Coleção Meira Mattos
revista das ciências militares

Coleção Meira Mattos

revista das ciências militares

CONTENTS

The need to strengthen the scientific journals in the area of Defense

Tássio Franchi (iD)
Exército Brasileiro. Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército, Instituto Meira Mattos.
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.
editor.cmm@eceme.eb.mil.br

The year 2020 marked some generations permanently. Crises and instabilities derived from the fear of populations for their lives, threatened by a practically invisible enemy, about which science would find to develop the weapons and effective response tactics; and the national states were responsible for the general strategy of confrontation. Certain groups of professionals considered essential were mobilized on the front line in a real war operation that has not yet ended. The Armed Forces, as one of the state instruments, have assumed responsibilities like several other state agencies.

The social, scientific and economic challenges imposed by the Covid-19 pandemic from the first half of 2020 have been reflected in scientific publications from all areas of knowledge. Although the general public mainly follows the advances in research applied to the development of treatments and vaccines for Covid-19, the debate about the importance of scientific development has become central in a year of debates on the role of science in the world. Questions about the role of states in controlling the pandemic, openness in decisions and the indispensable support to their societies were also the target of analyses designed in the heat of the moment and published in specialized journals.

It is the responsibility of scientific journals of all areas to guarantee autonomy to the scientific communities and to favor the understanding of the general public about the processes and stages of scientific and social development. **Publishing is necessary, but publishing with quality is fundamental!** The function of scientific journals is: the free and validated dissemination of research results; the proposal of new analytical methods; the sharing of data and research results; among other activities that help society to have contact with knowledge that is fundamental for the evolution of the various areas of science.

During the pandemic, we have several examples of free sharing of articles and data, which favored the fast development of solutions to the Covid-19 challenge. This sharing has been a catalyst for scientific progress and can be replicated in other important themes for our society (CROW; TANANBAUM, 2020).

Coleç. Meira Mattos, Rio de Janeiro, v. 15, n. 52, p. v-vii, January/April 2021

V

The Brazilian Defense field of investigation has been built on this scientific sharing, via open access to articles. Several journals linked to the CAPES humanities college and area 39 – Political Science and International Relations, where several of the graduate programs of the military schools (Brazilian Navy, Brazilian Army and Air Force) are linked and use editorial management systems such as the Open Journal System (OJS), which allows this free access to readers.

The area's journals have also sought indexation in important open access databases such as Scielo and Redalyc, with the aim of broadening the sharing of articles and promoting debates. We can further expand the development of the area by bringing to debate issues such as the sharing of research data, digital preservation, clearness of the editorial process and the exchange of editorial experiences that favor the construction of publications dedicated to the field of Defense.

In 2020, debates also started around the New Qualis-CAPES[1], which should classify all relevant journals for each area of knowledge. As the National Defense, despite its daily importance, has not yet configured itself as an area independent from the others, it is necessary to pay attention to and value the journals related to the subject. Be it for induction, investment, or even dissemination.

These journals often publicize the results of investigations by civilians and military personnel directly linked to the institutions responsible for educating future Forces' leaders. They collaborate expressively in the academic debate that has repercussions in the proposition of public policies applied by the Ministry of Defense and subordinated institutions. They collaborate to bring the themes of national defense closer to politics and society.

The English General Rupert Smith in his work *A Utilidade da Força* (2008. p.15) points out: "(...) politicians have a free right to expect the military to respond to their needs, but they do it many times without understanding at all the practical aspects of the issue, let alone the conceptual ones. For Force to continue to be used and be useful, this situation has to change". Part of the role of periodicals is to offer society the knowledge that can help build this understanding about the area of Defense.

The Meira Mattos Collection reiterates the invitation to the scientific community and journals in the area to move forward together in the construction of widely spread, reliable and accessible periodicals.

---

1 "Qualis Journals is a tool for the evaluation of postgraduate programs with regard to articles published in scientific journals". More information is available at: http://www1.capes.gov.br/perguntas-frequentes. Access on: Dec. 21, 2020.

References

CROW, M. M.; TANANBAUM, G. We Must Tear Down the Barriers That Impede Scientific Progress. **Scientific American**, New York, NY, Dec. 18, 2020. Available at: https://bit.ly/2WFmSbP. Access on: 21 dez. 2020.

SMITH, R. **A Utilidade da Força**: a arte da Guerra no mundo moderno. Lisboa: Edições 70. 2008.

Coleç. Meira Mattos, Rio de Janeiro, v. 15, n. 52, p. v-vii, January/April 2021

vii

The role of strategic partnerships for the development of the Brazilian Defense Industrial Base: FX-2 and Guarani programs

El papel de las alianzas estratégicas para el desarrollo de la Base Industrial de Defensa brasileña: los programas FX-2 y Guaraní

Abstract: The National Defense Strategy (END) conveys the necessity for technological development through strategic partnerships, allowing for development and transference of sensible technology to the Brazilian Defense Industrial Base (BID). Certain advances are still unattainable to Brazil in an autonomous manner, therefore the need for the establishment of strategic partnerships, which possess deeper bilateral relations as the main objective. This work proposes to analyze two strategic Brazilian programs in progress in the scope of the Armed Forces, namely: F-X2 Project and Guarani Programs. In order to guide the analysis and achieve the objectives, the concept of Grand Strategy is used along with the Theory of Structural Power and the Neoliberal Institutionalism. Case studies are used as a methodology, to later arrive at the general conclusions on the benefits of the defense cooperation to the national BID.

Keywords: Industrial Defense Base. Strategic Partnership. Brazil.

Resumen: La Estrategia Nacional de Defensa (END) aborda la necesidad del desarrollo tecnológico por medio de alianzas estratégicas, para hacer posible el desarrollo y la transferencia de tecnología sensible a la Base Industrial de Defensa (BID) brasileña. Ciertos avances aún no pueden ser alcanzados de forma autónoma por Brasil, por lo que se hace necesario establecer alianzas estratégicas, que tienen como principal objetivo la profundización de una relación bilateral. El presente artículo se propone a analizar dos programas estratégicos brasileños en curso en el ámbito de las Fuerzas Armadas, a saber: el proyecto F-X2 y el Guaraní. Para orientar el análisis y lograr los objetivos, se adopta el concepto de Gran Estrategia, la Teoría del Poder Estructural y el Institucionalismo Neoliberal. Como metodología, se emplean estudios de caso para, posteriormente, presentar una visión general sobre los beneficios de la cooperación en defensa para la BID nacional.

Palabras clave: Base Industrial de Defensa. Alianza Estratégica. Brasil.

Fernanda Cristina Nanci Izidro Gonçalves (ID)
Centro Universitário La Salle, Coordenação de Relações Internacionais. Nitéroi, RJ, Brasil.
fnanci@gmail.com

Lorena Toffano Ferreira (ID)
Exército Brasileiro, Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército.
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.
lorenatoffano@hotmail.com

Coleç. Meira Mattos, Rio de Janeiro, v. 15, n. 52, p. 1-20, January/April 2021

1

1 Introduction

The formulation of a robust defense policy, based mainly on the development of the Industrial Defense Base (BID), emerges as a condition to overcome vulnerabilities, in order to guarantee autonomy and the ability to influence in a multipolar world. The BID refers to the group of State or private companies responsible for the research, development, production, distribution, and maintenance of strategic defense products (BRASIL, 2019). Thus, BID is a complex structure composed of different institutions that need to operate in a coordinated manner to produce materials and services necessary for the Armed Forces, encompassing Education and Research (educational institutions), Research and Development (R&D centers), Projects (engineering companies), Production (industrial companies), and Logistics (service companies) (AMARANTE, 2012).

Considering the BID relevance for better formulating and carrying out the defense policy in Brazil, the National Defense Strategy (END), prepared by the Brazilian government, consists of structural axes, and one of which is the reorganization of the BID through the development of new technological capabilities for civil and military use. In this context, establishing strategic partnerships that can provide development and transfer of technologies that meet the national interest becomes a fundamental instrument (BRASIL, 2012).

Although widely used in the literature, the concept of strategic partnership is still poorly defined and frequently employed in a global and imprecise manner. When dealing with the term, Vaz (1999) associates it with a privileged relationship at the bilateral level for fulfilling interests – important for the achievement of internal and/or external objectives – of the States that constitute it. In the Brazilian case, according to the author, strategic partnerships are historically built with a view to obtaining resources, inputs, and exploring opportunities that encourage national development. Blanco (2009) defines strategic partnership as the search for deepening and formalizing a bilateral relationship, with the objective of defining coordinated actions so that shared fundamental interests are achieved. Lessa (1998, p. 31, our translation) defines it as a priority political and economic bilateral relationship, which generates reciprocal effects, a selective approach, "which opens up the possibility of adaptation to the niches of opportunity and to the international constraints that appear in a conjunctural manner." Therefore, as can be seen, the concept of strategic partnership refers specifically to a bilateral relationship that involves countries willing to cooperate in favor of common projects that stimulate national development.

When discussing this concept, Grassi (2019) points out that partnerships are not restricted to one field, for example military or technological, and may involve other areas, but, in general, partnerships are established to cover some specific issues on a bilateral agenda. However, as the author highlights, partnerships initiated on a specific topic may have a spillover effect on other matters. Thus, strategic partnership "can be summed up as a synonym for a special, priority and necessary relationship" (GRASSI, 2019, p. 631, our translation), which is based on long-term bilateral relations and may involve "a wide spectrum of (political-institutional, diplomatic, economic-commercial, military, technological, social and or cultural) means" (GRASSI, 2019, p. 634, our translation). In the case of this article, the focus is the strategic partnership established by the Brazilian government with partners in the technological and military fields, reflecting the recognition that certain

advances cannot yet be achieved by Brazil autonomously. Thus, the objective of cooperation with counterparties is to seek strategic autonomy, preventing the government from investing more years of work and spending even more resources when walking alone (MELO, 2015).

Seeking to promote the development of the defense industry, the government has therefore encouraged the transfer of technology by establishment of strategic partnerships. The effectiveness of this process depends on four requirements: (1) there must be an entity that owns the technology and another entity capable of receiving it; (2) the knowledge to be transferred must be useful; (3) the methodology used must favor the absorption of knowledge; and (4) the full use of the technique employed must be guaranteed to the recipient (FEDERAÇÃO DAS INDÚSTRIAS DO ESTADO DE SÃO PAULO, 2012 apud MELO, 2015).

An example of a partnership is the Submarine Development Program (PROSUB), which aims to develop four conventional submarines (S-BR) and the nuclear submarine (SN-BR), together with the French DCNS company. This program, initiated in 2008, involves the largest international military contract entered into by Brazil, whose purpose is to make the country one of the few in the world to develop and build a submarine that uses one of the most complex technologies ever developed by mankind (ROSENDO; LIMA , 2018), increasing its deterrence capacity.

Despite all the positive impacts of PROSUB on the Brazilian BID, it is worth mentioning that a specific program alone is not sufficient to develop the national BID, requiring the State to adopt a strategic vision that broadly plans its submarine fleet strength, including the perspective of modernization and construction of other means. Recognizing the relevance of the program, but based on this principle, this article does not have PROSUB as the object of study, aiming to give greater prominence to other strategic programs developed by the other Armed Forces, in view of the vast existing literature on this Navy program.

Thus, recognizing the fundamental importance of strategic partnerships for the development of the Brazilian BID, this article aims to study two strategic projects in progress developed by the Brazilian Armed Forces, namely: F-X2 program, in partnership with Sweden, and Guarani, in partnership with Italy. The time frame is defined from the 2000s, more specifically from 2006 to date, in order to cover the formalization of these projects, addressing the technology transfer process.

Considering this scenario, the article aims to analyze the importance of strategic partnerships for the development of the Brazilian BID, specifically investigating the antecedents and development of FX-2 and Guarani programs, reflecting on lessons that can be learned from defense cooperation in terms of technological autonomy for the country. Thus, it seeks to identify which benefits can be provided by the establishment of strategic partnerships. To guide the analysis, it starts from a theoretical framework in the field of International Relations, using the Theory of Structural Power, proposed by Susan Strange (1994), and Neoliberal Institutionalism, developed by Axelrod and Keohane (1985). The analysis proposed is complemented with the concept of Grand Strategy, developed in Brazil by Celso Amorim (2012).[1]

---

1   This concept has different definitions for classic and contemporary authors. In this sense, the author Liddel Hart (1991), who defined the term in question as the major instrument of a State's policy, stands out. Other authors, such as Porter (2013) and Brands (2014), also elaborated their perceptions about the Grand Strategy. In this article we use the concept as implemented by the former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defense, Celso Amorim, who applied it to the articulation of Brazilian foreign and defense policy.

The question that guides this article is: aiming at developing the Brazilian BID, what benefits can be provided by establishing strategic partnerships? It is assumed that through strategic partnerships it is possible to extract technological and economic advantages, besides fostering new jobs and technical labor and seeking autonomy in the technological plan.

To conduct this investigation, this study is based on case studies of the strategic programs mentioned above. According to George and Bennett (2005), case studies enable detailed evaluation of an event to develop or test explanations that can be generalized and applicable to other events. In this sense, the authors emphasize that the case study method can combine the analysis of isolated cases with the comparative analysis of a small number of cases, becoming a robust way to make inferences. Breuning (2007) corroborates this argument, stating that the comparison of a few cases allows a detailed analysis of similarities and differences that in a larger sample would be difficult to be identified, deepening the analytical richness of the study. The purpose of this article is – by analyzing F-X2 and Guarani programs – to understand the importance of establishing strategic partnerships for the development of the Brazilian BID, contributing to the dissemination of knowledge in the area.

In addition, it is a qualitative descriptive research. Research with this characteristic does not intend to generalize the results in a probabilistic way, and can be understood as a set of interpretative practices, which seek to describe phenomena, situations and contexts, detailing how they are and manifest (SAMPIERI; COLLADO; LUCIO, 1997). With regard to data collection, various academic works concerning the topic addressed are used as main sources, including articles, books and magazines, in addition to Brazilian government's official publications.

Besides the introduction, the article is divided into four sections. The first section concerns the theoretical perspective and the concepts that guide the analysis. The second and third sections present F-X2 and Guarani strategic programs, respectively. Finally, the last section refers to the conclusion and analysis of the results.

2 Theoretical Framework

2.1 Theory of Structural Power: the four sides of the pyramid

Susan Strange (1994) considers that there are two main types of power in international relations: *Relational Power* and *Structural Power*. The former is defined as "the power of A to get to B to do something they would not otherwise do" (STRANGE, 1994, p. 24). On the other hand, the latter is the one capable of influencing others.

Strange (1994) defines four structures that compose Structural Power: *production, finance, security, and knowledge*. For the author, in general terms, all the structures of this power have in common the ability to shape and determine the direction of global economic policy, exercising control without using force.

Such structures are represented graphically by means of a four-sided pyramid, where each side represents a structure through which power is exercised in particular situations (Figure 1). It is worth mentioning that although the author has not defined a hierarchy between these structures, knowledge and security are the most important for this article, given their importance for scientific and technological development, especially with regard to the defense industry.

Figure 1 – Graphical representation of the Structural Power four-sided pyramid

Source: Strange (1994, p. 27)

The production structure is configured according to what gives health to the economy and the individuals' working condition, how they organize themselves, and what they produce (STRANGE, 1994). In other words, it is the structure that underlies almost all economic policies, since organized societies depend on production for well-being creation. There is a link between power and production: changes in the power relationship affect production, just as changes in production interfere with/change the social relations of power. This statement is confirmed by two major changes that have occurred in recent times: the rise of the capitalist model and the gradual change in production, which previously aimed at satisfying the national market, and currently seeks the global market.

The finance structure is basically based on granting and creation of credit, in addition to currency exchange (STRANGE, 1994). Credit creation is shared between governments and banks. On the other hand, the monetary system is determined by government policies and the market. In general terms, this structure refers to agreements that deal with the availability of credit and the factors that determine the terms of currency exchange. It is the product of a global system defined by domestic policies, and it is a paradox; at the same time it crosses borders, it legitimizes the national State. It is characterized by being the "driving force for the development of States in the nineteenth century" (CARPES, 2006, p. 43, our translation).

The security structure is the definition according to the realistic ideal. In general, it is a structure built around State institutions. Relations between States are of great importance for this security structure, in terms of providing stability for the world economy and, as cited by Carpes (2006), at the systemic level, it is the capacity of State actors to be the only ones able to employ the legitimate use of force.

However, the security structure is also related to military expenditures that are capable of boosting technological development, expanding positive externalities, and generating spin-off effects.[2] As evidenced by the author (STRANGE, 1987), the United States dominates the security structure due to high military expenditures, contributing to the development of new military technologies, which later can also be incorporated into the civilian environment.

Therefore, one can notice a profound relationship between security structure and knowledge structure. With regard to the knowledge structure, it is noteworthy that it should not be analyzed apart from the others, since they have mutual interactions (STRANGE, 1994). The knowledge structure determines the development of science and technology as important sources of power. Based on social values, it gives value to material resources. The consolidation of the dominant capitalist mode of production took place with the First Industrial Revolution, which has since started to value the material and, consequently, the issues promoted by science and technology (CARPES, 2006).

Knowledge is owned by a group of specific people and used as a source of influence. It is an instrument of domination, as it points "to a direction, by creating the foundations on which the rest of society will order itself" (CARPES, 2006, p. 44, our translation). It produces technological innovations, which optimize production in the global market. This occurs through the specialization of labor, invested by State and private apparatuses.

The importance of science and technology in international relations goes beyond the sense of capitalist development, as it is present in political relations between States. That said, the possession of knowledge fostered by a strong security structure and, consequently, of the technological apparatus, is understood as a resource of power and dominance. Control over the knowledge structure, therefore, is paramount for the development of the defense industry, since it concentrates power in the hands of those who hold it, without explicitly showing significant coercive influence over the others. In general, knowledge is the development of technologies, a source of dispute between States, and, above all, a source of power. Therefore, it is necessary to maintain the development of the national defense industry in the State's hands by strengthening the security structure. This guarantees the defense of national sovereignty and maintains the *status quo*, if it does not increase it. In this sense, in an international scenario in which States must guarantee their security and survival, investing in knowledge and security structures, developing sensitive technologies and the defense industry is a central element to expand the country's autonomy and its deterrent capacity in relation to the others States, strengthening its international projection.

---

2   Spin-off: "spillover effect or 'splash' of technological and economic results triggered by military spending in the defense sector for the civilian sector of the economy" (DAGNINO, 2008, p. 46, our translation).

2.2 Cooperation from the perspective of Neoliberal Institutionalism

There are several theories in the area of International Relations with different perspectives on cooperation. For example, the realistic aspect understands that the origin of relations between States lies in human nature, and as individuals seek their own interests and power, conflict occurs easily; therefore, community ties are easily broken by the search for advantages. In its turn, constructivism affirms that cooperation should not be explained only through the lens of political and economic interest, since it arose if related to a normative nature that reflects an ethical and human concern. On the other hand, the Marxist perspective sees cooperation as a tool for maximizing the domination of States that are at the center of the capitalist world. Such States aim to get closer to control and exploit developing countries (AYLLÓN, 2007).

According to Axelrod and Keohane (1985), authors of Neoliberal Institutionalism, cooperation is difficult to be achieved, given the political reality of the international system characterized by anarchy. However, international politics is not associated with a permanent state of war, and there is the possibility of cooperation. In this way, the authors make a distinction between the terms "cooperation" and "harmony," where the former corresponds to the total alignment of interests and the latter is related to the adjustment of behavior to achieve the complementarity of interests between the actors involved (AXELROD; KEOHANE, 1985). The idea present in these distinctions is that it is possible to cooperate even in the face of certain conflicts between the parties.

The purposes and motivations of cooperation vary, and may be mainly associated with diplomatic, developmental, commercial, and humanitarian interests. Historically, issues related to security and defense have been more influenced by anarchy compared to political and economic relations, due to the level of institutionalization presented by these two structures. As a way of understanding the successes and failures in the attempts at cooperation both in the political and economic sphere and in the security and defense sphere, it is important to address three factors: the mutuality of interests, the shadow of the future, and the number of actors (AXELROD; KEOHANE, 1985).

The *mutuality of interests* involves the actors' perceptions that lead to the definition of their own interests. The process by which such interests are pursued and preferences determined is fundamental to understand the degree of mutuality, both in the military and in the economic area, although the latter is apparently less conflictive. Although military issues involve a greater number of points of disagreement, this does not mean that this will be the scenario in all cases of defense cooperation (AXELROD; KEOHANE, 1985). It can be said that the greater the degree of mutual interest, the greater the tendency to establish lasting partnerships.

The *shadow of the future* concerns what may happen in the relationship between the actors involved in the cooperation. Its perpetuation involves expectations about the future, regularity in interactions, information about the actions of the actors and fast notification in case of change of attitude (AXELROD; KEOHANE, 1985). This aspect is closely linked to the reduction of information asymmetries.

Coleç. Meira Mattos, Rio de Janeiro, v. 15, n. 52, p. 1-20, January/April 2021

7

The *number of actors* affects the governments' ability to cooperate. Reciprocity can be an effective strategy in promoting cooperation. However, when there are many actors involved, the conditions for aligning interests are difficult (AXELROD; KEOHANE, 1985). That is, the fewer actors, the easier the negotiations will be.

The barriers imposed by the assumption that States are rational and act selfishly can be overcome by bringing governments closer together, stimulated to practice reciprocity in situations of distinct conflicting and complementary interests. The condition for the success of such reciprocity starts from the idea that mutual cooperation produces better results than mistrust (AXELROD; KEOHANE, 1985).

Given the above, it is worth mentioning that decision making is strongly influenced by the perception that the actors have of their own problems, especially when it comes to the area of security. And, despite the existence of independent States that aim at maintaining sovereignty and power, it is possible to seek approximation so that mutual interests are achieved in the economic and military areas. In this way, even with the realities of an anarchic international system, beneficial forms of cooperation can be promoted, increasing the States' action capacity in the face of the challenges of international relations (AXELROD; KEOHANE, 1985).

In short, the neoliberal institutionalist dimension does not consider total harmony between the actors of cooperation to be necessary, emphasizing the constant need to adjust interests so that mutual gains are achieved. Such a view is related to the concept of strategic partnership presented in the introduction of this article, in view of the fact that it makes the fact that a bilateral relationship can be rationally deepened in the face of a scenario that imposes challenges understandable. Such partnerships aim to achieve shared or complementary goals, generating better consequences than pessimism regarding the governments' ability to cooperate.

2.3 Grand Strategy: a multifaceted policy

Celso Amorim, as defense minister, pointed out that the Grand Strategy adopted by Brazil aims to contribute to the maintenance of world peace, through the combination of foreign policy and defense policy. In this context, the objective of protecting Brazilian interests is inserted, based on diplomacy and the permanent support for defense policy, where soft power,[3] marked by beneficial cooperation with other countries in the region, or extra-regional ones, will be reinforced by hard power,[4] by deterring threats and contributing to collaboration with other countries in the military sphere (AMORIM, 2013).

In this way, it can be said that the country's Grand Strategy refers to a multifaceted policy developed from the resources available domestically and from the existing opportunities at

---

3   Soft power: considered a mild form of power, since it induces other actors to act in accordance with certain concepts and ideas, without the need for the use of warlike capabilities (NYE, 2002).

4   Hard power: it involves concrete actions such as coercion, induction and deterrence, most commonly associated with the military power of a given state (NYE, 2002).

the international level to defend the State's interests. As you can see, the development of a grand strategy involves the coordination of different actors and areas – diplomacy, military, development – to advance interests and guarantee the country's sovereignty.

Due to the Brazilian pacifist character, the former minister points out the difficulty in preparing the Armed Forces in the face of possible external threats. Thus, he established two axes as challenges for their improvement: i) reorganization and reorientation, and ii) organization of the National Defense Industry, observing the importance of development policy. He also mentions the END, which defines the three strategic nuclear, cybernetics and aerospace sectors where Brazil seeks to obtain technological autonomy.

In view of the above, it can be said that the concept addressed, as a strategic vision of international insertion, has an intimate relationship with foreign policy, defense and development, since it "refers to the need to use the full range of resources available for the State, and not just military resources, to maintain its security" (AMORIM, 2012, p. 133, our translation).

For the Brazilian Grand Strategy to be effective, it is necessary to strengthen a Structural Power focused on technological development, closely linked to the BID. However, such development cannot be achieved on its own, mainly due to its fiscal limitations. In this context, cooperation through strategic partnerships established with countries with sensitive technologies emerges as an alternative for progress, as it will be demonstrated by analysis of the Brazilian strategic partnerships with regard to the development of the programs presented in the following sections.

3 Brazil-Sweden partnership: the F-X2 Program

In the Brazilian case, the aeronautical industry is one of the few industries with high technological density in the country, achieving a prominent position in the international aircraft market. The leading company in the Brazilian aeronautical sector is *Empresa Brasileira de Aeronáutica S.A.* (EMBRAER), whose own history is confused with the development of the sector at the national level.

However, in the late 1990s, the Brazilian Air Force (FAB) found itself with a considerable deficit in its fighter fleet, largely due to changes in the international scenario that slowed the development of the sector. In this context of need to renew the Brazilian fleet, FX program was announced in 1997, during Fernando Henrique Cardoso government (1995-2003), as part of a broader program called *Plano Fênix⁵* (ANDRADE; LIMA, 2018). The FX program would take place in three phases: (1) receipt of offer proposals; (2) elaboration of a list of the best options in cost-benefit terms, analyzing competing companies, and (3) hiring of the company chosen. It is worth mentioning that in this period creating a project with local manufacture of a new fighter was analyzed, but it was considered unfeasible because it has very high costs and a long-term completion (BONACINA et al., 2018).

---

5   Plano Fênix: launched in 1996, characterized by a broad program that sought to modernize the FAB, replacing the most obsolete vectors and increasing the Force operation capacity.

In 2000, the Brazilian government announced the creation of the Program to Strengthen the Control of the Brazilian Air Space (PFCEAB), whose objective was to maintain the intention to re-equip the FAB, providing the necessary conditions to carry out an international bidding process involving the F-X program. However, the acquisition was delayed in early 2003. The then Minister of Defense of Lula government (2003-2011), José Viegas Filho, justified the postponement based on the fact that the priorities of government spending were focused on social areas, especially in the fight against hunger and social programs (ANDRADE; LIMA, 2018).

As a way to resolve the issue concerning the renewal of the Brazilian aircraft fleet, the government decided to launch the proposal for the acquisition of used aircraft, seeking an alternative solution. In 2005, the Brazilian government, faced with some possibilities, opted to buy 12 Mirage 2000-5 from France, reducing the cost of the FX project from US$ 700 million to less than US$ 171 million (ANDRADE; LIMA, 2018). However, in the same year, the government announced that said project would be canceled, arguing that it considered the F-X model unambitious and problematic in some aspects (BONACINA et al., 2018).

Between the indefiniteness of the F-X program and the announcement of the F-X2 program, the Brazilian internal context was not favorable to major military acquisitions. The Ministry of Defense was experiencing political tensions, considering that civil aviation, still linked to the body, was presenting problems related to air accidents, delays, and strikes. The crisis situation allowed the then defense minister, Nelson Jobim, to propose broad reforms for the sector, with the objective of creating a strategic plan capable of focusing on armament acquisitions that would allow the development of technologies within the scope of the Brazilian BID (ANDRADE; LIMA, 2018).

In 2006, with the intention of contributing to the modernization of the Armed Forces, President Lula announced the revitalization of the F-X program, which became F-X2, with correction to the imperfections of the previous project. Thus, the manufacturer nation would have to transfer technology to Brazil as an F-X2 requirement. This meant that, at the end of an evaluation carried out with six companies, three models that could compete were selected, namely: *Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornet*; *Dassault Rafale*; and *Saab Gripen NG* (BONACINA et al., 2018). It is worth mentioning that one of the reasons for the revitalization of the F-X program was due to the fact that it had a long execution process, being technologically out of date. Some fighters, like the *Mirage 2000* and the *Gripen C/D*, were no longer being manufactured.

In this period of reactivation of the project for re-equipping the FAB, South America was experiencing a huge increase in military expenditure and armament acquisition. The broad economic growth and the improvement of socioeconomic indicators were the main drivers for this scenario. In foreign policy, Brazil started to adopt a more assertive stance, and increased expenditure and reorganization of the defense sector returned to be part of the Brazilian government's public policy agendas.

With regard to the competition for aircraft production, it can be said that *Rafale*, the French model, had political advantage. One of the reasons for this advantage was the approach to France in the defense sector, resulting in the agreement to build conventional and nuclear submarines – the theme of the previous section – and the purchase of 50 *Eurocopter EC725* helicopters for the Armed Forces. Despite the political advantage, there was strong resistance

from the military to the choice of the French model, mainly due to the high cost and a history of contractual problems between the European country and the FAB. In short, there was some suspicion about the French willingness to fully transfer the technology used in manufacturing the *Rafale*. Even with the aforementioned dissatisfaction, the tendency towards signing an agreement with France under the F-X2 scope remained unchanged (UBIRATAN, 2014).

However, in Dilma Rousseff government (2011-2016), after analyzing the proposals, the government's preference became to be Boeing's offer, as it would allow a strategic approach with the United States. From the military point of view, the advantage of this model was characterized by operational issues. However, there was a suspicion that the US Congress would not accept arms exports or technology transfer requested in the contract. Subsequently, the espionage scandal on the Internet involving classified government documents and Brazilian state-owned companies like Petrobras, revealed by Edward Snowden, caused the Brazilian government to abandon the idea of establishing a strategic partnership with the United States (UBIRATAN, 2014).

At the end of 2013, after years of discussion about the direction of FX and F-X2 programs, the then Minister of Defense, Celso Amorim, announced that the Saab company, with its *Gripen-NG* model, had been chosen in the international competition for FAB modernization. According to the minister, the choice was based on studies and considerations on performance, technology transfer, and acquisition and maintenance costs (UBIRATAN, 2014).

On October 24, 2014, the offset contract for the acquisition of 36 *Gripen-NG* fighters – 28 units for one pilot and eight for two crew members – was entered into, with the first delivery scheduled for 2019 and the last in 2024, with a total investment estimated at R$ 13 billion. It is worth mentioning that this is the largest contract in the history of the Swedish company, and the Brazilian government will have the funds for project payment supplied through a loan from the Swedish Export Credit Corporation (SEK), Swedish export credit agency (ANDRADE; LIMA, 2018).

In 2015, about 50 Brazilian engineers and technicians went to Sweden to receive training according to their roles in the program. They were the first of more than 350 Brazilians to be involved in this intense technology transfer program until the end of the production of the fighters. The agreement entered into between Brazil and Sweden comprises the largest technology transfer agreement ever made by the European country (BRAZILIAN..., 2019). In addition to training Brazilian professionals, EMBRAER will take the lead in local aircraft manufacturing and will count on the participation of other national companies such as AEL, Akaer, Atech and SBTA. The Brazilian companies' involvement in the program enables the development of the domestic capacity to design and produce *Gripen-NG* fighters in the future, meaning an important technological leap for Brazilian industry. The 36 multi-mission fighters will be used by the FAB for activities in air defense, policing, attack, and airspace reconnaissance.

According to Saab's proposal, about 40% of the fighters, and up to 80% of their structure, will be produced in Brazil. To this end, in 2016, the Gripen Design and Development Network (GDDN) was inaugurated at the EMBRAER plant in Gavião Peixoto, in the state of São Paulo. The GDDN is considered the center of technological development of *Gripen* in Brazil and currently employs about 105 Brazilian engineers, and 280 engineers may be employed throughout the years of the program. In addition, in 2018 the facilities of *Saab Aeronáutica e Montagens* (SAM) were completed, located in the city of São Bernardo do Campo, in the state of São Paulo.

SAM will produce aerostructural segments for the Brazilian *Gripen* and, by 2020 the entire area production will be ready to start working in the production of the parts (BRAZILIAN..., 2019).

Despite the apparent Swedish intention to actually transfer technology and to internalize the production process in the Brazilian industry, it can be said that there is a disadvantage in choosing this model, since some systems present in *Gripen-NG* are from other countries, as the United States, with the possibility of an embargo, since SAAB is not the owner of the intellectual property of such systems. However, in view of the interdependence that exists in the international market, it is difficult for a company to be able to fully manufacture parts, systems, processors and other technologies that involve the production of materials with a high technological level.

Even with the issue of intellectual property and possible embargo regarding the transfer of some systems, it can be said that F-X2 program encompasses a wide debate on BID national companies' training and the consequent scientific and technological progress in Brazil. In this way, the strategic partnership with Sweden can expand defense cooperation in South America and increase the importance of the Brazilian BID for the country's foreign trade. If such expectations are realized, the Grand Strategy will be put into practice, since it will depend both on the articulation between foreign policy and defense and on the expansion of cooperation with the region (ANDRADE; LIMA, 2018).

With the development of *Gripen-NG* through a strategic partnership with Sweden, Brazil will be able to achieve the status of holder of the most advanced aircraft in Latin America. Through technology transfer and internalization of production, Brazil would become a reference in military technology, being able to export its equipment to other countries in the region (BONACINA et al., 2018). In general terms, it can be said that Brazil has been achieving its main objective through the F-X2 program, which is to modernize the fighter fleet. The offset agreement with Sweden has an important meaning for the national strategy, since it boosts the country's autonomy and international prestige (BONACINA et al., 2018).

Despite the strategic importance of the program in question for the development of the Brazilian BID, a sensitive point that can be noted in this case study is the time spent to finally decide on the models and manufacturer, and five presidential administrations were necessary to come to some conclusion. This long period of uncertainty can be attributed to complexity and different interest groups at national and international levels (SILVEIRA et al., 2018). Recently, on August 26, 2019, the first *Gripen-NG* made its maiden flight in Sweden, marking an important moment in the strategic partnership between Brazil and this country (BRAZILIAN..., 2019).

4 Brazil-Italy partnership: the Guarani Program

Since 1970, Brazil has been able to build an important tradition in the tank industry, especially through the manufacture of Urutu and Cascavel armored vehicles. Both vehicles were developed by the extinct Engesa, which for a long time has exported armored models used by

the EB (Brazilian Army) and other Armed Forces around the world. Despite the stimulus to Brazilian war material export, mainly driven by the War between Iran and Iraq (1979-1988), Engesa declared bankruptcy and ended its activities in 1993. The company's concentration in the markets of the Middle East and Africa was one of the factors responsible for its collapse, considering that the countries of these regions cut imports of large arms. As a result of Engesa bankruptcy, Brazil lost expertise in the development of armored vehicles (DIAS; SANTOS; RAMOS, 2018).

Since 1998, the Army General Staff has realized the need to create a new family of armored vehicles capable of contributing to the renovation of existing units. However, the activity of developing armored vehicles in Brazil was only resumed in 2005, when the Army Technological Center (CETex) developed a project to meet existing needs. In March 2006, through studies of technical and economic feasibility, it was concluded that new armored vehicles would be produced through the creation of the New Family of Armored On Wheels (NFBR) program, aiming to recreate the Brazilian capacity to produce armored vehicles in national territory for its Armed Forces (PINOTTI, 2018).

The NFBR program consists of two subfamilies: the Light Wheeled Multi-Task Armored Vehicle (VBMT-LR) and the Wheeled Medium Armored Personnel Carrier (VBTP-MR). The former aims at the development of an armored 4x4 multi-task vehicle. However, this project is still in the initial phase of implementation, in view of the Brazilian budgetary reality that restricts the continuity of the program. The latter, called Guarani, aims to create a base platform of armored 6x6 personnel carrier vehicle, that is, it is a vehicle designed to safely transport a group to the combat area (PINOTTI, 2018).

In the context of the implementation of part of the NFBR program, Guarani strategic program was designed to modernize the Military Cavalry Organizations and transform the Motorized Infantry into Mechanized Infantry. Such a strategic project is based on the most recent trends and current technological advances. Having the END as a premise, the project contributes to the development of new capacities, since it strengthens the Brazilian industry by obtaining dual employment technology.

After defining the project, the EB launched the process to select the company that would produce the armored vehicle jointly with the institution. The process was extensive, with the participation of several companies in the sector. However, it was decided to establish a strategic partnership with FIAT, the Italian company, which designated IVECO, its internal division. In this way, the vehicle was designed so that the parts available in the Brazilian auto parts market were used, keeping it cheap and easy to maintain, and also stimulating the national industry through technical management together with the Italian automaker. In the vehicle manufacturing process, in order to guarantee technology transfer, the EB maintains a team of three full-time engineers who compose the knowledge absorption team (PINOTTI, 2018). Thus, with the presence of engineers at the factory, Brazil is again developing its expertise lost with Engesa bankruptcy, taking note of all stages of production of the vehicle and equipment attached to it.

The logistical strategy of the program in question seeks integration with the BID through partnerships with national companies that meet operational requirements and are able to sustain the program, from its conception to the maintenance of military means. The strategic partnership with IVECO is a cooperation program in which means and costs are shared, as well as a high technological level.

