-Qaeda. For instance, during an interview in 2012, the sect's spokesman Abu Qaqa was quoted as saying 'Al-Qaeda are our senior brothers, we enjoy financial and technical support from them' (MILITARY..., 2003). Therefore, negative usage of the social media occasioned by globalization is an enabler for insurgency which necessitates strategic communication by FGN for enhanced ED.

5.3 Porous Borders

Porous borders constitute a challenge to combating insecurity in Nigeria. It has a land border of 4,047 km with the neighbouring Republics of Benin, Niger, Chad and Cameroon with most of it physically unmanned. In 2014, the NIS disclosed that the country had over 1400 illegal as opposed to only 86 legal entry points along the borders (GEORGE, 2014). For instance, a conservative estimate indicates over 250 footpaths from Nigeria's Borno, Adamawa and Benue states lead into Cameroon (OJEWALE, 2021). These hidden tracks provide unfettered passage to insurgents and smuggling of SALW into Nigeria. Border porosity has remained an important factor for BHT's survival, offering it a lifeline to external support from transnational groups in the form of SALW, training, radicalisation, and funding (ONUOHA, 2013). Since the manpower required to effectively patrol and monitor Nigeria's vast expanse of land border is inadequate, BHT has leveraged on this lacuna to ferry logistics across to its fighters in Nigeria. Thus, there is need to formulate a Border Security Management Strategy (BSMS) to tackle influx of insurgents and SALW for enhanced ED.

5.4 Inadequate Integrated Data Management Systems

Inadequate integrated data system has posed a challenge to Nigeria in combating insecurity. At present, various databases on Nigerians are held by Ministries Department and Agencies (MDAs) that are yet to be centrally integrated for planning purposes. For instance, the FRSC and NIS only maintains biometric data of Nigerians with drivers' licence and international passports respectively while the National Population Commission (NPC) holds outdated demographics obtained from the last projection of 2006. Also, commercial banks hold biometric data known as Bank Verification Numbers, linking all accounts operated by individuals. This data is also limited as it captures data only on Nigerians that have bank accounts. All these databases held by MDAs can only be useful for identification, planning of socio-economic activities and intelligence if integrated into a central database.

In view of the aforesaid, the National Identity Management Commission (NIMC) was established in 2007 by the FGN (NATIONAL IDENTITY MANAGEMENT COMMISSION, 2007). Its mandate was to establish a harmonized National Identity Management System anchored on the unique National Identification Number (NIN),

which connects the various institutional databases under a single platform (NATIONAL IDENTITY MANAGEMENT COMMISSION, 2021b). As at 29 Jul 21, NIMC announced that it has captured more than 60 million unique NIN records in its National Identity Database (NID), (NATIONAL IDENTITY MANAGEMENT COMMISSION, 2021b). Additionally, the integration of biometric data from other MDAs had made tremendous progress. For example, a 31 Oct 21 deadline was set for linking all cellular phone numbers with NIN or else such lines would be blocked (AGBAKWURU, 2021). Accordingly, about 59.8 million unique NINs linked to an average of about 3-4 mobile numbers each. Also, the international passports and drivers' licence databases have been integrated with the NID where renewals or new issues of the documents involves linkage with the NIN. Despite these attempts by the FGN to integrate all the databases, the lack of a National Data Management Policy (NDMP) has hampered on full integration. This poses a challenge of accurate identification of citizens by NSLEAs towards curbing security threats.

6 Strategies to mitigate the challenges of curbing insecurity for enhanced economic development in north east of Nigeria

Sequel to appraising the challenges encountered in curbing insecurity for enhanced ED, it is important to suggest strategies to be employed by Nigeria to mitigate them. The proposed strategies are streamlining the roles of security agencies, development of strategic media initiatives, formulation of BSMS and NDMP.

6.1 Streamlining Roles of Security and Law Enforcement Agencies

The challenge of conflicting roles of NSLEAs can be addressed by streamlining their responsibilities. For instance, the establishment acts of the NPF, FRSC and NSCDC could be amended to clearly delineate their specific roles to enhance efficiency. The FGN could initiate an executive bill through the Attorney General of the Federation to amend the NPF Act to excise overlapping functions with FRSC and NSCDC. Synergizing their combined efforts thereafter would greatly improve efficacy of crime prevention. The NPF could also be adequately equipped to deal with internal security which would reduce the rate and duration of deployment for the military on that role.

Additionally, the NSCDC Act could be amended to ascribe it with the role of protecting all forest reserves in the country to prevent use by BHT and other groups for criminal ends. Also, the EFCC and ICPC could be collapsed into one stronger and more vibrant agency by bundling together and articulating their establishment acts. The resulting organization would be better positioned to efficiently tackle financial crimes and corrupt practices through elimination of duplication in both funding and efforts. These strategies would strengthen the coordination of security agencies and reduce the legitimacy gaps that make them unable to combat security threats.

6.2 Development of Strategic Media Initiatives

The development of strategic media initiatives would mitigate the challenge of negative exploitation of the social media by BHT in NE Nigeria. Strategic communication is the purposeful use of communication by an organization to fulfil its mission through identification of key concepts, audience analysis, goal setting and message strategy (HALLAHAN et al., 2007). In doing so, the FGN would seek to deny the BHT propaganda team a voice in order to prevent them from achieving publicity while undermining their credibility. BHT's secret supporters and rest of the populace would be targeted to hinder tolerance for their nefarious activities.

Thus, the developing a series of media initiatives such as Defence Website, Radio and Satellite TV stations would counter the insurgents' appeal as well as raise public awareness of their illegitimate claims. In this approach, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) could create a rapid response media team to address extremist messages in print, electronic media, and the internet. The team should also be able to take down propaganda video released by the sect to diminish the effect on morale of troops and the populace in general. However, for strategic communications to be successful, various organisations such as media-based NGOs, MDAs, media houses and religious leaders should be incorporated.

6.3 Formulation of a Border Security Management Strategy

The improvement of border security would undoubtedly address the challenge of border porosity in Nigeria. The vast land borders especially in the Northeast Nigeria with Niger, Chad and Cameroon largely remain porous due to the inadequate border control personnel and infrastructure. To this end, the FGN could evolve a BSMS which should include capacity enhancement for NIS and NCS, as well as improvement of relations regarding border control with neighbouring countries. To enhance capacity for border control, the government could shore up the manpower of the NIS and NCS with highly trained and dedicated personnel while also providing development interventions to border communities to win their hearts and minds. Most importantly also, is the need to avail the agencies with state-of-the-art surveillance equipment for remote monitoring of unmanned portions of the borders. In the area of improving relations with neighbouring countries, each could shift their posture from only focusing on preventing illegal entry of aliens and goods – for revenue generation – to also what leaves their countries. This practice would be beneficial to countries with shared borders in crime control. The BSMS would therefore, reduce the impact of proliferation of SALW into Nigeria and thus, improve security for enhanced ED.

6.4 Formulation of National Data Management Policy

The challenge of inadequate integrated data on Nigerians could be addressed by a NDMP. The policy would spell out the procedure for collection, storage, integration, harmonisation, and usage of biometric data among MDAs, and for security purposes. Firstly, the FGN could direct the NPC to conduct a national population census to avail the country with the dated demography as well as accurate data on employment and addresses of all residents amongst others. This would serve as a basis to update databases of all other MDAs especially the NIS and NCS to effectively enforce border control which is the bane of proliferation of SALW and influx of criminals.

Thereafter, the NIMC could aggregate and integrate all biometric information on Nigerians domiciled with other MDAs to serve as a basis to formulate and implement the NDMP. The synchronisation of all databases by the NDMP with access to phone numbers, bank accounts, NIN, drivers' licence and travel documents of Nigerians would assist NSLEAs in tracking and curbing security threats for enhanced ED. This rich databank would be invaluable for non-kinetic and kinetic efforts in tackling insecurity as well as intelligence gathering for an agency such as ONSA in safeguarding the nation's security.

7 Final considerations

The contemporary security environment post-Cold War witnessed a change in the nature of conflicts to intra-state occasioned mainly by internal threats from non-state actors. The security threats include insurgency, armed banditry, kidnapping, cyber warfare, sabotage, and terrorism. All these threats are rooted in common socio-economic denominators such as unemployment, extreme poverty, injustice, illiteracy, poor health care and lack of infrastructure. Insecurity in NE Nigeria has a profound effect on the safety and wellbeing of people due to fear of BHT attacks. Additionally, food security and commercial activities have been threatened as most farmers and traders have abandoned the region for safety of their lives. The situation has also occasioned increasing unemployment and inflation which further exacerbates insecurity as jobless youth become readily available for recruitment into criminal activities that hinder ED in the NE Nigeria.

The FGN has advanced several non-kinetic and kinetic measures to combat insecurity occasioned by BHT. Nevertheless, challenges abound such as duplication of roles of NSLEAs where the conflicting roles of some agencies created lacunae in legitimacy and elicited inter-agency rivalry as well as struggle for supremacy. Consequently, the joint efforts of numerous security agencies were inadequate to mitigate the negative impacts of insecurity on socio-economic development. Thus, the FGN could streamline the roles of security agencies with duplicitous roles by amending their establishment laws for greater efficiency. Furthermore, the protection of the vast forest reserves across the nation could be assigned to

NSCDC to dominate ungoverned spaces in the country which serve as hideouts for perpetrators of criminal acts hampering security.

Negative use of social media by BHT is also a challenge to the FGn in mitigating effects of the sect's terrorist acts. The use of cyber space by BHT to spread their ideological messages to potential insurgents, make demands to the FGn and solicit support from international terrorist organisations all attest to the sect's strategic impact thorough a well-coordinated media campaign. The MOD could create a rapid response media team to take down propaganda material released by the sect to diminish the effect on morale of troops and the populace in general. These strategic media initiatives could incorporate various other media-based NGOs, MDAs, media houses and the clergy.

Another challenge to the FGn's efforts at mitigating the effects of BHT insurgency is porosity of the country's borders. There are presently over 1400 illegal entry points along the Nigerian borders some of which provide unfettered passage for influx of insurgents and SALWs fuelling BHT insurgency. To address this, the FGn could evolve a BSMS to shore up manpower and enhance capacity of the NIS and NCS for border control while also providing state-of-the-art surveillance devices for remote detection. It could also renew relationship stance between Nigeria and other countries it shares common border with all in a bid to hamper BHTs freedom of illegal crossing of logistics is support of its activities.

Inadequate integrated data management also pose a challenge to the government's effort in curbing the effects of BHT insurgency on ED. The numerous MDAs identified independently hold databases which are neither harmonized nor linked for planning and intelligence gathering purposes in support of FGn's kinetic and non-kinetic efforts. The FGn could thus, organize a population census to get dated demographic data of all citizens followed by formulation and implementation of a NDMP by NIMC to collect and harmonize all databases held by MDAs. This would serve as a government databank for socio-economic planning and intelligence purposes by ONSA.

8 Recommendations

Having critically analysed the challenges impeding Nigeria's efforts in curbing BHT insurgency this article makes the following recommendations to enhance ED in Nigeria:

- a. FGn should amend the establishment laws of NSLEAs to streamline their roles.
- b. FGn should assign the protection of forest reserves to the NSCDC.
- c. The MOD should create a rapid response media team for strategic communication.
- d. FGn should evolve and implement a BSMS.
- e. NIMC should formulate and implement a NDMP.

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China Pakistan Economic Corridor: implications on Pakistan's economy and security concerns

Corredor Económico China-Pakistán: implicaciones para la economía de Pakistán y preocupaciones de seguridad

Abstract: CPEC (China Pakistan Economic Corridor) holds a unique importance in Pakistan's economic future pursuits. It aims at upgrading Pakistan's required infrastructure and strengthen its economy by the construction of modern transportation networks, various energy projects, and special economic zones. CPEC will not only benefit China and Pakistan but will have positive impact on Iran, Afghanistan, Central Asian Republic, and the region. The project is the bedrock of Pakistan's future economic progress which is sure to bring lot of positive changes in the country's development. Under the auspices of CPEC, a number of roads, energy, special economic zones and new railway tracks will be constructed along with development of Gawadar seaport which holds a vital and strategic importance for both Pakistan and China. However, given the fact that USA has been openly opposing the CPEC under it's contain China policy, a number of regional players specially India has aimed from the beginning to disrupt the project. There are some security concerns to the project some of which are indigenous and most are externally sponsored.

Keywords: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Special Economic Zones. Development of Gwadar Port.

Resumen: El CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor en inglés) tiene una importancia única en las futuras actividades económicas de Pakistán. Es un desiderátum vital de la Iniciativa de la Franja y la Ruta de China. El objetivo es actualizar la infraestructura necesaria de Pakistán y fortalecer su economía mediante la construcción de redes de transporte modernas, varios proyectos de energía y zonas económicas especiales. En general, es un gran proyecto de conectividad regional. El proyecto es la base del futuro progreso económico de Pakistán, que seguramente traerá muchos cambios positivos en el desarrollo del país. Bajo los auspicios del CPEC, se construirán una serie de carreteras, energía, zonas económicas especiales y nuevas vías ferroviarias junto con el desarrollo del puerto marítimo de Guadar, que tiene una importancia vital y estratégica para Pakistán y China. Sin embargo, dado el hecho de que Estados Unidos se ha opuesto abiertamente al CPEC bajo su política de contener a China, varios actores regionales, especialmente India, han tenido como objetivo desde el principio detener el proyecto. Hay algunas preocupaciones de seguridad en el proyecto, algunas de las cuales son nativas y la mayoría están patrocinadas externamente.

Palabras clave: Corredor Económico China-Pakistán (CPEC). Zonas Económicas Especiales. Desarrollo del Puerto de Guadar.

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1 Introduction

a. The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is being regarded as the game changer not only in Pakistan but amongst most of the countries in the region. Given the situation, CPEC is considered as a stroke of perfection (GUL; ISHAQUE; ASGHAR, 2021) in major projects required by Pakistan and duly embraced by China. The passageway centres around a 2,000-kilometer road and rail interface between Western China and Pakistan. It associates Kashgar to Gwadar port in the Arabian Sea. CPEC goes under the umbrella of a bigger Chinese OBOR "One Belt One Road" drive that incorporates a populace of multiple billion and a monetary yield of US\$ 21 trillion (KHALID; JALAL; ULLAH, 2019) in Eurasia. Evidently, the Sino-Pakistan relationship will essentially develop with CPEC (according to a financial security perspective) and can modify the geo-economic, geo-political and legislative issues of South Asia.

b. Envisaged in mid-2013 and initiated in April 2015, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), denotes another period of financial ties in mutual relationship which is generally characterized by security participation. Pakistan's economy plainly needs a change and numerous authorities say CPEC will help in such manner.

c. CPEC, which involves credits, speculations, and awards that could develop to around \$60 billion, voyages a 2,700 km course. It begins at the Pakistani Arabian Sea port of Gwadar, in Baluchistan area, moves along the Karakoram highway through the Khunjerab pass in Gilgit-Baltistan, prior to intersection with the Kashgar in China's Xinjiang district. Inside Pakistan's domain, the monetary and improvement projects focus on transport foundation, modern turn of events, energy and Baluchistan's Gwadar port. CPEC was at first assessed at 50 Bn USDs which was additionally expanded to 62 Bn USDs (HUSSAIN, 2021) and assessed to go past 100 Bn USDs by 2030. In this specific circumstance, OBOR is the impression of provincial political incorporation, refining financial turn of events, exchange, up-degree of putting resources into transportation and energy areas. By associating China with Asia, Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, OBOR plans to reshape trade. CPEC is likely open ways to trade and economic upgrade for Pakistan and China as well as for Iran, Afghanistan, and Central Asian Republics.

2 Historical Background

a. CPEC is a branch of OBOR (One Belt One Road) drive whose roots can be followed back to the old silk course. Silk Road, likewise called Silk Route, an old shipping lane, connecting China with the West, that transported merchandise and thoughts between the two incredible developments of Rome and China. China got Nestorian Christianity and Buddhism (from India) through the Silk Road.

b. In 138 B.C (HOPKIRK, 2001), an audacious explorer, Chang Chien was shipped off the West by Han Emperor Wu-Ti, who confronted colossal badgering from China's conventional adversaries (Hsing-Nu, Huns of Turkic Stock) from 476-201 B.C. The extraordinary mass of China in 221 B.C was underlying a similar setting. The motivation behind the endeavour was to search for new partners in the West against the Chinese power. A sum of 100 people was sent on the endeavour through bone-dry / tricky landscape of Taklamakan desert in South West China. Just 2 x people came back after 13 years having effectively connected with Asia which and brought forth the Silk course.

c. The Silk Road stayed in use until 1453 A. D (SILK..., 2021), when the Ottoman Empire boycotted (HISTORY, 2017) all types of trade with China. Despite being stopped for a longer period of time, it's been long since the Silk Road has been utilized for global trade, the non-utilized courses have seriously affected trade, culture and history that reverberates even today.

Map 1 – The main routes of the Silk Road



The Main Routes of the Old Silk Road

Source: Hopkirk (2001).

3 CPEC and Pakistan Economy.

It should be remembered that the arranging of CPEC follows four phases (HUSAIN, 2018) which are:

- a. Early Harvest (2015-2019). Most of the ventures are energy oriented and are almost finished adding roughly 7000 MW power to the public power sector facilitating the energy deficiencies and load shedding.
- b. Short term projects (up to 2022). Primarily roads, Gwadar City Development, Optic fiber organization and the Hydel + coal mining projects.
- c. Medium projects (up to 2025) include Railway's upgradation and Industrial zones.
- d. Long term projects (up to 2030) include the completion of Industrial zones, Agriculture, Tourism and so on.

4 Power Sector


a. Pakistan was undergoing power shortages in the recent past. More than 140 million Pakistanis either were exposed to load shedding and power shortages experiencing more than 12 hours of load shedding every day. The normal shortfall in the energy area was around 4,000 MWs. The shortfall had the potential to rise to 7,000 MW or 32% of the complete power grid (JAVID, 2018). The energy shortage costed almost 14 billion PKR (7% of GDP) to Pakistan just last year. Under these conditions Pakistan industry seriously shrank. Ventures were compelled to utilize diesel generators to meet their requirements. More than 500,000 families were affected by joblessness.

b. Under CPEC, 13,000 Mega Watts of additionally generated electricity was to be added to the power grid, out of which projects worth 10,000 Mega Watts are already completed (by 2018). Remaining projects are likely to be completed by 2022. Ventures under CPEC are given as per Annex A to this paper.

c. Energy is defined as the life line of the economy of any country. It is the most dynamic instrument of financial advancement of a country. Because of population surge and industrial expansion, there have been extreme energy emergencies in Pakistan. The significant explanation for Pakistan's power shortage is the political insecurity and the dramatic absence of productivity. No answer for the issue has yet been found and it keeps on torturing the residents. Power shortages and load shedding (purposeful power outages) are normal in each sphere in Pakistan but they are particularly significant in the urban areas.

d. CPEC will assist in freeing the nation from the energy emergencies. Energy accessibility will restore existing ventures, and is likely to add 2 percent to Pakistani GDP. China is already stretching out incredible monetary collaboration with Pakistan and is putting forth genuine attempt for settling the energy shortage. CPEC structure will cover four significant regions and energy is one of them. In energy, project totalling 10,400 megawatts have already been finished (by 2018). Chinese firms will set up \$35 to \$37 Bn in the IPP sector with the strategy that of accessing Energy projects with financial backers. These projects would be based on wind, sun, coal and hydropower age with an estimated outcome of 16,400 MWs and would be situated in all the regions including Azad Kashmir. China would set up 10 projects of 6,600MW (ABID; ASHFAQ, 2015) in Thar Desert that is likely to change this remote district into Pakistan’s energy capital and open up monetary freedom for the inhabitants.

