Analysis of High-Cost Long-Term Defense Programs A Case Study of the Joint Strike Fighter

Abstract

The present paper discusses the decision-making process in defense acquisition and budgeting. While the budget for defense services and for defense in general usually presents itself as stable, the same is not true for specific programs. Certain programs reveal the political turmoil that underlies defense acquisition. This paper investigates why programs differ in terms of budget volatility and what are the main factors that drive it. To attain this purpose, our first topic is a theoretical debate about decision-making, its main actors, and the budgeting process. This is followed by a description of the United States budgeting process. The case of the Joint Strike Fighter is then studied. Complemented by literature on innovation processes, our last topic is dedicated to the following hypothesis: since the F-35 program presents itself as essentially stable in acquisition and budgeting terms, it is argued that what distinguishes it from volatile programs is its elite consensus and a suitable Defense Industrial Base. This model intends to shed light on high-cost, long-term defense programs and their volatility.