Initially, the program provided for the acquisition of 2,044 VBTP-MR units, but with the budget reduction, there was a reassessment of planning, with an estimated acquisition of 1,783 armored vehicles by the year 2038. In view of the budgetary reality, it is necessary to organize activities in order to achieve the objectives. The Guarani Program magnitude requires an adequate analysis of the EB budget in view of the costs of each project that makes up the program (SANTOS, 2018).

Investments in the new VBTP-MR are justified due to their greater mobility and firepower. Thus, Guarani is able to react effectively to threats present in the national territory, making it possible to act in a wide range of environments in different Brazilian regions. This characteristic is a crucial factor for the confidence of the Brazilian Armed Forces in the vehicle.

In 2012, IVECO delivered the first Guarani to the EB for evaluation evaluated by the Army Evaluation Center, and has been approved in all aspects and employed officially since March 2013. The results of the armored model in question enabled development of new products, such as the 8x8 version with greater armored protection and a more powerful engine. This new version started to be elaborated in 2015; however, the Army Bulletin of December 1, 2017 informed its suspension for budgetary reasons (BRASIL, 2017).

The strategy of the Guarani program sought integration with existing systems in the other Armed Forces, with a view to interoperability in the transportation of VBTP-MR in C-130 and KC-390 aircraft in joint operations. This integration was present in other public bodies when Guarani units were employed in the 2014 World Cup and in the 2016 Olympic Games, strengthening Brazil's national defense system (DIAS; SANTOS; RAMOS, 2018).

The activities in the program contribute to promoting science, technology and innovation in the country. With the development of all subfamilies, Guarani will bring benefits to Brazilian society, since it contributes to extra-regional deterrence and implements an effective investment in research, development and innovation. At the same time, it incorporates new technologies from all fields of knowledge applicable to modern conflicts and to the development of the Brazilian BID (DIAS; SANTOS; RAMOS, 2018).

Although it is still too early to evaluate the results of the strategic partnership between the EB and the Italian company, the program can be considered successful, since some units are already in operation, and others are still being manufactured. Using Guarani in actions, such as those of Guarantee of Law and Order, serves to improve the material and test in real situations, showing its capabilities, limitations, possibilities and characteristics (PINOTTI, 2018).

The fact that EB owns the armored vehicle intellectual property, with a team of engineers working at the IVECO factory to ensure technology transfer plus a large number of

armored vehicles ordered means that the companies that make up the project, especially the Italian company, remain in Brazil, fulfilling the main objective of the program: to restore the production capacity of armored vehicles in the national territory. In addition, some South American and Arab countries have already shown interest in acquiring Guarani (PINOTTI, 2018).

According to General Cristino (2011), one can point out as positive points of the program: (1) the development of the national ballistic steel industrial process; (2) company established in the country capable of producing state-of-the-art armored vehicles and weapon systems; (3) lower terms and costs compared to similar programs; (4) internalization of knowledge in the country; (5) promotion of national companies, and (6) the EB commanding and controlling. It is worth mentioning that a vehicle with similar characteristics would cost 30% more in the international market and the simple acquisition abroad would not generate jobs and taxes in Brazil, nor would it contribute to improving the Brazilian BID (AMARANTE, 2013). Therefore, it is concluded that the Guarani program, through the technology transfer process from the Italian company, reinforces the Brazilian technological capacity, and it is aligned with the END.

5   Final Remarks

Faced with the challenge of overcoming vulnerabilities, in order to guarantee its sovereignty and development in a competitive international context, Brazil reshaped the look at the defense area, recognizing the importance of the issue at the national level. This recognition was translated into the END (BRASIL, 2012), having as one of the structuring axes the BID and its reorganization for the formulation of a consistent defense policy. In this context, the establishment of strategic partnerships is paramount for the country to acquire the ability to master sensitive technologies through knowledge transfer provided by this type of agreement.

Thus, this article aimed to analyze the strategic partnerships in the defense area of Brazil, in the context of the execution of F-X2 and Guarani programs, highlighting their challenges, particularities, and possibilities. The chart below (Chart 1) summarizes the analysis presented throughout the article, showing the programs, their objectives, their relationship with the Grand Strategy and how they help improve the Brazilian BID.

Chart 1 – Strategic programs

	Strategic Programs	
	FX-2	Guarani
Strategic Partner	Sweden	Italy
Partnership objective	Production of 36 Gripen-NG aircraft	Production of 1,783 armored vehicles
Start Year	2014	2007

Table 5 – Continuation

	Strategic Programs	
	FX-2	**Guarani**
Completion Forecast	2023	2038
Relation with the Grand Strategy	Take the country to a new aerospace level	Modernization and resumption of the Brazilian capacity to produce armored vehicles nationally
Technology Transfer Forecast	Yes	Yes
Key Elements of BID Increment	Local manufacturing, participation of national companies and human training	Dual employment technology, use of national parts, knowledge absorption team and interoperability

Source: The authors (2020)

Returning to the central concepts of the work, the theory of Structural Power, developed by Strange (1994), evidenced the importance of investing in security and knowledge structures, since through them it is possible to increase the autonomy in strategic sectors and expand the capacity of international projection of the country. This theory is related to the case studies, considering that the strategic partnerships analyzed are inserted in the context of resumption of public policies aimed at the development of the national BID, based on the perception of the Brazilian deficit in operational means and military materials. In other words, the mastery of security and knowledge structures contributes to the country's capacity to control the source of power, instrumentalizing it as a necessary influencer in the progress of the national defense industry.

Through Neoliberal Institutionalism, the contributions of Axelrod and Keohane (1985) helped understand cooperation in defense, even in an anarchic international scenario.

The distinction between the terms "cooperation" and "harmony" is fundamental to the idea that strategic partnerships can be deepened based on rationality and constant adjustment of interests among the actors involved. Therefore, the strategic agreements entered into within the scope of the programs analyzed represent the ability to cooperate in defense in practice and demonstrate that the achievement of shared or complementary goals generates good results.

The application of the Grand Strategy concept is justified by its ability to connect with cooperation through an assertive foreign policy, creating an awareness focused on the importance of the capacity for deterrence, economic development, and the search for autonomy at the international level. Starting from the concept in question, the Brazilian State, as a provider of peace and domestic security, needs to develop defense mechanisms to be able to defend its individuals and, mainly, its sovereignty. Therefore, F-X2 and Guarani strategic programs represent important initiatives of the Brazilian State when trying to put into practice part of its Grand Strategy, having the relationship between diplomacy, defense and development.

Despite the still initial process of restructuring the Brazilian BID, it can be concluded that strategic partnerships assume a fundamental role in the objective of revitalizing and achieving national progress, since Brazil would not have the financial capacity and expertize to develop certain capacities autonomously.

Even with the recognition of the strategic character of the programs addressed for development of the BID, knowing how to manage knowledge is essential for the innovation process to be maintained and the results to be extended. In other words, a holistic view of the defense structure needs to be adopted, correcting distortions that involve disarticulation and fragmentation of the elements that compose it (CUNHA; AMARANTE, 2011). The real perception of innovation and of the need for interconnections between the actors involved in the process creates a supportive environment that triggers policies and actions that are increasingly efficient in generating conditions that increase productivity, competitiveness, economic growth and national development, aiming at autonomy in areas strategic for National Defense (SCHONS; PRADO FILHO; GALDINO, 2020).

Thus, it is concluded that despite the relevance of these projects, which have limitations and potential, the capabilities of the Brazilian Defense Industry must be constantly expanded and improved, guaranteeing national sovereignty and positive externalities. In this sense, studies that address Brazil's National Innovation System in a more specific way and the need to change the organizational culture, with the aim of expanding the potential for transforming investments into concrete results, are paramount, and come together with the analytical effort performed here. Additionally, the Defense Modernization Trilemma is suggested as an analytical tool to deepen the understanding of case studies, as suggested by Patrice Franko (2013). According to the author, intermediate countries that need to modernize their Armed Forces in the face of a context with budgetary limitations and technological industrial capacity, such as the case of Brazil, face the so-called Trilemma. This occurs when a country fails to harmonize economic sustainability, strategic autonomy and insertion in the global value chain. However, if we consider the cases presented, we can see that Brazil has been relatively successful in dealing with the Trilemma, diversifying global strategic partners, with a view to promoting economic sustainability and greater integration in the global value chain, without abandoning issues involving their autonomy (FRANKO, 2013). A more in-depth analysis of each case based on these variables can foster interesting conclusions.

References

AMARANTE, J. C. **Base Industrial de Defesa Brasileira**. Rio de Janeiro: Ipea, 2012.

AMARANTE, J. C. **Processo de obtenção de tecnologia militar**. Rio de Janeiro: Ipea, 2013.

AMORIM, C. Defesa Nacional e pensamento estratégico brasileiro. **Política Hoje**, Recife, v. 21, n. 2, p. 330-349, 2012.

AMORIM, C. Grande estratégia e poder naval em um mundo em fluxo. **Revista da Escola de Guerra Naval**, Rio de Janeiro, v. 19, n. 2, p. 253-267, jul./dez. 2013.

ANDRADE, I. O.; LIMA, R. C. **Parcerias estratégicas na agenda tecnológica de defesa: o caso Brasil-Suécia**. Brasília, DF: Ipea, 2018.

AXELROD, R.; KEOHANE, R. O. Achieving cooperation under anarchy: strategies and institutions. **World Politics**, Cambridge, v. 38, n. 1, p. 226-254, 1985.

AYLLÓN, B. La cooperación internacional para el desarrollo: fundamentos y justificaciones en la perspectiva de la teoría de las relaciones internacionales. **Carta Internacional**, Belo Horizonte, v. 2, n. 2, p. 32-41, out. 2007.

BLANCO, L. F. M. Y. **Parceria estratégica**: a linguagem que constitui as relações entre a Rússia e a União Europeia. 2009. Dissertação (Mestrado em Relações Internacionais) – Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, 2009.

BONACINA, A.; LOPES, J.; VIEIRA, M.; CASSEL, R. O acordo de compensação offset entre Brasil e Suécia: o Projeto F-x2 e o Gripen Ng. **Revista Perspectiva**, Porto Alegre, v. 11, n. 21, p. 45-64, 2018.

BRANDS, H. **What good is grand strategy?** Power and purpose in American statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014.

BRASIL. Ministério da Defesa. **Estratégia Nacional de Defesa**. Brasília, DF: Ministério da Defesa, 2012. Available at: https://bit.ly/2Cbfiir. Access on: 23 mar. 2020.

BRASIL. Secretaria Geral do Exército. **Boletim do Exército nº 48/2017**. Brasília, DF: Ministério da Defesa, 1 dez. 2017.

BRASIL. Ministério da Defesa. **Base Industrial de Defesa (BID)**. Brasília, DF: Ministério da Defesa, 2019. Available at: https://bit.ly/3ep6til. Access on: 23 mar. 2020.

BRAZILIAN Gripen Programme – A history of milestones. **SAAB**, [S. l.], 26 sept. 2019. Available at: https://bit.ly/2OlnDmg. Access on: 13 out. 2019.

BREUNING, M. **Foreign policy analysis**: a comparative introduction. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

CARPES, M. **A política nuclear brasileira no contexto das relações internacionais contemporâneas**. Domínio tecnológico como estratégia de inserção internacional. 2006. Dissertação (Mestrado em Relações Internacionais) – Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, 2006.

CRISTINO, W. **O Programa Guarani, relatório técnico sobre o carro de combate IVECO**. [S. l.: s. n.], 2011.

CUNHA, M. B.; AMARANTE, J. C. O livro branco e a base científica, tecnológica, industrial e logística de defesa. **Revista da Escola de Guerra Naval**, Rio de Janeiro, v. 17, n. 1, p. 11-32, 2011.

DAGNINO, R. Em que a economia de defesa pode ajudar nas decisões sobre a revitalização da indústria de defesa brasileira? **OIKOS**, Rio de Janeiro, n. 9, ano VII, p. 113-137, 2008.

DIAS, L. L. G. S.; SANTOS, A. C.; RAMOS, C. E. F. A nova Estratégia Nacional de Defesa e o alinhamento do programa estratégico Guarani do Exército Brasileiro. **Revista da Escola Superior de Guerra**, [S. l.], v. 33, n. 69, p. 174-197, 2018.

FRANKO, P. The defense acquisition trilemma: the case of Brazil. In: CONFERENCE OF FORTE DE COPACABANA INTERNATIONAL SECURITY A EUROPEAN-SOUTH AMERICAN DIALOGUE, 10., 2013, Rio de Janeiro. **Anais** […]. Washington, DC: INSS, 2013.

GEORGE, A.; BENNETT, A. **Case studies and theory development in the social sciences**. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005.

GRASSI, J. Parceria estratégica nas relações internacionais: aportes teóricos e o caso brasileiro. **Brazilian Journal of International Relations**, Marília, v. 8, n. 3, p. 616-650, set./dez. 2019.

HART, L. B. H. **Strategy**. New York: Penguin, 1991.

LESSA, A. C. A diplomacia universalista do Brasil: a construção do sistema contemporâneo de relações bilaterais. **Brazilian Journal of International Relations**, Brasília, v. 41, p. 29-41, 1998.

MELO, R. **Indústria de defesa e desenvolvimento estratégico**: estudo comparado França-Brasil. Brasília, DF: Funag, 2015.

NYE, J. S. **Paradoxo do poder americano**. São Paulo: Ed. Unesp, 2002.

PINOTTI, L. A. Avaliando a implementação do programa VBTP-MR Guarani. In: PEDONE, L.; VEDUNG, E. (org.). **Avaliação de políticas públicas**: programas militares complexos. Rio de Janeiro: Luzes, 2018. p. 165-186.

PORTER, P. **Sharing power?** Prospects for a US concert-balance strategy. Carlisle: US War College Press, 2013.

ROSENDO, R. C.; LIMA, Á. M. S. Programa de desenvolvimento de submarinos – avaliação do processo de transferência de tecnologia e nacionalização da produção. In: PEDONE. L.; VEDUNG. E. (org.). **Avaliação de políticas públicas**: programas militares complexos. Rio de Janeiro: Luzes, 2018. p. 19-44.

SAMPIERI, R. H.; COLLADO, C. F.; LUCIO, P. B. **Metodología de la Investigación**. Ciudad de Mexico: McGraw Hill, 1997.

SANTOS, A. C. **A governança no setor público e a sua influência sobre a execução do Programa Estratégico do Exército Guarani**. 2018. Dissertação (Mestrado em Ciências Militares) – Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército, Rio de Janeiro, 2018.

SCHONS, D. L.; PRADO FILHO, H. V.; GALDINO, J. F. Política Nacional de Inovação: uma questão de crescimento econômico, desenvolvimento e soberania nacional. **Coleção Meira Mattos**, Rio de Janeiro, v. 14, n. 49, p. 27-50, jan./abr. 2020.

SILVEIRA, C. C.; BOTELHO, D. A.; LIMA, D. F.; MARÇAL, I. S.; CASTRO, S. S.; SILVA, T. R. O Projeto FX-2: uma análise a partir da relação entre a Política Externa e o Planejamento de Defesa Brasileiro. In: CONGRESSO ACADÊMICO SOBRE DEFESA NACIONAL, 15., 2018, Resende. **Anais** […]. Brasília, DF: Ministério da Defesa, 2018.

STRANGE, S. The persistent myth of lost hegemony. **International Organization**, Cambridge, v. 41, n. 4, p. 551-574, 1987.

STRANGE, S. **States and markets**. 2. ed. New York: Continuum, 1994.

UBIRATAN, E. Como o Gripen NG venceu o Programa F-X2. **Aeromagazine**, São Paulo, 2014. Available at: https://bit.ly/3fEQFZW. Access on: 14 jul. 2020.

VAZ, A. C. Parcerias estratégicas no contexto da política exterior brasileira: implicações para o Mercosul. **Brazilian Journal of International Relations**, Brasília, v. 42, n. 2, p. 52-80, jul./dez. 1999.

Insertion of cabotage in transportation of supplies for the 8th Military Region

Implantación del cabotaje en el transporte de suministros a la 8.ª Región Militar

Abstract: Cabotage shipping is a fundamental part of the optimization of transport networks for large volumes of cargo over long distances, with significant potential for expansion considering the extension of the Brazilian maritime coast and a territorial dimension of Brazil. The reduction in transportation costs and, consequently, the logistic costs, is directly linked to the replacement of the current mode of road transportation by cabotage. In this article, two transportation channels of the military supply chain involved in the 8th Military Region were described: the internal and the external. The methodology applied to the research was developed based on the technical knowledge applied to the case of the 8th RM, comparing transport costs between the two modalities. As a result, it was found that with the insertion of cabotage, some routes crossed by road can be suppressed, favoring the reduction of transportation costs for the Brazilian Army in the Eastern Amazon.

Keywords: Cabotage. Military Logistics. Transportation. Amazon.

Newton Carlos de Oliveira Portella ID
Exército Brasileiro, Instituto Militar de Engenharia (IME)
Rio de Janeiro, RJ. Brasil.
newtoncarlos99@gmail.com

Luiz Antônio Silveira Lopes ID
Exército Brasileiro, Instituto Militar de Engenharia (IME)
Rio de Janeiro, RJ. Brasil.
laslopes@ime.eb.br

Orivalde Soares da Silva Júnior ID
Exército Brasileiro, Instituto Militar de Engenharia (IME)
Rio de Janeiro, RJ. Brasil.
orivalde@ime.eb.br

Resumen: La navegación de cabotaje es una parte fundamental para la optimización de las redes de transporte de grandes volúmenes de carga a largas distancias, con un significativo potencial de expansión teniendo en vista la extensión de la costa marítima brasileña y la dimensión territorial de Brasil. La reducción de los costos de transporte y, como consecuencia, de los costos logísticos, está directamente relacionada con el reemplazo del actual modo de transporte por carretera por el cabotaje. En este artículo, se caracterizaron dos canales de transporte de la cadena de suministros militares para la 8.ª Región Militar: el interno y el externo. La metodología aplicada a la investigación se desarrolló con base en los conocimientos técnicos aplicados al caso de la 8.ª RM, comparando los costos de transporte entre los dos modos. Como resultado, se constató que, con la implantación del cabotaje, se podrían eliminar algunas rutas realizadas por el modo de transporte por carretera, lo que favorecería la reducción de los costos de transportes para el Ejército Brasileño en la Amazonia Oriental.

Palabras clave: Cabotaje. Logística Militar. Transportes. Amazonia.

Coleç. Meira Mattos, Rio de Janeiro, v. 15, n. 52, p. 21-37, January/April 2021

21

1 Introduction

Transportation in the Eastern Amazon is hampered by a number of natural factors characteristic of the region. Besides the great distances to be traveled for transportation, the logistic infrastructure is lagged compared to other Brazilian regions. The precariousness of the road, water, airport and rail networks characterizes the region as a challenge for logistics activities. In this work, the focus is on road and waterway transportation.

Administratively, the Brazilian Army divides the national territory into 12 sets of states called Military Regions (RM – *Regiões Militares*). The logistical support is performed by Logistical Military Organizations (OM – *Organizações Militares*) linked to each RM, which are responsible for receiving, controlling, storing and distributing supplies to the OM located in its area of responsibility.

In the specific case of the 8th Military Region (8th RM – *8º Região Militar*), which supports most of the Military Organizations present in the Eastern Amazon, it is imperative the execution of an effective and efficient logistics as a decisive factor for the continuity of the Brazilian Army's action and presence in the region.

In this way, it is latent the challenge of conceiving in the area of 8th RM a logistics capable of adjusting to the multiplicity of working situations, with its nuances and specificities, according to the Campaign Manual EB70-MC-10.238 – Military Terrestrial Logistics (*Manual de Campanha* EB70-MC-10.238 – *Logística Militar Terrestre*) (BRASIL, 2018a). Among the Logistic Units subordinated to the 8th RM, the 8th Supply Warehouse (8th D Sup – *8º Depósito de Suprimento*) is the one that moves the biggest financial volumes and that delivers the biggest quantity of materials to the Battalions supplied.

For each type of material used by the Army, a military classification is assigned according to the purpose of use. Such procurement items are assigned a classification from I to X. Class I supply items are subsistence items for the troop, including animal feed and water. Class II are intendance materials as uniforms, individual equipment, tents, rucksacks and kitchen utensils. Class III are fuels and lubricants. Class IV refer to building materials including equipment. Those of Class V refer to armament and ammunition. Class VI supply items are engineering and cartography. Class VII are information technology, communications, electronics and informatics; those of Class VIII are human and veterinary health. Class IX are those of motomechanization, aviation and naval; and those of class X are the materials not included in the other classes (BRASIL 2018a).

In general, the largest financial volume of transported supplies and with greater constancy refer to classes I, II and V. Two distribution channels were identified for these supply classes:

- The internal network where the distribution of supplies acquired centrally by the 8th Supply Warehouse (8th D Sup) for delivery to Military Organizations (OM) subordinate to the 8th Military Region (8th RM);
- The external network, where the distribution of supplies acquired centrally by the Logistics Command and transported by the Central Transportation Establishment (ECT – *Estabelecimento Central de Transporte*), from Rio de Janeiro to the 8th D Sup in Belém-PA, takes place, using the road transport modality.

The ECT is an Army Military Organization dedicated to the transportation of supplies of various classes by road, based in Rio de Janeiro – RJ, capable of transporting bulk cargo, palletized and containerized, including dangerous cargo, such as the transportation of class V materials (including explosives).

Every year the ECT performs eight regular national supply transportation missions, according to the General Transportation Plan (PGT – *Plano Geral de Transportes*) approved by the Logistics Command (COLOG – *Comando Logístico*). In this plan, the distribution of transports is made in four axes: Amazonian, North, Northeast and South, which are crossed every semester.

ECT road trains have flexible composition according to demand and types of supplies to be transported. According to Toledo (2018), when there are demands greater than the internal capacity of ECT, its means can be complemented by the 2nd Transport Company/21th D Sup, located in São Paulo-SP and the 18th Transport Battalion, located in Campo Grande-MS. Means from other OM may be adjudicated to the ECT for specific missions.

In this context, the cabotage transport is presented as a complementary option to the distribution of supplies by road modality, focusing on the transport made by ECT in the North axis, from Rio de Janeiro-RJ to 8th D Sup, in Belém-PA.

The ECT trains bound for Belém pass through Marabá city, however for administrative reasons; all supplies must be delivered at the 8th D Sup, in Belém, for conference and distribution procedures. After receipt, the supply destined to Marabá follows back, now in the direction of Belém-Marabá, carrying this supply twice (BRASIL, 2017).

Pitz et al. (2017) studied the transportation problem in the same region, using the results of the choice of the lowest cost modalities and the best location for the possible Distribution Centers (CD – *Centros de Distribuição*). The contribution is in inserting the cabotage transport as a new option for the external channel currently made by trucks, as an extension of the transport options beyond the road modality.

The objective of this study is to present the feasibility for the insertion of a waterway sub modality, called cabotage, using containerized cargo, as an alternative to supply the external distribution channel, optimizing the transport of ECT on the north axis and suppressing two road routes in the internal channel, Belém-Marabá and Belém-São Luís.

The methodology applied for this research is in the application of technical knowledge to the case study of the Army's transportation of supplies in the Eastern Amazon region. By comparing road and waterway transport costs to cabotage costs, we find that cabotage presents itself as a viable alternative for transport on the north axis.

The work is structured in five more sections after this introduction. Section 2 presents information about cabotage with a brief comparison of the cargo capacities of water convoys in the United States and the percentage of investments in the transportation sector in relation to the national GDP, two important incentive programs for waterways and the obstacles to the development of cabotage. In section 3 an introduction is made about the logistics in the 8th RM and some bibliographic reviews in the Army manuals and literature on themes similar to the one proposed in this work. Section 4 presents cost analysis for the transport of the 8th RM, with a table of expenditures with personnel and fuel. The values of container transport by cabotage are also presented to compose the value of the minimum cost

reduction. Section 5 discusses the insertion of cabotage as an option to reduce road costs in the transport mission. Also in this section, the advantages and disadvantages of cabotage and for transport done by ECT are presented, as well as the survey of their costs. Finally, section 6 presents the conclusions.

2 Cabotage

According to Law no. 9.432 of January 8, 1997, providing on the ordering of waterway transport, the concept of cabotage transport is defined as that performed between ports or points in the Brazilian territory, using the maritime route or this one and inland waterways (BRASIL, 1997).

Brazil has a territory of continental dimensions, a large maritime coast and a population of more than 200 million inhabitants mostly concentrated along the coast, in a strip of approximately 200 km from the coast. Despite this characteristic favorable to navigation, the road culture has stood out in the transportation of national cargo, resulting from a great incentive, since the 1950s, to build roads at the expense of other modalities of transport, including cabotage navigation.

According to the Ministry of Infrastructure (BRASIL, 2018b), Brazil has 8,500 kilometers of navigable coastline and 21,000 kilometers of economically navigable waterways. In 2017, investments made by the Federal Government in the waterway sector totaled R$ 495.69 million, and the National Confederation of Transportation estimated that R$280.89 billion are needed to resolve structural waterway problems (CNT, 2018). In other words, public investments made in 2017 did not reach 0.2% of the sector's investment needs. In Brazil, it is common for waterways to have low efficiency due to lack of investment in new projects and maintenance of existing ones.

In the United States of America (USA), which is a country of similar geographic extension to Brazil, according to the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (UNITED STATES, 2018) and the United States Army Corps of Engineers (UNITED STATES, 2012), the length of the waterways is 40,200 kilometers. Of this number, about 19,300 kilometers is made up of shallow watercourses (depth of 2.7 to 4.3 meters) and 33,700 kilometers of deep channels of more than 4.7 meters. The information shows that the U.S. has almost double the length of the Brazilian waterways economically navigable and has much greater transport capacity than Brazil. These data are shown in Table 1, elaborated by BNDES (2018).

Table 1 – Brazil-U.S. Waterway cargo capacity

Rivers/waterways	Approximate convoy capacity (t)
Madeira	20,000-24,000
Teles Pires-Tapajós	7,500
Tocantins-Araguaia	2,000-3,000

Table 5 – Continuation

Rivers/waterways	Approximate convoy capacity (t)
Paraguai-Paraná	19,000-22,000
Paraná-Tietê	2,400-6,000
High Mississippi (USA)	18,000-22,500
Low Mississippi (USA)	36,000-60,000

Source: BNDES (2018).

The Mississippi River is one of the longest rivers in the USA (6,270 Km), and together with the Missouri River, it forms the largest river basin in North America. In the 1930's several floodgates were built to maintain the level of the channel with a depth of 2.7 meters ensuring the flow of commercial vessels. The Mississippi canal is maintained by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, where at the beginning of the work (1929) sandbanks and rocks were removed, and secondary channels were closed.

The Brazilian Amazon region, the focus of this research, has large rivers that favor river navigation, but could have greater capacity to transport cargo if infrastructure works such as rectification of margins, rock removal in some areas to increase depth and signaling to make them safe waterways with greater cargo capacity were made. Such works would directly reflect in the decrease of the amount of trucks circulating on the roads and in the decrease of the logistic cost for cargo transportation.

For a country with continental dimensions such as Brazil, there is an urgent need to redesign the transportation matrix towards more efficient modes. However, investments in transport infrastructure based on GDP are declining, as shown in Table 2.

Table 2 – Investments in the transport sector (millions R$)

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
% GDP (CNT)	0.28%	0.27%	0.27%	0.18%	0.20%	0.17%	0.16%	0.14%
GDP annual (IBGE)	4,814,760	5,331,619	5,778,952	5,995,788	6,269,328	6,583,318	6,889,176	7,256,927
Amounts invested	13,481	14,395	15,603	10,792	12,539	11,192	11,023	10,160

Source: Authors, based on CNT (2020) and IBGE (2020).

The variables that directly influence transportation planning are cost and time, which are inversely proportional. In general, reducing time in transportation increases the cost of operation (in optimized systems). Adequate transportation logistics planning must provide degrees of freedom that allow the operations manager to analyze the system's trade-offs and make quick and efficient decisions.

The logistic costs, which include transportation, stock, storage and administrative costs, have been configured as high when the costs of other countries are considered. Comparing the logistic costs of the United States of America and Brazil, in relation to the GDP, there is 8.7% for USA and 11.5% for Brazil, and the biggest difference is in the component of transport costs: 4.8% for the USA and 7.1% for Brazil (BRASIL, 2019a).

According to the World Bank (BRASIL, 2019a), cabotage is more efficient and comparatively cheaper than road and rail transport when the distance traveled is more than 1500 Km. In this sense, it is important to point out that the distance traveled on the north axis of the ECT from Rio de Janeiro-RJ to Belém-PA is approximately 3,172 Km.

2.1 Incentive programs for the waterway modality

The Brazilian shipbuilding sector is an important element to support the growth of maritime activities in the country. After going through a long period without stimulus in this sector, the increase in the price of oil and the demands for ships made the government establish programs for the resumption of naval development to stimulate the growth of oil and gas exploration activities in the country.

In 1999, Petrobras launched the Renewal Program of the Marine Support Fleet (Prorefam – *Programa de Renovação da Frota de Apoio Marítimo*), offering charter contracts for ships built in Brazil, specialized in the support of oil and gas exploration activities. The purpose was to increase the demand of the sector and reactivate the Brazilian naval industry with financial inputs from BNDES to the Navy Merchant Fund (FMM – *Fundo da Marinha Mercante*) (DORES; LAGE; PROCESSI, 2012).

In 2005, Transpetro, a Petrobrás subsidiary for product transportation and storage, started the Transpetro Fleet Modernization and Expansion Program (Promef – *Programa de Modernização e Expansão da Frota*), bidding 26 oil tankers to national shipyards that year, with a total of 216 ships predicted for the subsequent phases of the project. Besides the renewal and expansion of Transpetro's fleet to follow the UN resolution about the need for double-hull ships, which offer greater security against oil spills, Promef aimed to stimulate national companies in the sector to return to the conditions of competing in the domestic and foreign markets for the shipbuilding as occurred in the 70s, when the Brazilian naval industry was only behind Japan. In its first phase, Promef had an initial contribution of US$ 2.5 billion and became one of the most important projects of the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC – *Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento*) (PETROBRAS, 2008).

Despite the large investments, Promef and Prorefam objectives were to build specialized ships to support oil and gas exploration activities, not contemplating direct benefits to cabotage navigation.

2.2 Obstacles to the development of cabotage navigation

According to Brasil (2019a) report , five obstacles that obstruct the sector's participation in the Brazilian transportation matrix were listed. The first one addresses the lack of a specific public policy to promote cabotage shipping, where the existing legal norms, especially Law 9.432/1997, report that there are no initiatives at the tactical and operational levels to promote cabotage, but only general guidelines without goals or frameworks to follow the development of the sector. About the National Logistic Plan (PNL – *Plano Nacional de Logística*), data inform that in 2018 the cabotage represented 11% of the cargo transported in the Brazilian transport matrix and that there is no expectation of changing this percentage to 2025.

The second obstacle is the lack of provision of sufficient information to allow the monitoring of actions to promote container cabotage, since the systems used (Merchant System of the Federal Revenue Service, Port Performance System and Support Maritime Navigation Chartering System, both of Antaq) are not integrated in a way that allows the sharing of information necessary for the monitoring of cabotage activities by operators.

The third one is about the lack of isonomy of fuel prices (bunker) between cabotage and long distance navigation, where the sale of fuel to long distance navigation companies is considered by Petrobras as an export, therefore free of taxes and contributions such as CIDE, Cofins and ICMS. However, for cabotage operators it is considered an internal sale and subject to all the duties. Foreign ships, to take advantage of idle cargo capacity, perform cabotage in Brazilian ports favored by the price of fuel and affecting domestic operators. The bunkering service represents 30% to 50% of the operational cost of ships for domestic companies, being a relevant item in the development of public policies.

The fourth emphasizes that there is no promotion of competition between shipowners in container cabotage shipping. The container market is concentrated in only three foreign companies that make the transport of feeder cargo, which is the transport between two Brazilian ports of foreign products but which is still made by foreign ships, that is, the cargo that could be transported by cabotage shipping is maintained by long distance companies that have lower prices, affecting the national operators.

The fifth and last obstacle presented is the lack of action by public agencies to promote multimodal cargo transport in cabotage. The National Transportation Policy (PNT – *Política Nacional de Transportes*) declares strategies to increase the number of multimodal operators, but does not consider actions at the strategic and operational level to guide the promotion of multimodality. The cabotage depends on other modalities, mainly the road that by its capillarity has the capacity to complement the last route of transport to the client, as the modality of door-to-door delivery.

In the absence of public policies that encourage the prioritization of cabotage navigation, such as investments in integrated logistics, essential infrastructure, updating the legal framework and tax subsidies for fuel (bunker), Brazil is able to use only half of its hydrographic potential for this purpose.

3 Military logistics of the 8th RM

The problem to be studied refers to the choice of the lowest cost modes of transportation network, without a decrease in the quality of service provided by the Army. The facilities are the Distribution Centers (CD – *Centros de Distribuição*), also called Providing Agencies (OP – *Órgãos Provedores*) in military doctrine.

The Army, as a Ground Force, carries out the transportation of supplies using its own means by road, on most routes, and by river when there is no road connection between the origin and destination place or when there is an impediment on the roads. In the case of the 8th RM, currently the CD is located in the city of Belém (8th D Sup) and the main

OM to be supplied are in Macapá-AP, Altamira-PA, Santarém-PA, Itaituba-PA, Tucuruí-PA, Marabá-PA, Imperatriz-MA and São Luís-MA cities, the first four by river mode. Figure 1 shows the locations to be supplied and the supply routes used by the 8th D Sup and by the ECT, on the north axis.

Figure 1 – Main supply distribution routes by ECT and 8th D Sup

Source: The authors (2019).

Military logistics has two aspects that differentiate it from civilian logistics. The first is that it must have the necessary support structure for cases of war and non-war. In general, "each Single Force (Navy, Army and Aeronautics) must have the means of transportation most appropriate to its specific activities, in order to support its own operations" (BRASIL, 2013, our translation). The second is that the permanent state of readiness and know-how acquired over the years in carrying out the transportation of their specific materials must be maintained, even to the detriment of doing it at a higher logistical cost, since in times of war there may be no civilian logistics operators prepared to transport war material to the areas of imminent conflict, at risk of death. In this case, the ECT should see cabotage as a complement to the road routes operated, but not to replace it completely, given the need to maintain expertise in the execution of military road transportation for the North Military Command.

In view of the above, this work will bring subsidies for the improvement of the Brazilian Army transportation network, expanding technical skills with the insertion of cabotage as means of transporting materials over long distances, making the distribution of ECT materials for the 8th D Sup.

3.1 Review in papers about the subject

The article by Pitz et al. (2017) about the analysis of the distribution chain of military supplies in the eastern Amazon brought a suggestion for the optimization of road and river routes used for the distribution of supplies in the area of responsibility of the 8th RM. Pitz et al. (2017) concludes that the 23rd Logistic Battalion of Jungle (23rd B Log Sl – *23º Batalhão Logístico de Selva*), in Marabá-PA, should supply Altamira-PA, Tucuruí-PA, Imperatriz-MA and São Luís-MA cities by road modality. At the same time, Belém should supply Macapá-AP, Santarém-PA and Itaituba-PA cities by waterway. The authors observed that there were 43.8% and 7.2% of idle space in river and road transport modes, respectively, even after the application of the proposed optimization. These percentages are reflected in little demand for return transport, since the items transported from Belém have practically only one destination, that is, the destination cities return very few items to Belém.

Carvalho and Silva Júnior (2019) verified that in order to reduce transportation costs, the best location for the Distribution Center that will support the Eastern Amazon region is Marabá-PA city, different from the actual Belém-PA. The results were obtained by applying AIMMS software in order to minimize costs. The average transportation costs found, using the calculation method known as p-median, that Marabá has the best location for road transportation and that the route currently done through Belém is 17.96% longer than the optimized one.

Although there are representative cost savings for the reallocation of the facility, it is important to emphasize that the opportunity cost must be measured, considering that this change will result in financial investments in the construction of new facilities, the need for works on the BR-230 highway (transamazon highway) and the adequacy of the Tocantins River waterway, through the dredging and rock removal of the Pedral do Lourenço.

Thus, in view of the budget restriction and the economic and fiscal crisis in the country, the alternative solution presented would be to use cabotage transport, optimizing the transport network and maintaining the facilities in the places already installed.

Portella and Silva Júnior (2019) considered that the conditions of the existing roads that connect the origin cities (Marabá and Belém) to the destination cities, where the supported OM are located, were in good conditions of traffic and that the demands of various supplies could be met by both Marabá and Belém, without restrictions. To obtain the optimization results the AIMMS modeling software was used, where the transport cost data in km/ton, the distances between the cities and the annual supply offers and demands were entered, and the mathematical model was built according to the characteristics of the transport problem.