Figure 1 – Major projects of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor



5 Infrastructure (ZIA; WAQAR, 2018)

(1) Roads. For Pakistan, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is an adequate model associating China to Central Asia, West Asia and portions of South Asia. The transportation projects are set forward to make the projects working under CPEC for more than US\$ 45 billion, from which 30% (US\$ 13.58 billion) is credited towards the development of foundation. At present, 6 street framework projects are under development through various areas of Pakistan. These incorporate the KKH Phase II (Thakot-Havelian Section) situated in Gilgit Baltistan and KPK, Peshawar-Karachi Motorway, the Multan-Sukkur and Lahore-Multan area, in the Punjab and Sindh, upgradation of D.I Khan (Yarik) – Zhob, N-50 Phase – I among Peshawar and Baluchistan, E-35 Expressway and lastly the M-4 among Faisalabad and Multan in Punjab. The road infrastructure being developed under the rubrics of CPEC, will help transform the Pakistan's economy by not only ensuring the transportation of goods but by also giving a huge boost to country's tourism industry which has a great potential. Significant framework projects under the CPEC project are specified underneath:

(a) KKH Phase II (Thakot -Havelian Section).

Covering the length of around 440kms (expenditure of US\$1,366 million), the KKH Phase II connects the districts of Gilgit Baltistan and KPK with the capital of Pakistan. With the completion of this project, trade between Pakistan and China would gain new heights as present road from Gilgit to KPK is in depleted shape. Gilgit Baltistan are in the north of Pakistan and home to some highest mountains in the world. The rea has tremendous amount of tourism potential and the project can help boost this potential.

(b) Peshawar-Karachi Motorway (Multan-Sukkur and Lahore-Multan Section).

This part of the motorway interfaces Punjab to Sindh covering 392km with an assessed financial plan of US\$ 2,980 million. It conceives the development of a 6-lane highway also for a length of 1,100Km. This motorway begins from the motorway of Karachi through M-9 up to Hyderabad (136Km). From Hyderabad this motorway stretches out towards Sukkur finishing the length of 345Km.

(c) Atualização de D.I Khan (Yarik-Hakla), Phase I to V.

The upgradation of D.I Khan motorway centres around the western portion of infrastructural development. It focuses on the construction of highway between Peshawar and Baluchistan through Hakla (close to Fatah Jang). The assessed cost to finish this venture is around US\$ 120 million covering a length of 290Kms.

(d) Faisalabad-Multan Motorway (M4), Package II e III.

The motorway developed under this venture is financed by ADB Bank, and is partitioned into 2 primary areas from Gojra to Khanewal. The main segment covers the

distance of 61 Kms while the other segment covers a distance of 65 kms. The project is under development and was completed by 2018.

(e) E-35 Expressway.

This project is important as it begins from Burhan on M-1 (Peshawar-Islamabad Motorway) and closures at Havlian. This 59.1 Kms, 6-lane highway will be finished in three stages. The main stage begins from Burhan to Jhari Kas (20Km), second stage from Jhari Kas to Sarai Saleh (19Kms) and the third stage from Sarai Saleh to Havelian (18 Kms).

Detail outline of the infrastructural projects are given as per Annex B to this document (CHINA-PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR, c2020).

(2) Ferrovias (ML-1 PROJECT..., 2021)

(a) The Chinese government is contributing US\$ 6.8 Billion in ML-1 tasks which includes the up-gradation and dualization of rail line track. This 1872-kilometer-long track from Peshawar to Karachi is relied upon to make 24,000 locations and would ensure a train speed upto 160 kilometres per hour. Railway line would be upgraded from Karachi to Peshawar and from Taxila to Havelian. This uber project is a glaring illustration of Pak-China kinship.

(b) As per official data, the limit of the railway line will likewise be expanded from 34 trains each day to 170 trains each day and speed of the cargo trains will be expanded upto 120 km/h. Pakistan Railways is a state institution but it has not been a benefit making element. Seeing its significance, the public authority has supported the tasks through Executive Committee of the National Economic Council (ECNEC) which is valued at \$ 6.8 billion. The initial tasks involve development of 527-km long rail-track associating Peshawar, Rawalpindi and Lahore (to be finished by 2024), second and third projects are generally aimed to overhaul 251-km long track among Lahore and Hyderabad and 740-kms railway line between Rawalpindi-Peshawar and Hyderabad-Multan separately.

(c) Pakistan will link China with West Asia and Africa through its Gwadar Port. All delivered products to and from China will be shipped alongside Pakistan's own merchandise. Ideal consummation of ML-I is in the best financial interests of Pakistan as much as it is for China. It is normal that railroad will give direct link to Chinese and East Asian products to Pakistani seaports at Karachi and Gwadar by 2030. Details are given as per Annex B (CHINA-PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR, c2020).

6 Special Economic Zones

a. Proposed SEZs

(1) China and Pakistan marked the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 2013 that filled in as the foundation of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor. The 2015 visit of Pakistan by the Chinese President Xi Jinping formalized CPEC for the distribution of 46 billion US\$. By the end of 2017, the aggregate of credits and speculation under CPEC has already crossed 60 billion US\$. Altogether, the initial activities under CPEC have effectively been operationalized and scores of projects in port, energy, railroads, streets, and so forth, are already in progress.

(2) To unite CPEC and improve reciprocal trade, the Chinese and Pakistani governments finished up, in the 6th Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC) held in December 2016, to set up Special Economic Zones. The number of such SEZs changed from more than hundred to forty-six. However, the Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform and the Board of Investment (that works under the Prime Minister Secretariat) proposed the development of nine modern zones in various sectors of Pakistan. Its framework is given in Annex C.

(3) The Special Economic Zones are viewed as the fundamental mainstays of China–Pakistan Economic Corridor. To accelerate the development of the proposed SEZs, four zones under CPEC were short-listed: ICT Model Industrial Zone (Islamabad), Allama Iqbal Industrial City (Punjab), Rashakai Economic Zone (KP) and Dhabeji (Sindh). Pakistan's Prime Minister Imran Khan has consented to different arrangements with his Chinese partners. Critically, one of the arrangements was identified with the development of Rashakai Economic Zone as a highest need. The work on additional SEZs is in also progress as per the second period of CPEC. The proposed SEZs offer various freedoms to both the Chinese and Pakistani government, firms and individuals.

b. Opportunities Offered

(1) Pakistan requires to establish a strong framework for its financial recuperation and recovery; the Special Economic Zones would give a wide scope of freedom to support improved industrialization. Pakistan is probably going to be well situated in the provincial and worldwide market because of these special economic zones. Though CPEC is relied upon to upgrade various parts in Pakistan and the western part of China, the development and streamlining of the proposed SEZs are probably going to help up industrial development inside Pakistan as well as in China.

(2) Proposed Special Economic Zones are expected to function as a solid financial impetus for Pakistani specialists to acquaint changes all together with enhance home-grown business climate, administering conduct, useful limit, send out base and improve business appeal for additional unfamiliar speculations. Moreover, industrialization with another face is probably going to make occupations for the country's enormous yet underemployed populace. The planned modern movement under SEZs overall and CPEC specifically would expectedly create work for the developing labour force.

(3) Secondly, the SEZs offer a chance to draw in Pakistani diaspora with their abilities and information alongside their gathered capital for more beneficial possibilities in the country. The SEZs can empower firms to agglomerate and get advantages of outer economies and will in this way give freedom to put homegrown businesses on a higher way of the expectation to absorb information.

(4) Thirdly, trade openings are probably going to force both the states to improve and reinforce reciprocal trade system. Also, inside SEZs, Pakistani organizations either contending or supplementing Chinese organizations would learn business and trade methods. Likewise, the international firms that are predominantly sorting out their creation and exchange progressively in search for the most un-exorbitant areas—Special Economic Zones can give a stage to receive the rewards of such freedoms that are in a real sense disregarded by the Pakistani specialists.

(5) Fourthly, the SEZs offer a chance to reinforce innovation and collaboration among Chinese and Pakistani organizations.

(6) Additionally, the SEZs give freedom to oversee work pooling, in this way reducing search expense and decreasing joblessness of talented work. Furthermore, while working inside a SEZ, there could be a solid chance of sustaining creative thoughts that can be dispersed across organizations and companies.

(7) In conclusion, the proposed SEZs, which would be operationalized in the second period of China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (2020–2025), convey the possibility to establish linkages with the gigantic Chinese market; and the Chinese SEZs.

7 Development of Gwadar Port (NAZ; ALI, 2018).

Gwadar port has been called as the "Gateway city" to CPEC and as "door to Asia." Gwadar Port is situated in the close vicinity of the Strait of Hormuz (20% of the worldwide oil supplies). Its development was finished in 2016 and as of October 2016, exchange freights from Kashgar have started to enter Pakistan, coming securely to Gwadar port. With respect to OBOR, Gwadar will assume a greater importance in the improvement of landlocked Central Asian countries. It is surveyed that on completion of Gwadar port, Pakistan will be the linchpin for the entire region. Thirty organizations have effectively put resources into free trade zone with an estimate of 474 million USDs. Total of 792.62 million USD fund has been assigned to the advancement of Gwadar with the following undertakings:

- a. Development of Gwadar University.
- b. Forty different organizations would be in Gwadar trade free zone focussing primarily on Stainless Steel and Petrochemical businesses.
- c. Special ventures will be initiated for the advancement of fisheries and foundation of boat making industry.
- d. For the upgrade of training, abilities and improvement of wellbeing, the professional and specialized organizations, clinics, primary and new water supply and its dissemination will be set up.
- e. Construction of additional terminals, East-Bay turnpike (to interface Gwadar with Makran seaside roadway) and Gwadar International Airport are the significant projects.

8 Employment Opportunities.

CPEC will give the necessary lift to Pakistan's economy. As per reports, a gradual increment of 3.6 units in speculation prompts the development of GDP by one unit. CPEC will prompt an expansion in GDP development rate at 1.5%.

9 Regional Security Threats to Pakistan

a. CPEC is a multi-billion venture focused on infrastructural network, further developing Pakistan's economy and transforming Gwadar into a regional economic hub. Different nations have shown interests in receiving its rewards. But, the project faces gigantic security challenges.

The changing environment of South Asia is especially unsettling for the security of CPEC. The region is seeing the dawn of Islamic State in Afghanistan, Baloch uprising and India's aggression towards Pakistan in general and CPEC in particular.

b. It is important to comprehend that stability situation of Afghanistan would have an overflow impact in Pakistan. Baluchistan is a crucial part of CPEC and has its boundary with Afghanistan also. Henceforth any insurrection in Afghanistan can (without much of a stretch) overwhelm Baluchistan and put the whole project in risk. Allow us to look at the basic security circumstances of South Asian and its likely effects on the China Pakistan Economic Corridor.

c. Given its trade war with China, USA has shown its disapproval to the CPEC right from its inception. USA has been very candid in its criticism of the mega project and has been putting diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to abandon the same. Pakistan however has maintained that it would at no cost step back from the project owing to its huge benefits for country's economy. In recent past, the relation between both the countries have not been ideal owing to the same reason

d. Security Situation in Afghanistan (Before Recent Taliban Take Over)

(1) The security climate of Afghanistan is one of the significant dangers to the CPEC because of Pakistan's close proximity and susceptibility to it. The dire test to the CPEC is the precariousness in Afghanistan¹⁸. The achievement of CPEC and OBOR extraordinarily relies upon harmony in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Western China. Islamabad and Beijing have worked with endeavours to carry Taliban to the arranging table by holding talks between the Taliban and US to stop the Afghan conflict. The security circumstance in Afghanistan is turning out to be more regrettable continuously as U.S. troops are likely to withdraw. The Afghan Taliban's are out of their hibernation and are currently administering the war-torn country. In addition, the possible influx of Afghan refugees has the possibility to compromise China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Since the declaration of CPEC in 2015, Beijing has been hoping to extend CPEC to Pakistan's adjoining nations, including Afghanistan. To prepare for it, Beijing has been pushing Pakistan to open its borders and increase bilateral relations with Afghanistan to expand CPEC. Because of Chinese and Pakistani efforts, Pakistan declared plans to build up to 12-line markets with Afghanistan, versus only six-line markets with Iran.

(2) Another threat to CPEC has emerged with the Baloch separatists tried to destabilize security situation inside Pakistan. They have already carried out assaults in Baluchistan against CPEC projects and the Chinese work force in location. Growing number of militants in TTP in Afghanistan with their underlying relationship with Baloch separatists is directly proportional to the increased Indian presence in Afghanistan. As of 2013, US described terrorist leader, Latif Mahsud (Pakistan Taliban Commander) was seized in Eastern Afghanistan (PAKISTAN..., 2013). As per US troops investigation, Latif Mehsud was returning from a meeting with Afghan intelligence officers to discuss the possibility of attacking various segments in Pakistan as per the requirements of NDS (Afghanistan Security Agency). Latif Mahsud was a close confidante of the Pakistani Taliban leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, whose group was killed thousands in its conflict with the Pakistani government. Similar shady relationship between the Afghan NDS and TTP has been found during the terrorist attack carried out on APS Peshawar which resulted in the shahadat of hundreds of children.

(3) The achievement of CPEC, and likewise, the whole BRI, presently relies upon a stable Afghanistan.

e. Rise of ISIS.

(1) In the midst of the peace talks, one more group has ascended in Afghanistan, Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). Its presence isn't just a danger to the Taliban and the united powers, but it also poses threat to all the neighbours. Pakistan and China welcomed Afghanistan to join CPEC, since its consideration would be useful not only for the entire region but particularly for Afghanistan. Notwithstanding, the demolished security situation in Afghanistan is a significant obstacle in way of Afghanistan's addition into CPEC. Pakistan has grave worries about the connection between the ISKP and Pakistani Taliban.

(2) In 2015, the ISIS representative officially declared the group's effort to use Afghanistan as a major landmark of the Islamic Khorasan territory that fuses into Pakistan and Central Asia also. Taliban rushed to denounce the group and brutal conflicts between the two have been incessant. Various Taliban fighters (ULLAH; AHMAD; KHAN, 2020) and officers absconded to the ISKP because of inner divisions (KHAN, 2019). Both rivals fought against each other in Kunar, Farah, Nangarhar, Helmand, and Kunduz from 2014 till the spring of 2015 and the two sides experienced substantial losses. These occurrences make it apparent that ISKP is presently another power in the Afghan conflict.

f. India's Hegemonic Design against CPEC

(1) Since the beginning of CPEC, Indians have stayed unfriendly to the thought and have fought on the basis of CPEC course passing through Gilgit-Baltistan. Kashmir is a region occupied by the Indians and one of the parts of Kashmir is Gilgit Baltistan. India claims it as its own which has been occupied by Paksitan. India's true stand spins around the declaration that CPEC is an infringement of its regional respectability. India is taking all customary and non-conventional actions to disturb the project.

(2) The capture of Indian covert agent Kulbhushan Yadhav (serving Indian Navy official) in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan on the charges of terrorism and spying for Indian Intelligence agency, RAW. The Indian naval officer has admitted to his involvement to subversive activities in Pakistan. The agent has testified for working closely for RAW and his contact with Baloch Separatists and militants to field sectarian violence in the province and the country. His admittance to channel in financial support to militants in Baluchistan and Karachi indicates the nefarious Indian designs to destabilize Pakistan at any cost. The alleged Indian terrorist had been travelling with a fake name of "Mubarak Hussain Patel" with an official Indian passport duly vetted by concerned Indian authorities. India admits that Kulbushan was an Indian citizens however deny the fact that he was involved in any terrorist activities and maintain that he had travelled to Iran from where he went missing. The Indian claim stands no frim grounds given the fact that he held a valid Indian document with a fake name.

(3) Moreover, India is also worried about China's maritime admittance to Indian Ocean. This load of realities demonstrates towards India developing hatred for CPEC. Even after such endeavours, various nations have communicated their desire to join the venture including Iran, Saudi Arabia and Central Asian Republics. This has limited India to utilize Baloch revolt as its intermediary to weaken the region and eventually damage CPEC.

(4) In the latest Indian Attempts to pitch obstacles, nine Chinese nationals were killed in a van transport blast in Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa area on July 14 while heading to the China-contributed Dasu hydropower project. As per investigation by Pakistan, connections between the terrorists and India's Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and Afghanistan's National Directorate of Security (NDS) were established in the terrorist attack (TRUTH..., 2021)21.

(5) In December 2019, a well reputed investigative agency, European Union Disinformation Lab, busted a well organised Indian operation, “Indian chronicles” aimed at targeting Pakistan with fake news with a view to influence international institutions. The network was active in Brussels and Geneva producing content to undermine the interests of Pakistan.

g. Terrorism and Religious Extremism Psychological warfare, hostility and extremism also pose genuine difficulties to CPEC. In excess of 63,000 security forces and regular people have been killed in Pakistan since 9/11 attack. At the point when religious extremism was at its full swing, China offered \$ 46 billion CPEC bundle, which has extraordinarily improved the environment in Pakistan. All things considered, the ever-existing Indian rivalry towards Pakistan’s development has ensured continuance of religious extremism and religious terrorism in some northern districts presenting enduring dangers to CPEC.

10 Conclusion

a. The smoothness execution / completion of CPEC projects in the stipulated time span relies on the timely mitigation of complex dangers of internal and external nature. Both Pakistan and China ought to offer the regional and international players to join in the mega project instead of opposing it. On the security front, notwithstanding affirmations by the Pakistani government and military, there are many difficulties ahead. Given the vastness of the project and Islamabad’s pained relations with India, flimsiness in Afghanistan, and tense Iran - the project’s speed might deteriorate given the host of customary and non-conventional security concerns. As the project advances, desirous neighbours and external obstructions are probably going to increase - - in this way aggregately intensifying the security measurement. Henceforth, if multipronged measures are not rigidly executed, challenges presented by radicalism and psychological oppression in Pakistan can’t be whisked away. CPEC is seen as a vehicle to encourage financial turn of events. In nutshell, political, social, and security challenges confronting CPEC and its execution can’t be left unaddressed:

(1) Foremost dangers are of psychological oppression, which has since long sabotaged Pakistan’s security and dependability.

