A case study on the evolution of force use decision during the first united nations peacekeeping operation in Haiti (1993-1996)

Abstract

On September 23, 1993, the Security Council (CS) adopted resolution 867 authorizing the sending of the United Nations Mission to Haiti (MINHA) to modernize the Armed Forces, create and train Haitian civil police, and restore power. President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. However, the landing of MINUHA was hampered by the hostile reaction of the armed civil group (attachés) on 11 October 1993. After the incident, the CS understood that the Haitian conflict was highly dangerous and had to revise the rules of engagement1 of the soldiers. United Nations peacekeeping operation or peacekeepers. Accordingly, and following the failure of peaceful negotiation attempts, the SC approved resolution 940 authorizing the sending of the multinational force to act through Chapter VII of the Charter to facilitate the removal of the de facto government from Haiti, enabling Aristide to return to presidency. The resolution also provided for the gradual replacement of multinational force by MINUHA (authorized to use force to fulfill its mandate). Therefore, this paper aims to address, by means of a case study, how and why the United Nations (UN) decided to use force to solve the Haitian intra-state conflict and what were the repercussions of this decision on the solution. of the Haitian crisis. In the first part, a review is made of the principles and characteristics of United Nations peacekeeping operations, emphasizing the context of the early 1990s. Secondly, the work focuses on the case study, explaining the events that led to the evolution of the rules of engagement and their impact on the resolution of the Caribbean country conflict.