As a result, Portella and Silva Júnior (2019) indicated the lowest cost road and river routes to fully meet the demands in each city. In this distribution, the Supply Agency in Belém (8th D Sup) supplies only Macapá city by waterway mode. The result proved to be coherent since the only viable connection route could only be established by river and there was no connection between Marabá and Macapá except by passing through Belém. For the Supply Agency in Marabá, all the road routes were chosen to deliver the supply, which is also

coherent since this OP is located in a central and axis position with all the destination cities, except Macapá.

For the analysis of the case of the 8th D Sup, the only restriction is that the missions have a maximum duration of 5 working days and that they occur during the same week. Drivers and vehicles must be back to Belém until Friday, in order to have a period of rest and maintenance of the vehicles for the next missions, according to the travel schedule in Table 3.

Table 3 – Schedule of travel and discharge activities

Day	Activities
D	Departure of the convoy from Belém/PA; arrival in Tucuruí/PA; discharge of the material and overnight stay.
D+1	Departure of the convoy from Tucuruí/PA; arrival in Marabá/PA; discharge of material and overnight stay.
D+2	Continuity of material discharge works in Marabá/PA and overnight.
D+3	Departure of the convoy from Marabá/PA; arrival in Imperatriz/MA; discharge of material and overnight stay.
D+4	Departure of the convoy from Imperatriz/MA; arrival in Belém/PA (8th D Sup)

Source: Supply Operations Center (COS – *Centro de Operações de Suprimento*) – 8th D Sup (BRASIL, 2019b).

4 Cost analysis

For the calculation of logistic savings, with the contracting of an outsourced company to carry out cabotage in the transportation of material from the ECT to the 8th D Sup, data were collected with the 8th Supply Deposit (BRASIL, 2019b) and with the Central Transportation Establishment (ECT, 2019), which resulted in the following Tables 4 to 7.

Table 4 – Total spent with personnel in the road part (Belém-São Luís)

Rank	Qty	Days in Mission	Pay (per military)	Pay (total)	Pay parcel (pay/30 days)	Bonus (2%)	Total spent (R$)
Lieutenant	1	2	6,169	6169	411.26	246.76	658.03
Corporal	1	2	2,627	2627	175.13	105.08	280.21
Soldier	2	2	956	1912	127.46	76.48	203.95
Total saved per mission in the itinerary. partial (I)							1,142.19

Source: Own elaboration, based on data of 8th D Sup (BRASIL, 2019B), ECT (2019) and Brasil (2016).

In addition, with regard to the road stretch between the municipalities Marabá-PA and Belém-PA, savings would be made as shown in Table 5.

Table 5 – Total spent with personnel in the stretch of road (Belém-Marabá)

Rank	Qty	Days in Mission	Pay (per military)	Pay (total)	Pay parcel (pay/30 days)	Bonus (2%)	Total spent (R$)
CPT	1	2	9,135.00	9,135.00	609.00	365.40	974.40

Table 5 – Continuation

Rank	Qty	Days in Mission	Pay (per military)	Pay (total)	Pay parcel (pay/30 days)	Bonus (2%)	Total spent (R$)
2º LT	1	2	7,490.00	7,490.00	499.33	299.60	798.93
1º SGT	1	2	5,483.00	5,483.00	365.53	219.32	584.85
3º SGT	2	2	3,825.00	7,650.00	510.00	306.00	816.00
Corporal	9	2	2,627.00	23,643.00	1,576.20	945.72	2.521.92
Soldier	14	2	956.00	13,384.00	892.26	535.36	1,427.63
Total Savings Partial (II)							7,123.73

Source: Own elaboration, based on data of 8th D Sup (BRASIL, 2019B), ECT (2019) and Brasil (2016).

Finally, the expenses that can be eliminated with the fuel economy are shown in Table 6.

Table 6 – Total spent fuel per stretch

Stretch	Qty of vehicles	Consumption Km/l	Km total	Spent (R$)
Belém-São Luis	2 heavy vehicle	2.3	1614	1,403.48
Belém-Marabá	12 heavy vehicle	2.3	1464	7,638.26
Belém-Marabá	2 light vehicle	8	1464	366.00
Total Savings Partial (III)				9,407.74

Source: Own elaboration, based on data of 8th D Sup (BRASIL, 2019B) and ECT (2019)

Considering that the estimate obtained by the ECT of the cost for transportation of a 40-foot container by road is R$ 37,317.64, a survey of Brazilian Navy bidding processes, of hiring companies for cabotage, was conducted, and obtaining the data from two bidding processes that hired multimodal transportation by the "door-to-door" system and with the use of cabotage, shown in Table 7.

Table 7 – Door-to-door transportation with cabotage according to stretch and container

Minute of the Electronic Bidding Realization	Size Container	Qty	Origin	Destination	Total Value (R$)	Individual Value (R$)
Nº 00012/2017	40'	25	Rio de Janeiro	Manaus	699,998.69	27,999.95
Nº 00013/2017	40'	3	Rio de Janeiro	Belém	112,499.93	37,499.98
Nº 00013/2017	40'	1	Rio de Janeiro	Salvador	25,700.00	25,700.00
Nº 00013/2017	40'	3	Rio de Janeiro	Manaus	81,000.00	27,000.00

Source: Own elaboration, based on data of ComprasNet.gov (2019)[1].

4.1 Use of cabotage for the external channel

As a result, it was verified that there was an initial saving with the use of cabotage for the distribution of supply through the external channel. The analysis was made as follows:

---

[1]   Available at: <https://bit.ly/2CykAo2>. Access on: Aug. 23, 2019.

1) A road convoy from ECT to the North Axis (Belém) is composed of 12 trucks and two more support vehicles. Each truck can carry the equivalent of a 40 feet container. The individual cost of this Army transport is 37,317.64 and the total is R$ 447,811.68.

2) It was made a survey of the electronic bidding sessions of the Brazilian Navy with the costs for transportation of 40 feet containers, coming from Rio de Janeiro and going to Belém, the value was R$ 37,499.98 for one 40 feet container. The total cost per cabotage according to this contract would be $ 449,999.76 for 12 containers.

With the use of cabotage, it was verified that round-trip routes in the Belém-Marabá stretch and the Belém-São Luís stretch could be eliminated, resulting in a minimum cost reduction of R$ 17,673.66 (Tables 4, 5 and 6), besides other indirect costs that were not included, such as: personnel who works in vehicle maintenance, acquisition of materials for maintenance, decrease in loss due to vehicle depreciation, decrease in greenhouse gas emissions, among others, as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2 – Supply distribution routes via ECT and cabotage

Source: The authors (2019).

5 Insertion of cabotage in 8th RM

Inland navigation and cabotage represent an option for sustainable investments in infrastructure capable of reducing the average cost of transporting national cargo, which would lead to a reduction in logistics costs. Cruz (2007) concludes that cabotage is about 20% more economical than other modalities of transport, reinforcing that it is a viable transport alternative to minimize the impacts of the road modality on the country's transport system.

According to Pitz et al. (2017), the strategic cargo distribution of the Brazilian Army in the "North Axis" is carried out in duplicate over a stretch of approximately 1400 km.

The North Axis is the designation of the route carried out by the ECT, coming from Rio de Janeiro and with destination to Juiz de Fora, Brasília and Belém cities.

Military transport systems are complex and subject to variations in the internal demands of the Army and climate variations, with high unpredictability and dynamism. Ensuring an adequate service level, optimizing available resources and contributing to the profitability and good management of public resources are fundamental objectives of the transportation administration. To make it possible, it is necessary to have an adequate planning and the ability to adapt to changes without losing the profitability of the operation. In the case of the Brazilian Army, with greater efficiency in the use of available financial resources.

In this way, the option of using cabotage for transporting along the "North Axis" in place of the road one, is attractive because of many aspects. Table 8 shows the advantages and disadvantages of the Army's use of cabotage for this supply.

Table 8 – Advantages and disadvantages of cabotage

Advantages	Disadvantages
Reduction of transportation costs;	Bureaucratic process for hiring;
Relocation of hired personnel;	New assignment without previous expertise;
Acquisition of Know-How in this modality of transport to reduce the dependence on the road modality;	Decreased control over the material;
Reduction of the cost of maintenance of vehicles;	Increased uncertainty of delivery time and possible disruption of logistics flow;
Increased efficiency of the Central Army Establishment (ECT);	Dependence on the Union's budget for hiring outsourced services.
Expand the options of modalities use for the ECT.	
Unitization of cargo in the container.	

Source: The authors (2019).

The use of cabotage is promising as a way to minimize costs and make transportation more efficient for the Brazilian Army. This sector needs several operational, institutional and regulatory obstacles to be eliminated for its full development. The main obstacles are: the bureaucracy required for the handling of cargo inside the country (equivalent to the bureaucracy for an export and import); the infrastructure of ships; the high taxes on fuel; the lack of integration between modalities, the cost of practicing and the crew cost.

Although there are many challenges to be faced, cabotage is an alternative for the transport of long distance cargo, and as shown in Table 9, it has been growing sustainably over the last decade.

Table 9 – Development of cabotage in Brazil.

(Millions of ton)	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Total transported cabotage	138,985	141,560	147,565	149,197	150,377	156,601	163,141	79,900
Percentage difference from previous year	-	1.85%	4.24%	1.11%	0.79%	4.14%	4.18%	*

Source: Own elaboration, based on the yearbook of the National Waterway Transport Agency (2019).

6 Conclusions

The Amazon region is provided with a vast waterway network that can be better used for inland navigation and cabotage. The waterway modality is the most indicated for transporting large volumes over long distances because it offers lower costs compared to the road modality.

Although the existence of this broad network and even though it is a consensus in the scientific literature, it is not what is observed in the Amazon region, since the potential of the waterways has not been fully utilized due to lack of infrastructure.

The optimization possibilities for the transportation system in the region are numerous; however, the budget constraint obstructs the realization of extensive building works necessary for their implementation.

In order to reduce transportation costs without having to wait for investments from the Federal Government, the use of cabotage to distribute supplies at the strategic level becomes one of the viable options for the Brazilian Army and also relatively easy to include.

Finally, as an opportunity for more studies, it is suggested to analyze the integration between the component hydrographic regions of the Legal Amazon (CMA and CMN) and to encourage their consolidation, since with the centralization of cabotage transport, there may be a reduction in the logistical costs of transport by the Brazilian Army in these Area Military Commands.

References

AGÊNCIA NACIONAL DE TRANSPORTES AQUAVIÁRIOS. **Anuário**. Brasília, DF: Antaq, 2019. Available at: web.antaq.gov.br/Anuario/. Access on: Aug. 23, 2019.

BNDES. **Navegação interior brasileira**. BNDES Setorial, Rio de Janeiro, n. 47 , p. [437]-482, mar. 2018. Available at: http://web.bndes.gov.br/bib/jspui/handle/1408/15380. Access on: Aug. 23, 2019.

BRASIL. Presidência da República. **Lei nº 9.432, de 8 de janeiro de 1997**. Dispõe sobre a ordenação do transporte aquaviário e dá outras providências. Brasília, DF: Presidência da República, 9 jan. 1997. Available at: https://bit.ly/2Z5vKbx. Access on: June 10, 2020.

BRASIL. **Manual de transporte para uso nas Forças Armadas. Brasília**, DF: Ministério da Defesa, 2013.

BRASIL. Exército. 8° Depósito de Suprimento. **Centro de Operações de Suprimentos:** Dados do Transporte modal rodoviário. Belém: 8º Depósito de Suprimento, 2019b. Informações recebidas por <newtoncarlos99@gmail.com> em 16 ago. 2019.

BRASIL. Exército. **Portaria nº 927, de 1º de agosto de 2016.** Estabelece as condições para o pagamento, no âmbito do Exército Brasileiro, da gratificação de representação de que trata a Medida Provisória nº 2.215-10, de 31 de agosto de 2001, regulamentada pelo Decreto nº 8.733, de 2 de maio de 2016. Brasília, DF: Secretaria Geral do Exército, 2016.

BRASIL. Exército. **Estudo inicial para a implantação do entreposto logístico em Marabá (HUB Logístico)**. Marabá: 23º Batalhão Logístico de Selva, 20 nov. 2017. 4 p.

BRASIL. Exército. **Manual de campanha:** logística militar terrestre. Brasília, DF: Estado-Maior do Exército, 2018a. EB70-MC-10.238.

BRASIL. Ministério da Infraestrutura. **Síntese – Setor Aquaviário**. Brasília, DF: Ministério da Infraestrutura, 27 set. 2018b. Available at: https://bit.ly/2Z8C7L4. Access on: Aug. 23, 2019.

BRASIL. Tribunal de Contas da União. **Relatório de Auditoria 023.297/2018-2**. Acórdão 1383/2019 – Plenário. Brasília, DF: TCU, 2019a. Relator: Bruno Dantas, 12 jun. 2019. Available at: https://bit.ly/3fYpRng. Access on: Apr. 17, 2020.

CARVALHO, Y. M.; SILVA JÚNIOR, O. S. Otimização da rede de transporte de suprimentos do Exército Brasileiro na região da Amazônia Oriental. *In*: SIMPÓSIO DE PESQUISA OPERACIONAL E LOGÍSTICA DA MARINHA, 19., 2019, Rio de Janeiro. **Anais** [...]. Rio de Janeiro: Centro de Análises de Sistemas Navais, 2019.

Coleç. Meira Mattos, Rio de Janeiro, v. 15, n. 52, p. 21-37, January/April 2021

35

CNT. **O transporte move o Brasil:** propostas da CNT aos candidatos. Brasília, DF: CNT, 2018. Available at: https://bit.ly/3dBQEo9. Access on: Aug. 23, 2019.

CNT. **Investimento em transporte como proporção do PIB cai pelo terceiro ano consecutivo:** Boletim Economia em Foco. Brasília, DF: CNT, 2020. Available at: https://cdn.cnt.org.br/diretorioVirtualPrd/27a8aaa2-f440-4656-be30-e7eecb8b55e3.pdf. Access on: Sept. 13, 2020.

CRUZ, T. R. P. V. **Causas e consequências da limitação da cabotagem no transporte de carga pela costa brasileira:** uma avaliação hierárquica no trecho Manaus-Santos. 2007. Dissertação (Mestrado em Transportes) – Universidade de Brasília, Brasília, DF, 2007. Publicação T.DM-005A/2007.

DORES, P. B.; LAGE, E. S.; PROCESSI, L. D. **A retomada da indústria naval brasileira.** Brasília, DF: BNDES, 2012. Available at: https://bit.ly/3eqpJwy. Access on: June 10, 2020.

ECT. Centro de Operações de Transportes. Entrevista concedida a Newton Carlos de Oliveira Portella. Estabelecimento Central de Transportes, Rio de Janeiro, 10 jun. 2019.

IBGE. **Sistema de Contas Nacionais Trimestrais – SCNT**. Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 2020. Available at: https://www.ibge.gov.br/estatisticas/economicas/contas-nacionais/9300-contas-nacionais-trimestrais.html?=&t=series-historicas. Access on: Sept. 13, 2020.

PITZ, I. B.; FIACO, R. M. D.; DINIZ, M. V.; LOPES, L. A. S. Análise da cadeia de distribuição de suprimentos militares na amazônia oriental. *In*: CONGRESSO NACIONAL DE PESQUISA EM TRANSPORTE DA ANPET, 31., Recife, 2017. **Anais** [...]. Rio de Janeiro: Anpet, 2017.

PORTELLA, N. C. O.; SILVA JÚNIOR, O. S. Transporte multimodal na Amazônia Oriental brasileira, caso da 8ª Região Militar. *In*: SIMPÓSIO DE PESQUISA OPERACIONAL E LOGÍSTICA DA MARINHA, 19., 2019, Rio de Janeiro. **Anais** [...]. Rio de Janeiro: Centro de Análises de Sistemas Navais, 2019.

TOLEDO, C. A. A. **Organizações Militares Executoras de Transporte (OMET) do exército brasileiro:** capacidades, limitações e integração da execução do transporte nacional frente ao aumento das demandas do exército brasileiro. 2018. Trabalho de Conclusão de Curso (Especialização em Ciências Militares) – Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército, Rio de Janeiro, 2018.

PETROBRAS. **Uma nova frota naval**. Rio de Janeiro, 12 set. 2008. Available at: https://bit.ly/3hXbIsi. Access on: June 10, 2020.

UNITED STATES. US Army Corps of Engineers. **Navigation**. Washington, DC: USACE, 6 jan. 2012. Available at: https://bit.ly/2NmVAm2. Access on: Aug. 23, 2019.

UNITED STATES. Department of Transportation. Bureau of Transportation Statistics. **National Transportation Statistics.** Washington, DC: Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2018. Available at: https://bit.ly/3ex6LEu. Access on: Aug. 23, 2019.

Coleç. Meira Mattos, Rio de Janeiro, v. 15, n. 52, p. 21-37, January/April 2021

37

Regiments and Battalions, Brigades and Divisions: organization and denomination of Western military units throughout history[1]

Regimientos y Batallones, Brigadas y Divisiones: organización y denominación de las unidades militares occidentales a lo largo del tiempo

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to examine the origins of the denominations and organization of military units in the western world, as well as their composing subunits and the larger units that comprise them. The article initially examines the origins of the organization and denomination of Western military units from the creation of professional armies in the early Modern Age. Then, it discusses the consolidation of regiments and battalions, based on the Spanish model of infantry Tercios and Escuadrones, and its evolution into the Dutch model, by Maurice of Nassau, and the Swedish one, by Gustavus Adolphus. It goes on to discuss the application of these models to cavalry and artillery units, and the formation of large units at the brigade and division levels. Finally, it presents the western military model that was consolidated in the 20th century.

Keywords: Military Language. Military Terms. Military Units. Military Concepts.

Resumen: El propósito de este trabajo es examinar los orígenes de las denominaciones y la organización de las unidades militares en el mundo occidental, así como de sus subunidades y de las grandes unidades que las encuadran. Antes de todo, el artículo examina los orígenes de la organización y denominación de las unidades militares occidentales desde la creación de los ejércitos profesionales a principios de la Edad Moderna. A continuación, se discute la consolidación de los regimientos y batallones, con base en el modelo español de los tercios y escuadrones de infantería, y su evolución hacia el modelo neerlandés, de Mauricio de Nassau, y el modelo sueco, por Gustavo Adolfo. Continúa discutiendo la aplicación de estos modelos a las unidades de caballería y artillería, y la formación de grandes unidades a nivel de brigada y división. Finalmente, presenta el modelo militar occidental que se consolidó en el siglo XX.

Palabras clave: Lenguaje Militar. Términos Militares. Unidades Militares. Conceptos Militares.

Fernando Velôzo Gomes Pedrosa iD
Exército Brasileiro, Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército.
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.
velozopedrosa@yahoo.com.br

Coleç. Meira Mattos, Rio de Janeiro, v. 15, n. 52, p. 39-60, January/April 2021

39

1 Introduction

The term "military unit" can be understood as a group of forces with a specific combat or support mission, framed by a more comprehensive military organization. The military units existing in modern Western armies are called companies, squadrons, batteries, regiments, battalions, brigades, and divisions. However, it is understood that there are ranks in military formations, according to their dimensions, combat power, and ability to operate with autonomy. According to this understanding, a "unit" is a military formation of a single branch (infantry, cavalry, artillery, etc.) or activity (logistics, command actions, psychological operations, etc.), composed of several hundred soldiers – in general, from 500 to 1,000 officers and enlisted personnel – and commanded by a colonel or lieutenant colonel. The "unit" is, in turn, composed of several "subunits," called companies, squadrons or batteries (depending on the branch, or specialty to which they belong), composed of about 100 to 200 men (depending on their nature) and commanded by a captain.

In spite of a military "unit" having a certain level of administrative autonomy, its own colors, history and traditions, it does not have the capacity to operate autonomously, as it lacks the multiplicity of capacities that can only be obtained in larger and equipped structures combining branches, combat support, and logistical support. This level of combination occurs at the level of "large units," which bring together "units" of different branches[1] and specialties, in combinations suitable for use in autonomous operations. The "large units" are commanded by general officers and can be "brigades" or "divisions."

The purpose of this article is to understand how the models of organization and the denominations of military units in the Western world emerged and were consolidated from the beginning of the Modern Age until the twentieth century. The first section examines the origins of the organization of Western military units, from its first type of formation, the medieval company. The second section discusses the emergence and consolidation of military units at the regiment and battalion levels, based on the Spanish model of *tercios* and infantry squadrons, and their evolution to the Dutch model, by Maurice of Nassau, and the Swedish one, by Gustavus Adolphus. The third section discusses the application of these models to cavalry and artillery units. The fourth section traces the origins of the formation of large units of the brigade and division levels. The fifth and last section presents the Western military model that was consolidated in the twentieth century, due to the experiences of the two World Wars and the Cold War. The conclusion proves the consolidation of a Western military model, characterized by a shared typology of branches, units and large military units, and by a common terminology to designate military units, despite the existence of some specific divergences. It also notes the increasing complexity and sophistication of the organizational structures of Western military forces, from their creation in the sixteenth century, until the end of the twentieth century.

1　Military specialty of an army's combatant troops. They can be close combat branches – infantry and cavalry and/or armor – and combat support branches – artillery, engineering, and communications. Armies also have logistical support units – quartermaster, ordnance, maintenance, transportation, medical services.

2 The medieval company

The first permanent European armies arose at the beginning of the Modern Age, from military formations of medieval origin, the "companies." In the Middle Ages, the term "company" was used to designate a group of comrades-in-arms led by a "captain" (the head of the group). The captain was a man of some local importance or military experience, who was commissioned by some superior authority to recruit a company of soldiers in relatively defined region (MCNEILL, 1984, p. 107). He was responsible for gathering and leading the company, and also had the privilege of appointing his main assistants and designing the flag that identified him (PARKER, 2004, p. 29-30). The flag was carried by a flag bearer or "ensign," who was the company's second officer and interim substitute for the captain. The Company was the basic unit of European armies since the fourteenth century (PARKER, 2004, p. 10), but until the beginning of the Modern Age, the term "company" was very vague. It had no precise meaning in terms of manpower or composition. It could refer to infantry or cavalry troops without distinction, and to gather many hundreds or just a few soldiers; it could randomly include knights, squires, men-at-arms, archers, and crossbowmen.[2]

3 Regiments and Battalions

Until the first decades of the sixteenth century, there was no military unit level above the "companies," and these were directly subordinated to the head of the army (MCNEILL, 1984, p. 107-108). The cavalry companies had much smaller troops than the infantry, in view of the cost of acquisition and care of the mounts, as well as the loss of importance of the mounted forces in the late Middle Ages. Throughout the sixteenth century, a European infantry company ranged from 150 to 300 men, while cavalry companies had about 60 to 80 horsemen, or less.

Throughout the sixteenth and seventeen centuries, expressions such as "regiment," "*tercio*," "battalion" and "squadron" emerged, to refer to military units that gathered several companies. The use of the word "regiment" in the sense of an army's unit would have been registered for the first time in France in the 1550s, and indicated a unit under the command of a colonel (RÉGIMENT, c2012). Permanent modern European armies emerged during the process of State consolidation throughout the fifteenth and sixteen centuries, as a way of asserting royal authority in the face of the threats and challenges posed by feudal lords, protected by the walls of their castles and relying on small private armies. In 1444, Charles VII of France created the first regular forces of a Western European state, the *compagnies d'ordonnance*, in order to suppress the attacks and looting of the armed gangs of unemployed mercenaries. But contrary to the medieval practice of hiring mercenary captains who would be in charge of recruiting and paying soldiers, the Crown had the right to appoint all captains and define the number of soldiers and the place of their quarters. All officers and soldiers would be paid by the Crown, characterizing a permanent and professional force (HOWARD, 1997, p. 30-31). The success of this model

---

2   See Ayton (2017) on the variety of personnel in a "company" of soldiers in the Middle Ages.

allowed, in the early seventeenth century, ordinance companies to be brought together under the command – or "regiment" – of a colonel. This model of French origin has spread to most European countries, as well as the name "regiment" to designate units commanded by a colonel and composed of several companies.

But Spain had preceded France in organizing large infantry units. Until the beginning of the sixteen century, companies were only gathered in an improvised way, to carry out expeditions or military campaigns. But in 1536, Emperor Charles V issued an ordinance that gave regular organization to the Spanish army in Italy. On the occasion, three *Tercios* of Spanish troops were organized, each one with a number of companies and commanded by a field master – hierarchical rank corresponding to an infantry colonel (ESPAÑA, 2017).

Throughout European history, the manpower of infantry regiments has ranged from a few hundred to more than three thousand men. Cavalry regiments have always had smaller manpower than infantry ones, given the costs of acquiring and maintaining large numbers of animals. The smaller manpower of cavalry regiments was also due to the fact that speed, strength and size of an animal weighing around 500 kilos were added to the strength of the mounted man. Generally speaking, from the Modern Age to the introduction of motor vehicles, cavalry regiments were composed of a few hundred horsemen, rarely reaching a thousand men. This difference in manpower between infantry and cavalry units was prevalent in all Western armies and was reproduced when the cavalry branch adopted armored vehicles and tanks[3] in the early twentieth century. In this case, vehicles of great firepower could be operated by small crews, but with enormous lethal power.

Between the sixteenth and seventeen centuries, the manpower of Spanish *tercios* and European infantry regiments was quite flexible. Ideally, each of their companies should have between 200 and 300 men, including musketeers/harquebusiers and pikemen.[4] Thus, the manpower of a *tercio* or infantry regiment organized with 10 companies should be around 2,000 to 3,000 men. In practice, the numbers were smaller. The three Spanish *tercios* employed in the Netherlands in May 1571, organized with 10 and 11 companies, had an average manpower of 1,611 men (PARKER, 2004, p. 233-235).

The Spanish *tercio*, like the regiment, was a more administrative than tactical unit (PARKER, 2004, p. 10). It took care of recruitment, instruction, payment, discipline, etc. For combat, the *tercio* (or regiment) formed a compact tactical unit, combining thrust weapons (pikes)[5] and firearms (harquebuses and muskets),[6] under the command of the

---

3   Heavily armored vehicle equipped with caterpillar tracks and armed with a large caliber cannon and machine guns.

4   Soldiers armed with pikes.

5   The pike was a long spear used by infantry from the late Middle Ages to the early eighteenth century. Its length varied a lot, depending on the place and time. In 1536, Spanish captain Diego de Salazar noted that the peak measured nine "codos" – about 4.5 meters (SALAZAR, 1590, p. 21v).

6   Harquebuses were the first portable firearms, created in the second half of the fifteenth century. They were shoulder weapons, fired by a matchlock firing mechanism. Muskets were an evolution of harquebuses, which emerged in the early sixteenth century. Muskets were longer and heavier than harquebuses, and had greater armor-piercing power (CHASE, 2008, p. 61).

sergeant-major,[7] who should be a very experienced officer. This unit was called a squadron, but in some countries, such as France, it was called a battalion (see ALCAZAR Y ZUÑIGA, 1703; PAVE, 1548). The sergeant-major was responsible for calculating the ranks and columns, the formation of the squadron or battalion and their conduct in combat.

Figures 1 and 2, taken from the book *Arte militar*, published in 1612 by the Portuguese Luis Mendes de Vasconcelos, show, schematically, an infantry force in "battle" configuration. In Figure 1, you can see a squadron (A) formed in a quadrangular configuration at the center of the "battle." The squadron, composed exclusively of pikemen, is flanked by "garrisons" (B), "sleeves" (C) of musketeers, and "wings" of cavalry (E). Four "horns" are placed at the configuration angles, also composed of musketeers (D). Figure 2 shows a *tercio* of 3,000 men in battle configuration. At the center of the configuration, the squadron of pikemen (p) can be seen, with horns of musketeers at the four angles (o). The flags (b) are at the center of the squadron, corresponding to the 10 companies of the *tercio*. Ideally, a squadron or infantry battalion should have 800 to 1,000 men (ALCAZAR Y ZUÑIGA, 1703, p. 4), but the military manuals of the time provided guidelines for the formation of squadrons that could range from 100 to 10,000 men (see CARRION PARDO, 1595; VASCONCELOS, 1612).

Figure 1 – Seventeenth century infantry force placed for combat.

A. Efquadraõ.
B. Guarniçaõ.
C. Mangas.
D. Cornos.
E. Alas.

Source: Vasconcelos (1612, p. 109).

---

7   The title or hierarchical grade of "sergeant-major" was later consolidated in its abbreviated form as "major," and has no correspondence with the current figure of the sergeant-major of armies of Anglo-American tradition. The old sergeant-major was a senior officer reporting directly to the commanding colonel of the regiment, while the current sergeant-major is a sergeant-grade noncommissioned officer.

Figure 2 – *Tercio* of 3,000 men in battle configuration.

Source: Vasconcelos (1612, p. 150-151), with author's explanatory legends.

The word "squadron" has an Italian origin – *squadrone* –, with the meaning of a large *squadra* – group of soldiers in quadrilateral formation. Its most well-known meaning, which has consolidated over time in Western military terminology, is that of a cavalry regiment's subunit. But in the sixteen and seventeen centuries, it meant an infantry troop in a square configuration and armed with pikes, designed to resist the attack of the enemy, like the ancient Greek phalanges (SQUADRA, c2004-2008; SQUADRONE, c2004-2008). The term "battalion" also comes from the Italian language – *battaglione* – and originally indicated a unit composed of several *battaglia,* which was one of the names given to companies in Italy at the beginning of the Modern Age (BATTAGLIONE, c2004-2008). Conceptual imprecision and vocabulary multiplicity is a characteristic of the period of emergence and consolidation of modern military institutions. In the military literature of the time, there is a tendency to indistinctly use the terms "regiment," "battalion" and "squadron" to refer to an infantry unit commanded by a colonel and composed of several companies. And, depending on the European country or region, the "company" could be called "flag" or "battle."[8]

---

8   See Feio (2018) for an example of this inaccuracy.

Throughout the sixteen and seventeen centuries, as the *tercio* or regiment, the company had predominantly administrative functions. The infantry squadron and its accessory structures – sleeves, horns, etc. – were the tactical units and main actors in the combat actions. When a *tercio* or regiment took the combat configuration, the pikemen of all companies were gathered to form the squadron, while the harquebusiers and musketeers were employed to form the horns and sleeves, regardless of their companies. The main role was played by the sergeant-major. He was responsible for analyzing the terrain, the enemy and the number of men available in his unit, in order to choose the most appropriate formation and calculate the number of ranks and columns of each of the elements of his "battle," as well as putting the troops into formation and directing their conduct during combat. In this task, he was assisted by the captains of the companies and their sergeants. Military experience and the ability to quickly calculate the number of ranks and columns was the sergeant-major's main attribute. In order to calculate the configuration, the sergeant-major could use a series of mathematical formulas, but also tables available in the main military treaties of the time (see FEIO, 2018; VALLE, [1521]).[9] The mixture of companies in the organization of an infantry battle can be seen in Figure 3. In it, you can see an Italian regiment made up of eight companies, identified by the eight flags unfurled at the center of the compact battalion of pikemen, which advances flanked by two sleeves of harquebusiers.

Figure 3 – Sixteenth century regiment in combat formation with a battalion of pikemen and two sleeves of harquebusiers.

Source: Ferretti (1568, p. 73).

---

9   On the central role of the sergeant-major as the soul that moves the squadron, see Alcazar y Zuñiga (1703, p. 6); on the role of captains of companies as mere auxiliaries to the sergeant-major in the constitution of the squadron, see Melo (1744, p. 275-277). The formulas and tables for calculating the ranks and columns of squadrons can be found, among other titles, in Melo (1744), Carrion Pardo (1595) and Vasconcelos (1612).

Throughout the seventeenth century, the improvement of firearms allowed European infantry units to increase the proportion of firearms in relation to pikes, favoring the reduction of the manpower of infantry tercios and regiments. During the 80 Years' War against Spain (1568-1648), Maurice of Nassau, Prince of Orange,[10] reformed the Dutch infantry between 1585 and 1620, in order to adopt combat units of about 500 men, called "divisions" or "half-regiments." Each Dutch regiment should be subdivided into two "half-regiments" (PUYPE, 1997, p. 69-112). The half-regiment was composed of 240 pikemen and 240 harquebusiers/musketeers. For the purpose of obtaining the maximum advantage of the firepower of the harquebuses and muskets, the combat configuration of the Dutch half-regiments became wider and thinner, with only 10 ranks, instead of the dozens of ranks that were necessary to compose a Spanish squadron. Three to four of these half-regiments were brought together to form a "brigade" of 1,500 to 2,000 men, which fought in an articulate and more flexible way than the huge solid "squadrons" of 1,000 to 3,000 men of the Spanish infantry (GROOT, 2017). Figure 4 shows the combat configuration of a 500-man Dutch infantry half-regiment formed in 10 ranks. The darker block indicates 240 pikemen; the lighter ones indicate the 240 musketeers and harquebusiers. At the center of the block of pikemen, you can see the flags (V) of the four companies that compose the half-regiment. Colonel (C) and company captains (H) are at the head of the troop. The company lieutenants (L) and the second in command (lieutenant colonel or sergeant- major) (M) form the rear.

Figure 4 – Combat configuration of a Dutch infantry half-regiment.

Source: Groot (2017, p. 17).

---

10 He should not be mistaken for his younger cousin, John Maurice of Nassau, Count of Nassau-Siegen, who ruled Dutch Brazil between 1637 and 1644.

The military challenges represented by the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) led other European powers to follow and refine the Dutch model. In Sweden, King Gustavus Adolphus (reign from 1611 to 1632) introduced a series of improvements that gave the Swedish Army features completely different from the Spanish model, which was still hegemonic in Europe. The first was the establishment of a strictly executed conscription system, which allowed a permanent flow of soldiers into the ranks of their regiments (BRZEZINSKI, 1991).

The basic unit of Gustavus Adolphus' Army was the Infantry Regiment. According to the organization he established in 1621, an infantry regiment should have 1,156 men, organized into eight companies of 142 soldiers. The increase in the volume of fire of shoulder weapons allowed him to decrease the number of pikemen compared to musketeers. Until 1620, the Spanish infantry had a ratio of 3:2 between pikemen and harquebusiers. In the 1620 Spanish and Dutch armies, the ratio between pikemen and musketeers had decreased to 1:1. Gustavus Adolphus reduced it to 3:4 (GROOT, 2017, p. 36). The regiment would have a total of 432 pikemen and 576 musketeers in its ranks (BRZEZINSKI, 1991, p. 8). But, as regiments and companies were predominantly administrative organizations, the Swedes organized groups of temporary forces for the combat – squadrons and brigades of three to four squadrons. The Swedish squadrons, organized with 504 soldiers, were similar to the Dutch half-regiments designed by Maurice of Nassau (THE SWEDISH..., 1632). In theory, each regiment could form two squadrons, if they were in full strength For this reason, the formation of a brigade of three squadrons required that at least two regiments should be gathered.

The increased lethality of the new muskets also allowed infantry formations to be even smaller. Gustavus Adolphus' army started to adopt a six-rank deep formation instead of the 10 ranks of the Dutch army. For combat, each infantry squadron was deployed into a block of pikemen and four "platoons" of musketeers, all six-rank deep. The block of pikemen consisted of 216 men divided into 36 files (*rotts*). Each of the four "platoons" of 48 musketeers was aligned in eight files. The remaining musketeers of the squadron were placed at its rear or at the rear of the brigade, also divided into two platoons, as a fire reserve, to be employed at the discretion of the squadron or brigade commander (BARRIFFE, 1661 apud BLACKMORE, 2012, p 70-71). Figure 5 shows the formation of a Swedish brigade, organized with three infantry squadrons, all composed of four companies, which can be identified by the four flags gathered in each block of pikemen. The central squadron is formed with platoons of musketeers at the rear of the block of pikemen. The squadrons of the right and left wings are formed with the blocks of pikemen in a more central position, protected by the musketeer platoons, which are in external positions. At the rear of the brigade configuration, there are six platoons of musketeers, two from each squadron.

Regarding infantry fire weapons, Gustavus Adolphus reduced the caliber of muskets, in order to make them lighter and eliminate the support forks. Lightening muskets allowed the Swedes to abandon the harquebuses, standardizing infantry firearms. To facilitate and speed up the loading of weapons and increase the musketeers' rate of fire, the Swedish King introduced the paper cartridge, which contained the bullet and the powder charge in the same wrapper (FULLER, 1998, p. 98).

Figure 5 – Formation of a Swedish brigade, organized with three infantry squadrons.

Source: Blackmore (2012, p. 71).

In spite of the evident military developments that took place in the seventeenth century in the Netherlands and Sweden, it can be seen that the basic military organizations of European armies continued to be the regiment and the company, consolidated in the sixteenth century. Likewise, its functions remained largely administrative. Regiments and their companies provided the men and command structure for the constitution of the tactical units that were formed for combat. There was not even a common name for this tactical unit – it could be called a squadron, battalion, half-regiment, or division. There is also the appearance of the "platoon" as the tactical subunit of a squadron or battalion. When it appeared, the platoon did not necessarily correspond to a company, nor was it one of its subdivisions. It was a group of a few dozen men, trained to make musket volley fire (BLACKMORE, 2012, p. 70).