(2) Second, a stable political framework is important for the achievement of CPEC. Pakistan has consistently battled for political solidness. Henceforth, Pakistan needs to guarantee steadiness at its homegrown front.

(3) Third, different social practices can prompt errors, and this can sabotage the execution of CPEC projects. For Chinese organizations to be fruitful in Pakistan, they should comprehend Pakistani culture and standards.

b. Getting CPEC away from sectarianism and extremism is the hardest test which is further accentuated by the China-Pakistan participation in the backdrop of growing strains among Pakistan and India. Nonetheless, Pakistan stays unflinching and at any point prepared in its determination to battle all types of sectarian and extremist dangers. Pakistan properly perceives the significance of its relations with China and CPEC is a worthwhile endeavour as far as financial improvements are concerned.

c. Thus, by mutually cooperating, the two nations can overcome these hindrances, given that they due care and consideration is given as expected of them. By proceeding to put stock in its common vision of territorial harmony and success, a hearty reaction to CPEC's current security challenges can extraordinarily lessen the potential security dangers as time goes on. This would fill in as immediate proof of how the battling of more non-customary dangers to territorial security can achieve a particular change within the global security structure.

d. In aggregate, the development of the "China-Pakistan Economic Corridor" is an imperative piece of China's "One Belt One Road" vision. It is of incredible importance for understanding China's trade outline, shielding public financial security, advancing the fast improvement of West China, keeping up with the dependability of all regions / neighbours, and setting up a land-based safe channel. Pakistan trusts CPEC will bring economic quality, infrastructural improvement, work openings, finishing the underestimation of distant, and more territorial, public, and sub-public availability. That is, CPEC is a chance not without challenges!

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
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Middle East's drone race and implication of weaponization on the security landscape


La carrera de los drones en Oriente Medio y la implicación del armamento en el panorama de la seguridad

Abstract: With the advancements in technological wars, autonomous systems and their impact on the future security infrastructure have increased the defense debate. Lately, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have fascinated experts, engineers, and scholars due to their application in security, lethal military operations, and emergency scenarios, where they can be deployed in hostile environments. The capacity of militarized drones to perform stealth reconnaissance missions and launch precision attacks opens an all-new debate on the future security environment of the Middle East region; hence, this research aims to identify the security benefits as well as the risks of utilizing UAVs, the level at which they have penetrated, and how they have been created controversies over the last decade in the region. The study will also utilize the qualitative research methodology in a cross-sectional approach to analyze and draw conclusions, this paper will try to put into context both strategic benefits and threats to aid future researchers identify implications of UAVs in the targeted region for further study.

Keywords: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.). Drones. Security. Warfare.

Resumen: Con los avances en las guerras tecnológicas, los sistemas autónomos y su impacto en la futura infraestructura de seguridad han aumentado el debate sobre la defensa. Últimamente, los Vehículos Aéreos No Tripulados (VANTs) han fascinado a expertos, ingenieros y académicos debido a su aplicación en seguridad, operaciones militares letales y escenarios de emergencia en los que pueden implantarse en entornos hostiles. La capacidad de los drones militarizados para realizar misiones de reconocimiento sigilosas y lanzar ataques de precisión abre un nuevo debate sobre el futuro entorno de seguridad de la región de Oriente Medio; Por lo tanto, esta investigación tiene como objetivo identificar los beneficios de la seguridad, así como los riesgos de la utilización de los vehículos aéreos no tripulados, el nivel en el que han penetrado, y cómo han estado creando controversia durante la última década en la región. El estudio también utilizará una metodología de investigación cualitativa con un enfoque transversal para analizar y extraer conclusiones, este artículo intentará contextualizar los beneficios estratégicos y las amenazas para ayudar a los futuros investigadores a identificar las implicaciones de los vehículos aéreos no tripulados en la región objetivo para un estudio más profundizado.

Palabras clave: Vehículos Aéreos No Tripulados (VANT). Emiratos Árabes Unidos (EAU). Drones. Seguridad. Guerra.

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1 Introduction

Artificial intelligence (A.I.) has been quite promising, deterministic, and capable of providing practical solutions to transform several sectors and industries globally. It has made autonomous technology possible, and its impact has been felt in the military and security sectors. It has remarkably changed the security dynamics in the Middle East, where the AI-powered, remotely operated UAVs have been used by foreign powers like the U.S. to fight the Islamic States and by regional powerhouses to serve their geopolitical ambitions. However, there is a lot of instability raised by the proliferation and diffused artificial intelligence inside these drones, causing differences among various strategic powers. Technology has played a significant role in aiding military actions for both lethal attacks and counter defence Measures.

Figure 1 - Global Hawk



Source: Guilmartins (2020).

In simple terms, a UAV can be defined as a device that can be guided remotely or operated automatically to a target position by its owner, works with electronic transmitters and remote controllers (BURTON, 2019). As far as the physical conditions of these aerial vehicles are concerned, they can be as big as the smallest helicopters, or they can be small that can be held in the hands (JOHNSON, 2019). Historically, the De Havilland DH.82B Queen Bee aircraft flown using a low-cost radio-control developed for aerial target

practice is considered by many to be the first modern drone. The first use in writing was in 1946 (CUSTERS, 2016) where the Austrian navy launched balloon carriers in Venice (HALLION, 2003). The technology was developed further during and after World War I and World War II and over the 1900s. Today, they are sophisticated aerial vehicles with cameras and sensors providing real-time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (I.S.R.) capabilities to multi-location receivers. They also have in-flight sensors and controls to perform manoeuvres around obstacles. In recent times, the use of UAVs for targeted military and terrorist attacks has risen. For example, the assassination of Briton Riyadh Khan by the Royal Air Force and the Assassination of Soleimani, Leader of the Quads force in Iran's revolution guards, etc.

Pesquisas recentes descobriram que os drones de combate são estratégicos para permitir que os Recent research has found that combat drones are strategic in enabling state actors to be more vigilant towards terrorism and security. The global market for drone procurement is anticipated to reach US\$21 billion by 2025, and the Gulf region is no exception. The United Arab Emirates, particularly, had been found encouraging towards building their technologies connected to the development of UAVs and improving regulations to deal with such devices on the border regions. China was one of the greatest dealers in this technology in the international markets by massively producing and supplying armed and surveillance drones for security watch purposes (OKPALEKE, 2021). The U.A.E.'s drone stock include Wing Loong" series and "Cai-Hong (CH) 4B" recognized under the Chengdu Aircraft industrial group and (C.A.S.C.) (BORSARI, 2021). The country also plans to buy 18 sophisticated armed MQ-9B aerial drones from the U.S. to be delivered by 2029.

The studies note that the vital function of drones coming into the gulf region is intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (I.S.R.), which promise to improve situational awareness on the battlefield; these war gadgets are scalable to meet various military applications. Many regional governments utilize the technology in their counter-terrorism campaigns and against domestic threats. For example, Saudi Arabia and U.A.E. had been deploying UAVs in their war against Houthis in Yemen. In addition to Chinese and U.S. systems, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh are strengthening their domestic UAV industries. They have invested in indigenous models such as the Emirate Yabhon series, produced by A.D.C.O.M. Systems, and the Saudi Saker family (BORSARI, 2021). Israel, by far, is the dominant country in drone technology innovation and exports up to 60% of global UAVs. Meanwhile, Turkey has been a big supplier of drones in Qatar, Tunisia, and Libya's internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA).

But in the Middle East, the proliferation of armed drones and missile capabilities, also by non-state actors, has quickly become a top issue on the agenda. The drone warfare that took off in 2002 turned out to be Pandora's box; as we see, now many types and sizes of drones are being deployed in various missions (REINL, 2019). Drones are rapidly becoming powerful tools in the Geopolitical dynamics, with countries like Iran developing indigenous strike-capable platforms for combat and direct attack purposes such as the Ababil-3T and its most combat-tested UAV - Shaed-129. Non-state actors' use of weaponized UAVs is a recent

phenomenon that has mainly taken place since August 2016 and almost exclusively only occurs in the Middle East (BENKENDORFER, 2021). The most recent attacks represent a considerable upgrade in the sophistication of the drones used by radical groups. UAVs offer non-state groups a tactical advantage and can dramatically improve their capabilities on the battlefield. The major challenges arising from these developments will deepen the intra-Arab divide and make the legal oversight of these drones difficult. Today, the UAVs has induced a transformation in the regional security realm by making it more asymmetrical.

2 Develop

2.1 Research Gap

This research study will explore and analyze the strategic and operational value of using these unmanned armed vehicles in the middle eastern countries in serving various purposes, including security, lethal, targeted assassinations, intelligence gathering, target finding, and lastly, in investigative procedures. However, the biggest reason why this advanced technology is accepted worldwide is the efficiency it comes with its cost, reliability over artificial intelligence, or the risk mitigation towards security risks, which have been preferred globally (BORSARI, 2021).

UAVs greatly changed the security environment in the 21st century, especially since the technology has reached the hands of non-state actors. A key aspect of this research paper will focus on the implications of drone technology in the regional security environment and evolving challenges and possible solutions to the strategic threat to stability and peace in the region.

2.2 Research Aim and Objectives

This research study aims to understand and investigate the security implications of UAV application in the Middle East, focusing on the U.A.E. The study aims to achieve the same through the following objectives:

- Identifying the security advantages and disadvantages of using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), in the Middle East, specifically in the U.A.E. region.
- Identifying the possible challenges, risks, and hazards, which can occur during the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV).
- To analyze the implications of using these automated armed aerial vehicles for political and security reasons and the impact of use by non-state actors.
- To analyze two case studies where the UAVs application was used for strategic advantage by state actors and non-state violent groups.

2.3 Research Questions


1. What are the consequences and evolving challenges of using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) for military and security-related activities?
2. What kind of advantages can be accomplished using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) in security applications?
3. What are the impacts of using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) on the political and security dynamics of the region?

2.4 Research Methodology

The research will be carried out on a desk-based methodology. It will use secondary data (qualitative data) to investigate and analyze the application and implications of UAVs in the Middle East region. The research Research Methodology strategy will adopt a cross-sectional approach due to the factors of time constraint and availability of data basically by secondary means. Levin (2006) explains that studies adopting a cross-sectional approach are carried out within a specific period. The reason behind selecting this method is the sensitivity of the topic and the availability of a vast database of related studies, which will be enough to research implications and strategies, and how they are being utilized around the Middle East. The research will have the following flow features:

1. Collecting data and information on UAVs' applications and security implications from various textbooks, journals, related research studies, online sources, organization websites, military & paramilitary websites, and government agencies.
2. Investigating, analyzing, and scrutinizing (critical observation) collected data and information from various textbooks, journals, related research studies, online sources, organization websites, military & paramilitary websites, and government agencies.
3. Researching and analyzing the concepts, functions, challenges, risks related to applications of drones from various textbooks, journals, related research studies, online sources, organization websites, military & paramilitary websites, and government agencies.
4. Relaying findings and making citations to references gotten from all the sources used in this study.
5. Concluding and making recommendations about the research study.

Figure 2 – Methodology workflow



Source: The author (2021).

2.5 Research Study Area

The research will focus on the Middle East region. The Middle East region refers to countries around the Arabian Gulf region; it spans from Western Asia toward Northern Africa to Egypt and Sudan. The region has over 18 countries, of which the majority belong to the Arab nations league and are Muslims by religion. Among nations in the Middle East are Saudi Arabia, U.A.E., Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Turkey, Yemen, Kuwait, Oman, Afghanistan, etc. The region is relatively characterized by the high level of conflicts, wars, and political instabilities, ranging from the Israeli- Arab conflict, Taliban-US wars, ISIS terrorism, Syria war, several assassination attempts, various suicide bombings, etc. Hence, the alert (security awareness) and the security risk around the region cannot be overemphasized. The study will analyze two case studies, focusing on the application of drones in operation, revealing where the technology (UAV device) has impacted positively and where it has impacted negatively in the Middle East and used by state and non-state actors.

Figure 3 – Map of the Middle East



Source: World Atlas (2021).

2.6 Literature Review and Theoretical framework

During the evolution phase of any technology, there are multiple elements to study to understand its value and impact on the world. Drones have continued to see advancements in the form and capabilities and their scope of use over the last century. But the rapid proliferation lately has raised a lot of debate among academics, government, security experts, and legislatures. This paper has drawn five elements that have influenced the development and proliferation of drone technologies in the Middle East: a technical element which is related to how improvements have been made to the working capabilities of UAV; the business element, which shows how much has been spent or made from selling and buying of UAV; the strategic element that analyses how countries leverage the technology; the legal element which relates to the judicial implications; and finally, the social element referring to the public safety and perception.


Practically, with the widespread instability and ongoing rift between countries in the Middle East, there have been reports of numerous UAV attacks in defense, assassinations, aerial bombing operations, and other minor conflicts, etc., and in (military operations) carried out by the government forces, anti-government groups, insurgents, terrorists.

Some experts and engineers have categorized UAVs/drones based on size, range, and configuration constraints. Figure 3 shows an overview of different kinds of UAVs categorized based on size, endurance, and configuration in a tabular form (PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY, 2018; MAIRAJ; BABA; JAVAID, 2019; SNOW, 2018).

In most instances, the application and type of operation are mostly dependent on the size. For example, larger drones are used in military and combat operations, while smaller drones are used for security surveillance, agriculture activities, academic research, wildlife monitoring, and entertainment. Similarly, in terms of endurance, the UAVs with greater endurance find their applications in surveillance missions. In contrast, the smaller UAVs work well for traffic monitoring and entertainment (MAIRAJ; BABA; JAVAID, 2019).

As far as applications are concerned, UAVs have performed many tasks in recent times in various sectors; it has been found to develop economy, create opportunities, assist in different kinds of surveillance, investigations, delivery services, traffic management activities, accessing of dangerous, hazardous environments, hitting of targets in inaccessible areas, visual capture of inaccessible area and timing constraint, locating of survivors and tracking of crime/criminals, etc.

Figure 5 – Commercial drone Hardware shipment, and total revenue (hardware + services), world market 2018-2025.



Source: Nguyen e Nguyen (2021).

2.8 Drone penetration in the region

This decade saw constant extensive, embracing and distributing unmanned aerial vehicles for recreational, commercial, civil, education, law enforcement, and national security applications, with an expected revenue/ income of about 12 billion dollars globally by 2021. Today, drone machinery is no longer constrained to its application in the military, entertainment, security surveillance, and meteorology. The massive availability of UAV toys has made it easy to be purchased for as little as hundreds of dollars nowadays for any intended purpose. Thus, the commercial drone market was projected to maintain overgrowing over the next few years while giving opportunities to several industry co-operators, attaining a global income/ revenue of \$13.7 billion by 2025 (NGUYEN; NGUYEN, 2021).

Saudi Arabia operates one of the largest and most modern in the Middle East and has purchased a few armed drones, particularly in China. The U.A.E. also has been developing drone capabilities, particularly with the Wing Loong series produced by the Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group. However, both countries have begun manufacturing their UAVs. So far, the acquisition of armed UAV capabilities has not altered how the country perceives the tools of airpower nor the sort of strike operations it conducts. Other middle nations have also embraced this move like Iran, Yemen, Iraq, U.A.E., Syria, Qatar, Kuwait, etc. However, due to ongoing conflicts and violent actors adopting the technology in the Middle East, the strategic importance of UAV platforms has expanded in the defense apparatus of numerous states. This tendency is particularly observable in the Middle East, where military UAVs accounted for about 82% of the overall regional drone market in 2019. Available data indicate that since the introduction of military UAVs in the MENA market space, regional countries (excluding Israel) have plausibly spent at least \$1.5 billion purchasing these platforms (BORSARI, 2021).

The UAVs has been used to carry lethal target attacks on rival nations' armies, terrorists, infrastructures, oil and gas facilities, and most often for assassination purposes by releasing or controlling them to target locations (WASSEF, 2021). They are also used to deliver military apparatus (guns, bullets, magazines, explosives, arsenals, P.P.E., and food & medical relief materials) to soldiers in inaccessible areas like bushes, mountains, desert areas during operations.

For example, Saudi Arabia has been heavily involved in campaigns against ISIS in Iraq as part of the US-led coalition for more than four years, as well as its fight against Iranian-backed rebel Houthi fighters in Yemen, prompting the Saudi military to acquire more drones recently, increasing its drone defense forces at the Sharora and Jizan air bases near the Yemen border. Thus, in the Middle East, the procurement of UAVs (armed drones) seems to have increased, with countries, driving prestige, lethal military attacks, a domestic defence industry as part of an ambitious wider national development plan (DORNER, 2021). Recently, armed UAVs have begun to change the way airpower campaigns are viewed in the Middle

East. Their massive acquisitions have been caused by an improvement in military operation's requirements due to conceptual future military and defence/ security operations, especially Iran, which openly show their massive purchase, production, and use of UAVs recently. Examples of the armed UAVs predominantly in the Middle East are Global Hawk, Wing Loong, CH-4B, Predator A, Harfang, RQ-7 shadow, Fire Scout, etc. (FAHLSTROM; GLEASON, 2012).

Figure 6 - Description of Wing Loong UAV.

Drone Wing Loong II	Range >1000km with SatCom, ~150km from Ground Control Station (GCS) if not
Type Medium Altitude, Long Endurance (MALE) UAV	Sensor Options Infra-Red (IR) and Electro-Optical (EO) cameras, and laser designator in sensor ball
Manufacturer Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group (CAIG)	Weaponry Up to 480kg of payload on twelve wing hardpoints which can include: AKD-10 air-to-surface anti-tank missile; BRMI-90 90-mm guided rocket; FT-7/130 130-kg glide bombs; FT-9/50 50-kg bomb; FT-10/25 25-kg bomb; GB-7/50 50-kg PGM; and GB-4/100 PGM
Number 5	
Endurance Up to 32 hours depending on payload	
Loaded Weight 4200kg	
Payload Capacity 480kg	

Source: RUSI (2021).

