Adaptation under fire: the 1st expeditionary infantry division learning in combat, 1944-45

Abstract

How doctrinal change occurs in a context of war? How do the weight of tradition, organizational culture and formative experiences function as opposing forces when an army is pressured to adopt a new doctrinal matrix? This article discusses the combat adaptation of the Brazilian Expeditionary Division during the final periods of the Italian campaign, in 1944-45. For many decades, analysts and historians argued that the teachings of the French military mission had been detrimental to the performance of the Brazilian division in its offensive operations. A closer look at the early periods of divisional organization shows, on the other hand, that some fundamental tenets of French military doctrine were not properly rooted in the Brazilian Army. Thus, some of the problems that were observed in the performance of the Brazilian division can't be atributed to the French mission, but rather, to the way in which different generations of officers were able to profit from the instruction derived from the French masters and to the dissemination of shared knowledge throughout the Army. Finally, the article inserts a new perspective on the importance of US military doctrine in the performance of the Brazilians during WWII, showing how the division created its own hybrid mix of French and US military doctrine during its tour of duty in Italy.