The late seventeenth century saw the widespread adoption of flintlock muskets and bayonets by European armies. This resulted in the pike abandonment and the standardization of the infantry units' armament (MCNEILL, 1984, p. 141-142). At the beginning of the eighteenth century, European armies' infantry units were armed with flintlock muskets with bayonets, which simplified their tactical use and allowed them to defend themselves against the action of the cavalry, employing square formations, in which all soldiers were capable of firing muskets and using their bayonets as thrust weapons.

The eighteenth century also saw the standardization of armies' units and subunits. As a contemporary military writer noted, the general organization of European armies was "almost universally the same – into companies, battalions, regiments, brigades, divisions, wings, lines" (DUNDAS, 1788, p. 55). In infantry, the regiment was consolidated as the armies' basic unit. Even the Spanish army had followed the general European trend after the ruinous end of the 80 Years' War in 1648 and the decline of the model of its *tercios* and squadrons. In 1714, the Spanish

Crown transformed its infantry *tercios* into regiments, subdivided into battalions and these into companies (MARTÍNEZ DE MERLO, 2017, p. 185).

According to the European military model of the eighteenth century, the infantry regiment employed the battalion as its tactical combat unit. There was, however, a certain overlapping between the terms "regiment" and "battalion." Regiments with small number of soldiers formed one single battalion. Regiments with larger troops were organized into multiple battalions. The regiments were composed of a variable number of companies, which were not their tactical subunits. In combat, the companies formed one or more tactical subunits called platoons, composed of a few dozen men. This is the model found in the military regulations of the main Western countries of the period (see ESPAÑA, 1768, p. 2; UNITED STATES, 1779, p. 8; FRANCE, 1776, p. 85-87; UNITED KINGDOM, 1795, p. 82; SCHAUMBOURG LIPPE, 1794, p. 2-3).

4 Cavalry and Artillery

Cavalry units had gone through a similar process of organization and standardization. At the beginning of the Modern Age, European cavalry was an aristocracy's reserve, and was organized into units much smaller than those of infantry. Until the beginning of the seventeenth century, the company was the European cavalry's basic unit. For combat use, the cavalry formed a tactical unit called a squadron by the French and a battalion by the Spanish and their followers. This squadron or battalion did not have a fixed constitution and could be organized with troops of one or more cavalry companies – between 75 and 200 knights (PRIORATO, [166-]). In the middle of the seventeenth century, cavalry companies began to be brought together into regiments, first by the French and then by the Spanish (PARKER, 2004, p. 16-17, p. 235). The decline of the Spanish military model led to the consolidation of the term "squadron" for the cavalry regiments' tactical subunits. According to this model, each squadron would be formed by the union of two companies, so that a cavalry regiment composed of eight companies could employ four squadrons in combat. Thus, as in the infantry, the cavalry regiment was organized for combat, composing its tactical subunits with the troops provided by its companies, whose functions were basically administrative. But unlike infantry, in which companies were transformed into combat platoons, each one commanded by its captain, the cavalry companies were mixed in a larger subunit – the squadron – which was commanded by the senior captain.

The organization of artillery into units went through a slower process. In the early Modern Age, artillery was considered more of a mechanical profession than a military activity. Usually, the artillery commander was a nobleman or an experienced soldier, but, until the seventeenth century, artillerymen and bombers were civilian artisans hired by campaigning armies. The transportation of guns and their accessorieswas also in charge of

civilians hired as carters and beast drivers. Until the beginning of the seventeenth century, artillery was mostly aimed at attacking and defending fortified positions. The guns and their carriages were very heavy, and their movement on the battlefield was almost impossible (MANUCY, 1949, p. 7-8).

During the Thirty Years War, Gustavus Adolphus created a lighter and mobile field artillery,[11] equipped with shorter guns and lighter carriages, capable of being maneuvered on the battlefield. He also organized artillery into three types: siege-artillery, equipped with heavy guns; field artillery, more mobile, equipped with lighter guns; and regimental artillery, equipped with small guns, attached to infantry regiments (FULLER, 1998, p. 98-99). During the reign of Louis XIV (from 1643 to1715), War Minister Marquis de Louvois promoted a broad reform of the French Army, which included the organization of an Artillery Regiment in 1671 (MANUCY, 1949, p. 8). This would have been the first artillery unit with a military character. Other countries followed the French model, organizing artillery companies and regiments (DUNCAN, 1879; ESPAÑA, 1710).

Since the Middle Ages, the master gunners gathered cannon "batteries," that is, sets of artillery pieces used to "batter" fortification walls or other types of targets. Initially, the number of cannons in a battery was quite variable, and depended on the availability of guns and the target to be battered Over time, the batteries started to consist of six to twelve guns. After the creation of artillery units, the batteries started to be manned and operated by gunner and bomber companies. But there was no direct correspondence between a battery and an artillery company. A battery of many guns could require more than one company to be operated. Conversely, the same company could man more than a battery of few guns. Mixed batteries of guns, mortars and howitzers could require personnel from different specialized companies – gunner company, which operated guns, and bomber company, which operated howitzers and mortars.[12] Only during the nineteenth century the term "battery" replaced the term "company" to designate the subunits of artillery regiments.

Artillery regiments were also subdivided into tactical employment units of the same level as infantry battalions. The French Army used the term "group" to designate tactical units in artillery regiments. A group of artillery gathered a number of batteries under the command of a senior officer. In the British Army, the Royal Regiment of Artillery was subdivided into two battalions in 1757. In 1859, these tactical units came to be called "brigades" (DUNCAN, 1879, p. 169-171). But designating a battalion-level unit as a "brigade" caused some confusion. For this reason, in 1938, British battalion-level artillery tactical units came to be called "regiments." In other words, the British artillery administrative regiment is subdivided into several tactical units also called regiments.

---

11 Field artillery is intended to support units of close combat (infantry and cavalry) using heavy fire. It differs from garrison artillery, which provides defensive firepower to forts and fortresses, and from siege artillery, intended for the siege and demolition of fortifications.

12 Cannons are pieces of artillery whose tubes are long and fire high-speed projectiles in a tense trajectory. The howitzers have a shorter tube and fire low-speed projectiles on a parabolic trajectory to hit the target in an abrupt downward curve. The mortars are pieces of artillery with a very short tube, intended to launch bombs and grenades on much curved trajectories, larger than 45º.

The Napoleonic Wars provided the right environment for the consolidation of a Western military model. In this model, infantry was organized into line (or heavy) units, intended for combat in close order, and light infantry units, which were employed in open order for skirmishing and screening missions. Line infantry was usually organized into regiments of multiple battalions, while light units – *chasseurs*, sharpshooters and riflemen[13] – were organized into independent battalions. The infantry regiments had a table strength that ranged from 1,500 to 4,000 men, while battalion troops ranged from 500 to 1,000 men. It should be noted, however, that these numbers were rarely reached. In the cavalry branch, there were regiments of heavy and light cavalry, with picturesque but little precise names in terms of their functions – hussars, uhlans, cuirassiers, dragons, *chasseurs à cheval*, etc. Regardless of their specialty or denomination, the cavalry regiments were subdivided into squadrons, each consisting of two companies brought together. Theoretically, larger regiments could have more than a thousand men, but the actual strength, in general, was around 500 horsemen, organized into two to four squadrons. In most European armies, artillery was organized into regiments, but it was employed in batteries, made up of about 60 to 120 men, organized into one or two companies, which manned and operated about six to 12 guns (MCNAB, 2009).

5 Brigades and Divisions

The word "brigade" became part of the military vocabulary permanently after its adoption by Maurice of Nassau to designate an infantry formation composed of three or four infantry half-regiments. Since its creation, the brigade has been characterized by a certain overlap with the regiment level. According to the organization conceived by Nassau, the brigade was a temporary tactical unit that competed with the regiment. As each Dutch regiment was composed of two half-regiments, it was necessary to gather two regiments to form a brigade. If the regiments were too smaller, it would be necessary to use troops from more regiments. On the other hand, the brigade was not composed of regiments, but of its tactical units – the half-regiments. In general, the brigade was commanded by the colonel with greater military seniority among the commanders of the regiments reunited to compose it (BRZEZINSKI, 1991). This overlap is still reflected today in the hierarchical level of the officers who command the brigades in the Western world. Depending on the country, the command of the brigades can be exercised by a brigadier general[14] or a colonel.

Until the Seven Years' War, European armies had no military structure higher than brigade. Armies marched in one or two dense columns, and regiments and brigades were arranged for battle into one or two lines. The formation of the battle lines implied the lateral movement of the forces, as the column reached the battlefield, which was a lengthy operation,

---

13 Sharpshooters and riflemen were infantry troops used as snipers in scattered combat. Riflemen were equipped with rifles, that is, shoulder arms with rifled barrels, more accurate than smooth barreled muskets.

14 In some countries the rank of "brigadier general" can be replaced by that of "brigadier."

and difficult to be controlled. In 1760, French Marshal Victor-François de Broglie published his *Instruction pour l'Armée du Roi*, in which he established the organization of the army in several "divisions," which would march independently along parallel routs, shortening the time of arrival on the battlefield and for taking the battle formation. Each division should be composed of four brigades, and each cavalry wing would also form a division (DE BROGLIE, 1760). This measure was designed to make the combat configuration faster, but, once on the battlefield, divisions were dissolved and combat was conducted in a traditional manner, in lines (TELP, 2005, p. 19). Finally, during the French Revolution Wars (1792-1801), War Minister Lazare Carnot formalized the creation of divisions as major combat units (SCHNEID, 2015). Infantry and cavalry divisions were organized consisting of brigades or regiments of the corresponding branches. Each division had some artillery batteries to provide them with its own fire support, and was commanded by a division general.[15] The divisional system gave the army commander great employment flexibility, allowing him to march in multiple columns, each one with its own means of fire support and transportation. The use of divisions also allowed for greater decentralization of combat actions, especially in large armies.

6 The Western Military Organization in the twentieth century

The divisional and regimental organization was a model adopted by most Western armies in the first half of the twentieth century. Generally speaking, armies were composed of infantry divisions and cavalry divisions, which were gathered into "army corps" for use in major operations. Infantry troops were organized into units of two levels: the regiment and the battalion. The infantry regiments were commanded by a colonel, and consisted of three to four battalions, each commanded by a major. The manpower of infantry regiments was between 3,000 and 4,000 men. Throughout the nineteenth century, the regiment had become a tactical unit with administrative autonomy, with battalions as its combat tactical units. At the beginning of the twentieth century, battalions were organized with three to four companies led by captains. Armies also had autonomous infantry battalions – not subordinate to regiments. These independent battalions were usually light infantry units (*chasseurs or jaggers*), commanded by lieutenant colonels. The cavalry was organized into regiments, whose subunits were their squadrons, commanded by captains. Similar to infantry, artillery regiments were composed of two to three tactical units called "groups," "battalions" or "brigades," depending on each army. These units, in turn, were consisted of two to four batteries of four to six guns.

This was the "continental" organization, as it differed from the "British regimental system" consolidated with the Caldwell-Childers reforms in the 1870s and 1880s. In the British system, the regiment was a purely administrative and territorial unit, responsible for recruiting and training its personnel. It was also a symbolic institution, which should

---

15   In countries with an Anglo-German military tradition, command of the divisions was assigned to a "major-general".

promote the *spirit de corps* that guaranteed the troops' morale and sustained men in combat. In general, each British infantry regiment consisted of two battalions, one of which was assigned to service in the colonies or in war operations, and the other remained at its headquarters to provide defense for the metropolitan territory and to serve as a personnel reserve for the completion of the battalion deployed abroad. For employment in operations, battalions were subordinate to brigades and divisions, but it was very rare for two battalions from the same regiment to join the same brigade. In other words, in the British regimental system – still in force –, the infantry regiment is not deployed in the theater of war and is not part of the chain of command of the forces in operations. The British regimental system becomes more confused with regard to cavalry, artillery and engineering units. In cavalry, the regiment is the administrative unit, but it is also the tactical unit equivalent to the battalion. Thus, each cavalry administrative regiment has a single tactical regiment, usually with the same name. With regard to artillery and engineering branches, the British Army has only one administrative regiment for each branch – the Royal Regiment of Artillery and the Corps of Royal Engineers –, to which all tactical artillery and engineering regiments are subordinate (FRENCH , 2008).

During World War I, in the main armies involved in the conflict, the infantry divisions were organized with two or three infantry brigades, each composed of about 4,000 to 6,000 men. In continental European and North American armies, each brigade was composed of two regiments; each of these regiments was composed of three or four battalions of 800 to 1,000 men. In the British Army, battalions were directly subordinate to brigades, without an intermediate regimental level. In addition to the infantry units – regiments and battalions –, the infantry divisions had combat support units – artillery, engineering, and communications elements – and logistical support, such as supply columns and medical support elements (BANKS, 2013, p. 34-37, p. 190). This support structure allowed the division to operate autonomously, and made it the basic "large unit" of armies. It should be noted that the brigades were also "large units," as they brought together a number of units – regiments or battalions –, but all of the same branch, and they did not have combat support units. Therefore, the brigade was not a large autonomous unit, capable of being employed independently. It depended on the division to receive fire, engineering, and logistical support.

It should be noted that, in the continental organization, the chain of command in the infantry divisions was longer than in the British model. In the main continental armies, there were two levels of command between the division and the battalion – the brigade and the regiment. In the British organization, there was only the brigade. The continental organization was square (or quadrangular), that is, each division had four regiments. In the British organization, the division was triangular, as it was organized with three brigades, but these were square, that is, each one had four battalions, which resulted in the same 12 battalions of the continental divisions.

In the interwar world period, the main Western armies shortened the length of the chain of command, suppressing the brigade in their infantry divisions. The exception was the British Army, whose brigades acted as regiments. At the same time, the triangular organization was introduced, in which each infantry division started having three regiments

Coleç. Meira Mattos, Rio de Janeiro, v. 15, n. 52, p. 39-60, January/April 2021

53

of three battalions. The infantry divisions became lighter, with nine battalions instead of the 12 battalions of the World War I (see FRANCE, 1967; MITCHAM JR., 2007; PALMER, 2014; WILSON, 1998). The loss of the role played by cavalry in the face of machine gun and artillery fire led to the almost complete disappearance of the cavalry divisions in the main Western armies or their replacement by armored and mechanized divisions. During World War II, the United States Army nominally maintained only two cavalry divisions, one of which was equipped like infantry. The other one was extinguished in 1944, and its personnel used to compose service units (WILSON, 1998, p. 191). At the beginning of the war, the German Army had only one cavalry division, which was transformed into an armored division in 1941-1942 Winter (UNITED STATES, 1943). In the same period, the British Army's battle order did not include cavalry divisions either. French correspondent divisions were being mechanized and disappeared after the war. The development of armored vehicles during the Great War, in turn, gave rise to armored and mechanized divisions. The latter were equipped mainly with light armored vehicles, and the former were stronger in tanks. World War II also saw airborne or parachutist divisions appear.

The organization of armored divisions differed widely in each of the armies involved in the conflict. But, in general terms, they were organized with three to six tank battalions, each with about 50 tanks, three to six motorized or mechanized infantry battalions, three to four artillery groups (or battalions), a mechanized reconnaissance regiment or battalion, an engineering battalion, as well as elements of communications, anti-aircraft defense and logistical support. Mechanized infantry battalions transported their troops in armored vehicles, while motorized ones did it in conventional trucks. Artillery in armored divisions should be equipped with self-propelled guns or howitzers, mounted on armored vehicles. Each division could also be equipped with a battalion or company of anti-tank-cannons, but these elements could be integrated within the infantry battalions (see FORCZYK, 2016; GRIFFITH, 2008; WILSON, 1998). The complexity and variety of organization of the armored divisions was due to its still experimental character and the different technical characteristics of the equipment with which its units were equipped: armored protection, speed and firepower of tanks and other armored vehicles; means of mobile communications; type, caliber and mobility of artillery and anti-tank weaponry etc.

The airborne divisions had a general organization similar to those of regular infantry, despite being equipped with lighter equipment. They consisted of three regiments of three battalions and units of combat support and logistics.

The shortened divisional chain of command model was consolidated after World War II. Initially, the United States Army experimented with an even shorter divisional chain of command, eliminating the regiment. This model, called the "pentomic" division, was conceived in the mid-1950s, for the possible scenario of an atomic war in Europe (BACEVICH, 1986). In order to operate in a chaotic battlefield and with serious command and control difficulties, the "pentomic" division would be organized with five "battle groups," a battalion of tanks and a mechanized reconnaissance squadron, supported by five

artillery battalions and batteries of heavy cannons and rockets capable of firing tactical nuclear projectiles, in addition to other elements of combat support and logistics. The "battle group" was a sort of super battalion, made up of five rifle companies, a heavy mortar company and a command and service company. It had about 1,360 men, well above the normal manpower of battalions, but much smaller than that of a World War II regiment. The manpower of the "pentomic" infantry division was 13,748 men, not much smaller than the Korean War infantry division (1950-1953), with 15,973 men (WILSON, 1998). But the "pentomic" division was abandoned in the early 1960s, and American divisions began to be organized with three brigade commands and nine to 10 battalions, in addition to supporting elements. For combat, the division organized its brigades, assigning them a number of battalions and support units (WILSON, 1998, p. 291-316). This model was the one that prevailed until the end of the twentieth century.

In the 1950s, the French Army also introduced important changes in the structure of its divisions. In 1955, it started to set up the *Javelot* division, which suppressed the brigade as an intermediate echelon between the division and the regiment. The *Javelot* model was adopted in armored, airborne and motorized and mechanized infantry divisions. In this new organization, the regiments were reduced to just four to six maneuver companies, plus other support and reconnaissance companies. This model eliminated the battalion between the regiment and the companies. The French regiments started to function as a single super battalion, similar to the "battle group" of the American "pentomic" division. The *Javelot* division was composed of four to five maneuver regiments, an artillery regiment, an armored reconnaissance regiment, and other support units (JACKSON, 2005). As a result of the new structure of the regiments, these divisions had their strength reduced to around 7,000 men, that is, about half of the manpower of a World War II division. The *Javelot* model was designed to be used in the event of an atomic war in Europe, but it worked very well in the Suez Expedition in 1956 and in operations against irregular forces in the Algerian War (1954 to 1962). A similar model was finally adopted by the French army in 1977 (see BEAUGENDRE, 1976; OLIVEIRA, 1979).

7   Conclusion

The period examined traces the path of creation and consolidation of a Western military model, characterized by a shared typology of branches, military units, their subunits and the large units that comprise them and by a common terminology to designate military units, despite some occasional divergences, resulting from the historical experiences of each country. It also shows the growing complexity and sophistication of the Western military forces' organizational structures, from their creation in the sixteenth century until the end of the twentieth century. Starting with massive blocks of soldiers armed with pikes and protected by blocks of musketeers, Western armies arrived at the end of the twentieth century with large units composed of varying types of combat units, combat support and logistical support. This organizational complexity derives not only from the technological development of military armaments and equipment, but also from purely organizational improvements.

Coleç. Meira Mattos, Rio de Janeiro, v. 15, n. 52, p. 39-60, January/April 2021

55

References

1. Documental sources

ALCAZAR Y ZUŃIGA, M. **Arte de esquadronar y exercicios de la Infanteria**. Madrid: Juan Garcia Infanzon, 1703.

CARRION PARDO, J. **Tratado como se deven formar los quatro esquadrones, en que milita nuestra nación española**: en que se hallaran cosas muy curiosas tocantes a al origen de las Armas. Lisboa: Antonio Alvarez, 1595.

DE BROGLIE, V.-F. **Instruction pour l'Armée du Roi, commandée par Mr. le Maréchal Duc de Broglie**. Francfort: Freres van Duren, 1760.

DUNDAS, D. **Principles of military movements**: chiefly applied to Infantry. London: T. Caldwell, 1788.

ESPAŃA. **Reglamento, y ordenanzas para la mas acertada, y puntual direccion de mi Artilleria de España, y el mejor servicio de todas sus Provincias, y particularmente del nuevo Regimiento de Artilleria que he mandado formar, y al presente sirve em mis Exercitos, y Plazas de España.** Madrid: Imprenta de Diego Martinez Abad, 1710.

ESPAŃA. **Ordenanzas de S. M. para el regimen, disciplina, subordinacion y servicio de sus Ejercitos**. Madrid: Oficina de Antonio Marín, 1768. t. 1.

ESPAŃA. Anexo XIII: Ordenanza de Génova (15 de noviembre de 1536). **Revista de Historia Militar**, Madrid, ano 61, n. 1, p. 300-311, 2017. Número extraordinário. Anexo 7.

FERRETTI, Francesco. **Della Osservanza Militare** del Capitan Francesco Ferretti d'Ancona, cauallieri di S. Stefano, Libri Due. Venetia: Appresso Camillo, & Rutili Borgominerij Fratelli, 1568.

FRANCE. **Ordonnance du Roy pour regler l'exercice de ses troupes d'Infanterie.** Toulon: Imprimerie de J. L. R. Mallard, 1776.

MELO, M. A. Regimento da Guerra (1570). In: SOUSA, A. C. (comp.). **Provas da historia genealogica da Casa Real Portugueza** [...]. Lisboa: Regia Officina de Sylviana, e da Academia Real, 1744. t. 3, p. 252-304.

PAVE, R. B. **Instructions sur le faict de la Guerre**. Paris: Michel Vascosan & Galiot du Pré, 1548.

PRIORATO, G. G. **Maneio da cavallaria, escrito pello Conde Galeaço Gualdo Priorato, com annotaçoens de Dom João Mascarenhas Conde do Sabugal do Conso de Guerra d'El Rei Dom Affonso 6º**. [S. l.]: [s. n.], [166-]. Manuscrito.

SALAZAR, D. **Tratado de Re Militari**. Brusselas: Casa de Roger Velpius, 1590.

SCHAUMBOURG LIPPE, C. **Regulamento para o exercicio, e disciplina dos regimentos de infantaria dos exercitos de Sua Magestade Fidelissima** [...]. Lisboa: Regia Officina Typografica, 1794.

VALLE, G. B. D. **Il Vallo**. [Napoli]: [s. n.], [1521].

VASCONCELOS, L. M. **Arte militar, dividida em tres partes**. Termo D'Alenquer: Vicente Alvarez, 1612.

THE SWEDISH discipline: religious, civile, and military [...]. London: Iohn Dawson for Nath: Butter and Nich: Bourne, 1632.

UNITED KINGDOM. **Rules and Regulations for the formations, field-exercise, and movements of His Majesty's Forces**. 2. ed. [London]: War-Office, 1795.

UNITED STATES. **Regulations for the order and discipline of the troops of the United States**. Philadelphia: Styner and Cist, 1779. pt. 1.

UNITED STATES. Military Intelligence Service. **Order of battle of the German Army**: April 1943. Washington, DC: Military Intelligence Service, 1943.

2. Bibliography

AYTON, A. The military careerist in fourteenth-century England. J**ournal of Medieval History,** Abingdon, UK, v. 43, n. 1, p. 4-43, 2017.

BACEVICH, A. J. **The Pentomic Era**: the US Army between Korea and Vietnam. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1986.

BANKS, A. **A military atlas of the First World War**: a map history of the war of 1914-18 on land, at sea and in the air. Commentary by Alan Palmer. Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Military, 2013.

BATTAGLIONE. In: PIANIGIANI, O.; BONOMI, F. (org.). **Vocabolario etimologico della lingua italiana**. [S. l.]: [s. n.], c2004-2008. Available at: https://www.etimo.it/?pag=hom. Acesso em: 18 nov. 2019.

BEAUGENDRE, M. A. P. Exército francês: a reorganização de 1976. **A Defesa Nacional,** Rio de Janeiro, Ano 68, n. 694, p. 123-149, 1981.

BLACKMORE, D. J. **"Destructive and formidable"**: British infantry firepower, 1642-1765. 2012. Tese (Doutorado em Filosofia) – Nottingham Trent University, Nottingham, UK, 2012.

BRZEZINSKI, R. **The army of Gustavus Adolphus (1)**: ifantry. Illustrated by Richard Hook. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 1991. (Osprey Military, 235).

CHASE, K. **Firearms:** a global history to 1700. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

DUNCAN, F. **History of The Royal Regiment of Artillery.** 3. ed. London: John Murray, 1879. v. 1.

FEIO, G. C. **A guerra no Renascimento**: o ensino e a aprendizagem militares em Portugal e no Império: de D. Manoel I a Felipe II. Lisboa: A Esfera dos Livros, 2018.

FORCZYK, R. A. **Tank warfare on the Eastern Front, 1943-1945:** Red Steamroller. Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2016.

FRANCE. Ministere des Armées. **Guerre 1939-1945**: les grandes unités françaises: historiques succincts: 1939-1940: divisions. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1967. v. 2.

FRENCH, D. **Military identities**: the regimental system, the British Army, and the British People, c. 1870-2000. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

FULLER, J. F. C. **Armament and History**: the influence of armament on History from the dawn of classical warfare to the end of the Second World War. New York: Da Capo, 1998.

GRIFFITH, P. **World War II desert tactics**. Illustrated by Adam Hook. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2008.

GROOT, B. **Dutch armies of the 80 Years' War 1568–1648 (1):** infantry. Illustrated by Gerry Embleton. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2017. (Men-at-Arms, 510).

HOWARD, M. **A guerra na história da Europa.** Tradução de Jorge Pinheiro. Mem Martins: Publicações Europa-América, 1997.

JACKSON, P. D. **French ground forces organizational development for counterrevolutionary warfare between 1945 and 1962**. 2005. Tese (Mestrado em Arte e Ciência Militar) – US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2005.

MANUCY, A. **Artillery through the ages**: a short illustrated history of cannon, emphasizing types used in America. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1949.

MARTÍNEZ DE MERLO, J. La organización de los ejércitos en los Austrias. **Revista de Historia Militar**, Madrid, ano 61, n. 1, p. 135-186, 2017. Número extraordinário.

MCNAB, C. (ed.). **Armies of the Napoleonic Wars**: an illustrated history. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2009.

MCNEILL, W. H. **The pursuit of power:** technology, armed force, and society since A.D. 1000. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1984.

MITCHAM JR., S. W. **German order of battle:** 1st – 290th infantry divisions in WWII. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2007. v. 1.

OLIVEIRA, H. J. C. As comunicações na "Divisão 77". **Revista Militar Brasileira,** Brasília, DF, ano 65, v. 115, n. 3, p. 3-32, 1979.

PALMER, R. Units & formations 1930-1956: divisions: infantry. **British Military History**, Barnstaple, 2 jan. 2014. Disponível em: https://www.britishmilitaryhistory.co.uk/docs-units-formations-divisions-infantry. Acesso em: 22 abr. 2020.

PARKER, G. **The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567-1659**. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

PUYPE, J. P. Victory at Nieuwpoort, 2 July 1600. In: HOEVEN, M. (ed.). **Exercise of arms**: warfare in the Netherlands, 1568-1648. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 1997. p. 69-112.

RÉGIMENT. In: CENTRE NATIONAL DE RESSOURCES TEXTUELLES ET LEXICALES. **Ortolang**: Outils et Ressources pour un Traitement Optimisé de la LANGue: portail lexical: etymologie. Nancy: CNRTL, c2012. Disponível em: https://www.cnrtl.fr/etymologie/r%C3%A9giment. Acesso em: 4 nov. 2019.

SCHNEID, F. C. The French Army. In: SCHNEID, F. C. (ed.). **European armies of the French Revolution, 1789–1802**. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2015. p. 13-35.

SQUADRA. In: PIANIGIANI, O.; BONOMI, F. **Vocabolario Etimologico della Lingua Italiana**. [S. l.]: [s. n.], c2004-2008. Disponível em: https://www.etimo.it/?pag=hom. Acesso em: 18 nov. 2019.

SQUADRONE. In: PIANIGIANI, O.; BONOMI, F. **Vocabolario Etimologico della Lingua Italiana**. [S. l.]: [s. n.], c2004-2008. Disponível em: https://www.etimo.it/?pag=hom. Acesso em: 18 nov. 2019.

Coleç. Meira Mattos, Rio de Janeiro, v. 15, n. 52, p. 39-60, January/April 2021

59

TELP, C. **The evolution of operational art, 1740-1813**: from Frederick the Great to Napoleon. Abingdon, UK: Frank Cass, 2005.

WILSON, J. B. **Maneuver and firepower:** the evolution of divisions and separated brigades. Washington, DC: US Army Center for Military History, 1998.

Geopolitics and related sciences: theoretical considerations

Geopolítica y ciencias afines: consideraciones teóricas

Abstract: The term geopolitics became stigmatized after the end of World War II, and this occurred since this science was the theoretical basis used to justify the expansionist actions undertaken by Nazi Germany. But the importance of geopolitics has progressively rescued it from prejudices, which is easily measured today, particularly by the constant presence of the word in the speeches of the world's leading statesmen. It is observed, however, that the research work carried out in the field of the geopolitical theory ends up restricted to the main lines of classical and contemporary thought, without going into more detail on the theoretical basis related to the other sciences that are interwoven with geopolitics, and which constantly dialogue with it. This study seeks to present a more comprehensive bibliographic review, addressing also theoretical concepts of various sciences, and which are on interest of geopolitics. In this way, the author intends to contribute with some conclusions aimed at a greater awareness about the multidisciplinary character of geopolitics and, eventually, inspire the development of new academic works in this area.

Keywords: Geopolitics. Political Science. Economic Sciences. Strategy. Geography.

Resumen: El término Geopolítica se estigmatizó después del fin de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, y esto ocurrió desde que esta ciencia fue la base teórica utilizada para justificar las acciones expansionistas emprendidas por la Alemania Nazi. Pero la importancia de la geopolítica la ha rescatado progresivamente de los prejuicios, que hoy se miden fácilmente, sobre todo por la presencia constante de la palabra en los discursos de los principales estadistas del mundo. Se observa, sin embargo, que el trabajo de investigación realizado en el campo de la teoría geopolítica termina restringiéndose a las líneas principales del pensamiento clásico y contemporáneo, sin entrar en más detalles sobre la base teórica relacionada con las otras Ciencias que están entrelazadas con la geopolítica y que dialogan constantemente con ella. Este estudio busca presentar una revisión bibliográfica más completa, abordando también conceptos teóricos de varias Ciencias y que están relacionados con el interés de la Geopolítica. De esta manera, el autor pretende contribuir con algunas conclusiones dirigidas a crear una mayor conciencia sobre el carácter multidisciplinar de la Geopolítica y, finalmente, inspirar el desarrollo de nuevas obras académicas en esta área.

Palabras clave: Geopolítica. Ciencia Política. Ciencias Económicas. Estrategia. Geografía.

Marco Antonio De Freitas Coutinho (iD)
Exército Brasileiro.
Brasília, DF, Brasil.
coutinho.marco@eb.mil.br

Coleç. Meira Mattos, Rio de Janeiro, v. 15, n. 52, p. 61-90, January/April 2021

61

1 Introduction

After the end of World War II, the term 'Geopolitics' ended up being quite stigmatized, since it was the doctrinal basis for the expansionist action taken by Nazi Germany. The Concept of Lebensraum (living space), which was frequently present in Adolf Hitler's speeches, was established in the nineteenth century by Friedrich Ratzel (FLINT, 2006, p. 20), one of the precursors of what would become the geopolitical thought.

A prejudiced perception of Geopolitics developed and contaminated discussions on the topic in the worldwide academic environment, attitude that was very clear in Josué de Castro's words, considered one of the greatest sociologists in Brazil:

> I am not infected by taboos. I won the taboo of hunger. I had the courage to name my book "Geopolitics of Hunger," knowing that "Geopolitics" is a Nazi word, forged by the Nazis, divulged by Karl Haushofer's school to justify the expansion of the Third Reich in the world (BRASIL, 2007, p 167, our translation).

But in practice, geopolitical theories have managed to maintain their importance in the global political game, marking the superpowers' behavior throughout the Cold War. According to Flint (2006, p. 18), Mackinder's and Spykman's ideas formed the intellectual basis for the establishment of strategies that made it possible to win the Cold War without risking a nuclear confrontation.

The unquestionable importance of Geopolitics meant that it was gradually rescued from prejudice, which is easily measured by the constant presence of the word in the speeches of the main world's statesmen.

President Trump, for example, has correlated US energy cooperation with India as an "important geopolitical tool" for both countries (READOUT..., 2017). President Putin had classified the collapse of the Soviet Union as the "geopolitical catastrophe of the century" (PUTIN, 2005). In a speech given in the German parliament, Chancellor Angela Merkel condemned Turkey's military offensive against the Kurds in Syria, calling it "a humanitarian drama with major geopolitical consequences" (MERKEL, 2019). Chinese President Xi Jinping, referring to the trade war between China and the USA, declared that "tensions are high on the geopolitical and ideological fronts" (XIN; ZHENG, 2019). In Brazil, Minister Paulo Guedes declared that the dispute over the implementation of 5G networks "creates a geopolitical issue in a situation that was previously only related to economy" (GUEDES apud SUSPEITA..., 2020).

Also, in academia, there has been a progressive resurgence of research in the geopolitical theory field. According to Dodds (2019), the topic had literally left the circulation of American political and popular life between 1945 and 1970, a period in which there was little or no interest in the discipline.

Ironically, still according to Dodds (2019), at the time when the term 'Geopolitics' was losing its academic credibility in countries like the United States, Japan, Great Britain and

other parts of Europe, it was possible to observe that the American strategy for the Cold War became increasingly oriented by geopolitical ideas.

Nevertheless, since the collapse of the Soviet Union some scholars have suggested other ways of employing Geopolitics to understand this changing world, such as the development of studies focused on human security, the environment, and the role of non-state actors in the global Geopolitics.

Under these new approaches, Geopolitics continues to have a place in discussions on migration, terrorism, the environment, international trade, energy, international relations and defense, as well as in other areas where geographic factors continue to influence political decisions. Even in the recent issue involving the covid-19 pandemic, an attempt has been made to assess the size and geopolitical consequences of this global threat.

In this context, it seems important to develop research works in the geopolitical theory field, as well focusing more closely on the theoretical basis of the other sciences that are deeply intertwined with Geopolitics, and which constantly dialogue with it.

Based on this, the objective of this study will be to present a bibliographic review of the main theoretical concepts directly involved with Geopolitics. For this purpose, a route was established covering the main areas that have a close connection with the discipline, without forgetting to value genuine Brazilian currents of thought.

In order for the objective proposed to be achieved, the study begins with a review of geopolitical theory and how it has developed to date, including what was published within the genuine national thought scope. From this overview, concepts extracted from Political Science, Strategy, Geography, and Economic Sciences will be discussed, exploring some points that are intimately related to geopolitical theory.

Thus, the intention is to present complementarity between geopolitical thought and other theoretical areas, allowing the establishment of a more comprehensive view on a topic that remains so present, thus contributing to a greater awareness of the multidisciplinary character of Geopolitics and, eventually, inspire the discussion on the subject in broader academic circles.

2 Geopolitical theories

The term 'Geopolitics' was first used by Professor Rudolf Kjëllén in 1899. However, Kjëllén did not hide the fact that he had developed such a neologism to better characterize concepts previously presented, and the best proof of that is in his statement that "the term geopolitics originally means the same as the political geography of Ratzel" (apud BACKHEUSER , 1952, p. 51, our translation).

In turn, Friedrich Ratzel's ideas had great influence in the early stages of the development of Geopolitical Science, and he was a pioneer in the study on the power relations between the State and the geographical space: "It is concluded that what remains to be done to bring all political geography to a high prestige consists of conducting comparative research on the relations between the State and the land" (apud BACKHEUSER, 1952, p. 24, our translation).

In his famous "seven laws of State growth," Ratzel defended the State's connection with the land evolves over the stages of its historical evolution, and that its growth depends on economic conditions and incorporation of new spaces. Therefore, it is the State's task to ensure the protection of its space through territorial policy (RATZEL apud BECKER, 2012, p. 122).

However, according to Professor Bertha Becker (2012), Ratzel's organic conception, rather than being restricted to comparing the State to a living being, sought to demonstrate that State and Nation merge into one actor, representing something natural, indivisible. Kjëllén, in turn, tried to deepen the discussion on several concepts initially brought up by Ratzel, particularly exploring the idea that the State needs growing spaces, conception that ended up serving as a theoretical basis for the expansionist policies of Nazi Germany, bringing an extremely negative image for Geopolitical Science, particularly in the years after the World War II.

On the other hand, the importance of combining Geographic and Social Sciences for the study of Geopolitics had been highlighted by Halford John Mackinder (1919, p. 38) as well, who was also considered a pioneer of theoretical references in this area when declaring that "The influence of geographical conditions upon human activities has depended, however, not merely on the realities as we are now know them to be and to have been, but in even greater degree on what men imagined in regard of them."

But what would be the most appropriate definition for Geopolitics? Answering this question is not a simple task.