2.9 Advantages and disadvantages of UAVs

Most of the advantages of drones are drawn from their initial intended functions ranging from package delivery, surveillance, tracking of crimes and criminals, investigation activities, search activities, rescue operations, etc. The foremost advantage and reason for utilizing drones in the conflict region was its ability to access targets in dangerous areas without the risk of loss of lives during operations. Ann Rogers notes that drones offer three clear benefits over manned systems: Access, persistence, and accuracy. She notes in her analysis that drones have become an increasingly attractive option for policy-makers and military commanders alike while also concluding that drones cause significant loss of civilian life amid much controversy (ROGERS, 2014). They present invaluable real-time

intelligence akin to watching high-definition television and sensors that collect a wide range of signals intelligence. They also offer persistence in the target area and material flexibility to strike if the rules of engagement allow. These traits created an evolution in warfare in a permissive environment, allowing tracking of high-value targets and finishing with a precision strike upon meeting defined criteria (NEMETH, 2017). However, there are a few noted disadvantages and vulnerabilities, such as the inability to operate in a contested environment, potential susceptibility to cyber and electronic warfare attacks, and manpower and frequency spectrum intensity, to name a few.

Being a cheap tool that can be easily modified as a weapon has perhaps made Criminals and terrorist groups use UAVs. However, the biggest disadvantage in security applications remains their widespread availability and easy scalability. And recent years have seen the use of drones by terrorist organizations. The first successful and significant use of drones to attack rival forces by a non-state actor was carried out by Hezbollah agents in Syria in late September 2014 (ALMOHAMMAD; SPECKHARD, 2017). This has opened a new race for counter-drone technologies globally.

2.10 Challenges related to weaponization

Over the past few decades, UAV technology has been remarkable. But so has its accompanying controversy. Two major challenges are proliferation and weaponization by non-state actors like terrorists and radical groups.

Non-state Actors: It is believed that the Iranian regime provides drones used by Hezbollah, Hamas, and Houthi. Unlike these terrorist organizations, ISIS developed its drone program using off-the-shelf commercial drones. The group increasingly used drone-based operations, including surveillance, command and control, and attacks. These published pictures and videos were largely employed for propaganda purposes (ALMOHAMMAD; SPECKHARD, 2017).

However, the Houthi insurgency against the Government of Yemen and the Saudi-led coalition is unique in that weaponized UAVs give the insurgency an aerial advantage to strike from extremely long ranges. According to Metz, modern insurgencies play a strategic role. They are important because of the links to transnational terrorism and the ability to project long-range attacks using terrorist methods against countries that assist the government they are fighting (BENKENDORFER, 2021). The critical role drones played in the war on terror for the U.S. after 9/11 has transitioned to more complex dynamics; since the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the onset of the war on terror, weaponized drones have effectuated thousands of strikes in numerous countries spanning multiple continents during acclaimed non-international armed conflict with "Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associated forces" (SWAN, 2019). However, in an age of expanding weaponized drone proliferation in the region, where both state and non-state actors have been weaponizing the system, the legal and regulatory framework of such technology remains premature, raising the rule of law concerns, potentially setting a troubling precedent for other state and non-state actors.

Public safety: Despite their foremost advantage in saving lives of boots on the ground (soldiers) in dangerous missions and targeted strikes, UAVs have also raised questions around their capabilities to infer the right target. A Bureau of Investigative Journalism report says that from 2009 through 2015, at least 372 drone strikes were carried out in Pakistan/Afghanistan, resulting in at least 2,084 total casualties, of which at least 246 were civilians.

Cyber Threat: Even though drones present many gains, they also encounter cyber threats and cyber attacks such as global position system jamming and spoofing, Wi-Fi security issues, sensor security concerns, Bluetooth security, UAV network security, and malicious attacks. UAVs incorporate high-accuracy cameras, sensors, and recorders that store images, signals, and voice notes, respectively, both remotely and precisely. If hacked can lead to leakage of data and information important for national security.

2.11 UAVs: Strategic Aspect

As a result of the increased deployment of drones in the Middle East and Gulf area, there has been an increase in security difficulties, wars, conflicts, and terrorism. The Middle East is still a dangerous militarized region, with major wars and active combat zones dominating the region's political landscape. As a result, studying Middle Eastern foreign affairs has been dubbed the study of interstate warfare. So, most Middle Eastern literature has concentrated on the chronology of Arab-Israeli conflicts, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and Gulf War I, notably among battles of a preceding era: civil war in northern Yemen and Lebanese Civil War, Iraq revolution and Gulf War, Iran-Iraq war. These conflicts have served as barometers for gauging the region's history and importance (SASLI; JACOBI, 2002). Middle Eastern nations, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, use drones to tighten their control over mountain borders to deter infiltration, particularly by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, violent groups. The Experts say that Gulf countries' air force procurement is changing, responding to the region's dual-energy security goals and economic diversification. Gulf nations are increasingly looking to construct their national military-technical and industrial bases. These recent advances in the procurement of the Gulf Air Force will undoubtedly have a substantial influence on the global arms trade and accompanying power dynamics. Saudi Arabia's Saudi Military Industries Company is an important part of the Kingdom's Vision 2030, while the U.A.E. has announced the development of EDGE, the region's first military conglomerate. Qatar looks to be contemplating similar means of economic diversification, maybe with the assistance of Turkey. Security has also been improved for Gulf Arab states because of diversifying their defense industry. By not depending on just one partner, they've been able to gain the backing of many other nations, which has given them relative independence.

This year's drone attack targeting Saudi Arabia has again brought in political and security perceptions for the region and opened a discussion on its expansive impact on the global security sphere; the proliferation and the use of missiles and drones undermine the security and stability of the region.

With further advancements in UAV technology, their strategic role in the regional security and political role. According to reports, their strike and reconnaissance operations will also undergo some changes in the future and their strategic application. Suppose there's one lesson to be learned from Turkey's UAV activity in Syria. In that case, it's that costly UAVs/drones like the Anka or Orion shouldn't be used for close support because they're expensive, don't carry enough weapons, and are easy targets. Instead, we believe it would be more prudent to arm the large, heavy drones and have them fly at higher, safer altitudes, while smaller drones fly at lower altitudes searching for targets and attracting ground fire for the higher-flying drones to detect and then aim in the future (SARKAR, 2021).

O ataque de drones deste ano contra a Arábia Saudita trouxe novamente percepções políticas e de segurança para a região e abriu uma discussão sobre seu amplo impacto na esfera de segurança global; a proliferação e o uso de mísseis e drones minam a segurança e a estabilidade da região.

2.11.1 Case Study 1: State Action using UAV

For the past two decades, the Middle East and countries including the U.A.E., Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Turkey have been accumulating their military technologies, including UAVs from China and the U.S. Their primary advantage is the capability to be controlled remotely without risking and endangering the lives of a country's forces and military apparatus (KONDOCH, 2020). Turkey is slowly catching up to the United States and Israel as the world's leading sellers of surveillance drones by producing and exporting its indigenous systems. UAVs are considered a vital tool for military actions; however, they have become a powerful tool for political means.

The most impactful leveraging of UAV technology by a state actor was seen in how Turkey's mid-altitude drones Bayraktar TB2 and Anka played a central role in shifting Libya's civil war in favour of the Turkish-backed government based in the capital, Tripoli. A signal moment for the drone program occurred when 36 Turkish soldiers were killed in a Syrian airstrike (said by Turkey) in Syria's northern Idlib province. In this rebel stronghold, Turkey had deployed troops. It was the highest death toll Turkey's armed forces had suffered in decades. Hundreds of Syrian soldiers were "neutralized" following this by coordinated drone attacks using TB2, a strategic-class drone with high payload capacity, air-to-air and air-to-ground attack capabilities, mission interoperability with fighter jets and fully autonomous flight and take-off control systems, which provides the Turkish armed forces high-level ISTAR and strike capabilities that only Israel (and the U.S.) currently possess. Aerial of these attacks' footage posted by the ministry showed a series of targets as explosions destroyed them. But the crucial role these TB2 drones played in the six-week conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the disputed

territory of Nagorno-Karabakh brought new prominence to Turkey's drone program. Experts believe that Turkey's drone attack demonstrated a sophisticated capability to coordinate the growing drone fleet with other weapons, a conceptual breakthrough in the strategic advantage UAVs present on the battlefield.

UAVs have become useful tools for politicians by providing tangible results without any meaningful human engagement. The definition of war and politics was never so close as it is now to the Clausewitzian concept that "the war is the continuation of politics by other means." It is one of the greatest advantages of the future of war that limits human losses by allowing a machine to perform missions that would traditionally have involved troops or human pilots. This advantage will provide the impetus for the coming revolution in remote warfare. The apparatus's strategic, tactical and political efficiency has been demonstrated in three conflicts Turkey is currently involved in, the civil wars in Libya and Syria and, most prominently, the recent outbreak of war in Nagorno-Karabakh. UAVs are an essential tool for the regional states to keep watch in the sky for any military or security threats.

Figure 7 – Drone Turco Bayraktar TB2



Source: Daily Sabah, (2021).

2.11.2 Case Study 2: Drone Insurgency by Non-State Actors

In January 2019, armed drones owned by Houthis killed several Yemeni government officials. This was one of the initial cases where violent, non-state successfully deployed drones to carry out precision-targeted operations. The Houthis are an Iran-aligned armed rebel movement that has been fighting to overthrow the Yemeni government. The attack killed at least 6 Saudi-backed Yemeni forces members. The drone in question was an Iranian Ababil-T from the Ababil II family of drones, strike-capable platforms for combat and direct attack purposes. In September of the same year, the Houthis, with alleged support from Iran, were suspected of attacking the world's largest oil-processing facility in Saudi Arabia. While their precise tactical capabilities are unclear, the rebel group claims to possess several short-range ballistic missiles (S.R.B.M.s) with ranges from 30 km (18 miles) to 1,000 km (620 miles). With help from Iran, the group also claims to possess several indigenously produced drones ranging from 15 km (9 miles) to 500 km (310 miles). According to the U.N., the new long-range UAV - Samad can fly up to 1,200-1,500 km (745 to 932 miles) - putting Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Dubai within range.

The Islamic State made ground-breaking use of commercial drones in waging an aerial bombardment campaign against U.S.-led forces in their defense of Mosul in 2016 and 2017. However, they could also modify them to create a novel weapons system that many experts identified as the "most daunting threat". In the following year, I.S. conducted between 60 and 100 aerial drone bombing attacks a month. Most recently, in August, weaponized drones were used to attack Jizan Airport in Saudi Arabia. This resulted in regional and international countries voicing support for Saudi Arabia, retaliating with airstrikes against the militia group. Other non-state actors, such as Hezbollah, have also developed UAV capabilities. Besides I.S.R. and strike purposes, the I.S. and Hezbollah have also used drones for propaganda, indicating expansion of their drone capabilities in the future that could deeply impact the regional security landscape.

These recent developments have also resulted in civil-society groups, such as Human Rights Watch, and disarmament advocates calling for multilateral action to create stronger international norms on developing and using UAV technologies. Supporting such action, more research is needed on how non-state groups adopt technologies and how particular contexts encourage the development and use of these weapon systems.

3 Conclusion and Recommendation

The globe is now arriving in an era with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles/drones as technology in the race for creating a criterion for global competition. It massively influences how the military offense and defense mechanisms are being carried out during conflicts and rivalries. The middle east has been characterized heavily by a lot of its crises, conflicts, wars, and terrorism in recent times and before, most nations carried out their military offense and defense with the application of lethal UAV, hence the reason for the drastic demand for these devices around the geography of the study area. Nonetheless, the propagation of lethal drones has been escorted by its rapid adaptation to new, and perhaps surprisingly, civilian commercial drones, which have altered the market dynamics of the device in terms of production, demand, and supply. The world is seeing an increase in demand for UAVs for commercial/ business applications and its development of new types and forms to meet demands in various sectors and industries, especially the military sector. This has given rise to the massive investment being inputted into the drone business. The Middle East nations are now following the pathway of China and Russia in outlying billions of investments to meet up with the United States' investment in research, production, and development for UAV/drone technology. The growing use of UAVs by non-state actors pose a global threat as these UAV technologies are scalable. There is a need for multilateral dialogue and action to contain drone use within the hand of state actors and unified action for counter-UAV technologies. The high complexities in the regional power dynamics have also motivated major states to improve security self-reliance. The regional states will likely keep investing massively in the military complexes of the international powers that collectively ensure their security, which also means the pervasiveness of UAV use by criminal and violent radical groups. Therefore, the study will recommend more international and national policies to regulate the production, sale/purchase, and use of UAVs as a lethal weapon via regulations, fines, penalties, and sanctions, to control how UAVs are used. And multilateral dialogue and action by regional and international security players in fighting the drone menace. This will assist against the uncontrollable use of technology for ill-gains and crimes against humanity.

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Strategic communication as a tool for Brazilian military diplomacy


La comunicación estratégica como herramienta para la diplomacia militar brasileña

Abstract: This is an article about Strategic Communication and its contribution to military diplomacy. It is based on documentary surveys of works and books acquired from authors in Brazil and abroad. The specific objectives of the research were: 1. To draw an overview of Brazilian Military Diplomacy; 2. Describe a Strategic Communication within the Brazilian Army, USA and Russia; 3. Raise tools for the integration of Strategic Communication with Brazilian Military Diplomacy. The faith study was divided into three stages: In the first and second, the descriptive method and bibliographical research were used, on Strategic Communication in Brazil and abroad and Military Diplomacy. In the third stage, through a comparative analysis, the tools that provide this integration were analyzed, concluding on the possible benefits of this proposal. At the end, the work presents premises for working together on Diplomacy with Strategic Communication, strengthening the Defense mentality in the country. Keywords: Strategic Communication. Diplomacy. International relations.

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Resumen: Se trata de un artículo sobre la Comunicación Estratégica y su contribución a la diplomacia militar. Se basa en levantamientos documentales de obras y libros producidos con autores de Brasil y del exterior. Los objetivos específicos de la investigación fueron: 1. Trazar un panorama de la Diplomacia Militar Brasileña; 2. Describir la Comunicación Estratégica en el ámbito del Ejército Brasileño, EE. UU. y Rusia; 3. Levantar herramientas para la integración de la Comunicación Estratégica con la Diplomacia Militar Brasileña. El estudio se dividió en tres etapas: en la primera y en la segunda, se utilizó el método descriptivo y la investigación bibliográfica, sobre Comunicación Estratégica en Brasil y en el exterior y sobre Diplomacia Militar. En la tercera etapa, a través de un análisis comparativo, se analizaron las herramientas que brindan esta integración, concluyendo sobre los posibles beneficios de esta propuesta. Al final, el trabajo presenta premisas para trabajar en conjunto la Diplomacia con la Comunicación Estratégica, fortaleciendo la mentalidad de Defensa en el país.

Palabras Clave: Comunicación Estratégica. Diplomacia. Relaciones Internacionales.

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1 Introduction

Strategic communication can be defined as communication that is integrated, synchronized and aligned with the actions carried out by an organization to achieve its goals. It presupposes the combination of practices adopted, in the context of traditional social communication, with systematized institutional relations and with the use of digital media, including social media and networks. Its field of activity is associated with the strategic environment.

Diplomacy, understood as a peaceful instrument of the foreign policy of a state, operates, by nature, in a multifaceted and plural field of action, characteristic of international politics. Therefore, the context of contemporary international relations gives intense dynamics to diplomatic activity, increasingly demanding preparation and specialization in dealing with issues linked to political, economic, military, social, environmental and technological agendas, among others. Military diplomacy, understood as the nonviolent employment of military means and resources, is a segment of the State's external activity. This article aims to look at the role of military diplomacy, highlighting its main characteristics and its relevance as a foreign policy tool.

It is verified, therefore, that Strategic Communication and military diplomacy are excellent tools for action in the informational dimension, each with its own field of action. Military diplomacy oriented through a well-defined foreign policy, associated with strategic communication at the highest level of the institution, interacting with existing actors in the strategic environment to follow and conduct actions focused on the defined national objectives.

2 Methodology

This paper is based on documentary research of works and books produced with authors from Brazil and abroad. It is an article of national scope, with the use of national and international references, of a quantitative and qualitative nature, with research in permanent archives and interviews inside and outside the Institution. The specific objectives of the research were: 1. Outline an overview of Brazilian Military Diplomacy; 2. Describe Strategic Communication within the Brazilian Army; 3. Raise the aspects for an integration of Strategic Communication with Brazilian Military Diplomacy. The study will have a quantitative and qualitative character and will be divided into three stages. In the first one, based on a descriptive method and a bibliographical research, the Strategic Communications of Brazil, if they exist, will be confronted with the form of application of this instrument in the United States of America and Russia. In the second stage, the aspects that need to be followed to enable its integration with Military Diplomacy will be identified. In the third stage, premises will be raised to provide this integration and concluding on the possible benefits of this proposal. This integration will provide tools to achieve, more efficiently, the interests of the Forces and, with that, obtain a consequent expansion of the mentality of Defense in Brazil and its strengthening abroad.

3 Diplomacy

Taking the text from a Portuguese language dictionary, Diplomacy in its broadest sense is:

1 A Science that deals with international relations and interests between States. 2 Activity involving international relations through rulers, embassies in another country or any other international body. 3 Art of preserving the rights and interests of the State in a negotiation with foreign governments (FERREIRA, 2008, p. 320).

Observing the meaning of diplomacy described above, it is observed that there is no consensus about its concept, since it is treated both as science and as art. The same is true in International Relations, in which several authors and scholars seek to define what comes to be diplomacy.

However, a consensus has been established that diplomacy in a broader sense is the relationship between States. In Antiquity, messengers and emissaries were widely used, sending communications from their kingdoms to other peoples. At that time, they were already representatives of their monarchs and possessed some privileges and immunities.

Thus, diplomacy sought to reconcile through dialogue and persuasion the different interests of States, always avoiding the use of force and military power (WATSON, 1982).

In the 20th century, the increase in the number of States, in interdependence and in agendas of global interest, generated a new development of diplomacy. The new and complex environment of international relations brought a new dynamic in the discussion of political, economic, military, social, environmental and technological agendas, among others, demanding a rapid adaptation to the reality of international society (SILVA, 2014).

Among the experts studied, common points for the function of diplomacy were found. Among them, negotiation, communication and information were listed as the most important.

In addition to these functions, it is important to highlight the official work of diplomacy provided for by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, promulgated through a Presidential Decree of 1965, namely: to represent the Sending State before the Receiving State; to protect, in the Receiving State, the interests of the Sending State and its nationals, within the limits permitted by international law; to negotiate with the government of the Receiving State; to learn, by all lawful means, about the existing conditions and developments of events in the Receiving State and to inform the government of the Sending State in this regard; and promote friendly relations and develop economic, cultural and scientific relations between the Sending State and the Receiving State.

Within this process of conducting the various international agendas, it becomes too costly to centralize and coordinate the implementation of the country's foreign policy, however great the effort of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SILVA, 2014). The State then seeks to share its task with other national agents, delegating many of its duties.