A mandatory reference is the work *Bausteine zur Geopolitik*, led by the German theoretician Karl Ernst Haushofer, where a classic definition of Geopolitics was presented, highlighting in it the deterministic character of the geographical space over political processes:

> Geopolitics is the science of the conditioning of political processes by the earth. It is based on the broad foundation of geography, especially political geography, as the science of political space organisms and their structure. The essence of regions as comprehended from the geographical point of view provides the framework for geopolitics within which the course of political processes must proceed if they are to succeed in the long term" (HAUSHOFER et al. apud FLINT, 2006, p. 22).

Quoting French geographer and geopolitician Yves Lacoste, Bonfim (2005, p. 26) has drawn attention to the complexity of Geopolitics and its peculiarity in relation to physical geography:

> Contrary to the claims of certain great theorists, a geopolitical situation is not essentially determined by such data of physical geography, but it results from the combination of many more numerous factors - demographic, economic, cultural, political -, and each of which has to be seen in its particular spatial configuration.

On the other hand, Flint (2006, p. 25) also seeks to define geopolitics, but casts doubt on its scientific character, highlighting that:

> Geopolitics was the study, some claimed science, of explaining and predicting the strategic behavior of states. States were the exclusive agents of geopolitics. This is the period of "classical geopolitics" we discussed earlier. But, the contemporary understanding of geopolitics is much different; indeed one set of definitions would classify all politics as geopolitics, in a broad understanding that no conflict is separate from its spatial setting.

In turn, Immanuel Wallerstein (2006, p. 93), a well-known American sociologist and political scientist, defined Geopolitics in a much more succinct way in the glossary of his work *World-systems analysis: an introduction*: "Geopolitics. A nineteenth-century term referring to the constellations and manipulations of power within the interstate system."

Finally, yet importantly, Henry Kissinger (1979, p. 914) stated that "By geopolitical I mean an approach that pays attention to the requirements of equilibrium."

In the updated and revised edition of *Geopolitics: a very short introduction*, Dodds (2019, p. 41) considers that Geopolitics involves three main characteristics. Firstly, there is its most well-known aspect, which is to deal with issues of power over space and territory. Secondly, Geopolitics allows the creation of geographic models to give meaning to world affairs. As examples of such models, quite common when faced with the so-called geopolitical analyzes, Dodds (2019) presents the concepts of "sphere of influence," "blocs," "backyard," "neighborhood," "proximity" and similar others. Thirdly, Dodds (2019) points out that geopolitical analyzes can be oriented towards the future, enabling the elaboration of national strategies and offering perspectives on States' likely behavior, since their interests are quite stable, at least in the short and medium term.

States even have some immutable concerns, among which to secure resources, protect their territory and manage their populations, and all of them with a direct impact on their behavior within the international system scope. It is worth mentioning that the most classic concepts of Geopolitics focus on the interrelations between States' territorial interests and power with geographical environments, the latter bringing with them an important deterministic factor for any analysis to be carried out, shaping the leaders' political choices worldwide.

On the other hand, the most updated concepts, said to be critical, focus on the interactions between the human and physical spheres, with the geographical environment weight being considered more fluid and subject to interpretation in the context of the analyzes performed within Geopolitics scope. A very interesting aspect was stressed by Gray and Sloan (2013), when stating that the critical currents analyze Geopolitics from four different points of view: Formal, Practical, Popular, and Structural. Table 1 presents a summary of these different points of view:

Table 1 – Critical views of geopolitics.

POINT OF VIEW	DEFINITION	OBJECT OF INVESTIGATION	PROBLEMATIZATION
Formal Geopolitics	Geopolitics of geopoliticians	Elaboration of Geopolitical Theory	Elaboration of theoretical models
Practical Geopolitics	Geopolitics of diplomats	Everyday execution of international politics ("Realpolitik")	Conduction of geopolitical analyzes, formulation of international policy strategies and their implementation
Popular Geopolitics	Geopolitics of politicians, mass media, and general population	Establishment of a common language for the complex issues of international politics, focusing on the media and the general population	Formation of national identities and construction of images for public opinion
Structural Geopolitics	Multidisciplinary Geopolitics	Mapping of the geographical, political, historical, social and economic processes that affect the contemporary international system	Elaboration of trends and scenarios based on a multidisciplinary vision

Sources: Based on Gray and Sloan (2013) and Coutinho (2020, p. 10).

It is possible to observe in Table 1 that Geopolitics play an important role in systematizing the study of Geopolitical Science, proposing theoretical models to explain reality. But what is quite clear is the fact that Geopolitics cannot be considered geopoliticians' monopoly (COUTINHO, 2020, p. 11).

In turn, Dodds (2019) emphasizes that the critical and classical currents converge to a point where both agree that geographical factors should always be considered. However, what puts them on opposite margins is how, where, for whom, and for what reason geographic factors matter.

For the development of this work it is possible to consider a very balanced definition of Geopolitics, in which it can be understood as the study (or science) that aims to analyze the influence of the combination of a wide range of conditions verified in a geographical environment on the political processes carried out by state and non-state actors.

After this conceptual approach, it is possible to consider that geopolitical theories basically come together in three schools of thought:

- German School (Determinism), which proclaimed a preponderance of geographical determinism over nations' destiny. It encompasses Sea Power Theory and Land Power Theory. This line had Karl Ernst Haushofer, Alfred Taylor Mahan and Halford Mackinder as exponents;
- French School (Possibilism), which emphasized human being's potential to conduct the possibilities presented by the geographical environment, emphasizing that the relationship between human being and geography is mediated by the political factor (TEIXEIRA JÚNIOR, 2017, p. 35). Vidal de La Blanche was its most outstanding exponent; and

- American School (Integration), which emerged as a criticism of the way of thinking that was studied until then, seeking to combine the ideas of German and French Schools. The central idea is that "possibilism acts, but often due to determinism" (BONFIM, 2005, p. 29). American School comprises many critical currents, but only two will be mentioned: Rimland Theory, whose main exponent was Nicholas Spykman, and more recently, World-Systems Theory, whose principles were presented by Flint and Taylor (2018) in the work *Political geography: world economy, nation-state and locality*.

The main and most representative geopolitical theories will be seen below, which, as already mentioned, are: Sea Power Theory, Land Power Theory, Rimland Theory, and World-Systems Theory. These theories do not exhaust attempts at scientific explanation for understanding the relationship between geographical factors and international politics, but they allow identifying how the evolution of geopolitics has proceeded over the years, as well as allowing the establishment of a necessary knowledge base for understanding the object of this study.

Sea Power Theory was proposed by Alfred Taylor Mahan (1840-1914). Admiral of the US Navy, he presented his main ideas in the book *The influence of sea power upon history* (MAHAN, 1987). Supported by studies on the historical evolution of countries like Portugal, England, France and the Netherlands, he argued in defense of superiority at sea for States' military success and political victory (TEIXEIRA JÚNIOR, 2017, p. 52-55). Mahan's ideas inspired many geopoliticians to think of a mathematical relationship between maritime and continental coefficients, in order to assess whether a State had the conditions to become a maritime power. According to Dodds (2019, p. 27), Mahan suggested that obtaining naval power was the most important factor to determine a nation's geopolitical power.

Currently, Sea Power Theory still finds support in a critical aspect called Atlanticism, "geo-ideology" practiced by some Western countries in the Northern hemisphere, and which is based on the principles of individuality, freedom, and democracy (REGIANI, 2020, p. 48)

With regard to Land Power Theory, the British Halford Mackinder (1919, p. 98) was responsible for elaborating the bases for the study of this aspect of Geopolitics, presenting the concepts of "World-Island," "Heartland" or "Pivot Area," "Inner Crescent" and "Outer Crescent."

It is also important to understand the concept of "Inner Crescent," which was a land area surrounding the territory defined as "Heartland," the latter being a crossing area between the center of the Eurasian continent and the extremes of Europe and Asia. There, disputes between land and sea powers would take place. This region, plus the American continent, was delimited by Spykman (1938) as being centered between 25º and 60º latitudes in the Northern hemisphere.[1]

---

1   "The political activity of the world is, and will continue to be, centered between 25° and 60° north latitude" (SPYKMAN, 1938, p. 42).

According to Melo (apud TEIXEIRA JÚNIOR, 2017, p. 64), Mackinder has developed his own historical-geographical conception, which highlighted the constant struggle for supremacy between sea and land powers. In this opposition between sea and continent, Mackinder considered that human inventiveness and technology (efficient means of communication and land transportation) would break down barriers that limited mobility in continental environments, causing the scale to tip in favor of land powers.

According to Regiani (2020, p. 49), a current aspect of Land Power Theory is Eurasianism, which has authority, hierarchy and nationalism as pillars, and prevails in some countries of Eurasia, particularly in the Russian Federation. Eurasianism is an ideology that tries to encompass a whole set of values and identities common to a more conservative and continental stance.

Rimland Theory, on the other hand, constituted a criticism made by Nicholas Spykman (1938) of Mackinder's thought, and which brought new and important elements to the study on Geopolitics. According to him, "geography does not determine, but it conditions" (SPYKMAN, 1938, p. 30). Its main objective was to propose a theoretical model that could serve as a basis for a US global strategy, considering that the United States is located outside the "World-Island." In this sense, he proposed a projection of American power by the "Rimland," which was basically the "Inner Crescent" region of the theory of Mackinder (1919), plus the Americas. He suggested that the USA should establish systems of regional alliances, which would prevent the World-Island from being controlled by the dominant land power, whatever it was. For this, it was essential for the USA to become an amphibious power (maritime and terrestrial).

As a result of this theory, the Western powers established their strategies to face the Cold War, guiding the formation of military alliances established in the period (TEIXEIRA JÚNIOR, 2017, p. 87), particularly the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which proved to be extremely successful in achieving the objectives established.

Finally, among the most recent trends, World-Systems Theory will be addressed, which adds considerable weight to sociological and economic factors within Geopolitics scope. In fact, the development of World-Systems Theory by Flint and Taylor (2018) resulted from the application, in Geopolitics field, of World-Systems Analysis, whose central ideas were presented by Wallerstein (2006) in the work *World-systems analysis: an introduction*.

Since the 1970s, American political scientist and sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein had been dedicated to establishing an analytical methodology that was able to lead to a better understanding of the processes that enabled the modern world's development. This work led him to perform the so-called "World-Systems Analysis," which started being a reference and came to be widely used in the field of social sciences and history (WALLERSTEIN, 2006). It also turned into a reference in discussions on globalization.

The model has become quite useful due to its unique definition of what is meant by "society" in broad geographic and historical terms ("*longue durée*"), considering the evolution of humanity as a whole and not just focusing on individual countries, resulting from isolated events ("big events") or from the action of specific historical personalities ("great men") (WALLERSTEIN, 2006, p. 13).

The result is a geographic political approach that is able to situate current events in a much broader and multidisciplinary context (such as the current tensions between the USA and China, discussions on Climate Change, or even the covid-19 pandemic impacts).

3 Brazilian geopolitical thought

It is important to refer to Brazilian geopolitical thought, which developed from the 1930s onwards and has been very active over the years. After studying this theme, Vesentini (2009) gathered arguments that seek to prove the effective existence of a Brazilian Geopolitical School in that period. His first argument points to the fact that the representative authors of this time dialogue with each other and complemented each other, even considering that they eventually disagreed on certain specific points. Also, he considers that Brazilian Geopolitics of that period contributed directly to formulation of a geopolitical project for the country, a point that will be developed later.

However, the origins of Brazilian geopolitical thought can be identified already from our independence process. According to Becker (2012, p. 130, our translation), "Brazil's Geopolitics have to be historically understood from national State's constitution after Independence and its essential and growing role in the formation of a country-continent whose economic, social and political organization was forged under colonial rule."

It is possible to see that this view had already found strong support in the academic and political performance of statesmen such as José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva (1763-1838), Francisco Adolpho Varnhagen (1816-1878) and João Pandiá Calógeras (1870-1934), to the extent that they clearly expressed in their works the influence of geographical factors (human or physiographic) on the Brazilian State's political action, which could, in itself, constitute a line of thought of a geopolitical nature in its essence (COUTINHO, 2020, p. 19).

Initially, exponents of the classic current that emerged in the period mentioned above will be discussed, among which Professor Everardo Backheuser, Marshal Mário Travassos, General Golbery do Couto e Silva, General Meira Mattos and Professor Therezinha de Castro stand out.

According to Lima et al. (2017, p. 3), still in the 1930s, Professor Backheuser presented his first ideas about a genuinely Brazilian geopolitical theory, through the work *Problemas do Brasil: geopolítica* [Problems of Brazil: geopolitics] (1932), in which he defined Geopolitics as "the policy made as a result of geographical conditions," highlighting the national unity maintenance as a major concern.

In this sense, he elaborated a study that presented as main threats to Brazilian national unity the country's great territorial extension; uneven distribution of territory among the federated entities; population's regionalism spirit, and the Federal Capital's peripheral location. In order to oppose the threats he identified, the following measures should be taken: capital transfer to the interior; strengthening of central power (with a return to the Monarchy); a new

Coleç. Meira Mattos, Rio de Janeiro, v. 15, n. 52, p. 61-90, janeiro/abril 2021

69

territorial division for federated entities, and creation of federal territories in the most inaccessible frontier regions to allow their defense and development.

Another view has been brought up through Travassos (1931), particularly in his work *Aspectos geográficos sul-americanos* [South American geographic aspects]. Mário Travassos explored several new aspects in our literature, particularly with regard to the integration of Brazil into the inter-American context. The main issues raised by him were the emergence of rival and imperialist powers (Argentina and the USA), political vulnerability of South American neighbors, and lack of a Brazilian national strategy in the face of the challenges mentioned (HAGE, 2013, p. 98). This may have been the starting point for the elaboration of a national geostrategic project, only carried out by post-1964 military governments.

Bonfim (2005, p. 98) adds that Mário Travassos presented projects to implement a transportation policy based on a model that currently could be called "export corridors," aiming at road integration with neighboring countries and providing a multimodal link between Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

According to Becker (2012, p. 132), Travassos' work focused on the need for effective occupation of the interior that has not yet been explored, in a true "march to the West," especially along two axes, one towards Bolivia and the other directed at occupying the Amazon.

Another exponent of national geopolitical thought was General Golbery do Couto e Silva, whose proposals and actions effectively influenced strategies implemented since President Juscelino Kubistchek government, with its Plan of Goals, as well as several governments of the Military Regime period (BONFIM, 2005, p. 99, our translation). Golbery defined Geopolitics as "the geographical foundation of political lines of action, when not, through initiative, the proposition of political guidelines formulated in the light of geographical factors, in particular from an analysis based, above all, on the basic concepts of space and position" (apud BONFIM, 2005, p. 25).

It is in General Golbery's work that it is possible to find the doctrinal bases of a genuine Brazilian geopolitical project, bringing "an expanded view of Geopolitics in terms of concern over realistic theories about the State's nature and the role of politics and power, around the central theme of the concept of National Security" (BECKER, 2012, p. 133, our translation) Golbery's thought brought to Brazilian Geopolitics a less regionalized and more global vision (SILVA, 1981, p. 199). Among his main ideas, the need for pragmatism for Brazilian foreign policy during the Cold War period was stressed, which placed the country alongside the former Portuguese colonies in Africa in their independence processes, even though they were at the time aligned with the Soviet bloc, contrary to the positions of the USA. According to Golbery, Brazil's projection in Southern Africa was fundamental to the national interest and depended on strengthening relations with Portuguese-speaking African countries, neglecting any stance based on any ideological bias.

Another great scholar of Brazilian Geopolitics was Professor Therezinha de Castro, with several works published, in which she spoke about Geopolitics applied not only to topics of national interest, but also to the discussion about geopolitical theory itself. Therezinha de Castro presented several important concepts in Geopolitics field. For her, Political Geography

should be considered the "last, if not definitive term" of political history, spatially reflecting the evolution of the State over time (CASTRO, 1981).

For Therezinha, the State should be primarily considered a creation of collective security, which would exist for defense of national interests. Therezinha considered that Geopolitics was based on a tripod formed by Politics, History and Geography, affirming that:

> It [Geopolitics] has as main objective the rational use of all branches of Geography in the planning of State activities, aiming at immediate or remote results. Consequently, Geopolitics can be considered a study on historical precedents in terms of geographical environments; the results of this study lead to practical conclusions that may or may not apply today (CASTRO, 1981, p.10, our translation).

With regard to Geopolitics applied to national interests, Professor Therezinha de Castro defended strategies for active presence in the South Atlantic, Southern Africa, Antarctica, and a policy of closer relations with the countries of the Southern Cone, in a preview of what would become Mercosur.

Finally, one could not fail to remember General Meira Mattos' work, who also dedicated himself to geopolitical theory and its application to Brazilian reality. He defined Geopolitics as being "the art of applying politics in geographic spaces" (BONFIM, 2005, p. 25, our translation), and which presents itself as a concept quite aligned with the French School (Possibilism). Meira Mattos was a tireless promoter both of the occupation of the Brazilian Amazon, including the military one, and of its definitive incorporation into the national development effort.

There is certain continuity in the formulation of Brazilian geopolitical thought in this period. Since our independence process, a true "geopolitical maneuver" has been progressively forged for the integration and security of the national territory (BECKER, 2012, p. 137).

Initially, transferring the capital to the interior as its flagship, as proposed by José Bonifácio and Varnhagen, going through a strategy based on the trinomial integration, development and security, which began to be forged by Calógeras' hands, still in the Old Republic (COUTINHO , 2020, p. 19), passing by Kubistchek government's Plan of Goals, and arriving at the National Security Doctrine and National Development Plans implemented during the military governments, there has been development of a national geopolitical project based on classical geopolitical thought, and it can be characterized by some basic parameters referring to applying power to the territory.

Such basic parameters were highlighted by Professor Bertha Becker: structuring and progressive reinforcement of a national ecumenical base, with its solid articulation from North to South; stimulus to a colonizing wave directed at the central core, and the Amazon incorporation (BECKER, 2012, p. 137).

Vesentini (2009) points to the fact that the model of geopolitical design progressively developed by the national classical geopolitical school, and applied by the military governments, would not have shown itself adjusted to the post-Cold War World, to the new technologies of the 3rd Industrial Revolution era, and to the economic crisis resulting from the enormous foreign

Coleç. Meira Mattos, Rio de Janeiro, v. 15, n. 52, p. 61-90, janeiro/abril 2021

71

debt, with the last fact having a great negative impact, since it has interrupted the flow of funds from essential external sources for its financing.

In this same sense, Costa and Théry (2012, p. 257) emphasize that the processes of political transformation verified since the 1980s, accelerated by the so-called democratic opening conducted by Geisel and Figueiredo governments, culminated in the promulgation of the 1988 Constitution and in 1989 Presidential direct election, characterizing a regime change. Still according to Costa and Théry (2012), these changes established the conditions for a new group of researchers to start studying national geopolitics from an academic perspective and with relative autonomy in relation to the State.

Among the authors who stood out since then, it is possible to mention Professors Wanderley Messias da Costa, Shiguenoli Miyamoto, Bertha Becker and José William Vesentini, all of them bringing a more critical view in relation to the classic thought that characterized the previous generations, which came to represent a rupture in the line of thought existing until then, when they started to seek a reconciliation between Geopolitics and contemporary practices in Human Geography and Political Sciences.

More recently, the national academic community has been discussing the revival of genuine Brazilian geopolitical theories. The main one is Meridionalism, whose basic principles were presented by André Roberto Martin, Geologist and Professor at the University of São Paulo.

Meridionalism corresponds, in terms of ideology, to the acceptance of the condition of Brazil's meridional aspect, that is, the use of this geographical feature as an asset in the international context, seeking to strengthen alliances with other countries in the Southern hemisphere, such as India, South Africa, and Australia (REGIANI, 2020, p. 52).

According to Professor Bertha Becker (2012, p. 117), it will be important to guide the construction of a new Brazilian Geopolitics within a context that takes into account the transformations experienced on a global scale, for which the sciences, in a general manner, should seek to regain the ability to accompany the movements of society and of new power structures, in order to propose solutions for the future.

The phenomena of globalization and the world's growing complexity in the new technological age that is beginning (4th Industrial Revolution) should lead to a search for new paradigms for Science, subsidizing the development of a process of breaking down barriers built over the years between the disciplines, because according to her:

> The search for new paradigms of science and breaking down barriers between disciplines – transdisciplinarity – seem today to become a requirement, and breaking down barriers between Geography and Geopolitics in a critical perspective, integrated with the holistic and strategic nature of space, can represent an important step along this path, since power and space and their relationships are undoubtedly significant contemporary issues (BECKER, 2012, p. 117).

It is in this context that some concepts important for the purpose of this study will be reviewed below.

4 Political science

Before defining what Political Science is, it seems convenient to recall the meaning of Politics. It is a term originating from the Greek word "polis," which refers to the ancient Greek city-states, organized according to a way of life in which freedom was citizens' attribute.

"Polis" was a community of equals that, through rules, allowed a harmonious life in society, potentially better than a life in isolation. It is from this perspective that the expression "man is by nature a political animal" has to be understood (Aristotle apud ROSS, 2005, p. 250). This model of social organization became the basis of Western civilization.

According to Dryzek, Honig and Phillips (2006, p. 15, our translation): "Politics is therefore largely about how to reconcile and aggregate individual interests, and takes place under a supposedly neutral set of constitutional rules." In a strict sense, politics involves a set of formal and informal processes that are expressed through power relationships, including with regard to conflict resolution (RUA, 2005, p. 1).

Darcy Azambuja, by means of his *Teoria geral do Estado* [General Theory of the State], considers Nicolau Machiavelli as the main precursor of Political Science, because "he conceives the foundations of politics as an art of governing States, or more certainly, as an art of reaching, exercising and conserving power" (apud SILVA, 2014, p. 38).

Political Science, according to Professor Maria das Graças Rua (2005, p. 1), is a scientific branch that studies political systems, institutions, processes, and political behaviors. Political Science is basically interested in the phenomena related to its main object of study: the State. Rua (2005, p. 1, emphasis added), however, warns of the fact that most political scientists have an understanding in which their scope is more comprehensive, comprising not only the relations involving the State, but the relations of power in its entirety, highlighting that:

> Political Science covers several fields, such as political theory, political and ideological systems, political economy, **geopolitics**, public policy analysis, comparative politics, international relations, political institutions, political processes (such as legislative, decision-making, political change processes, etc.), and political behaviors (such as electoral behavior, social movements, etc.).

According to Morgenthau (1997, p. 3), the history of thought within Political Science scope is characterized by the clash between two schools, which have different conceptions about man, society, and politics in itself.

One is based on the belief that a political, moral and rational order, derived from abstract universal principles, has to be pursued here and now. This school considers that the deficiencies verified in the social order are due, among other factors, to the obsolescence of social institutions and to certain groups' selfish behavior. Morgenthau (1997) refers here to the school of thought related to idealism and to critical and liberal theories.

Coleç. Meira Mattos, Rio de Janeiro, v. 15, n. 52, p. 61-90, janeiro/abril 2021

73

Regarding the liberal line of thought, Andrew Moravcsik considers that individuals and social groups, through democratic representations, induce the State's orientation in the face of the international system: "Demands from individuals and groups in this society, as transmitted through domestic representative institutions, define 'state preferences' – that is, fundamental substantive social purposes that give states an underlying stake in the international issues they face" (REUS-SMIT; SNIDAL, 2008, p. 234).

In the second case, Morgenthau (1997, p. 3) refers to the realistic school, of which he himself is one of the main theorists. This school believed that the world, imperfect from the rationality point of view, is the result of the action of forces inherent in human nature. This branch of political thought argues, therefore, that the world's progress can only be achieved through searching for control of the said forces of human nature, and not by going against them.

Morgenthau (1997) considers that, since the world is characterized by interests in constant opposition, generating conflicts, moral principles could not be fully met in all situations, but worked in the scope of negotiations between divergent interests. In the words of Morgenthau (1997, p. 4): "It appeals to historic precedent rather than to abstract principles, and aims at the realization of the lesser evil rather of the absolute good."

The confrontation between the different worldviews defended by idealistic and realistic currents leads us, without a doubt, to the discussion of philosophical and ethical issues. In this respect, the *Escola Superior de Guerra* (ESG) [Brazilian War College] considers that there is a very close link between political actions and ethical requirements, but notes that an individual ethic and a political ethic have to coexist in societies:

> It is a mistake, however, to imagine that it is possible to transplant into the universe of Politics, in all its dimensions, the same ethical principles that must govern personal behavior. Individual ethics and political ethics must coexist. The first is an ethics of convictions, and the second, an ethics of responsibility (BRASIL, 2014, p. 51, our translation).

An important aspect to be stressed in Political Science scope is the study of the National State and its role as a territorial actor in international politics.

Sovereign national States are entities resulting from a process of consolidation of global political relations, verified after the Thirty Years' War and the so-called Peace of Westphalia (1648). Particularly after the second half of the nineteenth century, the process of building national States underwent an enormous boost. It was the period characterized by the independence of European colonies in the Americas.

According to Adelman et al. (2015, p. 608), Enlightenment theorists already emphasized the importance of Nations, defined as peoples who shared a common past, territory, culture, and traditions. Therefore, it was expected that the States that emerged in the process of colonial independence has been built with the purpose of shaping the sovereign institutions that would govern Nations, which traditionally inhabited certain territories. From this perspective, a classic definition emerges, in which the State is the politically organized Nation, based

on three basic elements: Man, Land, and Institutions (BRASIL, 2014, p. 34, p. 37). Along the same lines, jurist Francisco Rezek (apud CASTRO, 2012, p. 107, our translation) presents the following definition:

> The State, a personality originating from public international law, has three combined elements: a territorial base, a human community established on that area, and a form of government that is not subordinate to any outside authority.

The idea of the organized nation searching for its conformation into a state would be, then, the logical sequence guiding the independence processes. But, as emphasized by Adelman et al. (2015, p. 608), the practice showed that the process worked differently, since what was observed in Latin America from the nineteenth century, and later in Africa and Asia, was the fact that States' formation was driven by local elites' action and interest, and not as a result of the political maturation of the nations involved. As a general rule, nations were only built after States' formation, through the institutions created or the legal framework established.

National identities were gradually being shaped by the State's central administration, and nationalism arose precisely because of need to affirm national identities. According to Castro (2012, p. 103, our translation), "nationalism strength is, above all, a product of state culturalism, initially of a romantic nature and, later, of a realistic-materialistic scope."

Also according to Castro (2012, p. 110), the constitutive elements of a National State are the bounded and recognized territoriality, the permanent population, an accepted government and, above all, the capacity to exercise sovereign power. In this context, sovereignty is a prerogative based on internal and external recognition, guaranteeing the State certain privileges of legal personality, which give it legitimacy and legality for the adoption of domestic and international acts. In the multilateral field, admission as a member of the United Nations (UN) represents the consecration of the existence of a National State, and whose requirements are those contained in Article 4 of the United Nations Charter:

> 1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.

> 2. The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

The sovereignty level exercised by a State stems from the power it has accumulated, and which can result in political initiatives that eventually feed a conflicting spiral in the international sphere, arising from ideological, religious, environmental, commercial, and border issues, among others, which can be resolved through diplomatic channels, but which, in some cases, can even reach the armed conflict level. According to Castro (2012, p. 139), maintenance of the physical-

Coleç. Meira Mattos, Rio de Janeiro, v. 15, n. 52, p. 61-90, janeiro/abril 2021

75

-territorial base and nationalism plays an important role in casualties and in explaining the belligerences between States.

General Golbery do Couto e Silva (1981, p. 5-15) highlighted in his work *Conjuntura política nacional: o Poder Executivo & geopolítica do Brasil* [National political conjuncture: Executive Power & geopolitics of Brazil], another characteristic of the State. According to him, each historical era brings with it specific parameters of physical permeability, diffusion of ideas, exchange of goods, mobility of people and social groups, affecting what he called "effective command and control actions," resulting in a periodic tendency of centralization or political decentralization, which he called "systoles and diastoles in States' lives" and is a characteristic trend of modern States, and not only Brazil's (SILVA, 1981, p. 5-15).

According to him, in the national case this phenomenon could be easily observed throughout our history, pointing out as moments of centralization: the First Reign, majority of D. Pedro II, 1930 Revolution, *Estado Novo*, and the 1964 Revolution, among others. On the other hand, he pointed out events that characterize the cycles of decentralization: the Confederation of the Equator, *Farroupilha* Revolution, Brazilian Naval Revolts, Governors' Policy, Constitutionalist Revolution of São Paulo, and the deposition of Getúlio Vargas in 1945.

Another important characteristic of States was pointed out by Max Weber (apud DRYZEK; HONIG; PHILLIPS, 2006, p. 386), when he stated that they have a legitimate monopoly on the use of violence over a given territory. This concept is considered essential for the application of public policies aimed at social control and the maintenance of public order, at the internal level, and for the defense against external threats, at the international system level.

This brings us to the last point to be explored in Political Science scope, which is the question of State Power, which has to be understood as a broader and more complex concept than the pure and simple use of force.

The search for knowledge (*logos*) of the nature of power (*kratos*), aiming at their critical understanding, gave rise to a branch of knowledge called cratology, which, according to Castro (2012, p. 163), constitutes the scientific study of power and its dynamics related to the State's performance, particularly in the international field.

Thales de Castro highlights some definitions of power, among several that exist. Initially, he cites the one presented by Rosati in his work *The politics of the United States foreign policy* (apud CASTRO, 2012, p. 169, our translation): "ability to influence the surrounding environment in the way that one prefers and determines." He also highlights the concept presented by Rosen and Jones in *The logic of international relations*, this one more directed at the power in the international system scope: "Ability of an actor in the international arena to employ tangible and intangible resources and means in order to influence the results of international events for his own satisfaction" (CASTRO, 2012, p. 169, our translation).

Morgenthau (1997, p. 31), on the other hand, affirmed that "International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power" and that although governments and peoples may in general desire freedom, prosperity and security, power ends up being an immediate objective. Still according to him, political power constitutes a psychological relationship between those who exercise it and those who suffer its impacts, which has to be evaluated under three aspects: expectation of benefits, fear of disadvantages, and respect for human beings and institutions.

Considering the flows of power between the actors involved, it is necessary to consider that in the search for solving conflicts, adjustments of interests can be made, eventually resulting in mutual gains, depending on the strategy employed (CASTRO, 2012, p. 164). As already seen, the State is the monopoly holder of legitimate means of coercion, not only to avoid violence and anarchy among its citizens, but mainly to endow the Government with the means destined to guarantee the instituted order, whether in the domestic or external field.

In this direction, State Power constitutes a politically institutionalized segment of National Power, the latter having been defined by ESG as the "capacity that the set of men and means that constitute the Nation have to reach and maintain the National Objectives, in accordance with the national will" (BRASIL, 2014, p. 34, our translation). From this point of view, the concept of National Power highlights the role of men in its composition, emphasizing its legitimacy origin triple condition, its main agent, and the final recipient of the results thus obtained, all according to Art. 1, sole paragraph, of the Brazilian Federal Constitution: "All power emanates from the people, who exercise it by means elected representatives or directly, under the terms of this Constitution" (BRASIL, [2016], our translation).

Returning to the international field, Morgenthau (1997, p. 33) considers that the power of arms, as a means of threat or deterrence, constitutes the most important material factor to constitute a Nation's political power. But military force is not the only component of national power, nor can it be an end in itself, but a means to produce effects. As ESG's doctrine emphasizes, the ultimate purpose of using Power should not be simply to overcome obstacles, but to achieve goals (BRASIL, 2014, p. 35).

Therefore, the value of National Power is the result of a synergistic effect between its various constituent expressions, and it will always have an aspect of relativity in relation to the obstacles that may interfere with the achievement of national objectives. Thales de Castro (2012, p. 170, our translation) seeks to explore the relativity aspect of National Power through a comparison with the classic canons of Accounting Sciences, by stating that "a power asset represents credit, payable element of a third international actor as part of the exchange currency of the game of favors and influences [...]." On the other hand, he states that "power liabilities mean, in turn, a material or immaterial debt; a need to respond to the third parties' demand" (CASTRO, 2012, p. 170, our translation).

Another view on the question of power was brought up by Joseph Nye Jr. 2004), when considering that, depending on a State's capacity to attract and persuade other international system actors, a "Soft Power" could be exercised in order to effectively serve national interests. This was a skill to be developed in the context of international relations, whose essence was the ability to shape other States' preferences (NYE JR., 2004, p. 5).

According to Nye Jr. (2004, p. 14), the sources of soft power were based on three main resources: the country's culture, based on values that can be considered universal; its democratic political values exercised internally, and the legitimacy and coherence of its foreign policy.

Coleç. Meira Mattos, Rio de Janeiro, v. 15, n. 52, p. 61-90, janeiro/abril 2021

77

The application of power over geographic spaces is a central aspect of geopolitical theories. But how national power can be exercised will depend on the capacities available to States and the strategies established by their governments.

5 Strategy

After the approach to the Political Science field, it also seems opportune to devote a little more attention to Strategy, which was popularized in the Western world in the nineteenth century, particularly by the works of Jomini (2004) and Clausewitz (2013), soldiers who were directly involved in the Napoleonic wars. Jomini was the first to establish the idea that strategy is more than an action, constituting an art, hence the name of his work, *The art of war* (JOMINI, 2004). From then on, Strategy became known as the "art of the generals." Initially restricted to the battlefield, its meaning has been expanded over time. Indeed, Clausewitz was the first scholar of Strategy to point to the fact that war was an extreme, but natural, extension of politics. He was the author of the famous phrase: "War is nothing more than the continuation of politics by other means" (CLAUSEWITZ, 2013, p. 38, our translation).

Starting from this strictly military notion, the meaning of the word started to be used in a more comprehensive way, particularly in the sense of pointing the way to be followed to achieve the objectives set by politics. In this sense, Strategy has also to be concerned with identifying the means and time necessary for the political objectives to be achieved, as well as the obstacles that may eventually interfere with the plan chosen.

It is possible to affirm that Strategy constitutes a politics tool, once the public manager, when capturing the popular desire, establishes goals and indicates directions to implement them, is, in fact, acting strategically. Thinking of it at the macro level, Strategy can continue to be defined as "art," but now also for politicians, and not just generals. In fact, the exercise of politics is based on very particular intuitive qualities, which constitute a differential, in fact an essential attribute, for the great statesmen. Politics ascends to Strategy, according as only it can define the objectives, by answering the question "what to do?" in order to guide the application of power. Once the objectives are defined, Strategy seeks to answer the question "how to do it?" Politics and Strategy are closely related, but at different levels, since Strategy has always to be subordinated to politics.

In fact, all modern concepts of Strategy clearly define their subordination to politics, even during the outbreak of armed conflicts. This makes it possible to avoid the possibility that the "end" will be subordinated to the "environment," due to the preponderant use of the military expression of power when a war breaks out. The great objective of any armed conflict is to achieve peace, a political objective, which cannot be translated simply by the act of achieving military victory.

In this way, one arrives at the concept of Strategy, which is "the art of preparing and applying power to, overcoming obstacles of all kinds, achieve the objectives set by politics" (BRASIL, 2004, p. 1-4, our translation). To apply power, Strategy has to be based on

concrete actions that, according to ESG's doctrine (BRASIL, 2004), are called "Strategic Actions." These can be carried out both in geographical areas and in different segments of human activity. With this in mind, it is necessary to give it adjectives to facilitate the understanding of its real meaning and the levels to which it refers, such as: national strategy, regional strategy, development strategy, defense strategy, commercial strategy, etc. It even may be more appropriate to refer to it as a "geopolitical strategy," instead of using the term "Geo-strategy," as the latter gives rise to interpretations that it would be another science. Each of the adjectives that one wishes to use has to represent a set of directed actions in a coordinated way, in order to reach the national objectives established. Only in this way it is possible to avoid an undesirable competition for resources, which are always scarce in any human society, as well as the divergent expenditure of efforts.

In turn, Johanson (2019, p. 5-8) considers that Strategy is a method used to allow the visualization of a desired future in the present. According to him, Strategy deals with the most important issues at a government's high levels, addressing the formulation, implementation, and achievement of State's objectives. Thus, the strategic vision has to allow a perfect distinction to be made between critical issues and the requirements more related to a public machine's administrative details.

Johanson (2019) also stresses that Strategic Governance is an essential element, which emerges from the growing interdependence, it being at the global, national and local levels, and has to consider the internal strengths and the opportunities identified in the external environment.

According to Lonsdale (2007, p. 5), getting to a desired end, at a compensating cost and in a reasonable time, and which was the purpose of establishing a strategy, is not always a simple plan to be accomplished. There will always be winners and losers in conflicts of interest, even when both are equipped with richly designed strategies. There are no formulas for the success of a strategy, as each context is unique and, therefore, will require a peculiar and exclusive calibration of types and intensities of actions. The success of a strategy will often depend on external factors that are not directly controlled by those who are designing and implementing it.

The close link between strategic planning and geopolitical analysis was one of the most striking features of the national geopolitical project implemented during the military governments of the post-1964 cycle, and which can be clearly seen in the model for formulating a national strategic concept, supported by a geopolitical research plan, as proposed by General Golbery do Couto e Silva (1981, p. 251-266) in his work *Conjuntura politica nacional: o Poder Executivo & geopolítica do Brasil*.

Many academics consider that Strategy does not constitute science, and should remain today as defined by Jomini (2004) at the beginning of his study: still an art, but essential for the implementation of objectives established by States and large corporations, in a world characterized by ever greater levels of complexity, generating opportunities and threats that need to be considered and processed by the international system actors.

Coleç. Meira Mattos, Rio de Janeiro, v. 15, n. 52, p. 61-90, janeiro/abril 2021

79

6 Geography

According to Flint (2006, p. 1-2), geographers examine the world through a spatial perspective, offering new points of view on other disciplines. The study on Geographic Science is directed at the characteristics that make the places peculiar, such as climate, vegetation, mineral wealth, energy sources, physiographic aspects, types of soil, as well as everything related to human activities' spatial organization.

However, Dodds (2019) adds that Geography is not limited to maps, since they are simply a graphical representation of the "state of nature." Geographic Science could not even be considered just a three-dimensional form of representing reality. Even though Dodds knows that height, depth and volume are important, he considers that it also involves relationships and scales, which gives it greater importance and complexity.

> Geography, as its etymology suggests, could be thought of as 'earth writing'. An activity that highlights the power of agents and organizations to describe space, to occupy space, to organize space, and to create places invested with particular visions and projects. Geography was and is integral to nation building and the creation of the modern territorial state" (DODDS, 2019, p. 33).

In this same sense, Teixeira Júnior (2017, p. 24-27) stresses that the study on Geographic Science sheds light on the relationships between societies, space and power in its multiple expressions, having a sensitivity of its own to study the phenomena concerning the space-human being-territory relationship. In this regard, Geographic Science is divided into two major strands: Physical Geography and Human Geography.

The development of these two aspects within the scope of Geographic Science led to the establishment of a philosophical controversy that resulted in major clashes between schools of thought in several areas. The problem that gave rise to the debate was as follows: does the physical environment have a decisive influence on human activity and States' development?

This philosophical discussion was also carried out within Geopolitics scope, giving rise to the German School (Determinism), French School (Possibilism), and American School (Integration), as already discussed.

Cultural, economic, political and social geographies are the main sub-disciplines of Human Geography (FLINT; TAYLOR, 2018, p. 1). This study focuses on Political Geography. According to Short (1993, p. 1-2), the main object of Geography, that is, the study of people's relations with nature, space and places, cannot be treated without establishing political considerations. One of the main focuses of the study on Political Geography is precisely the Nation-State, which has been analyzed, particularly, based on three aspects:

- people's relations with the environment;
- State's relations with the environment; and
- People's relations with the State.

With regard to the State's relations with the environment, Becker (2008, p. 128) considers that territoriality and territory management are two sides of a single process of political organization of contemporary space.

For her, territoriality includes appropriation of a space, implying the construction of a notion of limit, manifesting the intention of power over a precise portion of the space. On the other hand, the territory management is a strategic practice of a scientific-technological character that directs, over time, the coherence of multiple decisions and actions to achieve a purpose. Thus, the management presents an eminently strategic character, following principles of economic purpose and application of power, and not just of intention.

In these conditions, Flint and Taylor (2018, p. 1) consider that Political Geography is a small sub-discipline with an extremely comprehensive theme: the relations between space and power. Still according to them, Political Geography needs a theoretical basis to allow a strong coherence to be established for this sub-discipline, and in the authors' view, such theoretical support can only be provided within Geopolitics scope through the "World-Systems Theory," since it is the only one that allows an integrated study between the relations of time, space and power, particularly in these globalized times in which we live.

Sociological aspects are also important for the study of Political Geography. Short (1993, p. 2) considers that in the process of the Nation's formation, a series of beliefs is usually generated involving the people and their native environment, which he calls "national environmental ideology." Such beliefs can contribute to creating a national identity and nationalism, which is often positive for and even encouraged by the State's interest. Nonetheless, distortions and excesses can contribute to generating conflicts. In this sense, Sigmund Freud (apud GADDIS, 1997, p. 75) had already identified some problems arising from these beliefs, when stating that:

> It is precisely communities with adjoining territories, and related to each other in other ways as well, who are engaged in constant feuds and ridiculing each other [...] the narcissism of minor differences [...] a convenient and relatively harmless satisfaction of the inclination to aggression, by means of which cohesion between the members of the community is made easier.

These beliefs can also shape other types of behavior typical of a national identity. People who establish a closer relationship with the sea over time, according to Mackinder (1919, p. 38) end up establishing a collective behavior that he called "seaman's point of view." This is the case for the Portuguese, British, Dutch and Japanese, a characteristic that contributed greatly to the development of their respective countries as maritime powers. On the other hand, Mackinder (1919, p. 90) considers that the people that over the years have been more dedicated to land matters ended up developing what he called "landsman's point of view," and it is the case of Russians, Chinese and ourselves, Brazilians.

In fact, since Joaquim Bonifácio de Andrada, passing through Tiradentes and even Juscelino Kubitscheck, the dream of transferring the Brazilian capital to the country's interior has always been nourished over the generations, almost always under considerations related to national integration, but also constituting a symptom that the "landsman's point of view" was firmly associated with the national identity (COUTINHO, 2020, p. 20).

Closing the overview on Geographic Science, it is clear the importance of the discipline for the object of this study, as it allows us to better understand the increasingly complex and interdependent environment that characterizes the international system, whether in its physical, human, or political aspects.

7 Economic sciences

Political Economy is an important field of study, both in Economic Sciences and in International Relations (through International Political economy), and focuses on the study of the social relations of production, circulation and distribution of material goods that aim to meet human needs, identifying the laws that govern such relations.

Becker (2018, p. 120) affirms that Geopolitics becomes incomprehensible without considering the planet shaping by scientific-technological and economic vectors, emphasizing that the dominance of technology by transnational economic-financial corporations progressively begins to threaten the State power.

Technological developments based on information and knowledge would give rise not only to new production techniques, but to completely new forms of wealth generation, directly affecting social organization in the context of this economic system restructuring.

Still according to Becker, while capitalist production gives rise to an imperative of accumulation, the Nation-State system starts giving rise to an imperative of national survival, which justifies the great interest aroused, in the current geopolitical milieu, in economic issues.

In this context, it is necessary to understand the new concepts that seek to portray the international system configuration, particularly about the meaning of the notions of core and periphery in the context of a changing global economic environment. In fact, attempts to define the modern world in terms of the core (that is, the rich regions of the world: North America, Western Europe and Asia-Pacific) and the periphery (the lands where developing countries are located, basically in the Southern hemisphere).

Wallerstein (2006), when developing his "World-Systems Analysis," also defended the thesis that the processes of the world economy always operate in a three-level format: core, semi-periphery, and periphery (FLINT; TAYLOR, 2018, p 18). But in his view, the meanings of the terms 'core' and 'periphery' are completely different from the understanding that has normally remained so far. Such concepts seek to establish a reference to diagnose how complex economic processes affect the international system actors differently, and do not directly refer to the location of areas, regions or states.

The spatial definition of core and periphery, in the view of Wallerstein (2006), stems from the predominance of core economic processes ("core processes") that operate in a particular area, region, or state. Likewise, in peripheral zones, regions or states are now defined as those in which peripheral economic processes ("peripheral processes") predominate. According to Flint and Taylor, this is not just a semantic issue, but is directly related to the way the spatial structure is modeled through economic and technological processes. The space itself may be neither core nor periphery in relation to its location regarding the world surface (FLINT; TAYLOR, 2018, p. 20).

In general terms, core processes consist of global economic relations that incorporate relatively high gains, advanced technology, and a diversified production model, while peripheral processes involve relatively low gains, more rudimentary technology, and a simple production structure. The processes are not characterized by a specific product, which can migrate from the productive chains of the core to the periphery as a result of technological developments or other economic factors (FLINT; TAYLOR, 2018, p. 21).

Commodities and simple industrialized products usually result from peripheral processes, and their value is defined by free market competition. The most advanced technological products are normally protected by patents, generating what Wallerstein (2006) classified as "quasi- monopoly." These are the products that result from core processes. Core processes tend to group together in a smaller number of States and compose the most of their production activity. Peripheral processes tend to be more dispersed, covering many States, where they constitute most of the productive activity (WALLERSTEIN, 2006, p. 28).

However, it is observed that some States have a mixture of core and peripheral processes. Wallerstein (2006) classified them as semiperipheral States. Still according to Wallerstein (2006), semiperipheral States are that which are in a relatively more difficult position. Under pressure from the core States and exerting pressure on the peripheral States, their permanent concern is to prevent them from regressing to the periphery, channeling all their efforts to advance to the core.

Throughout history, the rise of the United States, Germany and Japan to the core category resulted from the mastery of "core processes." Nowadays, this has also been observed in relation to China. Brazil, on the other hand, can be considered a semiperipheral country.

These concepts related to global economic processes help explain the other central aspect in World-Systems Theory: the Kondratiev Cycles. The model of the aforementioned business cycles was presented by the Russian economist Nikolai Dmitrievich Kondratiev, who, in the 1920s, developed a study to identify economic causes of the World War I. In his research, he also ended up identifying an economic pattern that repeated long before the conflagration of the referred world conflict. This phenomenon was then called by him "long economic cycles in a historical context" (BARNETT, 1998, p. 105, our translation).

According to this view, the evolution of "core-periphery" economic processes is normally characterized by the fact that countries and industries that hold the "quasi-monopoly" accumulate enormous amounts of capital. As technologies are spreading, more and more companies enter the "quasi-monopoly" market, initiating a process of overproduction (greater supply than demand), with a greater price competition and increasing reduction in profit margins. At some point, an accumulation of unsold products results in a reduction in future production capacity.

The question of the dispute over the dominance of 5G technology (telephony and data), for example, becomes a central point in the geopolitical strategies of the United States and China, in the context of the 4th Industrial Revolution. When this type of dispute occurs, its result contributes to a considerable migration of the core processes in the scope of the powers involved. This pattern repeats in "Great Cycles" characterized by duration of approximately 50 to 60 years, depending on the political measures taken by the States and on technological deve-

Coleç. Meira Mattos, Rio de Janeiro, v. 15, n. 52, p. 61-90, janeiro/abril 2021

83

lopments. Such periods are also characterized by global "sub-cycles" of growth (Cycle A) and stagnation (Cycle B) (FLINT; TAYLOR, 2018, p. 21-28).

Also according to Flint and Taylor (2018), the world economy has clearly shown that the international system is heading towards a new cycle of stagnation (Cycle B), whose result may also lead to a global geopolitical transformation and, consequently, to a new configuration of the "core" of the hegemonic powers (one or more). The covid-19 pandemic crisis may contribute to the acceleration of this change, which is not an unprecedented fact, considering that the Spanish Flu crisis, which also occurred in a Cycle B period (1914 to 1945), also brought global economic reflexes.

Graph 1 represents the development of the Great Cycles verified since 1850, and it is possible to observe that the international system is in a moment of transition from a cycle of growth (Cycle A) to one of stagnation (Cycle B). Considering the last two Cycles B experienced (1914-1945 and 1973-2003), it is possible to identify the existence of a pattern of global hegemonic transformations, which may eventually result both in a possible decline in the United States of America and in a China's possible candidacy for the hegemonic power level.

Graph 1 – Kondratiev cycles.

Sources: Adapted by the author from Barnett (1998), Flint and Taylor (2018) and Landes (2008).

Also according to Flint and Taylor (2018, p. 69), the economic processes that have been determining the transformation of the geopolitical order have also been forming some new parameters, among which, the following stand out:

- States continue to be the territorial agents of the international system, with the environment of competition existing among them, always within the scope of the search for hegemony within the scope of the "core-periphery" economic model;
- emergence of other transnational actors, whether economic or civil society, which promote a greater integration between States, but which, at the same time, undermine their sovereignty; and
- existence of movements that resist both the processes of globalization and the e State power.

As it was possible to verify, the integrated study between the economic sciences and geopolitics is proving to be increasingly relevant, constituting a central point for the development of the so-called critical theories.

8 Conclusion

In the development of this work, it was possible to verify that a fog of mistrust hung over Geopolitics, either because of its use as a theoretical basis that supported expansionist strategies during the World War II, or for strategies of ideological conflict developed in the context of the Cold War.

However, this fog has dissipated over the past few decades. It was possible to find reference to the importance of Geopolitics in several current world leaders' speeches, regardless of a liberal or conservative line, adept at positions more to the right or to the left of the political spectrum. This reinforces the universal character of the concepts that have been improved over time.

It was observed that the gestation process of a school of geopolitical thought in Brazil, and which constituted a theoretical basis for a model of national project implemented by the military governments, also ended up being affected by the changes resulting from the end of the world bipolarity, the global economic crisis from the 1980s and the process of democratic opening adopted in Brazil at the end of that decade, from when a process of reviving academic interest in geopolitics began to take place.

After a review of the main aspects of geopolitical theory, including national geopolitical thought, it was sought to identify possible complementarity between geopolitical thought and other theoretical areas, allowing the establishment of a more comprehensive view on a topic that remains so current, and thus contribute to a greater awareness of the multidisciplinary nature of geopolitical studies and, eventually, inspire discussion of the subject in broader academic circles.

Through the bibliographic review carried out, it was possible to prove that Geopolitics effectively dialogues with important disciplines, particularly Political Science, Strategy, Geography, and Economic Sciences.

Coleç. Meira Mattos, Rio de Janeiro, v. 15, n. 52, p. 61-90, janeiro/abril 2021

85

From Geographic Science, it was possible to find that there are promising fields of interdisciplinary study with human geography and political geography. It was found that the study of the influence of geographic factors on States' political action cannot fail to consider that the term 'geography' involves a multiplicity of complex, and not just spatial, aspects.

Regarding Political Science, it was possible to see, as expected, major areas of interest: State and Power, which are focal points, particularly in international relations scope. The formulation of public policy goals and the development of National Strategies to achieve them can and should also be based on geopolitical analysis and strategies.

With regard to Economic Sciences, it was possible to learn about its importance for the perfect understanding of the most current geopolitical theoretical trends, constituting a very promising field for those who are willing to explore new and important areas of interdisciplinary research.

Our attention is drawn to the fact that World-Systems Theory presents interesting opportunities for the multidisciplinary and critical study of geopolitics in the current context, a time when we are witnessing an unquestionable transition in power relations between States, as well as in their relations with non-state actors. A more comprehensive and updated view of Geopolitics will certainly be of great value for the formulation of national strategies adapted to this environment of high complexity and uncertainty.

Although specific topics on sociology and history have not been presented, they will certainly be present in all discussions, as highlighted at some points in the development of this work.

In this sense, this study was aimed at offering a contribution to the deepening of the study of geopolitics within Brazilian academic community scope, in an interdisciplinary and transversal way in relation to the various areas of science presented here.

References

ADELMAN, J.; POLLARD, E.; ROSENBERG, C.; TIGNOR, R. L. (org.). **Worlds together, worlds apart**: a history of the world from the beginnings of humankind to the present. 4. ed. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2015. v. 2. Edição concisa.

BACKHEUSER, E. **Curso de geopolítica geral e do Brasil**. Rio de Janeiro: Gráfica Laemmert, 1952. Disponivel em: https://archive.org/details/AGeopoliticaGeralEDoBrasil. EverardoBackheuser/page/n47/mode/1up. Access on: 22 mar. 2020.

BARNETT, V. **Kondratiev and the dynamics of economic development**: long cycles and industrial growth in historical context. New York: St. Marin's Press, 1998.

BECKER, B. K. A geografia e o resgate da geopolítica. **Revista Brasileira de Geografia**, Rio de Janeiro, v. 2, n. 1, p. 117-150, 2012. Número especial. Available at: https://doi.org/10.36403/espacoaberto.2012.2079. Access on: 5 jul. 2020.

BONFIM, U. C. **Geopolítica**: Curso de Política, Estratégia e Alta Administração do Exército: ensino a distância: CPEAEx/EAD. Rio de Janeiro: Eceme, 2005. Available at: http://www.eceme.eb.mil.br/images/cpeceme/publicacoes/03_INTRO_GEOPOLITICA_2011.pdf. Access on: 28 out. 2019.

BRASIL. Presidência da República. **Decreto nº 19.841, de 22 de outubro de 1945**. Promulga a Carta das Nações Unidas, da qual faz parte integrante o anexo Estatuto da Corte Internacional de Justiça, assinada em São Francisco, a 26 de junho de 1945, por ocasião da Conferência de Organização Internacional das Nações Unidas. Rio de Janeiro: Presidência da República, [2001]. Available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/1930-1949/D19841.htm. Access on: 3 nov. 2019.

BRASIL. Exército. **Manual de campanha**: estratégia. Brasília, DF: Estado-Maior do Exército, 2004. (Manual de Campanha C 124-1).

BRASIL. Câmara dos Deputados. **Josué de Castro**. Brasília, DF: Plenarium, 2007. (Perfis Parlamentares, 52). Available at: http://bd.camara.gov.br/bd/handle/bdcamara/2642. Access on: 3 nov. 2019.

BRASIL. Escola Superior de Guerra. **Manual básico**: elementos fundamentais. Rio de Janeiro: ESG, 2014. v. 1.

BRASIL. [Constituição (1988)]. **Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988**. Brasília, DF: Presidência da República, [2016]. Available at: www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constituicaocompilado.htm. Access on: 8 nov. 2019.

Coleç. Meira Mattos, Rio de Janeiro, v. 15, n. 52, p. 61-90, janeiro/abril 2021

87

CASTRO, T. **África**: geohistória, geopolítica e relações internacionais. Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1981.

CASTRO, T. **Teorias das relações internacionais**. Brasília, DF: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2012. Available at: http://funag.gov.br/loja/download/931-Teoria_das_Relacoes_Internacionais. pdf. Access on: 28 out. 2019.

CLAUSEWITZ, C. **O Voinê**. Mosckva: Eksmo, 2013.

COSTA, W. M.; THÉRY, H. Quatre-vingts ans de géopolitique au Brésil: de la géographie militaire à une pensée stratégique nationale. **Hérodote**, Paris, v. 146-147, n. 3-4, p. 253-276, 2012. Available at: https://www.cairn.info/revue-herodote-2012-3-page-253.htm. Access on: 5 jul. 2020.

COUTINHO, M. A. F. As origens do pensamento geopolítico brasileiro: a contribuição de José Bonifácio, Varnhagen e Calógeras. **Análise Estratégica**, Brasília, DF, v. 16, n. 2, p. 7-24, 2020. Available at: http://www.ebrevistas.eb.mil.br/index.php/CEEExAE/article/view/4833. Access on: 5 jul. 2020.

DODDS, K. **Geopolitics**: a very short introduction. 3. ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019.

DRYZEK, J. S.; HONIG, B.; PHILLIPS, A. (ed.). **The Oxford handbook of political theory**. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

EUROPE must speak with one voice. **The Federal Chancellor**, Berlin, 17 out. 2019. Available at: https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/bkin-en/news/regierungserklaerung-merkel-1682840. Access on: 6 nov. 2019.

FLINT, C. **Introduction to geopolitics**. New York: Routledge, 2006.

FLINT, C.; TAYLOR, P. J. **Political geography**: world economy, nation-state and locality. 7. ed. New York: Routledge, 2018.

GADDIS, J. L. History, theory and common ground. **International Security**, Cambridge, v. 22, n. 1, p. 75-85, 1997. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539330. Access on: 10 nov. 2019.

GRAY, C. S.; SLOAN, G. (ed.). **Geopolitics, geography and strategy**. New York: Routledge, 2013.

HAGE, J. A. A. Mário Travassos e a geopolítica brasileira: tensões com a Argentina e preocupações com imperialismos. **Revista de Geopolítica**, Natal, v. 4, n. 1, p. 98-114, 2013. Available at: http:// www.revistageopolitica.com.br/index.php/revistageopolitica/article/view/80/73. Access on: 8 nov. 2019.

JOHANSON, J.-E. **Strategy formation and policy making in government**. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.

JOMINI, A. H. **The art of war**. Salt Lake City: Project Gutenberg, 2004. E-book. Available at: http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/13549. Access on: 4 nov. 2019.

KISSINGER, H. **White House years**. Boston: Little Brown, 1979.

LANDES, D. S. **The unbound Prometheus**: technological change and industrial development in Western Europe from 1750 to the present. 4. ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

LIMA, W. T. *et al.* A geopolítica de Everardo Backheuser para o Brasil: entre processos e retrocessos. Revista Geopolítica Transfronteiriça, Tabatinga, v. 1, n. 1, p. 51-62, 2017. Available at: http://periodicos.uea.edu.br/index.php/revistageotransfronteirica/article/view/622. Access on: 8 nov. 2019.

LONSDALE, D. J. **Alexander the Great**: lessons in strategy. New York: Routledge, 2007.

MACKINDER, H. J. **Democratic ideals and reality**: a study in the politics of reconstruction. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1919.

MAHAN, A. T. **The influence of sea power upon history**: 1660-1783. New York: Dover Publications, 1987.

MORGENTHAU, H. J. **Politics among nations**: the struggle for power and peace. 6. ed. Peking: Peking University Press, 1997.

NYE JR., J. S. **Soft power**: the means to success in world politics. New York: PublicAffairs, 2004.

POSLANIE Federal'nomu Sobraniiu Rossiiscoi Federatsii. **Kremlin**, Moskva, 25 abr. 2005. Available at: https://bit.ly/2PFQGCW. Access on: 11 out. 2019.

READOUT of President Donald J. Trump's meeting with Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India. **The White House**, Washington, DC, 13 nov. 2017. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/readout-president-donald-j-trumps-meeting-prime-minister-narendra-modi-india/. Access on: 6 nov. 2019.

REGIANI, R. Meridionalismo: o novo paradigma da geopolítica brasileira? **Revista de Geopolítica**, Natal, v. 11, n. 1, p. 48-61, 2020. Available at: http://revistageopolitica.com.br/index.php/revistageopolitica/article/view/270. Access on: 22 mar. 2020.

REUS-SMIT, C.; SNIDAL, D. (ed.). **The Oxford handbook of international relations**. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Coleç. Meira Mattos, Rio de Janeiro, v. 15, n. 52, p. 61-90, janeiro/abril 2021

89

ROSS, W. D. **Aristotle**. 6. ed. New York: Routledge, 2005.

RUA, M. G. **Ciência política**: conceitos básicos. Brasília, DF: IGEPP, 2005. Available at: https://pt.scribd.com/document/432592528/Ciencia-Politica-IGEPP. Access on: 6 out. 2020.

SHORT, J. R. **An introduction to political geography**. 2. ed. New York: Routledge, 1993.

SILVA, G. C. **Conjuntura política nacional**: o Poder Executivo & geopolítica do Brasil. 2. ed. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1981.

SILVA, V. S. V. Ciência política com teoria geral do estado? **Ciências Sociais Aplicadas em Revista**, Marechal Cândido Rondon, v. 14, n. 26, p. 33-52, 2014. Available at: http://e-revista.unioeste.br/index.php/csaemrevista/article/view/15186. Access on: 4 nov. 2019.

SPYKMAN, N. J. Geography and foreign policy, I. **The American Political Science Review**, Washington, DC, v. 32, n. 1, p. 28-50, 1938. Available at: www.jstor.org/stable/1949029. Access on: 21 mar. 2020.

SUSPEITA sobre a China cria problema para a implantação do 5G, diz Guedes. **CNN Brasil Business**, São Paulo, 6 jul. 2020. Available at: https://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/business/2020/07/06/suspeita-sobre-a-china-cria-problema-para-implantacao-do-5g-diz-guedes. Access on: 6 jul. 2020.

TEIXEIRA JÚNIOR, A. W. M. **Geopolítica**: do pensamento clássico aos conflitos contemporâneos. Curitiba: InterSaberes, 2017.

TRAVASSOS, M. **Aspectos geográficos sul-americanos**, Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Militar, 1931.

VESENTINI, J. W. **Ensaios de geografia crítica**: história, epistemologia e (geo)política. São Paulo: Plêiade, 2009.

WALLERSTEIN, Immanuel. **World-systems analysis**: an introduction. 4. ed. London: Duke University Press, 2006.

XIN, Z.; ZHENG, S. Xi Jinping rallies China for decades-long 'struggle' to rise in global order, amid escalating US trade war. **South China Morning Post**, Hong Kong, 5 set. 2019. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3025725/xi-jinping-rallies-china-decades-long-struggle-rise-global. Access on: 6 nov. 2019.

Did Bin Laden Read Mao Correctly?

Bin Laden leu Mao corretamente?

Abstract: The Global War on Terror has consumed a great deal of American resources since 2001. Operating within Iraq and Afghanistan for almost two decades, the US has failed so far to put together a plan for war termination in the Middle East. This raises the question of whether, or not, al Qaeda's – along with associated movements' – strategy and related operations have been successful since war was declared on the United States. To respond to the question, we compared elements of al Qaeda's plans and actions with Mao Zedong's theory on how to carry out a protracted war in three stages. By doing so, it sounded reasonable to state that al Qaeda, although fairly successful in implementing its stage 1, failed to evolve its own army-like to deal with stages 2 and 3. It was also observed that neither al Qaeda nor al Qaeda in Iraq have timely reassessed their failing strategy.

Keywords: Protracted war. Al Qaeda. Zarqawi. Insurgency. Middle East.

Resumen: La Guerra Mundial contra el Terrorismo ha consumido una gran cantidad de recursos americanos desde 2001. Operando dentro de Irak y Afganistán por casi dos décadas, los EE.UU. han fallado hasta ahora en la elaboración de un plan para la terminación de la guerra en el Oriente Medio. Esto plantea la pregunta si la estrategia de Al Qaeda –junto con los movimientos asociados– y las operaciones relacionadas han sido exitosas o no desde que se declaró la guerra a los Estados Unidos. Para responder a la pregunta, comparamos elementos de los planes y acciones de al Qaeda con la teoría de Mao Zedong sobre cómo llevar a cabo una guerra prolongada en tres etapas. Al hacerlo, parecía razonable afirmar que Al Qaeda, aunque tuvo bastante éxito en la implementación de su etapa 1, no logró desarrollar su propio ejército para lidiar con las etapas 2 y 3. También se observó que tanto Al Qaeda como el movimiento asociado llamado Al Qaeda en Irak no reevaluaron oportunamente su fallida estrategia.

Palabras Clave: Guerra prolongada. Al Qaeda. Zarqawi. Insurrección. Oriente Medio.

Carlos Eduardo Macedo iD
Marinha do Brasil. Escola de Guerra Naval.
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.
carlosermacedo@yahoo.com.br

Coleç. Meira Mattos, Rio de Janeiro, v. 15, n. 52, p. 91-110, January/April 2021

91

1 Introduction

It was the distant 2001 when the United States of America (US) stepped in the Global War on Terror (GWT). By that time, before the outcry of the people in the wake of the September 11 episode (9/11), it did not simply seem the right thing to do, but the only imaginable response to carry out. Fast forwarding, what the US faces today, however, is a two-decade intervention from which Washington is finding difficult to step out with the sensation of mission accomplished. The setting of unachievable political goals, being the most remarkable one "prevent[ing] any future acts of international terrorism against the United States" (UNITED STATES, 2001), may have contributed to this sort of trap. The reality is that the US so far has been struggling to put together a war termination plan. Even with the last two Presidents– Barack Obama (1961-) and Donald Trump (1946-) – stating the necessity of leaving the Middle Eastern theater in order to, respectively, pivot security priority to East Asia (CLINTON, 2011) and formally embrace the near-peer competition *vis-à-vis* China and Russia (UNITED STATES, 2017, p. 26).

With all this, we may be pushed to affirm that the terrorist organizations, namely Al Qaeda (AQ) and its associated movements (AM), have been successful with their overall strategy and related operations since their war was declared against the US. If we consider, however, that their ultimate objective was the political congregation of the whole *Umma* in a new Caliphate-like state – which includes getting rid of local apostates and foreign influence –, their Master Plan, their strategy as named by Brian Fishman's book (2016), is still far from turning into reality. Thus, it seems of a reasonable conclusion that the American unsuccessful GWT is not necessarily due to a profitable strategy in the side of AQ/AM. Conversely, we propose that AQ/AM's overall strategy and operations, although called the world's attention with mind-blowing results right after the first steps, have not been fully effective since the war on the US was declared in 1998[1], after the promulgation of the *fatwa* that instituted a "*jihad* against Jews and Crusaders" (BIN LADEN *et al*., 1998).

The argument for our statement above arises after comparing facets of the terrorist groups' balance of "ends-means-ways" with the Maoist-inspired theory on how to conduct an insurgency based on the "three stages of a protracted war". Although those events are sixty years apart, and there is no formal claim from AQ that the group followed Mao Zedong's (1893-1976) footsteps, such comparison seems credible because Mao's united front and AQ/AM, in both cases started their campaigns against an imperial power without being the legitimate (or sole) local power, and with no formal occupation of a sovereign territory of their own and no direct influence to, or support from, a group of people. In the case of Mao's Communist Party, it started the protracted war against Japan, while also competing with the *Kuomintang* for internal legitimacy inside

---

[1] Countless sources postulate that war was rather declared by the *fatwa* of 1996 (August). For this paper, we consider that the *fatwa* of 1996 was a public wakening of al Qaeda calling attention not only from the Islamic world but also from the US. Two characteristics of the *fatwa* of 1998 justify our choice as the real benchmark in declaring war on the US: a) it was signed by others than just bin Laden himself, and b) it was proceeded indeed by acts of war – the attacks in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.

China (ZEDONG, 1967, p. 43).Same way as the older example, AQ, far from being the only and uncontested *jihad* movement in the Middle East, and controlling no land, proclaimed a war against the "invader" US. According to the terrorist group's plan, the recreation of the Islamic Caliphate, its ultimate objective, would only be possible after the elimination of the US presence in the area.

Having Mao's strategy – the three stages of a protracted war – as a milestone, next sections of this paper will detail that, regardless prominent achievements of AQ/AM, especially during stage 1, the groups' *modus operandi* – how they put means and ways together – did not fully contribute to the achievement of the final political objective, as originally designed by its long-standing leader Osama bin Laden (1957-2011). At least, not until his death in 2011[2]. Bottom line upfront, we will show, in the section 3 of this paper, that AQ ended up with just a fairly successful stage 1, while failing to implement the other two remaining stages. The reason that not even the stage 1 was fully triumphant is that its main mistake was not being able to form its own guerrilla/army to execute the remainder of the group's strategy. Therefore, the terrorist group was not able to build on the success of the actions carried during stage 1 and implemented a poor stage 2 and almost nothing of stage 3. This will be addressed more deeply in section 4. In addition, AQ/AM neglected another topic of Mao's recipe, failing at timely reassessing the results of the setbacks suffered by them. As a result, they also failed at transitioning back and forth from one stage to another, which would be a likely "procedure" after a sound reassessment. Section 5 will get into this matter, showing that this was one of the main features of the successful North Vietnamese war scheme. Before all these, ensuing lines will discuss the Maoist three stages of a protracted war, as a sediment to our thesis.

2 "On protracted war"

As previously stated, the AQ never really claimed to be a Maoist-inspired group. Indeed, one may argue that this label fits to the Taliban much better than it does into the AQ. However, there are authors, such as Daniel Byman (2006), who, while studying the AQ and other terrorist groups, postulate there is no clear-cut between insurgency and terrorism. According to them, the latter might be a supplementary and expedite way to achieve the ends of the former. Although the guerrilla is noticeably the preferred way an insurgency fights, Byman finds echo in Michael Gross (2014), who states that terrorism cannot be ruled out as a means in an insurgency's panoply. Especially when going protractedly does not seem to be enough and the nature of terror meets the urgency in coercing – compelling – the occupying power to cede something. With all this in mind and considering that Mao Zedong is the main reference

---

2   Since this case has repercussions that are still going on in the present time, this paper will focus on the period in which bin Laden was still alive and, presumably, ruling AQ.

Coleç. Meira Mattos, Rio de Janeiro, v. 15, n. 52, p. 91-110, January/April 2021

93

in the realm of insurgencies, his recipe for a protracted war was chosen as a theoretical baseline to examine the AQ/AM's strategy.

Classic strategy in the Western world is deeply influenced by some of the writings of Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831). At least in terms of conventional war. Amongst his famous statements, two are still fundamental for the teaching of strategy and operational art in military schools of the Occident: "war is merely the continuation of policy by other means" (CLAUSEWITZ, 1989, p. 87); and the definition of the "paradoxical trinity", which, according to Glascott (2017), entails the chaos of war due to the tension between government, military might and people.

By the transcribed sentence above, we may understand that, while war is "other means" for conducting policy, yet it is a different thing, with its own dynamics. Military objectives shall indeed contribute to reaching political goals, but, in a Clausewitzian world, politics stay behind the scenes while military movements are progressing on the field. Politics should only appear to reasonably take advantage of the military results. In short, Clausewitz did not offer that politics and military march hand in hand; each, although conscious of the other party's importance, follows its own rationale.

As for the chaotic trinity, a possible interpretation is that it derives from different roles, with opposing tendencies, performed by the three sections of the state's war machine: the government, the military, and the people. Three horses free to roam, as the metaphor written down by Glascott (2017). To compensate for that, a sound strategy "maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets" (CLAUSEWITZ, 1989, p. 90, our emphasis).As a result, Western military culture tends to respect the separation of the roles of government, military, and people. Ideally, Governments shall reasonably conduct the war's general effort; military planners are to not only be meticulous and less vulnerable to the play of chance but also show great adaptability ("creative spirit") during the war; passionate people are to be convinced to turn hatred into power will and to allow themselves to be converted into fighting forces and means for large-scale production.

It is difficult, though, to follow this recipe when waging war as an insurgent movement. There is still no state and no formal army. For the sake of this, Mao Zedong, although not ruling Clausewitz out, accommodated the trinity and the relation between war and politics in his way. First, by mixing and matching elements of politics and war altogether, which results in a dualism of political struggle and armed conflict at the same time. Only "the marriage of violence to politics" (PIKE, 1986, p. 216-217) can bring victory. So, different from stated in the paragraphs above, according to Mao, politics do not simply wait for military results to capitalize on them. They are all mingled. Second, and a corollary of the previous sentence, separation is blurred between government, military, and people. Because there is no specific military segment, political leaders are the generals themselves and the people are not just an indirect manpower production force but an army with no formal enlistment. The people are an instrument of war in itself (PIKE, 1986, p. 220).

This said an insurgency needs to work with time in its favor. Time passing, the informal army and lower echelons of politics will eventually merge into a regular army. Insurgencies, then, need to wage a protracted war. For that, Mao (ZEDONG, 1967, p. 34-40) envisioned three stages, starting the first one with village-based (rural) support. The first stage is not meant to be decisive yet is to maintain movement on peripherical territories while building not only systems of subsistence and communication but also a myth around the ideology and its "prophet". All that to cut the countryside from the control of the formal state while perpetrating a "hearts and minds" strategy. The movement that characterizes the Stage One is to be implemented based on banditry, ambushes, and rural guerrilla; not on regular military actions even because organized corps of soldiers are still not available. Paradoxically, it is a defensive phase, since there is no physical strength to confront a regular army. Only when enough areas are secured and there is already an army-like group forged and trained, the Stage One can transition to the next level. Not before a remarkable demonstration of force to attract the response of the incumbent state.

Stage Two is when the insurgency needs to overcome a stalemate imposed by the response of a regular opposing force. It, then, involves attrition in a conventional small-scale war, in which spaces gained in the previous phase are to be consolidated. By this time, politics must come out from behind the curtains, and the informational dimension of war gains predominance. It officially reaches the status of war against the establishment. Thus, it is a dangerous period for the insurgents since they no longer enjoy anonymity. After surviving the first half of this stage, it is time to accelerate and escalate the war, bringing it to other areas and increasing speed to bleed the enemy. The insurgency is to keep such intensity and pace until the group is ready to launch the Stage Three, one of decisive battles of offensive character, carried by a then-institutionalized regular army.

After detailing the three stages of a protracted war, we can follow with our analysis of AQ/AM's strategy and operations. We shall first acknowledge that terrorism and insurgency cannot be said as the same concepts. The selection of targets is one of the main differences between them (DASGUPTA, 2002). Both, however, fit to the concept of being, each one, a movement that uses political violence as a mean of asymmetric warfare. This way, there is not much of an obstacle to carrying the comparison we proposed. If terrorism was such a thing in the time of Mao's writings, it is reasonable that he might have reserved some pages to accommodate the organized terror in his theory. Given this, the next section will seek to demonstrate that AQ/AM's stage one was fairly successful.

3   A proficuous beginning

In the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan (1988), long before issuing his *fatwa* against the US in 1998, bin Laden kicked off the organization of AQ. Generally, that happened in a low-profile manner. Even the involvement of AQ in some events in the first half of the '90s, all of them somehow against the US, was of less notability without the group claiming

Coleç. Meira Mattos, Rio de Janeiro, v. 15, n. 52, p. 91-110, January/April 2021

95

formal responsibility on them. It was only *The 9/11 Commission report* (UNITED STATES, 2004, p. 59-60) that confirmed the participation of AQ in training warlords battling US forces in Somalia, in 1993; in an attack to a Saudi-US joint facility in Riyadh, in 1995; and in the attempt to attack the World Trade Center, in 1993.