Therefore, the main role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the conduct of foreign policy is verified, but the existence and use of sectoral diplomacy is admitted, which are carried out

by other government agencies. Each specific governmental agent can relate directly to its counterparts from other countries in the international scenario (SILVA, 2014).

Among the sectoral diplomacy carried out by specific government agents, the one carried out in the environment of the ministries of defense can be highlighted. It is called defense diplomacy or military diplomacy.

3.1 Military Diplomacy

In the history of mankind, the armed forces have always been seen as elements of force and coercion of States (BARSTON, 2006). They have always been an instrument of imposing the will of the most powerful nations upon the weakest. Foreign policy can make use of war as a final instrument of achieving interests not achieved by diplomacy (HILL, 2003).

During the Cold War period, the first references to military diplomacy appear. At that time, however, this diplomacy was basically in the form of military cooperation, with the aim of forming strategic alliances within each of the two opposing power blocks, the American and the Soviet. These alliances basically sought to “increase military capabilities, counterbalance threats from the opposite pole, maintain spheres of influence, support friendly governments in the internal control of the State and conquer markets for the arms industry” (SILVA, 2014).

With these objectives in mind, military diplomacy contributes to foreign policy with activities such as political, security and strategic defense dialogues; defense agreements and treaties; transparency of intentions in relation to national defense policy; assistance in maintaining the government’s legality and legitimacy; exchange of military personnel and insights; participation in UN peacekeeping operations; strengthening defense relationships to promote influence; strengthen its own defense capabilities in the areas of defense equipment; friendly assistance to foreign countries to develop their defense capabilities; make international military commitments to improve its own military capability; promote military and defense interoperability; assignment of defense attachés to other countries; and specific defense diplomacy actions. (MUTHANNA, 2016).

Brazilian military diplomacy in the Cold War period, as in the rest of the world, was marked by the realism that predominated in international relations at that time. In the 1970s, there was an approximation between Brazil and Paraguay in the construction project of the Itaipu Hydroelectric Dam, a work that followed the national developmentalism that characterized the military governments in Brazil. The biggest obstacle to the Itaipu agreement was still Argentina’s mistrust, which saw the work as a threat to the balance of power in the region. It is necessary to note that the rapprochement between Brazil and Paraguay began before Itaipu, still in the government of Getúlio Vargas, in 1942, with the creation of the Brazilian Military Mission of Instruction in Paraguay (VASCONCELOS, 2011). It was military diplomacy acting as a driving tool of the country’s foreign policy. During the Figueiredo government, in 1979, Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay signed the tripartite Itaipu-Corpus agreement, which made the construction of the hydroelectric dam possible. In this context of greater cooperation, the process of integration of the Southern Cone region began (LANDIM, 2014).

In this favorable environment for dialogue, new bilateral agreements were signed between Argentina and Brazil, with the aim of eliminating antagonisms and fostering mutual trust between nations. The main one was in the nuclear area, which was in full expansion in the 70s and 80s. At that time, there was clear concern that the nuclear development of the two countries could raise possible animosities and the nuclear race in the region. Thus, on May 17, 1980, the Cooperation Agreement for the Development and Applications of the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy was signed (AGUILLAR, 2010). This convergence in the nuclear area is fundamental and embryonic for what would become the process of creation and integration of MERCOSUR.

The end of the Cold War in the 1990s brought a new environment for military diplomacy. A context permeated by realism, in which the military power that was used as a factor of coercion and deterrence, gives way to relations marked by cooperation, influenced by liberalism in international relations and by the multilateralism promoted by the UN. In the Southern Cone, regionalism and cooperation were fostered by the implementation of MERCOSUR and were succeeded by other bodies, such as UNASUR, created in 2008.

The beginning of the 21st century and the challenges of an increasingly global world brought, as already mentioned, significant impacts on Brazilian Foreign Policy (BFP). According to the BFP, the international order must be based on democracy, multilateralism, cooperation and the pursuit of peace between States. In this way, it defends “the reformulation and democratization of decision-making bodies of international organizations, as a way of reinforcing the peaceful settlement of disputes and their trust in the principles and norms of international law” (BRASIL, 2013).

The premises indicated by the BFP then start to guide Brazilian diplomatic actions and also the country's military action abroad. The Brazilian Army, through the Guidelines for the Activities of the Brazilian Army in the International Area (DAEBAI in Portuguese), elaborated in 2013, seeks to guide and subsidize its actions in the international field, as well as its military diplomacy, adapting to the demands of the current BFP. In the view of the institution, military diplomacy is:

[...] the set of cooperation actions in the Defense Area, carried out between friendly countries, including the establishment of military distances, bilateral conferences, combined military actions, exchanges between educational establishments, among others (BRASIL2013, p. 19).

The guideline also specifies what would be military diplomacy in the field of defense, that is, defense diplomacy: “In the field of Defense, Military Diplomacy aims to promote exchanges and cooperation, building relationships of mutual trust, in order to collaborate with security, development, regional stability and world peace” (BRASIL, 2013, p. 19).

The guideline continues to explore the field of military diplomacy, presenting its purposes:

[...] maintain a regular dialogue on bilateral and multilateral issues of mutual interest in the field of Defense, fostering cooperation, integration and mutual trust with the armies of other countries; contribute to maintaining a stable global order, through participation in humanitarian aid and peace operations under the aegis of international and regional organizations; support and contribute to the efforts of the armies of friendly countries to consolidate their structures; facilitate the achievement of a legal framework that regulates the development, in the field of Defense, of bilateral and multilateral relations; and expand opportunities to strengthen the national defense products industry, to reduce technological dependence and overcome unilateral restrictions on access to sensitive technologies (BRASIL, 2013, p. 20-21).

Going forward, the guideline details the actions to be carried out by the Force through military diplomacy:

[...] to deepen the relationship in the military field with the countries of greatest interest to Brazil; contribute to the defense of the interests of the Brazilian Army, through military attachés, liaison with foreign attachés accredited in Brazil, participation in international events, visits by Brazilian military authorities abroad and the reception of foreign military authorities in Brazil; assist in projecting a positive image of Brazil in the concert of nations, particularly by contributing to international peace and security and by participating in relevant international bodies; advise the heads of Brazilian diplomatic missions abroad; and coordinate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), through the MD, the necessary measures so that the diplomatic work, on issues related to the Force, accurately reflects the interests of Defense. (BRASIL, 2013, p. 21).

Finally, DAEBAI presents the concept of “Strategic Preclusion” as a permanent goal of military diplomacy:

Military diplomacy should favor Strategic Preclusion, which encompasses the set of actions aimed at the prevention and neutralization of aggressions that would make the use of military force by Brazil imperative in conditions that would potentially escalate the situation to a more serious crisis. Thus, it may include specific cooperation programs for a particular country, defining differentiated strategies for the performance of military attendants and for the provision of exchange opportunities subsidized by Brazil (BRASIL, 2013, p. 24).

Participation in peacekeeping operations under the aegis of the United Nations, as one of the main activities of military diplomacy, is a common point for virtually all its scholars and the guidelines of the various Armed Forces. It is an important foreign policy tool for three reasons: based on the peace discourse, it builds a positive image before the international community; it allows the expansion of strategic influence at regional and global levels; and it enables the expansion of capacities and learning (SINGH, 2011). Aware of these premises, Brazil, since 1947, participates in UN peacekeeping missions. More recently, in 2004, the country gained notoriety for having taken command of one of these missions, MINUSTAH in Haiti. This prominent position assumed in United Nations missions meets Brazil's wishes for the reform of the UN Security Council and its old plea for a permanent seat on the aforementioned council.

A last aspect deserves to be analyzed in military diplomacy, given its value as a factor of rapprochement and facilitator of relations between nations: the common military language and the homogeneity of military culture around the world. Just as there is an international diplomatic community, it is possible to recognize an international military community with common culture and thoughts, favoring dialogue between the militaries of different nations.

Of course, there are also various divergences and animosities between armies of different nations, provoked by historical disagreements or recent conflicts. However, in the field of defense diplomacy there is an understanding facilitated by a common environment and culture, "which contributes to creating and maintaining a global network of partners in the military" (REVERON, 2010).

Similarities can be verified in the form of organization of military institutions, in the sharing of values such as hierarchy and discipline, in the employment of often similar doctrines, since some armies literally "copy" their doctrines from others considered more powerful. Even the visions and demands are similar, as there is a constant search and commitment to the objectives of their States, with the strengthening of the means of defense and in the search for even better provisions. The various exchanges of military personnel in the study centers and training schools enable the exchange of information and doctrines, strengthening the diffusion of military culture (SILVA, 2014).

Among the attributes of the military professional and that define their culture, three are considered among those common to practically all countries: "capacity – acquired through extensive education and experiences; corporatism – as the conscience of the group of professionals; and responsibility – towards society as a whole" (HUNTINGTON, 1996).

Janowitz (1971), in turn, presents five common characteristics of the military professional: "important social skills, proper organization, autonomy and proper rules, ingrained code of ethics, and well-defined system of obligations". This common military identity makes military diplomacy a valuable aid of Foreign Relations and that well directed through effective strategic communication becomes a powerful tool.

4 Strategic Communication

With the current trend of globalization, modern organizations began to invest in communication processes to adapt to the new reality. In this scenario, information has become indispensable and determining strategic element, because it produces economic, political, social and cultural impacts for organizations (OLIVEIRA; PAULA, 2007). For Cabestré, Graziadei and Polesel Filho (2008), only Strategic Communication presents the ideal conditions to manage the flow of information and provide favorable results to the organization.

For Pereira (2014), Strategic Communication consists of a set of planned, well-defined and structured actions so that the objectives of the organization are met. This communication leads to changes in attitudes and changes in the behavior of the members of the organization and guides them in such a way that they feel motivated and integrated so that the goals are achieved. Communication involves the organization in its entirety – directors, employees, associates, volunteers, etc.

Strategic Communication is a way of agglutinating the different communication actions to achieve the strategic objectives of the company, thinking more about the objectives than the actions, corresponds to the survival and sustained success of a company (ZERFASS et al., 2018).

Strategic Communication does not participate in the entire business strategy, but rather in that part related to the relationship with stakeholders to increase their value, in terms of image and reputation (intangible assets), contributing to success in business objectives.

Strategic Communication is not integral or global communication that is defined by all communications actions taken (internal and external), but can be defined as communication carried out by the objectives to be achieved and decisions to be made in this direction.

Strategic Communication is defined by two terms: long-term and omnidirectional *communication* (VAN RULER, 2018) and *strategy*, through tactics and plans (CARRILLO, 2014).

In this context it is important to define strategy as being associated with strategic thinking, the way to achieve long-term goals, predicting scenarios, threats, reactions and other factors such as, even, bad luck. Strategies rely on tactics that must be employed through the Coordination of actions and available resources to obtain an advantageous position, through action plans. The strategy must be thought out in the long term (VAN RULER, 2018).

According to Carrillo (2014), Strategy should have some focal points: the management of communication; Stakeholders; models capable of measuring the benefit of Strategic Communication; the demand for new professionals; and the integration of internal and external communication.

A director of Strategic Communication must master some areas: information relations; corporate social responsibility (**intangible assets**); knowledge management; brand management; corporate culture; strategic planning and management; crisis communication; and image and reputation creation.

In possession of all the concepts and definitions, previously described, one can define strategic communication as **a long-term communication management effort carried out around an organization, to ensure that relationships with all stakeholders linked to it**

positively contribute to achieving the objectives defined in the company's global strategic vision (author's emphasis). The pursuit of such goals will set in motion a mechanism of tactical actions that will unfold in communication action plans, with a defined temporality, to achieve the defined goals.

Strategic Communication serves to help the management of intangible assets, such as image and reputation, among others. It is only possible to be done in the long term, since it does not pursue partial results but global ones and that consolidate the values of an organization (CARRILLO, 2014).

4.1 Strategic Communication in the Brazilian Army

The Brazilian Army is currently implementing strategic communication within its scope, however, this issue within the Force is still incipient. The Army Politics and Senior Management Course, in 2021, is presenting the following proposal:

It is proposed that the Strategic Communication of the Brazilian Army is the unit of actions, words and images in line with its Mission, Vision, Values and its Strategic Objectives, in peace or in operations, in an aligned, integrated and synchronized way, aiming to reach its audiences of interest, producing long-term effects (A COMUNICAÇÃO..., 2021, p. 353, author's emphasis).

Currently, Strategic Communication in the Brazilian Army assumes its own characteristics, facilitated by the projection and capillarity of the Force at the national level.

The strategy is focused on strengthening the image of the Force, through the presentation of the values and deliveries of the Brazilian Army, through the use of media, especially digital media.

But it is “stagnant” information, based on operations that stand out on the national scene and in the interest of the population, it does not work in the long term, and it resents the lack of greater alignment and integration of Strategic Communication actions, which requires a structural and cultural approach to the implementation and systematization of this important process of our Force, focused also on the internal public and based on the monitoring and evaluation of various indicators.

It is noteworthy that the fundamental of Strategic Communication is to work with an alignment of the aspects of the Social Communication System with the work developed by the Institutional Relations team, to allow the transmission of messages from the highest management by all levels of the Organization, reaching its internal and external stakeholders, in the three branches of Power, in other Institutions and before society as a whole, strengthening the Institution's image and credibility, contributing to the achievement of the Organization's objectives.

From the above, it is verified that within the Brazilian Army, it is necessary to improve and create a strategic communication mentality, so that one begins to work and use this important strategic tool to conduct actions within the Force.

4.2 Strategic Communication in Other Countries

The United States of America establishes in its doctrine, that Strategic Communication is composed of four main components: information operations, psychological operations, public diplomacy and public relations. When working with these components, it turns out that first, it is necessary to inform, influence and persuade audiences at home and abroad, whether friendly, adverse publics or simply the general population. Second, it is necessary to carry out the coordination of actions through the various government agencies to prevent what the US Army calls “information fratricide”. Third, the need to communicate strategically is intrinsically dependent on the ability to communicate actions to all affected or interested audiences, ensuring that these actions are communicable by themselves, that is, that these actions complement and support the achievement of strategic objectives.

In his book on Strategic Communication, Christopher Paul defined Strategic Communication as support for the national strategy and not as an essential element of that strategy. Paul highlights an essential relationship between national strategy and Strategic Communication:

We have to clearly define the national objectives, which contains the intermediate objectives and related support objectives, all properly aligned up to the operational and tactical levels. With these clear goals, it is easy to determine which goals can be achieved through influence and/or persuasion, and which can be supported by such efforts. In pursuit of these goals, the appropriate priority is given to influence. Not that influence is always the main means to achieve the objective set by the policy, but it will always be considered as a means to achieve a policy or operation, and will be the priority means when it is appropriate for this (PAUL, 2011, p. 174).

Therefore, the important relationship between strategic communication and the strategic objectives of an Organization and/or Country can be deduced. Strategic Communication not only communicates strategic goals, it creates a favorable environment for achieving Strategic Goals.

The Strategic Communication thinking of the US Department of Defense is very advanced and has established that:

Strategic Communication is the alignment of multiple lines of operation (for example: policy implementation, public relations, movement of forces, information operations, etc.) which together generate effects that support national objectives. Strategic communication essentially means sharing meanings (i.e. communicating) in support of national objectives (i.e. strategically). This involves listening as much as transmitting, and applies not only to information, but also to physical communication (action that conveys meaning) (UNITED STATES, 2009, p. II).

As an inseparable part of national strategy, Strategic Communication cannot be reactive and led by military personnel. It must be long-term and involve the entire government structure.

Finally, for Americans, Strategic Communication must be truly national, it must not only reflect government policy, it must contain a national narrative, owned and endorsed by the whole society.

In Russia, Strategic Communication is the State's projection of certain values, interests and strategic objectives into the consciousness of national and foreign audiences.

In Russia, the three main aspects of its Strategic Communication that are interrelated are: Public Relations, Public Diplomacy and Information Security Systems.

In relation to Russian public diplomacy, it enriches diplomacy, marked by the dominance of official interaction of professional diplomats. For the most part, public affairs aim to inform and influence Russia's population and mass media. Public diplomacy is used to affect attitudes towards Russian Foreign Policy and national interests – preferably to gain broad support in both spheres. On the other hand, public relations includes activities of direct contact with citizens, the public, journalists and other opinion makers outside the country.

In the Russian system, there is a strong strategic alignment, from the political/strategic levels to the operational and tactical levels to achieve the intended effects of Strategic Communication.

In short, there are common parts between the communication strategies by the countries covered above. Both use Strategic Communication to act on the designated publics with all elements of National Power, assisting in the achievement of the defined strategic objectives.

5 Integration of Strategic Communication with Military Diplomacy

Strategic communication can be defined as a set of processes created to make communication between members of the same institution or company, more efficient in different channels and for different audiences, with support for the achievement of its global objectives.

In an organizational context, strategic communication is a practice focused on valuing and propagating business culture and its values to internal and external customers.

A strategic communication planning involves the segmentation of stakeholders, the systematic evaluation and research of their area of activity and the use of financial, technological and human resources for the development of the strategy to be executed.

Military diplomacy refers to all external activities related to national security and the Armed Forces. Specifically, it refers to the Foreign Relations that the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces conduct or participate in.

In a broader sense we can say that military diplomacy is the employment of armed forces in operations other than war, based on their experience and discipline, to achieve national and international goals.

Thus, the use of strategic communication planning, seeking to work on the national objectives outlined, supported by a military diplomacy already established in optimal relationship and the work developed at the national and international level carried out by the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defense, will enhance the pursuit of the objectives and decision-making in the direction that the country wishes to follow.

The Ministry of Defense produced, with the collaboration of diplomats, the National Defense Policy and the National Defense Strategy, which allowed to coordinate the actions of Defense and diplomacy in line with Brazilian foreign policy.

This legislation has provoked the production of several guidelines, such as the DAEBAI by the Brazilian Army, as well as concrete results in interministerial actions and coordination. Several high-level meetings have taken place between the portfolios of Defense, Foreign Relations and the Office of Institutional Security, seeking to align and synchronize the main activities to be carried out by the aforementioned ministries and that cooperate for the success and achievement of foreign policy objectives.

Therefore, strategic communication can and should be considered as an important integration tool because, through this communication planning, based on the existing and well-built legislation between military and diplomats, and the construction of a military relationship, supported by premises raised after careful evaluation and research work in areas of interest, such as requests for cooperation and exchanges with foreign Armed Forces, diplomacy will have one more tool to achieve and develop its national foreign policy objectives.

6 Proposals For the Use of Strategic Communication as a Tool for Increasing Military Diplomacy

From the analysis carried out, considering the importance of the subject and with the aim of enabling the increase of military diplomacy, premises were elaborated to achieve a strategic communication planning:

Table 1 – Premises for Strategic Communication for military diplomacy

Premises for strategic communication for military diplomacy	
01	Strengthen and preserve the image of the Country.
02	Be guided by alignment, integration and synchronization, with centralized planning at the highest decision-making level.
03	All actions of the Ministry of Defense should be supported by the pillars of credibility, transparency and opportunity.
04	Disseminate, encourage and strengthen the Defense Industry.
05	Prospective vision, with timely action.
06	The Strategic Communication must be dynamic and integrated with all three Forces.
07	The MD is a unique organizational institution.
08	The Strategic Communication must be led from the time of peace.
09	Disseminate and strengthen the principles that govern the country's international relations provided for in Art. 4th.
10	Strengthen the image of the Country in its defense and protection of the environment and the search to comply with the agreements established by employing, the MD and its Armed Forces.

Source: A comunicação... (2021).

These assumptions can serve as the basis for proposing an effective system of Strategic Communication within the Ministry of Defense to integrate with our defense diplomacy.

7 Conclusion

The final objective of this work was to present diplomacy limiting its “sectoral” branch of military diplomacy, integrating it with strategic communication, which would provide tools to more efficiently achieve the interests of the Forces and, with that, obtain a consequent expansion of the Defense mentality in Brazil and its strengthening abroad.

In short, military diplomacy is a branch of diplomacy that employs military means in actions in the national and international environment, mainly in non-war operations, to help achieve the objectives outlined by foreign policy.

Strategic Communication should be understood as a broader approach and at the highest level in a joint action of government, driven by interagency processes and integration of efforts focused on effectively communicating the national strategy.

From the publication of documents such as the National Defense Policy and the National Defense Strategy, prepared by the military and diplomats, actions and coordination for Defense and diplomacy have been established, which can be very well explored through higher-level strategic communication, to strengthen cooperation ties between countries, establish international partnerships, develop the defense industrial base, among other examples.

This article, in analyzing military diplomacy and strategic communication, sought to establish a convergent point between the two subjects, proposing at the end premises for the achievement of strategic communication planning to strengthen military diplomacy.

Finally, strategic communication is an important tool that governments can use to disseminate and strengthen their foreign policy. This communication, carried out in a planned way, working with its public of interest, includes as central ideas the influence or change in behavior and the focus on matters of interest to national politics, thus creating a favorable environment to be explored by military diplomacy.

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Special Forces of the Guatemalan Army in the fight against drug trafficking.

Fuerzas Especiales del Ejército de Guatemala en el combate contra el tráfico de drogas.

Abstract: The objective of this essay is to describe the results of the counternarcotics operations of the Guatemalan Army Special Forces. To this end, the methodological orientation that this research work will follow is based on qualitative/descriptive research, applying the inductive method through the collection of updated information and the use of qualitative research instruments, which consists of a bibliographic review of the authors referring to the topics presented, a synthesis of their main concepts and perspectives with the aim of supporting the ideas of the essay and documentary analysis, that is, the search and classification of existing and available documents on the operations of the special forces. The results obtained by the Special Forces of the Guatemalan Army in the period 2018-2020, the successes and errors in the planning, preparation, execution and evaluation of operations, through the use of mission variables, METT-TC (Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Climate, Troops and Available Support, Available Time and Civil Considerations) are exposed to improve the understanding of the situation. In addition, there are exogenous factors in terms of cocaine production in the south of the American continent and its consumption in the north of this. Finally, conclusions are drawn on the results of the use of the Guatemalan Army's Special Forces in the fight against drug trafficking.

Keywords: Drug Trafficking. Security. Special Forces. Mission Variables. Guatemala.

Resumen: El propósito de este ensayo es describir los resultados de las operaciones de contienda contra las drogas de las Fuerzas Especiales del Ejército de Guatemala. Para ello, la orientación metodológica se basa en la investigación cualitativa/descriptiva, aplicando el método inductivo por medio de la recolección de informaciones actualizadas y de la utilización de instrumentos de investigación cualitativa, que consiste en una revisión bibliográfica de los autores referentes a los temas presentados, una síntesis de sus principales conceptos y perspectivas con el objetivo de apoyar las ideas del ensayo y el análisis documental, o sea, la búsqueda y clasificación de documentos existentes y disponibles sobre las operaciones de las Fuerzas Especiales. Los resultados obtenidos por las fuerzas especiales del Ejército de Guatemala en el período 2018-2020, los éxitos y errores en la planificación, preparación, ejecución y evaluación de las operaciones, mediante el uso de variables de misión, METT-TC (Misión, Enemigo, Terreno y Clima, Tropas y Apoyo Disponible, Tiempo Disponible y Consideraciones Civiles) están expuestos para mejorar la comprensión de la situación. Además, existen factores exógenos en términos de producción de cocaína en el sur del continente americano y su consumo en el norte. Finalmente, se extraen conclusiones sobre los resultados del uso de las Fuerzas Especiales del Ejército de Guatemala en el combate contra el tráfico de drogas.

Palabras clave: Tráfico de drogas. Seguridad. Fuerzas Especiales. Variables de Misión. Guatemala.

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1 Introduction

The end of the cold war and various terrorist acts in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries¹, motivated through the Conference of American Armies CEA, in Williamsburg 1995, Bariloche 1996, Cartagena 1998 and Manaus 2000, the new direction that countries would take for the commitment of their armed forces in the fight against the new latent and emerging threats that were presented, such as terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, natural disasters, among others. In Guatemala, in 1996, the internal armed conflict was over, giving way to the Peace Accords, a new doctrine, the White Book, a framework law of the national security system. By virtue of the above, the General Staff of the National Defense of the Guatemalan Army orders the creation of an eminently counterterrorism unit with the existing personnel in the Special Forces Group.

Since 2007, the most violent and bloodthirsty criminal organization in Mexico, The Zetas, see in Guatemala not only a strategic area for operations on the drug trafficking route, but the link in the distribution chain by air, sea and land, between the maximum producers of cocaine in South America and one of the maximum consumers in the north of the continent, which is why they decided to venture into the country, but not in a conventional way. "Rather than controlling the distribution chains or managing the day-to-day operations, the Zetas are focused on controlling territories [...] creating a set of thugs willing to take the fight to other levels" (DUDLEY, 2011, n.p., our translation). At the same time, in that same year, with the support of the Southern Command of the United States of America, a process of personnel selection and counterterrorism and urban combat training began, taught by a Special Operations Detachment, ODA for its acronym in English, who also presented proposals for the acquisition of equipment, weapons and the restructuring of the counterterrorism unit, which by order of the Army High Command, would be used in the fight against narcoterrorism that threatened national and regional security.

That said, the objective of the essay is to describe the results obtained by the Special Forces of the Guatemalan Army in the period 2018-2020, the successes and errors in the planning, preparation, execution and evaluation of operations, through the use of mission variables, METT-TC (Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Climate, Troops and Available Support, Available Time and Civil Considerations), in addition to the exogenous factors regarding the production of cocaine in the south of the American continent and its consumption in the north of the east.

The methodological orientation is based on qualitative/descriptive research, applying the inductive method through the collection of updated information and the use of qualitative research instruments, which consists of a bibliographic review of the authors referring to the topics presented, a synthesis of their main concepts and perspectives with the aim of supporting the ideas of the essay and the documentary analysis, that is, the search and classification of existing and available documents on the operations of the special forces of the Guatemalan Army during the aforementioned years.

1 Argentina 1992 and 1994, Kenya and Tanzania 1998, USA 1993 and 2001, Spain 2004.

2 Methodology

"Research is a systematic, critical and empirical set that is applied to the study of a phenomenon or problem" (HERNÁNDEZ SAMPIERI; FERNÁNDEZ COLLADO; BAPTISTA LUCI, 2014, our translation). In this sense, the methodological orientation that will be followed in this research work is based on qualitative/descriptive research, applying the inductive method (explores and describes to generate theoretical perspectives), that is, it goes from the particular to the general to understand the phenomenon being studied. It is a recurring process; it analyzes multiple realities. The qualitative approach evaluates the natural development of events. According to the same author, the qualitative approach usually includes:

- a. The purpose and/or objectives,
- b. Research questions,
- c. Justification and feasibility,
- d. An exploration of deficiencies in the knowledge of the problem,
- e. The initial definition of the environment or context.

"The qualitative approach uses data collection and analysis to fine-tune research questions or reveal new questions in the interpretation process" (HERNÁNDEZ SAMPIERI; FERNÁNDEZ COLLADO; BAPTISTA LUCI, 2014, our translation). The qualitative approach uses different techniques for the collection and analysis of data with the aim of refining research questions or revealing new questions in the interpretation process (literature review, documents, interviews, observation, etc.).

This essay, being qualitative research, carries out a review of the main literature on the subject raised. Likewise, the collection of updated information, the bibliographic review of the authors referring to the topics presented, the synthesis of their main concepts and perspectives are used with the aim of supporting the ideas of the essay. Likewise, the evaluation of personal experiences in special operations, the use of documentary analysis, that is, the search and classification of existing, available and strategic documents, at the highest level of the State of Guatemala, National Security System, Intelligence System. Also, the search and compilation of operational and tactical documents of the Ministry of National Defense and specifically on the operations carried out by the special forces of the Army with respect to the fight against drug trafficking in Guatemala during the years 2018, 2019 and 2020 respectively; threat number one, established in the National Agenda of Risks and Threats 2021, a document prepared by the National Intelligence System and approved annually by the National Security Council.

Once the information and data collected during the years 2018, 2019 and 2020 have been analyzed and interpreted, the report of the results achieved by the special forces of the Guatemalan Army in the fight against drug trafficking is prepared in order to contextualize the phenomenon and subsequently reach the conclusions derived on the subject matter of this investigation.

3 Analysis of capabilities of the Special Forces of the Guatemalan Army in special interdiction operations.

From the signing of the peace accords in 1996 to the present day, the Guatemalan Army has been engaged in a variety of tasks, such as security patrols, protection of detention centers, delivery of fertilizers, books, bags of food, renovation of roads, preparation of desks and stretchers; its natural function, in accordance with the provisions of article 244 of the Political Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala:

The Guatemalan Army is an institution aimed at maintaining the independence, sovereignty and honor of Guatemala, the integrity of the territory, peace and internal and external security. It is unique and indivisible, essentially professional, apolitical, obedient and non-deliberative. It is made up of land, air and sea forces. Its organization is hierarchical and based on the principles of discipline and obedience (GUATEMALA, 1993, p. 62, our translation).

The Strategic Plan of the Ministry of National Defense establishes five (05) mission areas:

- a. National Borders and Areas of Strategic Value.
- b. Protection of Critical Infrastructure related to National Defense.
- c. Institutional support in the field of internal security.
- d. Cooperation within the national system of attention to natural disasters.
- e. Proactive actions, in support of the foreign policy of the State of Guatemala (GUATEMALA, 2016, p. 20, our translation).

The Operations Plan Evolution II, determines the area of mission1, the following operations to be carried out:

- a. Warlike and non-warlike, joint and combined.
- b. Operations in support of combating transnational threats.
- c. Coordinated; coordinated patrolling and/or coincidence; matching flights (CFAC, GANSEG, GANSEJ).
- d. Contact patrolling (Confidence-building measures, Guatemala-Belize).
- e. Traffic control posts, in the national territory.
- f. Land checkpoints, at uncontrolled vehicular crossings of the road network.
- g. Air defense, reconnaissance and surveillance flights in the national airspace.
- h. Naval Defense, Deterrence and Naval Presence. (Preventive and reaction).
- i. Naval safeguarding (naval police functions, control of maritime, river or lake traffic) (GUATEMALA, 2018, p. 24).

The Special Forces Brigade of the Guatemalan Army has within its organization two Battalions, the Kaibil BAFEK Special Forces Battalion and the BEIR Special Interdiction and Rescue Battalion, which, for the purposes of the following work, we will delimit ourselves in the analysis of the same, whose mission is the following:

Conduct special operations in any part of the national territory at the order of persuading, neutralizing and countering any terrorist or narco-terrorist threat, directed towards personnel, infrastructure and facilities (GUATEMALA, 2021, p. 3, our translation).

In accordance with the above, the general objective of this trial is to determine the results of anti-narcotics operations, by the BEIR, in compliance with mission area1, national borders and areas of strategic value, carrying out operations in support of the fight against transnational threats. To check whether BEIR has such capabilities, the United States Army's "DOTMLPF integrated structured systems analysis" tool will be used (UNITED STATES, 2010, p. 3-5), which aims to identify gaps in their current and future capabilities to meet mission area 1 and an analysis of Strengths, Opportunities, Weaknesses and Threats as follows.

Figure 1 – Drug trafficking routes in Central America 2020



Source: Silva, Papadovassilakis and Dittmar (2020).

a. Analysis of structured integrated systems (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materials, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities).

1) Doctrine:

The doctrinal basis for the use of the BEIR in mission area 1 is the Book of National Defense, the Doctrine Manual and the Manual of Territorial Defense. This doctrinal base is designed for the strategic and operational levels, at the tactical level of conducting operations, so that the BEIR is committed to national borders and defense against transnational threats, there is a diversity of manuals, directives, orders and plans.

2) Organization:

The organization of the BEIR, has undergone modifications since its foundation in 1999, these restructurings obey the needs of the Guatemalan Army, according to the threats to sovereignty, being the last adopted from the year 2019, based on the assigned missions of interdiction and rescue and is the one that is detailed below:

- a) Command.
- b) Senior Staff.
- c) Support Detachment.
- d) Two Companies.
- e) Detachments, four (04) per company.
 - i. Teams of penetrators (02 per detachment).
 - ii. Sniper teams (01 per detachment).

3) Training:

The Directorate of Operations of the General Staff of the National Defense, issues the Training Directive of the Guatemalan Army, which regulates instruction and training, the current directive is 3-"B"-i-EMDN-001-SAGE-2009 and is in force since 2009. The BEIR, in accordance with cooperation agreements between the State of Guatemala and the United States of America, has received training and certification since 2007 from the Alpha Special Operations Detachments of the Army of the United States of America, which has increased their skill levels to be used in operations against drug trafficking. In addition to them, new capacities have been generated for use in vertical infiltration in free fall, both day and night.

4) Materials:

Due to alleged human rights violations, since 1977 the Guatemalan Army has had an embargo on the acquisition of weapons and equipment from the United States of America. For this reason and because it has not been committed to its natural mission, the inventory of weapons, aircraft, military vehicles and vessels has deteriorated, however, through the programs to combat terrorism and drug trafficking, the BEIR receives support for its equipment.

5) Leadership:

Since 1873, the training of leaders of the Guatemalan Army is carried out by the Polytechnic School. For the professionalization of the leaders of the institution, the Superior Command of the Army COSEDE, carries out a variety of courses, which are carried out exclusively by Officers, without currently existing, professionalization courses for Specialists or Sergeants. Therefore, it is recommended that the School of Professional Galonists be restructured and become the School of Non-Commissioned Officers and professionalization courses are also scheduled for such personnel.

6) Personnel:

The personnel who enter the BEIR, goes through a selection process according to their abilities and the employment they will have within the organization of the same, in addition to this, they must satisfactorily pass the reliability test and the valid name check VETTING, which serve to maintain reliability standards within the staff.

7) Facilities:

The BEIR is located on the ground in two headquarters, 50% in the Central Air Command in the Capital City and the other 50% in the facilities of the Special Forces Brigade "GBPNH", municipality of Poptún, Department of Peten, at a distance of 385 kilometers. Since 2018, the construction of a new facility for the BEIR has been requested, taking into account that, as a rapid reaction unit, it is at the disposal of the Guatemalan Army Command, under operational control, of the Chief of the General Staff of the National Defense.

b. Strengths, Opportunities, Weaknesses and SWOT Threats, on the use of BEIR, in mission area 1.

1) Strengths:

- a) Acceptance before the population not involved with organized crime
- b) Discipline and hierarchical organization.
- c) Staff committed to the institution.
- d) Proactive leadership.
- e) Better and greater professionalization according to mission area 1.

- f) Continuous improvement of doctrine according to mission area 1.
 - g) Coherence with public policies, strategic plans and agendas developed by the National Security System.
- 2) Opportunities:
- a) The defense of the national territory is strengthened.
 - b) International interest (Alliance for Prosperity Plan).
 - c) Good image at the international level for participation in peace operations.
 - d) Delimiting the missions of the BEIR.
 - e) Participation in multinational coalitions, after negotiation or definition of foreign policy.
- 3) Weaknesses:
- a) Decreased operational capacity.
 - b) Donation unit for the acquisition of equipment.
 - c) Budgetary constraints.
 - d) Areas not accessible by land.
 - e) Dispersion of efforts and activities, generating an inefficient and inefficient management of resources.
- 4) Threats:
- a) Permeable to infiltration by criminal organizations.
 - b) Great border porosity.
 - c) High financial capacity of criminal organizations.
 - d) Socialization of drug trafficking and related crimes.
 - e) Increased institutional vulnerability to the threats and risks that the country must face.

- f) Loss of capacities and prestige vis-à-vis other States, international governmental organizations.

4 Interdiction of the national territory through the Special Interdiction and Rescue Battalion.

Having carried out the analysis of integrated structured systems and the SWOT to the BEIR, having as its mission the interdiction of the territory ,to combat transnational threats, it must be taken into account that these criminal structures have large amounts of economic, material, technological and human resources, which is why the planning process must be carried out many times against time and taking into consideration that the leakage of information must be avoided to achieve the fulfillment of the mission. It should also be taken into account that twenty years have passed in which the Army has been engaged in citizen security tasks. In addition, the Army continues to be assigned a variety of missions that have absolutely no relation to the mains missions of the Guatemalan army.

This has meant that, at present, the Guatemalan Army does not have differentiated capabilities to be used in the interdiction of the national territory; by virtue of lacking, mainly, the material, technological and financial resources that this mission requires. Despite this, the Guatemalan Army continues to bet on being an efficient and effective partner in the fight against transnational threats, which is why the BEIR has been organized, equipped and trained for this purpose, as a special operations unit, according to U.S. doctrine:

Special operations require particular modes of employment, tactics, techniques, procedures and equipment. They are often carried out in a hostile, politically denied or/ or diplomatically vulnerable environment and are characterized by one or more of the following aspects: urgency, clandestine or covert character, low visibility, working with or through local guides, increased requirements for regional orientation and cultural expertise, and a higher degree of risk (UNITED STATES, 2014, p. 9).

That is why the operations will be evaluated, through the use of the mission variables, METT-TC, Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Climate, Troops and Available Support, Available Time and Civil Considerations, a method that is used to evaluate the situation of the operation and develop the best course of action to fulfill the mission and that promotes an approach to evaluate several factors, which are represented by each of the letters of that acronym.

a. Mission.