Avoiding any initial protagonist role among other *jihadist* movements and "accepting" Saudi's government disavowal (1992), bin Laden used discreet Sudan to establish his sanctuary. It was also from there he launched his "Golden Chain",

> an increasingly complex, almost worldwide organization [that] included a financial support network [to the mujahideen fight in Afghanistan] put together mainly by financiers in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states [by which] donations flowed through charities or other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (UNITED STATES, 2010, p. 55).

The hosting country was used to, simultaneously, carry money laundering and to leverage his wealth to generate a self-supporting economy aimed to turn feasible the envisioned *jihad* (BERGEN; CRUICKSHANK, 2011). More importantly, the same authors propose that bin Laden focused on strengthening AQ's legitimacy amongst other *jihadist* movements. He carried actions to support the Taliban rule in Afghanistan; maintained and improved military training camps; financed AQ-alike movements; and shaped their message to conquer the mobilization of common people.

Although this paper is mainly concerned with what has happened after 1998, the analysis of the early years of AQ is of fundamental importance while addressing the question we proposed on the effectiveness of AQ's strategy. Altogether, preparative movements and isolated offensive actions before the *fatwa* of 1998 were the materialization of a well-orchestrated initial step of Stage One, in a Maoist-type protracted war. Without the sound preparation that culminated with the consolidation of AQ's influence, we can doubt the *fatwa* itself would have ever been released. It was because AQ chose to operate in the shadows while building up its foundation, that the rest of the stage 1 could be implemented, culminating with 9/11. Had the message not been shaped to gain clerical support, it would have not reverberated in the mosques and religious schools. Thus, no "hearts and minds" in the Sunni world would have been conquered to accept the death of not only *mujahedeen* but also of innocent Muslims killed in some of the initial attacks. As for the development of its leadership toward other *jihadist* groups, AQ had gained the protagonist role as it provided a considerable number of fighters to Muslim struggles taking place in Tajikistan, Chechnya, and Kashmir (UNITED STATES,2004, p. 64). Besides building legitimacy, the involvement of AQ's fighters – generally trained in the camps of Pakistan and Afghanistan – in insurgencies of the time was equally relevant to enhance the experience of the men, who would eventually be employed in further stages of AQ's protracted war against the US.

The group's growth finally resulted in Sudan becoming a doubtful haven. Some may say that the move to Afghanistan, in 1996, had delayed future operations (UNITED STATES, 2010, p. 55), and this does not seem all incorrect. Especially when we recollect that, as already discussed in footnote 1, the 1996-*fatwa* ended up more as just propaganda than as a substantial declaration of war to the US. However, AQ's foundation was sound enough to prevent compromising the strategy as a whole. This said, after the 1998-*fatwa* was released, the remainder of the strategy of the group followed its designed path and the *grand finale* of stage 1 showed a military escalation only possible to a very well-trained and prepared *jihadi*. First carrying an attack on land, AQ targeted the US *diplomatic power* with the explosion of the embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, in 1998. The next choice was a token of the US *military power*, and the USS Cole was targeted at sea by a maritime asset in 2000. Finally, 9/11 showed the AQ's capacity in carrying an "airstrike" in its way and an iconic piece of American *economic power* (and soft power as well – part of the famous NYC's cinematic skyline) was brought down, while the center of the political power has also been attacked. Indeed, the escalation of events has shown that AQ was able to operate in all domains of war (land, sea, and air) and to attack different expressions of the American national power (diplomatic, economic, and military). More than this, the escalation culminated with an attack on the US homeland, which has not happened since World War II[3], and provoked the American-led GWT, the beginning of stage 2 for the purpose of this paper.

Before we conclude this section, it is convenient to acknowledge that some of AQ's features here described do not perfectly match the original description of Mao's stage 1. In our opinion, however, differences between AQ's actions and Maoist theory more resemble the common saying "history doesn't repeat itself, but it often rhymes" than invalidate their similarities. This said some noticeable mismatches between the two strategies in their early phases can be interpreted as an adaptation carried by AQ to face the singularities of the new strategic environment. For example, yet there was no indication from Mao that the fight should be expanded outside the targeted country, we should consider that the Japanese occupation in China was "stronger" than the American one in the Middle East; the Japanese, then, offered obvious targets inside China while the US did not inside the AQ's geographic objective. Equally, although in Mao's writings there was neither a prescription for seeking haven abroad nor for bringing foreign people to the fight, two aspects need to be considered: the continental size of China compared to the Middle Eastern countries and the nationalist [and ideological] character of the Chinese fight versus the religious impeller of AQ. The huge size of China provided Mao with various havens and maneuvering space that were not available in the Middle East for bin Laden. On the other hand, the religious inspiration of the AQ's fight allowed the group to attract foreign fighters while the character of the Maoist struggle was not meant to use alien direct support.

---

3   Even though, the attack on Pearl Harbor happened on a territory (not a formal state) outside the continental US.

Conclusively, not even the differences between the united front in China and AQ do not hamper the fact that they are equivalent phenomena. All in all, there are enough similarities, being the following the easiest to identify: the seek for protagonism and consolidation of power, the informational aspect (propaganda – the *fatwa* of 1996 as an example), and the avoidance of direct military fight against the target. Looking at these similar features, AQ was indeed successful in conducting its stage 1.

4 Flawed acceleration of ensuing stages

> The enemy will attempt to safeguard the occupied areas and to make them his own by the fraudulent method of setting up puppet governments (ZEDONG, 1967, p. 55).

The transcription above calls attention for the response of the incumbent state to the rise of an insurgency. Because of the differences we previously described regarding the strategies of Mao and bin Laden, especially the fact that there was not a specific incumbent state, the particular American response, after 9/11, was of its own. Different than Japan, who was already occupying China when the Chinese stage 2 began, the US formally declared the GWT and started a more direct intervention in the Middle East. Thus, the response of the Americans to AQ was "stronger" than one of the Japanese in China.

This difference in the response of the target, though, does not necessarily demand a change from the side of the insurgents carrying stage 2. There is no elimination of the need for the insurgency to be prepared to survive a stalemate against an enemy who is militarily stronger and able to ostensibly hold ground (main cities) with the support of locally chosen governments. That is why Mao proposes that stage 2 shall be marked by the insurgency being able to enhance and prolong the stalemate. By doing so, the stronger side would eventually diminish its power because of some facts that lead to the "deterioration of troop morale [and] popular discontent at home" (ZEDONG, 1967, p. 57). In addition, Mao (ZEDONG, 1967, p. 55) suggests that protracting this stage, while weathering "its hardships", will also serve the purpose of waiting for the international situation (opinion) to change in favor of the insurgency. It is imperative, however, to be prepared with a minimum of military force organization. Even though guerrilla still prevails in this stage, it is no longer enough to only operate in the deep rear of the enemy, because direct clashes on the front will inevitably arise.

This stage, then, would be the most peculiar phase of a protracted war. Indeed, it is neither just defensive nor simply offensive. It shall mix and match conventional and asymmetric lines of operation to fulfill a strategy in which there is not a distinct separation between attack and defense. It is also the most decisive; not because it seeks decisive battles, but because it slowly bleeds the enemy to the point it ends up changing the balance of strength. Finally,

Professor Paine (2012, p. 237) warns the danger in evolving from stage 1 to stage 2; from operations "under the radar", even perceived as mere banditry, to the enemy's ultimate acknowledgment that an eventual near-peer competitor has emerged. By the beginning of this stage, the enemy is still stronger, and "willpower alone [can] not defeat modern weapons" (PAINE, 2012, p. 139). Thus, the transition from stage 1 is only recommended after a critical mass of fighters is formed by the amalgamation of the insurgency and the local society. Combining all said – the distinctiveness, the importance, and the difficulty of stage 2 –, the result is that the insurgency shall wisely consider whether it is ready, or not, to go on with the last act of stage 1. As previously discussed, the latter is likely to provoke a large-scale response of the enemy, against which the insurgency shall be able to defend conquered spaces. The corollary of the previous analysis is that the big event of stage 1 is only to be perpetrated when the struggle has already sufficiently benefitted the insurgents during stage 1. In short, and using Maoist terms, once "luring the enemy in deep" in one's own terrain (ZEDONG, 1967, p. 32) is a new reality (stage 2), enough military force – even if it is still not perfectly organized as such – is needed to face the enemy's resistance. Failing in this stage means, most likely, not being able to reach the final objectives and, ultimately, failing as an insurgency.

This said it is noteworthy that AQ, the first group to take the *jihad* to the "far enemy"[4] (FISHMAN, 2016, p. 12), enjoying relevant results in its stage 1, was not ready for the American response. Heavily relying on the Taliban, AQ was not able to resist not even the first blow. The Taliban has always held a contested and only tenuous leadership in Afghanistan. Taking advantage of this, the coalition between the US and the Northern Alliance, who carried impressive ground advances along with the American aerial strikes, caused the Taliban to be disbanded. That represented the end of AQ's haven in the Hindu Kush range. With almost no fight, bin Laden fled to Pakistan (BARFIELD, 2010, p. 269-270).

AQ's second chance for a protracted war against the US was opened in Iraq in 2003/04, in the aftermath of the overthrow of Saddam's regime. The political turmoil and the social upheaval were assessed by AQ as an opportunity to get the western enemy trapped in its own choice of carrying an unlimited war while facing with diminished support of its allies and a lessening approval of its internal public. The opportunity to create a stalemate in "the heart of the Arab world" (FISHMAN, 2016, p. 22) fell onto AQ's lap while the group was not fully ready for it. Opening a new front in Iraq was a matter of manpower, which again, same as in Afghanistan, in 2001, was not available.

To overcome this, AQ decided, although some internal resistance, to franchise the brand to Abu Zarqawi's (1966-2006) group and some dissidents of the vanished Ba'ath Party, merging them all into the al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in August 2004. This opportunistic approach of AQ unveiled the same *modus operandi* of the war in Afghanistan. Again, AQ was trying to control the operations from abroad, relying upon a third-party *jihadi*. This time

---

4   All previous jihadist movements only focused on their "near enemies", "apostate" governments financed by the US, according to them. Even some of the contemporary groups opposed AQ's idea of reaching the "far enemy". This would eventually provoke a response against which AQ could not be able to weather (FISHMAN, 2016, p. 12).

with the aggravating support of a patchwork of Ba'ath-nationalist forces, whose participation complicated, even more, the unification of objectives. At least, there was a nuance that went along with the Maoist prescription for stage 2. Bin Laden introduced the diplomatic piece into the confrontation, with his speech in October 2004 that showed a clear attempt to not only corrupt American legitimacy in invading Iraq but also break the coalition around the US (BIN LADEN, 2004).

The diplomatic effort soon became useless. The actions of AQI, although initially successful, being able to build on the terrible social repercussions of the power vacuum left in Iraq after American intervention, quickly frustrated the expectations of AQ's informational campaign. At the end of the day, there was no match between AQ's plan and Zarqawi's short-term strategy – or simply an action-oriented plan with obedience to no strategy at all. The latter's visceral approach to the *Sharia* (FISHMAN, 2016, p. 44) turned fighting – and slaughtering – into an objective in itself. This altogether stained AQ's message. To complicate this relation, there was not much the primitive system of command and control (C_2) between AQ, in Pakistan, and its affiliates, in Iraq, could do to stop the horrific show of executions. Because the C_2 was based on couriers bringing letters back and forth, it was ineffective to bring to AQI the message that "policy must be dominant over militarism" (FISHMAN, 2016, p. 77).

The effect, besides compromising the AQ's legitimacy as the main combatant to a foreign invader, also ruined AQI's base area inside Iraq and turned future operations in the country almost unfeasible to AQ. In short, AQI started receiving clerical disavowal, including from Abu Maqdisi (1959-), Zarqawi's former mentor (FISHMAN, 2016, p. 62-67). Not only the extreme violence contributed to that. Two other events played well in that sense: first, the employment of scholars and regular men in the defense frontline of Fallujah; and second, the AQI's activism in addressing violence and killing to Sunni Muslims not totally aligned to the *jihad* rule. To overcome the growing dissatisfaction inside the area of operations, a second and simultaneous front against the Shi'ites was the solution implemented by AQI. The result, however, was that the initiative exposed Sunni common people to Shia backlash the *jihadists* were not prepared to respond (FISHMAN, 2016, p. 82-83). Attacks against Shi'ites, thus, had the opposite effect rather than attracting Sunni unconditional support to AQI.

The aforementioned episodes reflect Zarqawi's obsession with his short-term plan: the creation of the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). Bringing Maoist protracted war theory again to the discussion, this is clearly a matter of the third stage of the strategy, which will only come after a prolonged stalemate during stage 2. A state cannot simply be proclaimed if a sound base – in the case of ISI, clerical support besides a regular military force – was not previously built.

With no care to bin Laden's directives (MENDELSOHN, 2016), and probably no knowledge of Mao, Zarqawi anticipated stage 3 without getting stronger than the enemy during stage 2. This means that the acceleration of the plans in Iraq brought the counter-offensive phase before the stalemate was finished. Actually, the latter was barely launched. The analysis of Mao's writings reminds us that it is through this period of an impasse that an insurgency would have enough time and room to merge its guerrillas and the rest of the peo-

ple into a regular army. Also, it would reach the aim of forging its base area and building its *Clausewitzian* trinity – using the people's hatred to enlist them in a regular army; and using clerical favorable leadership as a base for a future theocratic government (analogy with CLAUSEWITZ, 1989, p. 89).

Finally, we shall consider that Mao's prescriptions for building a state were based on a strong unifying ideology. Nevertheless, the micro-universe of Iraq, with its different peoples – Arabs and Kurdish, to stay simple – and competing confessions of the Islam – Sunni, and Shia –, brings a tough, maybe impossible, challenge in building a sound and amalgamating ideology. This turns especially true when clerical support lacks even from the Sunni "priests". Zarqawi's "cumulative strategy"[5], implemented by an "army" that, in reality, was a mix of different *jihadis* and banded Iraqi military – all with different aims and supply chains and distinct levels of training – was already a problem. Adding to this the poor ideological preparation of the battlefield, the fall of the ISI became inevitable. Ultimately, Zarqawi failed to "ensure that the counter-offensive [did] not collapse halfway through internal dissension" (ZEDONG, 1967, p. 58). Altogether, AQI lacked internal cohesion and grassroots support. It ended up, then, fighting various simultaneous enemies, just to reach its culminating point of victory (see CLAUSEWITZ, 1989, chapter 22).

5 Late reassessment and no transitioning between stages

Reassessment in a war, for this paper, is the constant examination of whether ongoing operations are contributing, or not, to reach military, strategic, and, ultimately, political objectives. It also evaluates the responses of the opponent to one's incentives. It is an activity with high subjectivity, being highly influenced by biases and very dependent on an effective system of C2.

To leave room for proper actions after a process of reassessment, Mao postulated that the protracted war does not need to follow a linear line that methodically connects the stages 1, 2, and 3. Rather, his recommendation is:

> Because the area is big and diverse, [the strategy] doesn't need to go with same speed throughout the whole region. It shall follow a 'rising here and subsiding there' scheme (ZEDONG, 1967, p. 58).

What the Maoist theory wants to stress with the passage above is that, once a new stage is started, actions related to previous stages are not necessarily ruled out. In other words, it is not because stage 3 is characterized by the [military] counter-offensive that it

---

5   Under quotation because it is not the same one as described by J.C. Wylie (1967, p. 117-121). While Wylie wrote about a cumulative strategy toward a single enemy, Zarqawi targeted the Shi'ites, tried to hold an important piece of Iraqi territory (Fallujah), targeted objectives in a neighbor country (Jordan) and carried a massive informational campaign, all while fighting US troops and the US-backed Sons of Iraq (SoI).

only preconizes open attacks. There will be areas in which actions of banditry, guerrilla, or even terror – all typical of stage 1 – will be needed. In some others, propaganda and defensive measures will be the rule. Altogether, this procedure is not only an accommodation to the imperatives of the terrain but also a sort of deception toward the enemy.

Going back to our case study, the first thing to consider is that combining bin Laden's long-term strategy with Zarqawi's action-oriented and short-term plan was not an easy job. Thus, the creation of a single and comprehensive strategy came only, at maximum, with much of compromise. Some may even argue that a combined strategy was never reached.

Trying to accommodate such a combination of strategies in 2005, when significant portions of both branches' plans were already in place, was even tougher (FISHMAN, 2016, p. 44-46). In attention to this, it seems clear that AQ tried as much as possible to not intervene, even when the "AQ-AQI's joint plan" was failing in Iraq. As a result, a reassessment, a plan for changing the course of actions, from the AQ side was not turned available until 2010/11. Although the speech of Ayman al-Zawahiri (1951-) in December 2006 called for uprisings (typical from stage 1) against the Saudi Royal Family, his address, as a whole, was more an endorsement of how operations were being conducted than a clear direction for change in plans (AL-ZAWAHIRI, 2006). Albeit the creation of a state was not a short-term objective of AQ, the latter felt obliged in defending the proclaimed ISI. Zawahiri's speech was, then, a general call not only for other *jihadis* to keep the fight after Zarqawi's death (2006) but also for both the Islamic "Academia" and press to support the effort of the war. Besides, we may say that the lack of reassessment was also due to the flawed perception in the side of those who were merely "observing" the war from a faraway haven. Supported by a poor C_2 system, the AQ may have suffered from a sort of confirmation bias, according to which the precipitation in proclaiming the ISI was perceived as a result of a successful campaign of AQI.

A public version of a sound reassessment came very late with another speech of Zawahiri in September 2011 (AL-ZAWAHIRI, 2011). Although officially celebrating a decade-anniversary of 9/11, the speech set the tone of AQ recognizing its weakness and renouncing the jihadi overall leadership. Basically, the then-leader of AQ recognized the success of the Arab Revolution (Spring) and called for the return to stage 1, with more isolated attacks to Americans and allies and the reconstruction of the financial – and informational – chain. The speech apparently synthesized a series of letter exchanges, including from bin Laden, in the period of 2010-2011 (LAHOUD, 2012). In all of them, AQ's leadership recognized the errors from the past, mainly the attacks to Muslim civilians rather than American targets and acknowledged bin Laden's struggle in exerting minimal influence on other *jihadis*. Those exchanges also proposed a new type of work for AQ rather than as a leader seeking to control the *jihadis*: to play the role of an enabler, centralizing a sophisticated and coherent media strategy, and providing military training and operational collaboration.

Had this reassessment happened before, it is unlikely that it would have refrained Zarqawi from working in his own way. However, a formal disavowal of his actions could have prevented the arise of *Zarqawiism* – a movement hardly controllable and with ongoing repercussions – after his death. Had the media strategy been in place before, horrific scenes of execution would not have compromised AQ's main message and lessened its leadership.

Alternatively, AQ could have timely sent other eminent fighters to join Iraqi Sunni militias whose eventual success would have diminished Zarqawi's role and would have controlled the rise of opposing groups, like the US-backed Sons of Iraq (SoI). Bottom line is that AQ should have better controlled the expansion of the brand and not granted Zarqawi with a proxy to operate in his way. At maximum, AQ should have considered Zarqawi as just another local partner operating under close (local) supervision.

A timely reassessment would have also shown the centrality of the Iraqi Shia population to a strategy to hold the country against the American response. The Shia population is indeed a center of gravity in Iraq not only because it comprises most of the Iraqi people (UNITED STATES, 2020) but also due to its strategic location in the Southeast of the country, in an area that could have been used as part of a military and a logistic corridor linking to Pakistan through Iran. Had the regions in this corridor been shaped to minimize mutual grievances between Shia and Sunni people, and to remain friendly to AQ during the war, it could have served as a sort of Ho Chi Minh trail – of the Vietnam War (1955-75). The same way the Vietnamese took advantage of the latter, a geographic corridor between the AQ's haven in Pakistan and the Southeast of Iraq would have provided room and flexibility for AQ in waging war to the US. It would have allowed using, at the same time, all elements of the three stages of a protracted war and, then, a great deal of deception while combating a stronger enemy. Without such enlarged space, AQI executed the transition between stages in a wrong way and new terrorist attacks turned to be the only means to convey the message that the group was not solely playing defensively. Examples of those attacks in Amman, Jordan (in November 2005) and in Samarra, Iraq (in February 2006) only targeted innocent Muslims causing AQI to "lose considerable sympathy from the Muslim public, [...] separating them from their popular bases" (LAHOUD, 2012, p. 13). With no reliable offensive option, the load was heavy on the defense. Without a regular-sized army to carry conventional war (Maoist stage 3), the 10-month long fight to hold Fallujah ended up involving the deployment on the field of clerics and scholars (FISHMAN, 2016, p. 55-58) who were meant to work in the task of conquering hearts and minds (Maoist stage 1), and, ultimately, of forging and delivering new soldiers.

6 Counterarguments: aq had fruitful stages 2 & 3

On the contrary to what has been discussed so far, it may be argued that AQ's stages 2 and 3 were productive and the overall strategy is still ongoing to bring AQ's heirs to the original utmost objective. It may be added that AQ and ISI (AQI) increased the costs for the American presence in the Middle East and this created for the US an unfavorable balance with the original value of the objective. An objective we may say as ambitious as the desired end state of a shaped Middle East region that favors both advancing American interests and, more importantly, preventing new attacks on the US mainland or its deployed assets. So, although AQ is a weakened institution nowadays, the actions of the group paved the way on which ensuing movements can benefit from American "tiredness" of the ori-

ginal enterprise of shaping a secure environment to favor its geopolitical interests. The outcome of this is that the American government overtly pushes for the final withdrawal of its assets from the region to happen anytime soon. And this shall happen regardless of how far the desired end state is. Following this, a favorable prediction to AQ's heirs points that local governments will likely fall, leaving the whole area ready for the creation of the Caliphate.

In the wake of this counterargument, it can be said that *Zarqawiism* survived to Zarqawi's death because AQI's stage 2 and the group's launching for a stage 3 were not wrong anticipations of the planned timeline, but actually, a necessary move to take advantage of the opportunity opened by the US in Iraq. Following this rationale, one can argue that 2011 is still very early to be a parameter of time to measure the effectiveness of AQ's original strategy. Afterall, backlashes were predicted and the AQ's Master Plan, as exposed by Fishman's book (2016), was set for final results only in 2020. Advocates for the plan would argue, then, that it is no coincidence the paradoxical current situation of the US policy; cumulative public demonstrations of the will of leaving Iraq and the Middle East as a whole versus the inability to put together a reasonable plan for war termination.

This proposed view of AQ's success can be supported by facts, being the most relevant one the expansion of ISI's original scope followed by the proclamation of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/ISIS) in 2014, within the timeline proposed by the Master Plan. Such a huge step could not happen without a successful stage 2 in which AQI was correct in adopting the *Suntzuan* recommendation for attacking the enemy's strategy (TZU, 1963) and in eliminating the gray zone that stands between the *Sharia* and the *jihad* (STERN, 2016). Attacking the enemy's strategy began with the understanding that the American end state in Iraq would have been turned easier through a process of pacification led by the United Nations (UN). By targeting the UN mission in 2003, Zarqawi certainly contributed to a decreased will of the UN – already wary of US allegations on the presence of weapons of massive destruction in Iraq – to operate in the country. With the UN retreat, other potential allies also decreased their participation and formal support, and, with time, the US image got eroded before the international arena. Eliminating the gray zone, materialized by the attacks against the Shi'ites, was a necessary evil to augment Sunni future disposition to take part in the fight, which has been demonstrated by the increasing numbers of fighters and organizations[6] involved in different levels of *jihad*.

Big picture at sight, all that has been seeded by bin Laden and Zarqawi is now contributing to the difficulty for the US in leaving Iraq and Afghanistan and, ultimately, for the unprecedented initiative of the peace talks with the Taliban. These events can, indeed, bring the perception of an effective strategy and an accordingly execution of operations.

---

6   Burak Kadercan's lecture on "ISIS and current conflict in the Middle East" (US Naval War College, Newport, RI, March 21, 2020). Professor Kadercan stated that the number of fighters grew from around 50K in 2001 to a rough estimation of 175K in the present. Also, the number of organizations grew from 20+, in 2001, to 65+, nowadays.

7 Rebuttal – there was not much of a harm to the us

Addressing the proposed question on the effectiveness of Al Qaeda (AQ)'s strategy and operations is a tough task since this is still a matter of ongoing History. However, even the examination of the facts in the aftermath of 2011 shows the strategy has not been completely effective.

Regarding the establishment of ISIS in 2014, the first thing to consider is Fishman's (2016, p. 37) statement that it was "more coincidental than causal". It cannot be denied that ISI was an inspiration, but by the time ISIS was created, the alliance between Zarqawiists (ISIS's embryo) and AQ had already crumbled. Although ISIS is not a new and isolated phenomenon, its ties to AQ's strategy are cloudy. The experiment of ISIS, albeit turned possible because of the surge of fighters after Zarqawi's propaganda, turned massive after the instrument of social media, is sustained only by young, radical, and inexperienced fighters, not backed by the clerical mainstream. At the end of the day, ISIS' collapse, as ISI's in the last decade, seems just a matter of time.

Even the spread of alike movements, such as in Yemen and Somalia, seems of less strategic importance. The perception is that they are just a temporary consequence of failing states, in which warlords have embraced a conveniently available ideology. This, in part, explains the growing number of *jihad* organizations and fighters mentioned in the last section. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to state that they have very few related to each other and, mainly, to the original *jihadi* idea. Then, these recent movements lack a unifying rationale to promote the amalgamation of them all. The result is that, paradoxically, some *jihadis*, rather than contributing to unify the *Umma* around the original project of the Caliphate, are only deepening the boundaries already existing between states artificially created by European imperialism. And this all began with AQ's initiative of franchising the brand to overcome its weakness in manpower.

When it comes to the cost of the war compared to the value of the objective, it is indeed reasonable to infer that the US spending of more than 6 trillion dollars in 18 years of war (CRAWFORD, 2019) sounds like a gradual bleeding of the American economy without a clear sense of achievement. This has not counted in much favor of AQ's strategy notwithstanding. The continuous growth of the American GDP over this decade suggests that the "bleeding" is not hampering the US economy. Rather, it emphasizes the American national power in sustaining large troops abroad while growing its economy. In terms of intangible costs, one may point that, internally, the GWT has ignited bipartisan politics. In the international arena, it is still a matter of constant grievances coming from traditional allies, and, more relevant, a cause for the "distraction" of the US while some of its competitors have reached shining achievements through uncontested hybrid warfare[7]. While the last sentences are true, the US has not experienced the same kind of political turmoil or civil unrest, as during the years in Vietnam. Maybe because the antagonist groups in the Middle East failed to put an augmented focus on American targets and, as a result, did not get close to cause popular

---

7   Russia against Georgia, in 2008, and against Ukraine in 2014; China, in the South China Sea (see STAVRIDIS, 2016).

discontent at the opponent's home. In parallel, although lessened for a while, American leadership tends to gain predominance again once-powerful threats for NATO and Far Eastern countries are perceived as more realistic.

We agree that, although the US is searching a way-out of Afghanistan and Iraq, peace talks with the Taliban should not be, in a first glance, part of the solution. Yet this sounds like an American weakness, what it entails is the recognition that the military instrument is not enough to reach the political objectives. The same rationale applies to the withdrawal from Iraq. Moreover, there is an urgent demand for the US military to focus on other theaters, as the nation is now pivoting to state competition.

Finally, although *jihadi* movements have grown, as previously demonstrated, the lack of general governance over all the different branches of them transformed what was supposed to be an embryonic regional movement into a fight of local fundamentalist warlords. Even less concerning, not rarely, recent episodes of terrorism have been just a matter of solitaire wolves. To tackle those isolated threats, the use of military force is an exaggerated response; a global effort of law enforcement, supported by shared intelligence, seems more suitable. In short, this does not mean the US was beaten by the AQ.

8 Conclusion

This paper aimed to respond to the question of whether the strategy and related operations of AQ/AM were effective after the war was declared on the US in 1998. Considering that AQ, like any other *jihad*, is more than just a terrorist group, we took advantage of its status as a *quasi*-insurgency to compare elements of its strategy with the Maoist prescription for protracted wars. We revisited Mao's work "On Protracted Wars", and found out that his envisioned strategy, against an imperial war– Japan – invading his territory, was mainly divided into three stages: defensive, stalemate, and counter-offensive. Our comparison pointed out that AQ's strategy was flawed because, although it tried to follow Mao's structure in three stages, it was based on an accelerated tempo that prevented AQ from having all available elements for transitioning from one stage to the other.

In section 2, we went through the description of Mao's stages. We saw that stage 1 is one of less military organization and complexity. Indeed, the actions may be seen sometimes as mere banditry. Because of these characteristics, AQ was able to conduct this stage fairly productively. During this period, the group was efficient in discreetly raising funds and legitimacy. Actions of the group were successfully implemented while AQ was operating behind the scenes. Only when enough clerical support –and from other *jihadis*, as well – was turned available, the 1998-*fatwa* was released declaring war on the US. The problem for AQ was that the last act of its stage 1, precisely the 9/11, was carried in a time – and in such magnitude – the group was not militarily prepared to confront the American-led response.

Therefore, AQ could not implement, with forces of its own, the defensive attrition which is particular to the Maoist stage 2. To try to overcome this, AQ franchised the response to Zarqawi's AQI, whose strategy's tempo and goals were completely different than those of the AQ. This said, what was observed is that AQI accelerated stage 3, without sufficiently degrading the enemy's force

and will to remain on the field. Zarqawi's actions even called for the recrudescence of international support to the US. His actions also led to the compromising of the battlefield due to an exaggerated clash between Sunni and Shia populations in Iraq.

Even when the strategy was falling apart, AQ/AM failed to reassess. Both groups ignored Mao's writings concerning the volatility of the protracted war's strategy. According to this feature, there is no red line between the three stages, and actions, more related to each of the three of them, shall alter depending on how the enemy is behaving. Once the AQI started stage 3 type of actions to hold the ISI, the group simply put aside any other actions pertaining to the previous phases (guerrilla, ambushes, banditry, and civil disobedience, in areas secured by the enemy, myth-building, social assistance, and, mainly, spreading the message). AQ's reassessment that the strategy was wrong came as late as 2011, only when the group's leadership was already hopelessly diminished by AQI's inconsequent actions and after bin Laden's death. For the purposes of this paper, we considered that Zawahiri's recognition that AQ was supposed to go behind the curtains again represented the collapse of the group's strategy and the temporal finishing line for our analysis.

This paper acknowledged that a vision different than ours is possible. Indeed, an interpretation that AQ sedimented the path to other movements arise is feasible. This view could be reinforced by the growing numbers of fighters joining *jihadis*– whose number also grew – throughout the Middle East, and by the American recognition that the GWT would never reach its political objectives. Although these counterarguments are sound, our rebuttal was based on the fact that the growth in numbers only came with the uncontrollable spread of the fight, which is ultimately turning the unification of the *Umma* even more difficult than it was when AQ came out. In parallel, American withdrawal is not necessarily related to AQ's success; terrorism as for now seems much more a law enforcement problem than a matter to be tackled by the military instrument. Also, the US no longer enjoys the stamp of "the hegemon of the unipolar world", and, thus, cannot stand having its military force employed in something alien to great power competition.

Coleç. Meira Mattos, Rio de Janeiro, v. 15, n. 52, p. 91-110, January/April 2021

107

References

AL-ZAWAHIRI, Ayman. **Realities of the conflict between Islam and unbelief**. Translated by Laura Mansfield. Herzliya: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2006.

AL-ZAWAHIRI, Ayman. **Dawn of the imminent victory**. New York: Flashpoint Partners, 2011.

BARFIELD, Thomas. **Afghanistan**: a cultural and political history. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010.

BERGEN, Peter; CRUICKSHANK, Paul. Revisiting the early Al Qaeda: an updated account of its formative years. **Studies in Conflict & Terrorism**, Abingdon, v. 35, n. 1, p. 1-36, 2012. Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2012.631454?src=recsys&. Access on: May 11, 2020.

BIN LADEN, Usamah et al. Jihad against Jews and Crusaders: World Islamic Front statement. **Federation of American Scientists**, Washington, DC, Feb. 23, 1998. Available at: https://fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm. Access on: May 4, 2020.

BIN LADEN, Usama. The full English transcript of bin Ladin's speech. **Aljazeera**, Doha, Nov. 1st, 2004. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2004/11/200849163336457223.html. Access on: May 16, 2020.

BYMAN, Daniel. The decision to begin talks with terrorists: lessons for policymakers. **Studies in Conflict & Terrorism**, v. 29, n. 5, p. 403-414, 2006. Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10576100600703996. Access on: Sept. 7, 2020.

CLAUSEWITZ, Carl von. **On war**. Edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.

CLINTON, Hillary. America's pacific century. **Foreign Policy**, Washington, DC, Oct. 11, 2011. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/. Access on: May 3, 2020.

CRAWFORD, Neta C. **United States budgetary costs and obligations of post 9/11 wars through FY2020**: $6.4 trillion. Providence: Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, 2019.(Costs of War). Available at: https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2019/US%20Budgetary%20Costs%20of%20Wars%20November%202019.pdf. Access on: May 23, 2020.

DASGUPTA, Sunil. Why Terrorism Fails While Insurgencies Can Sometimes Succeed. **Brookings**, Washington, DC, Jan. 4, 2002. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/why-terrorism-fails-while-insurgencies-can-sometimes-succeed/. Access on: Oct. 10, 2020.

FISHMAN, Brian. **The master plan**: ISIS, Al Qaeda, and the jihadi strategy for final victory. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016.

GLASCOTT, Julie Anna. The trinity and law of war. **The Strategy Bridge**, Washington, DC, Nov. 12, 2017. Available at: https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/11/12/the-trinity-and-the-law-of-war. Access on: May 9, 2020.

GROSS, Michael. **The ethics of insurgency**: a critical guide to just guerrilla warfare. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

LAHOUD, Nelly et al. **Letters from Abbottabad**: bin Laden sidelined? West Point: Combating Terrorism Center, 2012.

MENDELSOHN, Barak. **The al-Qaeda franchise**: the expansion of al-Qaeda and its consequences. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.

PAINE, Sarah. **The wars for Asia, 1911-1949**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

PIKE, Douglas. **PAVN**: People's Army of Vietnam. Novato: Presidio Press, 1986.

STAVRIDIS, James. Maritime hybrid warfare is coming. **Proceedings**, Annapolis, v. 142, n. 12, 2016. Available at: https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2016/december/maritime-hybrid-warfare-coming. Access on: May 23, 2020.

STERN, Jessica. ISIS targets 'gray zone' of moderate Islam. **The Boston Globe**, Boston, Mar. 23, 2016. Available at: https://bit.ly/2LCkYGS. Access on: May 23, 2020.

TZU, Sun. **The art of war**. Translated by Samuel Griffith. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963.

UNITED STATES. Congress. Public Law 107–40: Sept. 18, 2001: 107th Congress. Authorization for use of military force. **United States Statutes at Large**, Washington, DC, v. 115, p. 224-225, 2001. Available at: https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ40/PLAW-107publ40.pdf. Access on: May 4, 2020.

UNITED STATES. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. **The 9/11 Commission report**: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. New York: Norton, 2004.

Coleç. Meira Mattos, Rio de Janeiro, v. 15, n. 52, p. 91-110, January/April 2021

109

UNITED STATES. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. **The 9/11 Commission report**: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. New York: Cosimo Reports, 2010.

UNITED STATES. The White House. **National security strategy of the United States of America**. Washington, DC: The White House,2017. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. Access on: Apr. 24, 2020.

UNITED STATES. Central Intelligence Agency. **The world factbook**. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2020. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html. Access on: May 18, 2020.

WYLIE, Joseph. **Military strategy**: a general theory of power control. Annapolis: Naval Press Institute, 1967.

ZEDONG, Mao. **On protracted war**. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1967.

The possibility of classifying the "war on terror" based on the classic war concepts of international law

La posibilidad de clasificar la "guerra contra el terror" a partir de los conceptos clásicos de guerra del derecho internacional público

Abstract: This article aims to analyze the main characteristics of the initial period of the "War on Terror," in order to work on the possibility of the convergence of this event with the concepts of war that are foreseen by the doctrines and treaties of International Law and from the perspective of United Nations. The analysis is pertinent because, when identifying the armed conflict, the actions that can be taken are restricted and sanctions are given to the responsible actors. Firstly, it aims to analyze the main concepts about war brought by International Law, so that in the subsequent section these definitions are applied to the War on Terror, finalizing the work with the solutions found by the UN to organize the event. The conclusion is that the "War on Terror" could not be considered by the term used, given that it does not converge with the theoretical aspects of the war and is distorted due to the unilateral actions taken by the North American government.

Keywords: War. War on terror. International Law. United Nations Charter.