The Special Interdiction and Rescue Battalion of the "BFEGBPNH", will be in readiness and under the operational control of the EMDN, to carry out interdiction operations of unidentified aircraft, from "D" day to "H" hour, throughout the National Territory and Airspace of the Republic of Guatemala, with the purpose of interdict traces of unidentified aircraft, exercising control over communication routes, authorized tracks, unauthorized tracks and thus combating the scourge of drug trafficking.

b. Enemy.

- 1) Criminal organizations continued to take advantage of the porosity of border areas and geographical areas where there is no state presence, to carry out illegal actions, violating internal security and national sovereignty.
- 2) Unidentified aircraft violate national airspace and intend to land on authorized airstrips, unauthorized airstrips, roads or any terrain that provides them with the facilities to do so, violating national sovereignty, violating current international air legislation.

c. Terrain and Weather

By their nature, air interdiction missions can be affected by the configuration of the terrain and weather conditions, both day and night, which is why when such an analysis is carried out, it is done as follows:

- 1) Terrain: surface conditions, length and extent of the runway or probable landing area, natural and artificial obstacles, land or river approach avenues, shooting ranges and observation, both for aircraft at the time of making their final approach, as well as at the time of providing air cover and for personnel on the ground, terrain characteristics that can help observation and firing ranges
- 2) Weather: especially rain, cloudiness, wind speed and direction, temperature and how it can affect the performance of personnel according to the duration of the mission, visibility for aircraft crews and for the personnel who will do the mission on the ground, sunrise and sunset, to contemplate the use of night visors.

d. Troops and Support Available.

It is carried out by verifying that it can be done only with the committed personnel of the unit, their training status, the material and equipment to be used and the morale and health conditions of each of the special operators and what support could be required from other units, whether or not they are in the capacity to support, reinforce or relieve the committed personnel and the approximate estimate of their proximity or remoteness from the area where the operation is being carried out.

e. Time Available.

To do this, a timeline is established, from the moment the alert order is received, in order to visualize what will be the parameters for the success of the mission and the effects of it.

As already mentioned above, the time factor for the realization of the planning and execution of this type of operations is minimal.

f. Civil Considerations

The level of acceptable risk must be evaluated, how it affects the development of the mission and the way in which it can be mitigated, the command, control and communications measures necessary to avoid especially incidents with the civilian population that is often used by drug trafficking organizations to prevent military or police units from carrying out the operation.

5 Results of special interdiction operations period 2018-2020.

a. Table 1 – Special Air Interdiction Operations carried out by the BIER, by year.

Number	Year	Quantity
01.	2018	19
02.	2019	54
03.	2020	40
TOTAL		113

Source: The author (2021).

b. Table 2 – Successful Air Interdiction Special Operations conducted by the BIER, per year.

Number	Year	Quantity
01.	2018	10
02.	2019	03
03.	2020	04
TOTAL		17

Source: The author (2021).

* The BEIR holds the record for the most people detained in a single ground forces operation, twelve (12) people.

** The BEIR holds the record for the largest drug seizure in a single ground forces operation, 2,353 kilos of cocaine.

c. Table 3 – Illicit traces and flights that entered Guatemala per year.

	2018	2019	2020	Total
South-North Traces	121	159	105	385
Aircraft that illegally entered the national territory	32	56	39	127
Aircraft located on the ground with illicit	2	8	13	23

Source: Guatemala (2021).

d. Table 4 – Achievements of special interdiction operations period 2018-2020.

Nuber	Year	Quantity
01.	Cocaine seized in kilos	5.191
02.	Cocaine base paste seized in kilos	571
03.	Seized aircraft	07
04.	Seized vehicles	28
05.	Seized boats	04
06.	Seized outboard motors	04
07.	Seized motorcycles	04
08.	Sized horses	11
09.	Detainees, Guatemalans	16
10.	Detainees, Mexicans	13
11.	Detainees, colombians	02
12.	Long guns seized	18
13.	Seized handguns	18
14.	Ammunition seized, 5.56 mm cartridges	153
15.	Ammunition seized, 7.62 mm cartridges	127
16.	Ammunition seized, 9 mm cartridges	395
17.	Ammunition seized, 0.45" cartridges	18
18.	Ammunition seized, .22" cartridges	07
19.	Ammunition seized, .40" cartridges	05
20.	Different caliber magazines	31
21.	Ammunition seized, shotgun cartridges	09
22.	U.S. Dollars	22.919,00
23.	Mexican Pesos	70.040,00
24.	Guatemalan quetzals	160.603,00

Source: The author (2021).

The above tables show us that of 127 aircraft that illegally entered the national territory of Guatemala in the years 2018, 2019 and 2010, the BEIR participated in 113 special air interdiction operations; similarly, of 23 aircraft located on the ground with illicit activities, the BEIR participated in 17 successful special air interdiction operations.

6 Conclusions

- a. Based on the analysis of structured integrated systems DOTMLPF (for its acronym in English), the BEIR has limited capacities to be committed primarily in mission area 1. To this end, changes have been initiated with regard to Doctrine, Organization, Leadership and Personnel, since these will cause changes in Training, Materials and Facilities.
- b. As part of the national power, the Guatemalan Army must efficiently and effectively; increase, equip, train and engage its personnel in the interdiction of the national territory. This will contribute to reducing the actions of transnational threats, not only for Guatemala, but for the region.
- c. The SWOT analysis envisions a great opportunity for the Guatemalan Army to focus on the natural mission for which it was created and to be able definitively to cease exercising functions that are the responsibility of other State institutions; since at present there is national, regional and international support for it.
- d. The population that is affected in the most remote areas of the national territory, due to the weak presence of the State, lacking services that cover basic needs, will benefit and perceive the military presence as support for the security of the community, providing conditions for local integral development.
- e. In making the contrasts, it is concluded that it is possible for the BEIR to transfer capabilities to other units of the Guatemalan Army that comply with the standards and agreements through which the BIER has obtained these capabilities, which will have an impact on the definitive withdrawal of the Guatemalan Army from missions that are not of the nature of an army and focus primarily on mission areas 1 and 2; protecting the population, guaranteeing independence, sovereignty and integrity of the territory and consequently complying with the provisions of articles 1 and 2 of the Political Constitution of the Republic.
- f. The BEIR during the years 2018, 2019 and 2020, had an 88.97% participation in special air interdiction operations against aircraft that illegally entered the national territory of Guatemala and a 73.91% success against aircraft that were located on the ground with illicit.

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Enhancing Nigerian Army welfare schemes towards improved personnel motivation


Perfeccionamiento de los esquemas de seguridad social del Ejército Nigeriano para mejorar la motivación del personal

Abstract: Members of the Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN) are among the most vulnerable populations in the country due to hazards associated with the profession and the rising security challenges in the country. The AFN are involved in counter terrorism, insurgency, kidnapping, cattle rustling, banditry, secessionism and separatism operations across the country. These operations have resulted in loss of lives, permanent disabilities and other forms of hardships to members of the armed forces, especially Nigerian Army. For this reason, the Nigerian Army have found ways and means to improve the motivation of personnel through a variety of Welfare Schemes (WS). The main objective of this study, therefore, is to examine ways to enhance the welfare of Nigerian Army personnel towards improved personnel motivation. This paper proposes strategies improve staff welfare in order to enhance PM in NA. The collected data were analysed using a qualitative method and presented in a descriptive analytical form.

Keywords: Welfare Schemes. Personnel Motivation. Nigerian Army

Resumen: Los miembros de las Fuerzas Armadas de Nigeria (FAN) se encuentran entre las poblaciones más vulnerables del país debido a los peligros asociados con la profesión y los crecientes desafíos de seguridad en el país. Las FAN participan en operaciones de combate al terrorismo, la insurgencia, los secuestros, el robo de ganado, el bandidaje, el secesionismo y el separatismo en todo el país. Estas operaciones provocaron la pérdida de vidas, la invalidez permanente y otras formas de daños a los miembros de las Fuerzas Armadas, especialmente del Ejército nigeriano. Por esta razón, el Ejército de Nigeria ha encontrado formas y medios para mejorar la motivación del personal a través de diversos Esquemas de Seguridad Social (ESS). Por lo tanto, el objetivo principal de este estudio es examinar las formas de mejorar la seguridad social del personal del Ejército Nigeriano (EN) para aumentar la Motivación del Personal (MP). Este artículo propone estrategias para mejorar la seguridad social del personal con el fin de mejorar la MP en el EN. Los datos recogidos se analizaron mediante el método cualitativo y se presentaron en forma de análisis descriptivo.

Palabras clave: Esquemas de Seguridad Social. Motivación de Personal. Ejército Nigeriano..

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1. Introduction

Governments maintain military forces principally to preserve its territorial integrity and defend national boundaries against external aggression. These force maintenance measures which often bolsters the morale component of fighting force are achieved via various personnel motivation (PM) initiatives implemented through diverse welfare schemes (WS). Such schemes powered by a robust defense strategy enhance the success of the military in combat operations and overall national defense. As human resources are essential to the success of organizations, personnel welfare has become a critical component in the formulation of military welfare schemes.

The term Welfare Scheme (WS) is defined as ‘a carefully coordinated arrangement towards improving the social conditions of personnel in the armed forces (COUNCIL OF SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT PROFESSIONALS, 2012). It also refers to a range of government programmes that provide financial or other aids to individuals or groups to support or motivate them. The goals of WS are thus to promote the pursuance of work, education, a better standard of living and improved personnel motivation. Personnel Motivation (PM) simply refers to the way to get soldiers to work together and make them feel part of a worthy fighting group. PM entails the strategic and tactical troop readiness required to accomplish military objectives and tasks in support of national security imperatives (KAYE, 2005).

The US Department of Defense (DOD) established funding targets to enhance the delivery of 2 categories of its Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) Programme towards improved PM. These are Category A, which promotes the physical and mental well-being of service-members, and Category B, which funds community support systems for service-members and their families. DOD’s MWR policy identifies six broad performance indicators for its WS. These targets are designed to ensure that military WS are adequately funded with appropriated resources to enhance PM instead of requiring service-members and their families to pay fees to cover costs (GAO, 2018).

The Ghanaian Army (GA) realized that most of its institutions are not productive due to ineffective WS. This affected human capital development and was difficult for management to achieve organizational goals and objectives (AMPOTY, 2014). Increasingly, the GA began to pay detailed attention to the development of personnel skills and made personnel development a central theme in the practice of Human Resource Management (HRM). This high level of commitment on HR practices improved GA outcomes by shaping capacities, behaviours and attitudes to work thereby increasing productivity (BARUCH, 2016).

The Nigerian Army (NA) in recent times has undergone series of transformations. The period from 2010 – 2020 witnessed great expansion in almost all spheres of influence ranging from welfare schemes, training, courses, increased manpower and infrastructure development. Consequently, the NA established the Army Welfare Holdings Limited (AWHL) in 2008. The AWHL later metamorphosed to the Nigerian Army Welfare Limited/

Guarantee (NAWL/G). The primary mandate of the NAWL/G was to coordinate the welfare of the NA personnel. The NAWL/G is also tasked to provide strategic policy direction, streamline, harmonize and coordinate the activities of hitherto independent subsidiaries. Its strategic mission is to harness opportunities within the Nigerian environment to improve the welfare of troops and ensure profitability for the NA. Despite these efforts, it is arguable if adequate WS are emplaced to enhance PM in the NA.

In the NA, WS are meant to assure personnel that their welfare and family's well-being are being taken care of. Accordingly, the Army Headquarters (AHQ) has implemented several WS including the Nigerian Army Insurance Scheme (NAWIS), Post Service Housing Development (PHD) and the Nigerian Army Post Exchange (NAPEX) among others. These schemes achieved some results in the areas of housing and monetary compensations given to the families of some personnel that were killed in active service. However, the implementation of WS in the NA is plagued by systemic inefficiencies and perceived insensitivity to the aspirations of personnel. Some of these deficiencies were attributed to declining NA resources, undue delays in accessing benefits and mismanagement of funds meant for WS implementation.

The purpose of this study is to identify ways of enhancing the efficacy of WS to improve PM in the NA. The study is motivated by the welfare plight of personnel and the prospects of an enhanced WS as the panacea for improved PM in the NA. Ordinarily, the WS available to NA personnel are reasonably adequate to improve PM in operational areas. However, NA does not have a flexible and adaptable WS structure that is able to keep pace with the dynamics of the operating environment. This necessitates the reappraisal of the objectives of NA WS to meet expected challenges. It is in view of this that this study seeks to find ways to proffer solutions to the challenges militating against WS in the NA for improved PM.

The study will discuss the prospects of improving WS in the NA for improved PM and highlight strategies to mitigate the challenges militating against the implementation of effective WS in the NA to improve PM. The scope of the study covers the period 2015 to September 2021. This marks the period of increased efforts to ensure effective and reliable WS for the NA to meet up with its requirements at various levels of operations. In terms of space, the study concentrates on NA WS in Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA) Kaduna, due to its relevance in recruiting and training of personnel. The Space will also include FCT Abuja because it is the location of the AHQ where policies regarding WS in the NA are developed and numerical benchmarks established to monitor and evaluate the progress of any program. The general focus of the study examines NA WS towards improved PM. However, specifically, the content of the study will focus on appraising the integrative roles of the existing WS in the NA towards improved PM.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Conceptual Discourse

The 2 key variables in this study are WS and PM, which are the independent and dependent variables respectively. These variables are conceptualized and their relationship established subsequently.

2.1.1 *Welfare Scheme*

Briggs (1961) sees WS as an organized effort deliberately used through politics and administration to modify the play of market forces in at least three directions. Firstly, by guaranteeing individuals and families a minimum income irrespective of the market value of their work or their property. Secondly, to narrow the extent of insecurity by enabling individuals and families to meet certain 'social contingencies' which could lead otherwise to individual and family crises. Thirdly, by ensuring that all citizens without distinction of status or class are offered the best standards available in relation to a certain agreed range of social services. This view is too narrow and not apt for this study because it does not consider the variance of models in WS.

Anderson and Ytrehus (2012) intellectualize WS as universal services that should not stigmatize. It should be available and accessible without involving any loss of dignity or self-respect. They argued that it should be a system which involves even the military to enjoy a comprehensive set of services, social security, education, personal social services, health care and housing. Some additional selective, specialist services may still be required to meet special needs or respond to the exclusion of some groups from services which ideally should be available to all. This view is military-centric and articulates other aspects of welfare schemes. Therefore, it is appropriate and is thus adopted as the operational definition for this study.

2.1.2 *Personnel Motivation*

According to Trevor (2007), PM is a measurement concept involving performance in relation to outcomes during the accomplishment of an assigned function. This view captures some fundamental basics of PM such as performance, outcomes and management control. However, Trevor's perspective did not view PM from the military operating dimension such as quality manpower, combat readiness and personnel proficiency. This perspective is not comprehensive enough for this study and is therefore not adopted.

Metz (2015) conceptualises PM as a measure of the ability attained by flexibly generating and maintaining an operationally ready force deployed with a right mix of platforms, personnel proficiency, effective welfare, logistics organisation and well-developed human resources to meet strategic objectives in a cost-efficient manner. Metz further posited that PM is attained through effective leadership, good state of equipment, optimum serviceability rate, personnel motivation and psychological readiness of troops with a view to achieving operational goals. Metz's view highlights combat efficiency, mission success, minimum casualty and cost effectiveness in the use of resources as indices of PM. It also considers personnel proficiency, right mix of platforms and effective welfare as well as logistics support as critical factors to PM. Metz's conceptual exposition is holistic, logical and adequate in the context of this study and is thus adopted.

2.2 Relationship Between Welfare Scheme and Personnel Motivation

The key attribute of WS is carefully coordinated arrangement towards improving the social conditions of personnel in the armed forces', while the attributes of PM include performance, precision and speed within the capacities of both man and the machine. An upgrade in WS facilitates the development of comprehensive social services which will enhance the performance of personnel and their ability to carry out missions with precision leading to the realisation of strategic objectives in a cost-efficient manner. Thus, an increase in WS provides a corresponding increase in PM.

Conversely, a cutback in the WS decreases the development of comprehensive social services. This will minimise the performance, speed and precision of the personnel in operations thus reducing PM. Therefore, improvement in WS would increase PM and vice versa. Hence, there is a direct relationship between WS and PM.

2.3 Review Of Existing Literature

There are several books, journals and unpublished research works conducted on WS and their effects on PM in the army. Andidi (2021), in a study titled "Welfare Schemes and Personnel Motivation: The Nigerian Army in Perspective", examined the positive effect of WS on the PM. He noted that, the provision of WS has been identified as a force multiplier in ensuring PM in the armed forces. The study also proposed new initiatives to guide the provision of WS. These include the creation of a Directorate of Future Plans in the NA, adoption of a Road Map for the NA as well as leveraging on the NA IGR sources. These strategies according to Andidi (2020) would certainly enhance the ability of the NA to provide appropriate and comforting WS for its personnel towards improving PM.

Bulus (2021), in his paper titled, “Welfare and Commercial Ventures of the Nigerian Army”, noted that militaries worldwide place welfare of their personnel as a top priority. He highlighted the various welfare and commercial ventures in the NA. He brought to fore the various WS such as NAWL/G, Nigerian Army Finance Incorporation (NAFIC), NAWIS, Nigerian Army Benevolent Fund (NA BENFUND) and Directorate of Non-public Funds (DNPF). The Nigerian Army Business Ventures such as Nigerian Army Properties Ltd Group, Post Housing Development Ltd, Command Guest Houses Limited, Nigerian Army Small Scale Drug Manufacturing Unit, Nigerian Army Farms and Range Ltd and Supply & Transports Foods Limited were examined. Bulus (2021) enumerated the challenges, prospects and strategies for numerous WS and business ventures to improve the welfare of personnel as well as generate revenue for the System. Bulus (2021) believes that the NA welfare and business ventures are capable of providing massive investment opportunities for officers and men thereby improving PM.


In summary, the reviewed papers established the relationship between WS, PM and combat readiness. However, combat readiness generally cannot always translate to PM of troops. Additionally, most of the researchers descriptively analysed their works but none established the nexus between the implementation of the various WS in the NA and their impacts on PM. Thus, this study will try to bridge the observed gap by providing the linkage between the delivery of WS and PM.

3. Theoretical Framework

There are several theories that could be used to situate WS and PM in the NA. Some of these theories include the General System Theory (GST), Herzberg’s Two Factor Theory and the Maslow’s Theory of the Hierarchy of Needs, among others. Considering the focus of this study, the most suitable theoretical framework is the GST. This theory was developed by Ludwig Von Bertalanffy in 1968. Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1968) noted that, a system is a complex web of interacting elements within an environment. He advocated for GST, a process in which problems are solved in a system from a holistic point of view. Since the NA is a complex web of organizational efforts, the GST best describes the process of evolving the NA WS to improve PM.