Mariana Uchôa Arcanjo (iD)
Universidade Federal de Roraima, Instituto de Ciências Jurídicas.
Boa Vista, RR, Brasil.
uchoaarcanjo@gmail.com

Gustavo da Frota Simões (iD)
Exército Brasileiro, Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército.
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.
gufsimoes@gmail.com

Resumen: Este artículo tiene por objeto analizar las principales características del período inicial de la "Guerra contra el Terror", a fin de trabajar sobre la posibilidad de convergencia de este acontecimiento con los conceptos de guerra previstos por las doctrinas y tratados de Derecho Internacional Público y bajo la perspectiva de las Naciones Unidas. El análisis es pertinente para identificar el conflicto armado, restringir las medidas que pueden adoptarse y conceder sanciones a los agentes responsables. En primer lugar, se pretende analizar los principales conceptos de guerra que aporta el Derecho Internacional Público, para que en el apartado siguiente se apliquen estas definiciones a la Guerra contra el Terror, finalizando el trabajo con las soluciones encontradas por la ONU para organizar el evento. Se concluye que la "Guerra contra el Terror" no puede ser considerada por el término utilizado, ya que no converge con los aspectos teóricos de la guerra y además está distorsionada debido a las acciones unilaterales del gobierno de los Estados Unidos.

Palabras clave: Guerra. Guerra contra el Terror. Derecho Internacional Público. Carta de las Naciones Unidas.

Coleç. Meira Mattos, Rio de Janeiro, v. 15, n. 52, p. 111-125, January/April 2021

111

1 Introduction

International Law (DIP-*Direito Internacional Público*) arises with the aim of promoting a harmonious relationship between national states. Thus, war is treated as one of the fundamental issue of the DIP, initially studying the means by which the use of force would be possible, developing until the moment when it was totally abolished as a state practice.

However, the concepts and regulations on war worked by the international legal system became outdated when defining States as main actors. Thus, they do not follow the changes in the international scenario, which modify both the actors and the new forms of conflict development.

This delay becomes evident from the declaration of the "War on Terror" due to the events of September 11, 2001, when the emergence of new actors became evident. Thus, global threats have been redefined in the international system, joining efforts to combat terrorist groups.

In this sense, due to the enemy actor treated, there were doubts about the applicability of the existing international legal rules and the extent to which the measures taken by the USA were allowed by the DIP.

According to this scenario, the article asks: could the "War on Terror" be considered a real war according to the definitions of International Law? The recognition of a conflict according to the legal system is essential to define the measures for redressing the acts suffered, limiting the action of the United States in the face of the actions taken as a response to 9/11. The impossibility of classifying this conflict as a war in the traditional way is the hypothesis of this article.

Using the qualitative methodology combined with the hypothetical-deductive method, primary sources were used for the overview we made, such as the use of United Nations Security Council resolutions, in addition to the analysis of the UN Charter to support arguments (NAÇÕES UNIDAS, 1945). It also includes the analysis of treaties such as the Geneva Conventions (COMITÊ INTERNACIONAL DA CRUZ VERMELHA, 1995), their additional Protocols and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The use of secondary sources is also present, working on concepts through the bibliographic review of scholars of International Law such as Hildebrando Accioly (2011), Francisco Rezek (2016) and Celso Mello (2002), in addition to other multidisciplinary relevant works.

Thus, the general objective is to evaluate the characteristics of the "War on Terror," seeking to compare its aspects with the classic concepts of war of the International Law and the United Nation.

The first section will address the classic doctrines of International Law in order to present how the subject defines wars and what are their limits.

Then, the "War on Terror" will be studied, analyzing the actor who caused the terrorist acts and the means by which this conflict was developed. We sought to analyze the

difficulties found to defend the use of the term "war" in the face of the reaction of George W. Bush to respond to the attacks on the USA territory.

Finally, the main resolutions of the United Nations Security Council on the topic will be addressed, which are fundamental for defining the possible sanctions for the attacks, bringing the form of prevention for future actions arising from the terrorist threat.

2 War in the classical concept of international law

The DIP can be defined as the set of legal rules that regulate the international community (ACCIOLY, 2011). The matter arises as a study of war, since it regulates interstate relations in order to obtain harmonious coexistence between states, respecting, above all, the sovereignty of each of them (MELLO, 2002).

Although the main objective is to avoid this conflicting phenomenon between States, International Law has regulated their right to initiate an armed conflict – the jus ad bellum – and limited its action while there is war – the *jus in bello* – (MAZZUOLI, 2015).

The law of war is based on two principles: necessity and humanity (ACCIOLY, 2011). Together they form the basis of the existence of this right, being *conditio sine qua non*. The need refers to the use of force as *ultima ratio* and humanity to ensure the protection of those who are not directly related to war, but who suffer its consequences.

Historically, the war was discussed among the states in the Hague Conventions in 1899 and 1907, held in the region where the Netherlands are today. With a humanitarian bias, it was carried out with the purpose of limiting the autonomy of States in armed conflicts, inspired by an ideology of peace. From then on, the way war occurs is continuously updated, while the actors, means and objectives on which armed conflicts are based change.

Its development reached the point where the practice became an international illicit act. First, to prohibit war it is necessary to conceptualize it. In the classic model, in general, a war is the conflict of armed forces between two or more States (ACCIOLY, 2011), whose purpose is restricted to making one of those involved submit to the will of the other (MAZZUOLI, 2015).

This exclusive competence for States is based on political motivation as a driving force of war (CLAUSEWITZ, 1996). It defines the means for the realization of a conflict and the intensity of States' actions to achieve their objectives. In this sense, "the political purpose is the goal, war is the means to achieve it, and the means should never be considered separately from its purpose." (CLAUSEWITZ, 1996, p. 92, our translation).

By defining what would be war, by prohibiting and criminalizing its practice, peace could be achieved by other means: avoiding the war. For this, DIP would be the ideal instrument to repress the use of force (ACCIOLLY, 2011).

In this way, international treaties and organizations emerge in order to renounce the use of force as a way of solving disputes, following the example of the Briand-Kellog Pact[1] (1928) and of the League of Nations (1919)[2].

Unfortunately, although they were two major advances for the DIP, they had their imperfections, especially the League of Nations, which from the 1930s began to disintegrate in the face of divergent interests among its members and problems in its infrastructure. In this way, the League ended up not prevailing from the moment it lost legitimacy in the international system with the States abandoning it (SEINTEFUS, 2005).

However, the League of Nations left a normative legacy that served as the basis for the creation of another organization of great international importance: the United Nations.

The Organization was created in 1945 with the objective of promoting multilateralism among countries. The post-World War II environment required a united effort to prohibit the use of force in the international environment and to seek peaceful conflict resolution, as States were recovering from two major world wars that had major consequences.

The Soviet Union, the United States, China and the United Kingdom signed the Dumbarton Oaks agreement exteriorizing the consensus among the states to prohibit war, bringing this desire in the Charter in the first articles (Art. 2):

> Art. 2, paragraph 3. All Members shall resolve their international disputes by peaceful means in order that international peace, security and justice are not threatened.

> Art. 2, paragraph 4. All Members shall avoid in their international relations the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political dependence of any State, or any other action incompatible with the Purposes of the United Nations. (NAÇÕES UNIDAS, 1945, p. 4, our translation).

The Charter do not define what war is, it only mentions the term in the preamble. This was due to an attempt to avoid any kind of conceptualization, expanding the probability of criminalizing the act by using the term "use of force" or "aggression" in order to repress States that acted against peace on the international scenario (MAZZUOLI, 2015).

---

1   It was concluded in Paris, signed in 1928 by fifteen States, reaching sixty-three members before the beginning of World War II. In the Pact, war would no longer be allowed as a political instrument, being accepted only the Self-Defense. Despite its great importance to the DIP, it contained gaps such as the lack of sanctions for violations of its devices (MELLO, 2002).

2   It appeared at the end of the First War, in 1919, having thirty-two original members who decided to prohibit the use of force among themselves to break with the political conduct adopted until then. It was established in Geneva, and in 1937, already possessing more than fifty member States, it received its own installation in the city (SEINTEFUS, 2005).

In terms of conceptualization, the Charter only define what would be aggression, in the words of the UN General Assembly, in the Resolution number 3.314 (1973):

> Art. 1 – Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition. (UNITED NATIONS, 2008)

Within the organization, we have the Security Council as a precursor in the solution of controversies between the States, producing recommendations or determining rules of mandatory nature (UZIEL, 2015). In the context of conflicts, there is a need for the organ to be consulted primarily by the States so that the use of force is allowed as a way to solve their controversies (Art. 41 of the United Nations Charter).

In addition, within the law of war we have the aspect of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), which is a regulatory means for States' actions during conflicts in order to protect goods and people, restricting the means and methods so that they do not bring large negative consequences to humanity.

IHL comes with the first Geneva Convention, together with the birth of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). This Convention consists of four main treaties and their three additional protocols: the first deals with the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field (1863), the second (1906) is intended to protect fighters from naval warfare, and the third (1929) takes care of prisoners of war. The 4th convention, the most current one, is concerned with speaking specifically of civilians, guaranteeing the protection of the general population from the scourges of war. It would be the first IHL treaty addressing specifically the protection of civilians in armed conflicts.

The Geneva Conventions were created to protect humanity during the course of an armed conflict. They began by worrying about combatants until they saw the need to protect civilians, as they were as vulnerable as those on the battlefield were.

Thus, after describing the concept of war through the vision of the main references of the DIP and exposing how it can be used by States – from the perspective of two international legal instruments of great importance –, a discussion about the War on Terror will be developed in the next topic. Since this phenomenon has generated debates about its definition as war, diverging on the legal concepts presented in this introductory topic.

3 War on terror

According to the classical concepts presented above, most of the regulations governing armed conflicts were produced during the 20th century. In the 21st century, from September

11, 2001, there was a debate about the contemporaneity of these regulations due to the advent of the "War on Terror," questioning the possibility of classifying the event as war.

On this date, USA was the target of attacks by the al-Qaeda group, which hijacked four national aircraft, throwing them against American symbols. The president at the time, George W. Bush, stated that the actions were acts of war and that American democracy was being threatened. Thus, a new national security policy was made, bringing deep changes in legislative, executive and military actions (OLIVEIRA, 2010).

In this context, war was declared against both the groups responsible and those who contributed in any way to the execution of such acts, calling upon allied states to assist in the repression and prevention of terrorist groups on their territories[3].

Two military campaigns were highlighted during the period. The first one occurred in Afghanistan and was initiated the month after the attacks. There was an authorization by the Security Council (UNITED NATIONS, 2001a), because of the Afghanistan government's connection with terrorist groups, already verified by the UN in previous years[4], therefore, seen as indirectly responsible for the attacks.

The second, generated the invasion in Iraq in 2003, under the assumption that Saddam Hussein would have a nuclear weapons depot targeted for USA territory. In this campaign, Preventive Self-defense was invoked, what initiated a discussion about the validity of this determination (MCGOLDRICK, 2004).

The "War on Terror" brings together characteristics that make it somewhat different from the wars that the DIP defines, which prevents its classification as war itself.

First, what makes it impossible would be its target, terrorism, because, although it is not a new movement, some authors agree with the absence of a solid concept about the term[5]. This is because terrorism has an eminently subjective characteristic as a form of violence and not as an actor that can be directly combated (SAINT-PIERRE, 2015).

Furthermore, a pejorative character is linked to this phenomenon, since it is very common to be considered as a terrorist the nation or group that differs from Western cultural and religious models (SAINT-PIERRE, 2015). These difficulties obstruct the creation of a solid, common and impartial concept of terrorism.

Thus, given this conceptual scope, declaring war in the traditional ways against these groups makes the objective of the campaign extremely vague, and it is not possible to visualize the enemy they intended to fight. Besides being asymmetrical due to the agents involved, since it would be a national State fighting against a transnational organization.

---

3   Text of the Bush speech, 2001. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/21/september11.usa13. Access on: July 10, 2019.

4   Since 1998, the UN Security Council, by resolutions, has demanded that the government of Afghanistan disconnect itself from any link with terrorist groups. Resolution number 1.267/1999 affirmed the determination and demanded efforts to bring these groups to justice so that the proper sanctions could be taken (SOUZA; MORAES, 2015).

5   Faced with the various studies dedicated to the search for a concept of terrorism, this article will use those developed by Ben Saul in his work "Defining Terrorism in International Law" (2010). The author discusses the importance of the conceptualization of terrorism in order to enable the criminalization of acts. Saul's analysis allows us to conclude that the search for a definition of terrorism was not concerned about knowing what specific acts provoked by the groups, but rather with classifying it broadly as any attack on human rights, security, and peace.

In addition, another characteristic is the plurality of the actors, as President Bush categorized some countries as potential threats because they contributed in some way to terrorist activities[6], the "Axis of Evil," which consisted of three countries (Iran, Iraq and North Korea). Bush justified his choice, mainly, in the fact that these countries had a nuclear war arsenal, added to the bad relationship with the USA at the time.

The international rules on conflict regulation have become outdated, as it has proved necessary to hold national States accountable for al-Qaeda terrorist attacks, as only in this way would it be possible to formulate legal responses to the advent of new actors.

Therefore, the War on Terror was proclaimed a war along traditional lines, but impossible to be seen as such, since terrorism itself is seen as an irregular conflict. In other words, it would be a target that does not have attack strategies and whose quantity of combatants does not reflect the potentiality of the damage they can cause (VISACRO, 2009).

With the difficulty of classifying the conflict, the protection of civilians and combatants also suffered some impasse. IHL does not provide a definition of what is terrorism, according to an official ICRC report, and IHL does not achieve terrorist acts outside of declared conflicts between States.

Therefore, IHL legislation does not fully achieve the War on Terror because it is not evaluated as a conflict for the ICRC, and is only analyzed in cases related to the conflict, such as the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Thus, due to the uncertainties on the subject, the USA carried out inhumane acts such as the use of torture in interrogation practices with foreigners they considered suspected of being associated to terrorist practice[7].

It also prohibited these foreigners from being judged as prisoners of war since the Geneva Convention did not reach the conflict of the War on Terror because it was not classified as an armed conflict. Only those who are on military service linked to a nation-state are recognized as prisoners, excluding those linked to no-state organizations such as those of terrorist groups. (BUTLER, 2007).

Although condemnation under IHL is difficult, there is no impediment to trial under Human Rights treaties, since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), in Article 5, condemns the practice of torture, treatment or punishment that is cruel, inhuman or degrading. It guarantees the trial of prisoners, since establishes the universal right of access to justice before national courts in Articles 8 and 10.

With the dimension taken by the War on Terror, it should be classified as multilateral, since from the declaration of war against terrorist groups, many countries offered some support to the USA, assisting militarily in combating this threat, such as the United Kingdom that supported the invasions in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, as the years passed and Bush's term ended, many of these countries during the event ceased to support the USA government (SOUZA; MORAES, 2015).

---

6   The USA listed countries in the 2002 National Security Strategy as potential threats because they were suspected of assisting terrorist activities. Available at: <http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2002.pdf>. Access on: July 10, 2019

7   The "John Yoo Memos" advised the Central Intelligence Agency and the USA Department of Justice to use torture as an interrogation practice against foreign suspects. Available at: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.09.pdf>. Access on: July 12, 2019.

The War on Terror has been reduced to the use of USA military force against non-Western countries to promote a policy of ostensible protection so that, according to them, they do not run the risk of having their territory invaded by terrorist groups again.

In addition to using the establishment of Self-Defense, USA also defended its acts as a form of "preventive warfare," arguing that they would not wait for future attacks before promoting an armed response. Faced with this justification, the War on Terror took on greater proportions, being questioned about its ideals and legitimacy.

3.1. Individual and Collective Self-defense

The War on Terror was based on the establishment of Self-defense, which concedes the counterattack to one State victim of aggression by another. Due to the requirement of being the conflict between two States, the legitimacy of this right applied to the event was discussed (DINSTEIN, 2004).

The Individual Self-defense arises by the doctrine of the Common Law (SHAW, 2014), through the resolution of the case of great repercussion of the ship Caroline[8]. In this context, requirements for the use of Self-defense were delimited: necessity and proportionality. The use of force is determined only after the exhaustion of other dispute resolution methods, and proportionally to the size of the attack received, and the response must be imminent to the attack (SPEROTTO, 2009).

Subsequently, it was legally provided in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which brings in its first part the circumstances under which a State is permitted to use this armed response, requiring a prior armed attack (SHAW, 2014):

> Art. 51. Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. [...]. (NAÇÕES UNIDAS, 1945, p. 30).

Therefore, in the legal parameters that currently govern an armed conflict, Self-defense is characterized as the only legal means for one State to use force against another, and must act in accordance with the rights and protections that the jus in bello brings (MELLO, 2002).

Also according to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council must authorize the use of force as Self-defense and must be previously consulted by the threatened State. This is because Self-defense is a temporary solution until the Council decides what actions should be adopted to stop the threats.

It is essential to question the use of Legitimate Defense in the War on Terror, since the event was entirely based on this establishment. It would be necessary to modify the law in order to allow the use of force against a group and not only a national State.

---

8   It occurred in the waters of the Niagara River, on the border of the United States with Canada, a place maintained under UK jurisdiction. The British state, to defend its intrusion into Canadian territory, set fire to a private ship under the USA flag, because they were giving support to Canada's independence groups (SPEROTTO, 2009).

However, this modification is impossible, since it is indispensable to recognize the State capable of being responsible for the acts of its citizens, because in order to allow the Self-defense, a pre-existing armed attack is necessary, and according to the organization's definition (see item 1.1), the aggression comes only from the States.

Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the concept that the UN adopts for what would consist in armed attack in order to qualify the event, identify the actors and thus allow the response. Thus, through Resolution 1,373 of 2001 (UNITED NATIONS, 2001b), the Security Council defined that it is the obligation of States to prevent terrorist activities from taking place within national territory, if the States are silent, they will be held responsible.

Acting beyond its reach, USA argued in favor of using Preventive Self-defense to continue its protection plans. This modality still has no legal provision in the DIP, but rescuing cases of common law, USA claimed that a threat also allows the use of force as a means of defense.

3.2. Preventive and Preemptive Self-defense

USA believed that future new attacks could happen again, so the War on Terror assumed its most discussed form: the preventive war. Preventive Self-defense is regulated by customary law based on cases tried by the International Court of Justice, which has consolidated understandings regarding preventive attacks, which generate discussion in the legal sphere regarding their permission in general (DINSTEIN, 2004). The establishment of Self-defense is already exceptional in allowing the use of force as a means of resolving disputes, going against one of the purposes of the creation of the UN and the preamble to the United Nations Charter, which aims for peace and security in the international system.

In advance, it deserves to expose the difference between the Preventive and Preemptive Self-defense, since it points out some inconsistency in this event. The first is the organized response against an imminent attack, when a State evidences the probability of suffering an armed attack. This is the most well received form in the international legal system due to the presentation of concrete proof of the possible attack (DINSTEIN, 2004).

The Preemptive form is characterized by a threat based on an assumption. In other words, without proof and only using deduction, one State claims that it is being threatened by another and therefore maintains that it is necessary to use force to protect itself. The UN (DINSTEIN, 2004) does not admit this form.

In this sense, USA argued that the mere threat could also guarantee the right to use force, according to the country's security strategy (UNITED STATES, 2002). Thus, USA government reported to the Security Council the presence of nuclear weapons in Iraq, so that they would be allowed to begin a preventive intervention in the country, but there was no concrete proof of the presence of these weapons. By the Resolution 1.441, 2002 (UNITED NATIONS, 2002), the Security Council announced the inspection of the complaint by a UN expert to assess the existence of nuclear weapons and, if they existed, the removal of them.

It is noteworthy that the text did not permit the use of force, nor were weapons found on Iraqi territory, but USA continued with their plan to invade Iraq, defining it as a way to prevent future attacks. In this aspect, the response action claimed by the USA was, in reality, the request to act in a Preemptive manner, which is undoubtedly illegal.

Other conflicts already developed under the justification of the Preventive Self-defense have been submitted to international courts, but there has never been any consolidation regarding the use of this instrument, requiring the individual evaluation of each case to determine the need for the anticipated use of force[9]. What distinguishes the War on Terror from the cases already tried is the imminent threat capable of being proven, since the pretext on which USA based its invasion of Iraq proved non-existent, as no nuclear weapons were found in the territory, delegitimizing the actions of the American State.

Another obstacle is that the War on Terror was entirely based on prevention as a justification for the USA's invasions in this battle against terrorism. In other words, only one attack on September 11 resulted in the extensive military campaigns of the War on Terror, making explicit its disproportionality and lack of scope like a war.

Thus, it was the responsibility of the Security Council to establish the necessary definitions of the context in which the conflict was inserted through the body's resolutions. The attitude was necessary so that the right palliative measures could be taken, avoiding the United States to determine them unilaterally.

4   Solutions presented by the UN on September 11

Given the conceptual breadth of terrorism, the Security Council determined measures to mediate the conflict. The subject was discussed intensively by means of resolutions, designing the necessary means by which this combat could be carried out.

It is important to emphasize that the Security Council has such importance within the UN, as it is one of the organizations that has the power to impose activities on behalf of the United Nations (UZIEL, 2015). In this regard, the Council has the power to determine measures to be taken by States with regard to security and peacekeeping (Article 24 of the United Nations Charter).

Since September 11, the debates offered by the UN about terrorism have been more frequent and intense, producing annual resolutions to deal with the issue. Therefore, it is noted that in reaching a State of great influence in the International System, terrorism has become a global issue, focusing the international agenda on security studies and the search for solutions using DIP instruments (BARBOSA, 2002).

---

9   Like the attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor during the Six Day War, in which Israel acted in anticipation of using the airspace to bomb the area in which the reactor was being built, claiming that it was a threat to the State by the possibility of using the apparatus against it. Because the countries were in a constant war, it was accepted as a use of Art. 51 of the United Nations Charter (DINSTEIN, 2004).

Below will be presented the most relevant resolutions aimed at combating the threat so far little known in the international environment.

4.1. Resolution 1.368 of September 12, 2001

The Resolution 1,368 (UNITED NATIONS, 2001a) recognizes the use of Self-defense for USA, pointing to the events of 9/11 as a threat to international peace and security, and determining the Security Council's responsibility to work on the issue of terrorism.

In its third Article, the resolution expresses the need for multilaterality to contain the terrorist threat, calling for cooperation among States to this end. Those who omit themselves and in some way assist organizations will be held responsible for terrorist acts.

It is clear that the function of this resolution was exclusively to declare the acts on September 11 as terrorist activities. Thus, with the publication one day after the attacks, it gave instantly to USA the Self-defense right against the actors, since it characterized the acts as an armed attack, defining them as a threat to international peace and security.

Later, with Resolution 1,373 of 2001 (UNITED NATIONS, 2001b), the Security Council detailed the required measures to prevent all terrorist acts, the most important of which is to combat terrorist groups.

4.2. Resolution 1.373 of September 28, 2001

The first resolution elaborated by the Security Council in 1999 presents actions that must be followed by national States to prevent the development and dispersion of terrorist groups (UNITED NATIONS, 1999, art. 4), and, if they do not respond to this duty, they are responsible for the acts of groups that are within their territory. These measures are reinforced and detailed in Security Council Resolution 1,373 of 2001.

The resolution details and intensifies the participation of States as the main combatants to the terrorist threat, shifting the guilt of the event to those who abstain from avoiding the activity of these organizations. It addresses both economic and administrative issues, requiring transparency of information about suspicious monetary movements, any type of financing to terrorist groups, and the border flow across territories. The purpose of these measures is to force cooperation in all areas of state power to prevent countries from encouraging terrorist activity.

Therefore, resolution number 1,373 can be considered the most relevant in the period after the September 11 attacks, and the resolutions that follow after this one are intended to reinforce the implementation of its measures. After 2003, with Resolution 1,455 (UNITED NATIONS, 2003), the following section was used as a standard to emphasize the importance and necessity of applying the measures brought by Resolution 1,373 in all its aspects, becoming a reference for the others:

Coleç. Meira Mattos, Rio de Janeiro, v. 15, n. 52, p. 111-125, January/April 2021

121

> Underlining the obligation placed upon all Member States to implement, in full, resolution 1373 (2001), including with regard to any member of the Taliban and the Al-Qaida organization, and any individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with the Taliban and the Al-Qaida organization, who have participated in the financing, planning, facilitating and preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts, as well as to facilitate the implementation of counter terrorism obligations in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions. (UNITED NATIONS, 2003, p. 1).

Furthermore, based on this resolution, the organization has joined efforts to create a Committee to oversee the fight against terrorist practice (art. 6) and to work more intensively on the determinations of the resolution.

Through each country's internal legislation, they will establish how they will penalize and prevent their territory from terrorist attacks, allowing for measures such as the "Patriot Act"[10] to emerge as a legislative alternative for the country's security.

Using the reaffirmation of Resolution 1,373 in subsequent resolutions, even the Council delegating legislative powers to itself has not yet dared to bring a legal definition of what terrorism is, following the same logic as the United Nations Charter by not presenting a definition of war, as this could compromise its objective of eliminating all possible forms of terrorism, even those that had not been discovered yet.

5   Final remarks

The DIP, despite being in constant development, uses classic sources as the main basis for judging contemporary acts, especially the United Nations Charter, since it holds great value and importance for international relations, but it was created in a period marked by the end of World War II, when few actors were recognized.

The right initially granted to the USA by the Resolution 1,368 provided the basis for the declaration of the "War on Terror," in which USA understood that, because of the attacks, they were legitimized to provoke a war against the new enemies, ignoring whether there was a legal parameter for such determination. However, there is no way to provoke a conflict in the circumstances in which that event occurred.

The "War on Terror" has influenced the international context in the sense of demanding an update of the measures taken in relation to security and international peace. Thus, the Resolutions relating to the event require the preparation of States to prevent possible new forms of attack on national territories.

---

10 In October 2001, the Department of Justice released a legislative measure titled the "Patriot Act," whose purpose was to determine the tools for combating terrorism and preventing future acts such as that which occurred in September of the same year. In a way, it represented a serious violation of the privacy not only of citizens of the United States but also of foreigners who crossed the border by providing special powers to the Executive, FBI, and CIA to investigate, spy on, arrest, and interrogate suspected terrorists (PECEQUILO, 2012).

The event is full of characteristics that question its legitimacy, such as the fact that the USA claims the use of force in the preemptive form, an establishment that is not allowed by the UN, there is not even legal provision, being allowed Self-defense only after an armed attack as the *ultimo ratio* in the solution of conflicts.

Moreover, even if they used the establishment provided by the San Francisco Charter, in developing several military campaigns that exceed the duration of 10 years, there is no longer any way to use the term "defense," but it is an attack against the sovereignty of the States that become targets of USA military operations.

There is no concession in the legal system for an armed response to a national State against an organization, making it even more difficult to use the term "war" and its development as a war, but it has not prevented USA military campaigns. As a result, Security Council resolutions sought to direct responsibility for terrorist acts to States, as this would be the means found to enable any sanction against the acts of September 11.

Another obstacle to the event would be the identification of this enemy, since until then, because it does not have a common definition, it is unimaginable to achieve the American goal of extinguishing any terrorist threat. It is an abstract and endless ideal, given the lack of full knowledge of these groups and that terrorism has always existed and will continue to exist, changing every year.

Thus, it is not surprising that so many difficulties are found in implementing Security Council resolutions, since they would not be measures to be taken by states at war, which follow the dictates of IHL, but measures of long scale for permanent and not temporary changes. Therefore, the term "war" used ambitiously by the USA government is mixed with a policy to combat new threats.

Coleç. Meira Mattos, Rio de Janeiro, v. 15, n. 52, p. 111-125, January/April 2021

123

References

ACCIOLY, H.; SILVA, G. E. N.; CASELLA, P. B. **Manual de Direito Internacional Público**. 19. ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2011.

BARBOSA, R. A. Os Estados Unidos pós 11 de setembro de 2001: implicações para a ordem mundial e para o Brasil. **Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional**, Brasília, DF, v. 45, n. 1, p. 72-91, jun. 2002.

BUTLER, J. O limbo de Guantánamo. **Novos Estudos - Cebrap**, São Paulo, n. 77, p. 223-231, mar. 2007. Available at: https://www.scielo.br/pdf/nec/n77/a11n77.pdf. Access on: 10 ago. 2019.

CLAUSEWITZ, C. V. **Da Guerra**. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1996.

COMITÊ INTERNACIONAL DA CRUZ VERMELHA. **Convenções de Genebra de 12 de agosto de 1949**. Genebra: CICV, 1995. Available at: https://bit.ly/3ngU3Od. Access on: 3 maio 2020.

DINSTEIN, Y. **Guerra, Agressão e Legítima Defesa**. 3. ed. São Paulo: Manole, 2004.

MAZZUOLI, V. O. **Curso de Direito Internacional público**. 9. ed. São Paulo: Editora Revista dos Tribunais, 2015.

MCGOLDRICK, D. **From 9/11 to the Iraq War 2003**: International Law in an Age of Complexity. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004.

MELLO, C. D. A. **Curso de direito Internacional Público**. 14. ed. Rio de Janeiro: Renovar, 2002.

NAÇÕES UNIDAS. **Carta das Nações Unidas**, de 26 de junho de 1945. São Francisco, CA, 2945. Available at: <https://nacoesunidas.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/A-Carta-das-Na%C3%A7%C3%B5es-Unidas.pdf>. Access on: 03 abr. 2019.

OLIVEIRA, A. B. de. A Guerra Terceirizada: As Empresas Privadas de Segurança e a "Guerra ao Terror". **Carta Internacional**, São Paulo, v. 5. n 1, p. 64-77, 2010. Available at: https://bit.ly/3eTxCMe. Access on: 18 ago. 2019.

PECEQUILO, C. S. **Manual do Candidato**: Política Internacional. 2. ed. Brasília, DF: Funag, 2012. Access on: 20 ago. 2019.

SAINT-PIERRE, H. L. 11 de Setembro: do terror à injustificada arbitrariedade e o terrorismo de Estado. **Revista de Sociologia e Política**, São Paulo, v. 23, n. 53, p. 9-26, mar. 2015. Available at: https://bit.ly/3eP5b1P. Access on: 30 jun. 2019.

REZEK, F. **Direito Internacional Público**. 16. ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2016.

SAUL, B. **Defining Terrorism in International Law**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

SEITENFUS, R. A. S. **Manual das Organizações Internacionais**. 4. ed. Porto Alegre: Livraria do Advogado, 2005.

SHAW, M. N. **International Law**. 7. ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

SOUZA, A. M.; MORAES, R. F. Coalizões globais lideradas pelos Estados Unidos na guerra ao terror (2001-2011): para além do unilateralismo. **Contexto Internacional**, Rio de Janeiro, v. 37, n. 2, p. 763-790, ago. 2015. Available at: https://bit.ly/3knP9wQ. Access on: 2 jul. 2019.

SPEROTTO, F. The Use of Force against Terrorists: A Reply to Christian J. Tams. **European Journal Of International Law**, Oxford, v. 20, n. 4, p. 1043-1048, 2009. Available at: https://bit.ly/3kohmUz. Access on: 15 jul. 2019.

UNITED NATIONS. Definition of Agression. **General Assembly Resolution 3314**. Geneva: United Nations, 2008. Available at: https://bit.ly/3pmJECD. Access on: 11 nov. 2020.

UNITED NATIONS. Security Council. **Resolution 1.269**, 19 October 1999. Geneva: United Nations, 1999. Available at: https://bit.ly/2GSEkWb. Access on: 20 out. 2019.

UNITED NATIONS. Security Council. **Resolution 1.368**, 12 September 2001. Geneva: United Nations, 2001a. Available at: https://bit.ly/2UkYSK1. Access on: 20 out. 2019.

UNITED NATIONS. Security Council. **Resolution 1.373**. 28 September 2001. Geneva: United Nations, 2001b. Available at: https://bit.ly/38xKUgb. Access on: 20 out. 2019.

UNITED NATIONS. Security Council. **Resolution 1.441**. 8 November 2002. Geneva: United Nations, 2002. Available at: https://bit.ly/2IAGwBS. Access on: 20 out. 2019.

UNITED NATIONS. Security Council. **Resolution 1.455**. 17 January 2003. Geneva: United Nations, 2003. Available at: https://bit.ly/38xL8Uz. Access on: 20 out. 2019.

UNITED STATES. Security Council. **The National Security Strategy**. Washington, DC: Security Council, 2002.

UZIEL, E. **O Conselho de Segurança, as Missões de Paz e o Brasil no Mecanismo de Segurança Coletiva das Nações Unidas**. 2. ed. Brasília, DF: Funag, 2015.

VISACRO, A. **Guerra irregular: terrorismo, guerrilha e movimentos de resistência ao longo da História**. São Paulo: Contexto, 2009.

ECEME

AUTHOR GUIDELINES AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The entire submission process should be performed through our editorial management system, available at:

http://ebrevistas.eb.mil.br/index.php/RMM/index (Short URL: bit.ly/cmmbr)

In case of doubts or technical difficulties, please contact us by email: info.cmm@eceme.eb.mil.br

The manuscript:

1) It must be original and unpublished;
2) It must not have been published or be in assessment process by another journal, and an eventual submission to another journal will only occur after the assessment return;
3) A substantially similar version must not have been published in annals of events.

Guidelines for Authors

The following guidelines are essential to good editorial flow. Please, read the instructions carefully to be sure that your article meets all requirements. Complete regulatory requirements must be accessed directly in our system.

Article submissions are open in a continuous flow. Other publications such as interviews or technical reports will be selected directly by the editorial team.

Focus and Scope

The *Coleção Meira Mattos* is an interdisciplinary journal that publishes scientific articles related to Security, Defense and Military Sciences, promoting a dialogue between academics and professionals and integrating questions about Armed Forces and Society. It publishes peer-reviewed articles and, occasionally, interviews and selected technical reports on current issues of interest to the area.

Formatting

The papers should be submitted in Word or RTF format.

Structure

Language: articles may be submitted in Portuguese, English or Spanish.

Title: The title should be brief, limited to 22 words (including, if any, the subtitle).

Abstract: with a maximum of 150 words in the language of the text and in English (when submitted in Portuguese or Spanish). It must describe the objectives, methodology and results.

Keywords: at least three and at most five.

Tables, graphics and images: Use editable formats whenever possible so that translations can occur directly in the image. The quality of the images should be 300dpi when they are not from Word/Excel (tables and graphics). The graphic content should be included only if they provide indispensable information for the article's understanding.

Word limit: The article should have between 6000 and 8000 words, including pre-text and references. However, major or minor articles may be published as long as justified by the content of the contribution.

Footnotes: Notes should be included as little as possible and only for essential information. They should be included on the same page as the note, do not use endnote. Avoid using notes to reference, privilege the use of author-date citations directly in the text. For notes of informative texts available on the Internet that are of interest to the reader and which are not direct or indirect citations, such as news, institutional or corporate websites, electronic documents, tables or statistical data, the link and access date must be indicated, as following example:

[Explanatory text]. Available at: [website]. Access on: [month abbr. Day, year].

More information available on the Brazilian Army website. Available at: www.eb.mil.br. Access on: Jul. 2, 2019.

Other Recommendations

Indication of financing: it should be indicated as a footnote of the title if the research is financed and who financed it. Also indicate, when available, the process number. According to the following structure:

Study/Research project financed by the [funding body], through [project/program], [notice/process].

Example:

Study funded by the Brazilian Ministry of Defense and the *Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior* (CAPES), through the Program of Support for Teaching and Scientific and Technological Research in National Defense (*Pró-Defesa*), notice 27/2018.

Data about the author(s): they must be informed only in the metadata filled in the system when submitting the article. Only the full name, institutional association and e-mail address will be published.

Example:

Tássio Franchi

Exército Brasileiro, Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército, Instituto Meira Mattos. Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.

editor.cmm@eceme.eb.mil.br

We will not accept articles with more than 4 (four) authors/co-authors.

The authors should have at least a masters or similar degree and, preferably, one of them should have a doctorate degree.

Additional documents: Other documents may be inserted during submission to assist reviewers in the article assessment process. However, only the article will be published and made available in the journal.

Citations and References

CMM adopts the Brazilian standards for references and citations, respectively ABNT 6023:2018 and 10520:2002.

For authors not familiar with the ABNT standard, we ask that you adapt your citations and references as much as possible according to the following examples. All references and citations will be reviewed by experts, ensuring their uniformity. However, articles standardized in other presentation standards will not be accepted.

See the full standard requirements and examples of references and citations on our website.

Copyright Statement

Acknowledgements

Our acknowledgment for the the financial and administrative support from the following institutions and their related agencies. As well as all staff who get involved directly and indirectly with the Coleção Meira Mattos.

Ministério da Defesa

Departamento de Ensino

Divisão de Cooperação Acadêmica

Departamento de Educação e Cultura do Exército

Diretoria de Educação Superior Militar

Dir. do Patrimônio Histórico e Cultural do Exército

Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército

Coordenadoria de Avaliação e Desenvolvimento da Educação Superior Militar no Exército

EB Conhecer

Coleção Meira Mattos

revista das ciências militares