The main criticism to the GST is that it is too vague, lacking in accepted definitions and its approach to an individual’s issues is not always adequate to explain their present circumstances. However, despite these weaknesses, this study still adopts the theory because, it enables the interrelations among the variables and also defines the system in relationship with the environment. In this way, the organisation is compelled to explore its relationship with the environment to meet expected goals.

Figure 1 – Diagram of the General System Theory



Source: Lucey (2004).

3.1 Overview of Welfare Scheme and Personnel Motivation

The British colonial authorities at inception, bequeathed to the NA welfare packages aimed at maximizing personnel output at independence in 1960. The WS included free medical services, free uniforms and furnished accommodation, good salaries as well as allowances, among others. However, the old WS installed right from the independence era was made ineffective by inflation and population growth, subsequently affecting PM. The resulting inadequate WS was created by the Government's inability to anticipate new economic realities alongside the expansion of the NA. This negatively affected PM.

In 1990, additional WS were introduced for the NA personnel in efforts to mitigate the effects of the institutional expansion thereby enhancing PM (IBRAHIM, 2016). Such WS included the famous IBB Spirit that saw the distribution of brand-new Peugeot Cars to officers in the NA as well as other vehicular subsidies for soldiers. These WS brought about increased PM and extracted outstanding loyalty from the personnel. However, this scheme did not anticipate the rapid expansion of the military and hence was unable to accommodate the resultant expansion in strength and operations of the NA. The other WS at the time was capacity development through foreign trainings. This WS enabled most officers to travel abroad for professional courses aimed at enhancing their capacity thereby improving PM. The resultant effects of these WS were highly motivated NA personnel that were willing and ready to defend the territorial integrity of the country as well as aid the civil authority when required.

By the 2000s, leadership of the NA continued to initiate various WS for the personnel that were aimed at improving PM with attendant operational efficiency (SHEHU, 2017). Such WS included massive barrack rehabilitation initiatives that saw most of the barracks renovated and new ones constructed. This ensured that personnel were accommodated in decent living quarters that helped enhance PM within the Service. Additionally, the Armed Forces Terms and Conditions of Service were reviewed and harmonized in 2004. The review was aimed at enhancing WS for the personnel in order to improve PM for better output (DHQ, 2019). The implementation of these efforts, was however, scuttled by change in leadership and absence of an institutional framework for policy implementation in the NA.

In efforts to mitigate the issue of inconsistent policy implementation, the AHQ reorganized the existing WS in 2007, aimed at enhancing PM. This initiative gave rise to the creation of the AWHL which eventually metamorphosed into the NAWL/G. The primary mandate of the NAWL/G was to coordinate the welfare of the NA personnel and independent subsidiaries. These are designed to generate wealth by exploring opportunities within the environment to improve the welfare of troops for enhanced PM and profitability of the NA. The noble ideals of the NAWL/G could however not be realized due to paucity of funds to implement the Company's agendas.

The overview of the various WS in the NA aimed at enhancing PM has highlighted some issues and challenges that would need to be addressed. This would ensure that the ambitious WS intended for the NA personnel are effectively implemented in order to achieve improved PM in the Service.

3.2 Highlight of Issues Associated With Welfare Scheme and Personnel Motivation in The Nigerian Army

Some of the issues associated with WS and PM in the NA include expansion realities, policy implementation and funding capacity. These issues and their corresponding challenges will be discussed and reliable strategies outlined for possible implementation.

3.2.1 Expansion Realities

The expansion realities of the NA from inception have been an issue in the provision of adequate and requisite WS to enhance PM. The NA's participation in counterinsurgency operations in the country has exerted significant strains on available manpower leading to increased recruitment. The resulting increase in personnel strength from 80,000 to about 120,000, within 3-year span was not envisaged in the development of the various WS. This limited the capacity of the WS to improve PM in the NA (NIGERIA, 2020). Thus, the NA has expanded at a faster rate than its WS could accommodate and this has negatively impacted PM.

3.2.2 Policy Implementation

The mechanisms for policy implementation in the NA have been an issue in ensuring adequate WS for enhanced PM. The AHQ through the relevant Departments is responsible for overseeing the implementation of NA' policy including WS. However, policy implementation changes every time there is new leadership in the NA. This has resulted in ineffective policy implementation mechanisms. Varying missions and visions of successive Chiefs of Army Staff (COAS) alter policy directions thereby affecting provision of WS for enhanced PM. Hence, the frequent change of leadership in the NA adversely affects policy implementation which is a major challenge affecting the delivery of decent WS for personnel that could improve PM (Inyang, 2 September 21)¹. Thus, lack of policy implementation would impede WS with attendant negative impact on PM.

3.2.3 Funding Capacity

The funding capacity of the NA, which is mostly drawn from the national budget, has been an issue in the provision of realistic WS for enhanced PM. The NA Annual Budget from 2016 to 2020 reveals that funds allocated have never matched the demands of the Service. For instance, only 85 per cent of the AHQ's proposals for the NA for 2020 was released in spite the Army's commitments in multiple operations (NIGERIA, 2020). The limited budgetary allocation prevented the NA from implementing several WS that could have improved PM. Hence, the meagre funds of the NA sourced from the national budget is an issue in the delivery of effective WS to enhance PM.

4. Data Presentation and Analysis

4.1 Information and Analysis of the Sample

The information on the sample is organized into logical and meaningful categories to establish the ability of respondents to provide answers with focus on the sample size and data analysis. A total of 425 copies of the questionnaire were administered, 413 were returned, while 4 of the returned questionnaires were invalid. From the sample size of 400, the percentage return rate and non-return rate of 97.2 per cent and 2.8 per cent respectively, represent a very good response rate for the purpose of making generalisations. The questionnaire distribution matrix is at Appendix 3.

¹ INYANG, K. E. DDLP, Army Headquarters Department of Logistics, Abuja. Interviewed on "Welfare Schemes and Personnel Motivation: The Nigerian Army in Perspective" Via Telephone, 2 May 2021.

The data collected from respondents were first coded and converted into percent-

ages using simple statistical analysis. The generated data were plotted on charts to enhance analysis and improve understanding. On the whole, the respondents return rate was adequate for valid quantitative and qualitative analysis, deductions and findings as represented.

Table 1 – Distribution of Information on Sample

Serial	Checklist	Frequency	Percentage	Remark
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
	Estimated Sample Size	400	-	
	No of Questionnaire Distributed	425	100	
	No of Questionnaire Returned	413	97.2	
	No of Valid Questionnaire after Cross-Checking	409	96.2	
	Percentage Return Rate	$413/425 \times 100$	97.2	High Return Rate

Source: The author (2021).

4.2 Data Presentation and Analysis on Issues Associated With Welfare Scheme and Personnel Motivation in The Nigerian Army

This section presents the issues examined in order to consolidate the interaction between data on WS and PM in the NA. These issues include the realities of expansion, implementation of policy and funding capacity. The issues will be analysed qualitatively and quantitatively using charts and graphs. The questionnaires were designed on a 6 points scale

of strongly agree (SA), agree (A), undecided (U), insufficient knowledge (IK), disagree (D) and strongly disagree (SD).


4.2.1 Realities of Expansion

The realities of expansion refer to the enforced high rate of recruitment in the NA due to the increasing need for manpower to curb insurgencies. These expanding realities were studied by the AHQ Department of Policy and Plans to capture the expected growth as well as to enable informed planning for a requisite WS that would ensure that PM is enhanced. The research conducted on the AHQ Department of Policy and Plans reviews the potentials of the expansion reality to support WS in the NA, as depicted in the table and figure below.

Table 2 – Is the AHQ Department of Policy and Plans Expansion Realities robust enough to support WS for improved PM?

Serial	Response	Frequency	Percentage
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1.	SA	29	7
2.	A	37	9
3.	U	12	3
4.	IK	20	5
5.	D	127	31
6.	SD	184	45
Total		09	100

Figure 2 – Is the AHQ Department of Policy and Plans Expansion Realities robust enough to support WS for improved PM?



Source: The author (2021).

The outcome of the field survey on whether the AHQ Department of Policy and Plans Expansion Realities is robust enough to support WS for improved PM showed that 45 per cent of the respondents strongly disagreed, 31 per cent disagreed while 7 per cent of the respondents strongly agreed and 9 per cent agreed. The results indicate that the AHQ Department of Policy and Plans Expansion Realities are not robust enough to support WS for improved PM. Therefore, the “realities of expansion” variable is relevant in the quest to enhance WS to improve PM in the NA.

4.2.2 Implementation of the Policy

Implementation of Policy refers to a set of guidelines on how an organisation expects or plans to realise the goals and objectives of a policy. The Harmonized Terms and Conditions of Service (HTACOS) guide all policy implementation. The mechanisms for policy imple-


mentation in the NA operate on the viewpoint of encouraging WS for improved PM. The AHQ through the relevant Departments is responsible for overseeing the implementation of NA' policy including WS.

The researcher carried out a field survey to determine if the implementation in the NA enhances existing WS for improved PM. The outcome of the field survey conducted indicated

Table 3 – Is there effective policy implementation in the NA operations on the viewpoint of encouraging WS for improved PM?

Serial	Response	Frequency	Percentage
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1.	SA	37	9
2.	A	45	11
3.	U	20	5
4.	IK	8	2
5.	D	172	42
6.	SD	127	31
Total		409	100

Figure 3 – Is there effective policy implementation in the NA operations on the viewpoint of encouraging WS for improved PM?



that 42 per cent of the respondents disagree, 31 per cent strongly disagrees while 9 per cent of the respondents strongly agree and 11 per cent agrees. The table and figure below depict the outcome of the survey and the various responses.

Source: The author (2021).

The highlights of this results indicate that poor implementation of policy in the NA reduces the efficacy of WS with attendant negative effect on PM. This was corroborated by Inyang (2001) who asserts that the frequent change of leadership in the NA adversely affects policy implementation and the formulation of appropriate WS to improve PM. Moreover, improved policy is one of the essential elements of the GST as it promotes synergy, PM and WS in the system. Thus, policy implementation is an important variable in delivery effective WS in the NA for improved PM.


4.2.3 Funding Capacity

Funding capacity refers to the availability of funds for projects designed to boost human resources. The limited budgetary allocation of the NA is not sufficient to support most of its WS aimed to improve PM. The outcome of the field survey conducted indicates that 44 per cent of respondents strongly disagree, 21 per cent disagrees, while 16 per cent strongly agree and 11 per cent agrees. The table and figure below depict the outcome of the survey and the various responses.

Table 4 – Does the Nigerian Army have sufficient funding capacity to ensure effective WS?

Serial	Response	Frequency	Percentage
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1.	SA	65	16
2.	A	45	11
3.	U	21	5
4.	IK	12	3
5.	D	86	21
6.	SD	180	44
Total		409	100

Figure 4 – Does the Nigerian Army have sufficient funding capacity to ensure effective WS?



Source: The author (2021).

The results reveal that the funding capacity of the NA is inadequate to effectively support WS for improved PM. The GST identified human resources as vital to realising the desired outcomes in any welfare process. The GST further noted that inadequate funding capacity can impede PM. Thus, funding capacity is an important variable to delivering effective WS to improve PM in the NA.

4.3 Data Presentation and Analysis on Contributions of Welfare Scheme to Personnel Motivation of The Nigerian Army

The contributions of WS to the PM of the NA include personnel discipline, personnel professional life and personnel productivity. These contributions are discussed in subsequent paragraphs.


4.3.1 Personnel Discipline

Discipline is the bedrock of military professionalism. It is the ability to obey rules and orders in carrying out assigned task without hesitation. Attainment of service discipline among personnel due to improved WS opportunities can be rewarding. Discipline has been observed to have an effect on PM due to its improved WS. In the survey, respondents were asked if WS has improved discipline in the NA? The feedback of the research survey conducted is highlighted in Table 5 and Figure 5:

Table 5 – Has WS improved personnel discipline in the NA?

Serial	Response	Frequency	Percentage
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1.	SA	202	49.3
2.	A	137	33.6
3.	U	21	5.2
4.	IK	15	3.6
5.	D	25	6
6.	SD	9	2.3
		409	100

Figure 5 – Has WS improved personnel discipline in the NA?



Source: The author (2021).

The results of the survey indicate that 201 respondents representing 49.3 per cent strongly agrees that improved WS has improved discipline and 33.6 per cent agrees. Meanwhile, 6 per cent maintained a negative position concerning the question, while 5.2 per cent were indifferent. Although the GST was conceived during World War II, however, when applied to personnel discipline in modern days, it still improves aspects of WS and PM.


4.3.2 Personnel Professional Life

The military profession thrives on ethics. Every profession is measured by their results and achievements. The accomplishments or outputs of personnel in any profession depend on how well they are equipped and catered for. This could be in terms of payment, accommodation and availability of WS, amongst others. A workforce must be emotionally, socially, mentally healthy and alert to be able to perform optimally. The results from the respondents are presented in Table 6 and Figure 6.

Table 6 – Do you think WS will improve Personnel Professional Life in the NA?

Serial	Response	Frequency	Percentage
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1.	SA	200	49
2.	A	139	34
3.	U	25	6
4.	IK	12	3
5.	D	21	5
6.	SD	12	3
Total		409	100

Figure 6 – Do you think WS will improve Personnel Professional Life in the NA?



Source: The author (2021).

The survey shows that 49 per cent of the respondents affirmed WS will improve personnel professional in the NA. Meanwhile, 5 per cent maintained a negative perception regarding the question asked, while 8 per cent were indifferent. Also, a key premise of GST has to do with the definition of a system and how an organization is formed to improve personnel professional life.


4.3.3 Improvement of Personnel Morale

Morale is the state of an individual’s psychological well-being based upon a sense of confidence. In the military, morale is considered as a spirit which makes members of a group endeavour to succeed. Wherever morale is lacking, enthusiasm to succeed by group members becomes weak. Opportunities created by WS in the NA have played a key role in improving the morale of personnel in the area of training and acquiring knowledge. This is supported by the results from the field survey in Table 7 and Figure 7.

Table 7 - Do you think WS in the NA has improved Personnel Morale?

Serial	Response	Frequency	Percentage
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1.	SA	180	44
2.	A	119	29
3.	U	41	10
4.	IK	12	3
5.	D	41	10
6.	SD	16	4
Total		409	100

Figure 7 – Do you think WS in the NA has improved Personnel Morale?



Source: The author (2021).

The results show that 44 per cent of the respondents agreed that WS in the NA has improved personnel morale, 29 per cent agreed while 10 per cent disagreed. Therefore, WS is a significant contributor to personnel morale in the NA.

4.4 Interpretation of Data Analysis

The data presented to answer the research questions were interpreted and analysed to make statistical inferences and deductions. Furthermore, the outcome of the research was modeled to show the application of the GST in WS and its relationship with PM. Finally, logical deductions were drawn to substantiate and authenticate the reliability of the research. Table 8 provides the statistical meaning and inferences of the outcome of the survey.

Table 8 – Interpretation of the Identified Factors and their Correlation to WS for Improved PM in the Nigerian Army

Serial	Contributions of Welfare Schemes (Independent Variable)	Attributes of Personnel Motivation (Dependent Variable)	Result/Relationship
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1.	Personnel Discipline.	Human Management.	Strong Positive Contribution
2.	Improvement of Personnel Morale.	Improved motivation.	Strong Positive Contribution
3.	Personnel Professional Life.	Innovation.	Strong Positive Contribution

Source: The author (2021).

4.4 Strategies to Improve Welfare Scheme in The Nigerian Army

Following the various challenges hampering the provision of adequate and encouraging WS for enhanced PM in the NA, some key strategies have been identified. Some of these strategies include creating a Directorate of Future Plans for the NA, adopting a roadmap for the continuation of WS policy implementation in the NA as well as leveraging the NA IGR sources. These strategies would be discussed accordingly.

4.4.1 Creation of a Directorate of Future Plans for the NA

The challenge of poor foresight and lack of adequate preparations for a growing Service like the NA could be addressed through the creation of an independent Directorate of Future Plans. The objective of this strategy is to ensure that the AHQ always keeps abreast of the growth potentials of the Service and making appropriate plans for requisite WS in order to enhance PM. This would ensure that WS are properly funded, enhancing PM in the NA. This strategy could be implemented by the Second Quarter of 2022.

4.4.2 Adoption of a Roadmap for the Continuation of WS Policy Implementation in the NA

The challenge of inconsistent policy implementation due to frequent regime changes in leadership could be addressed through the adoption of a roadmap for the continuation of the implementation of WS policy in the NA that would ensure that PM remains a priority. In the past 6 decades, the COAS have been changed more than 20 times with every new chief coming on-board with a different vision and mission. Thus, policy implementation becomes the greatest casualty as its either left partially executed or abandoned in totality. Hence, adopting a roadmap that would institutionalise the implementation of policies could ensure that the NA remains on a steady course to developing and implementing effective WS for enhanced PM. The AHQ could convene a committee for the development of this roadmap for NA's WS by the First Quarter of 2022.

4.4.3 Leveraging the NA IGR Sources

The challenge of dwindling budgetary allocation for the NA largely due to other competing national needs as well as the current economic realities in the country could be addressed through leveraging the existing NA IGR sources. The NA could reserve up to 70 per cent of the funds generated from her IGR sources to the provision of WS that would enhance PM. Thus, funding for WS would be out of the regular budgets of the NA, hence ensuring funds availability. Accordingly, a committee would be required to develop modalities for harnessing the NA IGR to increase funds available to develop an effective WS for improved PM in the NA. The AHQ could convene a committee to leverage the existing NA IGR sources by the Second Quarter of 2022.

5. Conclusion

The provision of WS has been identified as a force multiplier in ensuring PM in the armed forces. This leads to high level of commitment to duty with attendant increased productivity in the NA as was evident during the Nigeria Civil War between 1967 and 1970 and its immediate aftermath. Over the years, however, WS in the NA became inadequate due to issues such as expansion realities, ineffective policy implementation as well as inadequate funding. These issues were associated with challenges such as poor projections, planning and forecast for the future, frequent changes in leadership as well as poor funding, which impacts WS and PM in the NA.

In order to mitigate the highlighted challenges, this study proposes some strategies that would improve WS for enhanced PM in the NA. These strategies include the creation of a Directorate of Future Plans in the NA, adoption of a roadmap for the NA as well as leveraging on the NA IGR sources. These strategies would certainly enhance the ability of the NA to provide appropriate and comforting WS for its personnel towards improving PM.

5.1 Recommendations

It is recommended that the AHQ should:

- a. Create the Directorate of Future Plans under the AHQ DAPP by the second quarter of 2022.
- b. Develop a roadmap for the continuation of WS policy implementation in the NA by the first quarter of 2022.
- c. Develop modalities to leverage the existing NA IGR by the second quarter of 2022.

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